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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·Rozsudok·15.12.1965

C-4/65

ECLI:EU:C:1965:130

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61965CJ0004

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT <ap note>1</ap note> 15 DECEMBER 1965­

Société Anonyme Métallurgique Hainaut-Sambre

v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community­<apnote>2</apnote>

Case 4/65

Summary

1. Common financial arrangements — Equalization — Contributions — Exemption — Principles (ECSC Treaty, Article 53)

2. Common financial arrangements — Equalization — Ferrous scrap — Exemption — Own resources — Concept

(ECSC Treaty, Article 53)

1. Of. paragraph 1, summary in Case 2. Cf. paragraph 2, summary in Case 3/65. 3/65.

In Case 4/65

SOCIÉTÉ MÉTALLURGIQUE HAINAUT-SAMBRE having its registered ANONYME ,

office in Couillet (Belgium), represented by Raymond Derclaye, Managing Director, and Raoul Eloy, Deputy Managing Director, assisted and repre­

sented by G. Liénard, Advocate at the Charleroi Bar, and by G. Van Hecke,

Advocate at the Cour de Cassation and lecturer at the University of Louvain, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of Ernest Arendt, Advocate at the Cour Supérieure de Justice, 6, rue Willy-Goergen,

applicant,

v

HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, represented by its Legal Adviser Giuseppe Marchesini, acting as Agent, assisted by Cyr Cambier, Advocate at the Cour d'appel, Brussels, with an

address for service in Luxembourg at its offices, 2, place de Metz,

defendant,

1 — Language of the Case: French. 2 — CMLR.

JUDGMENT OF 15. 12. 1965 — CASE 4/65

Application

primarily; for the annulment of the individual decision of the High

Authority of 13 November 1964 requesting the applicant to pay an

equalization contribution on 79 990 metric tons of scrap;

secondarily for damages for the defendant's wrongful act or omission, —

THE COURT

composed L. Hammes, President, L. Delvaux of Ch. and W. Strauß, Presidents Chambers, A. M. Dormer, A. Trabucchi of (Rap orteur), R. Lecourt and R. Monaco, Judges,

Advocate-Gneral: K. Roemer Registra : A. Van Houtte

gives the following

JUDGMENT

Issues of fact and of law

I — F­a c­ t­ s 'We retain ownership of the processing waste from the moment of delivery. For The facts of the case may, be sum­ practical reasons, the scrap to toe re­

marized as fol ws: turned by you to us subject to the con­

Since 1947 the applicant, which has an ditions and time-limits mentioned at (b) iron and steel works, has supplied the below shall be ... kg per metric ton company Phenix-Works with sheet bars of sheet bars delivered to you. This for. and as thin figure of kg represents the average re-rolling processing ...

sheets. weight of waste scrap arising from the

In order to secure the return of any processing of our own sheet bars. waste scrap arising from the processing Further, as regards the price fixed at

of the sheet bars into sheets, the appli­ . . . francs as set out below, the value cant first employed the legal device of of the scrap is fixed at francs per . . .

the jobbing contract, and then—over a metric ton up to 4 months after delivery in­ the including the whole period of that of sheet bars, that is, the average

decision—inser­ volved in the contested price of the scrap arising from the sheet " ted in each contract for the sale of sheet bars .

bars to Phenix-Works a clause retaining By a decision on 13 November 1964, ownership of the processing waste. This the High Authority charged on the scrap clause was formulated as fol ws: arising at Phenix-Works and consumed

1 — The figures omitted from this passage have since been altered.

S.A. MÉTALLURGIQUE HAINAUT-SAMBRE v HIGH AUTHORITY

by the applicant a contribution towards The substance of the case

the equalization scheme for imported A — The application for annulment scrap.

This decision, notified By letter or 18 1. The argument with regard to the

December 1964, was challenged by the clause retaining ownership in the

applicant in an application lodged on 19 scrap

January 1965. The applicant complains that the con­

tested decision is vitiated by an error

in law, because it assimilates recovery II — Conclusions of the of the scrap in question to a transaction parties of sale, ignoring the retention of owner­

ship clause. Under Belgian law however­ The applicant claims that the Court —applicable here—such retention of

should : ownership is valid, and consequently 'annul the disputed decision; affords exemption from the contribu­

as award it full tion levied. The validity of the clause a subsidiary matter, compensation for the damage suffered in question rests on Article 546 of the

Civil Code dealing with accession, and by it, valued at the amount of the equal­

ization contribution on the 79 990 on the fact that the laws relating to

involved in accession can be by-passed by mutual metric tons the dispute, it is confirmed in calculated by the High Authority in its agreement; moreover

provisional statement of account at RF this instance by the attitude of the

40 082 551. Belgian fiscal authorities, which recog­

High nized the return of the scrap in order the Authority to pay the that

costs of the action'. question constituted neither a sale nor

a transfer inter vivos for valuable con­ The defendant contends that the Court sideration. should : Nor does the clause in question con­

'as regards the application for annul­

flict with the principles invoked by the ment, declare it inadmissible and in any Court in Case 19/61, when the Court case unfounded; declared that a retention of ownership as regards the application for damages, clause for a constituent and indeter­ declare it inadmissible and in any case minate part of a thing could not be unfounded; valid. For, in the first place, the amount dismiss the action accordingly and order of scrap covered by the retention of the applicant to pay the costs'. ownership clause is not indeterminate, but determined precisely by each con­

tract and, secondly, 'the waste scrap is III — Submissions and "constituent part"

not a of the sheet arguments of the bar, of which it constitutes an economic­

parties ally inseparable element, for on the con­

trary, the sheet bar is intended precisely The submissions and arguments of the for re-rolling thus giving rise to waste parties may be summarized as fol ws: been scrap which, never having sold, cannot have been re-sold'. Admissibility The defendant replies:

In its conclusions the defendant asks the (a) The reference made to the law on

Court to declare both the application accession does not go far enough. Acces­ for annulment and the application for sion really concerns the natural or civil

damages inadmissible, but submits no fruits of a thing. The waste scrap to arguments on the point. which the retention in question applies,

JUDGMENT OF 15. 12. 1965 — CASE 4/65

on the other hand, is neither the natural the processing of the sheet bars sold, nor the artificial product of the sheet estimated in advance: this retention of

bars; rather, it is the result of a trans­ ownership clause thus corresponds to

formation of the bars themselves. By its Phenix-Works de­ an obligation on to

reference to the theory of accession, the liver an amount of scrap fixed at a flat applicant's argument questions the ex­ rate, without regard to whether this

clusive nature of the right of ownership, scrap does in fact arise from the sheet

a feature which is inconsistent with the bars sold. The applicant's claim that the dispose scrap in question does not con­ right to enjoy and of a thing waste be­ being invested in several persons simul­ stitute an integral part of the bars

taneously. In the present case, the waste cause it has never been sold is merely scrap is apparently the result of the begging the question, since the prob­

exercise of the jus abutendi, which re­ lem is precisely that of seeing whether

sides solely in the owner of the sheet the retention of ownership clause is bars, that is. in Phenix-Works. valid bearing in mind the fact that the The distinguish­ reference to the law on accession subject matter of it is not

also impeaches the real nature of the able from the sheet bars supplied.

right of ownership. This requires the The applicant, arguing that the clause

right to relate to a which is de­ on the of the disputed waste thing ownership terminate, the substance of which is scrap is permissible under Belgian law, separable from that of any other, and refers in its reply to three opinions given which is consequently capable of separ­ on this question by experts in Belgian ate and exclusive appropriation. But that civil law consulted by it: Jean Dabin, is not the case with a share in a thing, Professor Emeritus at University of the

of a percentage fixed at a standard rate Louvain, Renard, Professor at Claude is Lim­ and which applied to what is con­ the University of Liege, and Jean

sidered to be the result of a transforma­ pens, Professor at the Universities of

tion of the thing transferred. Ghent and Brussels. (b) The reference to the national tax (a) According to the first opinion (that provisions misses the point because the of Mr Dabin), the disputed scrap is to tax authorities, in the exercise of their be considered as a product of rolling

discretionary powers, act on considera­ the bars into rough sheets. It is in fact tions of expediency rather than on pre­ as a result of its processing and by the cise legal principles. exercise of the jus abutendi that the

The reference also conflicts with the product is, in the legal sense, created:

applicant's own argument, since if the as, for example, in the cutting down of

tax authorities recognized the legal trees in timber forests, the extraction of

validity of the retention of ownership stone from a quarry and other opera­

they could not limit the tax exemption tions which transform the basic element. granted by them to a set sum, as they The applicant sold Phenix-Works a

can in the case of some products. single entity not composed of constitu­

(c) This case, the defendant claims, is ent elements. The waste scrap is in no

indistinguishable from others where the sense an indeterminate inseparable con­

Court has excluded the possibility of stituent part of the sheet bars but, on

having a retention of ownership. The the contrary, a new and separated thing. dis­ Since this scrap does into ex­ quantity of waste scrap which the not come

puted clause is intended to cover is not istence until the moment of separation, even determined as 'being that which it cannot be considered as a constituent

will be present at the moment of com­ element of the bars. pletion of the transformation, but the Its existence being only future, the

amount of scrap which might arise from waste scrap belongs normally to the

S.A. MÉTALLURGIQUE HAINAUT-SAMBRE v HIGH AUTHORITY

owner of the entity, in consequence of Article 573 of the Belgian Civil Code, the right of accession by production, not it is considered that for as long as the to be confused with the right of acces­ division (here, the cutting of the rough sion by incorporation. Because the right sheets) has not been made, the owner of accession is not a matter of public of the future sheets and the owner of

interest, the buyer is permitted to re­ the future waste scrap are co-owners of nounce in advance his claim to the the sheet bar in which the two future

products which might arise from the things are for the time being united.

thing he has bought. Phenix-Works The exclusiveness of the right of owner­

validly renounced, by contract, its right ship does not mean that the right to

of accession by production to the scrap enjoy and dispose of an object cannot

which was to foe produced. Thus it was be vested in several persons at once.

impossible for it to something to sell According to the will of the parties, the which it had renounced its tide. In union of the two elements comes to an

other words, thescrap becomes waste end when the sheet bar is divided, from the moment of its creat­ has merely declara­ instantly, which operation a

ion, the property of the applicant by tory effect. Each party must be con­

virtue of the disputed clause. sidered to have been the owner of its (b) According to a second opinion (that particular parcel since the time of the

of Mr Renard), the agreement in ques­ union of the two parcels first existed.

tion be deter­ The therefore be concerns something to applicant cannot said

mined only after rolling and cutting, in to have purchased the waste scrap of

accordance with Article 1585 of the which it was always the owner. Belgian Civil Code; it is that part of The applicant emphasizes the fact that

the sheet bar which will become the the opinions arrive at similar conclu­

finished sheet. According to this view, sions even though for different reasons. atti­ the applicant remained the owner of the as for the argument regarding the sheet bars delivered, and thus there did tude of the Belgian tax authorities, the

not at any moment exist any new applicant claims that taxation practice

ownership in the separate parts of the is based on legal concepts, and must

bar, prior to their identification and not operate on considerations of mere

separation. When this occurred, Phenix- expediency as asserted by the defendant. Works acquired tide to the part of the The applicant complains of the assump­ bars which had been turned into sheet. tion in the contested decision that the

As for the waste scrap, it remained dis­ retention of ownership clause contained

tinct from the Phenix- the of a contract for thing sold and elements of sale; Works was obliged to restore it to the instance, it fixed a quantity, a price and applicant in accordance with the terms a place for delivery. When the parties

of the disputed clause. fixed by contract and in advance the Lim­ (c) A third opinion (that of Mr quantity of waste scrap per metric ton

pens) emphasizes the priority that the of sheet bars, they were merely acting parties'

real intention must take over in conformity with normal commercial

their declared intention, considering that practi e: the amount of waste scrap per in accordance with this the applicant metric ton was fixed not in an arbitrary disposed of only a part of the bar and fashion, but in the light of past experi­

made Phenix-Works temporarily co- ence. It is precisely because of this that owner of the thing delivered, but neither the basic figure has altered as time

contracting party could claim exclusive passed. A similar approach is adopted

ownership of a part of the bar, the with regard to agreements for contract­

pants being as yet undetermined. By ing work out. Even if it were estab­

analogy with the second paragraph of lished—as the defendant has yet to

JUDGMENT OF 15. 12. 1965 — CASE 4/65

prove—that the scrap returned by cised by it in its acquired capacity as

Phenix-Works arose from sheet bars owner. It appears moreover from the

other than those supplied by the appli­ applicant's statement in its application

cant, the substitution can be explained that it never claimed that its sheet bars by the fungible nature of scrap arising were not sold on leaving its factory. from processing carried out by the As a subsidiary point, the defendant re­

Phenix-Works. The fixing of the value marks that the endeavour to identify the

of the arisings to be returned by Phenix- supposed intention of the parties by Works does not amount to a statement the writer of this opinion relies on

of the price, its only purpose being to Articles 1156 and 1157 of the Belgian indicate the method by which the con­ Civil Code. However, the Community tract price of the thing sold was arrived scheme for the equalization of ferrous at. Lasdy, determination of the place scrap does not justify the calling in aid for delivery does not necessarily mean of the interpretative criteria expressed

that there must have been a sale; it in those provisions. Other criteria exist

must be present whenever there is a which should be given precedence here, duty to deliver or to re-deliver. for instance the interpreting of the con­

As regards the opinions given by the cept of 'bought scrap'

in a sense most

three experts consulted by the applicant, likey to foster an extension of the basis the defendant makes the following ob­ of assessment to contributions, and the

servations : preference to be given in borderline

(a; As to the first opinion: the argu­ cases to charging contributions.

ment developed on the theory of acces­ (c) As to the third opinion, the defen­

sion is not applicable to the present dant states first that its underlying con­ situation. Any product of an object be­ cept (co-ownership in sheet bars and in

longs to the owner of that object, not arithmetical fractions of their constitu­

by virtue of principle of accession the ent elements in the context of 'the pro­

but by effective exercise of the jus the duct of processing them into sheets and fruendi which is an attribute of owner­ sheet-waste) is formally repudiated by ship. In the present case the cutting the applicant, which 'has denied that

'brought about the splitting into two of there could at any time have existed the thing which belonged to a single co-ownership of the bars. Article 573 owner. There is therefore no question of of the Belgian Civil Code, on which

accession, which assumes the unification this theory relies, is not applicable to

of two things belonging to different our case, for here, contrary to what

owners. This has been confirmed, more­ was envisaged by this provision, there

over, by Professor Renard, who has been sub­ supplied no mixture of several

the second opinion. stances but the sale of a single sub­

de­ (b) As to the second opinion the stance: a sheet bar, which is a single

fendant, while recognizing that in civil entity not composed of different parts, law the autonomy of the intention pre­ as is indeed confirmed by the writers

serves a certain freedom of action which of the first and second expert opinions

allows ownership to be disposed as the produced by the applicant.

parties agree, contends that this may Contrary to the argument with regard

view in practice imputes to the appli­ to the attitude of the Belgian tax

cant an intention which could not have authorities, the defendant draws a clear

been there. The processing by Phenix- distinction between discretionary power Works hav­ of the thing sold, far from and arbitrary power and contends that ing been performed as part of an agree­ between the letter of the law and its ment for work under contract, repre­ practical application there lies a margin sents the right of usus and abusus exer- within which the administration may

S.A. MÉTALLURGIQUE HAINAUT-SAMBRE v HIGH AUTHORITY

act as it sees fit. This power is exer­ any particular national legal system. In cised in the guise of a controlled and addition, these principles must not con­

limited tolerance, using objective cri­ flict with the inherent requirements of

teria, determined in the interests of ex­ the scheme set up by the Community pediency by the administration. The regulations.

requirements which dictate the actions In applying these principles to the pres­

of the Belgian fiscal authorities are alto­ ent case, the defendant that, contends

gether different from those which even if it were established that the scrap answer to the special aims of the equal­ in dispute were in no way alienated, ization scheme for imported ferrous this fact would not be conclusive. For

scrap set up by the High Authority. the waste scrap concerned was not crea­

The defendant does not agree with the ted by the applicant but by another un­

applicant's view that in this instance dertaking, and as a consequence of the there are no legal concepts belonging productive operations of the latter. This

specifically to Community law, and that being so, the transfer of the scrap to

only national law can supply the criteria the firm which had not created it is itself

on the basis of which it may be decided sufficient to constitute a basis for charg­ whether or not the disputed scrap is ing contributions. Insistence on this re­

liable to contributions; and it stresses quirement is justified in view of the

the fact in the the fact that to the de­ that preamble to accord status of a

contested decision it is stated that use termining factor to provisions enabling 'ownership' of the term is not sufficient the undertakings subject to equalization

to confer on the scrap in question the freely to escape liability to pay their

character of being the firm's own re­ contributions would compromise and

sources. The essential requirement to conflict with the basic principles of the

be preserved in the operation of the scheme.

scrap equalization scheme is that of Lastly, quite apart from the question

equal treatment of the consumer under­ whether such transfers amount to sale

takings. in the proper sense of the word as used

It is with this in mind that the con­ in national civil law, the defendant ob­

deter­ sumption scrap is made the of serves, as a subsidiary point, that the

mining factor in charging the for contribu­ method used particular this transfer

tions. That is why Court has held the bears close resemblance to a sale proper, (in Case 19/61) that the concept of in that the quantity, price and place of

'bought does include merely delivery are fixed. scrap'

not

scrap acquired by the consumer under­

taking under a genuine contract of sale. 2. The argument relating to the ap­

According to this judgment, transfers of plicant's general conditions of sale

scrap metal from one undertaking to

another are as such liable to equaliza­ The applicant claims that by virtue of tion, without its being necessary to as­ Article 7 of its general conditions of sale certain whether, under the civil law ap­ it reserved to itself ownership of the

plicable, they occurred as a consequence entire sheet bar until the moment full of a genuine contract of sale. If the payment was made. Now the applicant

Court has on occasion referred to prin­ asserts—and offers to prove, in the event ciples of civil law, in particular the con­ of dispute—that during the whole

purely due ownership, this was concerned the accounts al­ cept of period were

to the pecularities of the case in hand. ways settled after the sheet bars had Regard must also 'be had to general prin­ been processed. Consequently, at the

ciples of law, if unequal treatment of time the waste scrap was created, the

undertakings is to 'be avoided, not to applicant owned the sheet bars, now

JUDGMENT OF 15. Vi. 1965 — CASE 4/65

transformed into sheet on the one hand The defendant persists in the conten­

and waste scrap on the other. tion that there is the contradiction, out­

The defendant contends that this theory lined above, 'between theory of the co-

conflicts with that advanced in support ownership and the argument based on

of the ground regarding the validity of the actual clause. Nor is the argument

the retention of ownership clause cover­ compatible with the theory of accession:

ing the waste scrap. In addition, the 'since the applicant had owned the sheet form envisaged

by Article 7 of the bar even before this yielded waste scrap, general conditions of sale amounts to a it was not open to the defendant to

condition with retroactive effect. On accord itself, by means of a waiver by payment of the purchase price, the ob­ Phenix-Works, a right, never acquired ject remains an accretion to the buyer's by Phenix-Works prior to the creation

property; thus the applicant's theory has of the waste, over the actual thing from no relevance. which the waste arose'.

The applicant replies that on payment

3. The argument relating to infringe­ of the contract price after the creation Phenix- of the principle of non-dis­ of the sheet and waste scrap, ment

Works 'became sole owner of the sheet, crimination

but not of the waste scrap, ownership of which had been reserved by the ap­ According to the applicant, the decision plicant under the contract. At no time, was wrong to refer to the principle of

therefore, did there exist more than one non-discrimination in order to justify title, nor even a state of co-ownership, its disregard of the retention of owner­

in a sheet bar; thus there is no conflict ship. The factual and legal circum­

between the applicant's arguments. The stances present here bear no resemb­

argument concerning the retention of lance whatsoever to those taken into

ownership of the thing sold pending consideration by the Court in Cases 17 payment becomes, moreover, of minor and 20/61. What we have here is a

importance if the defendant's theory as practice constantly observed since 1947 to the impossibility of creating a separ­ and which was not created with any ate right ofownership over the future intention of influencing the 'basis of

waste is correct. Even if it had some assessment to equalization contributions.

foundation, this theory is not applicable Secondly, the quantity of scrap covered to the present facts since the moment by the retention of ownership was at all the sheet bar was cut the sheets, as times precisely determined. Thirdly, also the waste, 'became the of there was never any transfer of capital property the applicants, payment not then having entry in the roll­ or accounts when the

been made. ing-waste was returned. The applicant

According to the case-law of the Belgian also refers the Court to Article 7 of its Cour de Cassation, payment of the pur­ general conditions of sale.

chase price cannot be a condition pre­ As to the first three arguments, the de­

for fendant bear­ cedent the entry into force of the replies that they have no contract; it is, on the contrary, a con­ ing at all on the legal nature of the dition governing the transfer of owner­ transaction concerned. Referring to the

ship and as such is not retroactive. statement of reasons for the contested

Besides, when payment was made, the decision, the defendant repeats that it sheet bars had been processed and no is impossible to allow the disputed longer existed, having become sheet clauses the effect in Community law plus waste and in view of this fact there which the parties would like them to

is no possible basis for a theory of have; indeed, conditions such as these

retroactivity. would make the undertakings in some

S.A. MÉTALLURGIQUE HAINAUT-SAMBRE v HIGH AUTHORITY

countries free to apply Community law a time when it was in a better position themselves in such matters, which to make them.

would be contrary to the fundamental The damages sought also cover the

principles of equalization, that is, the amount claimed by the High Authority principles of non-discrimination and the as interest for the delay caused by its equal treatment of all undertakings con­ own negligence.

suming scrap. The defendant first denies that the

The applicant replies that, if the aims High Authority was under any obliga­

of the equalization scheme require Bel­ tion such as that alleged by the ap­

gian Civil Law to cede to the new con­ plicant. There could only have been cept of Community law specifically ap­ a wrongful act or omission if the rele­

plicable to the equalization procedure, vant department of the High Authority the defendant should have legislated on had induced the applicant into error.

the matter or, at least, should have em­ The facts preclude this possibility. Even ployed independent concepts unrelated in November 1957 the defendant had to the domestic law ordinarily applic­ expressed doubts as to the treatment of

able. It did not do so, and the concept the disputed waste scrap; the letter sent of bought scrap calls to mind the rules by the High Authority to the Joint of civil law concerning the transfer of Bureau of Ferrous Scrap Consumers Con­ published in the Official Journal 1 ownership under a contract of sale. on discrimina­ sequently, if an element of February 1958, which gave a very nar­

tion has to be applied here, it is solely row definition of the concept of own

the responsibility of the High Authority, resources, ought to have shown the

the result of its lack of foresight. The applicant that it could not avoid paying defendant's views may be useful as de equalization contributions in respect of

lege ferenda, but they are contrary, in the waste scrap in question. The second the existing state of the relevant regu­ check carried out in the applicant's fac­

lations, to both Community regulations tory gave rise to fresh observations con­ Phenix- and Belgian Civil Law. cerning the scrap coming from Lastly it must 'be asked what would be Works. Also, in order to check the con­ the defendant's attitude if the applicant ditions governing the return of the scrap had, after having its sheet bars proces­ in question, the High Authority reques­ sed into sheets at Phenix-Works, sold ted copies in February 1962 of the con­

the sheets to the defendant. tract(s) involved. This enabled it to

complete its investigation and to reach

B — The application for damages for a the conclusion, in a letter of 4 April wrongful act or omission 1963, that the disputed clauses could

not have the effect which the applicant

This subsidiary request by the applicant seeks to impute to them. Thus the High relies on the claim that the High Authority did not fail to act, and in­

Authority failed in the obligation im­ deed fulfilled in all respects the duties posed on it by Article 5 of the Treaty entrusted to it by the Treaty. to provide all includ­ As a further defendant parties concerned, alternative the

ing the applicant, with guidance and denies that damage occurred. In view

assistance. Had it done so the appli­ of the clear difference between the legal cant might have been able, for instance, characteristics of the agreement for a

to have the work contracted out, or to jobbing contract and those of a con­

refrain from retaining ownership of the tract of sale, whether or not a retention

waste and to take this into account in of ownership clauses is included, the

the sale price, or to spread payment of defendant declares it impossible to

its contributions over a period and at maintain that the two contracts are

JUDGMENT - OF 15. 12. 1965 — CASE 4/65

interchangeable. The legal difference be­ the High Authority sent its letter. In tween the two contracts is also exempli­ view of this, it is difficult to see how fied in their economic features: one the applicant could at that late stage

has only to recall the risks involved in have made the necessary alternative ar­

a jobbing contract for rolling work as rangements. And when the notice ap­

compared with those in a contract of peared in the Official Journal of 1 sale. February 1958 the period in question

The assessment of the damage alleged had already come to an end.

to have been suffered, fixed at the The argument concerning the law of amount of the contribution, is incorrect supply and demand is misconceived since it is not possible to know what because the applicant had only to

would have been, in fact, the economic charge the total price of 'the sheet bars, advantages and disadvantages of the which was listed, without deducting the agreement for rolling work contracted value of the waste scran.

out. The defendant replies that the check

As for 'the applicant's claim that it could carried out in the applicant's works

have waived its ownership to the waste was in no way one that the High

scrap and taken this into account when Authority was under a duty to perform fixing the price, the defendant remarks in any case, far less one that it had to

that the is usually determined by price complete within a given time; it was

fluctuation in supply and demand and merely an optional measure provided

that, moreover, in the present case the for the benefit of the institution. list- applicant's prices were either the As regards the argument relating to the prices or those obtained by determining possibility of increasing the price

the average price from other lists in charged to Phenix-Works for 'the sheet

force in the market for rolled sheets. bars, the defendant has produced a

It is therefore difficult to believe that comparative table of prices charged by Phenix-Works had agreed to pay prices the applicant and of list prices charged

above the published list prices, and this for the same period by Cockerill-Ougree. would in any case have been contrary From a comparison of these it con­

to Article 60 of the Treaty. As for the cludes that no increase corresponding argument the applicant seeks to put for­ to the amount of the contribution would im­ have been in ward as regards the alternatives of possible fact, since other­

mediate payment of contributions and wise Phenix-Works would have bought payment thereof by instalments, the de­ from other undertakings.

fendant remarks that in 'this context the The fact that 'the value of the waste

applicant could have contented itself scrap in dispute might not have been with asking for partial compensation for deducted from the purchase price of the loss entailed in making the payment the Sheet 'bars, which would then have in one sum, without asking for the en­ been charged at the full price, could

tire amount of the contribution. In ad­ not have benefited the applicant, since

dition the applicant has had at its dis­ the acquisition of a corresponding posal for several years the sums owed amount of waste scrap would perforce by it as its contribution, and this is no have rendered it liable to pay the con­ mean advantage. tribution.

The applicant replies that at the time

of the check carried out in January 1957 80% of the scrap concerned in IV — Procedure this dispute had already been delivered and that this figure had become 96% The procedure followed the normal

by 6 November 1957, the date on which course.

S.A. MÉTALLURGIQUE HAINAUT-SAMBRE v HIGH AUTHORITY

By a letter from the Registrar of the 1965 the Court decided to join this

Court dated 4 October 1965 the applicant case and Case 3/65 (Société Anonyme was requested to adduce evidence to Métallurgique d'Espérance-Longdoz v

show that its general conditions of sale, High Authority) for the purposes of the in particular Article 7 thereof, were oral procedure.

applied in its (transactions with Phenix- The parties oral observations were

Works. The applicant complied with heard on 18 and 19 October 1965. this by producing written evidence The Advocate-General delivered his favour­ prior to the commencement of the oral opinion on 4 November 1965, proceedings. By order of 11 October ing rejection of the application.

Grounds of judgment

I — The application for annulment

The applicant claims that the scrap in the dispute constituted not bought

meaning of the general decisions, but 'own resources'

scrap within the which, as such, were granted exemption from the equalization contribution.

On the basis of this description, it concludes that the ownership of the said

scrap never ceased to be vested in it by virtue of the retention of ownership clause included in each of the contracts, of sale made with Phenix-Works and in Article 7 of its general conditions of sale, and that the decision which it

contests was therefore wrong in subjecting the scrap to equalization

contributions.

The general decisions applicable to this question introduced, for the benefit of all undertakings within the Community, a scheme designed to ensure them a regular supply scrap of at the Member State uniform prices whatever to

which they belonged or the origin of the scrap in question.

These decisions, aimed at spreading between undertakings the financial burden of a benefit in which all could share, accordingly made all scrap con­ sumed by Community undertakings subject to the equalization levy, with the single exception of scrap which constituted their own resources.

The scope of this exemption can be determined only by reference to the system within which it is designed to operate and in the light of the funda­ mental principles on which it is based.

Since the obligation to contribute to the equalization scheme is the rule and

exemption the exception, the latter must be interpreted strictly and must be consistent with the aims, the basic principles and the requirements for the

JUDGMENT OF 15. 12. 1965 — CASE 4/65

proper functioning of the equalization scheme, in particular the principle of liability of all those affected to pay contributions, shared in propor­ the equal

tion to the amounts and the requirement that the respectively consumed, scheme be applied impartially to all those subject to it.

When it pleads the right of ownership, which it claims never to have ceased has toenjoy in respect of the disputed scrap, and the fact that this element been taken into account in certain similar cases previously, the applicant is

ignoring the fact that the concept of 'own depends equally resources'

on a

consideration of the method of scrap production required by the spirit and

purpose of the equalization scheme. The applicant is therefore mistaken in

thinking that the exemption can be made to apply to the scrap here in dispute simply by showing that at no time did it transfer its ownership thereof.

In doing so, it fails to appreciate that the fact that scrap arising from a trans­ fer of ownership was classified in previous similiar cases as bought scrap does not by any means indicate that the absence of any such transfer will justify exemption from the equalization levy.

Indeed, the question who holds title to the ownership of the disputed scrap, however important, cannot be the sole determining factor in the equalization

scheme.

The aims of the scheme make it imperative to take into consideration the

circumstances surrounding the production of the scrap in question.

No exemption from equalization contributions can be allowed which would

tend to increase substantially differences in production costs, otherwise than by altering the level of output, and thereby bring about an appreciable dis­ equilibrium in the competitive relationships between undertakings.

That does not occur when an undertaking puts back into its production cycle wastes arising from the production or processing, carried out by it or on its behalf, of its own products.

Such re-utilization constitutes in fact on internal measure of economy con­

ducive to increased productivity; scrap so used does not exemption of there­

fore distort competition within the market.

On the other hand any exemption which depends not on the way in which an

undertaking arranges its production, but on the contractual relationships

which it has with other undertakings, is not compatible with the scheme.

S.A. MÉTALLURGIQUE HAINAUT-SAMBRE v HIGH AUTHORITY

The classification of scrap as 'own is not therefore necessarily resources'

dependent on the concept of ownership of the scrap, but is intended to apply in the main to scrap which is genuinely the product of the undertaking's own

activity, the result of its own work.

The scrap in question did not arise by separation from the sheet bar by a joint pro quota operation performed by Phenix-Works and the applicant but is the outcome of the manufacture of sheets carried out by Phenix-Works working on its own account and at its own risk.

In addition, when the sheet bars were sold, a valuation was made of the scrap transferred by Phenix-Works to the applicant and taken into account when the selling price of the sheet bars was fixed.

The value so fixed for the scrap is lower than the value of a corresponding

quantity of sheet bars.

This separate valuation of the sheet bars sold and of the scrap recovered

confirms that the latter do not merely represent a portion retained from the sheet bars sold, but is a new product.

Consequently consumption of this scrap by the applicant cannot be considered as a re-utilization by the producer undertaking of its own resources.

In these circumstances, the scrap in question must be subject to the payment of the equalization contributions, the affinities with private law invoked here

by the applicant being irrelevant to the matter.

The determining factor lies not, therefore, as the applicant claims, simply in the physical transfer of the scrap, but in its incorporation into the cycle of

production of an undertaking which has had no part in the production process from which it has arisen.

The argument put forward by the applicant is therefore not well founded.

From what has been said above it is clear that the reference to the principle of non-discrimination in the statement of reasons for the contested decision is relevant; accordingly the applicant's argument thereon is likewise un­

founded.

JUDGMENT OF 15. 12. 1965 — CASE 4/65

II — The application for damages

The applicant claims to have suffered damage as a result of not having been informed in time that the scrap in question was liable to equalization, and

further claims that this omission on the part of the defendant constitutes a

failure to comply with Article 5 of the Treaty and is therefore a wrongful act of omission.

On the question of damage, the applicant claims that it would have been able to gain exemption from equalization contributions by having the processing done as work contracted out.

It is not certain, however, that this method would have attained the aims of both the applicant and Phenix-Works as well as a sale would have done. An agreement contracting work out serves a purpose, and implies a risk, quite different from those which characterize the contracts of sale actually used here. In view of the above it is not possible to determine either the manner in which the relationship between the two undertakings would have been

created, or whether an agreement for contracting out which no longer met

the actual production requirements of the applicant could still have been utilized by the latter in order to gain exemption from the equalization

contributions.

Moreover the applicant cannot complain that the defendant's conduct pre­

vented it from taking advantage of a legal device designed purely to enable it to avoid having to pay its due contributions in application of the principle of equal treatment of scrap consumers.

Nor is it established that the applicant would have been able, if it withdrew the formula whereby it sought to keep the scrap for itself, to obtain for the sheet bars terms more favourable than those actually in force.

It has also not been established that real damage was constituted by the im­

possibility of settling the equalization debt in instalments.

The Court is therefore not satified that damage was suffered. This being so, the application for damages must be dismissed and it is not necessary to con­ sider the existence or otherwise of a wrongful act or omission.

III — Costs

According to Article 69 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party must pay the costs. The applicant has failed in its submissions and must

therefore bear the costs of the action.

S.A. MÉTALLURGIQUE HAINAUT-SAMBRE v HIGH AUTHORITY

On those grounds,

Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General;

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel

Community, especially Articles 5, 33, 40 and 53; Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community;

Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the

European Communities;

THE COURT

hereby:

I. Dismisses the application as unfounded;

2. Orders the applicant to bear the costs.

Hammes Delvaux Strauß

Donner Trabucchi Lecourt Monaco

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 15 December 1965.

A. Van Houtte Ch. L. Hammes Registrar President

OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL ROEMER

(see Case 3/65, page 1085)

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Rozsudok C-4/65 – Súdny dvor Európskej únie | AI Pravnik