C-19/60

assisted by Jean-Pierre Aron, Advocate at the Cour d'Appel, Paris, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the offices of the Chambre Syndicate de la Siderurgie Française, 49 Boulevard Joseph-II,

applicants,

v

High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community , represented by its Legal Adviser, Italo Telchini, acting as Agent, and Professor André de Laubadère, of the University of Paris, acting as co-Agent, with an address for service in Luxembourg at its office at 2 place de Metz,

defendant,

Application:

For the annulment of the enforceable decision of the High Authority of 14 December 1960 ordering the applicant, the Société des Forges et Ateliers du Creusot, to repay to it the amount of FF 20 800 which had been wrongly paid to the applicant under the scheme for the equalization of imported scrap and scrap treated as such; in the alternative, for an order that the High Authority pay as damages to the said applicant the sum of FF 20 800;

(d) In Case 3/61:

For the annulment of the enforceable decision of the High Authority of 14 December 1960 ordering the applicant, Marrel Frères, to repay to it the amount of FF 4 760; in the alternative, for an order that the High Authority pay as damages to the said applicant the sum of FF 4 760.

THE COURT

Composed of: A.M. Donner, President, J. Rueff, President of Chamber, L. Delvaux, Ch. L. Hammes (Rapporteur) and R. Rossi, Judges,

Advocate-General: K. Roemer

scrap from third countries and shipyard and the third and fourth companies about scrap treated as such and for equalization of $15 000 each. the prices of this scrap and domestic scrap. 6. In October 1958, the four applicant com 2. Since the equalization scheme was in panies accepted delivery of certain quan troduced, the Office Commun des Consom tities of shipyard scrap in execution of mateurs de Ferraille (the Joint Bureau of supply contracts concluded by the OCCF, Ferrous Scrap Consumers, hereinafter namely: referred to by its French initials as 'the (a) Fives Lille Cail (the applicant in Case OCCF') has negotiated on behalf of the un 19/60): 392 120 metric tons in execu dertakings of the Community a large tion of Contract 2/RN-2568f con number of contracts for the purchase of cluded by the OCCF with Les Abeilles, shipyard scrap for delivery price-free on rail Le Havre, a recovery and salvage un ex-railway station nearest to the scrap dertaking, on 19 September 1958; recovery yard; the recipient undertakings (b) Usinor (the applicant in Case 21/60): were designated to the seller of the scrap by 1 014 470 metric tons in execution of the regional offices (in France, the Union Contract 6/RN-2582f concluded by the des Consommateurs de Ferraile de France, OCCF with the Lombarda Metalli un the French union of ferrous scrap con dertaking, Milan, on 24 September sumers, hereinafter referred to as 'the 1958;

Société de Démolitions Navales et 4. In these circumstances, the undertakings Terrestres, Paris; concerned were unwilling to take supplies of (d) Marrel Frères (the applicant in Case shipyard scrap without an assurance that, to 3/61): 506 220 metric tons in execution put them on an equal footing, they would be of the said Contract 772/DN-1605f. repaid the difference between the cost of The applicant companies maintain that transport from the railway station nearest to they had, through the UCFF, obtained the scrap recovery yard (in the case of the prior consent of the OCCF to the shipyard scrap) and the cost of transport grant of transport parity, calculated on from the nearest port of entry (in the case of the basis of notional ferrous scrap im scrap from third countries). ports either through the port of

FIVES LILLE CAIL v HIGH AUTHORITY

et Ateliers du Creusot and Marrel Frères crease its invoices by FF 1 050 per lodged applications against these decisions metric ton (Marseilles parity). which were entered in the Registry under 7. On 15 March 1960, the Directorate Nos 2/61 and 3/61 respectively. General for Steel of the High Authority sent to the applicants in Cases 19/60 (Fives Lille II — Conclusions of the parties Cail) and 21/60 (Usinor) equalization state ments in respect of the above-mentioned The applicants claim: contracts which took no account of the (a) In Case 19/60 (Fives Lille Cail) that the agreed transport parities (FF 5 764.16 for Court should annul, 'as being ultra vires the former, and FF 14 912.71 for the latter and contrary to the rules of law relating to undertaking). the application of the ECSC Treaty', the By letters of 30 July and 11 August 1960 implied decision of the refusal by the High respectively the said applicants requested Authority to grant the request contained in the High Authority to correct these state the letter of 30 July 1960 for payment of the ments of account by allowing for transport sum of FF 5 764.16 as transport parity; parity; when, after two months, they had In the alternative that the High Authority received no reply, they lodged an applica be ordered to pay the same sum of FF tion on 26 October and 5 November 1960 5 764.16 as damages for a wrongful act or against the implied decision of refusal to be omission in the performance of its functions; inferred from the failure of the High (b) In Case 21/60 (Usinor) that the Court Authority to reply. should annul 'as being ultra vires and con

On be ordered to pay the same sum of FF 10 December 1959, three out of four of 14 912.71 as damages for a wrongful act or these statements of account were corrected omission in the performance of its functions;

(c) In Case 2/61 (Société des Forges el The submissions and arguments of the par­ Ateliers du Creusot) that the Court should ties may be summarized as follows: annul, 'as being ultra vires and contrary to the rules of law relating to the application of A — Admissibility the ECSC Treaty', the enforceable decision The defendant contests the admissibility of of the High Authority of 14 December 1960 the applications only in so far as they arise ordering it to repay the sum of FF 20 800 out of the proceedings for annulment, and which it had received as the difference in the in any event largely as a formality. transport costs of shipyard scrap on the basis of the Marseilles parity; 1. Admissibility of Applications 19/60 and In the alternative, and in the event of the 21/60 with regard to the application of enforceable decision's being upheld, that the Article 35 of the Treaty High Authority be ordered to pay the same sum of FF 20 800 as damages for a In respect of these two applications the wrongful act or omission in the performance defendant raises the question whether the of its functions; conditions precedent for an action for (d) In Case 3/61 (Marrel Frères) that the failure to act based on Article 35 are Court should annul 'as being ultra vires satisfied in the present case. It does so from and contrary to the rules of law relating to two points of view: the application of the ECSC Treaty', the en­ (a) Under what provision was the High forceable decision of the High Authority of Authority bound to take the decision 14 December 1960 ordering it to repay the requested? sum of FF 4 760 which it had received as (b) There was not in this case an express the difference in the transport costs for request for a decision or, in conse­ shipyard scrap on the basis of the Marseilles quence, formal notice duly served. parity; On the first point (a), the applicants reply In the alternative, and in the event of the that, in making 'part' payment of the enforceable decision's being upheld, that the equalization amounts due to them, the High High Authority be ordered to pay the same Authority was acting on the basis of its sum of FF 4 760 as damages for a wrongful Decisions Nos 16/58, 17/58, 23/58, 29/59 act or omission in the performance of its and 30/59 fixing the general rules to be functions. applied with regard to equalization. For this (e) In all four cases, that the High Authority reason, it had a duty under those decisions be ordered to pay the costs. to make the equalization payments and was, The defendant contends that the applica­ of necessity, bound subsequently to meet the tions lodged by the four applicant com­ applicants' requests for a further payment. panies should be dismissed as inadmissible The applicants also rely on Article 53 of the or unfounded, with all legal consequences, Treaty as a lawful and mandatory provision especially as regards the payment of fees, which regulates the working of the equaliza­ costs and any other expenses. tion scheme.

Again, the defendant raises the principle of B — The substance of the case exceptio obscuri libelli but the Court is un­ able to say with certainty whether this refers Action for 'ultra vires acts and infringe­ to all four applications or merely to Applica­ ment of rules relating to the application tions 19 and 21/60. of the Treaty' Pursuing this objection the defendant main­ tains that the wording of the applications 1. In support of their argument, the appli­ makes it impossible to understand what con­ cants maintain that the High Authority had stitute the alleged ultra vires acts and no right to revoke the measures adopted by 'infringement of the rules governing the the OCCF concerning transport parity for application of the Treaty' which vitiate its shipyard scrap because this practice con­ implied decisions of refusal and its decisions stituted a substantive right of the parties, regarding repayment. Applications based on which is infringed by its withdrawal ex post such vague and indefinite submissions must facto. be dismissed. In their reply they submit, on this point, the In their reply the applicants maintain that following arguments to establish the legal they have set out in the clearest terms two basis and nature of this practice: basic legal submissions: (a) The consent of the OCCF in October 1958 as regards transport parity was in (a) The fact that the High Authority accordance with a practice regularly repeatedly allowed for transport parity followed by the OCCF since 1954 in making previous equalization pay­ which was, moreover, subsequently ments and the assurances which, in this confirmed when the High Authority case, they were given by the OCCF itself applied it to Applicants Nos. 3 created a right in their favour and the and 4. High Authority could no longer, in (b) This consent, which was a condition of March 1960, validly annul the effects their acceptance of the deliveries in of the said agreements. question, and which, under Article 1 (b) In their reply, they contend that to ig­ (5) of the statutes of the OCCF, they nore this situation constitutes a breach were free to accept or to refuse if the of a general principle of law 'which price of the scrap was unsatisfactory, comes within the rules governing the was binding on the High Authority as application of the ECSC Treaty', the body responsible for the working of namely, the principle governing the the OCCF, which it controlled through revocation of an administrative a permanent representative. measure and, in particular, the time- In this connexion, the applicants invoke limit within which revocation can be also the High Authority's quasi- effected. delictual liability for a wrongful act or The applicants add that, as the OCCF omission in the performance of its func­ has always operated under the control tions. and on the responsibility of the High (c) By virtue of the rules applicable to the Authority, 'the formal undertakings' revocation of administrative measures, which it has 'entered into' are binding even assuming their illegality, it was not on the latter and 'annulment' of them legally possible for the High Authority, is illegal. in March 1960, that is to say after a

lapse of 17 months, to annul the effect parity appears to have been fairly common of the consent given by the OCCF in in France, intermittent or at least very October 1958 regardless of the reasons variable in Italy and in the Netherlands and, which impelled it to withdraw these finally, completely non-existent in Germany, agreements, especially in view of the Belgium and Luxembourg. fact that the High Authority did not ac On this point the applicants claim that the cuse them of bad faith as a result of problem of parity arises very rarely or not at false or incomplete information. all in countries where the seaports are (d) The principle which prohibits situated at the same distance from or closer withdrawal of administrative decisions to the works than the recovery yards. cannot be undermined by the fact that As regards the legal arguments: the statements of account or the (a) The defendant states first that the equalization payments are provisional. revocation of an administrative They are provisional only in so far as measure consists in a decision taken by adjustments have to be made either an administrative authority concerning because of substantive corrections of measures it has adopted itself and arithmetical errors or because of revi which it decides to retract.

from them. repayment amounts to nothing more 2. Against the arguments of the applicants than recovery of sums not owed and the defendant puts forward four submis paid in error. sions which may be summarized as follows: In any event, the Court has in its judgment (a) No withdrawal of an administrative in Joined Cases 42 and 49/59 (SNUPAT) decision, properly speaking, is involved itself recognized that the withdrawal of an in this case. administrative measure with retroactive (b) The 'undertakings' which the appli effect is permissible where, as in the present cants claim constitute decisions have no case, the public interest of the Community, legal value because they were entered which is to ensure the proper functioning of into unlawfully by unauthorized the equalization scheme, must prevail over agents. the private interest which particular under (c) The said undertakings' are absolutely takings have in maintaining an illegal void since they conflict with the fun

FIVES LILLE CAIL v HIGH AUTHORITY

undertakings cannot create or con takings given by the OCCF in Oc stitute a legal rule subject to the princi tober 1958 and that, in any case, ples governing the withdrawal of ad before Decision No 18/60, there ministrative measures. This is because: was no express prohibition in the defendant's decisions against (i) Neither the OCCF nor the Caisse applying the correcting factor for de Péréquation des Ferrailles Im

Against Authority in turn adopted Deci this argument the applicants ad sions Nos 34/56, 19/58, 15/59 and vance the contention that, even if 18/60 which 'expressly' fixed at the financial bodies set up by the the vendor's yards the equalization High Authority and which are price for scrap treated as imported subject to its control had exceeded scrap broken up on the territory of their powers because of their

After 1 August 1958 those different distances from the seaports, organizations could have been but that has never been suggested. entrusted only with simple ex­ The principle of refunding the tran­ ecutive work; consequently any sport 'parity' has, therefore, never been organization, authority or agent recognized by the High Authority and other than the High Authority had was formally disapproved by it as soon absolutely no power to take a deci­ as unjustified action to that effect was found to have been taken. sion such as that permitting the re­ fund of the transport parity. The applicants reply that the contested 'Assurances' such as those on undertakings are not in conflict with which the applicants rely and either Article 3(b) or with Article 4(b) which date from September 1958 of the Treaty. were therefore based on measures First, they certainly accord with the having no legal value and which, principle of equal access, since their absence would have meant that some assuming that the High Authority works would have been denied access to wanted to change its point of view, ought to have been taken by it in shipyard scrap. the form of and pursuant to a Secondly, the result of the provisions general decision. adopted by the OCCF is not to create The applicants reply that the prin­ but, on the contrary, to prevent dis­ crimination between consumers of im­ ciple of transport parity has always been accepted by the ported scrap and consumers of shipyard OCCF for whose work the High scrap because their effect is to place Authority was in any case respon­ both in the same position. sible. Nor is there any discrimination The latter itself applied the princi­ between the various undertakings ple on two occasions after August needing shipyard scrap because the 1958, after checking the relevant principle of refunding transport statements of account and pay­ charges was applied to all undertakings ment of the amounts in question; in the six countries which could prove it could not have more clearly con­ excessive transport costs.

The applicants further maintain that (d) (i) The defendant contends that there transport parity is in the interest of the can be no doubt about the legality general public, which bears the excess of the procedure for recovering un­ of the purchase price of imported scrap lawful payments when it is borne and scrap treated as such including in mind that the equalization shipyard scrap, over the equalization scheme is based on principles of prices. During the whole equalization public law and when account is period, the cost price of shipyard scrap, taken of the necessarily on rail ex scrap recovery yard was provisional nature of the amounts markedly lower than the cost price of paid under this financial scrap imported by sea cif the port of machinery. It denies that the entry; it was therefore in the interest of provisional nature of the state­ the public to purchase all available ments of account is as unimpor­ supplies of shipyard scrap. The effect, tant as the applicants claim. It therefore, of the undertakings entered goes without saying that material into by the OCCF was to reduce the errors are always subject to burden of equalization and to prevent amendment; to describe a discount the export of amounts of scrap at prices as only provisional implies that it which were especially favourable to is subject to further adjustments consumers as a whole; these undertak­ going beyond mere material ings fulfilled one of the fundamental amendments, for example adjust­ objectives of the Treaty, which is to en­ ments arising from the fact that sure the establishment of the lowest the initial calculation took account prices in accordance with Article of factors which ought to have 3(c). been ignored. Of course, the In its reply, the defendant states that provisional nature of the state­ the applicants' view is based on mis­ ments of account obviously does interpretation of the fundamental not constitute authority for altera­ provisions of the Treaty governing tions in the principles themselves, equal access and non-discrimination. It but the decisions concerning presupposes that natural differences repayment which are complained produced by geographical location are of entail no alteration in the prin­ compensated for by artificial means; to ciples which the High Authority introduce into the equalization scheme claims to have previously accepted. a formula for geographical correcting (ii) The defendant contests, as regards factors based on the distance between the effect in law of errors which it

decision into which there crept an abandon at some time. Accordingly, its error. refusal to allow for the transport parity in To maintain the contrary would no way amounted to a change of mind on its be to accept that the High part, of which it should have informed those Authority consciously acted in concerned, but was the application of the conflict with its Own general deci­ legal rules which it had laid down: it denies sions and deliberately agreed to having been guilty of a wrongful act or discrimination between the un­ omission by failing to inform the undertak­ dertakings in the Community ings of the alleged abandonment of a prac­ which is expressly prohibited un­ tice which was neither consistent with the der the Treaty. Treaty nor widespread. The High Authority merely made In any case, the applicants cannot complain a mistake which it had a duty to of lack of information without revealing the correct and which the provisional negligence of which they themselves were nature of statements of account in guilty when, particularly after publication any case enabled it to make good. of Decision No 13/58, they relied on promises which were made to them in the Application for damages in respect of a circumstances which they describe; after wrongful act or omission publication of that decision, they could not have been unaware that the executive bodies 1. The applicants claim that the defendant has been guilty of a wrongful act or omis­ with whom they were dealing had no power sion in that it failed to make its new view­ whatever to take decisions of principle such point known in good time and thus allowed as that in question. A wrongful act or omis­ undertakings to enter into undertakings sion on the part of the alleged victims ex­ which they would have refrained from empts the defendant from liability. entering into if they had been properly in­ 2. Another wrongful act or omission on the formed. part of the High Authority is, in the appli­ In their view, it was for the High Authority, cants' view, the way, which the defendant as soon as it took over the management of itself describes as improper, in which the the equalization scheme itself on 24 July equalization scheme for which it is responsi­ 1958 to announce without delay that it in­ ble functioned. The OCCF always func­ tended to put an end to the practice of tioned under the control of the High refunding the transport parity which had Authority and not under that of the under­ been followed constantly since 1954. By fail­ takings; it was therefore the duty of the ing to do so and in waiting nearly two years High Authority and of it alone to examine to define its position expressis verbis after the measures adopted by the OCCF. having itself carried out the OCCF's under­ If, as the defendant maintains, the OCCF's takings to the applicants in Joined Cases 2 agreements were manifestly irregular, the and 3/61, the High Authority was guilty of High Authority is gravely at fault for hav­ a wrongful act or omission giving rise to ing, in two of the present cases, itself given liability on its part. It should, therefore, be effect to provisions which were so clearly ordered to compensate the applicants for the unlawful under the signature of one of its damage suffered, which they assess as the Directors-General.

not consulting the High Authority in ad­ In the light of these observations, the defen­ vance. It is responsible for the working of dant contends that no serious negligence on the OCCF and any wrongful act or omission its part can be established. on the part of that body constitutes a 3. In its rejoinder, the defendant points out wrongful act or omission on the part of the that the estimate made by the applicants of High Authority. their damage appears to be erroneous and to The defendant replies that, although it is be the result of confusion between the ques­ true that Decision No 14/55 of 26 March tion of ultra vires acts and that of liability 1955 entrusted the OCCF and the Fund for a wrongful act or omission. 'under the responsibility of the High Since the undertakings on which the appli­ Authority' with the operation of the finan­ cants rely are invalid, there is, accordingly, cial machinery, this provision must not be no legal basis for payment of the amounts interpreted as establishing a system of relating to those commitments. automatic and absolute substitution of The alleged damage must therefore be responsibility but only as placing the said assessed 'directly, as it actually was'. The bodies under the supervison of the High damage to which the applicants refer arises Authority and making the latter responsible from the fact that they were dissuaded from for the proper functioning of that supervi­ making purchases of imported scrap which sion. would have been more profitable for them. What may, therefore, be required of the The criterion of the 'Dunkirk parity', which High Authority is normal diligence in the is the only one to which they refer, is exercise of its supervision; it is possible to arbitrary. seek to establish its liability only in so far as this supervision is seen to have been lacking. To appraise these alleged deficiencies in concreto regard must be had to the dif­ IV — Procedure ficulties which may arise from the technicality of the working of an equaliza­ tion scheme and to the periods of time which The applications were lodged in due form are inevitably required to correct the and within the prescribed period; the irregularities or mistakes which may have procedure, including the joinder of the been committed. cases, followed the normal course.

JUDGMENT OF 15. 12. 1961 — JOINED CASES 19/60, 21/60, 2/61, 3/61

is therefore subject to the conditions laid down by Article 35 of the Treaty for the institution of an action for failure to act.

The admissibility of such an action is subject in the first place to a finding that the High Authority had, under a provision of the Treaty or rules laid down for the im­ plementation thereof, a duty to take a decision or make a recommendation.

It is established in this case that neither any provision of the Treaty nor any deci­ sion of general or individual application which would constitute a rule laid down for the implementation thereof provided for or governed any allowance whatever as transport parity. None of the decisions adopted by the High Authority under Article 53 of the Treaty, the legal basis for the institution and the working of the equaliza­ tion scheme, contains or lays down specific rules on this subject. Without its being necessary to examine whether these decisions formally preclude the practice regularly followed in respect and to the advantage of the applicants, they could not in any case, in the absence of a general foundation in law, constitute rules laid down for the implementation of the Treaty which could create for the High Authority a duty to act in a particular manner. Since the High Authority was under no duty to act, the conditions laid down in the first paragraph of Article 35 are therefore not satisfied.

Furthermore, since there was no submission alleging misuse of powers, it is not necessary to enquire whether it was open to the High Authority to take action within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 35.

With regard to the wording of the applications, although it must be accepted that the statement of the grounds for instituting the proceedings need not conform with the phraseology or the list in the first paragraph of Article 33, it may be sufficient for the grounds for instituting the proceedings to be expressed in terms of their sub­ stance rather than of their legal classification provided, however, that it is suf­ ficiently clear from the application which of the grounds referred to in the Treaty is being invoked. A mere abstract statement of the grounds in the application does not alone satisfy the requirements of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice or the Rules of Procedure. The words 'brief statement of the grounds' used in those instruments mean that the application must specify the nature of the grounds on which the application is based. The ground of complaint relied upon must therefore be established in relation to the facts which have been set out. This has not, however, been done in the present case.

The applicants have, in fact, confined themselves to accusing the High Authority of acting ultra vires and infringing the rules of law governing the application of the Treaty without specifying what constituted the ultra vires acts, which is a general expression capable of covering all cases in which an application for annulment is lodged as provided for in Article 33, and, moreover, without identifying the rule of law the infringment of which by the High Authority is such as to justify lodging an application.

This wrongful act or omission is alleged to take three forms. In the first place, the High Authority failed to make known in good time its new view on transport parity and thus allowed the undertakings to enter into commitments which they would have refrained from entering into if they had been properly informed. Secondly, it failed to prevent, by adequate supervision, the bodies operating under its control or under its direction from taking unlawful action and entering into illegal commit­ ments. Finally, it is accordingly liable for the unlawful and defective working of the equalization scheme.

In consequence, the applications for compensation are not based on the submission that the High Authority illegally withdrew from them rights and privileges which had been granted to them by the OCCF. Those applications are based on grounds which are independent of those of the applications for annulment. They are, conse­ quently, admissible.

B — Substance

1. Wrongful act or omission on the part of the High Authority

The defendant claims that the applicants wrongly accused it of having, in 1958, changed its mind with regard to transport parity. On the contrary, it always con­ sidered that this parity could not form part of the equalization price, and in support of this claim the High Authority relies principally on Decision No 34/56. It further contends that, although the question of refunding the transport parity was raised at the OCCF, it was never the subject of a decision of principal. However, there appears to be no need to go into these arguments. Even if they were substantiated they would not alter the fact, admitted by the High Authority, that promises to re­ fund transport costs were on various occasions made and carried out.

obliged the High Authority to supervise it, which in fact was the principle laid down by Article 1 of Decision Nos 22/54 and 14/55 setting up the said scheme. The High Authority's failure to exercise adequate supervision is further aggravated as regards the present disputes. In these cases the assurances with regard to the transport parities were in fact given to the applicants at a time when the High Authority no longer limited its activities to mere supervision of the equalization scheme but had, by Decision No 13/58, taken over the administration of it. Alerted by previous dif­ ficulties, it ought to have intensified its surveillance of the organizations which con­ tinued to act de facto on its behalf. Whatever the reasons for this failure, in not preventing them from continuing their previous practices and, in particular, from making promises in October 1958 to the four applicant companies, with regard to the grant of the transport parity, whatever were the reasons for this omission, it gravely neglected the duties of supervision required by a normal standard of care, and it is this shortcoming which gives rise to its liability.

The defendant continues to maintain that the lack of supervision cannot have affected the applicants adversely since the latter must have been aware of the il­ legality of the measures adopted in their favour and also of the lack of authority of the organizations which had adopted them.

JUDGMENT OF 15. 12. 1961 — JOINED CASES 19/60, 21/60, 2/61, 3/61

sive for the applicants than an outright purchase of imported ferrous scrap. The applicants have neither submitted nor offered evidence on this point and their applications cannot therefore be upheld.

Costs

The applicant parties, having failed in their submissions, must, under the terms of Article 69 of the Rules of procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Com­ munities, be ordered to pay the costs.

Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General; Having regard to Articles 35, 40 and 53 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community; Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the Euro­ pean Coal and Steel Community; Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities;

THE COURT

A. Van Houtte A. M. Donner

Registrar President