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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·Rozsudok·9.6.1964

C-69/63

ECLI:EU:C:1964:38

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
IČS
61963CJ0069

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (FIRST CHAMBER) <apnote>1</apnote> 9 JUNE 1964

Mrs Anne-Marie Marcillat (nee Capitaine)

v Commission of the European Atomic Energy Community

Case 69/63

Summary

1. Officials — Appeals relating to decisions prior to the publication of the Regulations —

Time-limits

(Staff Regulations of officials of the EAEC, Articles 91 and 102)

2. Officials — Contract of employment concluded before the entry into force of the Staff Regula­ tions — Appeal relating to the interpretation of such contracts — Applicability of the Staff Regulations after establishment

(Staff Regulations of officials of the EAEC, Article 91)

3. Officials — Employment on a contractual basis — Legal system

1. Article 91, in so far as it lays down which concerns the interpretation of time-limits for the filing of appeals, a contract concluded during the

applies to previous decisions only period before the entry into force of

from the date of its publication. the Staff Regulations, the rules of This rule applies in particular to the Regulations, and especially those

disputes concerning the application of Article 91, cannot be applied of Article 102 of the Staff Regulations, before establishment has been duly which lays down transitional pro­ granted.

visions to enable the Staff Regula­ 3. It is generally accepted that public

tions to be applied to servants who servants employed on a contractual

are already employed. These pro­ basis are subject to the application of visions are in addition to the rules regulations relating to the function­ prescribed by the Staff Regulations ing of the service and that these for the recruitment of officials. regulations apply to servants taking 2. However, where there is a dispute up their duties.

In Case 69/63

ANNE-MARIE CAPITAINE, the wife of Gerard MARCILLAT , a secretary at the Joint Nuclear Research Centre Ispra, residing at Laveno (Italy), at

Supé- assisted by Ernest Arendt and Jean Welter, Advocates of the Cour

1 — Language of the Case: French.

JUDGMENT OF 9.6.1964 — CASE 69/63

rieure de Justice of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, with an address for in Chambers Ernest Willy- service Luxembourg at the of Arendt, 6 rue

Goergen, applicant,

v

COMMISSION of the European Atomic Energy COMMUNITY , represented by its Legal Adviser, Jean-Pierre Delahousse, acting as Agent, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of Henri Manzanarès, Secretary of the Legal Department of the European Executives, 2 place de Metz,

defendant,

Application for the reversal of the decisions withdrawing the separation

allowance following the applicant's marriage and for an order for the de­ fendant to pay the arrears from the date of such withdrawal;

THE COURT (First Chamber)

(Rap­ composed of: A. Trabucchi, President of Chamber, L. Delvaux porteur) and W. Strauß, Judges,

Advocate-General: M. Lagrange Registrar: A. Van Houtte

gives the following

JUDGMENT

Issues of fact and of law

I — Facts indicate the basic elements of remunera­

tion, namely the basic salary fixed by it The facts may be summarized as fol ws: and certain additional allowances. The

Administration used for this purpose a

The applicant was recruited in March duplicated form which was at that time 1960 a secretary in as the Commission in use for the recruitment of staff. In the of the EAEC. form it was stated that these provisions

The terms of the letter of engagement ' … may be cancelled at any time by (Schedule 1 to the application) which either side on one month's notice', and

was sent on 2 March 1960 and accepted that 'this letter is without prejudice to

on 5 March are very succinct. In fact the subsequent drawing up of a con­

the Administration only goes as far as to tract'.

MARCILLAT v COMMISSION

'reclassifica­ Among the additional allowances pres­ sphere of operations called

cribed in the letter there appears one tion at the end of the probationary entitled 'separation allowance' the grant period', which the Administration car­

of which is subject solely to a well-defined ried out on the basis of a periodic

condition relating to the residence of the report drawn up at the end of the first servant at the time of engagement. As six months of service. The applicant was the applicant fulfilled this condition, informed in addition that the provisions she received the allowance from the of the letter of engagement remained

first month of taking up her duties. unchanged.

On 6 May 1961 the applicant married By letter of 26 October 1961 (Schedule 7 Gérard Marcillat, an engineer, himself a to the application) the applicant asked

servant of the institution, working for the the Legal Department to resubmit her Centre at Ispra to which she had in the case to the Directorate General of

meantime been transferred. On 14 June Administration, as the decision of 14 1961 the applicant was notified of a June appeared to her to be inconsistent decision 'withdrawing the separation with the letter of engagement and the

following her 29 August. marriage'

allowance aforementioned note of

(Schedule 1A to the application). She There being no reply to this request, the her in letter applicant reminded the Legal Depart­ expressed surprise a of

24 July 1961 (Schedule 2 to the applica­ ment in a registered letter of 5 March

tion) in which, referring to the express 1962 (Schedule 8 to the application) of 'request' provisions of the letter of her of 26 October 1961 a engagement, copy she asked the Administration, if it was of which she enclosed.

not able to comply with the letter, to be The Administration, in the person of its good enough to point out to her the Director-General, rejected this request

criterion capable of 'causing the letter by letter of 4 May 1962 (Schedule 10 to of engagement to be legally deficient'. the application), merely confirming 'the

The Director-General Administra­ 2 August 1961 opinion'

of expressed on

tion explained to the applicant on and, consequently, the decision of 14 2 August 1961 (Schedule 3 to the June. 'withdrawal'

application) that the of her The applicant lodged her application at separation allowance had been made the Registry on 22 June 1963, at the

in accordance with Article 9 (c) of the expiration of a period of four months

General Staff Regulations of the ECSC from the sending of another written

on which the Euratom Commission complaint on 22 February 1963 to the

based its relations with its staff and Deputy Director of the Ispra Centre which provides that: (Schedule 11 to the application), to

When a husband and wife are em­ which there was no reply. The applica­

ployed by the Community this allow­ tion has as its object the reversal of the

ance shall be payable only to the decision suspending the grant of the higher.'

spouse whose salary is the allowance in dispute, the reversal of the

Moreover, on 29 August 1961, the local express or implied measures of the

directorate of Ispra notified the appli­ Administration directed towards that

cant (Schedule 4 to the application) that same end and that the defendant be her basic monthly salary was increased ordered to pay the arrears.

to 8350 BF, 'corresponding to Step 3 of It is also to be noted that the applicant

Grade 11 of Category C in the salary was established in February 1963 under scale of the ECSC applied provisionally Article 102 of the Staff Regulations of

by the Euratom Commission'. This officials of the EEC and EAEC. She decision, which took effect retroactively was asked in accordance with Article from 1 October 1960, was taken in the 104 of those Regulations to waive in

JUDGMENT OF 9.6.1964 — CASE 69/63

follows: writing the benefit of the provisions of parties may be summarized as

her contract. The application is directed against the

The waiver by the applicant, occurring following decisons:

several months after she had made the 1. The express decision of the Com­

present application, was, with the ex­ mission, notified to the applicant on

press agreement of the Administration, 14 June 1961 (Schedule 1A to the

made subject to the following conditon: application), by which the appli­

'Without prejudice to the dispute pend­ cant's separation allowance was with­

ing before the Court of Justice of the drawn following her marriage; European Communities (Case 69/63)'. 2. In so far as they constitute confirma­

tory decisions, the letters sent to the II — Conclusions of the parties applicant on 2 August 1961 and

4 May 1962 (Schedules 3 and 10 to

A. The applicant claims in her applica­ the application) by Mr Funk, the

tion that the Court should: Director-General of Administration 1. Declare that it has jurisdiction to and Personnel; entertain this dispute; 3. The implied decision of refusal of the 2. Declare the application to be applicant's request to the Deputy Director on 22 February 1963 (Sche­ admissible; 3. Reverse the decisions taken and dule 11 to the application), arising declare that, despite her marriage, from the silence of the Director of the the applicant has the right to the Centre at Ispra. separation allowance prescribed

by the letter of engagement of A — On admissibility 2 March 1960; 4. Consequently, order the defendant The applicant does not dispute that, to pay the applicant the arrears of according to Article 91 of the Staff separation allowance as from the Regulations of officials of the EEC and date of its withdrawal; EAEC an appeal must be filed within

5. Order the defendant to pay the three months of the notification of the

costs and expenses of the pro­ decision in dispute, but asserts that the Regulations apply only ceedings.'

said to officials

In her reply she claims that the Court of the Community and, pursuant to

should: Article 1, the status of official stems from Accept the conclusions set out in the the manner of appointment. As she was application and, consequently, order not appointed under the Staff Regula­ the defendant to pay the applicant tions, the applicant cannot be con­

the separation allowance from the sidered Community as an official of the

date of its withdrawal up to the and the time-limits provided for by the day.' present Regulations thus cannot operate against B. The defendant contends that the her. In the absence of provisions which Court should: limit in time the manner of proceeding Declare the application to be out of with this application, it is admissible. time and therefore inadmis ble; The defendant considers that this applica­

alternatively, dismiss it as unfo de; tion falls under the provisions of Article the applicant to costs.'

91 the Staff Regulations that it order pay the of and

must be considered as being out of time III —

Submissions and argu­ and therefore be held to be inadmissible.

ments of the parties Article 91 applies to disputes of a finan­ cial character between one of the Com­ The submissions and arguments of the munities and 'any person to whom

MARCILLAT v COMMISSION

Staff Regulations Article 91 be these apply'. ing Regulation, cannot

The applicant belongs to the category applied from 1 January 1962 because of of servants referred to in Article 102 the delay in the publication of the Staff of the Regulations may be who estab­ Regulations in the Official Journal, the

lished under the conditions laid down in appeal have been validly lodged could

that Article. With the entry into force of at the Court within three months from

the Regulations, such servants were 14 June 1962, the date of publication, in

automatically made subject to the pro­ other words on 15 September 1962 at

visions of Article 91 as regards methods the latest.

of recourse. By that provision, the The applicant's attempt to obtain for authors of the Staff Regulations have herself a new time-limit by submitting a followed Article 152 of the EAEC complaint on 22 February 1963 to the Establish­ Treaty, by which: 'The Court of Justice administration of the Ispra shall have jurisdiction in any dispute ment was ineffective. That request, in so between the Community and its ser­ far as its aim was to have the case

vants within the limits and under the brought before the Combined Com­

conditions laid down in the Staff Regula­ mittee set up by circular no 66 of 27 May tions or the Conditions of Employment'. 1959, was unacceptable since the same In that way the Regulations circum­ circular provided for its automatic abro­ vented the lacuna which arose from the gation on the entry into force of the

fact that, in view of the afore-mentioned Staff Regulations and from that date Article 152, the Rules of Procedure of the Committeewas replaced by bodies

the Court of Justice of 3 March 1959 set up by those Regulations. Moreover were not able to reproduce, on the the complaint of 22 February only subject of time-limits for appeals by repeated the grievances aired by the

Community servants, the provisions of applicant in the course of 1961 and 1962 the Rules of Procedure of 21 February and contested the decision on the ground

1957, relating to disputes as prescribed that the consequences of the decision

by the old Staff Regulations of the taken on 14 June 1961 were still present

ECSC. at the time of her establishment. The The defendant then goes on to examine silence with which this complaint was

the admissibility of the application in met, in so far as it can be considered as

respect of each of the impugned deci­ equivalent to an implied decision of

sions. refusal, has thus a purely confirmatory According to the defendant, the present character and cannot have the effect of

application by the applicant is directed making the time-limit for appeal against against a decision of 14 June 1961 which the decision of 14 June 1961 start to

the Administration, following a number run afresh.

of subsequent complaints, merely con­ The applicant replies that the submission firmed expressly or by implication. of inadmissibility based on the allega­

im­ is By virtue of the principle of the tion that the application out of time

mediate applicability of provisions re­ must be dismissed.

lating to procedure, the time-limit for the applicant's appeal began to run on 1. The decision of 14 June 1961 and the

the date of entry into force of the the confirmatory notes dated 2 August Staff Regulations. In principle, the 1961 and 4 May 1962 applicant ought therefore to have ap­

pealed to the Court no later than 31 The applicant denies that the time-limit

March 1962 to avoid being time-barred. for bringing an appeal specified in Although it appears, however, that, Article 91 of the Staff Regulations despite the provisions of the implement­ applies to servants who have not been

JUDGMENT OF 9.6.1964 — CASE 69/63

established. in fact sufficient to read the end of the

(a) Since, in the applicant's opinion, judgment to convince oneself that the

Article 152 of the EAEC Treaty pro­ Court was merely reaffirming the prin­

vides for the implementation of the ciple of non-retroactivity of rules of

Staff Regulations of officials, the appli­ procedure, without at the same time

cation of time-limits for bringing an invalidating the principle, equally well appeal is only conceivable after the established, of the immediate applica­

Regulations have come into force (a bility of those same rules. situation realized on 14 June 1962) and (b) The applicant considers that in this after they have become applicable to case the conditions for the application

the applicant and to the dispute. of Article 91 of the Staff Regulations are The question whether Article 91 of the not fulfilled. Staff Regulations applies to servants She points out that the issue in dispute who are not established has not yet is not concerned with a difficulty of

been resolved by the Court ofJustice. application of the Staff Regulations but It follows from the judgment of 12 with a difficulty of interpretation of the December 1956, Mirossevich v High contract of employment which was

Authority (Rec. 1955-1956, p. 369, Sum­ concluded before the entry into force mary, paragraph 2), that a time-limit of the Staff Regulations. The applicant similar to that of Article 33 of the ECSC states on this point that the question of

Treaty and of Article 39 of the Statute of admissibility is closely connected with

the Court ofJustice of the ECSC cannot the substance of the case.

be applied by analogy. She infers from this that, as the matter

The Rules of Procedure of the Court in dispute is outside the ambit of the

of Justice of 3 March 1959 did not Staff Regulations, the applicant is not

adopt the time-limit of two months 'one of the persons to whom these Staff fixedby the Rules of Procedure of Regulations in apply'

the words of

21 February 1957. The Second Cham­ Article 91. She claims that the time-

ber of the Court decided in its judgment limits laid down by that Article cannot of 4 April 1960, Elz v High Authority (Rec. operate against her. 1960, p. 228), that the entry into force of T he defendant replies that the applicant 's the Rules of Procedure of 3 March 1959 reasoning is not consistent with the

did not prejudice either rights of appeal letter and spirit of the provision. acquired before that date or time- The wording of Article 91 does not

limits running under the former Rules restrict its field of application to mere

of Procedure. 'difficulties of application of the Staff In Mirossevich it in­ respect of the decision, Regulations'; on the contrary the defendant replies that, although the cludes on a very general basis any dis­ Court dismissed the plea of inadmissi­ financial nature, pute, especially of a bility raised on the ground that the between one of the Communities and

application was out of time, it was any person to whom the Staff Regula­ because at that time there was no pro­ tions apply. The determinative cri­

vision laying down the time-limits for terion is consequently the status of the

bringing appeals in so-called disputes parties and not the legal nature of the

'concerning officials'. Today, however, relationship of employment which binds such a provision does exist: Article 91 them. From the entry into force of the

of the Staff Regulations. In respect of new rules the applicant possessed the

the Elz decision, the defendant alleges status of a 'person to whom the Staff that the applicant is trying to give it a Regulations apply'. From the mere

which it does not have, by fact of her holding a permanent post, meaning taking one clause out of context. It is she can become established and auto-

MARCILLAT v COMMISSION

matically enjoy the guarantees speci­ where else and cannot have a scope

fied in Article 102. According to the restricted to a fraction of the possible

Commission this condition is necessary disputes between the institutions and

but sufficient to bring the present dispute their servants.

within the sphere of Article 91. The fact that this dispute has its origin in a 2. The implied decision of refusal result­

divergence interpretation regarding of ing from the silence in respect of the the scope of a contractual provision is request of 22 February 1963 not such as to remove it from the

ambit of Article 91, given that the The applicant asserts that, even if it action concerns one of the financial were admitted that the time-limits in elements of the legal relationship estab­ Article 91 of the Staff Regulations lished between the applicant and the applied to this dispute, the silence in institution employing her. respect of her request of 22 February legis' The 'ratio supports, if that were 1963 cannot be considered as a mere

de­ necessary, the interpretation taken from confirmation of a previous express

the text. To restrict the application of cision of refusal.

Article 91 only to disputes relating to interpretation of the Staff Regula­ On 6 February 1963 the applicant the (a) tions amounts in fact to leaving un­ became established. Consequently she

decided the question of the time-limits was asked, in accordance with Article for appeals in disputes concerning the 104 of the Staff Regulations, to 'waive termination of contracts entered into the benefit of her contract'. before the existence of the Staff Regula­ The establishment of the applicant with tions, for example where, despite the the status of official constitutes for her provisions of Article 104, the servant and for the defendant a new circum­

refuses to waive the benefit of the con­ stance which justified a new request, tract. A lacuna of this kind, clearly since the, mere waiver of the contract

contrary to the aim of Article 152 of signified the surrender of the claim to

the EAEC Treaty, has in addition the payment of the separation allowance.

effect of to some hypo­ T he Commission of the EAEC was thus extending up thetical time-limit the legal protection bound to take account of this new

to by the very least let con­ given servants governed circumstance and at duration' tracts 'of limited as provided the applicant know what were the

by Article 214 (3) of the EAEC Treaty, consequences, with regard to her claim,

while, at the same time, that protection of the waiver of the contract.

is confined to narrow limits when it is a As the applicant 's legal position had question of officials or those entitled changed, her request of 22 February under them. 1963 deserved a new inquiry forming In short, Article 91 of the Staff Regula­ the basis for a new express decision. tions of officials and correspondingthe The Administration's silence which

provisions of the Conditions of Employ­ lasted for more than four months must

ment of Other Servants, which refer be regarded as an implied decision of

to the former, constitute without doubt refusal and not as confirmation of a

the 'regulatory provision', the lack of previous express decision. which the applicant wrongly believes The defendant replies that it cannot see

she has to invoke in order to avoid the how the establishment of the applicant

application of the time-limits in force. can constitute a 'new circumstance' Such a provision, made necessary by the such as to affect the existence and

express provisions of Article 152 of the extent of her financial rights during the EAEC Treaty, was to be found no­ period of validity of her contract, since

JUDGMENT OF 9.6.1964 —

CASE 69/63

waiver of the said contract excludes, as B —

On the substance of the case it must, any retroactive effect to the time before establishment took place The applicant points out that the letter of and is subject, moreover, (with the engagement, which forms the contract

Administra­ her 5 March express agreement of the following acceptance on

tion) to an express reservation as re­ 1960, specifies clearly and fully the

gards the result of the present dispute. conditions for the grant of the separation

allowance and that there is no need to

(b) The applicant goes on to assert search elsewhere for a provision which

that, as in its notes of 2 August 1961 and is capable of limiting the exercise of the 4 May 1962 the Administration men­ right which is thus recognized by con­

'suspension' tioned only of the separa­ tract. The contract contains no reserva­

tion allowance and not its 'withdrawal', tion or limitation with the exception of

it gave to the decision of 14 June 1961 a that relating to the distance from work

clearly provisional nature and it was of the place of residence at the time of

consequently only valid until the advent engagement. To be more precise, she

of subsequent decisions. At the time of comments that it does not in fact her establishment the applicant had mention the withdrawal of the allow­

thus the best reasons for pressing for a ance in the event of the marriage of the

new, and this time definite, decision. person concerned to another servant or

And that is what she did by her request official of the Community. Consequently of 22 February 1963. the Administration is disregarding the The defendant replies that the notes of applicant's right conferred by her con­

2 August 1961 and 4 May 1962 cannot tract when it refers to a restrictive

be interpreted as revoking the decision clause contained in rules which have of 14 June 1961 (relating to the with­ nothing to do with the relationship of

drawal of the separation allowance) and employment established.

as substituting for it an alleged pro­ The defendant replies that a purely 'suspending' 'literal' visional decision simply appraisal of the applicant's

the said allowance. One has only to rights, which does not take account of

read them again to perceive that the the detailed rules and general conditions Director General of Administration, in applied consistently and in a known

rejecting the claim presented by the manner by the new institutions to all

applicant on 24 July 1961, is merely their servants, leads inevitably to an

specifying the reasons for the decision over-formalistic solution which con­

of 14 June 1961 without altering its flicts with the principle of equal treat­

scope. ment accorded to all employees with

The defendant adds that it clearly fol­ the aim of avoiding discrimination.

lows from the expressions used by the After the entry into force of the T­ reaties

applicant in the letters sent to the of Rome the institutions unanimously Administration on 5 and 26 October agreed that during the initial period the 1961 and 22 February 1963 that the provisions enacted in Luxembourg applicant herself considered the decision should serve as a guide for the adminis­

of

14 June 1961 as an act 'adversely tration of the staff of the institutions in affecting' her. Brussels. These provisions subsequently The silence met by the complaint of prompted drawing up of contracts the

22 February 1963, through which the of limited duration as prescribed by applicant attempted, she states today, Article 214 (3) of the EAEC Treaty and to 'force a decision', can only, in any the application of interim provisions for case, be interpretedmerely as con­ employment such as the standard letter

firming the decision of 14 June 1961. sent to the applicant, which did not

MARCILLAT v COMMISSION

adversely affect the drawing up of a public law — with its servants. subsequent contract. By a decision of The applicant cannot moreover be 25 January 1958 the Councils authorized responsible for the delay in the imple­ the Presidents of the Institutions to mentation of the Staff Regulations of

Regula­ European Communities. apply the provisions of the Staff officials of the

tions of officials of the ECSC to senior The basic uncertainty in which the

officials. applicant, like the rest of her col­

This principle was then extended to all leagues, lived during the period before the staff of the institutions in Brussels. the entry into force of the Staff Regula­ With regard to this matter, see the tions gave rise to anxieties as numerous

budget of the EAEC for the 1959 as they were worrying. It is now time to financial year (OJ of 28 August 1959, wipe out the past by applying strictly p. 987, note under Article 11). the terms of the contract entered into The prohibition where two spouses are before the advent of the Staff Regula­ both employed in the Communities on tions.

combining their separation allowances, The present dispute raises no problems

like its corollary, namely the prohibition of interpretation, literal or otherwise.

on combining the installation allow­ The terms of the letter of engagement

ance and the resettlement allowance, is a are clear and unequivocal. In order to

settled practice which is both general counter the applicant's allegation it is and well-known, applied to all the staff for the defendant to prove that the

from the date when the institutions applicant agreed with the application

were set up. This practice, which is by analogy of the provisions of the Staff connected with the very nature of the Regulations of the ECSC. From the

allowance at issue and was confirmed in evidence it appears that the opposite is

Luxembourg by the first Staff Regula­ the case. Far from being improper, the tions of the ECSC, became a rule of applicant's allegation is well-founded

good administration and was spon­ in law.

taneously applied in Brussels from the The applicant points out that the note

beginning and incorporated without of 29 August 1961 in which she was

any reservation or discussion in the Staff informed that her basic salary had been Regulations of the new Communities. increased to 8350 BF emphasizes in The applicant replies that an imperative precise terms that: 'this decision, which requirement of legal ortho­ has from 1 October 1960, alters certainty and effect

dox administration is that the letter as in no other respect, apart from the basic well as the spirit of the contract of salary, the provisions of the letter of

be Ad­ This employment observed by the engagement sent to you'. express

ministration, which was perfectly free to confirmation of the letter of engage­

modify it, if it had so wished. The ment came after her marriage, which

applicant does not intend to enter into occurred on 6 May 1961, her complaint 'ins of 24 July 1961 and the note of 2 August administration'

the and outs of to

which the defendant refers nor to dispute 1961. 'literal' the argument that a application The applicant then replies to the argu­

of the contract of engagement leads to a ments pleaded by the defendant in its result which is contrary to the principle statement of defence.

of equality of treatment granted to all 1. She by expressing serious starts

with the aim of avoiding discrimination. doubts as legality of the decision to the

If that were in fact the case, the de­ of the Councils of 25 January 1958 and

fendant only blame itself and the can denies that it can operate against her, imperfect way in which it has organized as it was never published, as she was

its relations — which are governed by totally unaware of it and in any case as

JUDGMENT OF 9.6.1964 — CASE 69/63

it only applies to senior officials. discrimination, was both well-known

Further, the applicant points out that and made public. In order to convince

the Court in its judgment of 15 July 1960 oneself that this is the case it is enough in Joined Cases 43, 45 and 48/59, von to read the issues of the Official Journal Lachmüller and Others v High Authority of the Communities in which the bud­

(Rec. 1960, pp. 937 and 938, Summary, gets published were (OJ of 28 August

paragraph 4) held that the position of 1959, 987; OJ of 16 February 1960, p.

servants of the ECSC before the entry p. 221; OJ of 7 February 1961, p. 187, into force of the Regulations is different etc.).

from the Com­ 2. The applicant then that of servants of new points out that, munities. during the period before the entry into The defendant replies that it is doubtful force of the Staff Regulations, there was whether Article 214 of the EAEC nothing to prevent the Administration Treaty and the corresponding provision from substituting for a contract of of the EEC Treaty directly confer on engagement of 2 March 1960 a contract the Councils the power of decreeing the based on the provisions of the Staff provisional application of the financial Regulations of officials of the ECSC. system of the ECSC not only in their The defendant replies that it had most

departments but also in those of the certainly been well-founded in its re­

Commissions. Without doubt the bind­ peated use of the power to give notice of 'decision'

ing force of the of 25 January termination, provided in the Brussels 1958 is debatable and the scope of the contracts, in order to impose on each 'authorization'

which it enacted is un­ servant the alteration of his contract

certain. It is no less the case that, in the every time the absence or omission of

circumstances in which the 'examina­ relevant provisions rendered reference tion'

Article 214 Staff Regula­ prescribed by of the to the provisions of the

EAEC ECSC The de­ Treaty was carried out, agree­ tions of the necessary.

ment was reached without reservation fendant considers however that it was

from that date to apply the financial not obliged to insist on formalism to

system in question to senior officials of that extent. The clearly brief, pro­

'parties'

the institutions which were to visional and uncertain nature of the 'decision'

the examination. Thus the of letter of engagement, the relationship 25 January 1958 did not have to be of public law between the institution

published as such in that part of the and its servants and the knowledge Official Journal reserved for measures of which, from the time of their engage­

the Councils. At the most it had to be ment, the latter necessarily acquired as

applied in conformity with the agree­ to the detailed rules of the financial and ment reached. administrative system applying to their

The defendant alleges that the applicant position constitute reasons enough for must have known of the decision of that the provisions of the ECSC asserting 25 January 1958. would be applied to them automatically

The application of the financial system to the extent necessary to clarify and of the ECSC to servants newly recruited complete the terms of the letter of

by the institutions in Brussels had been, engagement.

even before the engagement of the 3. The applicant finally maintains that

applicant, the general, settled and well­ the application by analogy of the Staff known practice. Regulations of the ECSC to the con­

In addition, its extension to all cate­ tract created by the letter of engage­

gories of servants, which was carried out ment is only possible to the extent that

immediately with the desire for simpli­ the provisions of the said Regulations do fication and with the aim of avoiding not conflict with the terms of the letter

MARCILLAT v COMMISSION

of engagement. But, as regards the the applicant tries to shelter behind the 'terms' separation there is incon­ of her contract when allowance, cla'iming sistency between the terms of the letter the continuance of the allowance she

of engagement and the provisions of the is in fact upon a lacuna or relying Staff Regulations of the ECSC. omission and not a 'clear and unequivo­

The defendant replies that the only cal provision'.

contradiction which it sees as regards

the terms relates to the criterion deter­

mining the commencement of the right IV — Procedure to the separation allowance following engagement, in other words the condi­ The statements of the parties were lod­ tion relating to the place of residence of ged in due form and within the pres­

the official during the six months before cribed time-limits and the procedure

that date. It is clear that, on this specific followed the normal course.

point, the Brussels contract stipulates a Having heard the preliminary report condition as to distance (70 km) which of the Judge-Rapporteur and the opinion

is different from that laid down by the of the Advocate-General, the First ECSC rules (25 km) and it is obvious Chamber decided at the hearing on

that on that point the contract prevails 22 January 1964 to open the oral pro­

over the Luxembourg provisions. cedure without making any preparatory As to the case in which marriage takes inquiry. place between a servant and a colleague The oral observations of the parties

and the consequences which it can have were submitted at the hearing on

on the right to the allowance, there is no 4 March 1964. mention of this in the terms of the letter The Advocate-General delivered his of engagement. The contract is simply opinion at the hearing on 11 March silent on this point. When, therefore, 1964.

Grounds of judgment

I — As to admissibility

The defendant alleges that, in respect of the decision of 14 June 1961

withdrawing the grant of the separation allowance at issue, the time-limits

prescribed in Article 91 of the Staff Regulations began to run from the

publication of the Staff Regulations (14 June 1962) and had thus expired by the time the application was made (22 June 1963); the subsequent decisions, which are also dealt with in the application cannot be taken into account in

calculating the time-limits because they merely confirm the first decision.

The preliminary objection of inadmissibility raised by the defendant cannot be accepted.

Article 91, in so far as it lays down time-limits for the filing of appeals, applies to previous decisions only from the date of its publication.

JUDGMENT OF 9.6.1964 — CASE 69/63

This rule applies in particular to disputes concerning the application of

Article 102 of the Staff Regulations, which lays down transitional provisions

to enable the Staff Regulations to be applied to servants who are already employed. These provisions are in addition to the rules prescribed by the Staff Regulations for the recruitment of officials.

However, where there is a dispute which, as in this case, concerns the inter­ pretation of a contract concluded during the period before the entry into force of the Staff Regulations, the rules of such Regulations, and especially those of Article 91, cannot be applied before establishment has been duly

granted.

In fact, if the immediate applicability of the new Staff Regulations to these

matters were to be accepted, this would amount to prejudging the decision to establish which, apart from the case of officials having benefited from establishment granted under the rules of the old Staff Regulations of officials

of the ECSC, is only granted under the conditions prescribed by Articles 102 et seq. of the Staff Regulations of the EEC and of the EAEC.

The applicant pointed out during the written procedure that she had been established on 6 February 1963.

As this claim has not been contradicted by the defendant one can infer from it that the time-limits for appeal against the decision of 14 June 1961 began

to run, in respect of the applicant, from 6 February 1963.

On 22 February 1963 the applicant sent to the Administration of the Ispra Centre an administrative complaint which referred expressly to her previous complaints relating to the withdrawal of the separation allowance.

She received no reply and her appeal of 22 June 1963 was lodged exactly 4 months after the above-mentioned administrative complaint.

Under the terms of Article 90 of the Staff Regulations any official may submit

to the appointing authority of his institution a request of complaint.

A preliminary administrative procedure is highly desirable in the matter of disputes concerning officials, as this enables the Administration to carry out an internal examination of requests and thereby possibly to avoid legal proceedings.

Moreover, the dictates of fair play require that an official should attempt to

MARCILLAT v COMMISSION

obtain an amicable solution of his dispute with his Administration before

bringing a case to the Court.

The establishment of the applicant on 6 February 1963 had the effect of causing the time-limits under Article 91 to begin to run in respect of the

decision of 14 June 1961.

Thus the applicant acted with both diligence and good judgment in lodging an administrative complaint against the above-mentioned decision as early

as 22 February 1963.

Then, because of the failure of the defendant to reply to this administrative complaint within two months, the time-limit for appeal was extended to 22 June 1963, or four months after the lodging of the administrative complaint.

The question whether the express or implied decisions rejecting the appli­

complaints against the decision of 14 June 1961 have a purely con­ cant's

firmatory character is not relevant to this case.

In short, the application directed against the withdrawal of the separation allowance is obviously aimed at the express decision of 14 June 1961.

The implied decision of refusal dating from 22 April 1963 is only relevant for the computation of the time-limits for the appeal.

In this case there are no grounds for the Court to raise the question of ad­

of its own motion. missibility

As the appeal was lodged within the prescribed time-limits it is admissible.

II — As to the substance of the case

The applicant alleges that her contract of engagement provides for a

separation allowance, subject only to one condition relating to the distance between her residence and her place of employment.

It is generally accepted that public servants employed on a contractual basis are subject to the application of regulations relating to the functioning of the service and that these regulations apply to servants taking up their duties.

The conditions for the grant and withdrawal of the separation allowance,

and especially its withdrawal where the spouse of the servant concerned is in

JUDGMENT OF 9.6.1964 — CASE 69/63

the service of the Community, form part of the general rules concerning the functioning of the service.

The applicant's contract contains no term which derogates from these rules.

The provision of Article 9 (c) of the General Staff Regulations of the ECSC, which lays down a principle which is logically an integral part of the general rules concerning the functioning of the service, establishes that when a husband and wife are employed by the Community the separation allowance is only payable to the spouse whose salary is the higher.

The in rules concerning the system of salaries, allowances and pensions

force in the ECSC were expressly made applicable to servants employed on a contractual basis in the service of the Commission of the EAEC.

It can be seen from the communication published by the defendant in the Official Journal of the European Communities of 28 August 1959, p. 987, that 'in the absence of any other appropriate scale and in order to avoid any

discrimination between the different categories of the staff of Euratom, the Commission has applied the rules in use with the ECSC to all its servants'.

This text, which is reported in the form of a commentary to the budget for the year 1959, refers expressly to Article 11, heading 112, of that budget, concerning the residence and separation allowances.

By this publication in the Official Journal of the Communities those con­

cerned were enabled to acquaint themselves with the system in force in the

ECSC on the question of separation allowances.

In addition, the alignment of the position of holders of so-called Brussels contracts with that of officials of the ECSC as regards their financial status

was well-known by the staff of the Institutions concerned.

It follows from the foregoing considerations that the decision impugned correctly applied the provisions in force.

The application must be dismissed as unfounded.

III — Costs

The applicant has failed in her application.

Under the terms of Article 70 of the Rules of Procedure, in proceedings

MARCILLAT v COMMISSION

brought by servants of the Communities the institutions shall bear their own

costs.

On those grounds,

Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General;

Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Atomic Energy Community;

Having regard to Article 152 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Com unity;

Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Com unites;

Having regard to the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Atomic Energy Community;

THE COURT (First Chamber)

her by:

1. Dismisses Application 69/63 as unfounded;

2. Orders that each of the parties shall bear its own costs.

Trabucchi Delvaux Strauß

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 9 June 1964.

A. Van Houtte A. Trabucchi

Registrar President of the First Chamber

OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL LAGRANGE <ap note>1</ap note> DELIVERED ON 11 MARCH 1964

Mr President, recruited by the Euratom Commission Members of the Court, following a letter of engagement of

2 March 1960 and was thereby made

Miss Capitaine, a secretary at the Joint subject to the system of so-called Brus­

Nuclear Research Centre at Ispra, was sels contracts. Following her marriage 1 — Translated from the French.

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Rozsudok C-69/63 – Súdny dvor Európskej únie | AI Pravnik