C-14/61

supported by

SOCIÉTÉ ACIÉRIES DU TEMPLE, a limited company having its registered office at Billancourt (Seine), represented by its general managing director, Eugene de Sèze, assisted by Jean de Richemont, advocate of the Paris Cour d'Appel, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of Georges Margue, 20 rue Philippe-II,

intervener,

Application for annulment of the Decision of 14 June 1961 whereby the High Authority withdrew with retroactive effect the exemption granted to the applicant relating to the equalization of imported ferrous scrap;

THE COURT

composed of: A. M. Donner, President, O. Riese (Rapporteur) and R. Rossi (Presidents of Chambers), L. Delvaux, Ch. L. Hammes, A. Trabucchi and R. Lecourt, Judges,

I — Statement of facts Consumers (Office commun des con­ sommateurs des ferrailles) (hereinafter The facts may be summarized as follows: referred to as "the OCCF"), to regard as Hoogovens' "own resources" arisings By its judgment of 22 March 1961 in delivered to it by Breedband whose Joined Cases 42 and 49/59 (Rec. 1961, factories were locally integrated with pp. 109 et seq.) (hereinafter called 'the those of Hoogovens and in consequence SNUPAT judgment'), the Court to exempt Hoogovens from the payment annulled the implied Decision of the of equalization contributions on those High Authority refusing to withdraw deliveries; and whereas the representa­ with retroactive effect the exemptions tive of the High Authority at the OCCF granted to the Hoogovens and Breda and the Fund made a reservation with Siderurgica companies in connexion regard to this decision; with the equalization of ferrous scrap. Whereas by a letter of 18 December As a result of the Court's judgment, the 1957, addressed to the OCCF and High Authority proceeded to examine published in the Official Journal of 1 the steps necessary for complying with it, February 1958, the High Authority in accordance with Article 34 of the withdrew its reservation; and whereas by ECSC Treaty. a letter of 17 April 1958, addressed to the On 15 May 1961, at the request of the OCCF and published in the Official Hoogovens company, a meeting took Journal of 13 May 1958, the High place between representatives of the Authority set out the circumstances company and of the High Authority. justifying the grant of the said exemption, The company's representatives put for­ namely the fact that the Hoogovens ward arguments which, they maintained, factories form a single industrial group demonstrated legally and factually that with the Breedband works at IJmuiden; there should be no withdrawal of the and whereas the High Authority added said exemptions retroactively (ex tunc). that any other undertaking in a similar On 14 June 1961 the High Authority condition of local integration could took a Decision withdrawing with retro­ likewise claim the benefit of exemption; active effect the exemption granted to the 'Whereas the Société nouvelle des usines Hoogovens company; this Decision was de Pontlieue — Acieries du Temple, in communicated to the applicant by letter its application of 28 October 1959 dated 21 June 1961. (Case 49/59) to the Court of Justice, The Decision was based on the following criticized the High Authority for not considerations: having withdrawn, with retroactive Whereas the Council of the Imported effect from the date when it had been Ferrous Scrap Equalization Fund (le granted, the Decision to grant an exemp­ Conseil de la Caisse de péréquation des tion to Hoogovens; and whereas Hoogo­ ferrailles importées) (hereinafter referred vens intervened in the case, arguing that to as "the Fund") decided at its meeting the application should be dismissed as in­ on 14 December 1956, pursuant to the admissible or unfounded; unanimous proposal of the Council of Whereas the Court of Justice, by its the Joint Bureau of Ferrous Scrap judgment of 22 March 1961, annulled

to Hoogovens, and expressly declared not permanently suffer the financial the exemption to be illegal; whereas consequences of an exemption illegal the Court referred the case back to the ly granted to their competitors; High Authority, so that it might pro 'Whereas in the present case preference ceed, in accordance with Article 34 should be given to the preservation of of the Treaty, to take the steps necessary the principle of joint liability of all the for complying with the annulment of undertakings, which requires them to the Decision; and whereas the Court, share the burdens of equalization on a while conceding the importance of the non-discriminatory basis; principle of legal certainty, a principle 'Whereas Hoogovens could not legiti which would be sacrificed where a

the High Authority; of other undertakings is not merely 'Whereas the withdrawal of the exemp that they should not permanently suffer tion ex nunc could have no practical the financial consequences of an illegal effect, since the equalization system has exemption, but consists also in seeing that been abolished; each competing undertaking bears a 'Whereas since the withdrawal of exemp share of the total burden, proportionate tion with retroactive effect was not in to its consumption of bought ferrous scrap; principle excluded, it is proper to weigh the public interest against the 'Whereas, quite apart from these con private interest involved; whereas the siderations, it is not possible to accede conflict between these two interests to the argument advanced by Hoogovens may be presented, according to the that any retroactive withdrawal can abovementioned judgment, as follows: only take effect within a "reasonable — on the one hand, the interest of period of time" which the case law of the Hoogovens in keeping the advantage Community recognizes as a period of the which it had acquired in good faith, order of months rather than years; and which had enabled it to arrange whereas so short a period has, in fact, its affairs in reliance on the been deemed appropriate only in the continuance of this position; case of public authorities, whilst in the — on the other hand, the interest of the present case the matter at issue is rather Community in ensuring the proper a question of a period of limitation, of working of the equalization scheme, the order of several years; whereas, which depends on the joint liability therefore, this argument is not relevant;

'Whereas Hoogovens' conviction that it II — Conclusions of the parties was conclusively entitled to the benefit The applicant claims that the Court of the exemption could have had no should: foundation until the High Authority made its attitude known on 18 December annul the Decision of the High Authority 1957; whereas, however, even after that of 14 June 1961 communicated to the date Hoogovens could not reasonably applicant by letter of 21 June 1961; exclude the possibility that the principle order the High Authority to pay the

of 18 December 1957 and 17 April should dismiss the application as un 1958, a certain number of undertakings founded, 'with all the consequences made applications for exemption from in law arising therefrom, in particular the levy in circumstances similar to with regard to the rules on costs and those of Hoogovens; and whereas since expenses'. any exemption has been declared illegal The intervener puts forward conclusions by the Court of Justice, the High identical to those of the defendant. Authority is bound to reject these

JUDGMENT OF 12.7.1962 — CASE 14/61

does not require the total sacrifice of the strative morality (overheidsfatsoen) and interests of one party to those of the of the proper management of the public other. service (behoorlijk bestuur). It has, The defendant for its part considers that moreover, acted contrary to the rules the contested Decision faithfully follows laid down by the previous decisions of the lines of the SNUPAT judgment as the Court, according to which the High well as the provisions of Article 34 of the Authority must not pursue a course of ECSC Treaty.

obliged to withdraw with retroactive drawal ex tunc; effect the exemptions from which Hoogo — fails to carry out an appraisal of the vens benefited. The applicant merely actual interests involved. Nowhere avoids the issue by invoking the principles is there 'made or even outlined' an of administrative morality and of the appraisal of the beneficial and harm proper management of the public service. ful consequences in which the main The defendant analyses the scope tenance of the past effects of the covered, according to it, by the operative exemption would involve the Com part of the SNUPAT judgment: what munity in comparison with those the Court annulled was the implied which withdrawal ex tunc would Decision of the High Authority refusing

application either was of no significance The intervener refers to French case (in that it referred to a withdrawal ex law and legal theory to show that under nunc), or else ran contrary to the principle the French legal system decisions of a of certainty (in that it referred to with­ financial nature, such as those which the drawal ex tunc). High Authority withdrew by the con­ With regard to the principle of certainty, tested Decision, do not create vested it coincided in this case with the rights, are 'purely declaratory' and actual interests of Hoogovens, which the may be withdrawn at any time, if they High Authority, contrary to what was are illegal. said by the applicant, did not fail to 2. On the infringement of an essential examine. But the High Authority had procedural requirement to appraise all the actual interests in question, not only those of Hoogovens. According to the applicant, the recitals in The defendant criticizes the means of the preamble to the contested Decision comparison chosen by the applicant: do not in any event justify that Decision; in the first place, Community law 'does they are irrelevant in fact and in law, not follow the 'points of agreement' which amounts to an absence of of the national legal systems', but has reasoning. The High Authority has 'an originality of its own'; in the second failed to take account of the previous place, the problem of revoking admini­ case law of the Court, which enjoined it strative measures should not be examined to 'state in the grounds of its Decision in general, since the disputed Decision the essential points of the findings of was taken under quite exceptional con­ fact on which the legal justification ditions, that is, following annulment by of its measure is based'. the Court, in connexion moreover with In fact the contested Decision only an application for withdrawal ex tunc. states 'general and abstract considera­ Having submitted these observations, tions', without 'referring expressly or by the defendant examines in detail the implication to Hoogovens' actual position case law and legal theory invoked by in particular'. If the High Authority had the applicant and by the professors carried out such an appraisal, it would consulted by the latter; it endeavours certainly have arrived at a different to show that these authorities in no result.

constitutes discrimination contrary to the However, the High Authority wasobliged Treaty and must consequently be to carry out research on its own initiative abolished is not to combine the principle not only into the factors militating in of legal security with the principle of favour of withdrawal ex tunc, but also legality; it is to suppress a priori one of those capable of swaying the balance in the two factors in the proposition.' the opposite direction. It is significant (b) To the extent to which the contested to note that, although the applicant Decision is based on the consideration had already offered on 17 April 1961 that to. supply all the information which the the interest of other undertakings is not High Authority might wish to obtain, merely that they should not permanently the latter did not put a single question suffer the financial consequences of an to the applicant. illegal exemption, but consists also in The absence of precise reasoning is once seeing that each competing under­ again illustrated by the fact that the taking bears a share of the total burden contested Decision is practically a copy proportionate to its consumption of of the analogous Decision taken in the bought ferrous scrap', case of the Breda Siderurgica company; the High Authority fails to indicate why, it appears therefore to be a 'standard in this case, the interests of other under­ form'. Whilst it must be admitted that takings are more important than those of the two cases were comparable up to the undertaking benefiting from the the moment theexemptions weregran ted, exemption. it does not at all follow that they were The applicant observes that, at the time also comparable with regard to the of the meeting of 15 May 1961, its effects of the retroactive withdrawal. representatives had drawn the attention (c) Although the defendant, as a of the High Authority 'to the fact that a defence against the plea of insufficiency retroactive contribution by Hoogovens of reasoning, observes that the contested of six million guilders, in relation to a Decision falls within its discretionary total amount of 1 464 thousand million power, it must be objected that this guilders for the Caisse de péréquation opinion 'is only partially correct'. On (Equalization Fund), represented only the one hand, the High Authority did 0.37% and that the payment of that not have such a power with regard to the sum by Hoogovens constituted such a expediency of the withdrawal; in fact, minimal advantage for each of its after weighing up the interests, it was competitors that it was of no importance bound to draw the resultant conclusion.

On the other hand, it is doubtful whether to pay as a result of the withdrawal of this power exists with regard to 'the the exemption. As the final accounts final appraisal of the respective weight of were not drawn up, the High Authority the interests in question and the serious could not yet state the exact sum; its ness of the damage which one or other appropraite department, however, esti of the possible solutions will cause to those mates this at approximately five million interests'; as the judgment of the Court guilders, an amount substantially lower declares that such appraisal 'in the first than Hoogovens' estimate. place falls within the competence of the With regard to the similarity between High Authority', this implies that legal the respective preambles to the Decisions supervision of this appraisal is not in the Hoogovens and Breda Siderurgica outside the jurisdiction of the Court. cases, the essential factor is that the The defendant cites the recitals in the High Authority examined these two preamble to the contested Decision to cases separately, which is shown in show that it was carefully reasoned and particular by the meeting on 15 May that the High Authority had duly 1961. In addition, the grounds on which examined the objections put forward by the two exemptions had been granted Hoogovens at the meeting on 15 May were the same and the SNUPAT judg

on the other hand that, although that ward any special arguments with regard Decision is based on an appraisal, it falls to this, but it may be considered that within the discretionary power of the the statements above under 1 constitute, High Authority. The SNUPAT judg in part, a reply to the complaints of the ment required it to withdraw the exemp applicant. tions and the only question was the choice between withdrawal ex nunc and ad b) The argument adduced from the ex tunc. In order to be able to choose, it slight effect which the contributions was necessary for the High Authority required would have on equalization as to make an appraisal of all the actual a whole does not take account of the circumstances of the case, a discretionary authority of the SNUPAT judgment.

sequences of an exemption illegally granted to their competitors'. 3. On infringement of the Treaty and of the In its rejoinder, the defendant states rules of law relating to its application that the reservation appearing in its A — On the balance of interests statement of defence relates to the involved amount which the applicant would have (a) The applicant maintains in the

first place that the preamble to the distribution network'. Finally, the contested Decision, when it states that equalization system was a Community 'the interest of other undertakings . . . undertaking and 'the success of the consists. . .in seeing that each competing scheme reinforces future Community undertaking bears a share of the total undertakings'. Hence respect for the burden proportionate to its consumption principle of legality, and in particular of bought ferrous scrap', for the rule of non-discrimination, com identifies the public interest of the pels added attention having regard in Community with the sum total of the particular to the basic importance which individual interests of the undertakings, the Court attaches to the strict obser which runs contrary to the case law of the vance of that rule.

Con equality. Moreover, this principle was tinuing this line of argument, the appli further strengthened by the principle of cant criticizes the reasoning of the joint liability which is fundamental to contested Decision, according to which the equalization scheme. Finally, it is withdrawal ex nunc would have no necessary to stress that the levy has the useful effect, as the scheme has in the nature of an addition to the price meantime been repealed. The applicant requiring that it be 'very equally' considers that precisely this factor is in divided between the undertakings, failing favour of retaining the exemption: in which the rules of competition established fact, the problem of the proper function by the Treaty would be infringed. ing of the scheme can no longer arise (b) According to the applicant, the

The benefit which other undertakings The applicant forgets that the equaliza would derive from withdrawal ex tunc tion scheme has not yet been finally would be insignificant; as the Court wound up and that certain outstanding has decided in its previous cases, altera questions have still to be settled by the tion of the conditions of competition must High Authority. In order that these be sufficiently significant to constitute decisions may be taken on an equitable discrimination. On the other hand, basis, it is necessary 'that Hoogovens' withdrawal ex tunc would constitute ferrous scrap should return to the discrimination to the detriment of the

applicant in comparison with other account is taken of the fact that the undertakings. In fact the period during overwhelming majority of its real com which the exemption was in force was petitors did not have to pay equalization. one of favourable market conditions In fact, the products in which Hoogovens which allowed those subject to equaliza competed with other undertakings are tion to pass on to the purchasers, in the thin sheets produced by the Hoog- short, 'not only their equalization . . . ovens-Breedband group; 97% of these but also the minute excess of equalization products are manufactured by under which arose for them from the exemption takings which combine in a single legal of Hoogovens'.

. . a given High Authority would be favouring legal form in anticipation of certain Hoogovens in comparison with other advantages, they have no grounds for undertakings by not requiring it to demanding that this legal form. . .should pay the levy. Payment of the disputed not be taken into account whenever its sums will not result in a deficit in the application is capable of operating to applicant's trading account; it is possible disadvantage'. Moreover, the majority that it will diminish the profit margin, of competing undertakings are far from but this has also happened to Hoogovens' using only their own ferrous scrap.

JUDGMENT OF 12.7.1962 — CASE 14/61

would carry weight only if the High judgment attached great importance to Authority had also appraised the the question whether the exemptions financial positions of other undertakings had or had not been obtained from —which is not the case. Finally, the inexact or incomplete information. At defendant fails to take account of the the meeting on 15 May 1961, the fact that the data in question 'incor­ applicant's representatives solemnly porate ancillary activities having no affirmed that the information supplied bearing on the problem of the balance of by Hoogovens in 1956 was complete and interests of Hoogovens and its competitors exact and the High Authority's represen­ in relation to the imposition of the tatives confirmed this. If the High equalization levy'. Moreover, the profits Authority refuses to take this factor into appearing in the balance sheets are not consideration, on the ground that it is directly comparable between one country not of primary importance, it disregards and another and certain adjustments the authority of the judgment. must be made for the differences in The defendant states that, for it, this calculation of cost prices in the con­ problem is not of primary importance; ception of profit and in the taxation in fact, an error or omission in the system. declarations would simply involve an The defendant is astonished that the alteration of the accounts.

HOOGOVENS v HIGH AUTHORITY

charge. In this case, the competent time the exemption was granted (14 authority took a decision expressly de December 1956), or, again, at the date claring that the levy should not apply, of the letter of 18 December 1957, this that is to say a decision conferring is still a long way from the period of a subjective right.' What is therefore serves that the exemption goes back to concerned here is' definitely legal cer Algera case. tainty and the inviolability of individual The defendant, on the other hand, ob measures giving rise to rights and not the serves that the exemption goes back to extinction of a tax debt by means of a the date of the Decision of the High period of limitation.

time. When the Société fiduciaire suisse exemptions should have shaken its con raised the problem, the applicant re fidence in the validity of those quested both the High Authority and the exemptions. In fact, those disputes were Equalization Fund to confirm that their based on the notion that the interpreta opinion on the nature of 'own arisings' tion of the High Authority was not too of the ferrous scrap in question accorded wide, but too narrow; they could there with that of the applicant. 'All the fore only reinforce the opinion of the views and subsequent decisions both applicant.

JUDGMENT OF 12.7.1962 — CASE 14/61

It arises the applicant deduces from this that the from the decisions of the Court that the period of time to be taken into con risk inherent in such an illegality cannot sideration is that during which this be made the sole responsibility of the presumption prevailed. party concerned under its authority. The defendant maintains that, through The defendant considers that if the out the period when the exemptions applicant complains today that it gran were in force, numerous circumstances ted an exemption which it had itself should have shaken Hoogovens'certainty solicited, it pushes "illogically a little too as to the definitive nature of the exemp

Nevertheless, the tions; the applications made by equalization scheme does not profit SNUPAT and by certain German under the High Authority; it is 'simply a takings; finally the grounds of the 'clearing' operation whose final outcome judgment of 17 July 1959. is not to show either a profit or a loss'. The intervener supports the defendant's The intervener states that the applicant line of argument. It is of the opinion is not in a position to raise any com that the applicant itself had little con plaints whatever against the High fidence in the legal value of the criterion Authority. of local integration, which is shown by the fact that in the SNUPAT proceedings 4. Production of documents relating to the its argument turned essentially on the case; offers of proof alleged existence of an 'association' (maatschap) between it and the Breed- The applicant attaches considerable im band company. portance to the production by the The defendant considers that, by annulling defendant of all the documents relating the refusal to institute a retroactive to the case and in particular to the withdrawal, the SNUPAT judgment 'minutes' of the meeting of 15 May 1961 considered such a withdrawal to be and the report made to the High perfectly possible in this case.

HOOGOVENS v HIGH AUTHORITY

The production of these documents is support of the application'. necessary to show that the factors to The defendant comments only on the which the representatives of the appli­ account of the meeting of 15 May (it cant company drew the attention of the states that minutes were not drawn up). High Authority at the time of the above- While disputing the efficacy of that mentioned meeting have not been men­ document, it produces it as a schedule to tioned in the contested Decision; produc­ its rejoinder. tion will allow the Court to test 'the actual motives' for that Decision. IV — Procedure

The applicant offers to prove 'by all legal means, including witnesses, the The procedure followed the normal facts and circumstances relied on ... in course.

Grounds of judgment

Admissibility

The application was made in due and proper form and within the appropriate time limit. No objection was raised on grounds of admissibility, either by the defendant or by the intervener and there is no reason for the Court to raise an objection of inadmissibility of its own motion. The application is therefore admissible.

Hence the Court, being anxious not to 'put itself in the place of the High Authority' or to deprive the applicant either of the benefit of an administrative appraisal, or of the possibility of further legal action, confined itself to referring the matter back to the High Authority, so that, in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty, the latter might proceed to make this appraisal and to take the decision whether or not to withdraw the irregular exemptions with retroactive effect.

2. Consequently, the defendant's argument that the Court, in its earlier judgment, had already ordered the retroactive withdrawal of the disputed exemptions, or had already decided that a withdrawal with retroactive effect was necessary in this case, must be dismissed.

In fact, the implied Decision refusing to withdraw the disputed exemptions 'with retroactive effect' was annulled only because of the erroneous ground on which it was based. It cannot be inferred that withdrawal with retroactive effect was in any event obligatory.

On the contrary, it is clear from the grounds of judgment that the decision whether it was appropriate in the particular case to withdraw the exemption ex nunc or ex tunc was referred back to the High Authority.

3. The High Authority has argued that the SNUPAT judgment recognized its discretionary power to withdraw exemptions with retroactive effect; this argument is correct in the sense that the judgment referred back to the High Authority the appraisal of the facts. However, this does not mean, as is apparent moreover from the SNUPAT judgment, that the legality of the Decision cannot be reviewed by the Court, as it has been in the present application.

2. The applicant impugns the defendant's evaluation of the conflicting interests involved, alleging that the High Authority has not taken proper account of the financial interests in question, in that it has not compared the burden imposed on the applicant by a retroactive withdrawal of exemption with the total amount of the equalization contributions.

According to the applicant, such a comparison would show that the amount due from Hoogovens in respect of equalization represents only about 0.37% of the total amount of the equalization contributions, so that the continuance of its exemption could not impair the regular functioning of the equalization scheme, which is the most important aspect of the public interest to be taken into account by the High Authority, according to the SNUPAT judgment.

The Court cannot accede to this argument. In fact, a comparison of the burden imposed on one undertaking with the total amount of the contribu­ tions would straightaway exclude any withdrawal of an illegal exemption, since the sum total of contributions is always of overwhelming magnitude. This conclusion is contrary to the view adopted by the Court in its previous judgment. Moreover, to leave exemptions in force as far as the past is concerned would, without justification, afford the applicant an advantage of 5 to 6 million Dutch guilders over each of the other undertakings in the Community. This aspect of the balance of financial interests must not be overlooked.

3. The applicant alleges that the defendant has failed to appreciate that the withdrawal ex tunc involves a real loss for Hoogovens and 'an advantage

The Court is unable to accept this argument.

(a) The interest of the Community, as the SNUPAT judgment has already laid down, requires that the other contributing undertakings shall not be made to suffer the effect of an exemption illegally granted to their competitors.

One must not underestimate the importance in this case of the typical aspect of the financial arrangement covering undertakings which are to a

HOOGOVENS v HIGH AUTHORITY

large extent in a situation of mutual competition, actual or potential, direct or indirect, total or partial, temporary or permanent.

(b) Moreover, even if the applicant's contention were in fact correct, it would still be the case that a mere withdrawal ex nunc would have left it with

It is certainly true that, in weighing the conflicting interests on which the choice between the ex nunc and ex tunc revocation of an illegal decision is to depend, it is important to bear in mind the actual situation of the parties concerned. It is clear, however, that this was done in the present case.

In fact, it is evident from findings 2 to 4 above that in the disputed Decision full account was taken of the actual situation of the applicant as regards the financial interests in question, the particular consequences which a retroactive withdrawal would entail for the applicant and its competitive position.

JUDGMENT OF 12.7.1962 — CASE 14/61

Moreover, it is clear that at the meeting on 15 May 1961 the High Authority received the representatives of the applicant, who laid before the defendant all their arguments in favour of the solution most advantageous to their interests. It appears, therefore, that the defendant, in arriving at its Decision, was in full possession of the facts of the case.

In these circumstances, one cannot but conclude that the High Authority, in its appraisal of the situation, had regard to the possible effects of each of the alternative solutions.

This complaint is therefore unfounded.

HOOGOVENS v HIGH AUTHORITY

For this reason also, the question of 'a reasonable period of time' could not be of decisive importance in this case, but constituted only one element in the applicant's special interest in the respect for the principle of legal certainty, a principle which the High Authority was bound to, and did, take into account.

However, the foregoing consideration does not mean that, even in these cases, the time factor has not a part to play; the competent authority can withdraw an exemption with retroactive effect only by taking into account the fact that the beneficiaries of the revoked Decision could assume in good faith that they would not have to pay contributions on the ferrous scrap in question, and could arrange their affairs in reliance on the continuance of this situation.

Consequently, one must see whether the considerations set out in the preamble to the disputed Decision (thirteenth recital) are correct.

The disputed Decision rightly states that:

'Hoogovens' conviction that it was conclusively entitled to the benefit of the exemption could have had no foundation until the High Authority made its attitude known on 18 December 1957'.

In this connexion, the Court is of the opinion that the attitude adopted by the High Authority until the SNUPAT judgment was certainly not a wrongful act or omission, since the correct interpretation of the basic Decisions on the distinction between bought ferrous scrap and own arisings has proved to be very debatable.

Since the High Authority could not be charged with a wrongful act or omission, its attitude could not entitle the applicant to more favourable treatment.

Moreover, the applicant's argument amounts to saying that the High Authority, which itself neither finances nor profits from the financial arrangement, should make the undertakings which it administers pay directly for the consequences of its own errors. For this reason, too, the said argument is unacceptable.

Consequently, this complaint must likewise be dismissed.

8. It is evident from the considerations set out above that the disputed Decision correctly weighed the public interest against the private interests involved.

The public interest is distinct from the private interest of the other under­ takings consuming ferrous scrap.

III — The reasons given for the contested Decision

The applicant alleges that the contested Decision shows a lack or insufficiency of reasons, constituting an infringement of an essential procedural require­ ment.

This complaint cannot be accepted by the Court. Although the reasons may appear to be inadequately elaborated, careful examination shows them to be to the point; they are, therefore, sufficient to justify the disputed Decision.

A statement of reasons must be deemed adequate, under the terms of Articles 15 and 33 of the Treaty, when it enables both the parties concerned and the Court to discover the essential elements of the High Authority's reasoning. In this connexion, the contested Decision makes clear the reasons which led the defendant to give preference in this case to the principle of legality. Moreover, if the defendant did not think it necessary to take note of the effects — effects of some consequence, no doubt — which a withdrawal ex tunc would, on a concrete appraisal of the interests involved, entail for the applicant, that is easily explained by the fact that, in the opinion of the High Authority, the well-known prosperity of the applicant company reduced the relative importance of those effects in the context of the balance balance of interests.

This reasoning emerges clearly from the scheme of the contested Decision, both for the party to whom it was addressed and for the Court, so that the statement of reasons cannot be said to be substantially inadequate in this regard.

According to the applicant, there is a logical inconsistency between the operative part of the Decision and the recital that 'the retroactive withdrawal of an illegal exemption has the effect only of removing an unjustified advantage and re-establishes equality between Hoogovens and other

The Court cannot accept this argument.

The fact that in this case withdrawal ex nunc would allow the consequences of the illegality which was committed to remain in being is obviously an argument which militates in favour of withdrawal ex tunc.

This complaint must therefore be dismissed.

IV — Costs

Under the terms of Article 69 (2) of the rules of Procedure the unsuccessful party shall be ordered to pay the costs.

The unsuccessful party has failed in all its submissions in the present case.

1. Dismisses the application as unfounded;

2. Orders the applicant to pay the costs, including those of the intervention.

Donner Riese Rossi Delvaux Hammes Trabucchi Lecourt

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 12 July 1962.

A. Van Houtte A. M. Donner Registrar President

OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL LAGRANGE