C-9/57

3. Financial arrangements — Indirect means of action [Cf. paragraph 3, summary in Case 8/57 of 21 June 1958]

4. Fundamental objectives of the Community (a) Duties of the High Authority — Implementation of Articles 2 to 5 [Cf. paragraph 4(a), summary in Case 8/57 of 21 June 1958] (b) Reconciliation of the various objectives of Article 3 [Cf. paragraph 4(b), summary in Case 8/57 of 21 June 1958] (c) Combination of various objectives — Common interest Protection of the common interest does not rule out, if the circumstances so require, the inclusion in a measure combining the pursuit of the various objectives laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty of all measures of a selective or gradual nature compatible with the princi­ ple of equality and necessary for carrying out the tasks laid down in the said article. Con­ sequently an indirect means of action on production cannot be considered as incompatible with the protection of the common interest on the pretext that it involves different treat­ ment

(Treaty, first paragraph of Article 3).

5. Financial arrangements — System of allocation — Direct action on production [Cf. paragraph 6, summary in Case 8/57 of 21 June 1958]

6. Influence on investments — Financial arrangements — Indirect action regarding investments [Cf. paragraph 7, summary in Case 8/57 of 21 June 1958]

In Case 9/57

Application for the annulment of Articles 6 (3), 8 and 9 of Decision No 2/57 of the High Authority of 26 January 1957, published in the Journal Officiel No 4, of 28 January 1957, and consequently of Articles 3 (1) (b), 4 (3), 5, 6(1) and (2) and 7 thereof

THE COURT

composed of: M. Pilotti, President, A. van Kleffens and L. Delvaux, Presidents of Chambers, P. J. S. Serrarens, O. Riese, J. Rueff, Ch. L. Hammes, Judges,

Advocate-General: M. Lagrange Registrar: A. Van Houtte

gives the following

JUDGMENT

come Decision No 2/57, it was unable to misuse of powers affecting the applicant, agree with any of them. with all the legal consequences thereof, in It holds that intervention of the nature of particular with regard to settlement of the Decision No 2/57 was unnecessary. The fees, costs and any other expenses.' deficit in ferrous scrap in the Community will not increase indefinitely and has alrea­ 3. Submissions and arguments of dy showed signs of decreasing although the the parties production of steel is extremely high. The equalization of imported ferrous scrap has A — Admissibility complied with the rules of a market econo­ 1. Whether it is possible for a misuse of my and has not prevented a massive in­ powers to have been committed affect­ crease in the cost of scrap for steel under­ ing the applicant association itself takings; those undertakings are sufficiently aware of the prospects of supplies of raw The defendant maintains that it is clear materials themselves to have taken action, from the judgments of the Court of Justice dating from 1956 and indeed from the end in Cases 3 and 4/54 that for an application of 1955, to increase production of pig-iron. by an association of undertakings to be ad­ The applicant finally maintains that Deci­ missible it is sufficient that certain under­ sion No 2/57 did not constitute the sole so­ takings are affected by the relevant decision lution to the problem as conceived by the although other undertakings are not. Furth­ High Authority. This solution was the most ermore in the judgments in Cases 8 and onerous and the most expensive for certain 9/55 the Court noted that the second para­ steel undertakings. graph of Article 33 constitutes an exception The defendant replies that it had to cope which is to be explained by the fact that the with the structural failings in the market in individual factor prevails in this instance. ferrous scrap in the Community; it had to Since the present case concerns an applica­ rectify defects in the system existing before tion by an association of undertakings ref­ Decision No 2/57, that is to say to counter erence must thus be made to the collective the incentive provided by the functioning factor. Can this collective interest prevail of the equalization scheme to increase con­ against the individual interests of the un­ sumption of ferrous scrap; it had to face dertakings which are members of the asso­ both a problem relating to prices and a prob­ ciation if those interests are divergent? lem relating to quantity. It was thus neces­ The applicant replies that the contested pro­ sary to adopt measures intended essentially visions of Decision No 2/57 affect both the to discourage any increases in the total con­ general interest and the individual interests sumption of ferrous scrap and to encourage of certain undertakings which are members scrap to be used with a maximum of econ­ of the Chambre Syndicale. This constitutes omy. a double ground for the admissibility of the application. 2. Conclusions of the parties 2. Whether the submissions constitute The applicant claims that the Court should: complaints of misuse of powers

The applicant replies that Decision No 2/57 tors peculiar to the undertakings, such as maintains a system previously in force and variation in output, but not in relation to lays down new requirements. In that the criteria foreign to the market economy, previous equalization scheme is maintained such as the date when the plant was put into the objective is indeed to ensure a regular operation. Any exceptions to this must be supply at a reasonable price. The application in accordance with express provisions of the is not directed against the equalization Treaty, which, in fact, is careful to author scheme but merely against the provisions of ize expressly (Article 58; Articles 24 and 29 the decision which establish a new system. (a) of the Convention on the Transitional Provisions) specific financial arrangements (b) The defendant sets out the eight com each time the problems in view cannot be plaints in the application in four groups re resolved merely by recourse to the proce lating to Articles 3, 54, 59 and 65 of the dures which maintain normal competition. Treaty respectively. The complaint with re It follows that the provisions of Article 53 gard to Article 65 is based upon a manifestly alone do not permit financial arrangements mistaken interpretation of the wording of to be made which affect the market econo Article 53 which the applicant does not dis

The ap in relation to Article 59, plication fails to show in what way the con in relation to Article 54, and tested provisions of Decision No 2/57 are in relation to Article 3 (d) and (g); contrary to the market economy. The appli cant has maintained that only indirect (2) Two complaints of infringement of the means of action must respect the principles Treaty: of the market economy as they have been defined in Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Treaty. infringement of Articles 53 and 54 This is not the case: the High Authority (the scope of the powers conferred by must in fact in all circumstances endeavour Article 53 with reference to Article 54) to act in accordance with the principles de and fined in those articles. Furthermore, Arti

tion. The financial arrangements under Ar ply at a reasonable price. Accordingly, it is ticle 53 constitute indirect means of action necessary to view the advantages and dis which do not permit substantial departure advantages of the scheme as a whole. It from the rules of the market economy as cannot be said that a special charge obtains they have been defined in Articles 2,3 and when an entirely general system, all the 4 of the Treaty. The lawfulness of an impo conditions of which apply to all undertak sition with regard to the Treaty may be ap ings, is concerned. praised in terms of physical or technical fac- The financial arrangements under Article

The objective of Article 53 is to apply the it adversely affects whole categories of un­ necessary corrective and supplementary dertakings deliberately selected as victims; factors to the interaction of supply and de­ it prevents existing plant from being used to mand in order to attain the objectives laid its full extent and violates the principle that down in Article 3, whenever the natural undertakings must be free to choose their operation of the market is insufficient to act own methods of production; as a regulator as it normally does. for the benefit of already established under­ takings, it penalizes undertakings putting First complaint: Misuse of powers in that the new plant into operation after 31 January contested provisions pursue objectives con­ 1958; trary to the objectives in Articles 3 and 53. in terms of the reduction in the specific in­ put of ferrous scrap, it benefits undertak­ The applicant relies on the argument that ings which limit themselves to correcting the financial arrangement provided for in previous operational deficiencies and, in or­ Article 53 must, as that article is worded, be der to re-establish balance, penalizes under­ necessary for the performance of the tasks takings whose operations, past and present, set out in Article 3. The arrangement which are above criticism. was made has objectives contrary to the ob­ jectives of this article. The High Authority (c) The contested provisions pursue objec­ has thus used the powers which it possesses tives contrary to those set out in Article 3 under Article 53 for objectives other than (d) and (g) in that they paralyse the expan­ those for which the powers were conferred sion and improvement of the production upon it. potential of undertakings and thereby pre­ (a) There is a contradiction between the ob­ vent the orderly expansion and moderniza­ tion of production. jective stated by the High Authority and the actual objective of the provisions com­ plained of. (d) The contested provisions pursue an ob­ The objective set out in the decision is two­ jective contrary to that laid down in Article fold: 3 (b) (equal access to the sources of produc­ tion) in that to encourage undertakings to effect econo­ mies in ferrous scrap; it subjects undertakings to a system of sup­ to take all appropriate steps not to exacer­ ply which varies depending on whether bate difficulties in creating new production they put new plant into operation before or capacities for steel. after 31 January 1958; it establishes generally a system for the re­ The true objectives of the contested deci­ duction of the supplementary contribution sions are as follows: in terms of the reduction of the specific in­ put of ferrous scrap whilst for whole catego­ to prohibit the creation of new plants to be ries of undertakings it is completely impos­ put into operation after 31 January 1958; to sible to reduce the unitary consumption of prevent the existing plant from being used ferrous scrap. to its full extent and to make it impossible for undertakings to substitute certain me­ The defendant denies that it sacrificed the thods of production for others; common interest by deliberately choosing

the High Authority in having recourse to In particular, the provisions in Article 6 (3) indirect means of action on production and, of the contested decision abolish any refer­ more particularly, to the financial arrange­ ence period for plant put into operation after ments in Article 53 (b). The High Authority 31 January 1958. Undertakings which in­ has in no way disregarded the objectives vest in new plant after this date are thus au­ laid down in Article 3 (d) and (g) but has tomatically penalized unless they can ben­ reconciled them, as was necessary in the efit from the provisions of Article 9 regard­ circumstances, with the objective in sub­ ing reductions in the specific reference. paragraph (a) (regular supply to the Com­ Thus, regardless of the objectives which the mon Market). High Authority claims it pursued in adopt­ With regard to infringement of the Treaty ing Decision No 2/57, its objective in enact­ the defendant denies that it infringed Arti­ ing the provisions of Article 6 (3) was indis­ cle 3 (b) of the Treaty (equal access to the putably to raise obstacles to new plant being sources of production). brought into service after 31 January 1958. The powers of the High Authority with re­ (a) With regard to the complaint that by gard to investments are detailed in a strictly Article 6 (3) of the decision it subjected un­ exhaustive list in Article 54. The High Au­ dertakings in comparable conditions to a thority may only deliver an opinion and has different system, the defendant replies that power to prevent investments only when the provision in Article 6 (3) is not in the na­ they involve the grant of subsidies and aids ture of a penalty but reflects the principle of contrary to the Treaty. When the High Au­ imposing a supplementary charge on any thority took action concerning investments increase in consumption of ferrous scrap outside the limits laid down by those provi­ during a reference period. On the contrary, sions and used for this purpose the powers the provisions conferring a notional refer­ which it holds under Article 53, it misap­ ence consumption in respect of plant put plied this article. into service before the date complained of The applicant further considers that when constitute a transitional benefit for the un­ the High Authority employed Article 53 in­ dertakings. stead of Article 54 it did so in the belief that the wording of the former was more favou­ (b) With regard to the complaint that, by rable to it than that of the latter. Article 54 Article 9 of the decision, it has placed at a requires the High Authority to act in ac­ disadvantage undertakings which for tech­ cordance with finely-distinguished apprai­ nical reasons are incapable of reducing their sals, taking into account, in particular, the specific input, the defendant replies that general objectives of Article 46. The High only solid-charged electric furnaces have a Authority could not claim to include specific input which it is technically possi­ amongst those general objectives the auto­ ble to reduce. It is true that there appear to matic prohibition of new investments or the be technical limitations to the possibility of repression of the full use of existing invest­ a reduction with regard to such plant. Ne­ ments.

an influence on investments, this can only exceeded, if the specific input reference can be regarded as the natural result of a price be reduced and in proportion to such reduc mechanism intended as an indirect action tion. on production. This procedure is strictly in Furthermore if the High Authority did not accordance with Article 53. The system have recourse to Article 59 this was in order complained of has neither the objective nor to avoid the conditions for the implementa the result of prohibiting new investments. tion of this article which require fine dis The complaint of misuse of procedure can tinctions to be drawn in taking account of not be accepted if it is conceded that Article various individual situations. 54 is by no means exhaustive with regard to The defendant replies that whilst the con investment and a financial arrangement in tested provisions indeed relate to quantities accordance with Article 53 may properly in they cannot be considered as identical to a volve indirect effects on investments. system of allocation.

Third complaint: Misuse of powers in that Article 59 and Annex II it does not require the contested provisions result in an alloca such unanimous assent; it can only be pre tion. vented from taking such steps if the Coun cil, acting unanimously, decides otherwise. The applicant maintains that the contested It is true that Article 59 states that the allo provisions effect an allocation, which can cation must be carried out on an equitable only be brought about under the procedure basis and that the High Authority must al in Article 59 and in Annex II. locate to each undertaking a specific quota The system established by the impugned of available resources.

Procedure view in establishing through Article 53 a system of double prices which prohibits The application is in the appropriate form all consumption of scrap in excess of a and was submitted within the prescribed reference level. This level may only be period.

B — Substance

The High Authority has selected Article 53 as the legal basis of the scheme for the equalization of ferrous scrap which it has established. That article permits it to intervene in connexion with the tasks assigned to it under the Treaty, in par­ ticular under Article 3 thereof. Article 53 appears in Chapter II, entitled 'Financial Provisions', the other articles of which relate to the use of funds which the High Authority obtains through lev­ ies on production or by loans and it may accordingly be considered that the finan­ cial arrangements referred to in Article 53 are arrangements based on the transfer of resources, in particular arrangements in the nature of equalization or compen­ sation. This interpretation is confirmed by the last paragraph of Article 62 which provides that certain equalization payments 'may ... be instituted as provided in Article 53'.

CHAMBRE SYNDICALE SIDERURGIE FRANCAISE v HIGH AUTHORITY ECSC

ticle 59). The High Authority, by using the financial arrangements provided for in Article 53, is in a position to exercise a broad influence on the market in coal and steel whilst it must be borne in mind that Article 53 restricts the application of such arrangements to the procedures 'necessary for the performance of the tasks set out in Article 3 and compatible with this Treaty, and in particular with Article 65'. The express reference made to Article 3 does not release the High Authority from its duty to observe the other articles of the Treaty and in particular Articles 2, 4 and 5 which, together with Article 3, must always be observed because they es tablish the fundamental objectives of the Community. Those provisions are bind ing and must be read together if they are to be properly applied.

propriate. If the High Authority wished to avoid following those procedures—and the provisions of Article 57 require it to endeavour as far as possible to refrain from doing so—it could not avoid the need and the duty to apply the procedure pre scribed in Article 53 (b), subject to observance of the conditions for its application.

(a) Pursuant to Article 53 (b) of the Treaty the High Authority may, with the unanimous assent of the Council, itself make any financial arrangements which it recognizes to be necessary for the performance of the tasks set out in Article 3. The exercise of the powers thus conferred upon the High Authority is subject to the conditions set out in Articles 2 and 5 concerning the establishment, admin­ istration and guidance of the Common Market. Pursuant to Article 2 of the Treaty the Community has as its task to contribute to economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living in the Member States. The means prescribed for the attainment of those objectives consists in the establishment of a Common Market on the conditions laid down in Article 4 concerning the abolition of obstacles to trade. Pursuant to Article 2 the Community is obliged progressively to bring about conditions which will of themselves ensure the most rational distribution of production at the highest pos­ sible level of productivity while safeguarding continuity of employment and tak­ ing care not to provoke fundamental and persistent disturbances in the economies of Member States. To those ends the Community must ensure on the market the establishment, maintenance and observance of normal conditions of competition and, subject to observance of the priorities laid down by Article 57 of the Treaty in relation to its means of action, it must, in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, 'exert di­ rect influence upon production or upon the market only when circumstances so require'. In pursuing the objectives laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty the High Authority must permanently reconcile any conflicts between those objectives considered in­ dividually and, when such reconciliation proves unattainable, must grant such temporary priority to one or other of them as appears necessary having regard to the economic facts or circumstances in the light of which, in carrying out the tasks entrusted to it under Article 8 of the Treaty, it adopts its decisions. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 57 of the Treaty in the sphere of production, the High Authority is required to give preference to the indirect means of action at its disposal, in particular to intervention in regard to prices. As has previously been stated, such means of action must be regarded as including the financial ar­ rangements provided for in Article 53 since they influence prices in particular through compensation for and correction of factors which contribute to their for­ mation. Since those arrangements contribute to the formation of prices they alter the price-level on the market and thereby influence the effects which the price- level produces on the direction of production, and thus on the structure of the means of production. Such arrangements thus provide the High Authority with the means to modify the effects of 'normal competitive conditions' whilst ensur­ ing, in accordance with the requirements of Article 5 of the Treaty, the mainte-

nance and observance of these conditions. By making appropriate use of this pow erful means of intervention the High Authority is largely capable, provided that the circumstances require it, of bringing about the required reconciliation between the objectives listed in Article 3 of the Treaty in carrying out the task with which it is entrusted under the Treaty. The powers which have thus been conferred on the High Authority are however limited by the specific provisions set out in Title III of the Treaty. In particular these powers would be used for an objective other than their legal purpose if it ap peared that the High Authority had applied them with the exclusive, or at any rate the decisive, purpose of evading a procedure especially prescribed by the Treaty in order to deal with the circumstances with which it is required to cope. At the time when the contested decisions were adopted the market in ferrous scrap was widely recognized as being characterized by a severe shortage of Com munity supplies, by mounting difficulties in imports and by large-scale and rapid increases in the price of foreign scrap. This situation arising from those economic facts and circumstances cannot in any event be regarded as prima facie excluding intervention by the High Authority to counter the consequences at variance with the requirements of Article 3 of the Treaty which this situation might have in

Through those measures the High Authority provided the scheme for the equalization of the prices of imported ferrous scrap, which it had previously established, with condi tions intended to prevent a fall in the price of ferrous scrap resulting from equal ization from encouraging producers in the Common Market to increase their con sumption of scrap.

(c) Pursuant to the beginning of Article 3 of the Treaty, when the institutions of the Community carry out the tasks defined in the said article they must act in the common interest. The concept of the common interest referred to in Article 3, far from being restricted to the sum of individual interests of undertakings or of cate­ gories of undertakings subject to the jurisdiction of the Community, considerably exceeds the scope of such interests and is defined in relation to the general aims clearly laid down in Article 2. Protection of the common interest does not rule out, if the circumstances so re- quire, the inclusion in a measure combining the pursuit of the various objectives laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty of all measures of a selective and gradual nature compatible with the principle of equality and necessary for carrying out the tasks laid down in that article. Consequently, an indirect means of action on production cannot be considered as incompatible with the protection of the common interest on the pretext that it involves different treatment.

CHAMBRE SYNDICALE SIDERURGIE FRANCAISE v HIGH AUTHORITY ECSC

different consequences or disparate disadvantages for the persons concerned when this is clearly the result of their different operating conditions. The supplementary rate established under Article 3 (1) (b) of the contested deci­ sion applies generally and entirely to any consumption of bought scrap in excess of that relating to a reference period. The discretion conferred upon the undertak­ ings subject to the scheme themselves to select, within specially prescribed tem­ poral limits, the period most favourable to them does not, however, mean that the criterion used for distinguishing between them thus loses its objective nature, without which it would appear arbitrary. Indeed the factual differences which this situation entails for undertakings stem from their dissimilar operating conditions and not from any legal inequality inherent in the decision. The graduation of the contested supplementary rate laid down by the provisions of Article 8 is based exclusively on the successive periods for the application of Decision No 2/57. The graduation is thus general and absolute, objectively based upon the wish progressively to provide encouragement, by influencing prices, to steel undertakings consuming ferrous scrap to economize in using it so as to avoid its unconsidered exhaustion.

The refunds of the proportion of the equalization contribution calculated at the supplementary rate, which were established pursuant to Article 9 of the disputed decision, are granted on a purely objective basis, the reduction of the specific input coefficient of ferrous scrap for each type of plant and manufacturing process using that material. The varying effects which the application of that article produces on the persons concerned, by reason of varying operating conditions and technical problems which, for certain categories of plant, may reduce or even exclude en­ titlement to refunds cannot render the rule inequitable in law—which is excluded by the nature of the criterion adopted.

Consequently, as has been stated, pursuit of the objectives prescribed in Article 3 does not rule out selective measures based in particular upon the nature of the means of production to be developed or created if it appears that economic circum­ stances and the reasonably foreseeable trend of market conditions call for such measures. This is certainly so when there are dangers of a serious shortage of one of the basic raw materials for the steel industry or if it appears necessary to adopt a policy of using resources rationally in order to avoid their unconsidered exhaus­ tion. The distinction which may consequently prove necessary to maintain con­ ditions which will encourage undertakings to expand and improve their produc­ tion potential and to promote its regular development nevertheless must be based upon purely objective criteria in accordance with the principle of equality laid down in the Treaty. The provisions of Article 6 of the contested decision are intended progressively to encourage steel undertakings to use scrap as rationally as possible. To attain this the provisions alter the cost of financing the equalization of the prices of imported ferrous scrap both in terms of the nature of the plant and manufacturing processes and the date when operations were commenced, through the combined action of reference consumption and refunds granted in respect of relative economies in scrap. The graduated increase in the cost of ferrous scrap and the selective influ­ ence thereof on the cost price of steel products vary in terms of objectively deter­ mined quantitative and qualitative criteria. Consequently the contested measures constitute with regard to the principle of non-discrimination, provisions encourag­ ing undertakings to develop new capacities considered compatible with regular supplies of scrap for the steel industry and the orderly expansion of production. The provisions of Articles 6 and 8 of the contested decision thus constitute a body of progressive rules without which the financial arrangement established by the said decision would forfeit its character of an indirect means of action in relation to production thereby rendering it unlawful with respect to the provisions of Ar­ ticles 5 and 57.

thority for the accomplishment of the tasks with which it is charged under the Treaty. On the other hand direct influence, such as the allocation of resources for which provision is made in Article 59, is not concerned with how producers would behave if they acted freely but directly prescribes, on pain of fines, as is stated in Article 59 (7), the behaviour which the High Authority considers necessary with regard to the situation with which the Treaty requires it to cope. The two procedures, indirect and direct, are intended to modify the structures to which, unless modified by intervention, individual behaviour would give rise. The procedures thus both constitute procedures for economic intervention but the for­ mer create the right conditions to encourage producers freely to adopt the behav­ iour which the common interest, referred to in Article 3, requires of them whilst the latter impose upon undertakings in the same common interest behaviour other than that which they would be prompted to adopt by the actual circum­ stances.

JUDGMENT OF 26. 6. 1958 — CASE 9/57

application of the supplementary contribution imposed on the latter in accordance with the variations in their consumption of ferrous scrap. This modification en­ tailed the gradual elimination of the effects of equalization, or even in certain cases their abolition.

The contested scheme was thus intended above all to ensure a regular supply to the market and to promote a policy of using resources rationally. Nevertheless there are no grounds for asserting that, by according temporary priority to certain of the aims set out in Article 3, and consequently only partially reconciling all of the aims set out therein, the High Authority used the powers given it under the Treaty for purposes other than those for which they were conferred. Since misuse of powers has not been established this complaint must be rejected.

2. The complaint of misuse of powers in that the contested provisions are intended to effect an allocation

CHAMBRE SYNDICALE SIDERURGIE FRANCAISE v HIGH AUTHORITY ECSC

the powers conferred upon it under Article 53 (b) of the Treaty it was acting in accordance with the provisions of Article 59 which provide that recourse shall only be had to the special procedure of quantitative allocation, even if a case of serious shortage has been duly found, if the means of action provided for in Article 57, amongst which the financial arrangements referred to in Article 53 must be clas­ sified, do not permit sufficiently effective action. Furthermore, whilst the contested provisions are intended progressively to in­ crease the cost of ferrous scrap in proportion to the quantities consumed and to graduate that cost so that it varies in terms of the type of plant and manufacturing processes using scrap, the applicant has failed to establish that the financial burden which this entails for the relevant undertakings is determined in such a way that the arrangement complained of must be considered as equivalent to a direct and specific arrangement for quantitative allocation or for regulating the level of their activity. Furthermore, although the system set up does not constitute a system of alloca­ tion, even on the view that such a system might display certain characteristics of indirect allocation it would be necessary to prove that the objective of the contest­ ed decisions was to attain this allocation by means of Article 53 (b), through the expedient of a financial arrangement and contrary to the stated objective of effect­ ing economies in ferrous scrap and ensuring a regular supply of scrap to the mar­ ket, or else, to prove that the High Authority had been motivated by a wish to evade Article 59 or that, through a serious misconception it had failed to recognize that the contested arrangement amounted to an arrangement under Article 59. Since this has not been sufficiently proved in law misuse of powers has not been established.

Costs

Under Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court the unsuccessful party shall be ordered to bear the costs. In the present case the applicant has been un­ successful with regard to the substance of the case and the defendant has been unsuccessful as regards admissibility. In accordance with the second paragraph of the said article the applicant must thus be ordered to bear four-fifths of the costs of the proceedings and the defendant to bear one fifth.

Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General; Having regard to Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 33, 46, 47, 48, 53, 54, 57, 58, 59, 65 and 80 of the Treaty and Annex II thereto; Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice; Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and the rules of the Court on costs,

THE COURT

hereby:

Declares that the application is admissible but unfounded and consequently dismisses the application for the annulment of the provisions contained in Articles 3 (1) (b), 4 (3), 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of Decision No 2/57 of the High Au­ thority dated 26 January 1957;

President Judge-Rapporteur A. Van Houtte

Registrar

OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL LAGRANGE (see p. 288)