C-9/60
ECLI:EU:C:1962:25
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JUDGMENTOF12.7.1962— JOINEDCASES9AND12/60
InJoinedCases9and12/60—Thirdpartyproceedings
GOVERNMENTOFTHEKINGDOMOFBELGIUM, representedbyH.Adriaens, LegalAdvisertotheMinisterofEconomicAffairsandEnergy,auditeurto theBelgianCouncilofStateandProfessorattheUniversityofGhent,acting asAgent,assistedbyA.Houtekier,advocateoftheMalinesBar,withan addressforserviceattheBelgianEmbassyinLuxembourg,
thirdparty,
v
SOCIÉTÉCOMMERCIALEANTOINEVLOEBERGHS, havingitsregisteredoffice atAntwerp,representedbyitspresidentandmanagingdirector,A. Vloeberghs,assistedbyJ.MertensdeWilmars,advocateoftheAntwerp Bar,withanaddressforserviceinLuxembourgattheofficeofE.Arendt, 27AvenueGuillaume,
and
HIGHAUTHORITYOFTHEEUROPEANCOALANDSTEELCOMMUNITY, representedbyitsLegalAdviser,G.Olivier,actingasAgent,withanaddress forserviceinLuxembourgatitsofficesat2PlacedeMetz,
defendants,
ApplicationforthevariationofthejudgmentdeliveredbytheCourtof JusticeoftheEuropeanCommunitieson14July1961inJoinedCases9and 12/60;
THECOURT
composedof:A.M.Donner,President,O.RieseandR.Rossi(Rapporteur), (PresidentsofChambers),L.DelvauxandCh.L.Hammes,Judges,
Advocate-General:K.Roemer
Registrar:A.VanHoutte
givesthefollowing
BELGIUMvVLOEBERGHSANDHIGHAUTHORITY
JUDGMENT
Issuesoffactandoflaw
I—Conclusionsof theparties II—Facts
ThethirdpartyclaimsthattheCourt Thefactsmaybesummarizedasfollows: should: Initsjudgmentof14July1961in 'aftertakingnoteoftheevidenceten JoinedCases9and12/60,between deredbythethirdparty, thesociétécommercialeAntoineVloe —declarethattheapplicationoriginat berghsandtheHighAuthorityofthe ingthirdpartyproceedingsisadmis ECSCtheCourtofJusticedecidedthat sibleandjustified; AmericancoalimportedintoBelgium —rulethatinthiscasetherehasnotin bytheapplicantcompanyandsub factbeenanyattemptatdirect sequentlyexportedtoFrancecouldnot importation,anysemblanceof benefitfromthefreemovementofgoods importingintoBelgiumor■any intheCommonMarket. disguisedtransitofgoodsthrough On13October1961theBelgian Belgium; Governmentinstitutedthirdpartypro —consequentlyvarythecontestedjudg ceedingsagainstthisjudgmentandmore menttowhichthesaidapplicationis particularlyagainstthatpartofthe allowed; judgmentwhichdecidedtheclaimfor —makeanappropriateorderastocosts.' compensation(Case9/60),publishedin ThedefendantcompanyVloeberghscontends theOfficialJournaloftheEuropean thattheCourtshould: Communitiesof16August1961. 'varythecontestedjudgmenttothe Theapplicationoriginatingthirdparty extentthatitdismissestheapplication proceedingsisbroughtagainstallthe inCase9/60andfurther partiestoJoinedCases9and12/60, inthefirstplace namely: —allowtheoriginalapplication; —AntoineVloeberghstheapplicant —allowtheclaimsoftheapplicantin companyintheoriginalaction, theoriginalactionassetoutinits —TheHighAuthorityof theEuropean applicationof3May1960; CoalandSteelCommunity,the alternatively defendantintheoriginalaction. —beforemakinganyfurtherruling, orderthere-openingoftheoral III—Submissionsand arguments procedurewithregardtothesubstance of the parties oftheoriginalactionsofarasthe claimforcompensationisconcerned; Thesubmissionsandargumentsofthe —makeanappropriateorderastocosts. partiesmaybesummarizedasfollows: ThedefendantHighAuthoritycontends thattheCourtshould: 1.Admissibility 'dismisstheapplicationbytheBelgian Governmentoriginatingthirdparty Thethirdparty,supportedbythedefendant proceedings,withalllegalconsequences, companyVloeberghs,maintainsthatithas inparticularwithregardtothecostsof compliedwiththeconditionslaiddown thepresentproceedings,ontheground byArticle36oftheProtocolonthe thattheapplicationisinadmissibleor StatuteoftheCourtofJusticeannexed atleasthasnolegalfoundation.' totheECSCTreatyandbyArticle97
JUDGMENTOF12.7.1962— JOINEDCASES9AND12/60
oftheRulesofProcedureforthird tanceinthiscase.Thirdpartyproceed partyproceedingstobeadmissible. ingsshouldnotinfactbeusedasaway Firstitexplainsthat ofsystematicallycallinginquestionthe —itwasnotheardintheoriginalcase; judgmentsdeliveredbytheCourt. —itcouldnotintervenebecausenothing (b)Article36oftheProtocol,a inthewrittenprocedure,insofaras provisionestablishingthebasicprinciple, thethirdpartycouldhavebeen providesthatthecasesandconditions aware,couldreasonablyjustifyits inwhichthirdpartyproceedingsmay intervention. bebroughtaretobedeterminedbythe Thethirdparty'sinterestinintervening RulesofProcedure.Theextentofthis inthecasecouldonlyhavebecome referencemustbeunderstoodinthe apparentatthepointwhentheHigh lightofArticle44ofthesaidStatute Authorityputforwardnewsubmissions accordingtowhichtheCourtisrequired duringtheoralprocedurecallingin toincludeinitsRulesofProcedure'all questiontheBelgianlegislationcon theprovisionsnecessaryforapplying cerningimportsandexports.Butatthat and,whenrequired,supplementingthis timeinterventionbytheBelgianGovern Statute'. mentwasprohibitedbyArticle93(1) However,accordingtoArticle36ofthe oftheRulesofProcedure. Statute,thirdpartyproceedingsare Secondlythethirdpartystatesthatthe notavailabletopartieswhotookpart contestedjudgmentisprejudicialtoits intheoriginalcase.Thefactofnot rights,becauseitdecidedthatthe havingtakenpartintheoriginalcaseis regulationsadoptedbytheBelgian thereforeanecessary,butnotinitself Governmentconcerningtheimportand sufficient,reasonforinstitutingthird exportofcoaloriginatingfromthird partyproceedings.Inordertobe countrieswereultraviresorconstituted admissible,applicationsoriginatingsuch amisuseofpowersandweretherefore proceedingsmustalsoincompliance contrarytotheTreaty.Itdeducesfrom withArticle97(l)(c)oftheRulesof thisfactthatthecontestedjudgment: Procedure,indicatethereasonswhy —restricts,contrarytotheprovisions thethirdpartywasunabletotake ofArticle73oftheTreaty,the partintheoriginalcase.Thesereasons excercisebytheBelgianGovernment cannotbebasedonthefinalphraseof ofthepowertomakecustomsregula Article36oftheStatute,namelythatthe tions; thirdpartywasnotheardasaparticipant —castsunwarrantedsuspiciononthe intheoriginalcase.Since,infact,the Governmentwhichisprejudicialtoits RulesofProcedureonlyprovidefor standingintheCommunity. 'voluntaryintervention',thisprovision 1hedefendantHighAuthoritymaintains concerningcompulsoryjoinderofathird ontheotherhandthattheapplicationis partyonlyappliestothedefendantin inadmissible.Insupportofthisobjection theoriginalcase.Moreovertoarguein itputsforwardthefollowingarguments: thiswaywouldleaveoutofaccount (a)TheheadingofChapter6ofthe entirelytheopportunitiesforvoluntary RulesofProcedure,whichinSection1 interventionprovidedbyArticle34 dealswith'Thirdpartyproceedings', oftheStatute,becauseitisobvious reads'ExceptionalReviewProcedures'. thatanypersonfulfillingtherequisite Itisclear,therefore,thatthirdparty conditionsforinterventioncouldhave proceedingscannotbeconsideredwithin takenpartintheoriginalcaseand, themeaningofthesaidRulestobea unlessthatpersoncanestablishadequate normalmethodofrecourseandthatthe reasonsforhisfailuretointervene, determinationoftheconditionsinwhich cannotbeallowedtoinstitutethird
theyareadmissibleisofspecialimpor- partyproceedings.
BELGIUMvVLOEBERGHSANDHIGHAUTHORITY
(c)Aninterestjustifyingintervention intheactionpublishedintheOfficial mustbedeterminedhavingregardtothe JournalaskedtheCourttocompelthe 'subjectmatter'of theactionaspublished HighAuthoritytorequiretheFrench intheOfficialJournaloftheEuropean Governmentto'observetheprincipleof Communitiesandnottothe'issues' freemovementwithintheCommon raisedduringthewrittenprocedure. Marketofcoaloriginatingfromthird Infactthepreciseeffectofvoluntary countriesbutwhichwasoratanyrate interventionistoenabletheintervener hadbeeninfreecirculationinaMember totakenoteof theissuesandarguments State'theinterestof theBelgianGovern putforwardbythepartiesinthewritten mentjustifyingitsinterventionemerges procedurewhichisnotconductedin fromthesubjectmatteroforthe public.Inadditionthefactthatthe conclusionsintheaction.Infact,to interventioncannotbemadeduringthe solvetheproblemsubmittedtoit,the oralprocedure,whereasfreshissues Courtwouldhavetoconsiderwhether mayberaisedbythepartiesuntilthe thecoalindisputehadbeenimported conclusionofthewrittenprocedure intoBelgiuminthenormalwayin (Article42(2)of theRulesofProcedure) conditionspermittingittherightof
showsthataninterestjustifyinginter freemovementtoFrance. ventionisnottobedeterminedaccord (e)Itisnotclearwhythecontested ingtotheissuesraisedbytheparties. judgmentprejudicestheprerogativesof Finallytheviewthattheinterestin BelgianGovernmentunderpubliclaw questionshouldbedeterminedaccord merelybecauseitsdescriptionofthe ingtotheargumentssubmittedbythe transactionbyBelgianlegislation.The partiesduringthewrittenprocedureis judgmentinquestionisinfactlimited allthemoreuntenablebecause,onthe tothedetermination,onthecriteria onehand,newargumentscanalways availabletotheCourtinthatcase,of the beputforwardbytheparties,in 'countryofdestination'withinthemean particularinactionsfordamages,and, ingofArticle73of theECSCTreaty.In ontheotherhand,freshissuescan,at notingthatatthattime'theadmission leastincertaincircumstances,beraised ofthiscoaltofreecirculationinBelgium bytheCourtofitsownmotion. couldbeeffectedwithoutdifficultiesor Moreover,sincethethirdpartycan chargesofanykind',theCourtmadea
alwaysarguethattheissuesandargu straight-forwardfindingoffactwhich mentsputforwardduringthewritten didnotincludeanyappraisalofBelgian procedurecannotberaisedagainsthim, customsregulations.Thescopeofthe thefactthathehasnothadnoticeofthese judgmentinquestionisallthemore issuesandargumentscannotjustifyhis restrictedbecauseitisajudgment failuretointervene;toadmitthecon dismissinganactionandtheonly trarywouldbetodivesttherequirements questiondecidedbytheCourtwiththe ofArticle93of theRulesofProcedureof forceofresjudicataisthattheclaimfor alllegalsignificance. compensationbytheapplicantinthe (d)TheCourtseemstogiveavery originalcaseisunfounded.Sucha widemeaningtotheconceptofan judgmentcouldnotprejudgedecisions interestjustifyingtheinterventionofa whichtheCourtmighttakeinother MemberState.Thisattitudeisallthe casesbroughtbytheBelgianGovern moreunderstandablebecause,onthe menttoDrotectitsinterests. onehand,MemberStatescan,under Secondly,thejudgmentinquestion Article33of theECSCTreaty,bringan causestheBelgianGovernmentno actionforannulmentwithouthavingto 'non-material'damageeither.Toadmit establishaninterestjustifyinginter
thatsuchdamagecouldbeputforward vention.Secondly,sincetheconclusions asagroundforinstitutingthirdparty
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proceedingsdoesnotappeartobe againstthewrongdefendant,thereby compatiblewiththeprinciplethatthird bringingintotheproceedingsaparty partyproceedings,asanexceptional againstwhomtheapplicationcouldnot reviewprocedure,areonlyavailable beinstituted,theresultwillbethedis whena'right'hasbeeninfringed.In chargeofthedefendantandpossiblythe additionthisprincipleislinkedwiththe dismissaloftheapplication. conceptthatthirdpartyproceedings Itmustmoreovernotbeforgottenthat cannotbetakenagainstthegrounds theapplicationreferredtoinArticle22 ofthejudgmentbutmustbedirected oftheProtocolis,apartfromthe againsttheoperativepart. circumstancescoveredbyArticle89 However,thepurposeofthepresent oftheTreaty,directedagainstadecision of theCouncil.Inthesecircumstances applicationispreciselytovaryoneonly ofthegroundsofthecontestedjudgment. itisdifficulttoimaginethatoneofthese Itistruethattheoperativepartofa institutions,citedasadefendantin judgmentcannotbeseparatedfromthe proceedingsbeforetheCourt,would statementofthegroundsuponwhichit prefernottotakepartinproceedingsin whichitcanbeheardandtoincurthe isbased,whicharethelogicaland necessaryfoundationofthejudgment, riskthatajudgmentindefaultwouldbe but,eveniftheBelgianGovernment's givenagainstit.Further,iftheauthors oftheProtocolhadintendedtorestrict claimswereallowed,itwouldbeno lesstruethattheVloeberghscompany theapplicationofArticle36totheone isnotentitledtoclaimcompensationfor casewhereadefendanthasbeenwrongly theinconvenienceitsufferedfroman citedasapartyandadefaultjudgment infringementoftheprincipleoffreedom hasbeengivenagainsthim,theywould ofmovementwithintheCommunityof havesaidsoclearlyinsteadofextending goodsoriginatingfromthirdcountries. itsapplicationtonaturalorlegalpersons Thethirdparty'sreplytotheobjection andtheinstitutionsoftheCommunity. Forallthesereasonsitcanbeassumed putforwardbytheHighAuthorityis asfollows: thatArticle36oftheStatuterefers firstandforemosttoapartywhohas (a)Sincethirdpartyproceedingsare neitherbeenrepresentedintheoriginal notonlyavailableinthecaseslaiddown casenormadeathirdpartybywayof bylawandarenotdependentuponthe compulsoryjoinderand,secondarily,to thirdparty'shavingmadeprioruseof apartywhowasnotproperlymadea normalmethodsofrecourse,theyshould defendantintheoriginalcase.Itistrue beregardedasanormalmethodof thattheRulesofProceduredonot recourse,inviewofthefactthatthe specificallylaydowntheprocedurefor thirdpartyhasnootherremedyathis thecompulsoryjoinderofthirdparties disposal. butthisomissioncannotaffectthe (b)TheRulesofProcedureprovidein normalapplicationofArticle36ofthe Article38thatanapplicationshall Protocol,theprovisionswhereofare containinparticularthenameofthe intendedtoprevailovertheprovisionsof partyagainstwhomitismadeand,in theRulesofProcedure. Article39,thatitshallbeservedonthe Sincethethirdpartywasneitherrepre defendant.Itisthereforebyserviceof sentednormadeapartyintheoriginal theapplicationthatthedefendantis caseitfollowsthattheapplicationis madeapartytotheactionandfailureto admissible. serveitisnotafactorwhichcanbe (c)Moreover,evenifitmustbe takenintoaccountwhenapplyingArticle assumedthattheinabilitytotakepart 36oftheProtocol.Inthesameway,if intheoriginalcasereferredtoinArticle theapplicanthasmadehisapplication 97(1)(c)oftheRulesofProcedureis
BELGIUMvVLOEBERGHSANDHIGHAUTHORITY
basedontheabsenceofanyvoluntary TheHighAuthoritystates,initsrejoinder, intervention,thesubjectmatterofthe thatthefactthatcompulsoryjoinderofa originalcase,aspublishedintheOfficial thirdpartyisnotprovidedforinthe Journalof25May1960,didnotdisclose RulesofProcedureinnowayreduces aninterestwhichtheBelgianGovern theeffectivescopeofArticle36cited mentcouldhaveestablishedforinter above,because,unliketheProtocolon veningvoluntarilyintheproceedingsin theStatuteoftheCourtofJustice,the ordertosupportorrejecttheconclusions saidRulesofProcedurecanbeamended ofoneof thepartiestotheoriginalcase. atanytimebytheCourt.Inthese Itisinadditionwrongtoclaimthatthe circumstancestheHighAuthoritycan interesttobeestablishedbyathird notpossiblyclaimthatinthisprovision partycanonlybedeterminedaccording theauthorsoftheStatuteonlycontem tothesubjectmatteroftheapplication, platedthecaseofadefendantwhowas becauseitcanequallybedetermined notproperlymadeapartytothepro accordingtothesubmissionsraised ceedings.TheHighAuthorityrestricts bythepartiesduringthewritten itselftoemphasizingthatinfactthe procedure. RulesofProceduredonotprovidefor (d)TheHighAuthorityseemsto thecompulsoryjoinderofthirdparties forgetthattheauthorityofajudgment andthat,therefore,onlyadefendant whichisresjudicataextendsnotonlyto canbemadeapartytotheaction. theoperativepartofitbutalsotothe Howeverthatmaybe,theapplicant statementofthegroundsuponwhichit appearstohaveconfusedthirdparty isbased,whichisindissolublyconnected proceedingswithproceedingstoset withtheoperativepartandstandsina asideajudgment.Ifthereisajudgment closeandessentialrelationshiptoit.In indefaulttheprocedureavailabletothe additionitisnotquitetruethatthe defendantistoapplytohavethe contestedjudgment,beingrestrictedto judgmentsetasidebutsuchanorder adecisiononaclaimforcompensation, canonlybemadeifthedefendantwas hasalimitedscopeandthat,therefore, properlymadeapartytotheaction.On theauthorityofresjudicataattachingto theotherhandiftheapplicationwas itonthispointcannotdamagethe notservedonthedefendant,thirdparty applicant'srights.Itcannotbedenied proceedingscanbeusedbythedefendant thatthestatementonthegroundsupon tocontestthejudgmentwhichhasbeen whichthecontestedjudgmentisbased giveninsuchcircumstances. touchesupontherightofthethirdparty byusingitssovereignpowerstomake 2. Onthesubstanceofthecase rulesfortheimportationintoBelgium ofgoodsoriginatinginthirdcountries Thethirdpartyarguesthatthegrounds andallowedtocirculatefreely,aright ofjudgmentinquestionarebasedonan conferredonitbyArticle73ofthe incorrectunderstandingoftheregula Treaty. tionsadoptedbytheBelgianGovernment FinallytheHighAuthority'sargument fortheimportandexportofcoaloriginat thatnon-materialdamagedoesnot inginthirdcountries.Accordingto implyinfringementofarightisnot them,thethirdpartyexplains,goods valid,becausethereisnoreasonto exemptfromimportdutybyvirtue supposethatthisargument,derived ofthecolumn'GeneralTariff'inthe
fromannulmentproceedings('conten 'TariffofImportDuties'canbepro tieuxd'annulation')appliesequallyto visionallyimportedexemptfromtrans casesinwhichtheCourthasunlimited ferencedutyunderthetermsofa jurisdiction('contentieuxdepleinejuri provisionalexemptionlicence47F,pro diction'). videdthattheimporterreservesfor
JUDGMENTOF12.7.1962— JOINEDCASES9AND12/60
himselfthepossibilityofre-exporting establishingtheEuropeanCoaland thegoodseitherintheirconditionatthe SteelCommunityareexportedunder timeofimportationorafterordinary duplicateForm47F2toanotherMember commercialhandling.47Flicencesare StateoftheCommunitythecustoms validforoneyearbutcanbeextended authoritiesmay,attherequestofthe uptofiveyears.Fromthecustoms personconcerned,endorseacertificate pointofviewgoodssubjecttothesaid thatthegoodsareinfreecirculation. licencesareconsideredasbeing'in Thisruledoesnotdifferfromthatin freecirculation'andtherulestowhich forceintheothercountriesmentioned theyaresubjectareinnowaytobe above. confusedwiththerulesapplicableto Thethirdpartyendsitsconclusionson goodsintransit. thispointbyemphasizingthatthe Infactifatalaterdateimportdutyhas Belgianregulationsregardingthe'Direc tobepaid,itispayableongoodswhich tionsrelatingtotheCommunitiesand havebeendeclaredonadmissioninan PreferentialSystems'('Instructionsur appropriatedocumenttobegoodsin lesCommunautésetlesrégimespreferen transit.Ontheotherhanddutyisnot tiels')adoptedin1954,andwhich claimedongoodssubjecttoa47F providedforthesystemjustdescribed, licence.Ifthesegoodsarenotre-exported arebasedonthedraftregulations onlytransferencedutybecomespayable. adoptedin1952atameetingofcustoms Howeverthistaxisnotachargehaving expertsofMemberStatestowhichthe equivalenteffecttoanimportduty.The HighAuthorityrecordeditsagreement. definitionofchargeshavingequivalent Thethirdpartystatesfurtherthat,in effecttoimportdutiesprohibitedby accordancewiththecontestedjudgment, Article4oftheTreaty—workedoutin theimportationofthecoalindispute, 1952byaCustomsRegulationsCom whilstitfulfilledtheconditionslaid missionwhichmetontheinitiativeof downbyBelgianlawforittoberegarded theHighAuthority—doesnotinfact asalawfulimportationentitledtothe applytochargeswhichtaketheplaceof benefitoffreedomofcirculation,wasin taxesandotherchargesimposeddirectly factonlyanattemptatdirectimportation orindirectlyonsimilarnational intoFrance,havingthemeresemblance products.Itfollowsthattransference ofanimportintoBelgium,because duty,althoughleviedonthegoodsin Belgianlawauthorizestheimportation questionbytheCustomsAuthorityis intoBelgium'withoutdifficultiesor notachargehavingthecharacterofa chargesofanykind'ofcoaloriginating customsduty.Itisataxonturnover inthirdcountriesand'intendedfor and,assuch,isirrelevanttothiscase. re-export.Itthereforearguesthatthe Ontheotherhandifgoodsimported contestedjudgmentadverselyaffects undera47Flicencearere-exporteda thesovereigntyoftheBelgianState duplicateform47F2isrequiredinrespect andatthesametimeinfringesthe thereof.Theeffectofthesetwodocu firstparagraphofArticle73ofthe mentsisthatthegoodsinquestionare Treaty,accordingtowhicheachMember enteredinthestatisticsasdefinitive Statehastheexclusivepowertomake importsandnormalexports. regulationsgoverningtheimportsof Thereisnoessentialdifferencebetween goodsfromthirdcountriesincluding thisprocedureandthatinforcein goodsintendedforre-export.Theexer France,Italy,theNetherlandsandthe ciseofthesepubliclawpowerscanonly FederalRepublicofGermanywherethe berestrictedifsuchregulationsinfringe importdutyisrefundedwhenthe thesecondparagraphofArticle73ofthe goodsarere-exported. Treaty.Ontheonehandthecriticism When goodssubject to theTreaty madeofBelgianlegislationforallowing
BELGIUMvVLOEBERGHSANDHIGHAUTHORITY
thegoodsinquestiontoenterBelgium therefore,asaresultofthethirdparty 'withoutdifficultiesorchargesofany proceedingsandonthebasisofthefacts kind'innowayreferstothecircum mentionedabove,theCourtwereto stancesbywayofrestrictionprescribed varythefirstofthesefindings,itwould bythesecondparagraphofArticle73. alsohavetovarytheotherfindings Ontheotherhandtherequirement whicharedirectlyandinevitablycon specifiedinthejudgmentthatthe nectedwithitandthereforevarythe destinationof thegoodsinfreecirculation operativepartofthejudgmenttothe mustnotbeknownbeforethedatewhen extentthatitdismissestheclaimfor
thegoodsareimportedintoBelgiumis compensation. notjustifiedhavingregardtotheabove- ThedefendantHighAuthorityrepliesfirst mentionedprovision,becauseunder thatadistinctionmustbemadebetween thelegislationofeachMemberStatethe thequestionofcustomsdutiesandthe factthatthedistributionofthegoods questionoflicencesandthattheregula shouldbeknownbeforehandbythe tions,towhichthethirdpartyandthe authoritiesofthecountryintowhich Vloeberghscompanyrefer,onlygovern theyareimportedinthefirstplace,is thequestionofcustomsduty.Asforthe notregardedasincompatiblewiththe practicalapplicationoftheseregulations conceptof'importfollowedbyexport'. theHighAuthoritystatesthattherewere Inadditionthereisthedangerthatthis not,in1957,anycustomsdutiesoncoal requirementwilladverselyaffectthe enteringBelgiumandthatiswhythe maintenanceofnormalcommercialre coalindisputewasabletobenefitfrom lationsbetweenMemberStatesand aprovisionallicenceexemptingitfrom nationalsofthesestates. transferenceduty. ThedefendantcompanyVloeberghsstates Asforthequestionoflicences,the initsobservationsthatitreferstothe authoritativetextonthispoint,the submissionsputforwardbythethird HighAuthoritycontinues,isaRoyal partyinitsapplicationandrepeats,so Decreeof17January1955,ratifiedbya farasisnecessary,thesubmissionsput Lawof20July1955,which,while forwardintheoriginalcase.Itproduces makingtheimportandexportofall inadditionthelegaltextsandadmini goodssubjecttolicence,providesthat strativerulesgoverningtheadmission ministersmaysuspendtheapplication intofreecirculationof thecoalimported ofsuchameasure,inparticularin intoBelgiumatthetimethedeliveries respectofgoodsgoingtoororiginating indisputeweremadeandemphasizes incountrieswhichtheyspecify.Thus thattheseregulationshadbeenadopted forcoalaMinisterialDecreedated11
withthe agreement of theHighAuthority September1957suspended,witheffect whichneverraisedasingleobjection fromthefollowing1October,the againstthesystemthusintroduced. necessitytoproduceanimportlicence. finallyitemphasizesthatthegrounds TheHighAuthoritynextconsidersthe ofjudgmentestablishbothalogical complaintbythethirdpartythatthe causalconnexionandalegalconnexion contestedjudgmentisprejudicialtothe betweenthefindingthatthetransaction rightsoftheBelgianGovernmentand indisputewasanattempttoimport putsforwardonthispointthefollowing directlycoaldestinedforFrance, arguments: whichonlyhadthesemblanceofan (a)Thecontestedjudgmentexamines importintoBelgium,andthefinding theconductoftheVloeberghscompany, thattheVloeberghscompanycouldnot butnotof thethirdparty,inthelightof takeadvantageoftheinjurytoaright Article73oftheTreaty.Inadditionit orthelegalprotectionprovidedby mustnotbeforgottenthatthisexamina Article40oftheECSCTreaty.If, tionisbasedaboveallontheallegations
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oftheVloeberghscompanyandthat Inthiscasethefactthatgoodssuchas noneofthedocumentsissuedbythe thecoalindispute,subjecttoa47F BelgianGovernmentwasannexedto licence,areregardedbycustomslawas theapplicationintheoriginalcase. beinginfreecirculationdoesnothelp tosolvetheproblem,because,asmen (b)Whenthecontestedjudgment tionedabove,a47Flicenceisonly statesthat'theadmissionofthiscoalto issuedforgoodsexemptfromimport freecirculationinBelgiumcouldbe duty.Ontheotherhandthereisno effectedwithoutdifficultiesorcharges indicationeitherintheapplicationorin ofanykind'itisquiteclearthatitis thereplywhichwouldleadtothe merelyrecordingasimplefindingof conclusionthatthecontestedjudgment fact.Novaluejudgmentregardingthe isbasedonanincorrectanalysisofthe Belgiancustomsregulationscantherefore transactionindispute. beimplied. (d)Theargumentputforwardbythe (c)ThefirstparagraphofArticle73 thirdpartythat,byinsistingthatthe oftheTreaty,farfromguaranteeing destinationofgoodsimportedintofree completefreedomofactiontothe circulationmustnotbeknownbefore
countryinwhichtheimportsarrive,is theyareimportedintoBelgium,the intendedtodefinetherespectivepowers contestedjudgmentinfringesthesecond ofMemberStatesbyfixingtherights paragraphofArticle73oftheTreaty, anddutiesofeachofthemintheir isnotvalid.AgaintheCourtsimply mutualrelations.Thusitprovidesthat foundthat,accordingtotheallegations theadministrationofimportlicences oftheVloeberghscompanyitself,the shallbeamatterforthejurisdictionof coalindisputewasneverintendedto thegovernmentinwhoseterritory circulateinsideBelgiumortheCom theplaceofdestinationforimportsis munityingeneralbutwasdestinedfor situated.Ifthereisadisputeasto Franceandthattheoperationswhich whichcountryisthecountryofdestina ithadundergoneinBelgium(washing, tionofthesaidproducts,reference screening,crushing)didnotinany couldobviouslynotbemadetothelaws wayaltertheoriginalnecessarydestina andcustomspracticesofthecountryin tionofthesaidcoal.
whichtheimportsarrive,becausethis wouldmeanthatthatcountrywouldbe IV—Procedure thesolejudgeofaquestionofthedelimi tationofpowersbetweenotherMember Theprocedurefollowedthenormal Statesanditself. course.
Inthesecircumstancesthesecondpara Atthehearingon6April1962the graphofthesameArticlemustbe Courtuponhearingthereportofthe interpretedasauthorizingtheHigh Judge-Rapporteurandtheopinionof Authoritytosupervisethewayinwhich theAdvocate-Generaldecidedthatthere
thecompetentgovernmentorganizes wasnoneedforapreparatoryenquiry theadministrationoflicences. inthiscase.
Groundsofjudgment Admissibility
1.ThepresentapplicationwasbroughtunderArticle36oftheProtocol ontheStatuteoftheCourtofJusticeannexedtotheECSCTreatyand Article97(1)oftheRulesofProcedure.
BELGIUMvVLOEBERGHSANDHIGHAUTHORITY
Accordingtothethirdpartytheabove-mentionedArticle36appearsto allowthirdpartyproceedingsifthepartyconcernedwasnot'heard' ('appele')intheoriginalcase.OntheotherhandthedefendantHigh Authorityobjectsthattheapplicationisinadmissibleonthegroundthatthe thirdpartycouldhaveintervenedintheoriginalcase.Thesearguments raisethequestionoftheinterpretationofArticle36oftheProtocolonthe Statuteof theCourtofJusticeannexedtotheECSCTreatyandArticle97 (1)(c)of theRulesofProcedure.
UnderArticle36of theProtocolthirdpartyproceedingsareonlyadmissible 'incasesandunderconditionstobedeterminedbytheRulesofProcedure'. Incompliancewithparagraph(1)(c)ofArticle97oftheRulesofProcedure thethirdpartymust,intheapplication,indicatethereasonswhyhe'was unabletotakepartintheoriginalcase'.Thisrequirementimpliesthatany personwhowasheardorcouldhavetakenpartintheoriginalcasecannot bringthirdpartyproceedings,andthatthereforetheprovisioninquestion mustbeinterpretedinthisway.
Itishowevernecessarytoconsiderwhether,thisprovision,asinterpreted above,isnotinapplicable,becauseitwouldbeincompatiblewiththepro visionsofArticle36of theProtocol.Intheopinionof theCourtthisisnotthe case.ByprovidingthattheRulesofProcedurearetodeterminethecases andconditionsunderwhichthirdpartyproceedingsareadmissible,the Protocolgivestheauthorsof theRulesthetaskofdeterminingtheconditions underwhichthirdpartyproceedingsareadmissible.Article97oftheRules ofProcedurethusputsintoeffecttheprinciplelaiddowninArticle36of the ProtocolontheStatuteoftheCourt.
2.Itisnownecessarytoanalyseingreaterdetailtheconditionsinwhich itmustbeadmittedthatthethirdpartywas'abletotakepartintheoriginal case'.Itisnecessary,intheinterestsof theefficientadministrationofjustice andofthecertaintyoflegalrelations,topreventsofaraspossiblepersons havinganinterestintheresultofproceedingspendingbeforetheCourt fromassertingthisinterestaftertheCourthasdelivereditsjudgmentand hasthussettledthequestionindispute.Itispreciselyinordertomeetthis requirementthatArticle34of theProtocolontheStatuteof theCourtallows allthosewhofindtheirinterestsatissueinanactionpendingbeforethe Courttoproceedbywayofvoluntaryintervention,providedonlythattheir conclusionshavenopurposeotherthantosupportorrejecttheconclusions ofoneof theparties.ThereforeArticle97(1)(c)of theRulesofProcedure mustbeinterpretedasbeingdesignedtoprovideamethodofrecourse,on theonehand,forathirdpartywho,havingbeencalledupon('appele')to
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takepartintheoriginalcase,wasunabletoparticipateforjustifiable reasonsand,ontheotherhand,foranypersonwhowasnotinapositionto interveneintheoriginalcaseinaccordancewithArticle34oftheProtocol ontheStatuteoftheCourtandArticle93oftheRulesofProcedure.
3.Theprinciplesmentionedabovemustnowbeappliedtothepresent case.
Thethirdpartyarguesthatthesubjectmatterandtheconclusionsinthe originalactioninCase9/60,aspublishedintheOfficialJournalofthe EuropeanCommunitiesof25May1960,didnotdiscloseanyinterestwhich itcouldhaveestablishedinordertointervenevoluntarilyintheoriginal case.
Itcannotbedeniedthat,inviewofthefactthatthewrittenprocedureisnot ofapublicnature,itisonlypossibletodetermineaninterestestablishinga righttointerveneinthecasefromthesubjectmatterandconclusionsofthe applicationaspublishedintheOfficialJournal.Voluntaryinterventionin acasebeforetheCourtisonlyadmissibleunderthesecondparagraphof Article34oftheProtocolontheStatuteoftheCourtiftheintervener
supportsorrejectstheconclusionsofoneoftheparties.Itisthereforeneces saryinthiscasetoascertainwhetherthesubjectmatterandconclusionsin theactioninCase9/60aspublishedintheOfficialJournaldisclosedan interestwhichtheBelgianGovernmenthadininterveningtosupportor rejecttheconclusionsoftheapplicant,theVloeberghscompany.
Itisclearfromthesaidpublicationthatthemainobjectoftheapplication wastoensurethattheprincipleofthefreemovementofgoodswithinthe CommonMarketisobservedanditwasneverexpectedthattheconceptof freecirculation,asappliedbytheBelgianGovernment,wouldthenbedis cussedaspartoftheoralproceedings.
AlthoughitcannotbedeniedthatitisintheinterestsofeachMemberState, asasignatorytotheTreatyandresponsibleforitsapplication,thatthe principleoffreemovementbeobserved,itisnolesstruethatthegeneral interestintheobservanceoftheTreatycannotjustifyvoluntaryintervention inanyandeveryaction.Infacttheinterestininterventioninproceedings pendingbeforetheCourtmustbejustifiedasmuchbyreferencetothenature oftheproceedingsinwhichtheinterveneraskstobeallowedtotakepartas byreferencetotheconclusionsofoneofthepartieswhichtheintervener mustsupportorreject.
InthepresentcasetheoriginalactionwasbroughtunderArticle40ofthe ECSCTreaty.Itwasthusanactionforcompensation,notfortheannul-
BELGIUMvVLOEBERGHSANDHIGHAUTHORITY
mentofadecisionorrecommendationoftheHighAuthorityasbeing contrarytotheTreaty,andtheconclusionsof theapplicantintheoriginal caseassetforthintheOfficialJournalsoughtontheotherhandpaymentof compensationforthewrongfulactoromissionoftheHighAuthority.In thesecircumstancesitisunreasonabletoassertthatthesubjectmatterofor theconclusionsintheapplicationwhichwasdeterminedbythecontested judgmentdiscloseadirectandspecificinterestonthepartoftheBelgian Governmentininterveningvoluntarilyinordertosupportorrejectthe conclusionsoftheapplicant.
ThereforetheconditionofadmissibilitylaiddowninArticle97(1)(c)of the RulesofProcedureisfulfilledinthepresentcase.
4.(a)MoreoverArticle97(1)(b)of thesaidRulesprovidesthatthe applicationoriginatingthirdpartyproceedingsshall'statehowthejudg mentisprejudicialtotherightsof thethirdparty'.Thisrequirementimplies thatonlypersonswhoserightshavebeenprejudicedbythecontested judgmentareentitledtobringthirdpartyproceedings.Itistherefore necessarytoconsidernowwhetherthepresentapplicationsatisfiesthis conditionofadmissibilityalso.
Thethirdpartyarguesinthefirstplacethatthecontestedjudgment,tothe extenttowhichitdecidesCase9/60,isprejudicialtoitsrightsinthatits effectistolimittheexerciseof thepowerof theBelgianGovernmenttomake customsregulations,whereasthislimitationisincompatiblewiththepro visionsofArticle73of theTreaty.
Itarguesinfactthat,inorderthattheprincipleoffreemovementofgoods maybeappliedtogoodsimportedinfreecirculationintoBelgium,the BelgianGovernmentmust,asaresultof thecontestedjudgment,amendits legislationonthissubjectbyimposingcharges,whetherof thetypeusually leviedbycustomsornot,onallimportersofgoodsoriginatinginthird countries,evenifthesegoodsareintendedforre-export.
Thethirdpartyattributestheprejudiceinquestiontothegroundsofthe contestedjudgment.Thegroundswhicharecriticizeddonotdeterminethe questionof thelegality,withreferencetotheTreaty,of theBelgianregula tionsconcerningtheadmissiontofreecirculationofcoaloriginatinginthird countriesbutdonomorethanstatewhatarethelegaleffectsproducedby thesaidregulations,sofarastheapplicationoftheprincipleofthefree movementofgoodsinthespecificcaseconsideredbytheCourtisconcerned.
Suchafindingcouldnotadverselyeffectthesovereigntyofthestatewhich hadlawfullyissuedtheseregulations.Thereforetheinjurytoitssovereignty
JUDGMENTOF12.7.1962— JOINEDCASES9AND12/60
allegedbythethirdparty,inconnexionwithitspowertoissueregulations, doesnotinfactexist.
(b)Thethirdpartyarguesinthesecondplacethatthecontestedjudg mentisprejudicialtoitsrightsbecauseitquestionsthemotiveswhichguided theBelgianGovernmentintheexerciseofitspowertomakeregulationsand intheusewhichitmadeofthispowerinthepresentcase,andthereforecasts ontheGovernmentsuspicionsliabletocausedamageofanon-material naturetoitsstandingintheCommunity.
ItisclearfromthestatementsoftheHighAuthoritythatwhenthecoalin disputewasimportedinfreecirculationintoBelgiumitwasnotthepolicyof theBelgianGovernmenttoimposequantitativerestrictionsoncoaloriginat inginthirdcountriesandthatimportandexportlicenceswereissuedauto maticallyforsuchcoal.Thethirdpartydoesnotdisputethevalidityofthese statements.Inadditionthethirdpartyhasitselfadmittedthatthecoalin disputeimportedinthiswayintoBelgiumandintendedforre-exportwithin agivenperiodoftimewassubjectneithertoimportdutynortotransference duty.
ThereforetheCourt,indeclaringthattheadmissionofthesaidgoodstofree circulationinBelgium'couldbeeffectedwithoutdifficultiesorchargesof anykind',farfromcriticizingtheBelgianregulationsinthismatter,merely describedthedefactosituation.
Inadditionasregardsthefindinginthegroundsofthecontestedjudgment thatthecasewasconcernedwith'anattemptatdirectimportationinto FrancehavingthemeresemblanceofanimportintoBelgium',itisnecessary tonotethatthisfindingcertainlydoesnotrefertotheBelgianGovernment. MoreoverinthegroundsofjudgmentinquestiontheCourtmerelyfound thattheVloeberghscompanyeffectedthecommercialtransactionindispute bytakingadvantageofthecustomsregulationspassedbytheBelgian Government.Insodoing,theCourtdidnotinanywaymakeavalue judgmentwithregardtotheseregulations,theeffectofwhichitexamined, intheparticularcase,onlywithreferencetotheprincipleoffreecirculation withinthemeaningoftheECSCTreaty.Nor,forthisreason,didthecon testedjudgment,indescribingthecommercialtransactionindisputeasa 'practice',implyanyunfavourablecriticismoftheconductoftheBelgian Government.Forallthesereasons,asthestatementssubmittedbythethird partyhavenotprovedtheexistenceoftheprejudicecomplainedof,this applicationisnotadmissiblewithinthemeaningofArticle97(1)(b)ofthe RulesofProcedure.
BELGIUMvVLOEBERGHSANDHIGHAUTHORITY
Costs
UnderArticle69(2)of theRulesofProceduretheunsuccessfulpartyshall beorderedtopaythecosts.
Sincethethirdpartyhasfailedinitsapplication,itmustbearthecosts.
Onthosegrounds,
Uponreadingthepleadings; UponhearingthereportoftheJudge-Rapporteur; Uponhearingtheparties; UponhearingtheopinionoftheAdvocate-General; HavingregardtoArticles34,36and44of theProtocolontheStatuteof the CourtofJusticeannexedtotheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanCoaland SteelCommunity; HavingregardtotheRulesofProcedureoftheCourtofJusticeofthe EuropeanCommunities;
THECOURT
hereby:
1.Dismissestheapplicationoriginatingthirdpartyproceedings asbeinginadmissible;
2.OrderstheGovernmentof theKingdomofBelgiumtopaythe costsoftheaction.
DonnerRieseRossi
DelvauxHammes
DeliveredinopencourtinLuxembourgon12July1962.
A.VanHoutte A.M.Donner
Registrar President