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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·Rozsudok·13.11.1964

C-90/63

ECLI:EU:C:1964:80

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61963CJ0090

judgment of 13.11.1964 —joined cases 90 and 91/63

organization for the national organ­ tion of legal institutions and measures

izations. Thus Article 12 constitutes a on the basis of which the appropriate

fundamental rule and any possible authorities seek to control and regu­

exception, in any event must which late the market.

be strictly construed, must be clearly Therefore a market organization can­

laid down. not possibly be separated from its con-

. stituent institutions, nor can it exist

3. Articles 39 to 46 contain nothing con­ independently of these institutions. ferring exemption from Article 12. The maintenance of a national mar­

ket organization cannot possibly 4. Article 12 also prohibits measures mean anything other than the main­

taken within the framework of a tenance of the institutions on which it

market organization in so far as they depends. On any other view the con­

constitute customs duties or charges cept of a national market organ­

having equivalent effect. ization would lose all force and plain meaning.

5. A market organization is a combina­

In Joined Cases 90 and 91/63

Commission of the European Economic Community , represented by Georges Le Tallec, Legal Adviser of European Executives, acting as the

Agent, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of Henri

Manzanarès, Secretary of the Legal Department of the European Executives, 2 place de Metz, Luxembourg,

applicant,

v

Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (Case 90/63), represented by Édouard Molitor, Assistant Legal Adviser at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxem­ bourg, acting as Agent, with an address for service in Luxembourg, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg, 5 rue Notre-Dame, and

Kingdom of BELGIUM (Case 91/63), represented by the Deputy Prime

Minister, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, by his Agent Jacques Karelle, Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, assisted by Marcel Verschelden, Advocate at the Cour d'Appel, Brussels, with an

address for service in Luxembourg at the Belgian Embassy, 9 boulevard Prince-Henri,

defendants,

Application concerning the introduction by the defendants, after 1 January

COMMISSION v LUXEMBOURG AND BELGIUM

1958, of a special duty leviable upon the issue of import licences for certain milk products,

THE COURT

composed of: Ch. L. Hammes, President, A. M. Donner (Rapporteur) and

R. Lecourt, Presidents of Chambers, L. Delvaux and A. Trabucchi, Judges,

Advocate-General: K. Roemer Registrar: A. Van Houtte

gives the following

JUDGMENT

Issues of fact and of law

I — Facts and procedure these observations, issued a reasoned

opinion dated 3 April 1963 under the

It is common ground that by Royal first paragraph of Article 169 of the

Decree of 3 November 1958 and by Treaty stating that the two governments Grand-Ducal Decree of 17 November had failed to fulfil their obligations

1958 the Belgian and Luxembourg arising out of Article 12 of the Treaty governments introduced a duty levied and inviting them to take the measures on the issue of import licences for certain necessary to comply with it within a

milk products. Maximum rates were period of one month.

fixed by these decrees, and the amounts By letter of 8 May 1963 the Belgian

actually charged were fixed in each case government stated that it agreed 'to by a ministerial order made on the same abolish the duties in force on licences for day. These duties were later amended by milk products so soon as an adequate

both governments by a long series of substitute formula by is established

orders fixing the maximum rates and agreement with By the Commission'. the rates actually charged. letter of 9 May 1963 the Luxembourg The Commission took the view that government stated that it supported the these measures, which applied to the attitude adopted by the Belgian govern­

importing of originating in products ment for the products in question. Member States or in free circulation in Since the levying of the duties in question those States, were contrary to Article 12 the Commission insti­ was continued

of the Treaty. So by letter of 8 Novem­ tuted the present proceedings on 15 ber 1961 it expressed its disapproval of October 1963. the maintenance of these measures to By order dated 28 November 1963 the the Belgian and Luxembourg govern­ Court joined the two cases as having

ments, and invited them to present their related subject-matter.

observations on this matter. On 19 April The procedure followed the normal

1963 the Commission, after receiving course.

JUDGMENT OF 13.11.1964 — JOINED CASES 90 AND 91/63

II — Submissions of the parties this objection and asserts in the first place that in this case it is not the 'Com­

In the two munity'

but Com­ each of cases the applicant more precisely the claims that the Court should hold that mission which is having recourse to law, the imposition and the charging of a and that the Commission has not failed special duty leviable upon the issue of in any obligation since it conformed with import licences for skimmed-milk pow­ the Council Resolution of 4 April 1962, der whether sweetened or not, whole- by presenting its proposal as early as

milk powder whether sweetened or not, 7 May 1962. concentrated and sweetened canned Furthermore in order to reject the

milk, hard and semi-hard cheeses, pro­ objection of inadmissibility which has cessed soft cheeses and blue- been raised it need only be observed cheeses, veined cheese, decided upon by the that the infringement of the Treaty defendant and introduced after 1 Jan­ alleged against the Belgian and Luxem­

uary 1958, are contrary to the Treaty, bourg governments goes back respec­

especially Article 12 thereof. tively to 3 November 1958 and 17 The applicant also asks that in each case November 1958 and is thus several years the defendant should be ordered to pay earlier than the wrong of which the

the costs. defendants accuse the Community. The defendants contend that the Court Whatever else may be said, the setting declare the inad­ for should application up of a common agricultural policy missible, further declare that it is un­ milk products could not in any case put

founded, dismiss it and order the appli­ right a past breach of the Treaty com­

cant to pay the costs. mitted by the defendants. The defendants reply in the rejoinder On admissibility that Article 169 of the Treaty does not

The defendants assert first of all that empower the Commission to bring according to the terms of its Resolution proceedings before the Court of Justice of 4April 1962 the Council, considering for infringements committed by Mem­ that it was necessary to make a regula­ ber States at any time, applications

tion setting up a system of levies and provided for in this Article being ad­

gradually establishing a common organ­ missible in so far as the infringement ization of the markets in the milk alleged against a Member State con­

Deci­ for products sector, agreed to take a tinues after expiry of the time-limit

sion on the basis of Article 43 of the compliance with the obligations of the

Treaty before 31 July 1962 such that the Treaty which the Commission has given regulation referred to above would come that State in its reasoned opinion.

into force on 1 November 1962 at the If the Community itself infringes the

latest and invited the Commission to Treaty prior to the expiry of this

present its proposals on this matter time-limit and if the consequence of

before 1 May 1962. that infringement is that the Member Therefore in this case it is impossible to State does not comply with obligations

arising under the Treaty, it cannot be a right vested in the Com­ recognize Com­ munity to have recourse to law with a considered as admissible for the view to compelling the two countries munity to institute proceedings before concerned to withdraw measures which the Court of Justice with a view to

would long since have been introduced establishing a failing on the part of that in another form if the Community had State. fulfilled its obligations within the time- On the Substance limits laid down. The applicant disputes the soundness of The applicant starts by recalling the

COMMISSION v LUXEMBOURG AND BELGIUM

'standstill' fact that under Article 12 of the Treaty justifying an exception to the Member States shall refrain from intro­ laid down by Article 12 of the principle 'standstill'

ducing between themselves any new Treaty, because, first, the

customs duties on imports or charges does not ensure the development of

having equivalent effect and that, fail­ trade, but simply maintains the status

ing any limitation indicated to the as at the coming into force of the 'standstill' be in­ contrary, this prohibition must Treaty and, secondly, the

terpreted as applying to all taxes in so principle does not prevent the carrying far as their effect is equivalent to that of out of longer-term agreements or con­

customs duties on imports. tracts and does not prevent Member A special duty levied upon the issue of States from maintaining their existing import licences for certain goods con­ national market organizations pending stitutes a charge having an effect equiv­ the establishment of a common organiz­

alent to customs duties as the Court of ation of agricultural markets.

Justice has recognized in its judgment Without making any exceptions to these of 14 December 1962 (Joined Cases 2 principles the Commission has simply and 3/62). It follows from this that the allowed, in certain cases, the continu­

duties in question are thus comparable ance in force as before of import duties to charges of this kind and that, since the rates of which vary in response to

they were introduced after the Treaty fluctuations of prices on the world

came into force, their introduction was market, and which were an integral

contrary to the requirement of the part of a national market organization 'standstill' propounded by Article 12 of as it existed at the moment when the

the Treaty. Treaty entered into force, because the According to Article 38 (2) of the levying of these duties did not introduce Treaty, the rules laid down for the any new or additional barrier to trade. establishment of the Common Market The defendants object that no infringe­ shall apply to agricultural products save ment of the Treaty has been committed as otherwise provided in Articles 39 to in this case. 46. From a general point of view the Treaty If the existence of a national market does not lay down for agriculture the

justify application of the system of free circula­ organization can exceptions to the obligation to abolish barriers to tion of goods without its being accom­

imports, these exceptions to the principle panied by a common agricultural policy that the development of trade is brought based on a common organization of

about by the free circulation of goods are markets.

only a logical consequence of Articles T he common agricultural policy for

40, 43 and 45 of the Treaty, because milk products had not been established respect for the abovementioned prin­ either when the Treaty came into force, ciple would in fact render nugatory the or on the date when notice of the opin­

application of allowing for provisions ion of the Commission was given, or

the conclusion of long-term agreements when the present application was made.

or contracts mentioned in Article 45, Therefore the application of the rules

and presupposing the continuance of concerning the elimination of barriers national market organizations until the to trade was not required at the dates establishment of a common organization referred to apply them above but to

of agricultural markets (Articles 40 and would have been contrary to Articles 39 43). to 46 of the Treaty, because their appli­

This however proves that none of these cation is such as to jeopardize the inten­ achievement of the aims of the common provisions may, considering the tion behind them, be interpreted as agricultural policy, for it would have

JUDGMENT OF 13.11.1964 — JOINED CASES 90 AND 91/63

had the effect of destroying the stability date when the Treaty entered into force, of markets that this policy is supposed to or the introduction of new measures, ensure in due course. may be necessary so as to ensure that the As a form of guarantee granted to Mem­ national market organization will con­

ber States, the permission to maintain tinue to be completely effective under

national market organizations until the new conditions and that the national

establishment of the common organiz­ products will command a ready sale. ation of markets connotes the inapplica­ Thus the right which is recognized by 'standstill'

bility of the laid down in Articles 43 and 45 to maintain national Article 12 to agricultural products so market organizations does not mean so

long as the common agricultural policy much the maintenance of the various

has not been set up. arrangements applied when the Treaty 'standstill' Since the principle is on a came into force as the maintenance of the

par with the progressive elimination of organizations themselves, and this right barriers to imports as one of the essential allows all measures necessary to that end.

means which the Treaty relies on for Therefore, contrary to the opinion of the achieving the free movement of goods, it applicant, the disputed duties are not an would be contradictory to claim that the additional barrier compared with those progressive elimination of these barriers existing when the Treaty came into is not in the circumstances outlined force, but are simply one of the means above, applicable to agricultural pro­ foreseen as a way of maintaining the

ducts, whereas the 'standstill', on the effective national market organization

other hand, is applicable to them in its in milk products in the two countries

entirety. concerned.

Both the progressive abolition of the said The applicant further affirms that no

barriers and the application of the national market organization existed 'standstill' would bring about the dis­ for the products in question in Belgium solution of national market organiza­ and in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg tions because the restrictions and duties when the Treaty came into force. To on imports, which are integral parts of support this assertion it relies on the

such organizations, could no longer legislation in force on this subject in respond to world prices and would Belgium on 1 January 1958, and on the therefore become ineffective. fact that at that date no legal provision In recognizing, as the applicant does, provided for control over imports of

that import duties the rates of which vary those products into the Grand Duchy of.

in response to fluctuations of price on Luxembourg so far as it is aware. the world market, and which existed On the basis both of the Spaak report

when Treaty came into force, are not the and of Article 40 of the Treaty, legal incompatible with the Treaty and do not theory and certain statements of the

strengthen pre-existing barriers to trade, Commission itself, the defendants argue

the applicant seems to admit that nation­ that a national market organization

al market organizations imply excep­ consists in essence of internal controls 'standstill' tions to the principle at least the practical result of which is to

as it conceives that principle to be. eliminate foreign competition or to

There is no point in the maintenance of control it at will. national organizations unless they are They then set out the facts proving the allowed to be effective. existence of a national organization of

Agriculture is not static but essentially the market in milk products within the

meaning of the Treaty in the two coun­ evolutionary and an amendment to

provisions already in existence at the tries in question.

COMMISSION v LUXEMBOURG AND BELGIUM

Grounds of judgment

Admissibility

The defendants, arguing that the application is inadmissible, complain that the Community failed to comply with the obligations falling on it by reason of the Resolution of the Council of 4 April 1962, and was thus responsible

for the continuance of the alleged infringement of the Treaty, which should have ceased before the issue of the reasoned opinion under Article 169. In their view, since international law allows a party, injured by the failure of another party to perform its obligations, to withold performance of its own, the Commission has lost the right to plead infringement of the Treaty. However this relationship between the obligations of parties cannot be recognized under Community law.

In fact the Treaty is not limited to creating reciprocal obligations between the different natural and legal persons to whom it is applicable, but estab­

lishes a new legal order which governs the powers, rights and obligations

of the said persons, as well as the necessary procedures for taking cognizance

penalizing any breach of it. Therefore, except where otherwise ex­ of and

pressly provided, the basic concept of the Treaty requires that the Member States shall not take the law into their own hands. Therefore the fact that the Council failed to carry out its obligations cannot relieve the defendants

from carrying out theirs.

Moreover, the Resolution of the Council to take a decision under Article 43 by 31 July 1962 at the latest, so that the rules for milk products would enter force by 1 November 1962 at the latest, does not create time-limits having the same effect as those laid down in the Treaty. The intention of the

authors of the measures is clear from the fact that they adopted it under a style and form which are not those of the binding measures of the Council within the meaning of Article 189 of the Treaty. Therefore the Council did not infringe the Treaty when it failed to observe the time-limits which it had set itself in its Resolution of 4 April 1962.

Furthermore the alleged breach of Article 12 of the Treaty was not caused

by anything done by the Community, particularly the Council. The disputed Belgian and Luxembourg decrees were made before both the Resolution of 4 April 1962 and the time-limits laid down therein, and nothing proves that

they somehow became different just because the said time-limits expired.

On the other hand, according to the arguments put forward by the de­ fendants themselves, had the Resolution of 4 April 1962 been carried out as

JUDGMENT OF 13.11.1964 —JOINED CASES 90 AND 91/63

was hoped, this would at most have led the defendants to withdraw the said measures but not to legalize them retroactively. Thus neither the nature of the disputed Decrees nor their legality with reference to the Treaty can possibly have been altered by the failure to observe the time-limits laid down in the Resolution of 4 April 1962.

Finally the defendants appear to argue that so long as the Community had not fulfilled the obligation to establish a common agricultural policy it could not be heard in applications brought under the second paragraph of Article 169 against a Member State for failure to eliminate barriers con­

cerning agricultural products as contemplated in Articles 12 and 13 of the Treaty. This question comes down in fact to the problem of how far the provisions of the Title concerning agriculture derogate from Article 12; thus it is a question of substance, not of admissibility.

The application is therefore admissible.

The substance

It is not disputed that the contested measures are customs duties on imports or chargeshaving equivalent effect within the meaning of Article 12 of the Treaty, and that they were introduced after the Treaty entered into force. The defendants only argue that this provision does not apply in the present case.

To this end they state that Article 38 (2) provides that the rules laid down for the establishment of the Common Market shall apply to agricultural

products, save as otherwise provided in Articles 39 to 46 of the Treaty, and that it is clear particularly from Articles 43 and 45 that national market

organizations shall continue to function so long as one of theof forms

common organization mentioned in Article 40 (2) has not replaced them.

The defendants further argue that it follows from these provisions combined with those of Article 44 that until national organizations have been replaced

the elimination of barriers to trade, in this case customs duties between Member States, is not compulsory. Thus their view is that, since the con­

tested measures form an integral part of the organization of the Belgian and Luxembourg markets for milk products, they are not caught by Article 12 so long as a common organization of the said markets has not entered into force.

A distinction should be drawn between the prohibition in Article 12 on

creating any new customs duties or increasing existing ones and the subse­

COMMISSION v LUXEMBOURG AND BELGIUM

quent provisions concerning the progressive abolition of customs duties between Member States. The only problem is whether the introduction of new customs duties on agricultural products is caught by Article 12.

It follows that, insofar as the defendants case is designed to prove that the

progressive elimination of customs duties in the sphere of agriculture could

only take place parallel with the substitution of a common organization of

the agricultural market for national market organizations, it is not relevant

here.

Article 12 prohibits the introduction of new customs barriers, so as to facili­ tate the integration of national markets and the establishment of a common

market. Without constituting of itself a measure removing economic pro­

tection, this prohibition of any new form of protection by way of customs

duties constitutes an essential requirement both for the substitution of a

common market for the different national markets and for the substitution of a common agricultural organization for the national organizations. Thus Article 12 constitutes a fundamental rule and any possible exception,

which in any event must be strictly construed, must be clearly laid down.

Articles 39 to 46 of the Treaty do not contain any provision explicitly con­

trary to the prohibition of new customs barriers in the agricultural sector. On the contrary, Article 44 which, in terms similar to those of Article 13, decrees the 'progressive abolition of customs duties', whilst providing for a possible exemption from the concerning the elimination of provisions cus­

toms duties, contains nothing from which any sort of exception to the

principle laid down in Article 12 can be inferred.

Furthermore Article 44 (2), which provides that minimum prices shall not cause a reduction of the trade existing between Member States, is based on a concern identical to that shown in Article 12. The same is true of Article 45,

paragraph (2) of which provides that, as regards quantities, the agreements contemplated shall be based on the average volume of trade during the three

years before the entry into force of the Treaty, and provides for an appro­ priate increase.

Thus Articles 39 to 46 contain nothing conferring exemption from Article 12.

However, the defendants allege that such a conclusion miscontrues the

nature and functioning of national market organizations. They assert that the right given to Member States to maintain the said organizations implies

that they are free to avail themselves not only of the means used at the date

JUDGMENT OF 13.11.1964 — JOINED CASES 90 AND 91/63

when the Treaty came into force, but also of all those necessary to preserve their effectiveness and to adapt them to changes in circumstances.

Such a distinction between market organizations, on the one hand, and the legal institutions and measures constituting them, on the other, cannot be admitted. A market organization is a combination of legal institutions and measures on the basis of which appropriate authorities seek to control and

regulate the market. Therefore a market organization cannot possibly be separated from its constituent institutions, nor can it exist independently of these institutions. The maintenance of a national market organization

institu­ cannot possibly mean anything other than the maintenance of the tions on which it depends. On any other view the concept of a national

market organization would lose all force and plain meaning.

Thus the argument that prohibition on the use of new measures must

gradually lead to national market organizations losing their effectiveness and so jeopardize agricultural activity during the transitional period is

unfounded. The Treaty expressly provides means and special procedures for remedying the difficulties in question under the supervision of the Com­

munity authorities or with their approval.

Thus Article 12 applies also to measures taken within the framework of a

national market organization in so far as they constitute customs duties or charges having equivalent effect. It therefore becomes superfluous to exa­

mine whether the Belgian and Luxembourg market organizations con­

cerned do or do not exist. From all the above it follows that the disputed

measures were taken in infringement of Article 12.

Therefore the applications are well founded.

Costs

Under Article 69 (2) of the Rules of Procedure the unsuccessful party shall be

ordered to pay the costs. The defendants have failed in their submissions.

On those grounds,

Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General;

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Com­

COMMISSION v LUXEMBOURG AND BELGIUM

munity, especially Articles 12, 13, 38 to 46, 169 and 189; Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community; Euro­ Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court ofJustice of the pean Communities;

THE COURT

hereby declares that the applications are admissible and:

1. Rules that the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium and the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg have failed to comply with the obligations laid down in Article 12 of the Treaty in that after 1 January 1958 they introduced and charged a special duty leviable upon the issue of import

licences for skimmed-milk powder whether sweetened or

whole-milk powder sweetened or con­ not, whether not, centrated and sweetened canned milk, hard and semi-hard

cheeses, processed cheeses, soft cheeses and blue-veined

che se ;

2. Orders the defendants to pay the costs.

Hammes Donner Lecourt Delvaux Trabucchi

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 13 November 1964.

A. Van Houtte Ch. L. Hammes Registrar President

OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL ROEMER 1 DELIVERED ON 13 OCTOBER 1964

Summary

Introduction (facts and conclusions of the parties) 636

Legal consideration 637

1—Translated from the German.

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