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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·Rozsudok·14.7.1961

C-9/60

ECLI:EU:C:1961:18

Súd
Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61960CJ0009

VLOEBERGHS v high AUT HORI TY

9. The principle of free movement which Even if it is accepted that the Member prohibits the Member States from refus­ States may defend themselves against ing entry into their territory of products such proceedings by the application of originating in third countries and which the mutual assistance provided for in Ar­ have been lawfully imported into ticle 71, the duty to have recourse to the another Member State does not apply to said mutual assistance is not intended to

an attempt at direct importation into a safeguard the interest of any third par­ Member country having the mere ties but only the interests of the Com­ semblance of an import into another munity. Consequently these third parties Member country, since Article 73 of the by making an application under Article Treaty reserves to the Government in 40 of the Treaty cannot rely upon the whose territory is situated the place of failure to apply mutual assistance in the destination of imports the administration defence and legal protection of practices of licences relating to them. which mutual assistance has precisely the object of preventing.

In Joined Cases 9/60 and 12/60

SOCIÉTÉ COMMERCIALE ANTOINE VLOEBERGHS,

Société Anonyme governed by Belgian law, having its registered office in Antwerp, represented by its President and managing director, Mr Antoine Vloeberghs, as­ sisted by J. Mertens de Wilmars, Advocate at the Antwerp Bar, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of Ernest Arendt, Advocate at the Cour d'Appel, 27 avenue Guillaume,

applicant,

v

High Authority of the European Coal & Steel Community , represented by its Legal Adviser, Gerard Olivier, with an address for service in Luxembourg at its of­ fices at 2 place de Metz,

defendant,

Application for

Pecuniary reparation from the Community for damage claimed to have been caused by a wrongful act or omission of the High Authority; the annulment of the decision of the High Authority contained in its letter, sent on 16 June 1960 by its President to the applicant.

JUDGMENT OF 14. 7. 1961—JOINED CASES 9 AND 12/60

THE COURT

composed of: A. M. Dormer, President, Ch. L. Hammes and N. Catalano (Judge- Rapporteur), Presidents of Chambers, O. Riese, L. Delvaux, J. Rueff and R. Rossi, Judges,

Advocate-General: K. Roemer

Registrar: A. Van Houtte

gives the following

JUDGMENT

Issues of Fact and of Law

I — Fa c t s traditional customers in France. In 1958, certain of the latter renewed their offers to make contracts for a total of 41 000 metric The facts of the case may be summarized as follows: tons but the applicant again encountered a 1. The applicant is established in Antwerp new refusal by the ATIC. as an importer of solid and liquid fuels. It During the years 1957, 1958 and 1959 the also runs a factory in the port of Antwerp applicant persisted in its approaches to the containing plant similar to the pit-head High Authority. In particular, it repeated its plant at a mine, especially a modern dense- claims by letters of 23 May 1959, 27 July liquid washing plant, enabling it to treat im­ 1959, 1 December 1959 and 20 January ported solid fuels (crushing, sizing, screen­ 1960, in respect of which the High ing and washing). It has in addition a factory Authority took no action. for the manufacture of compressed fuels. In the meantime, at the request of the By letters of 14 March 1953 and 25 January Governments of Belgium (February 1958), 1954, the applicant drew the attention of Germany (September 1958) and The the High Authority to the difficulties and Netherlands (March 1959), the High restrictions placed by the French authorities Authority took the view that the conditions on the free movement of anthracite im­ for the application of the third paragraph of ported by it from third countries and treated Article 71 of the Treaty were satisfied and in its factories, and asked it to take the that the Governments concerned were necessary measures. therefore entitled to suspend the free entry In January 1957, the ATIC (Association of coal from third countries across the inter­ Technique de l'Importation Charbonnière) nal frontiers of the Community. agreed to the delivery of 30 000 metric tons The company Antoine Vloeberghs, consider­ of American anthracite. Subsequently, dur­ ing itself to have suffered damage through ing 1957, the applicant imported 73 000 the behaviour of the High Authority, made metric tons of American anthracite and an application on 4 May 1960 for compen­ treated it in its factories with the view to sation against the Community (Case 9/60). selling it in France, but it did not succeed in 2. On 3 May 1960, that company sent to obtaining the necessary authorization the High Authority a letter in which, basing despite its applications and those of its itself on Article 35 of the Treaty, it asked it

VLOEBERGHS v HIGH AUTHORITY

'to take a decision in respect of the French the refusal of the ATIC to authorize Government requiring the latter to the importation of stocks of authorize French importers and/or dealers American anthracite stored in to buy freely' the anthracite which it im Strasbourg, Givet and Terneuzen, ported from third countries and treated in Ghent and Antwerp, especially the its plant provided that this anthracite was costs of storage and warehousing put into free circulation in Belgium. paid by the applicant, the cost of Further, it asked that emergency measures financing the goods in stock, its loss should be taken in respect especially of cer

in value and the commercial loss tain stocks frozen since 1957. suffered by the applicant; give their By an answer of 16 June 1960, the High reasoned opinion on all other points Authority denied that the Vloeberghs com which the Court considers proper as pany had the capacity to set in motion the well as replying to all the questions procedure under Article 35, and maintained of the parties in that respect; that it was not an undertaking within the make an appropriate order as to meaning of the Treaty and raised an objec

costs.' tion of inadmissibility against the applica The defendant contends in the first place tion. The High Authority further informed that the Court should: the applicant that it had made contact with the French Government on the subject of 'dismiss the application made by the com the question concerning it, and that it ap pany Antoine Vloeberghs on 3 May 1960 peared from this discussion that the French with all consequences in law, as regards Government was not inclined, in the present costs;' situation of the market, to alter its position In the second place the defendant in respect of the applicant. 'reserves its position fully on the assess On 15 July 1960 the Vloeberghs company ment of the damage which may according brought an action for annulment against the to the circumstances require the services decision of refusal contained in that letter of qualified experts.'

(Case 12/60). In Case 12/60, the applicant claims that the Court should: II — Conclusions of the parties 'annul the decision contained in the letter dated 16 June 1960 sent by the High In Case 9/60 the applicant claims that Authority to the applicant in so far as by the Court should: that letter the High Authority refused to 'hold the application to be admissi adopt a decision requiring the said ble and well-founded; French Government to authorize the free circulation in France of anthracite im consequently award the applicant ported by the applicant from third provisional damages of FB countries and allowed into free circula 64 852 973; tion in Belgium, as the applicant had in vited it to do by its letter of 30 April hold that such damages are to bear 1960, and more especially of stocks of interest at 5.5% on the principal, anthracite put into store by the applicant from the date of judgment until the at Strasbourg (30 000 metric tons), at date of payment.

Before ad Givet (7 500 metric tons), at Antwerp judicating upon the remainder of and Terneuzen (13 000 metric tons), and the application to appoint one or at Antwerp and Ghent (23 391 metric more experts for the purposes of as tons); sessing the damage suffered by the hold that the High Authority is required applicant between 1957 and the to take the measures involved in the ex

date of the expert's report, following ecution of the annulling judgment and es-

JUDGMENT OF 14. 7. 1961-JOINED CASES 9 AND 12/60

pecially to take measures appropriate to High Authority is annulled persons not ensure equitable reparation of the mentioned in Article 34 cannot put in damage directly consequent upon the an­ issue by means of Article 40 the finan­ nulled decision.' cial liability of the High Authority for a The defendant contends that the Court wrongful act or omission following should: from the irregularity of the annulled decision. 'dismiss the application made by the com­ pany Antoine Vloeberghs with all conse­ (b) If the possibility of applying Article 40 quences in law, especially as regards when there has not been a prior ap­ costs'. plication for annulment is accepted, it is necessary to accept the co-existence of two different systems of liability dependent upon whether there has or III — Submissions and arguments has not been a prior application for an­ of the parties nulment.

(c) If the financial liability following from The submissions and arguments of the par­ non-compliance with the Treaty of the ties may be summarized as follows; acts or failures to act of the High Authority could be put in issue by 1. Admissibility means of Article 40 of the Treaty, those concerned would have a means of set­

A — The application in Case 9/60 ting in motion the judicial review of legality. The High Authority, once The defendant challenges the admissibility found liable under Article 40, cannot of of the application maintaining that the as­ course refuse to draw the consequences sessment of any liability consequent upon from the findings of the Court on the the non-conformity with the Treaty of an non-conformity with the Treaty of its act or failure to act. Thus the limit im­ act or omission of the High Authority neces­ sarily calls for a review of legality and that posed by the Treaty as regards those in the present case, because the application entitled to call for a judicial review of puts in issue the liability of the Community legality would in fact lose all practical on account of a failure to act by the High significance. Authority, Article 40, which is relied upon Article 40 must therefore be interpreted as by the applicant, does not apply. The case directed towards governing cases quite dif­ ferent from those mentioned in Article 34 can be decided only, first by the procedure of an action founded on a failure to act, fol­ such as, for example, liability for the con­ lowed by putting in issue the financial lia­ crete acts of Community institutions and bility of the High Authority in the circum­ those which may result from defects or stances laid down in Article 34 of the Treaty. negligence in the actual functioning of the departments. In support of its contention the defendant puts forward the following arguments: Against this view, the applicant puts (a) After having emphasized the various forward two types of argument: objective conditions to which Article 34 (a) In the first place it denies that the subjects the financial liability of the legality of an act or omission of the High Authority, it deduces from them High Authority can be reviewed only that the authors of the Treaty clearly through proceedings for annulment. had here a particularly restrictive in­ This contention finds no support in the tention. From that consideration and positive law of the Member States and from the reference made by Article 40 it is contradicted by the Treaty itself to the application of Article 34, it which provides, in addition to deduces that where a decision of the proceedings for annulment (Articles 33

VLOEBERGHS v HIGH AUTHORITY

to 35), for other forms of action, in­ It would, furthermore, deprive of all mean­ cluding those mentioned in Article 40. ing the reservation made by the first (b) In the second place, the applicant dis­ paragraph of Article 40, concerning the ap­ putes the meaning attributed to Article plication of Article 34, to accept that in case 34 by the defendant which considers of the annulment of a decision of the High that this provision is applicable where Authority persons not referred to in Article an application for damages calls in is­ 34 may put in issue, by means of Article 40, sue the legality not only of a decision the financial liability of the High Authority but, more widely, 'of any act or omis­ for an unlawful act or omission stemming sion of the High Authority'. Article 34 from the irregularity of the annulled deci­ on the contrary refers only to an action sion.

based on liability derived from a Contesting the argument which the appli­ wrongful decision or recommendation cant had based on Article 34, the defendant of the High Authority. The applicant observes that it is difficult to understand denies that Article 34 would be ap­ why in the case of an application on the plicable in case of an implied decision ground of a failure to act the authors of the capable of giving rise to an application Treaty paid no attention to regulating the for failure to act since, on the one consequences of a judgment of annulment, hand, the cause of the damage is not to when they had just done so in respect of Ar­ be found exclusively in such refusal, ticle 33. In fact since the proceedings men­ but also and mainly in an omission tioned in Article 35 must be regarded as a which may, at the time of the implied special case of the action for annulment decision of refusal, already have lasted provided for in Article 33, the absence from for a long time. the wording of that article of details con­ On the basis of that consideration and cerning the character and the grounds of the remarking that it is the conduct of the High action as well as the consequences of the Authority taken as a whole over several judgment can be interpreted only as a years which it has put in issue by its applica­ reference to the general rules laid down by tion, the applicant goes on to challenge the Articles 33 and 34 of the Treaty. defendant's statement that for the purposes The defendant also contests the solution fol­

of the present proceedings it is a matter of lowing from the argument of the applicant assessing not the conduct of the High relating to Article 35, according to which Authority, taken as a whole, concerning the only the provisions of Article 40, to the ex­ problem of free movement, but only the clusion of those of Article 34, allow the question how the High Authority by refrain­ financial liability consequent upon an omis­ ing from using Article 88 against the French sion to act to be put in issue. The defendant Government as soon as it received the com­ considers, on the contrary, that the provi­ plaint of Mr Vloeberghs (May 1959), was sions of Article 34 and only those, apply in guilty of a wrongful act or omission which every case where the liability of the High caused damage to the applicant. Authority is put in issue on the ground of Lastly, the applicant states it has the the non-conformity of an omission with the capacity to make an application under Arti­ provisions of the Treaty and that the cle 34, but since the defendant disputes its liability of the High Authority for the non­ capacity as a Community undertaking it conformity with the Treaty of an omission is observes that in these circumstances the linked to the use of the action established by High Authority cannot, except at the risk of Article 34 of the Treaty. The Treaty has denial of justice, deny it the right to bring tightly bound financial liability for non­ an action under Article 40. conformity with its provisions to the institu­ The defendant replies that the Treaty has tion of proceedings for annulment. The con­ not established a complete system of legal sequence is that undertakings not entitled to protection for private persons. institute proceedings pursuant to Article 35

JUDGMENT OF 14. 7. 1961—JOINED CASES 9 AND 12/60

have neither directly nor indirectly the op confines itself to treating it in order to make portunity of having an act or omission of a product capable of being distributed. the High Authority reviewed. In its statement in defence, the defendant The defendant further disputes that Article emphasizes first that the application in Case 31 gives the Court the power to exercise in 12/60 brings a new factor into the presenta all kinds of action the judicial review of tion of the problem raised by the applicant legality by considering the conformity of the in its application in Case 9/60.

The latter is conduct of the High Authority with the arguing in fact that it carries on a produc Treaty. tion activity within the meaning of the As regards Article 36 the defendant observes ECSC Treaty, whereas in its application in that this provision has no relationship to the Case 9/60 it described itself as an importer argument submitted in the statement in reseller of coal from third countries. That defence, which relies exclusively on the alteration affects the very basis of the ac meaning of Articles 34 and 40 respectively tion, because if the party concerned could be

of the Treaty. Furthermore Article 36 shows regarded as a Community producer of coal only that the unlimited jurisdiction which it the coal thus produced by it would therefore establishes allows the Court greater scope be a product originating in the Community. than in the action for annulment established The defendant observes further that the ap by Articles 33 and 35. This is therefore a plicant has thus presented in parallel two concept which is the opposite of that es arguments which are quite different and poused by the applicant. even contradictory: one based on a claimed Lastly as regards Article 40, the defendant status as a Community producer; the other disputes that by using the expression 'injury based on the status of importer-reseller of caused in carrying out this Treaty by a coal from third countries. wrongful act or omission' the authors of the On this subject the defendant maintains: Treaty wished to restrict the jurisdiction of (a) That the operations of processing coal the Court to cases where the liability of the carried out by the Vloeberghs firm institutions of the Community is put in comes within the normal activity of a question on the ground of the non dealer and cannot confer upon it the conformity of their conduct with the provi status of an undertaking within the sions of the Treaty; because, starting from meaning of Article 80 of the Treaty. this criterion, it is not possible to explain the According to the defendant, the authors Court's jurisdiction, laid down in the second of the Treaty, when speaking of produc paragraph of Article 40 in case of damage tion activities as opposed to distribution caused by a servant in the performance of activities, intended to limit the normal

his duties. sphere of jurisdiction of the High Authority by referring to the manufac B — The application in Case ture properly so-called of a product and 12/60 not merely to simple operations in Referring to the reasons given by the defen tended to improve the presentation of a dant in its letter of 16 June 1960 concerning product already manufactured, as is so the refusal of the applicant's request, the ap in the case of Vloeberghs. plicant states in its application that the In cases where the activity in question is treatment which the crude imported coal carried on immediately upon extraction undergoes in its plant constitutes an activity by the mining undertaking itself, it is which the High Authority itself regards as regarded, it is true, as a production ac production activity when it is carried out tivity as concerns for example the ap directly by mining undertakings. It cannot plication of Article 54, but that is so therefore be regarded as distribution when it only to the extent to which it constitutes is the work of an undertaking which does an activity accessory to and connected not itself extract the coal from the mine, but with the principal activity of the mine.

VLOEBERGHS v HIGH AUTHORITY

Although it can be accepted that the ac sary, according to the applicant, that its ac cessory follows the principal, the con tivity should be of such a character as to verse cannot be accepted. 'naturalize' the produce subject to industrial The defendant goes on to emphasize treatment by the undertaking. that outside the present application Mr As regards the character of the activity Vloeberghs never considered himself as which it carries on in its plants, the appli a producer within the meaning of the cant reiterates that the fact that the various

ECSC Treaty. In fact he sends, pur operations of crushing, washing and screen suant to Article 60, to the High ing and, in another division of its undertak Authority the price lists only for his ing, the manufacture of compressed fuel, sales of compressed fuels, and not for result directly in transforming a raw sales of anthracite such as those in ques material into a finished product suffices to tion in the present case. Further, Mr bring its activities within the production Vloeberghs has never made investment cycle. declarations to the High Authority in The applicant states also that the argument

accordance with Article 54 of the that the processing of coal on the surface of Treaty. a mine has the nature of a production ac (b) Furthermore the applicant based its ac tivity within the meaning of the Treaty only tion on its status as a dealer, relying on because it is accessory to extraction is not the right to free movement within the supported by any argument and is irrecon Community for coal from third cilable with the wording of Article 80 of the countries which has been properly Treaty. cleared through customs in one of the Lastly the applicant states that the observa countries of the Community, which tion of the defendant that, outside the pre shows that the rejection already given to sent application, it never occurred to it to the notice submitted by Vloeberghs un regard itself as a producer, is irrelevant, der Article 35 is well founded.

Ac since it is precisely in respect of the present cording to the case-law of the Court in application that the question arises and Cases 7/54 and 9/54 on the one hand must be resolved. The applicant states that and 18/57 on the other, undertakings it is ready to accept the legal consequences carrying out distribution activities have which may follow for it from the recognition not the capacity to make an application of its status as a producer. on the basis of Article 35. The defendant disputes that the operations To these arguments the applicant replies of crushing, washing and screening of that, both in its application for damages and anthracite carried on by Vloeberghs alter in its application for annulment, it put itself the substance of the product thus treated to forward 'in its sole and real capacity as an the point of transforming a raw material importer of coal from third countries in into a finished product.

As regards in par order to sell it in the Common Market after ticular the manufacture of compressed fuel, having subjected it to an industrial process'. the defendant states that this is an activity It disputes that the fact that an undertaking which is quite distinct from the one in ques is regarded as carrying on a production ac tion in the present case, for the coal which tivity in the sphere of coal within the ter Mr Vloeberghs has not been able to bring ritory of a Member State necessarily has the into France is anthracite and not com

consequence that the coal which is the sub­ pressed fuel. The defendant also finds in the ject of such activity becomes, through this, a applicant's argument a contradiction of the product originating in the Community. In view held by the applicant that the product order that an undertaking which treats coal coming from his factory must not be coming from outside the Common Market regarded as originating in the Community may be regarded as an undertaking within (that argument is furthermore irreconcilable the meaning of the Treaty it is not neces­ with the very wording of Annex I to the

JUDGMENT OF 14. 7. 1961-JOINED CASES 9 AND 12/60

Treaty). It observes that the problem thus the Community of coal imported from third raised is posed in analogous terms in the countries which had been allowed into free spheres of ferrous scrap and of steel. circulation in the territory of one of the The defendant goes on to state that the Member States is based upon Articles 3 (a) number of traders carrying on an activity in and (f), 4 (b) and (d), the third sentence of Belgium similar to that of the applicant the second paragraph of Article 5, Articles company is seven and not two or three as 46 and 60 in fine of the Treaty and the latter states and that this comparison paragraphs 15 and 19 of the Convention on with the Belgian traders taken as a whole the Transitional Provisions. This principle has no significance for the purposes of is not, moreover, contested by the High deciding an argument which concerns only Authority which recalled its existence to the the activity of the largest among the whole­ Governments of the Member States on sale traders. various occasions and especially on 28 May The defendant also observes that, even if the 1955 and 7 January 1956. rules laid down by the Treaty in the spheres Articles 71 to 75 of the Treaty, tar from of prices and production were regarded as contradicting the principle of free move­ applying to the applicant company, it would ment, conferred on the High Authority and be necessary to limit the opportunities for on the Council of Ministers the power neces­ bringing actions conferred on it in its sary both to ensure this free movement and capacity as a producer only to cases where to prevent the disadvantages which might its production activity properly so-called is follow from it and thus confirm that this

brought into question. It would be necessary principle is one of the rules of the Common therefore in the present proceedings in any Market.

case to deny to Mr Vloeberghs the capacity Since it is not disputed that the American to bring an action for annulment in order to coal treated by the applicant had been im­ claim a right to free movement which in his ported in lawful circumstances which pre­ own opinion has nothing to do with the vent the High Authority and the Council treatment to which he subjects the coal from using in respect of it the powers set out which he imports. in Articles 71 to 75 of the Treaty, it follows, Furthermore, the applicant's argument that according to the applicant, that this coal there are, in respect of the Treaty, different must be able to circulate freely within the classes of production undertakings subject Community in the same way as coal to different rules, is in contradiction with originating in the territory of the Com­ the very letter of the Treaty where the word munity, and that the French Government, 'undertakings' was used in referring to a by prohibiting its nationals from purchasing general definition given once and for all in this coal because of its origin, has therefore Article 80 and drawing a distinction only infringed the rule of free movement. between production and distribution. In these circumstances the High Authority Further, that argument also runs counter to had the duty, in accordance with Articles 8, the very concept of the Treaty by which 14 and 88 of the Treaty, to take action to freedom of movement, escaping the restric­ ensure respect for the rules of the Treaty, tions which may apply to products from but although its attention had on numerous third countries, finds its counterpart inter occasions been drawn to this fact, it alia in subjecting production undertakings deliberately failed to take the necessary to a body of closely interlocking rules. measures.

2. On the substance of the case The applicant sees in this failure to act an unlawful act or omission in the execution of A - As regards the application in Case 9/60 the Treaty giving rise to reparation of the The High Authority's failure to act damage which it suffered as a result. The applicant first and foremost emphasizes The defendant maintains that the cor­ that the principle of free movement within respondence produced by the applicant

VLOEBERGHS v HIGH AUTHORITY

shows that until May 1959 Mr Vloeberghs, Authority did not at any time dispute the far from basing his claims on the principle correctness in law of its argument on the of free movement for coal from third subject of free movement within the Com­ countries within the Community, based his mon Market of coal imported from third conduct on the concept that the operations countries and admitted to free circulation in he carried out were related rather to the one of the Member States and that further commercial policy of the French Govern­ the High Authority does not in fact dispute ment in respect of third countries. It was not that the French Government refuses to con­ until May 1959 that Mr Vloeberghs began form to that rule.

to rely on the rules of the ECSC Treaty That explains why the defendant confines regarding freedom of movement. But in the its defence to a purely formal plane and meanwhile, faced with the crisis on the carefully avoids the substance of the market in coal, the High Authority had ac problem. Furthermore the High Authority cepted that the Belgian, German and itself, as appears from its letter of 16 June Netherlands Governments, which had made 1960 to the applicant company, had on its an appropriate request, were entitled to sus own initiative made contact with the French pend the free movement of coal from third Government on the subject of the importa countries across the internal frontiers of the tion into France of anthracite treated by

Community. The French Government, Vloeberghs, thus impliedly recognizing its states the defendant, would certainly also duty to intervene. have obtained the benefit of mutual assist In its rejoinder the defendant indicates its ance if, after having recognized the disagreement on the subject-matter of the principle of free movement of coal from action as it appears from the reply. The third countries, it has asked for such defendant considers that this subject-matter assistance. was set out on page 2 of the application and The applicant disputes that interpretation it concludes from this passage that the appli of the facts and especially that it did not rely cant has not put the liability of the High on the rule of free movement until 1959. It Authority in issue except to the extent to refers, inter alia, to its letter of 14 March which the latter abstained from acceding to 1953 in which it complained to the Market its requests. To wish now to put in issue the Division of the High Authority of the whole of the High Authority's conduct over restraints placed by the ATIC on free move several years, even before it had been ap

ment. The departments of the High proached by Mr Vloeberghs, as the appli Authority replied to the letter claiming that cant does in its reply, amounts to altering this question did not concern the High the subject-matter of its application. Authority, but was within the exclusive The defendant contests furthermore that competence of the national governments. the question of the right of free movement The applicant reaffirms further that it was within the Community for coal from third its reliance on the application of the Treaty countries was raised before 23 May 1959 by which made it decide in 1954 to add to its Mr Vloeberghs. In his letter of 14 March crushing and re-screening installations a 1953 Mr Vloeberghs proceeded on the basis large modern dense-liquid washing plant. that coal treated by him became Belgian After the difficulties encountered because of coal and had, because of this, the right to the ATIC in 1957, the departments of the free movement like coal originating within High Authority caused it to hope that the Community.

The letter of 25 January within the framework of an arrangement 1954 raised only a problem of obtaining with France in respect of the ATIC, a solu foreign currency. tion to its problems would be arrived at, Concerning the installation in 1954 of a which explains its great patience before as large modern washing plant by the serting its rights at law. Vloeberghs firm, the High Authority replies The applicant goes on to state that the High that the Vloeberghs company had carried

JUDGMENT OF 14. 7. 1961-JOINED CASES 9 AND 12/60

out this installation at its own risk. In fact it press reference to this problem. The High was only in 1955 that it finally settled its Authority does not therefore claim that by position concerning the free movement of adopting the decision of 18 December 1957 goods from third countries in respect of the in respect of the French Government, it six governments. Furthermore, the Treaty took the actions necessary to require that does not in the least guarantee, according to Government to accept the principle of free the defendant, free movement for the said movement within the Community of coal products in all circumstances. from third countries'. It accepts never­ The defendant does not dispute the verbal theless the existence of an indirect link

approaches which the applicant made on between the problem of free movement numerous occasions in 1957 and 1958 to raised by the present application and the one of the two directors of the Market Divi­ questions raised in Case 2/58, for that deci­ sion of the High Authority, but it considers sion of the High Authority showed the in­ that it was a matter of contacts which were compatibility with the provisions of the not capable of binding the parties and which Treaty of the prohibition placed on French cannot be placed on the same level as the purchasers on obtaining supplies from non- letter of 23 May 1959. French dealers in the Community (among According to the defendant the fact that the whom are persons capable of selling coal High Authority does not dispute the princi­ from third countries). The existence of Ap­ ple of the freedom of movement within the plication No 2/58, states the defendant, Community of coal from third countries 'constitutes one of the factors which might does not entitle the applicant to conclude have caused the High Authority to refrain that this principle must necessarily lead to until now from initiating the procedure laid the admission to French territory of down in Article 88 of the Treaty to require American coal which Vloeberghs had im­ the French Government to recognize the ported from the United States into Belgium principle of free movement within the Com­ for this purpose. Relying upon the first munity of coal from third countries'. paragraph of Article 71 of the Treaty, the During the oral procedure the defendant defendant maintains that 'the choice of a per­ furthermore maintained for the first time

manent policy of directing imports from third that since coal imported from America by countries (which in the present case finds the applicant was intended from the begin­ expression in the ATIC monopoly) comes ning for France and not for Belgium it was within the competence of the Governments in Belgium as coal in transit and that in these of the Member Countries and cannot in circumstances, according to Article 73, the itself be regarded as contrary to the Treaty' administration of import licences came and that 'supposing even that the principle within the competence of the French of freedom of movement within the Com­ Government. The question raised by the ap­ munity for coal from third countries is ac­ plication has therefore no relationship with cepted by the Government concerned, it still that of free movement within the Com­ remains to decide whether the Treaty offers munity of coal originating in third countries in practice a way to reconcile its application properly imported into a Member State. with the conduct of a permanent policy of The applicant contests that argument by as­ direction of imports'. The defendant serting that the 73 000 metric tons which specifies that 'by adopting (on 18 December the Vloeberghs firm had purchased in the 1957) the decision which was the subject of United States and which was intended for Application No 2/58 by the French Govern­ the French State had not been in transit

ment the High Authority did not intend to through Belgium either legally or econo­ decide the question of freedom of movement mically. This 73 000 metric tons had in within the Community for coal from third fact been released into free circulation in countries. Neither the recitals nor the Belgium and left Belgium with export operative part of that decision include an ex­ licences.

VLOEBERGHS v HIGH AUTHORITY

The defendant opposed the concept sup­ mentions especially a series of facts which ported by the applicant that the duty on the appear to it to be particularly relevant. High Authority to take action under Article The defendant denies that the damage suf­ 88 existed prior to any notice being given fered by the applicant is due to the and that consequently the financial liability behaviour of the High Authority. It main­ of the High Authority comes into existence tains that the illegality of its behaviour does at the time when a Government has in­ not necessarily amount to an unlawful act troduced regulations or taken measures or omission bringing financial liability with amounting to a failure to comply with the it. In order to prove this act or omission it obligations it has under the Treaty. does not suffice to show that the High The defendant maintained that in the case Authority abstained, following complaints provided for in Article 88, the Treaty left to from Mr Vloeberghs, from applying Article the High Authority, to the extent to which 88 to the French Government but 'it is

the procedure laid down in Article 35 is not necessary also, by referring to all the facts set in train, the choice of the time to take ac­ and circumstances at the time, to point to tion. Furthermore, it is not for private special factors which justify the conclusion persons to open before the Court a discus­ that there is a wrongful act or omission on sion on the diligence shown by the High the part of the High Authority'. Authority in putting Article 88 into prac­ The defendant further denies the ex­ tice. istence of a causal nexus between the The obligation to act and the commence­ criticized behaviour of the High Authority ment of financial liability do not coincide. and the damage suffered by the applicant This fact is furthermore confirmed by Arti­ until May 1959, because, even if the High cle 88 which lays down a procedure making Authority, following the complaints of Mr it possible to annul with retroactive effect Vloeberghs as from May 1959, had set in Government regulations which are contrary train the procedure laid down in Article 88 to the Treaty but which gives the High in respect of the French Government, his ac­ Authority the means of requiring Member tion could not have resulted in compensa­ States to put an end to legal situations tion for the wrong caused to the applicant, which are contrary to the Treaty. The because that procedure has no retroactive defendant expressed doubts on the question scope and merely gives the High Authority whether an individual is entitled to behave the means of requiring the Member States as if a Government regulation, regarded by to put an end to situations of law contrary him as contrary to the Treaty but not con­ to the Treaty. Further, since the High tested by the High Authority under Article Authority was not in any case in a position 88, could not be used against him. immediately to ensure the application by the French Government of the principle of free The damage movement within the Community of coal The applicant states that it had envisaged from third countries, it would be very dif­ deliveries of the order of 70 000 metric tons ficult to assess the link between the as from the second quarter of 1957. The im­ criticized conduct of the High Authority possibility of selling this tonnage in 1957, and the impossibility which Mr Vloeberghs which was caused as a result of the opposi­ always encountered since May 1959 of tion of the ATIC, caused it damage which it sending third countries' coal coming from estimates in total and provisionally as a sum another Community State into France and between a minimum of FB 69 962 979 and a the more so since at that time the coal maximum of FB 99 162 973. market was such as to justify, on the part of The applicant offers to prove by all legal the Member States, measures restricting im­ means the facts and circumstances which it ports from third countries. has set out in support of its application, to In its reply, the applicant although ac­ the extent to which they are disputed. It cepting the distinction between illegality

JUDGMENT OF 14. 7. 1961-JOINED CASES 9 AND 12/60

and wrong, maintains that for a public ad­ it founds on the argument that the contested ministration to commit an illegality is in decision is general in nature. principle a wrong, except where the il­ Referring to the judgments in Joined Cases legality is purely formal in the sense that it 7 and 9/54, it maintains that the decision applies only to matters external to the deci­ which the High Authority would have to sion and does not affect in any way the con­ adopt under Article 88 in respect of the tents of the decision. On the other hand, it is French Government in case of annulment of always a wrong 'when it renders illusory the its refusal to act could not be regarded, if ac­ legal certainty to which the party subject to count is taken of the contents of the duty the administration is entitled, or when it which that Government is said to have shows that the public service is not neglected, as an individual decision; for the operating in the conditions of efficiency and real subject-matter of the proceedings is the legal certainty which one is normally en­ general rules adopted by the French titled to expect of it'. Government at the opening of the Common According to the applicant the prolonged Market (Decree of 9 February 1953) which failure to act of the High Authority which limited free movement of products from has not required one of the Governments to other Member States to products adhere to such an essential rule as that of originating in the Community. free movement is evidence of wrongful con­ In its reply the applicant puts forward two duct. arguments against the proposition that the With regard to the existence of a causal contested decision is a general decision. It states that on the one hand what it re­ nexus between the damage and the conduct of the High Authority, the applicant men­ quested from the High Authority was not to tions that the requirement imposed on the lay down a rule, but merely to require a par­ High Authority to ensure respect for the ticular party, in this instance the French Treaty is not subject to the condition of a Government, 'to comply with and to apply a prior complaint from the applicant. Conse­ pre-existing rule in one or more individual cases' and that on the other hand the con­ quently that obligation was already in ex­ istence in 1957 and 1958. tested measure is the High Authority's refusal of the applicant's request that it should take action. It is therefore a matter

B —As regards Case 12/60 of an individual decision.

The defendant disputes the first argument Infringement of the Treaty and states that the applicant has in this con­ In the application in Case 12/60, the nexion failed to take account of the scope of applicant, basing itself on arguments Article 88 of the Treaty by seeing that similar to those which it set out in the provision only as a method of execution, application in Case 9/60, complains that enabling a rule of law which is no longer in the High Authority has infringed Articles dispute to be enforced in this or that in­ 3, 4, 5, 71 and 75 of the Treaty and the dividual case, whereas the dispute between rule of law concerning the free movement the High Authority and the French Govern­ of goods imported from third countries. ment within the framework of Article 88

The applicant maintains further that the turns on the very existence of the rule of law High Authority infringed Articles 14 and 88 in question and the intervention of the High of the Treaty by refusing to use, after the Authority is directed towards having the failure of its approach to the French general rules in force in France concerning Government, the powers which those arti­ the movement in its territory of coal from cles confer on it, to require recalcitrant other Member Countries of the ECSC States to conform to the Treaty. modified. On the other hand according to The defendant opposes this submission by the defendant the second argument would raising an objection of inadmissibility which ultimately amount to maintaining that

VLOEBERGHS v HIGH AUTHORITY

every decision adopted by the High before the procedure under that article is set Authority under Article 35 of the Treaty in motion. On the contrary, only the must necessarily be of an individual nature. reasoned decision taken under Article 88 has, as to the extent of the disputed duty, Misuse of powers the character of a declaration which, subject to a right to bring the matter before the The applicant further complains that the Court, is binding upon those to whom it is High Authority has been guilty of a misuse addressed. of powers. Contesting the complaint of deliberate in­ Referring to the assertions of the High fringement of Articles 14 and 88 of the Authority contained in the statement in Treaty, the defendant denies that in dealing defence in Case 9/60, it observes that the defendant shows itself conscious of the fact with the French Government concerning that if the French Government had no need the problem raised by Mr Vloeberghs it ac­ cepted through this the validity of the lat­ to call for mutual assistance, as have the ter's position. On the other hand the High Belgian, German and Netherlands Govern­ Authority cannot in any way be regarded as ments, it is because it had already infringed legally bound by a declaration made outside the principle of free movement with im­ the procedure laid down in Article 88 of the punity. The High Authority therefore Treaty. knowingly accepts discrimination between the Governments which conform to the IV — Procedure

Treaty and the Governments which do not The procedure followed the normal course. conform to it and, consequently, discrimina­ At the request of the applicant and with the tion between the nationals of the various consent of the defendant the Court joined Member States in contravention of Articles the two cases on 12 October 1960. 3, 4 and 5 of the Treaty. It has therefore Following replies from the applicant to the made use of its powers in a manner contrary questions put by the Advocate-General and to the purpose for which these powers were observations lodged in respect of these by conferred upon it. the defendant the Court, by order of The defendant replies that this submission is 17 March 1961, decided to hear the parties based on the false concept that the High again. Authority must with the assistance of Arti­ The parties were heard again on 22 March cle 88 only give effect to a situation defined 1961.

Grounds of judgment

A — The admissibility of the application for failure to act

(Case 12/60)

The defendant maintains that the applicant company cannot be regarded as an un­ dertaking within the meaning of Article 80 of the Treaty.

As is plain from Article 35 an application for failure to act is admissible only if the applicant has the nature of an undertaking within the meaning of Article 80.

The applicant maintains it has the character of an undertaking producing coal by reason of the activities which it pursues by way of crushing, screening and washing of the imported anthracite.

JUDGMENT OF 14. 7. 1961-J0INED CASES 9 AND 12/60

These operations cannot be regarded as production activities as described by Article 80 of the Treaty. In addition to extraction, the Treaty regards as production ac­ tivities only those which it expressly recognizes as such. To decide whether a par­ ticular activity constitutes a 'production' activity it is necessary to refer to the nomenclature of Annex I to the Treaty. If the activity involves a certain degree of processing of the raw material, the decisive criterion is in particular whether after the processing operation the product in question falls within the said nomenclature under a heading different from that under which it appeared previously.

However this is not so in the present case for the original product and the product obtained after crushing etc., come under the heading 'Hard coal' (heading 3100 of the nomenclature).

The activities of crushing, screening and washing consist, as the applicant itself stated during the oral proceedings, in sorting operations enabling pieces of different size, quality and specific weight to be separated, these operations covering neither the processing of a particular product nor the manufacture of a new product. The fact that operations similar to those carried on by the applicant company may be carried on by mining undertakings and that in that case they are considered as forming part of the production of coal, cannot be taken into account because in that context it is an ancillary activity which is concerned and which cannot in any case in itself constitute a coal-producing activity.

Although it is true that the applicant carries on production activities as a manufac­ turer of briquettes, that capacity has not been taken into account in the present case in which the applicant has instituted proceedings in its capacity as an importer and exporter of, and therefore as a dealer in, coal originating in third countries, whilst its capacity as manufacturer of briquettes plays no role either directly or indirectly in relation to the subject-matter of the dispute.

It follows from the foregoing considerations that the application for failure to act is inadmissible and it is not necessary to consider the other objections raised on this subject by the defendant.

B — The admissibility of the application for compensation

(Case 9/60)

The defendant maintains that where adjudication on the question of liability is linked to the review of legality, Article 40 is not applicable, and that in such a case the proceedings can be decided only by means of an application for annulment followed, after annulment of the disputed measure, by putting in issue the financial

VLOEBERGHS v HIGH AUTHORITY

liability of the High Authority under the conditions laid down in Article 34 of the Treaty. Otherwise those concerned would be able to obtain a judicial review of legality even in a case where the time-limit for commencing annulment proceedings is past.

1. The meaning of the first paragraph of Article 40

The first paragraph of Article 40 deals with disputes concerning the liability of the Community for wrongful acts or omissions.

The action for reparation referred to in Article 40 differs from an application for annulment both in its subject-matter and in the nature of the grounds which may be pleaded. As regards its subject-matter, an action for reparation is directed not to the abolition of a particular measure but only to reparation of damage caused by an act or failure to act amounting to a wrongful act or omission. As regards the grounds on which an action for reparation may be based only the existence of a wrongful act or omission can lead to a finding against the High Authority whereas an application for annulment enables the four grounds mentioned in Article 33 to be pleaded.

Article 40 consequently confers on the Court a jurisdiction which is clearly different from that which it exercises in disputes concerning legality.

In the present case the Court is not asked to rule on the question whether it may be pleaded that the alleged illegality of a measure which has not been annulled con­ stitutes in itself a wrong capable of giving rise to a right to reparation under Article 40.

On the other hand in the present case there was no decision of the High Authority creating rights or having legal effects. In these circumstances the infringement of the Treaty of which the High Authority is accused, on the ground that this is in­ herent in its inaction, may unquestionably be pleaded in support of an action based on Article 40 and there is no need, in considering the present case, to rule upon the question of the admissibility of an action for reparation based on the illegality of a positive act the annulment of which has not been sought.

The difference which exists between the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by Articles 33 and 35, and that which is conferred on it by Article 40, is confirmed by the reservation contained in the first paragraph of the latter article: 'without prejudice to the first paragraph of Article 34'. That phrase excludes any possibility of a reference to Article 34 and refers on the contrary to situations where Article 34 is not applicable, as in the present case.

JUDGMENT OF 14. 7. 1961—JOINED CASES 9 AND 12/60

2. The capacity to bring an action under Article 40

Since, as has already been shown, the applicant does not have the status of an un­ dertaking within the meaning of Article 80 of the Treaty, it is necessary to consider whether it has the capacity to institute proceedings for reparation under the first paragraph of Article 40.

Article 40 does not contain the limits laid down by Articles 33 and 35 as regards the capacity of applicants. Because of the distinction between actions for annulment and actions concerning liability, that difference in wording must be regarded in itself as a factor sufficient to exclude the possibility that the authors of the Treaty intended to lay down, as regards the right to take proceedings for reparation, limits similar to those which they had laid down as regards actions for annulment.

That literal interpretation is confirmed by the following considerations.

An application for annulment makes possible a direct review of the activities of the High Authority leading, where appropriate, to the annulment of illegal acts, whereas an application for reparation can give rise only to an order directed to the High Authority to make good the injury caused by its conduct. An application for annulment has a much more marked impact on the High Authority's field of ac­ tivity whilst an application for reparation can deal only with the consequences of that activity.

On the other hand the problem arises in a different manner in the case of an action for reparation,

on the one hand because the subject-matter of the application for repaaration is much more limited than that of an application for annulment, and because the basis of the action is subject to proof of the existence of a wrongful act or omis­ sion;

on the other hand because no reason can justify the refusal of any legal protec­ tion to natural or legal persons who are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Community, when such damage is caused by a wrongful act or omission com­ mitted in the implementation of the Treaty, a matter in which the Court has ex­ clusive jurisdiction, whilst any natural or legal person may by application to the competent national courts obtain reparation for damage caused by Community institutions outside the application of the Treaty (third paragraph of Article 40).

For the reasons set out above, the objection of inadmissibility raised by the defen­ dant must be dismissed.

VLOEBERGHS v HIGH AUTHORITY

3. Subject-matter of the application

The defendant further maintained that the applicant confined itself in its applica­ tion to complaining of the High Authority's conduct as from 1957 and that it ex­ tended its claim in the reply, in which it belatedly criticized the previous conduct of the High Authority.

It is in the context of the examination of the substance of the case that a decision

may be called for on whether a failure to act by the High Authority may constitute a wrongful omission independently of any request from those concerned. Within the context of admissibility it is enough to say that the subject-matter of the claim was set out in the application with sufficient clarity in the arguments relied upon by the applicant, which complains that the High Authority never acted, as it was its duty to do, in order to ensure respect by the French Government for the rule of free movement of products imported from third countries. On the other hand, there must be no confusion between the subject-matter of the application, which is reparation for damage caused as from a particular time, with the legal arguments relied on to show the existence of a wrongful act or omission, since these arguments may be supplemented and expounded in greater detail during the course of the proceedings.

This second objection must therefore also be dismissed.

C— On the substance of the case

(a) The applicant maintains that when the Treaty prescribes the free movement of products of the Member States, this implies also the free movement of products originating in third countries, which are lawfully granted by one of the Member States the right of entry into its own territory.

The defendant does not contest this view, which was adopted officially by the High Authority as from 1955 and formulated by it in its letter sent on 28 May 1955 to the Governments of the Member States in the following terms:

'The Community is based, in its own sphere, on the principle of unity, that is to say on that of the Common Market which assumes unrestricted movement of all coal and steel products coming within the jurisdiction of the Community. This principle of the free movement of products laid down in Article 4 (a) of the Treaty applies not only to products originating from a Community country but

JUDGMENT OF 14. 7. 1961-JOINED CASES 9 AND 12/60

also to coal and steel products of third countries, on condition however that they have been imported properly into any country of the Community' (Document No 12 annexed to the application in Case 9/60).

The Court accepts the principle (which is not disputed by the parties) of the free movement of products from third countries and considers that it is not necessary in the present case to examine it in greater detail.

(b) The applicant maintains that the High Authority was guilty of a wrongful omis­ sion by abstaining from ensuring respect, by applying the procedure laid down in Article 88, for the abovementioned rule of free movement, and that because of this wrongful omission the applicant was not in a position to make regular sales in France of the coal which it had imported into Belgium, and that consequently the High Authority is obliged to compensate it for the damage caused to it by this in­ fringement of its rights.

The Court, before considering whether the abstention of the High Authority must be regarded as wrongful omission, proposes first of all to to examine whether such abstention (even assuming that it amounted to a wrongful omission) damaged the interests of the applicant in such a way that a right to reparation accrued to it.

Article 4 (a) must be interpreted in the light of Articles 2 and 3 (b), and especially of their respective objectives, that is to say 'progressively bring about conditions which will of themselves ensure the most rational distribution of production' and 'ensure that all .. . consumers in the Common Market have equal access to the sources of production'. The principle of the free movement of goods implied by Article 4 (a) was established especially in the interests of Community production. The extension of that rule to products coming from third countries and properly imported was not adopted for the protection of those products or their producers, but in order to pre­ vent the free movement of Community products being itself diminished or impaired by the establishment of obstacles to the free movement of the said products.

Consequently if the High Authority, which is required to have Article 4 (a) respected by the Member States and Community undertakings, does not carry out that duty, those who are subject to it are entitled to consider themselves to have suf­ fered damage to their legitimate expectations or to their rights and to ask for reparation of the damage which has thus been done to them. It is otherwise when products originating in third countries are concerned because although in certain circumstances these products are allowed to benefit from the application of Article 4 (a) that advantage is only a reflection of the guarantee which the Treaty intended to grant to Community products, so that producers in third countries and traders dealing in their products are therefore not entitled to put forward claims for repara-

VLOEBERGHS v HIGH AUTHORITY

tion on the basis of the infringement of some alleged personal right vested in them if it should happen that the above rule is not applied and they suffer damage as a result.

Article 73 assigns the administration of import licences for trade with third countries to the Government in whose territory the place of destination for imports is situated. It emerges from the allegations of the applicant itself, and especially from the document annexed to the application in Case 9/60, that the coal in ques­ tion was never intended for movement within Belgium or the Community in general, but only for France. The fact of having subjected the coal to washing, screening and crushing in Belgium in no way changes this first and final destination of the coal. The admission of this coal to free circulation in Belgium could be effected without difficulties or charges of any kind. In these circumstances the applicant cannot rely on a possible breach of duty by the High Authority in order to claim compensation for the damage thereby said to be caused to it.

Although the principle of free movement, accepted by the Court, prohibits the Member States from refusing entry into their territory of products originating in third countries and lawfully imported into another Member State, Article 73 of the Treaty on the other hand assigns the administration of import licences for trade with third countries to the Government in whose territory the place of destination for imports is situated. In the present case, as has been said already, what is at issue is an attempt at direct importation into France having the mere semblance of an im­ port into Belgium.

Even if it is accepted that the Member States may defend themselves against such practices by the application of the mutual assistance provided for in Article 71, the duty to have recourse to the said mutual assistance is not intended to safeguard the interests of any third parties, but only the interests of the Community. In making an application under Article 40 of the Treaty, these third parties cannot rely on the failure of mutual assistance for the defence and legal protection of practices which mutual assistance has precisely the object of preventing. In these circumstances the applicant cannot rely on a possible breach of duty by the High Authority in order to claim compensation for the damage thereby caused to it.

Because of these considerations and without its being necessary to consider the applicant's other arguments the application must be dismissed.

D — Costs

Under Article 67 (2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the Euro­ pean Communities, the unsuccessful party shall be ordered to pay the costs.

JUDGMENT OF 14. 7. 1961—JOINED CASES 9 AND 12/60

In the present case the applicant has been unsuccessful in all its submissions.

It must therefore bear the costs of the proceedings.

Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General; Having regard to Articles 2, 3, 4, 33, 35, 40, 71 and 73 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community; Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the Euro­ pean Coal and Steel Community; Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities;

THE COURT

hereby:

1. Dismisses the application in Case 9/60 as unfounded;

2. Dismisses the application in Case 12/60 as inadmissible;

3. Orders the applicant to pay the costs.

Donner Hammes Catalano

Riese Delvaux Rueff Rossi

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 14 July 1961.

A. Van Houtte A. M. Donner

Registrar President

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Rozsudok C-9/60 – Súdny dvor Európskej únie | AI Pravnik