C-6/54
ECLI:EU:C:1955:5
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JUDGMENT OF 21. 3. 1955 — CASE 6/54
decision is based and the conclusions drawn by the High Authority in its subsequent evaluation of the situation (Treaty, Article 61).
5. Applications for annulment
(a) Examination of the evaluation of the situation based on the facts and economic cir cumstances — Conditions
A study ofthe market taking account offactors relating to the market structure and eco nomic trends would constitute an evaluation within the meaning of the second sentence of the first paragraph ofArticle 33. The examination by the Court extends to the eval uation of the situation resulting from the economic facts and circumstances if the ob jection is supported by appropriate evidence. The mere assertion of a manifest failure to observe the Treaty is not sufficient to open the way to examination by the Court; on the other hand Article 33 does not require proofto be given in advance which would im mediately entail the annulment of the decision (Treaty, second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 33).
(b) Manifest failure to observe the Treaty — Concept
The term 'manifest' presupposes that a certain degree is reached in the failure to ob serve the legal provisions so that the failure to observe the Treaty appears to derive from an obvious error in the evaluation, having regard to the provisions of the Treaty, of the situation in respect of which the decision was taken. In the case of subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph ofArticle 61 the manifest failure to observe the Treaty can only result from the finding by the Court of the existence of an economic situation which, prima facie, reveals no necessity for the contested measure in the pursuit of the objec tives set out in Article 3 of the Treaty, in particular paragraph (c). (Treaty, second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 33).
6. Misuse of powers — Proof
Proof ofthe motives for the contested decision such as to establish misuse ofpowers may be evident either from the preparations, including the deliberations of the Consultative Committee and ofthe Council ofMinisters, or else from the incompatibility of the con tested decision with the avowed and evident aims of the decision (Treaty, first paragraph of Article 33).
In the Case:
GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS with an address for service at the Netherlands Legation in Luxembourg, represented by J. H. M. Verzijl, Professor at the State University in Utrecht, G. M. Verrijn Stuart, Professor at the University of the City of Amsterdam, acting as Agents,
applicant,
v
THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, with an
NETHERLANDS v HIGH AUTHORITY
address for service at its offices, 2 Place de Metz, Luxembourg, represented by its Legal Adviser, Doctor Walter Much, acting as Agent, assisted by Georges Van Hecke, Advocate ofthe Cour d'Appel, Brussels, Professor at the University of Louvain,
defendant,
Application for the annulment of Decisions Nos 18/54, 19/54 and 20/54 of the High Authority dated 20 March 1954,
THE COURT,
composed of: Massimo Pilotti, President, P. J. S. Serrarens and Ch. L. Hammes (Presidents of Chambers), O. Riese, L. Delvaux, J. Rueff and A. van Kleffens, Judges,
Advocate General: K. Roemer, Registrar: A. Van Houtte,
gives the following
JUDGMENT
The procedure and the conclu the Common Market by undertakings in sions of the parties the Ruhr coalfield and the Nord and Pas- de-Calais coalfield, No 19/54 concerning The course of the procedure was as fol the establishment of price lists for under lows: takings in the Ruhr coalfield and No 20/54 concerning the establishment of price lists for undertakings in the Nord and Pas-de- 1. By application lodged at the Court Re Calais coalfield'. gistry on 7 May 1954 at the suit of its En voy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipot Pursuant to two authorizations signed by entiary in Luxembourg, the Government the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and for of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, with Economic Affairs and lodged at the Regis an address for service at the seat of its Leg try on 23 August 1954, the Government of ation in Luxembourg, seeks the annulment the Netherlands appointed as its Agents of three decisions of the High Authority Professor Dr J. H. W. Verzijl of The Hague dated 20 March 1954 and published in the and Professor Dr G. M. Verrijn Stuart of Journal Officiel de la Communauté (pp. Amsterdam. 267 et seq.) under Nos 18/54, 19/54 and 20/54 claiming that the Court should: 2. The High Authority with an address for service at its offices, 2 Place de Metz, Lux 'Annul the decisions ofthe High Authority embourg, in accordance with an order giv dated 20 March 1954, No 18/54 concern en at its request extending the time-limit ing the principles governing the fixing of for lodging its pleadings, lodged its defence maximum prices for sales of coal within on 30 June 1954 within the prescribed pe-
JUDGMENT OF 21. 3. 1955 — CASE 6/54
riod contending that the Court should: on questions specified in greater detail in that decision. 'Reject as being without foundation the ap plication of the Government of the King By order of 10 December 1954 the time-li dom of the Netherlands of 7 May 1954 mit was extended to 16 December 1954 at with all the legal consequences and order the request of the High Authority. the applicant to bear the costs'. 8. These requirements having been satis By an authority to act signed by Jean Mon fied by the parties, the Advocate General net, President of the High Authority and having been heard, the Chamber, by order lodged at the Registry on 3 June 1954, Dr of 21 December 1954, in conformity with Walter Much was appointed Agent of the Article 45 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of defendant and by a power signed by Franz the Court declared the inquiry closed. Etzel, Vice-President of the High Authori ty and lodged at the Registry on 30 June By the same decision the defendant was re 1954, Professor G. van Hecke, Advocate quired to submit by 24 December at the la of the Bar of the Cour d'Appel of Brussels, test in addition to the documents it had al was appointed Counsel in order to assist ready lodged further documents specified the abovementioned Agent of the High in greater detail in the order. Authority. At the same time the parties were ordered 3. On 31 August 1954 the applicant to present their final written conclusions lodged its reply within the time-limit fixed by 11 January 1955 at the latest. by order of the President of the Court of 1 July 1954 and reaffirmed the claims set out The parties met these requirements within in its application. the specified time-limits.
4. The rejoinder was lodged on 15 Octo 9. In accordance with Article 45 (2) of the ber 1954, within the time-limit laid down Rules of Procedure of the Court the file for the defendant by order of the judge act was passed to the Advocate General and ing as President of 31 August 1954 and the subsequently to the President of the Court defendant reaffirmed its prior contentions. who fixed the date for the oral proceedings as the hearing of the Court on 1 February 5. The case having been placed on the roll 1955. ofthe Second Chamber the preliminary re port provided for in the second paragraph All the written pleadings and the support of Article 34 of the Rules of Procedure of ing documents were lodged and registered the Court was lodged on 7 November 1954 at the Court Registry. by Judge Hammes, the Rapporteur ap pointed by the President of the Court by They were notified to interested parties by letter of 15 October 1954. the Registrar.
6. The report recommended an inquiry to The course of the oral procedure was as obtain the production of documents and follows: the verification of the facts alleged by the parties and the fixing ofa date for the com (1) The public hearings were held on 1, 2 mencement of such measures. and 4 February 1955.
7. By order ofthe Chamber of 1 December (2) At the commencement of the hearings 1954, after it had heard the Advocate Gen the Judge-Rapporteur, in conformity with eral and reserved the possibility of other Article 21 of the Protocol on the Statute of preparatory measures, the parties were re the Court of Justice, read his report. quired to supply before 13 December in formation and all the relevant documents Represented by their agents and counsel
NETHERLANDS v HIGH AUTHORITY
the parties submitted their pleadings, the (a) certain categories of coal from a parti reply and rejoinder. cular coalfield; (b) certain grades from a particular coal In the course of the hearing the President field; asked the parties the questions set out in (c) average prices for grades in each cate the minutes of the hearing 'without preju gory. dice to any question of admissibility or substance'. The grounds for the differentiation are set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble In accordance with Articles 11 and 21 of to the decision. the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice the Advocate General delivered his In application ofthose principles by its De opinion to the effect that the application cisions Nos 7/53 to 24/53 of 6 March 1953 should be dismissed. the High Authority laid down the limits for prices in respect of each coalfield on the (3) The hearings were declared closed by basis of its list specifically for the Ruhr the President in accordance with Article coalfield by Decision No 9/53 and for the 50 (2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais coalfield by Deci Court and the Court commenced its delib sion No 13/53. erations upon the case. 4. As those rules expired on 31 May 1954 they were replaced by new provisions dat ed 20 March 1954 Nos 18/54, 19/54 and Facts 20/54 which entered into force on 1 April 1954 and expired on 31 March 1955. The following facts have given rise to the action by the applicant government: It is those decisions which are contested by the application. 1. The Common Market for coal, ore and scrap was opened on 10 February 1953. The amendments made to the earlier rules are as follows: 2. With particular regard to coal the deci sions taken by the High Authority on 12 as to the undertakings affected, Decision February 1953, Nos 3/53 and 4/53 regu No 6/53 on the one hand is henceforth lated the methods of price quotation, the solely applicable to the Ruhr and the Nord conditions for publicizing the lists and the and Pas-de-Calais coalfields; on the other conditions of sale. its validity has been extended to 31 March 1955; Those decisions are still in force ; they were amplified by Decision No 30/53 of 2 May as to its scope, the aforementioned deci 1953, amended by Decision No 1/54 of 7 sion was amended by the removal of the li January 1954 whereby the vendor is mits for average prices of grades in each bound by his price lists and conditions of category but at the same time maintained sale save in the case of individual transac the maximum prices for different catego tions or if identical differences apply to all ries and specific grades of coal. comparable transactions. 5. The new decision laying down a prin 3. Apart from those measures the High ciple is based on Article 61 and Article 63 Authority by Decision No 6/53 of 5 March (2) of the Treaty. 1953 fixed the maximum prices for coal in a general recommendation which was to The following are given as the grounds for expire on 31 March 1954. it:
It laid down price limits for: (a) in general terms the development of
JUDGMENT OF 21. 3. 1955 — CASE 6/54
the Common Market no longer necessi and the Houillères du Nord et du Pas-de- tates the maintenance ofthe fixing of maxi Calais. mum prices for undertakings in all the Finally the decision did not state the rea coalfields of the Community; sons on which it was based or at least did not do so sufficiently. (b) nevertheless in view of the present The defendant contends that the applica structure of the Common Market the sell tion should be dismissed as being without ing agency in the Ruhr coalfield and of the foundation and that the applicant should Houillères du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais bear the costs. would in fact determine coal prices if the It maintains that in adopting the contested High Authority were to abolish all maxi decisions it acted well within the powers mum prices; conferred on it by the first paragraph ofAr furthermore, in view of the nature and the ticle 61; it made use ofthose powers within volume of production those organizations the spirit and within the system of the exert a decisive influence throughout the Treaty and had also complied with the Common Market. procedural requirements set out in the
Treaty. Such a state of affairs could have an effect on the Community contrary to the objec In support of their submissions the parties tives referred to in Article 3 of the Treaty put forward the following arguments: in particular with regard to prices, produc tion and the employment of labour. 1. The infringement of the Treaty 6. In order to attain those objectives the High Authority deemed it necessary for a (a) In the opinion of the applicant para limited period to adopt the measures con graph 6 of the preamble to Decision No tested by the application by rendering 18/54 infringes Articles 5 and 61 of the more flexible the methods previously used Treaty because the High Authority bases for fixing maximum prices, taking account its argument on the possibility that one of in particular of the increase in revenue as the objectives of Article 3 might not be a result of the elimination of certain special achieved instead of stating the need for its charges with effect from 1 April 1954. intervention. In particular it should have
indicated the consequences which the free Submissions of the parties ing of prices would in fact have entailed and the aims which would not have been The submissions of the parties may be achieved in the absence ofthe rules. In par summarized as follows: ticular it should have stated that one or more of those objectives would not in fact The applicant attacks Decision No 18/54 be achieved if maximum prices were not and the implementing Decisions Nos fixed. Without such indications it would 19/54 and 20/54 for infringement of the indeed be possible for the High Authority Treaty, manifest failure to observe its pro to intervene continually in infringement of visions, misuse ofpowers and infringement Article 5 of the Treaty. of essential procedural requirements. It As no price increase was to be feared the claims that in the given circumstances the laying down of maximum prices constitut prices should have been freed completely ed a manifest failure to observe the provi because maximum prices were inadmissi
sions of Article 61 of the Treaty. ble and futhermore were not necessary and The applicant further maintains that the that the market structure could not be tak effect of the decisions both on the con en into consideration in view of its illegal trolled prices and on the free prices was in nature. The applicant further claims that sufficient to justify the affirmation that the in reality the High Authority had taken the new prices were noticeably lower than they decision in order to avoid an action against would have been without the intervention the selling agencies of the Ruhr coalfield of the High Authority.
NETHERLANDS v HIGH AUTHORITY
There is no evidence whatever to support the High Authority had not wished to run the High Authority's contention that that risk. maximum prices were fixed in order to (b) The applicant maintains that the High achieve the lowest level ofprices having re Authority infringed Article 61 in taking gard to the situation ofthe market and that into account a market structure contrary the fixing is based on the hypothesis that to the provisions of the Treaty and thereby the prices would not have fallen substan approving the existence of an unlawful tially if they had been freed. structure. Furthermore, in the opinion of the appli This was inadmissible on the ground that cant, prices would have fallen after a cer in Articles 65 and 66 the Treaty provides tain time even in the absence of such inter measures against such an unlawful situa vention. tion.
The absence of such measures cannot Finally, the applicant states that having re justify the exercise of a power given for gard to the market situation the fixing of other purposes and provided for a market maximum prices was in fact harmful be situation which is not vitiated by the exis cause in practice they became fixed prices. tence of prohibited agreements. In reply to these arguments the defendant In reply to this the defendant states that the states: fixing of maximum prices does not depend On the basis of its studies of the situation solely on the market situation.
As the of the market and following discussions structure of the market was not contrary to with producers it had reached the conclu the Treaty, having regard to Article 12 of sion that if prices were freed when the ear the Convention on the Transitional Provi lier rules expired the prices would not have sions, and as it was an incontrovertible been the lowest possible as required by Ar fact the High Authority could and indeed ticle 3 (c) and consequently the fixing of had to take it into account in so far as the maximum prices was necessary. prices could be influenced by it. The defendant concedes that mere expec The existence of monopolistic organiza tation of harmful effects is not sufficient to tions gave rise to the fear that such under enable it to intervene. On the other hand, takings might abuse their dominant posi however, in the economic sector there is no tion by preventing the establishment of as absolute certainty. Furthermore the activ low a level of prices as possible.
In the ities of the High Authority must in essence opinion of the defendant the existence of be of a preventive nature. agreements and concentrations was not In the present instance the discussions with unlawful at the time when the decisions producers of the Ruhr coalfield had shown were taken. So long as the High Authority with a probability bordering on certainty had not decided to refuse the authoriza that the reduction in prices as sought by tion, the prohibition in principle set out in Article 3 (c) would not take place without Article 65 of the Treaty has no effect in re intervention and in any case a substantial spect of existing organizations which have decrease would not have occurred.
Possi sought such authorization in acordance bly the downward trend would have been with Article 3 of Decision No 37/53 of 11 felt in the long term but such had not been July 1953. the case in the short term. With regard to the Nord and Pas-de-Calais 2. The misuse of powers coalfield the reason for apprehension had been the artificial protection enjoyed by (a) For the reasons set out under (b) above that coalfield.
Therefore it had been neces the applicant argues that at the same time sary to fix the lowest possible prices as the High Authority had been guilty of mis maximum prices. use of powers: in reality it had adopted the There is no proofat all for the allegation of contested decision in order to combat the the applicant that prices would in any case activity of certain organizations which it have fallen because of the market situa should have done by applying not Article tion; even if that was the case the fall 61 but the methods provided by Article would not have occurred immediately and 65; furthermore, it was under an obliga-
JUDGMENT OF 21. 3. 1955 — CASE 6/54
tion to apply those methods in order to dis pothesis, however, only the fixing of mini solve those organizations without delay. mum prices would be required and there In this respect the defendant states that it fore from this aspect as well the decision will certainly not fail to take steps against constitutes a misuse of powers. the organizations and dominant undertak In this respect the defendant has stated re ings on the market and that, on the con peatedly that it had not and could not have trary, it has already initiated the necessary counted on an immediate reduction in steps which, however, must only be taken prices and consequently the argument of with caution. the applicant is not valid as the decision Moreover it had immediately done all that was only directly aimed at effects on prices. was possible to combat by a temporary measure the most dangerous effects of that 3. Infringement of essential procedural re
situation. quirements The question whether the High Authority failed to take the measures which it was The applicant argues that by not setting obliged by Articles 65 and 66 ofthe Treaty out the genuine reasons for its decision the to take is not the subject ofthe present pro defendant has failed to state the reasons or ceedings and should be the subject of pro failed to state sufficient reasons for its de ceedings for failure to act under Article 35. cision and consequently infringed the obli In addition the defendant states that a long gation as to essential procedural require and difficult process of transformation and ments contained in Article 15. adaptation is necessary and at the present In this respect the High Authority has ad time it has no obligation to conclude it nor mitted this in that in its defence sub has there been any possibility of its doing missions it gives in support of its decisions so. arguments which were not referred to in
the reasons for that decision. (b) The proof that the fixing of the maxi The applicant takes the view that the rea mum price was carried out for a purpose sons put forward by the High Authority for other than to obtain the lowest possible the first time in its defence submissions prices in accordance with Article 3 (c) is, in cannot be taken into consideration. the opinion of the applicant, derived from The defendant believes that the reasons the fact that the new maximum prices fixed stated in the decision are sufficient both as are not appreciably lower than the list to the form and as to the substance as they prices which were applied previously by contain all the essential points.
producers. It argues that in this respect it must be al The defendant state with regard to the level lowed to develop an appropriate method of the maximum prices which it has just gradually. fixed that the old and the new table ofprice In conformity with Article 15 it set out the limits are not in every way comparable; facts and the provisions of the Treaty on nevertheless, from that comparison and which its action was based; it is not obliged from a comparison of the old and the new to state the reasons for its reasons. lists there is evident a substantial reduction There can certainly not exist an infringe in the price of grades for which no fall in ment of an essential procedural require price would have occurred if the prices had ment in the present case as the substance of been freed; in the free sector there has in the decision was not in any way influenced. certain cases even been an increase in
price. 4. The Court's right of investigation
(c) If and in so far as the High Authority The applicant believes that the argument feared detrimental effects on production derived from the misuse of powers and the and the employment of labour this appre manifest failure to observe the Treaty is hension could in the opinion of the appli sufficient to enable the Court to examine cant only have arisen from the expectation the assessment of the facts or economic cir of a considerable fall in prices; on that hy cumstances.
NETHERLANDS v HIGH AUTHORITY
The defendant contests the allegation of ing from the economic facts or circum the applicant to the effect that the Court stances in the light of which a decision was has unlimited jurisdiction to judge the taken only exists in very exceptional cir suitability of the decision as the applicant cumstances. In the present case the appli has failed to establish sufficiently a mani cant is challenging the High Authority's fest failure to observe the Treaty or misuse economic forecast with its own and this is of powers. not sufficient to establish manifest failure The right to examine the situtation result to observe the Treaty.
Law
A — The admissibility of the action
The admissibility of the action gives rise to no criticisms by the Court of its own motion and moreover has not been the subject of any objection.
B — The scope of the action
It should be emphasized that the action only relates to Decisions ofthe High Au thority Nos 19/54 and 20/54 in so far as they constitute the implementation of the principle laid down in Decision No 18/54.
C — Infringement of essential procedural requirements
(a) The applicant first alleges that Decision No 18/54 fails to state sufficiently the reasons on which it is based because the High Authority has merely justified its measures by stating in a purely hypothetical form that the structure of the Common Market could compromise the achievement ofthe objectives ofArticle 3 of the Treaty. Under Article 61 it should have found and stated that the necessity existed and should have specified the objective or objectives compromised if the maximum prices were to be abolished altogether. The general provisions of Articles 5 and 15 of the Treaty oblige the High Au thority to state reasons for its decisions and to make those reasons public. However, no details are given as to the form or extent of that obligation. Reasonably understood those requirements oblige the High Authority to men tion in the reasons for its decision the essential elements of the findings of fact on which the legal justification for the measure depends. The Treaty does not require that it should state, and still less that it should re fute, the opinions expressed in this regard by consultative bodies or by certain of their members. The measures referred to in Article 61 (a) ofthe Treaty can be applied ifthe High Authority 'finds that such a decision is necessary to attain the objectives set out in Article 3, and particularly in paragraph (c) thereof.
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The contested decision refers to and affirms this necessity and indicates that it results from the existence of certain organizations having a decisive influence on the market in such a way that all effective competition is excluded. It expressly refers to a position which is detrimental to the achievement of the objectives of Article 3 with regard to prices, production or the employment of labour.
Although they do not state precisely which objective or objectives referred to in Article 3 are specifically envisaged the statement ofthe reasons on which the de cision is based can be regarded in its present form as satisfying the conditions for the application of Article 61 (a). The statement of reasons thus satisfies the requirements as to form, which are applicable.
(b) In accordance with the opinion of the Advocate General it is appropriate to examine whether the procedural requirements laid down by the Treaty for the adoption of the contested decisions were complied with. As they were intended to ensure that the measures concerned were formulated with all due care and prudence these procedural requirements may be regarded as essential and, consequently, the question whether they have been observed must be examined by the Court. Article 61 of the Treaty provides that the decision of the High Authority fixing maximum prices must be taken:
(1) 'On the basis of studies made jointly with undertakings and associations of undertakings, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 46 and the third paragraph of Article 48';
(2) after consulting the Consultative Committee;
and
(3) after consulting the Council of Ministers.
It appears from the evidence submitted that the studies required by Article 61 have been carried out. The text of the decision affirms that the consultations with the Consultative Committee and the Council were held. That affirmation can not relieve the Court of the duty to carry out an examin ation with regard to the application of the above-mentioned requirements. In the present instance the consultations referred to in the first paragraph of Ar ticle 61 related both to the appropriateness of the measures in question and to the level of prices. Consequently in this respect no procedural requirement for the validity of the decision has been infringed.
NETHERLANDS v HIGH AUTHORITY
D — Infringement of the Treaty
(a) It is necessary to examine the intrinsic legality of the decision having regard to the terms of the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Treaty which gives the High Authority the power to fix maximum prices 'for one or more of the pro ducts within its jurisdiction'. On the one hand that text must be reconciled with Article 5 which provides for limited measures of intervention such as those in the present instance. On the other in providing for the establishment of maximum prices within the Common Market the Treaty merely distinguishes the Common Market from the external market but was not intended to prohibit a measure or measures which only affect certain sectors of the Common Market. Furthermore the measure in question in directly affects the whole of that market.
(b) In support of the argument based on the breach of the Treaty the applicant claims that the contested decision refers to a market structure ofan illegal nature. It states that the defendant is acting in infringement of the Treaty in stating as the reasons for its decision the existence of agreements and concentrations of un dertakings which are expressly prohibited by Articles 65 and 66 of the Treaty. That argument would only be valid if, by virtue of the Treaty, agreements and concentrations which conflict with those articles were deprived of all legal effect. On the one hand in application of the second paragraph ofArticle 12 ofthe Con vention on the Transitional Provisions the existence of agreements was provi sionally authorized subject to certain conditions by Decision No 37/53 of the High Authority of 11 July 1953 with the reservation that such agreements might subsequently be prohibited. In this respect Article 12 of the aforementioned Convention provides no time-limit for the intervention of the High Authority and the latter therefore possesses a discretionary power in this respect within the limits of the transitional period. On the other hand the applicant finds that a structure contrary to the Treaty is constituted by the fact that the Nord and Pas-de-Calais coalfield exercises a dom inant influence on the French market and argues that that situation falls exclu sively within the provisions of Article 66 (7). The existence ofa situation which might justify the application of the provisions of Article 66 (7) does not in itself constitute an obstacle to the exercise by the High Authority of the powers assigned to it by subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 61. Consequently there is nothing to prevent the effects of such agreements and con centrations in so far as they affect the level of prices on the Common Market and the achievement of objectives set out in Article 3 from being opposed by the de fendant with the aid of powers conferred on it by Article 61 of the Treaty.
(c) In support of the arguments based on the infringement of the Treaty the ap plicant objects that in its decision the High Authority relies on the general objec-
JUDGMENT OF 21. 3. 1955 — CASE 6/54
tives of the Treaty and that that general reference cannot constitute sufficient reasons because the special provisions of subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 61 refer to specific hypotheses. That reasoning is without legal foundation. In fact Article 61 refers expressly to the objectives set out in Article 3.
(d) The applicant alleges that the contested decision is based on reasons which are wrong in substance. The fixing of maximum prices was not necessary as, in view of the development of the market, prices already showed a downward trend and in any case maxi mum prices could not bring about a fall in prices but solely a price freeze. On the other hand the developments in production and employment could only be threatened by a fall and if it were sought to counteract that danger minimum prices should have been introduced. Having regard to those arguments a distinction should be made between the find ing of facts and economic circumstances on which the decision was based and the conclusions drawn by the High Authority in its subsequent evaluation of the situation. In the present instance the decision in fact states that in spite of the trends ex isting on the market and because of the market structure coal prices were deter mined by the selling agency of the Ruhr coalfield and by the Houillères du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais.
By documents submitted to the Court (Market Division of the High Authority of 3 and 15 February 1954, Nos 728 and 6523) the content of which is not dis puted by the applicant the High Authority proved that in the German and French coalfields there was no trend towards a general reduction in prices. On the contrary producers let it be known that they intended to maintain their prices at the existing level. More particularly after intensive discussion the representatives of the Ruhr coal producers opposed the reduction in prices and the representatives of the Houil lères du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais, after looking at the possibility of an increase in prices but in the end not adopting it, declared that they wished to apply cur rent prices with the proposed changes even if prices were freed which did not constitute an undertaking such as to remove all necessity for fixing maximum prices. In the light of the existing situation the High Authority came to the conclusion that the fixing of maximum prices was necessary; the correctness of this conclu sion is contested by the applicant which argues that in the present circumstances such a measure could not cause or set off a fall in prices but at the very most a price freeze. Thus it claims that the decision is not well founded. The evaluation of the situation resulting from the economic facts or circum stances in the light of which the High Authority took its decisions is not subject to examination by the Court save where the High Authority is alleged to have
NETHERLANDS v HIGH AUTHORITY
misused its powers or to have manifestly failed to observe provisions of the Treaty. A study of the market taking account of factors relating to the market structure and economic trends would constitute such an examination. It is therefore necessary to examine with regard to their general scope and their presence in this instance the two conditions which alone allow of an examina tion of the proper economic foundation of a decision, that is to say manifest failure to observe the provisions of the Treaty and misuse of powers.
E — Manifest failure to observe provisions of the Treaty
It should be emphasized that the objection of the manifest failure to observe the provisions of the Treaty was not raised by the applicant as a separate ground for annulment but solely with a view to having the examination by the Court extend to an assessment of the situation arising from the economic facts and circum stances in the present instance. In this respect Article 33 does not require that the objection raised be supported by full proofin advance; this moreover would immediately entail the annulment of the decision for infringement of the Treaty. On the other hand the mere assertion of a manifest failure to observe the Treaty is not sufficient to open the way to examination by the Court of the economic evaluation as otherwise a submission of this kind could become a mere formal ity. It is necessary and it is sufficient that the objection is supported by appropriate evidence.
Such is the case in the present instance and that evidence should be examined from the point of view of manifest failure to observe the Treaty. The term 'manifest' presupposes that a certain degree is reached in the failure to observe legal provisions so that the failure to observe the Treaty appears to derive from an obvious error in the evaluation, having regard to the provisions of the Treaty, of the situation in respect of which the decision was taken. In the present instance the 'manifest' failure to observe the Treaty can only result from the finding by the Court of the existence of an economic situation which prima facie reveals no necessity for the contested measure in the pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 3 of the Treaty, in particular paragraph (c). The statement in the contested decision that the fixing of maximum prices was necessary to serve the objectives set out in Article 3 of the Treaty for reasons re lating to the market structure does not conflict a priori with the text or the spirit of subparagraph (a) of Article 61 which, unlike subparagraph (b) does not en visage any condition relating to the economic cycle. The applicant's reasoning to the effect that the maximum prices in fact consti tute a minimum which stabilizes and freezes prices does not prima facie exclude all necessity for maximum prices and consequently is not sufficient to constitute manifest failure to observe the Treaty.
JUDGMENT OF 21. 3. 1955 — CASE 6/54
It is further appropriate to examine whether the manifest lack of necessity for the measure results from the amounts of the prices fixed. It is clear from the table drawn up by the parties together that the new figures are not identical with the old figures and that according to the defendant's con tention, not contested by the applicant, the prices which were freed have shown a .tendency to increase. These findings do not therefore reveal manifest lack of necessity. Having regard to the objectives of Article 3 of the Treaty the lack of necessity of the measure is not evident immediately from the rate of the prices fixed. That article ofthe Treaty obliges the High Authority to ensure the establishment of certain economic conditions and this might justify preventive intervention even if certain reassuring declarations have been made which contain no com mitment as to the extent of their validity. In this context paragraph (c) more specifically envisages the establishment of the lowest prices but does not require an attempt to reach the absolute minimum but merely a price which, while being the lowest within the meaning of Article 3 (c), takes account of the other objectives imposed by this article on the actions of the High Authority. In this respect as well a failure to observe the Treaty is not manifestly evident from the decision.
F — Misuse of powers
This submission seeks a ruling that in determining maximum prices on the basis of Article 61 the High Authority was not so much pursuing its declared objec tives, in particular the lowering of prices, but in reality was seeking to combat agreements and concentrations of undertakings. Consequently it had made use ofthe powers assigned to it by Article 61 for a pur pose other than that for which they were conferred upon it. Proof of the motives for the contested decision may be evident either from the preparations, including the deliberations of the Consultative Committee and of the Council of Ministers, or else from the fact that in view of their level relative to the prices in the lists applicable before 1 April 1954 the new prices are incom patible with the avowed and evident aims of the decision. However, the documents submitted by the parties do not reveal any covert in tent.
As to the argument derived from the fact that the new prices are identical or al most identical with the old prices the Court has already dismissed this allegation with regard to the manifest failure to observe the Treaty and in addition even freezing prices at their level at that time might not have been wholly without its use in view of the possibility of increases inherent in the market structure.
Moreover, the arguments of the High Authority clearly relate to a disquieting
NETHERLANDS v HIGH AUTHORITY
situation with regard to prices and it is impossible to regard the contested deci sion as a measure whose aims are incompatible with the aims for which the power to establish maximum prices was conferred, on the High Authority.
The misuse of powers has not been established.
Costs
Under Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court the unsuccessful party shall be ordered to pay the costs.
The applicant government should therefore be ordered to bear the costs.
Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate General which accorded with the view of the Court; Having regard to Articles 3, 5, 33, 35, 61, 65, 66 and 84 of the Treaty and Article 12 of the Convention on the Transitional Provisions; Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice; Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court and the rules of the Court on costs,
THE COURT
hereby:
Dismisses the application for the annulment of Decisions Nos 18/54, 19/54 and 20/54 of the High Authority dated 20 March 1954;
Orders the applicant to pay the costs.
Pilotti Serrarens Hammes
Riese Delvaux Rueff Van Kleffens
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 March 1955.
M. Pilotti Ch. L. Hammes
President Judge-Rapporteur A. Van Houtte
Registrar