C-6/60

The taking into account of this remuner­ 4. The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice ation for the purpose of calculating the provided forby Article 16 of the Protocol rate applicable to the income of the on the Privileges and Immunities of the spouse of an official of the ECSC where ECSC is exclusive; an application the national legislation applicable pro­ brought under this provision is not inad­ vides for assessment on the joint income missible merely because the applicant of the spouses is likewise prohibited. has not exhausted his rights of recourse to the courts of his own country before­ 7. If the Court finds that a legislative or ad­ hand. ministrative measure adopted by the au­ thorities of a Member State is contrary to 5. The privileges and immunities of offi­ Community law, that State is obliged by cials of the ECSC, in particular exemp­ virtue of Article 86 of the ECSC Treaty tion from national taxes, although prov­ to rescind the measure in question and to ided in the public interest of the Com­ make reparation for any unlawful conse­ munity, are granted directly to those of­ quences thereof.

In Case 6/60

JEAN-E. HUMBLET , an official of the ECSC, with an address for service in Luxem­ bourg at 7 rue du Fort-Rheinsheim,

applicant,

assisted by Paul Orianne, Advocate at the Cour d'Appel, Brussels,

v

composed of: A. M. Donner, President, Ch. L. Hammes and N. Catalano, Pres­ idents of Chambers, O. Riese (Judge-Rapporteur) and R. Rossi, Judges,

Advocate-General: M. Lagrange Registrar: A. Van Houtte

gives the following

JUDGMENT

Issues of fact and of law

I — Summary of the facts The applicant, an official of the ECSC, is a Belgian citizen. In accordance with the The facts giving rise to the present case may above-mentioned provisions, the Inspector be summarized as follows: of Taxes (Controleur des Contributions) at Hollogne-aux-Pierres requested him on 26 In the Belgian income tax system there are Qctober 1959 to supply information as to the scheduled taxes (impôts cédulaires) the gross amount of the remuneration paid which are levied at different rates according to him by the ECSC for the years 1957,1958 to the nature of the incomeand an additional and 1959, adding: 'Although exempt, the tax known as the 'personal surtax' (impôt net remuneration must be taken into ac­ complémentaire personnel) (cf. Decree of count in order to determine the rates of tax the Regent of 15 January 1948 consolidat­ applicable to other taxable income; in your ing the laws and decrees relating to income case income subject to the personal surtax.' tax (hereinafter referred to as 'the consoli­ This other taxable income had been re­ dated laws'), in particular Article 37 et ceived by the spouse of the applicant, who seq. — Moniteur Belge of 21 January 1948). is not an official of the Community. This tax is levied on the aggregate income; the rate increases progressively with succes­ In his reply of 12 November 1959 the appli­ sive bands of income; the income of the cant refused to make a declaration of his spouses is aggregated whatever regime of own income maintaining that by virtue of matrimonial property is adopted and the as­ Article 11 (b) of the Protocol on the Privi­ sessment is made on the head of the family leges and Immunities of the ECSC (herein­ (cf. Articles 37, 43 and 46 of the consol­ after referred to as 'the Protocol') officials of idated laws). the Community are exempt from all taxa-

tion on salaries and emoluments paid by the On 18 or 19 December 1959 the Collector of Community and that therefore his salary Taxes at Engis sent to the applicant a 'No­ could not be taken into account in calculat­ tice and Extract from the income tax regis­ ing the personal surtax. ter showing unpaid tax for the 1957 tax year' ('Avertissement-extrait de role aux By a notice of estimated assessment (avis impôts sur les revenus, rappel de droits de d'imposition d'office) of 25 November 1959 l'exercice 1957') requiring payment of FB and notice of rectification of the declaration 9035 in respect of the personal surtax; this (avis de rectification de la declaration) of notice further contained the observation the same day, the tax inspectorate informed 'additional assessment including sur­ the applicant that his assessment to person­ charges for an inexact or incomplete declar­ al surtax would be made on an estimated ation' (imposition supplemental avec ac­ basis in accordance with Article 56 of the croissements pour declaration inexacte ou consolidated laws and informed him that in incomplete). view of'your clear intention to avoid paying the tax due by supplying an incomplete dec­ The tax was assessed on an amount of FB laration' the tax inspectorate was author­ 69122 declared by the applicant as the ized 'to apply Article 74 of the consolidated amount of his wife's income, but the rate of laws which provides a time-limit of five the tax assessed on this amount was deter­ years for collecting back taxes'. On the back mined by adding to the income of the wife of the notice of estimated assessment the the estimated amount of the applicant's in­ tax authorities stated 'it is not contested come from his employment as an official of that the income from employment received the ECSC. by a person as an official of the ECSC in Luxembourg is exempt from tax'; neverthe­ On 1 April 1960 the applicant brought the less by virtue of the first paragraph of Arti­ present application based in the main on the cle 43 of the consolidated laws providing for view that the procedure followed by the the aggregation of the incomes of the Belgian tax authorities which took account spouses for the personal surtax 'whilst being of the emoluments paid by the ECSC and exempt from this tax, the net income from which required the applicant to declare employment must be known in order to de­ them is contrary to Article 11 (b) of the Pro­ termine the rate of tax applicable to the in­ tocol. come received by the spouse' of the appli­ cant. II — Conclusions of the parties

for by Belgian law cannot, even for the de­ 1. The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice termination of the rate of this tax, be based on the existence of or on the amount of the A — Article 16 of the Protocol provides above-mentioned salary; therefore the tax that assessed on the applicant as set out in the Notice and Extract from the income tax re­ 'any dispute concerning the interpretation gister sent to him on 18 December 1959 or application of the present Protocol shall (Articles 913,321) in the sum of FB 9035 is be submitted to the Court.' prohibited by the Protocol and therefore is void and of no effect; The applicant considers that in view of this provision the Court of Justice has jurisdic­ accordingly: tion to rule on the present case since it con­ cerns the interpretation or application of annul the contested assessment and order Article 11 (b) of the Protocol which reads as the Belgian State to repay to the applicant all follows: the amounts, including interest and charges which have been or may be paid by the ap­ 'In the territory of each of the Member plicant in respect of this assessment; order States, and whatever their nationality, ... it to pay compensatory interest at 4.5% per officials of the Community: annum on the amounts repayable as from the date of payment to the date of repay­ ment; (b) shall be exempt form any tax on salaries order the Belgian State to bear the costs. and emoluments paid by the Commu­ nity; In its defence the defendant contends that the Court should:

JUDGMENT OF 16.12.1960 — CASE 6/60

The applicant replies that if the view advo­ (d) If the view of the defendant were ac­ cated by the defendant were adopted, this cepted, this would give rise to insoluble would reduce the judgment of the Court to problems and the protection of the privi­ a mere opinion; such a restrictive interpre­ leges and immunities established by the tation of Article 16 of the Protocol which Protocol would be ineffective in the ab­ gives the Court the power to resolve any sence of coordination of the national rules dispute concerning its application would be of procedure on the one hand and those of in conflict with the 'particular aim of its the Community on the other (the possible provisions' and the 'requirements for their expiry of the time-limits provided for by na­ implementation'. tional law; the applicant's inability to secure the enforcement of a judgment of the Court (a) The Protocol entails a restriction of the of Justice). sovereignty of the Member States which is regarded as indispensable in order to ensure Further by recognizing that the judgents of the proper functioning of the Community the Court are enforceable, the Treaty gives institutions and to ensure protection the Court of Justice the power to make the against 'the exercise by the Member States appropriate orders.

HUMBLET v BELGIUM

In the present case the exemption Neither the ECSC Treaty nor the Protocol was granted since no tax was required from provides for any exception to this proce the applicant in respcet of his own remun dure. The Protocol does not assign to the eration; the amount on which the tax in Court the right to annul directly assess question is assessed merely covers the in ments to national tax. Further, no such come of his wife who is not an official of the right may be derived from the powers as

case of Baron de Selys-Longchamps, Secre 2. The substance of the case tary-General of the Customs Cooperation Council, and in the case of G. de Burlet, an The applicant believes that the Belgian State official of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ infringed the rule contained in Article 11 ization. Furthermore the defendant refers (b) of the Protocol by aggregating the to earlier case-law relating to income ex remuneration paid by the Community and empted from Belgian taxation by the inter income taxable for the purpose of the per national conventions for the avoidance of sonal surtax to determine and thus auto double taxation, in particular the judgment matically to increase the rate of this tax. of the Cour de Cassation of Belgium of 6 February 1935 in the Eyers case (Pasicrisie, The defendant states that the dispute relates 1939, I, 62). In these judgments, given in to 'the question whether the remuneration cases analagous to that of the applicant, Bel of an official of the Community who is ex gian case-law confirmed the point of view empt from all taxation by virtue of Article adopted in the present case by the defend 11 (b) of the Protocol on the Privileges and ant.

Acceptace of the interpretation advocated (b) If the other income which gave rise to by the applicant 'would produce the ex­ the assessment to tax had been acquired traordinary result that the income of his by the applicant personally, the tax spouse, governed exclusively by Belgian tax would have been assessed in exactly the law, would receive favourable treatment... same way and the tax authorities would The tax exemption granted to the applicant likewise have contested the application by the Protocol would have the effect of of Article 11 (b) of the Protocol; this is further reducing the tax liability of his wife evident from their correspondence with to whom the Protocol does not apply'. the applicant and from Belgian case-law on which the defendant relies. In reply to this argument the applicant states that in the present case what is at is­ 3. If the applicant had received no remun­ sue is not Belgian law but the Protocol on eration from the ECSC, he would not have the Privileges and Immunities of the Com­ been assessed to the sum of FB 9035. munity. That tax assessment 'originates, at least in 1. The distinction between the words 'exo- part, from the fact that the applicant re­ néré' ('exempt') and 'immunise' (immune) ceives remuneration from the Community has no significance in Belgian tax law as and, in reliance on the Protocol, refused to both words are used in legislation and in declare the amount of this remuneration to case-law interchangeably; this is confirmed the tax authorities'. by the Dutch text of the Belgian laws. The distinction is still less valid in supranational The Protocol obliges national authorities to law. The intention of the authors of the Pro­ consider the exempt income as non-exist­ tocol was to remove the remuneration of of­ ent. It prohibits any fiscal charge which ficials from 'all control by national tax au­ would not have been imposed if the remun­ thorities'. eration had not been paid, in order to guar­ antee to officials of the Community the 2. The fact that the other income subject to benefit of the whole of their salary and in or­ taxation is income of the wife from move­ der to ensure equality of remuneration for able property is not relevant to the case for all officials of the Community. the following reasons: To authorize the tax authorities to take into (a) The subject-matter of the dispute is the account the remuneration in order to tax taxation of the applicant himself who the other income of the official more heav­ was ordered to pay the sum of FB 9035 ily would in effect enable them by indirect comprising: means to achieve what is prohibited by the Protocol and to deprive the tax exemption a penalty for failing to declare his rem­ laid down in the Protocol of any effect. uneration as an official of the ECSC, The defendant replies: the additional personal surtax levied on him. As to Point I.

law this proves nothing in the present case As to Point 3. where the point at issue is the distinction between the concepts ’income exempt from The defendant denies that the exemption or immune from tax‘ (‘revenus exonérés ou from taxation provided for by the Protocol immunises d'impôt') and an ‘individual ex­ obliges the national authorities to regard the empt from taxation'(‘contribuable exonéré exempt income as non-existent. d'impôt'). These two terms characterize the difference existing between the objective If the authors of Article 11 (b) of the Proto­ concept of income exempt from all tax on col had intended to create the tax position the one hand and the subjective concept of which the applicant claims to exist, they a person exempt from all taxation on the would have expressed themselves in differ­ other hand. ent terms or else they would have expressly defined or interpreted the words used. In In the first case, the income itself can in no expressly choosing the system of exemp­ way be subject to tax; on the other hand in tion of the official rather than that of the ex­ the second case it is the person himself who emption of income 'they were fully aware of benefits from the provision and who may what they were doing and accepted the legal therefore be subject to no taxation. Here it consequences inherent in their choice'. In is the second example which applies; the tax fact as regards the legal position accepted which would have had to be levied on the not only in Belgium but also in other coun­ income of the applicant as an official of the tries such as Switzerland (judgment of the ECSC may not be demanded of him; in fact Swiss Federal Court (Tribunal Federal such tax was not demanded of him. Suisse) of 2 May 1958) it is recognized that income in respect of which a person benef­ As to Point 2. its from an exemption 'must nevertheless be taken into account in determining the On the other hand there is no justification rate applicable for certain taxes'. for allowing the wife of the applicant, who has no connexion with the Community, a reduction in the tax which is lawfully due on her personal income. IV — Procedure

In the present case the defendant nevertheless contends that the Court has no ju­ risdiction and that the case does not relate to the interpretation of the Protocol but to the correct application of Belgian law to the income of the applicant's wife who is not herself an official of the Community.

This argument cannot be accepted by the Court.

In reality the dispute relates to the question whether Article 11 (b) of the Protocol allows Member States to take into account the remuneration of an official of the Community in order to determine the rate of tax applicable to his wife's income. In its defence, the defendant itself stated that this was the subject of the dispute.

The Court is therefore concerned with resolving a dispute relating to the interpre­ tation or application of the Protocol, in particular Article 11 (b).

Consequently the contention that the Court lacks jurisdiction must be rejected.

2. On the other hand the Court has no jurisdiction to annul legislative or admin­ istrative measures of one of the Member States.

ported by an argument stemming from the Treaties of Rome, in particular from Article 171 of the EEC Treaty and Article 143 of the EAEC Treaty which merely attach declaratory effect to the decisions of the Court in cases of failure to comply with the Treaties, albeit obliging the Member States to take the necessary mea­ sures to comply with the judgment.

The Court finds that there is no foundation to the argument of the applicant that the protection of the privileges and immunities conferred by the Protocol would be ineffective and the judgment of the Court of Justice reduced to a mere opinion if it were unable to annul illegal measures adopted by national authorities and or­ der the Member States to make reparation for the resultant damage.

The applicant bases his reasoning on the text of Article 16 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities in conjunction with Article 43 of the ECSC Treaty on the grounds that the above-mentioned Article 16 refers not only to interpretation but also to the 'application' of that Protocol.

Nevertheless it would be erroneous to accept that this provision enables the Court to interfere directly in the legislation or administration of Member States.

In fact if the Court rules in a judgment that a legislative or administrative measure adopted by the authorities of a Member State is contrary to Community law, that Member State is obliged, by virtue of Article 86 of the ECSC Treaty, to rescind the measure in question and to make reparation for any unlawful consequences which may have ensued. This obligation is evident from the Treaty and from the Protocol which have the force of law in the Member States following their rati­ fication and which take precedence over national law.

As regards the admissibility it must first be considered (a) whether an individual may by himself lodge with the Court of Justice an application based on Article 16 of the Protocol and (b) whether he may do this before exhausting the legal and procedural means provided either by Community law or by national legislation.

Although this question was not raised by the parties in the course of the written procedure, nevertheless the Court must examine this of its own motion as it con­ cerns the admissibility of the application.

1. Examination of the relevant provisions gives rise to the following considera­ tions:

(a) By giving a right of recourse based on Article 16 of the Protocol, the authors of the Protocol clearly sought to ensure compliance with the privileges and im­ munities therein prescribed, in the interests not only of the Community and its institutions but also of the individuals to whom these privileges and im­ munities were granted and, on the other hand, in the interests of the Member States and of their administrative authorities which need to be protected against too wide an interpretation of those privileges and immunities.

It is thus quite acceptable for an official of the Community to appear before the Court of Justice as an applicant against the government of his own country in the same way as undertakings have already contested before the Court of Justice arguments submitted by the governments of their countries, interven­ ing in support of the High Authority.

Although the privileges and immunities were granted 'solely in the interests of the Community' it must not be forgotten that they were expressly accorded 'to the officials of institutions of the Community'.

(a) The question must first of all be resolved whether action by an official of the Community who regards himself as being prejudiced by an infringement of the Protocol by a Member State is not exclusively a matter for the Community or the institution to which the official belongs. Examination of this question is all the more necessary as no provision of the ECSC Treaty permits individ­ uals to bring an application directly to the Court in reliance on infringement of the Treaty by a Member State but, on the contrary, in principle it is for the High Authority to act against such an infringement by applying the procedure provided for this purpose in Article 88 of the Treaty.

Nevertheless the authors of the Treaty certainly do not overlook the fact that 'disputes' capable of arising concerning 'the interpretation or application' of the Protocol would arise in the first place from controversies between the par­ ties on whom the Protocol confers privileges and immunities and the author­ ities which have an interest in the restrictive interpretation of those privileges and immunities.

In this respect the parties to the present suit appear to be typically parties to a 'dispute' within the meaning of Article 16.

In addition, as has already been stated above, the privileges set out in the Pro­ tocol confer individual rights on the persons to whom it applies as is evidenced by the German and Dutch equivalents of the term 'privilege' (Vorrechte and voorrechten). It may generally be presumed that a substantive right has as its

JUDGMENT OF 16.12.1960 — CASE 6/60

Nevertheless the Treaties establishing the European Communities in no way set the Court of Justice of the Communities above the national judicial system in the sense that decisions taken by national courts may be contested before the Court of Justice.

As against this, the Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction with the regard to the intepretation of the Protocol. As has already been stated above the Trea­ ties are based on the principle of the strict separation between the powers of the Court on the one hand and of the national courts on the other. It follows that there is no overlapping of the jurisdiction assigned to the different courts.

Therefore, in so far as the Court of Justice has jurisdiction, there can be no question of a prior 'exhausting' in the national courts of a procedure which consists of the submission of one and the same question for decision, first by the national courts and subsequently by the Court of Justice.

Consequently the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to resolve the question of

HUMBLET v BELGIUM

law submitted to it within the limits set out above and the fact that the ap­ plicant has not exhausted his rights of recourse to the courts of his own coun­ try is no obstacle to the admissibility of the application.

The applicant believes that this method of assessment is contrary to Article 11 (b) of the Protocol.

Therefore the dispute relates to the question whether Article 11 (b) of the Protocol allows the Belgian tax authorities to take account of the salary and emoluments paid to an official of the Community by the Community in order to determine the rates applicable to the income of his spouse who is subject to the Belgian surtax on income.

Thus the applicant's conclusions raise before the Court the general problem whether, by prohibiting any taxation of the abovementioned income, Article 11

JUDGMENT OF 16.12.1960 — CASE 6/60

(b) of the Protocol also prevents, in particular, its being into account in fixing the rate of the surtax on income as provided by Belgian law.

It is necessary therefore to examine the general problem in order to deduce the principle which can be applied to enable the particular case raised here to be settled.

Literal interpretation of the text supports the view advocated by the applicant.

In fact the words 'shall be exempt from any tax on salaries' indicate clearly and unambiguously exemption from any fiscal charge based directly or indirectly on the exempted remuneration.

HUMBLET v BELGIUM

Against this it may not be contended that the term 'on salaries' justifies the con­ verse argument that Article 11 does not prevent the taxation of other income at a higher rate by reason of the remuneration in question.

Such taxation would be contrary to the exemption provided by Article 11 since the Community salary, which is exempt from all taxation, would even in this case constitute the legal basis of the taxation in question.

Furthermore the ECSC Protocol (and also the EEC and EAEC Protocols) contains no provision stating that the exemption of Community salaries does not prevent this income from being included in the total taxable income for the purpose of a tax of similar scope to that of the Belgian surtax whilst most of the more recent international agreements relating to double taxation expressly contain this reser­ vation.

The opinions of the governments put forward during the parliamentary debates on the ECSC Treaty do not touch on this question.

JUDGMENT OF 16.12.1960 — CASE 6/60

The same is true of the parliamentary votes on the EEC and EAEC Treaties which contain a provision in substantially the same terms. Most of the statements by the governments did not deal with the question, the exception being that of the Lux­ embourg government, concerning the EAEC Treaty; this asserts that the provi­ sion adopted 'will not prevent the national tax authorities from taking into account the exempted income for the purpose of calculating the rate of tax applicable to the non-exempt income, that is to say income arising from sources other than the emoluments paid by the Communities'.

Quite apart from the fact that it refers to the Protocols annexed to the Treaties of Rome and not to the ECSC Protocol, this passage does not in itself prove that the authors of the Treaties were all in agreement on this interpretation. On the con­ trary it raises afresh the question whether the common intent of the contracting parties applied equally to the secondary effects of the exemption granted which have been at issue in the present case.

A comparison of the various national laws reinforces these doubts.

Indeed, whilst it is true that the finance law of the French Republic is based on the same principles as the case-law and practice in Belgium, it is clear from the legislation of the Federal Republic of Germany that it interpreted the Protocol in the sense advocated by the applicant. The German Law on the taxation of income (Einkommensteuergesetz), in the versions of 23 September 1958 (Bundesgesetz­ blatt I, p. 672) and of 11 October 1960 (Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 789) incorporated Article 11 (b) of the Protocol into German law by including it at No 34 of Paragraph 3 under exempt incomes.

The application of national tax laws to the salaries paid by the Community would thus detrimentally affect the Community's exclusive power to fix the amount of those salaries.

This reasoning is confirmed by the Treaties establishing the EEC and the EAEC which, while providing for a tax on salaries paid by the Communities for the bene­ fit of the Communities, nevertheless reserve the power to determine this tax as well as to determine salaries to an institution of the Community, that is to say, its Council (first paragraph of Article 12 of the Protocols on the Privileges and Im­ munities of the EEC and EAEC; Article 212 of the EEC Treaty, Article 186 of the EAEC Treaty).

Taken as a whole, the three Treaties in this respect share common ground in that they withdraw the remuneration paid to officials of the Community from the Member States' sovereignty in tax matters.

In this way the Treaties sought to reinforce the independence of the administra­ tive departments of the Community vis-à-vis the national powers.

(b) A further decisive reason may be added to the line of argument set out above, namely the fact that the total exemption from national taxes is indispensable in order to guarantee the equality of remuneration for officials of different nation­ alities. It would be extremely unjust if two officials, for whom the Community in­ stitution had provided the same gross salary, were to receive different net salaries.

The difference in net remuneration could make the recruitment of officials from certain Member States more difficult, thus creating discrimination in respect of the real opportunities of access to Community service for nationals of each Mem­ ber State.

This division of reciprocal fiscal jurisdiction must exclude any taxation, direct or indirect, of income which is not within the jurisdiction of the Member States.

(a) The system adopted by the Belgian tax authorities with regard to the applica­ tion of the surtax to officials of the ECSC constitutes indirect taxation of Com­ munity salaries.

The defendant argues that the system is not contrary to the provisions of Article 11 (b) of the Protocol since the remuneration paid by the Community is not sub­ jected to any tax. The tax is merely imposed on other income by applying the rate which would be applicable to the income band resulting from the fictitious addi­ tion of the Community salary to the other income.

This argument fails to recognize certain effects of the taxation system provided for by the Belgian Law on the surtax (or by the similar systems in force in other Member States) whereby the taxable income is divided into bands which are taxed at progressively higher rates.

Application of this system of taxation gives rise to no difficulties where all of the taxpayer's income is liable to tax. In fact the application of different rates to dif­ ferent bands does not prevent the imposition of a single total sum of tax covering the whole of the income with the result that the highest rate applied to the highest band in reality also covers the whole of the income.

Normally therefore it is of no importance whether a particular item of income is

In view of this, the imposition of taxes 'on' a category of income while taking ac­ count of other income to calculate the rate of tax has the effect, at least in sub­ stance, of taxing the latter income directly.

In fact there exists a common fundamental element in taxing income directly and taxing it indirectly by aggregating it since in both cases there is a causal link be­ tween that income and the total amount for which the person concerned is liable.

(c) Consequently, a Member State infringes the Protocol if it takes account of the salaries paid by the Community to its officials in order to determine the rate of tax due on other income which is not exempted where the national tax law pro­ vides for a system of taxation on a rising scale.

It is contrary to Community law that an official should be taxed more heavily in repect of his private income because he receives a salary from the Community as taxation on this basis inevitably has the effect of reducing that salary thus breach­ ing the principle of equality of remuneration.

It cannot be argued against this that such an assessment does not infringe the principle of equality in relation to fiscal charges because it only affects officials who possess sources of income other than the emoluments paid by the Commu­ nity.

This line of argument takes no account of the fact that the essential comparison

The view advocated by the defendant has the result of misconstruing, if only in part, the meaning which should be assigned to Article 11 (b) of the Protocol. It would result not only in removing the remuneration in question from the sphere of the single, uniform law of the Community but it would also subject it to a num­ ber of different, and indeed disparate, legal systems.

It is therefore an infringement of the Treaty to take into account the remuneration referred to in Article 11 (b) of the Protocol in order to calculate the rate applicable to other income of the person concerned.

6. It must also be borne in mind that the present case concerns not the taxation of the assets of an official of the Community but those of his wife who is not an official and that for this reason the defendant argues that the Protocol is not ap­ plicable to her personal income.

Nevertheless the Belgian tax law regards the assets of the two spouses, even if they are separate in the eyes of civil law, as a single unit from the point of view of tax

HUMBLET v BELGIUM

law. The effects of the tax in question on the common income cannot be and in­ deed are not denied.

Consequently the competent Belgian authorities are obliged, in accordance with Article 86 of the ECSC Treaty, to nullify the effects of the measures whereby the assessment was made and confirmed.

Costs

The applicant was successful in his conclusions concerning the interpretation of the Protocol and thus in the main issue in the case.

Under Article 69 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court the defendant shall be ordered to pay the costs.

Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General; Having regard to the provisions of the ECSC Treaty, especially Articles 78,86 and

JUDGMENT OF 16.12.1960 — CASE 6/60

(b) The Protocol also prohibits the taking into account of this salary in order to determine the rate of tax applicable to other income of an official.

(c) The same applies to the case of an assessment on the joint income of an official of the Community and of his spouse in respect of tax payable on the income of the latter.

(d) Consequently, the tax demanded in the Notice and Extract from the income tax register sent to the applicant on 18 or 19 December 1959 (Articles 913, 321) by the Collector of Taxes at Engis in the sum of FB 9035 is contrary to the Protocol in so far as it is based on the existence of salary and emoluments paid to the applicant by the ECSC.

3. Orders the defendant to pay the costs.

Donner Hammes Catalino Riese Rossi

HUMBLET v BELGIUM

(a) Arguments of the parties 586

(b) Terminology 587

(c) Legal discussion 588 (d) Ratio Legis 591 (e) General considerations 592

Mr President, Members of the Court, wanted in fact to take the amount thereof In a few words I shall first go over the facts into account in arriving at the income of the of the case which are very simple: Mr Hum­ spouses in order to determine the rate of tax blet, of Belgian nationality, is an official of applicable although tax was subsequently to the High Authority of the European Coal be imposed only on that proportion of the and Steel Community. Although he is em­ income which was not exempt, in this case ployed in Luxembourg where he resides the income of the wife. The applicant, Mr with his wife, he is regarded as having re­ Humblet, refused to comply and was issued tained his domicile for tax purposes (dom­ with an estimated assessment in respect of icile fiscale) in Belgium where he also main­ the years 1957, 1958 and 1959 (for the in­ tains a residence and where his wife come in the years 1956,1957 and 1958) and receives income: this much is common to this assessment were added what in Bel­ ground. gium are called 'surcharges', a term which appears to correspond to what in other The income of Mrs Humblet, which was countries are less delicately called penalties. duly declared, was subjected in Belgium to The objection which he lodged in accor­ the personal surtax (impôt complémentaire dance with the proper procedure against personnel) in the name of her husband as this assessment was rejected and proceed­ head of family in accordance with the law. ings in the matter are at present pending be­ Nevertheless in 1959, changing their previ­ fore the Cour d'Appel. ous practice, the Belgian fiscal authorities requested Mr Humblet to declare the Alongside these national proceedings Mr amount of the remuneration which he re­ Humblet considered himself entitled also to ceived as an official of the High Authority bring the matter before the Court of Justice and which was exempt from taxation under in application of Article 16 of the Protocol the Protocol on the Privileges and Immuni­ on the Privileges and Immunities which as ties of the Community. The authorities you know provides that: