C-50/64

decision — No act adversely affecting the official

(Staff Regulations of officials of the EEC, EAEC and ECSC, Articles 90 and 91)

2. Procedure — Judgment granting annulment — Legal effects — Limited to the parties and to the persons directly concerned by the measure annulled —

Judgment constituting a new factor — Concept

1. The rejection of a complaint by way (b) A refusal of one of: the; parties to of a communication confirming a take the measures necessary in previous decision is not an act ad­ order to comply with a judgment

versely affecting an official ('faisant of the Court does not constitute

Tommaso VALERIO , a Head of Section in the Translation Department of the General Secretariat of the Councils,

53/64

GUILLAUME BATTIN , a Head of Section in the Translation Department of the General Secretariat of the Councils,

1 — Language of the Case: French.

JUDGMENT OF 14. 7. 1965 — JOINED CASES 50, 51, 53, 54, AND 57/64

54/64

v

COUNCILS OF THE EEC, EAEC AND ECSC, represented by Hans Jürgen

Lambers, Legal Adviser to the General Secretariat of the Councils, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the offices of Jacques Leclerc, an

official of the General Secretariat of the Councils, 3 rue Auguste-Lumière,

defendant,

Application to be classified in a particular step of a grade;

Issues of fact and of law

I — Facts the applicants submitted a complaint to

the Secretary-General of the Councils fol­ The facts may be summarized as against the grading given to them on lows: 28 March 1963. In this complaint, each Between 22 July and 12 August 1964 applicant asked for his grading to be

LOEBISCH v COUNCIL

reassessed and backdated for remunera­ the provisions of the Staff Regulations tion purposes to 1 January 1962 (the of officials.

date when the Staff Regulations of The defendants contend that the Court officials came into force) on the basis should declare the applications inadmis­

57/64 made an application to the Court parties

for a decision on a procedural issue within the meaning of Article 91 of the In their application the applicants ad­

Rules of Procedure, and in at he reques­ vanced the following arguments in sup­

ted the Court to take a decision on the port of the admissibility of their ap­

admissibility of his application prior to peals:

all arguments as to substance. On 24 1965 defendants signified A In the first place May —

Secondarily By order dated 17 June 1965 the

Second Chamber of the Court ordered Taking into account the judgment of

that the cases be joined. the Court in Joined Cases 42 and 49/­ 59, the judgment in Case 70/63 should factor' be considered as a 'new requir­

II — Conclusions of the ing the Secretary-General to reconsider

parties his position on the meaning and the application of the various Articles of In their applications the applicants claim the Staff Regulations. that the Court should annul in part and The refusal of the Secretary-General to vary the decision rejecting their com­ allow the complaints made by the ap­

plaints and the decisions of 28 March plicants, far from simply confirming his 1963 assigning them to a grade, in so earlier decisions of 28 March 1963 far as they were maintained in or given (appointing the applicants to given

ing their applications against the decis­ dent to Article 91 (2) of the Staff ions of 28 March 1963 concerning their Regulations. grading is entirely due to their good B — As to the secondary allegations faith. However the judgment in Case 70/63 The Court has already decided that a

constitutes a new factor reviving their measure which does no more than con­

rights of action. The Secretary-General firm an earlier measure cannot give the

himself this in his de­ the to seems to admit parties concerned right reopen

cision rejecting the complaints submit­ the period for appealing against the

ted by the applicants because he ex­ measure confirmed. Thus the implied cludes the possibility of relying on the negative decision which confirmed the

is taken by the Court on a question of criterion of a general nature: it reached interpretation of the Staff Regulations in its conclusions in the light of circum­

favour of an official, this decision inures stances which were exclusively peculiar

for the benefit of all the others who are to the case before it and which have in the same position. The administrative not recurred in the present case. The practice is based on a natural desire for facts are:

fairness and on the need to avoid an — that Joined Cases 32 and 33/58, on

unnecessary accumulation of disputes. the one hand, and Joined Cases 42 The defendants maintain that the ap­ and 49/59, on the other, arose be­ plications are inadmissible 'because they tween the same parties (SNUPAT v are out of time, and in support of this High Authority). Furthermore the

objection they submit the following issue in these latter cases was mainly arguments: whether the institution had under­

de­ such a way that the increase or ation. Furthermore, the internal law of

crease in the contribution of one the Member States has not by any undertaking had this Finally, reper­ an automatic means adopted principle..

cussion on the position of all the the desire for fairness and for avoiding others. The individual situation of multiplicity of actions referred to by the each undertaking subject to the applicants should not let it be forgotten

scheme in those cases therefore de­ how important strict enforcement of the pended very closely on the situations time-limits is for legal certainty. of the others. Such a state of affairs The applicants in Cases 50, 51, 53 and is certainly not found as between the 54/64—who have already lodged their

to the present case. reply—answer this argument as fol­ parties

In these circumstances there can be no lows : justification for a general application of It is doubtless true that any judgment the principle derived from the judg­ applies to the case with which it only ment in Joined Cases 42 and 49/59. deals, but they have never claimed that It would be incompatible with the the Court had elaborated a principle

piry of the period for lodging an also expressed a principle of a general

appeal. nature which goes beyond the. said Furthermore it is incorrect to suppose case. This principle is that a judgment that, 'both in the national administra­ of the Court constitutes a new factor tions of Member States and in Com­ if it requires the administration to re­

munity administrations, a decision of consider the basis of its earlier decision.

the Court on a question of interpreta­ However the grounds of the judgment tion of the Staff Regulations in favour in Case 70/63 laid down a general prin­ of one. official inures for the benefit of ciple concerning the reassessment of

all the others who are in the same posts which is absolutely contrary to

position. On the one hand, the Court the practice followed by all the institu­ of Justice did not lay down any such tions. Therefore the complaints made

was identical or analogous to the one IV — Procedure dealt with in that judgment, or to depart from the said principle. The latter al­ The procedure followed the normal

ternative was applicable in the present course.

cases, and it cannot be denied that in By order dated 17 June 1965 the

these circumstances the decision taken Second Chamber of the Court ordered

by the administration was not a mere that the present cases be joined for confirmation of the decisions of 28 the purposes of a judgment on the

March 1963. But in fact whichever al­ question of admissibility.

new, such as Community 'law. The ings. development of this law is in fact largely The Advocate -General was heard at

brought about through the judgments the hearing on 30 June 1965 and ad­

of the Court, which for this reason are vised that the appeals were inadmissible often intended to constitute a 'new and that the applicants should bear the

factor'. Under such a system the up­ costs in accordance with Articles 70

holding of a decision contrary to prin­ and 95 of the Rules of Procedure of the ciples of law contained in a judgment Court.

Grounds of judgment

cases they were in fact confirmations of the said decisions of 28 March 1963 whereby the applicants were allotted their grades. It is admitted on all sides that these decisions gave the applicants a lower step than the one to which

they claim to be entitled. Therefore, since the applicants'

complaints originate

in the decisions of 28 March 1963, it is against these decisions that they should have lodged their appeals within the time-limits laid down by Article 91 of the Staff Regulations of officials. However both the present appeals and the said complaints were lodged outside the abovementioned legal time-limits.

Nevertheless the applicants assert that the judgment delivered by the Court on 7 July 1964 in Case 70/63 constitutes a new factor calculated to change the essential circumstances and conditions which led to the disputed grading, and that this enabled the period for lodging an appeal to start to run afresh. In support of this argument they refer to the judgment of 22 March 1961 in Joined Cases 42 and 49/59, and conclude that the refusal of the Councils to revoke the decisions of 28 March 1963 constitutes a new decision which can be contested.

As regards the said judgment in Case 70/63, apart from the actual parties in proceedings before the Court, the only persons concerned by the legal effects of a judgment of the Court annulling a measure are the persons directly

33/58, and the reason for bringing which was the refusal of one of the

parties to take certain measuresnecessary in order to comply which were

with the previous judgment delivered as between those parties. In the present

case the facts are not the same.

For the reasons stated, and without its being necessary to examine the sub­

mission concerning good faith which was raised as a very minor point, the

that, in proceedings commenced by servants of the Communities, institutions shall bear their own costs.

On those grounds,

Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General; Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community

and the European Atomic Energy Community;

Having regard to the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community; Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, especially Articles 69, 70, 91 and 95,

THE COURT (Second Chamber)