C-27/67
ECLI:EU:C:1968:22
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JUDGMENT OF 4. 4. 1968— CASE 27/67
quantitative restriction and internaltax imported product to a specificfiscal ation. charge in such a way as to protect certain activities distinct from those usedin the 3. Similaritybetween productswithin the manufactureof the imported product. meaning of the first paragraphofArticle However, thesaid second paragraph is 95 existswhenthe productsinquestion only applicable when the various econ arenormally to be considered ascoming omic relationships envisaged by it are within the samefiscal,customsor statis not merely fortuitous, but lasting and tical classification,as the case maybe. characteristic. The effects of a tax on the economic rela 4. The secondparagraph of Article 95 of theTreatyis capable of producing direct tionships referred to in the second para effects andcreatingindividual rights graph of Article 95 must be assessed in which national courts must protect. thelight ofthe objectives of Article 95, whichare to ensure normal conditions of 5. Thesecond paragraphof Article 95 is competition and to remove all restric complementary tothe first. It prohibits tions of the fiscal nature capable of the impositionof any internal taxation hindering the free movementofgoods which imposes a highercharge on an within the Common Market. imported thanon adomestic product The Treaty doesnot prevent national which competes withthe importedprod courts fromdeciding, where necessary, uct, although itis not similarto it within the levelbelow which the tax in question the meaning of the first paragraphof would cease to havethe protective effects Article 95. Theprohibition also applies prohibited by the Treatyand from draw in the absence ofdirect competition ingall appropriate conclusions there where theinternal taxationsubjects the from.
In Case 26/67
Reference to theCourt under Article 177ofthe Treatyestablishing the European Economic Community bythe Finanzgericht(Finance Court), Munich, for apre liminary ruling in the action pendingbefore thatcourt between
FirmaFink-Frucht GmbH , Frankfurt-am-Main,
and
Hautpzollamt(Principal Customs Office) München-Landsbergerstrasse,
THE COURT
composed of:R. Lecourt,President, A.M. Donner andW. Strauß (Rapporteur), President of Chambers, A. Trabucchi, R. Monaco, J. Mertens deWilmars and P. Pescatore,Judges,
Advocate-General: J. Gand
Registrar:A.Van Houtte
gives thefollowing
FINK-FRUCHT vHAUPTZOLLAMT MÜNCHEN
JUDGMENT
Issues offact andoflaw
I-Facts within the meaning of Article30 of theEEC Treaty? 1.Summary (2) What is the meaning of the phrase 'similar products' as used inthe first Thefacts ofthe case maybe summarizedas paragraph of Article 95, and how are follows: theseto be distinguished from the prod On5 July1966 the Fink-Frucht GmbH uctsreferred to in thesecond para undertaking cleared through customs acon graph? signmentfrom Italyconsisting mainlyof (3) Doesthe second paragraph of Article95 sweetpeppers, on which the appropriate have direct effects and does it create customs officecharged the undertaking individualrights which national courts turnover equalization tax('Umsatzaus mustprotect? gleichssteuer—UASt'—hereinafter referred (4) What is the meaning of the legal concept to as 'equalizationtax') at the rate of2.5 % of'taxationof such a nature as toafford in accordance with Germanlaw. indirect protection to other products' Fink-Frucht appealed tothe Finanzgericht usedin the secondparagraph of Article (Finance Court) claiming that the provi 95, inparticular: sions ofGerman tax law applied werecon trary to Article 95 of theEEC Treaty. (a)Does the expression of such a na ture' mean any tax, however small, 2. Subject-matterof the reference:opinion the effect of which is to afford a
of theFinanzgericht measure of protectionto domestic products competing even remotely A— On 12July 1967 the Finanzgericht, with the importedproduct, or does Munich,decided torequest the Court for a it mean a tax which changes the preliminary ruling on the followingques price of the importedproduct to tions: such a point that domesticcon sumers give preference tothe com (1) Does thefirst paragraph of Article95 of peting domestic products? the EEC Treaty (b)What products are covered by the (a) merely prohibitall discrimination as second paragraph of Article 95, and regards taxation of productsfrom what criteria are to be applied in other Member States; or order to determine either that other
(b)permit the turnover equalization tax products on the market are being (UASt) to be leviedsolely where protected indirectly (same charac similar domestic productsexist and teristics, same use, equivalent utility where these aredirectly orindirectly value), or that there is no such subject to turnover tax,with the indirect protection (essential differ result that, if thereare in the ences in price)? national territory no products either (c)What is the position where the im similar or comparableto theim ported product mayhave several ported products, the equalization different uses? tax isprohibited because itwould (5) Doesthe second paragraph of Article 95 be withoutpurpose? prohibit the collection of any tax, or (c) Alternatively, is the equalization tax doesit merely—as in thefirst para in thelastmentioned caseto be graph—prohibit the collection of taxes regarded ashaving an effect equiv in excessof the internal taxation levied alent toquantitative restrictions on competing domestic products?
JUDGMENT OF4. 4.1968 — CASE 27/67
B — Theobservation put forward bythe thepurchaser would only choose therele Finanzgericht are as follows: vanthome product if there were an un usually large increase in the price of the Question 1 imported product. On the other hand, it may equallybe considered thatthe concept The Finanzgericht refers tothe various applies only to a 'close competitive relation theorieson the subject of this questionto be ship', that is, that it must be possible for a foundin legal writing. slight adjustmentin price tobeenough to persuade the purchaser to change from one Question 2 product to another.
Whilst admittedlyfactual circumstances Question 5 mustplay a partin each case inthe applica tion ofthe conceptof 'similarproducts', the The wording of thesecond paragraph of absence ofsome generalcriteria tobe ob Article 95 appears to prohibit not merely servedby thenationalcourts and, where excessive, butall, internal taxation; some necessary, byexperts, would leadto legal writers indeed support this view, but others uncertainty. believe that this provision is no wider than A definition of therequired characteristics the first paragraph of Article95. oftheproducts referred toin the first and secondparagraphs of Article 95is needed II —Procedure particularly ifthe firstalternative given in Question 5 istobe answered in the affirm ative. The order referring the matter was received at theCourt Registry on 24July 1967.
Question 3 The Government ofthe Federal Republic of Germany, theCommission of the European When the Court declared in its judgment in Communities and the Fink-Frucht under
Case 57/65 (Rec. 1966,p. 295 et seq.) that taking submitted written observations in Article 95creates individualrights it refer accordance with Article 20 of the Protocol
redonly to the first paragraph of that on the Statute of the Court of Justice, and article. presented oralargument at the hearings on Whether ornot atax isof sucha nature as to 5, 6 and7 December 1967. 'afford indirect protection to other prod TheAdvocate-General delivered his oral, ucts' is 'more a question ofcustoms reasoned opinion at the hearing on 25 policy'. Moreover,the wording ofthe January 1968. secondparagraph ofArticle 95is neither The Fink-Fruchtundertaking wasrepre sufficiently clear nor sufficiently wide for it sented by Messrs Ditges and Ehle, Advo to beapplied directly by nationalcourts and cates of Cologne, the Government ofthe administrations. Federal Republic of Germany by Messrs Question 3 appears especially welljustified Everling and Hahnfeld (Ministerialrate) if itis found necessaryto draw aprecise and Mr Biilow, (Oberlandesgerichtsrat), distinction between groupsof products to and theCommission of the European Com which thefirst paragraph appliesand those munities by its Legal Adviser,Mr Wägen baur. covered by thesecond paragraph(cf. Questions2 and 5). III —Summary ofthe observations Question4 submittedby the parties
The legal conceptraised in thisquestion Question 1 may be understood,on theone hand, to apply even wherethere are such differences A —The Fink-Frucht undertaking intro betweenthe products to be compared,in duces its observations by pointingout that their nature, their objective utility orin thisquestion indirectly raisesanother, more view of subjective habits of consumers,that general problem whether there is in fact any
FINK-FRUCHTv HAUPTZOLLAMTMUNCHEN
provision in the Treaty covering the col B — As regards Question 1(c), Fink-Frucht lectionof tax on importedproductswhich considers that logically the examination do notcompete with domestic products. shouldfirst be directedto the possibility that,in the cases contemplated here, equal Onthispoint, it makesthe following ob izationtaxes should beregarded as customs servations: dutiesor chargeshaving equivalent effect. Theonly purpose of theequalization tax is In support of this idea, it emphasizes the tocompensatefor the taxesimposed on
following points: comparabledomestic products. Sincefruit andvegetables areexempt fromturnover The chargeshave the same effect as customs tax in Germany, itis clear from the start duties of a fiscal nature,because their sole that the onlycompensation in question is purposeis to bring revenueto the State. that for indirect taxeslevied at anearlier However, Article 17(3) of the Treaty per stage. However,whenthere is no compar mits Member States to 'substitute for these able product at all,there isno way of duties aninternal tax which complies with justifyingthe equalization tax,because it theprovisions of Article95'; nevertheless, cannothave either the purpose or theeffect it isdoubtful whether Article 17 allows such of 'equalizing' anything.
If thiscase fell out asubstitution incases like the present.If, side the terms ofthe Treaty, Member States despite this, one relieson Article 17, then would be entitled to collect tax atwhatever theequalization taxes applicable to non- rate they wished. However, since such a comparable products should have been result wouldbecontrary tothe objectives of abolished no later than six years after the the Community, the onlyproblem which Treaty's entry into force(Article 17(4)). remains is to determine whichof the pro 1 Theprohibition againstquantitative restric hibitions imposed bythe Treaty areappli tions andmeasures havingequivalent effect cable here. alsoimpinges on the field of fiscal provisions The factthat the first paragraph of Article which affect internationaltrade to the 95 contains aprohibition against discrim extent to which provisions concerning cus ination is not disputed.Doubts do arise, tomsduties, taxes having equivalent effect however, as towhether or notthe article orinternal taxation do not apply.Only in goes on to make an exception, which would the eventof none of these provisions being compelone to conclude, a contrario,that applicable in the circumstances (which can the taxationof products notcompeting notbe conceded)might it prove necessary with domestic products mustbe prohibited; toinvoke thisprohibition. there arevery goodgrounds for thistheory. TheFederalGovernment hasthe following
Another argument ispossible: Article 95 remarksto make: requires thatdomesticand foreign products be placed onthe samefooting; if thereis no Thefirst paragraph of Article 95 contains a competing domesticproduct, the imported clearly-stated prohibition, applicable solely one must be treated inthe same manneras inthe circumstances which it expressly that accorded toa nationalproduct com describes; in addition, the second para parable to it, if such exists; if itisfound (as graphof that article would be pointless if in the present case)that thisnational prod equalization taxes applied to products not uct is not directly subject to turnover tax, incompetitition with domestic products the equalizationtax can, ofcourse, becol wereprohibited by the first paragraph; and lected, butonly up tothe amount of the where Communitylaw has not restricted indirect tax imposed onthe(hypothetical) them, thelegislative powers of national comparable domesticproduct. administrations remainintact. In factboth these theories areopen to Article95 must be consideredin conjunc criticism and thetask of deciding which tionwiththe many other provisions in the prohibitions are applicable, those set out in Treatydesigned to prevent distortion of Article95or those inArticles 12, 13 and17 competition between MemberStates (Ar ofthe Treaty, must accordingly be left to ticles85 et seq., 92 etseq. and 100 et seq.); the Court. since theprinciple of taxation in the country
JUDGMENTOF 4.4. 1968— CASE 27/67
of destinationis applied by allMember In itsopinion, the activities of Member States, the product whenexported is exempt States can be restricted by the prohibition from turnover tax andother indirect taxes against taxes having an effect equivalent to applicableto it inthe exporting country customs duties, aprohibition which leads (export refunds); Article 96 is intended to one toconclude that the nationallegislature guarantee that such exemptionsdo not isnot entitledto collect 'exorbitant' taxes exceed theamount of thecharge originally evenonthe productsin question. imposed on theproduct.
The importing country, for its part,levies turnover tax(or Question 2 other indirect taxes) on the product,with themain aim of ensuring thatthe imported Fink-Frucht submits the following observa product does not have any advantageover tions: competingnational products; it isfor this Thesecond paragraph of Article95 merely reason that the taxesin question are general supplements the first paragraph. Conse ly known as 'equalization taxes'('Aus quently, the definition of the conceptof gleichssteuern'), whena better namefor 'similar products' isnot very significant them mightbe 'turnover taxes onimporta sincein cases of doubt the second paragraph tion' ('Umsatzsteuern bei der Einfuhr'); but willstill be applicable. in any case these taxesarecollected in all 'Similar' productsshould meanall prod Member Stateson all products, thatis, ucts 'which are close substitutes' ('en rela without determining whether inany partic
tionétroite desubstitution'), that is to say, ular case the domestic productsare subject all products which current opinion accepts toa charge to beequalized. without discussion as interchangeable, in These points areconfirmed inArticle 17(3) viewof their objective characteristics and of theTreaty; as a general rule,customs the useswhich they are intended to fulfil. duties of a fiscal natureare imposedon Theequivalence required need by no means products which arenot manufacturedin the beabsolute, for to argue otherwise would be
national territory. By permittingconversion toattribute greater significance to the of thesedutiesinto internal taxation, the secondparagraph of Article 95 than was provisionacknowledges thatthe taxes in intended by the States signatory to the question do nothave 'an effectequivalentto Treaty. customs duties'; inaddition, the wording TheFederal Government considers that the compels oneto conclude thatArticle 95 useof the expression 'similar' products does not prohibitthe collection of taxeson indicates, literally, either that the products the importationofproducts forwhich there compared are completely equivalent to each is no domesticcompetition, for in fact, if the other, or that they have similar character contrary weretrue, Article 17(3)would be istics and one neednot look for similarityin practically deprived ofits purpose, because quality. it is precisely theabsence ofsuch competi tion that characterizes products subjectto Thefollowing arguments are put forward customs duties of afiscal nature. bythe Commission: TheTreaty distinguishesclearly between Theword-similar' has a widermeaning than customs dutiesand taxes('Abgaben'), on 'equivalent'.
In order to establish whether theone hand, andquantitative restrictions there isa similarity, one must first of all on theother. Consequently itis impossible enquirewhether, in view oftheir properties, toregard taxes as quantitative restrictions. natureand quality, the products compared Likethe Federal Government,and for afford the same possibilities of utilization. essentially the same reasons,the Commis It israrely possible, however,to answer this sion considersthat Article95 is notappli questionwith a simple yesor no; the de cableto products not competing against cidinginfluence will be current opinion and domestic products and that theequalization theusefor which the productis intended in tax levied on products of this kind is not a the particular case in question. measurehaving an effectequivalent to Noris it possible to applyan abstract quantitative restrictions. distinctionbetween the respective spheres
FINK-FRUCHT v HAUPTZOLLAMTMÜNCHEN
ofapplication of thefirst andthe second Court's decisionin Case 28/67,in which the paragraphs of Article95; often thediffer Court deliveredjudgment on 3 April 1968. ences are simplydifferences of degree. This apart, it isperfectly possible to inter This problempresents no difficulty because pret the two paragraphs inArticle 95 differ thelegal consequences of the provisions are ently. Thesecond paragraph is 'extremely identical. vague and incomplete' andcannot therefore The principalfunction of the second para have direct effect;the value-judgments graphis to disposeof the objectionwhich which it requires should not beforced on mightotherwise prevent the application of national courts. thefirstparagraph, namely that it doesnot The Commission for its part considers that, apply to 'similar products'. on thebasis of thecase-law of the Court,the questionshould be answered in the affirm
Question 3 ative,and comments asfollows: Fink-Fruchtobservesthat: The secondparagraph of Article 95 is a The second paragraph of Article 95 isa clearprovision,as long as it is understood provisionsupplementary to thefirst; that in that'clear' does not mean 'leaving no roomfor doubt'. It allowsno area of dis itself is sufficientreason to convinceone that theprinciple of direct effect(so far con cretion to the Member States, for its sole firmed bythe Court only with regardto the purposeis,on the contrary, to define cer firstparagraph) applies equally tothe tain legal concepts. second paragraph.
TheFinanzgericht is mistakenin its belief Furthermore, therequirements whichthe that this is a matterof customs policy. TheCommission supports the view that Court has held necessaryfor direct effect apply alsowith regard to theprohibition thereisproof of the fact that the second stated in thesecond paragraph, assuming paragraphofArticle 95 must necessarily that thisprovisioniscomplete and legally have directeffects in the difficulty of de self-sufficient.It does notmatter that it may fining therespective spheres of application not beabsolutely clear because theCourt
of thefirst and the second paragraphs of Article 95. haspower toremedy this. The Finanzgericht, Munich, mistakenly Question 4 claims that thisprovision 'relatesto customs policy', when in realityit is solely designed to giveeffect to the principle ofapplying to Fink-Frucht makes the following com ments: all products thesame treatment asthat given to domesticproducts. The phrase 'of such a nature' does not Finally, the legalprotection enjoyedby necessarily imply that a harmful effect must individualsshould be the sameirrespective be a foreseeable one, or have actuallyoc of whether the courtsconsider that the curred. It is sufficient if common experience possibilityof substitutionunder consider shows that one cannotexclude the possibil ation is close (firstparagraph) or remote ity ofsuch an effect occurring; the second (second paragraph). paragraph of Article 95 covers any adverse effect onthemarketing of the imported
The Federal Government believesthat the product, and it matters little how such question should be answered in the negative adverseeffect manifests itself and where in and bases itsopinion onthe following theimporting country it occurs. arguments: A broad capacityfor substitution ('relation Tomaintain that thefirst twoparagraphs of large de substitution') such as that which Article 95 must havethe same effectin law exists, for example, between umbrellasand is merelytogive one more reason for hold raincoats, is enough for thesecond para ing thatthe firstparagraph, too, is not graph of Article 95 to be applicable; it is directly applicable;reference should be possible, onthis principle, that absolutely made to thecriticisms made by the Bundes no product exists which is incapable ofbeing finanzhof (FederalFinance Court)of the substituted by another.
JUDGMENT OF 4. 4. 1968— CASE27/67
Finally, if the imported product canbe put The Commission'sobservations areas fol to a numberofuses, it isenough for the lows: indirect protectioncondemned by the The second paragraph ofArticle 95 relates second paragraphof Article95 toaffect one to all those cases where internaltaxation is of those uses. 'manifestly of such a nature as to protect The question is answered by theFederal competing products'. This being so, the Government in the followingmanner: prohibition applies to any tax (however Taxation isof sucha nature asto afford minimal) which affects imported products indirect protection to other products when to agreater extent. ananalysis of the market reveals that, On the other hand, the protectiveeffectof because of theiressential characteristics, the thetax stems from the idea that the user, use for which theyare intendedand their facedwith a choice between several com price,the products compared are in com parableproducts, will generally selectthe petition with eachother andthat this com cheapest. petition (that isto say, the buyers' choice) The replywhich should be given to point (c) is strongly influenced by thetaxes. of the question is as follows: for the second It isunnecessary forthe product tobe given paragraphof Article 95 to be applicable,all a competitiveadvantage in actualfact;it is that is required is that the effect which it enough that thetaxation is objectivelyof envisages exists 'for an appreciable pro such a natureas tobring about sucha portion of the products'; inother words,the result. criterion is 'the existenceof economically Itis scarcely possible to determinewhether perceptible competition against domestic products are in competition with each other products'. on thebasisof abstract criteria;all thatcan besaid isthis: Question 5
— The essential propertiesof the products Fink-Frucht considers that the question must coincide.In this contextthe aspects should be answered as suggestedin the which are important may beextremely second alternative, in accordancewith the varied: format, efficiency, conservability, general spirit of Article 95. physical appearance, taste,etc. None of TheFederal Government holds the same these propertiescan be judgedexcept in opinion and considers that the sole object conjunction withthe others. ofArticle 95 is to prevent products from —Special importanceshould beattached sufferingfrom a competitive disadvantage. to the function which the products are designed to fulfil;but onlytheprincipal TheCommission is also of the same view, functioncan beincluded in theconsider and saysthat: ation. — itis impossibleto hold thatindirect pro —Considerable differencesin pricemay be tection canarise from even the lowest a reason for declaring thatthere isno tax; competitionbetween the products. — on thecontrary, it canonly arise as the — In applying thesecriteria, however, itis effectof one which is excessively high; necessary to bear in mindthe diversity —moreover, it would be somewhat sur which existsforthe benefit ofthe buyers, prising if the Treaty accorded better and thefact thatin consequence onlythe treatment to products capable of sub basic correspondenceshould be taken stitution than to similar products. into account.
Grounds of judgment
By an order of 12July1967 which reachedthe Court on 24 July 1967, the Finanz gericht, Munich, asked fora preliminary ruling underArticle 177 of the Treaty establishingthe European Economic Community on a number of questions
FINK-FRUCHT vHAUPTZOLLAMT MÜNCHEN
involving the interpretation of Articles95 and 30 ofthe said Treaty in connexion with theimposition ofthe turnover equalization taxon the importation of certain goods.
Applicabilityof Articles 95and 30 in theabsence of any competition between importedand domestic products (Question 1)
The courtmaking the referenceasks whetherthefirst paragraph of Article 95 prohibits aMember Statefrom imposing turnover equalization taxon products imported from another Member State wherethere are no similar or comparable domesticproducts, and whether the equalizationtax in suchcases amounts to a measure having equivalent effectto quantitative restrictionswithin the meaning of Article30.
The firstand second paragraphs of Article95 prohibit Member States from impos ing on importsfrom otherMember States anyinternal taxationinexcess of that imposed onsimilar domestic products,or of sucha nature as to affordindirect protection to otherdomestic products.Article 95is intended to removecertain restrictions on the free movement ofgoods. But to conclude that it prohibits the impositionof anyinternal taxation onimported goodswhich do not compete with domestic productswould beto give it a scopeexceeding its purpose. Internal taxes, and turnover taxin particular, areessentially fiscal in purpose. Thereis therefore no reason why certainimported products shouldbegiven privileged treatment becausethey do notcompete with any domesticproducts capable of being pro tected. Where sucha taxis imposed atthe import stage,even on products which do not competewith domestic products,its purpose is to put every kind of product, whateverits origin,in acomparable fiscalsituationin the territory of the state im posingthe tax. It must therefore beconcluded that Article 95 doesnot prohibit Member States fromimposing internaltaxationonimported products when there is no similardomestic product, orany otherdomestic products capable of being protected.
Nor does internal taxation imposedunder the conditions set out abovecome within theprohibition on quantitative restrictionsandmeasures having equivalent effect, withinthe meaningofArticle 30 of theTreaty. Such restrictions,which are intended tolimit the quantitiesimported, are in factdifferent both in their purposeand the way in whichthey operate frommeasures of afiscal nature. Furthermore, since Article 30 et seq.,on the onehand, and Article95, on the other, lay down different periodsof time and different procedures for the elimination of the restrictions to which theyrefer, itwould be difficult to concede thatone and the sametax could be both ameasure havinganeffect equivalentto a quantitative restrictionand internal taxation.
The directeffect ofthe secondparagraph of Article 95 (Question 3) In its third question the court making thereference asks the Courtof Justiceto rule
JUDGMENT OF 4. 4.1968 — CASE 27/67
whether 'the second paragraph of Article 95has direct effects and creates individual rights which national courts mustprotect'.
This provision containsa straightforwardprohibition against protection which is thenecessary complement tothe prohibitionset out in the first paragraph of the article.The obligation which resultsfrom that prohibition is unconditional, and no action is required on thepart of the institutions of the Community or the Member States for its implementation or itsentry into force. The prohibition is therefore self-sufficient and legallycomplete,and is thuscapable of having direct effects on the legalrelationships between Member States andthose subject to theirjurisdic tion.Although this provision involves theevaluation ofeconomic factors, this does not exclude the rightand duty ofnational courtsto ensure that the rules of the Treaty areobserved wheneverthey canascertain, in the lightof the interpretation given below inanswerto Questions 2,4 and5,that the conditions necessary for the application ofthe article are fulfilled. The answer to thisquestion, therefore,must bethat the provisionin question is capable ofproducing direct effects and creating individualrights which national courtsmust protect.
The conceptof'similar products' in thefirstparagraph of Article 95, therelationship betweenthe first and second paragraphs and the interpretation of the second paragraph (Questions 2, 4 and 5)
Theobjectof Questions2, 4and 5 is, insubstance, to establish the conditions under which an imported product, ascompared witha domestic product, comes within one orother ofthe situationsreferredto inthe first twoparagraphsof Article 95, and alsoto have the conditions underwhich thesecond paragraph applies andits effects defined.
Under theterms of Article 95 no MemberState shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the productsof otherMember Statesinternaltaxation of anykind in excess o f that imposed directly or indirectly on 'similar domestic products'. Similarity between products within themeaningof the first paragraphof Article 95 exists when theproductsin question are normallytobe considered as coming within the samefiscal, customs orstatistical classification,as the case may be.
In addition tothe prohibition imposed inthe first paragraph of Article 95, the secondparagraph of the same articleforbid the imposition on imported products of any form of taxation 'of sucha natureas toafford indirect protection to other products'. Suchprotection wouldoccur inparticular if internal taxation were to impose aheavier burden on an importedproduct than on a domestic product with whichthe imported productis, by raeson ofone or more economic uses to whichit may be put, in competition, even thoughthe condition of similarity forthe pur poses of the firstparagraph ofArticle95 isnot fulfilled. Even if there is no direct
FINK-FRUCHT vHAUPTZOLLAMTMÜNCHEN
competition of any sortwith adomestic product,such protection would still exist if itwere established that theimported productbore a specific fiscal charge because ofits stateofmanufacture or distribution or because of anyother economic circum stancein sucha wayas toprotect certain activitiesdistinct from those used in the manufactureof theimported product.In theinterests of legal certainty, however, itis necessary for the various economicrelationships covered by the second para graph ofArticle 95 to benot merelyfortuitous, but lasting and characteristic.
Theeffects of a taxon the economic relationships referred to in the second para graph of Article 95 must be assessed in the lightof the objectives of Article 95, which are toensure normal conditionsof competition and to remove allrestrictions of afiscal nature capableof hindering thefree movementof goods within the Common Market. Whereasthe first paragraph of Article 95 only prohibits taxation inso far asit exceedsa clearly definedlevel,the prohibition laid down in the second paragraphis based on theprotective effect of the taxationin question totheex clusionof any exactstandard of reference. A taxmust therefore be considered as incompatiblewith theTreaty if it iscapable ofhaving the effect referred to above. Infact the Treaty doesnot prevent national courtsfrom deciding, where necessary, the levelbelow which the tax inquestionwould ceaseto havethe protective effects prohibited bythe Treaty and fromdrawing allappropriate conclusions therefrom.
Costs
The costs incurred by theGovernment of the FederalRepublic of Germany and by the Commission ofthe EuropeanCommunities, which have submitted observa tionsto the Court,are not recoverable, and asthese proceedings are, in so far as the parties to the main action areconcerned, a step in the action pending before the Finanzgericht, Munich, the decision oncosts is amatter for that court.
On those grounds,
Uponreading the pleadings; Uponhearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur; Upon hearing the oral observations ofthe Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Commission of the European Communitiesand the plaintiff in the main action; Uponhearing the opinion of the Advocate-General; Having regard to theTreaty establishing theEuropean Economic Community, especially Articles 30, 95and 177; Having regard to theProtocol on the Statuteof the Courtof Justice of the Euro pean Economic Community, especially Article20; Havingregard to the Rules ofProcedureof the Court of Justice of the European Communities;
JUDGMENT OF 4.4. 1968 —CASE27/67
THE COURT
in answer tothe questions referredto it by theFinanzgericht, Munich, by anorder of thatcourt of12 July1967 herebyrules:
1. Neither Article 95 nor Article30 ofthe Treaty establishing the European Economic Communityprohibits Member States from imposing internal taxationon products imported from other Member States when there are no similardomestic products orother domestic products capable of being protected;
2.The secondparagraph of Article 95of the Treaty is capable of producing direct effectsand creating individual rightswhich national courts must protect;
3. (a) Similarlybetween products within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 95exists when theproductsin question are normally to be con sidered ascoming withinthe samefiscal, customs or statistical classifica tion,as the case may be; (b)The second paragraph of Article95 is complementary to the first. It prohibits the imposition ofanyinternal taxation which imposes a higher charge onan importedthan on adomestic product which competes with the imported product, although it isnot similarto it within the meaning of the first paragraph ofArticle 95. The prohibition also applies in the absence of direct competition where the internaltaxation subjects the imported product toa specificfiscal charge in such a way asto protect certain activities distinct from those used in the manufacture of the
imported product;
and declares:
The decision oncosts in these proceedings isa matter for the Finanzgericht, Munich.
LecourtDonner Strauß
Trabucchi MonacoMertens de Wilmars Pescatore
Delivered inopen court in Luxembourg on4 April1968.
A. Van Houtte R.Lecourt
Registrar President
OPINION OFMR ADVOCATE-GENERALGAND
(SeeCase28/67, p.159)