C-2/56

JUDGMENT OF 20. 3. 1957 — CASE 2/56

5. Cartels — Authorization

The High Authority is not required to alter the contents of an agreement which is submitted to it under Article 65, in order for it to qualify for authorization (Treaty, Article 65).

6. Application for annulment — Extent of the power of review by the Court Where it is not necessary to take into consideration and to assess economic facts in order to find that an agreement is of a restrictive nature, the Court has unlimited jurisdiction to review that finding (Treaty, second sentence of first paragraph of Article 33). 1

7. Discrimination — Cartels

Articles 4(b) and 65 of the Treaty govern the different aspects of economic life in their re­ spective fields of application. Those two articles do not exclude neither do they annul each other; on the contrary, they serve to bring about the objectives of the Community. They are thus complementary in this respect. In certain cases their provisions can cover acts justifying a simultaneous and concurrent ap­ plication of the said articles (Treaty, Articles 4(b), 65).

1 — Cf. paragraph 5. summary, judgment in Case 6/54, Rec. 1954-1955. p. 201.

GEITLING v HIGH AUTHORITY

STINNES AG, Essen, GEBR. STUMM GMBH, ZECHE MIN. ACHENBACH , Bram­ bauer/Westfalen, HOESCH BERGWERKS AG, Dortmund, GEWERKSCHAFT VER. KLOSTERBUSCH , Herbede/Ruhr, STEINKOHLENBERGWERK FRIEDRICH DER GROSSE AG, Heme, RHEINELBE BERGBAU AG, Gelsenkirchen, GRAF MOLTKE BERGBAU AG, Gelsenkirchen, STEINKOHLENBERGBAU HANNOVER-HANNIBAL AG, Bochum, BERGWERKSGESELLSCHAFT WALSUM MBH , Walsum/Niederr­ hein, GEWERKSCHAFT SOPHIA JACOBA , Hückelhoven/Aachen, HARPENER BERGEAU AG, Dortmund, MONOPOL BERGBAU AG, Kamen, Gewerkschaft ALTE HAASE , Dortmund, GEWERKSCHAFT GOTTESSEGEN , Dortmund, repres­ ented by the Geitling selling agency for Ruhr coal, a limited liability company, 4, Frau-Berta-Krupp-Straße, Essen,

2. The GEITLING SELLING AGENCY FOR RUHR COAL , a limited liability company, Frau-Berta-Krupp-Straße 4, Essen,

jointly represented by Werner von Simson, Advocate at the Oberlandesgericht, Düsseldorf with an address for service at the Chambers of their Advocate at Luxembourg-Capellen,

applicants,

Advocate-General: K. Roemer Registrar: A Van Houtte

gives the following

JUDGMENT OF 20. 3. 1957 — CASE 2/56

JUDGMENT

Facts

tion. annul Article 8 of Decision No 5/56 of the High Authority of 15 February 1956. 4. The rejoinder was lodged on 15 Novem ber 1956, within the time allowed to the de The following annexes were joined to the fendant by order of the President. The de application: fendant reasserted its earlier conclusions. (a) The issue of the Journal Officiel in which the contested decision was pub 5. After the case had been assigned to the lished; First Chamber, the Judge-Rapporteur, Ch. (b) The agreement made on 6 February L. Hammes, designated as such by the 1956 between the mining undertakings, President of the Court by letter of 3 October being members of the Geitling agency, es 1956, lodged the preliminary report, pursu tablishing trading rules for the Common ant to Article 34 (2) of the Rules of Proce Market from 1 April 1956, and an annex to dure of the Court. those rules.

should: In accordance with Article 45 (2) of the reject as unfounded the application Rules of Procedure of the Court, the acting lodged by the 19 mining undertakings of President of the Court set down the hearing the Ruhr basin, being members of the of the oral procedure for 28 January 1957, Geitling selling agency for Ruhr coal, and and if necessary, on the days following.

7. At the opening of the hearing, the the same number of undertakings are mem Judge-Rapporteur, in accordance with Arti bers. cle 21 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court, read his report. The oral arguments 2. In accordance with the provisions of Ar of the parties were heard through their Ad ticle 65 of the Treaty, that reorganization vocates. and also an agreement made on 6 February 1956 in identical terms by each of the three

9. In accordance with Article 50 (2) of the fuels and was necessary in order to ensure Rules of Procedure of the Court, the Pres that the sales would be profitable, that the ident of the Court declared the oral proce employment would be stable, and that sup dure at an end, and the case was reserved plies would be regular. for deliberation. In so far as the High Authority took the view that some of the agreement went be 10. Judges O. Riese and A. van Kleffens yond that purpose, it refused to authorize being prevented from attending, the judg

ties: tions, only three ot the conditions for such acceptance were authorized, whilst ano 1. The application contests Article 8 of De ther—the clause at issue—was rejected. cision No 5/56 of 15 February 1956. By virtue of those articles, a wholesale trad The contested measure was adopted in con er may be accepted and given the right to nexion with the reorganization, by the pro obtain direct supplies provided that: ducer undertakings, of the sale of Ruhr coal (a) the trader sells within the Common and its essential provisions were approved Market a minimum of 75 000 metric tons of by the High Authority in Decisions Nos fuel from the producer basins of the Com 5/56 and 8/56 of 15 February 1956, after it munity; had considered whether they were in con (b) of that total, 40 000 metric tons at least formity with the requirements laid down by are sold within the trader's sales area; the Treaty concerning cartels. (c) of which at least 12 500 metric tons That reorganization divides the sales cartel come from the Geitling selling agency. of the mining undertakings of the Ruhr ba The condition contained in the trading sin into three independent selling agencies. rules and rejected by the High Authority Until that time the said undertakings were provided in addition that in his sales area part of a single organization, the Gemein the wholesaler had to sell 12 500 metric tons schafts-Organisation Ruhrkohle GmbH. from one of the three selling agencies for The said agencies consist of applicant No 2 Ruhr coal in addition to the 12 500 metric and the two other agencies of which about tons from Geitling.

However, during the oral procedure, the de­ may not be necessary for establishing a standard for a certain volume of business fendant argued that in the case of an appli­ cation against one isolated article of a deci­ cannot be put forward as a reason, for other­ sion, the annulment of that article would in wise two of the three other approved criteria practice be tantamount to a new decision should also have been rejected, because each of those criteria also constitutes such which the Court has no jurisdiction to a standard. adopt, even indirectly, since Article 34 only makes provision for referring the matter back to the High Authority, and that there­ 2. The applicants also argue that in the rea­ fore the admissibility was doubtful. sons for its decision the High Authority is required, according to the case-law of the IV — Summary of the submissions Court on Articles 5 and 15 of the Treaty made by the parties (Judgment in Case 6/54), to mention the essential elements of the findings of fact on The arguments of the parties may be sum­ which the legal justification for the measure marized as follows: depends.

GEITLING v HIGH AUTHORITY

effect on the number of wholesalers ap­ tion under Article 65 (1)(c) was necessary proved if the rejected clause was or was since they submitted a request for authori­ not applied. zation. As to (b): There is no indication of the Since joint selling falls in its entirety under reasons for which the clause at issue Article 65 (1), it was not necessary to prove could not, unlike the other clauses, be au­ this afresh in respect of each particular thorized under Article 65 (2). clause. On the contrary, it was necessary to refuse to authorize any clause which per­ mitted discrimination or which contained a In its defence, for the first time, the de­ restriction which was not necessary in order fendant does not content itself with as­ to achieve the purpose intended. serting that the clause is more restrictive than is necessary for the purpose of the 4. It was for that reason that in its decision agreement, but argues why such is the the High Authority stated that the clause case: that the clause would enable the un­ not authorized more particularly (a) permit­ dertakings to determine the prices of a ted discrimination and (b) was of a more large part of the Community's coal pro­ restrictive nature than was required by the duction, to control extraction and sales purpose of the trading rules. and thus to restrict competition. Those reasons are not stated in the decision it­ As to (a): In particular there is discrimina­ self. tion in respect of producers from other ba­ sins of the Community, since the required b — The High Authority replies to these condition encourages traders towards a arguments as follows: preference, up to 25 000 metric tons, for fuel from the other selling agencies for Ruhr 1. The applicants have failed to understand coal and, therefore, to defer the purchases the scope of Articles 5 and 15 of the Treaty; of fuel from producers from other basins In the statement of the reasons for Decision until that figure is reached. No 5/56, the High Authority did not limit A single instance of discrimination of that itself to the essential elements of fact, kind is sufficient to bring the prohibition which would have been sufficient; it set into action. out, in addition, all the legal aspects.

JUDGMENT OF 20. 3. 1957 — CASE 2/56

general ground that the Court's examina­ (e) Moreover the general finding contained tion can only go into the legality of the de­ in Decision No 5/56, that the clause at issue cision. enables the applicants to determine prices According to the second sentence of the or to control the extraction and sale of a first paragraph of Article 33 of the Treaty, substantial part of the coal production of the the Court may not examine the High Au­ Community is obviously irrelevant as re­ thority's evaluation of the situation result­ gards Article 8 of the decision. The High ing from economic facts in the absence of Authority has authorized the other provi­ evidence allowing of the conclusion that sions of the new rules as being in accor­ there exists a manifest failure to observe the dance with the Treaty, and yet, looked at in provisions of the Treaty. isolation, the clause at issue cannot put the With this reservation, which it puts forward applicants in a monopoly situation. in the rejoinder in respect of the arguments of the applicants, the High Authority only 2. As regards the Court's power of review, adopts a position on the complaint of in­ the defendant denies that there exists any fringement of the Treaty as an alternative. evidence of manifest disregard for the Treaty. 1. (a) The application states first that there It states in detail in the rejoinder the reasons is a manifest failure to observe the provi­ for which the complaints put forward by the sions of the Treaty in the illogicality, on the applicants are not subject to any review: part of the High Authority, of accepting dis­ crimination in respect of other producers as (a) From the point of view of discrimina­ legally possible. tion, a study of the economic justification for a distinction between two groups of (b) Next the applicants say that there is a traders involves examining the repercus­ manifest failure to observe the Treaty in sions of that distinction on the coal market

GEITLING v HIGH AUTHORITY

c — The possibility of authorization under (c) It does not constitute a measure having Article 65 (2) repercussions on the market because its economic purpose is otherwise, namely to 1. The applicants complain first that the ensure that wholesalers shall have adequate High Authority did not consider whether qualifications. the clause at issue could be authorized un­ der Article 65 (2). They are also of the opin­ 2. The defence sets out in detail the reasons ion that if a restriction on competition does for which the defendant is of the opinion exist it is within what is permitted by the that there is a restriction on competition. provisions of the Treaty because it is not more restrictive than is required by the pur­ (a) First, there is a restriction as regards re­ pose of the trading rules. lationship between producers and traders, The reply asserts that the alleged reason, to in the form of a sharing of the market and the effect that the clause at issue is incom­ of customers. That sharing is an element of patible with Article 65 (2)(a) and (b), does the agreement and requires authorization. not appear in the decision and in addition is not correct in fact. There is no limit on the (b) Furthermore the clause restricts compe­ competition between the three selling agen­ tition between the agencies. cies. The requirement of purchases of Since all three apply the same rules, they 25 000 metric tons of Ruhr coal is justified

II

JUDGMENT OF 20. 3. 1957 — CASE 2/56

The additional requirement is not justified by Geitling's interest in an improved dis­ 2. (a) The defendant argues this is quar­ tribution of the fuel which it sells. Nor can relling over words: it contribute in any way to an improvement A cartel between producers which results in in the sale of coal. It is therefore of a more discrimination between traders and be­

restrictive nature than is required by its pur­ tween producers is not essential in order to pose. obtain an improvement in distribution. Moreover it is always of a more restrictive nature than is required by its purpose. d — The problem of discrimination The case-law of the Court has given to Ar­ ticles 2 to 4 of the Treaty the status of prin­ In the first place, the parties disagree on the ciples. The High Authority must therefore question whether, in the procedure for au­ take those provisions into account in all its thorization, Article 4 (b) of the Treaty has decisions. any significance independently of Article Therefore, when it examines whether and 65 (2). to what extent an agreement meets the con­ ditions set out in Article 65 (2) (a), the High 1. On this subject, the applicants argue that Authority must always consider whether agreements intended to create discrimina­ that agreement involves discrimination. tion may not be authorized simply by virtue In effect, it matters little whether the de­ of the first subparagraph of Article 65 (2). fendant expressly refers to Article 4 (b) in For such discrimination is always, in effect, the procedure for authorization and uses of a more restrictive nature than is required the concept of 'discrimination' or whether it by their legitimate purpose (the improve­ relies only on Article 65 (2). When the con­ ment of distribution or of production). The ditions set out in paragraph 2 (a) and (b) are

1. (a) The applicants argue that the con­ (b) In its rejoinder, the High Authority re­ cept of discrimination involves a difference futes the applicants' conception that the in treatment between producers or custom­ Treaty does not prohibit discrimination be­ ers bound by an agreement within the mar­ tween traders. It appears necessary to pro­ ket. tect traders against discrimination, since al­ Now, under the rejected clause, the sellers most half the sales take place through trad­ do not discriminate between the purcha­ ers. sers, who are the only possible contracting parties. (c) In assessing the nature of the condition (b) In addition the applicants doubt wheth­ at issue, what is decisive is not whether an er Article 4 (b) is intended to ensure the in­ objective reason exists for establishing a dependent protection of each trader. They distinction, but whether there exists an ob­ are of the opinion that a measure affecting jective reason of such a nature as to justify a trader can only be judged incompatible that differentiation, taking into account its with the Common Market if it affects the object and its effects, in accordance with position of the user or of the producer on the principles on which the Treaty is based. the market. (d) Whereas until the opening of the Com­ (c) Moreover, the prohibited clause only mon Market it was necessary to sell a min­ constitutes a condition of sale which does imum of 6 000 metric tons in order to be ac­ not differ fundamentally from other such cepted as a first-hand trader, the applicants conditions. If the defendant's point of view have not proved that the situation has be adopted, all the conditions are of a dis­ changed so fundamentally that the figure of criminatory nature, because they establish a 12 500 metric tons from one selling agency distinction between purchasers who satisfy is now no longer sufficient. them and those who do not. (e) In practice, a wholesaler is not con­ (d) The applicants have a legitimate inter­ cerned with storage. In the case of carriage est in requiring not only that a wholesaler by rail no problem arises. As regards carri­ shall have proper experience of carriage, in­ age by water, the question of storage comes surance and storage, but also that his busi­ up only at the unloading stage, and here the ness shall involve a sufficiently high ton­ agent for the selling agency uses the pre­ nage of coal from the same source to enable mises existing in the wholesale trade which him, should supplies from one of the selling are available for unloading. No insurance is agencies be temporarily inadequate, to turn necessary as regards carriage by rail. As to supplies from another agency instead. It regards carriage by water, it is usually the is only with a sales figure of 25 000 metric agent who insures. The general conditions tons that there can be certainty that the of insurance apply to contracts of carriage.

(f) The ostensible purpose of the clause can to discrimination to the detriment of the only be achieved if the trader purchases other two selling agencies for Ruhr coal. 12 500 metric tons from each of the three selling agencies. Otherwise, he is a trader at 2. (a) The High Authority replies that the second hand in the eyes of each of the other criterion of the purchase of 25 000 metric two selling agencies, and he must, for his tons from the Ruhr encourages wholesalers part, obtain supplies from a trader approved to defer, up to that quantity, the purchase of by them, that is to say on terms different fuels from producers of other basins and from those which are applied by the agency that it involves unequal treatment of the by which he is approved as a first-hand other producers which is objectively unjus­ trader. tified. Thus the Geitling selling agency does not establish discrimination between itself (II) Discrimination as regards producers and other producers, but between several other producers, that is to say on the one 1. (a) The applicants see another infringe­ hand the other two selling agencies for ment of the Treaty in the fact that the High Ruhr coal and, on the other hand, the re­ Authority considers it as also legally possi­ maining basins of the Community. ble for a producer to discriminate in respect of other producers. (b) The defendant also argues that condi­ tions encouraging the purchaser to make a (b) The High Authority's conception that distinction between the products of certain the sellers encourage the purchasers to dis­ other producers cannot be considered as le­ criminate, amounts to treating any compet­ gitimate or fair competition. Moreover itive measures as prohibited discrimination. what matters as regards the existence of dis­ It is in the nature of competition for a seller crimination is not the subjective intention to encourage the purchaser to discriminate of the person who adopts a given measure, between that seller and other sellers. The but the practical effect of that measure on applicants' conception is based on the ex­ the Common Market. ample of discount for quantity. (c) The example, mentioned by the appli­ (c) Moreover the clause at issue does not cants, of discount for quantity, legitimate in encourage the customers to distinguish be­ itself, clearly shows the boundary between tween the different producers, but between the practice of legally acceptable competi­ one particular kind of coal, Ruhr coal, and tion and discrimination. The rejected crite­ other kinds. The advantages obtained from rion is tantamount in practice to a fidelity that distinction arise from natural condi­ discount on a collective basis, a discount tions and failure to use them would amount which is prohibited.

3. The contested decision individually concerns each of the 19 mining undertak­ ings, the applicants at 1, being coal producing undertakings with a right to institute proceedings before the Court. The applicant at 2 must be considered as an undertaking regularly engaged in dis­ tribution within the meaning of Article 80 of the Treaty. Therefore the said article, together with Article 65 of the Treaty, gives it the right to institute proceedings before the Court.

4. The application is therefore admissible. The applicants may raise all the grounds set out in the first paragraph of Article 33.

B — Substance

(I) Infringement of essential procedural requirements

1. The applicants see an infringement of essential procedural requirements in the inadequacy of the reasons in support of Article 8 of the decision; according to them, an error as to reasons is equivalent to an absence of reasons. According to the general provisions of Article 5 and 15 of the Treaty, the High Authority is required to state the reasons for its decisions, mentioning those facts on which the legal justification for the measure depends, and the considerations which have led it to adopt its decision. The reasons on which the decision is based must be stated in order that review by the Court shall be possible. However, the High Authority is not required to discuss all the possible objections which might be raised against the decision.

Moreover, the Court cannot share the opinion of the applicants, that the argu­ ments of the High Authority do not constitute legally acceptable reasons, because they are also applicable to the criteria which the High Authority did not criticize. That opinion is incorrect, if only because the said criteria merely require the pur­ chase of a certain tonnage from the whole of the Community or from the appli­ cants, but not from certain other selling agencies. In order to judge whether there has been an infringement of essential procedural requirements, it is not necessary to examine whether the conception of the High Authority is correct in law. What matters is that it must be logically compatible with the decision adopted.

(II) Infringement of the Treaty

a — In general

Article 65 (2) provides that joint-selling agreements may be authorized. The result is, as is shown by the remainder of the general considerations, that in the first instance they are caught by the prohibition in Article 65 (1) and that they are then subject to authorization.

Therefore the application puts forward a complaint based on an incorrect applica­ tion of Article 65 of the Treaty. The structure of that provision requires that one must first examine whether there exists a restriction on competition subject to authorization (Article 65 (1)), and then examine whether there are grounds for authorizing that restriction (Article 65 (2)).

b — Infringement of Article 65 of the Treaty

1. Is there a restriction on competition within the meaning of Article 65 (1)?

(a) The applicants did not at first deny that the trading rules contained in their agreement constituted a restriction on competition which was subject to author­ ization. In their reply, they argued for the first time that the clause at issue, as such, did not contain a restriction, and that therefore it was not subject to author­ ization.

That argument can have its place as a development of the submission of infringe­ ment of Article 65, put forward in the application, and it must not be considered as an independent complaint, which could be rejected as out of time under Article 22 of the Statute of the Court.

A wholesale trader who has already purchased 12 500 metric tons from the appli­ cant at 2 must, in order to satisfy the criterion at issue, purchase 12 500 extra metric tons of Ruhr coal from one of the other two selling agencies for Ruhr coal assuming he does not purchase them from the said applicant—and that obligation distorts or restricts competition between the three agencies. The agreements previously submitted by the President and Mausegatt agencies to the High Authority for authorization contained corresponding clauses (cf. Decisions Nos 6/56 and 7/56, JO No 6 of 13.3.1956, p. 47 and p. 60). If the High Authority had authorized the clause at issue and the similar clauses of the other two agencies, it would have practically approved, on that point, of a sort of market- sharing arrangement between all the producers of coal from the Ruhr basin. The High Authority intended to prevent competition from being distorted and to prevent such a concentration from being created. Its aim was 'to ensure by appro­ priate limitations and conditions in this authorization that the independence of the three selling agencies for Ruhr coal shall be preserved, and that in particular it shall remain possible for each selling agency to develop its own policy as regards pro­ duction and sales' (JO No 6 of 13.3.1956, p. 32). The finding that the clause at issue distorts and restricts competition arises from a purely legal assessment of the trading rules, without its being necessary to con­ sider and to assess the economic circumstances.

Thus the question whether the Court has jurisdiction to verify the finding does not arise in the present case. It follows from the foregoing considerations that the clause at issue was subject to authorization, not only as an element of the whole of the agreement concluded by the applicants, but also of itself.

joint-selling agreement submitted for authorization, was examined and assessed in particular from the aspect of its possible contribution to an improvement in the distribution of fuels (JO No 6 of 13.3.1956, p. 30) and of the need for it, taking into account in particular the conditions applying to the coal industry (JO No 6 of 13.3.1956, p. 31). In this regard, the applicants say that the clause was necessary as part of the trad­ ing rules for determining the requirement for acceptance as wholesale traders with the right to make direct purchases, that requirement only being met if the trader sells a large tonnage of fuels of the same sort, for present purposes 25 000 metric tons of Ruhr coal, upon identical conditions as to freight, carriage and storage. They argue that a trader is all the more suitable if he is given the possibility of qualifying as a wholesaler with other agencies distributing the same products by means of the provisions for set-off laid down in the rules. They claim that this sensible choice of traders is essential for an appreciable im­ provement in the distribution of the products of the applicants, and that it thus accords with the purpose of Article 65 (2). The clause at issue, and in particular the reciprocal set-off of quantities purchased from certain other selling agencies for Ruhr coal for which it provides, leads in any case to an improvement in the distribution of Ruhr coal as a whole. Under the terms of the trading rules, that task is entrusted to certain organizations common to the three selling agencies. In authorizing certain common organizations and arrangements, the High Au­ thority has in fact taken into account, to the extent permitted by the Treaty, in particular by Article 65, of the natural conditions, mentioned by the applicants, common to all the mining undertakings of the Ruhr. To a large extent, those organizations ensure that the interests which the appli­ cants purport to protect by the application of the clause at issue are upheld, namely publicity in favour of Ruhr coal (Ruhrkohlenberatungsgesellschaft— JO No 6 of 13.3.1956, p. 31) and maintenance of a balance in case of scarcity (Common Bu­ reau— JO No 6 of 13.3.1956, p. 71). However, according to Decision No 5/56 of the High Authority, each of the newly created selling agencies must develop an independent distribution policy. Their trading rules can only be authorized under Article 65 (2) if they make for improve­ ment in the distribution of the product of each of the agencies. The clause at issue does not fulfil that condition, because in determining who are wholesale traders, it provides for taking into account the quantities bought from the other two joint-selling agencies. As has been explained above, that is unnecessary as regards the improvement of the distribution of the product of each of the agencies. It is thus more restrictive than is required by its purpose. This finding arises directly from the text of the clause at issue and not from an assessment of the economic situation, which would not be liable to review by the Court.

The applicants see an infringement of the Treaty in the fact that first the High Au­ thority manifestly failed to understand the relationship existing between Article 4 (b) and Article 65 (2) and that secondly it also applied Article 4 wrongly.

1. In support of a failure to understand the relationship existing between Article 4 (b) and Article 65, the applicants claim that the provisions of Article 65, since they rank as a lex specialis, exclude the fundamental provisions of Article 4 (b).

However, such is not the case.

Articles 4 (b) and 65 of the Treaty govern the different aspects of economic life in their respective fields of application. Those two articles do not exclude neither do they annul each other; they serve to bring about the objectives of the Community. They are thus complimentary in this respect. In certain cases their provisions can cover facts justifying a simultaneous and con­ current application of the said articles. That is particularly true where, as in the present case, the clause at issue is more restrictive than is necessary for the purpose of the rules, so that it not only fails to qualify for authorization under Article 65, but also can bring about discrimin­ ation within the meaning of Article 4 (b). Therefore in mentioning Article 4 (b) in support of its decision, the High Author­ ity did not infringe the Treaty.

2. The High Authority was right in stating that the clause at issue could bring about discrimination.

(a) Discrimination between producers is conceivable and possible as the High Au thority has rightly assumed.

Therefore the application must be rejected.

C — Costs

Under Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, the unsuccessful party shall be ordered to pay the costs; the applicants must accordingly be ordered to bear the costs of the proceedings.

Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General; Having regard to Articles 4, 5, 15, 33, 34, 65 and 80 of the Treaty; Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice; Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and to the Rules of the Court on costs

THE COURT

hereby:

M. Pilotti Ch. L. Hammes President Judge-Rapporteur A. Van Houtte

Registrar

OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL ROEMER1

Summary

I — Facts 22

II — Conclusion and admissibility of the application 23 III — Infringement of essential procedural requirements 24