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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·Rozsudok·14.7.1972

C-51/69

ECLI:EU:C:1972:72

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61969CJ0051

BAYER v COMMISSION

In Case 51/69

Farbenfabriken BAYER AG, having its registered office in Leverkusen, re­ presented by its board of management, assisted by H. Axster, W. Decker, O. Axster, Advocates at Düsseldorf, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the offices of E. Graff von Carmer, Counsellor (First Class) at the German Embassy, 20-22 rue de l'Arsenal

applicant,

V

Commission of the European Communities , represented by its Legal Advisers J. Thiesing, G. Marchesini and J. Griesmar, acting as Agents, assisted by Professor W. Hefermehl, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of its Legal Adviser, É. Reuter, 4 boulevard Royal,

defendant,

Application for the annulment of the Commission Decision of 24 July 1969, published in the Journal Official L 195 of 7 August 1969, p. 11 et seq., relating to proceedings under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/26.267—Dyestuffs),

THE COURT

composed of: R. Lecourt, President, J. Mertens de Wilmars and H. Kutscher, Presidents of Chambers, A. M. Donner, A. Trabucchi (Rapporteur), R. Monaco and P. Pescatore, Judges,

Advocate-General: H. Mayras Registrar: A. Van Houtte

gives the following

JUDGMENT

Issues of fact and of law

I — Statement of the facts for these products which had occurred since the beginning of 1964 in the countries The facts may be summarized as follows: of the Community were made by mutual On the basis of information supplied by agreement between the undertakings con- trade associations of the various industries cerned.

using dyestuffs, the Commission made as a result of these inquiries the Com­ inquiries as to whether increases in prices mission found that three uniform price

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

increases had taken place. An increase of — Farbenfabriken Bayer AG, Leverkusen 15% affecting most aniline dyes took (Federal Republic of Germany),

place between 7 and 20 January 1964 in — Farbwerke Hoechst AG, Frankfurt am Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Main (Federal Republic of Germany), Luxembourg and on 1 January 1965 it — Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik AG was extended to Germany. On that same day almost all producers introduced, in (BASF), Ludwigshafen (Federal Re­ public of Germany Germany and the other countries already affected by the increase of 1964, a uniform — Cassella Farbwerke Mainkur AG, increase of 10% on dyes and pigments not Frankfurt am Main (Federal Republic of Germany), covered by the first increase. Finally on 16 October 1967 an increase of 8% on all — Société Française des Matières Colo­

dyes was introduced by almost all pro­ rantes SA (Francolor), Paris (France), ducers in Germany, the Netherlands, — Fabriek van Chemische Produkten Belgium and Luxembourg. In France this Vondelingenplaat NV, Rotterdam increase amounted to 12%; in Italy no (Netherlands), such increase was introduced at all. Ciba SA Basel (Switzerland), On 31 may 15/0/ the Commission decided upon its own initiative to commence — Sandoz SA, Basel (Switzerland), proceedings under Article 3 of Regulation — J. R. Geigy SA, Basel (Switzerland), No 17/62 of the Council for presumed — Fabrique de Matières Colorantes infringement of Article 85 of the Treaty Durand et Huguenin SA, Basel (Swit­ against the undertakings, including in zerland), particular the undertaking Farbenfabriken — Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd (ICI), Bayer AG, which had participated in a Manchester (United Kingdom), concerted practice for the purpose of fixing prices for dyestuffs. — Yorkshire Dyeware and Chemical, By letter of 11 December 1967, the Com­ Leeds (United Kingdom), mission informed the abovementioned — E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Company undertaking of this decision. This letter Inc., Wilmington, Del. (United States of was accompanied by a notice of objections America). made by the Commission against the undertakings which had participated in By letter of 10 April 1968, in reply to this the abovementioned increases. There were notice of objections, the undertaking sixty recipients of the said letter and Farbenfabriken Bayer AG submitted to notice. They were producers of dyestuffs the Commission its written observations established both inside and outside the the purpose of which was to refute the Community, and their subsidiaries and objections raised against it. representatives established within the Com- On 10 September 1968, that undertaking mon Market. delivered its oral observations in the pres­ In the notice or objections the commission ence of representatives of the Commission declared that within the Common Market and of the Member States. the price increases had been introduced by At its meeting on 24 July 1969, the Com­ the following producers, and by their sub­ mission adopted a decision ordering sidiaries or representatives: Farbenfabriken Bayer AG to pay a fine of 50 000 u.a. for infringements of the — Azienda Colori Nazionali Affini S.p.A. provisions of Article 85(1) of the Treaty, (ACNA), Milan (Italy), which it had allegedly committed as a — Industria Piemontese dei Colori di participant with other undertakings in con­ Anilina S.p.A. (IPCA), Milan (Italy), certed practices for the purpose of fixing — Fabbrica Lombarda Colori Anilina the amount of price increases and the S.p.A. (FLCA), Milan (Italy), circumstances in which these increases — Industria Electro-Chimica Bergamasca, were to be introduced in the dyestuffs Bergamo (Italy), industry in 1964, 1965 and 1967.

BAYER v COMMISSION

For the same reasons the decision ordered Community procedure for fixing and levy­ that fines of 50 000 u.a. be paid by: ing fines is governed by only a few, very general provisions, and by the general — Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik AG, principles of law. Therefore the protection — Cassella Farbwerke Mainkur AG, of the rights of the parties concerned — Farbwerke Hoechst AG, renders it indispensable that the Com­ — Société Française des Matières Colo­ mission should scrupulously respect all rantes SA, the rules as to procedure and all the — Ciba SA, general principles of law applicable to — J. R. Geigy SA, the subject. — Sandoz SA, The defendant objects that the procedural — Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. rules found in Regulations Nos 17/62 and 99/63 must not necessarily be considered and that a fine of 40 000 u.a. be paid by as rules relating to the application of the Azienda Colori Nazionali Affini S.p.A. Treaty within the meaning of Article 173; Farbenfabriken Bayer AG lodged an for it such were the case infringement of appeal against this decision at the Court procedural requirements laid down in the Registry on 3 October 1969. regulations would always constitute, un­ like procedural requirements set out in the Treaty, grounds for instituting proceedings within the meaning of that article. II — Conclusions of the parties In its reply, the applicant observes that the

The applicant claims that the Court should: concept of infringement of rules of law relating to the application of the Treaty, (a) Annul the defendant's decision of 24 which constitutes a ground for instituting July 1969 (Case IV/26.267-Dyestuffs), proceedings for annulment, is not to be notified to the applicant on 28 July applied restrictively. Article 173 of the 1969, in so far as it concerns the Treaty means that only provisions which applicant; have a purely administrative character, which are not intended to protect the rights (b) Order the defendant to bear the costs of those concerned, can be considered as of the action. Finally, the applicant stresses the impor­ The defendant contends that the Court tance of the principle of the rights of the should: defence, which, in Germany, has been written into the constitution, and accord­ (a) Dismiss the application as unfounded; ingly stresses the importance of requiring that the few procedural provisions to be (b) Order the applicant to bear the costs. found in Community law upholding this principle be applied rigorously.

HI — Submissions and arguments 2. Complaints concerning the commence­ of the parties ment of the procedure

The applicant observes that on 31 May The submissions and arguments of the 1967 the Commission commenced a parties may be summarized as follows: procedure under Article 3 of Regulation A — Submissions as to form No 17, but that by imposing a fine the defendant took a decision on the basis of 1. General considerations Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17. The two provisions mentioned above concern The applicant observes as a preliminary two different types of decision, not only point that, unlike similar procedures in respect of their subject-matter and their found in national systems of law, the effects, but also in that the conditions to

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

be fulfilled and the formalities to be facts necessary for establishing the objec satisfied are different in the two cases. tions stated, in accordance with the prin It is argued that because of these funda ciples set out in Article 19(1) of Regulation mental differences, when the Commission No 17. This information must be provided wishes to go beyond the procedure leading in writing, or, where applicable, by permit to a mere cease and desist order, to a ting those concerned to have access to the procedure leading to the imposition of a documents mentioned in the notice of fine it must commence that procedure objections. It is argued that it is of no formally by taking the requisite decision importance that some of the elements of and by sending a notice of objections to fact on which the Commission has based the interested party, stating that the pur its objections may have been known to pose of the procedure is to impose a the applicant, since the purpose of Article 4 fine. of Regulation No 99/63 is to ensure that The defendant objects that the decision of those concerned are informed that the 31 May 1967 whereby the administrative defendant intends to allege certain facts procedure was commenced was taken in against that party and to consider them as application of Regulation No 17 as a evidence of an infringement. whole, not solely on the basis of Articles 3 The applicant cites a number of conclusions

and 9. The fact that that decision referred in the notice of objections which, it claims, 'especially' to Article 3 of Regulation No are not supported by elements of fact, so 17 was intended to forestall the future that the applicant was not given the oppor application of the concurrent jurisdiction tunity of submitting its observations on of the national authorities to apply Article the factual data allegedly in the possession 85(1). of the Commission in respect of those The applicant argues that the defendant conclusions. The applicant asserts that this cannot set up against it the text of the infringement of the rights of the defence decision relating to the commencement of was all the more unjustified in that the the procedure since it did not receive a applicant specifically informed the Com true copy thereof. mission on several occasions that it required The defendant observes that in the to see the text of the letters sent by the relationship between undertakings and the various producers which allegedly con Commission it is the notice of objections tained coincidences, and asked permission and not the decision to commence the to consult the file in appropriate cases. procedure which determines the scope of The Commission refused. that procedure, as appears from Article The defendant replies that according to the 19(1) of Regulation No 17 and from judgment in the Grundig-Consten case, it Articles 2 and 4 of Regulation No 99. is not necessary for the entire content of In part 5 of the notice in question it is the file to be made available.

It is sufficient stated that the infringement resulted at for the Commission to inform the interested the least from serious negligence, such parties of the elements knowledge of which that the requirements for the imposition of is necessary to ascertain which objections a fine appear to have been fulfilled. were taken into consideration. This is what it did in the present case in the second 3. Failure to inform the applicant of the section of the notice of objections. Further essential elements of fact alleged against more, it would have been wrong, because it of the risk of betrying business secrets, to allow those concerned to consult the The applicant argues that academic writers, files or to sent them the full text of the and the case-law of the Court of Justice circulars sent by them to their subsidiaries (Judgment in Joint Cases 56 and 58/64, or representatives. Grundig-Consten), require that the Com

In its reply the applicant observes that mission must, in application of Article 85 consulting the file was only one way of of the Treaty, inform those concerned, informing it of the charges laid against it. who are party to the procedure, of all the Instead of generalizing, the defendant

BAYER v COMMISSION

ought, during the administrative procedure, communicated to those concerned, it to have made available the documents from should have sent them an adequate supple which it draws conclusions concerning ment to the notice of objections in respect alleged similarities in wording and in dates, of that further investigation. as it has done during the course of the The defendant replies that the sole purpose judicial proceedings. This failure to make of the inquiries in question was to check information available prevented the appli the accuracy of certain statements made cant from defending itself during the by those concerned either orally in the administrative phase as regards the objec presence of officials of the Commission or tions based on those documents. in written statements in reply to the notice The justification which the defendant of objections.

Some of the undertakings claims to draw from the need to preserve claimed that every time there was a general business secrets is entirely without founda increase prices slid quickly downwards as tion, because since then it has made these a result of discounts given to certain cus documents available without even asking tomers. It was this particular point upon the undertakings if they had any objection. which the checks in question were made. Furthermore, the risk of betrying business As an alternative argument the defendant secrets is not a reason for refusing an claims that neither Article 19 of Regulation interested party the right to be heard, for No 17 nor Regulation No 99 was infringed Article 20(2) of Regulation No 17 provides because the inquiries to which the applicant expressly that the prohibition on dis refers (those of 13 December 1967, 25 closing business secrets is without prejudice January 1968 and 6 February 1968) all to the provision of Article 19 which took place before the meeting of 10 protects the rights of the defence. December 1968 organized for the very The defendant objects that the applicant is purpose of enabling the undertakings con confusing the obligations which Article cerned to submit their oral observations 19(1) of Regulation No 17 imposes on the on the objections as a whole.

In any Commission during the administrative event, the contested decision was not based procedure with the obligations upon it in on any objection other than those set out its capacity as defendant before the Court in the notice of 11 December 1967. of Justice. The applicant observes that those inquiries led the Commission to add to and make considerable alterations to the statement 4. Complaints concerning the communica tion of the notice of objections before the of the facts which had already been sent to inquiries were concluded it. It stresses on this point that the notice of objections did not contain any evidence The applicant, after pointing out that per of the existence of a concerted practice as sons duly authorized by the Commission regards the increase of 1967, but simply obtained information from the applicant asserted that those concerned had agreed itself or from its sales companies on the on that increase. But in the contested subject of the 1967 increase on dates falling decision, relying on such matters as the between 19 December 1967 and 15 April Geigy announcement and the findings of 1969, argues that the Commission acted the Bundeskartellamt, which only came in a way incompatible with the very nature to the Commission's knowledge afterwards, of the notice of objections, which must the defendant referred to a concerted constitute the final act of the inquiry, in practice. that the Commission arbitrarily drew up The defendant is opposed to this interpreta its notice of objections at some point tion of the notice of objections, in which during its investigation and not at the end it never spoke of agreements, but always of of it, as it should have done according to concerted practices even as regards the Regulation No. 17 and Regulation No 99. increase of 1967.

On this point, it cites in If the Commission thought it necessary particular point 12 of page 9 of that notice, to undertake further measures of inquiry where reference is also made to the meeting after the notice of objections had been at Basel in August 1967.

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

5. Complaints concerning the hearing The defendant denies that minutes may only be used when expressly approved by the The applicant claims that since, for the persons heard. In any event the applicant's reasons set out above, it had not been failure to approve the minutes is of no informed of certain essential elements on importance at all in this case, because the which the Commission based its con contested decision did not use any of the clusions contained in the notice of objec statements made by the applicant's counsel tions, all it could possibly do at the hearing at the hearing of 10 December 1968.

The was to repeat the protests which it had text of the letter of 27 June to which the already made previously in writing. applicant refers, and which was sent by Furthermore, since there were doubts in the defendant to the applicant with the text the applicant's mind as regards the factors of the draft minutes of the hearing, was in on which in December 1968 the defendant fact only a draft which, because of a mis intended to base its decision, the two take made by officials of the Commission, weeks' notice on which it was invited to was sent to the applicant's counsel instead appear was too short for it to prepare of the letter which was in fact sent to the itself sufficiently, a point which it made applicant. during the administrative procedure. as regards me applicant s complaints to No answer to these complaints is given in the effect that the statements of its counsel the statement of defence. They are further were recorded inaccurately, the defendant developed by the applicant in its reply. produces as an annex to its statement of The defendant states, in its rejoinder, that defence the complete text of the two state the complaint as to insufficient notice is a ments made by the applicant's counsel new submission which cannot be considered during the hearing of 10 December 1968. to be admissible under Article 42(2) of As regards the date when the minutes were the Rules of Procedure. sent to the members of the Advisory Furthermore, notice of not less than 3 Committee, the defendant states that this weeks, such as was given to the applicant, occurred as early as 19 June 1967. cannot be considered insufficient. In its reply the applicant states that the defendant wrongly attributes only sec

6. Complaint concerning the minutes of the ondary importance to the minutes. It is hearing of 10 December 1968 argued that approval of the minutes by those concerned is indispensable, regardless The applicant observes that by letter of of whether the Commission uses or does 27 June 1969 the defendant sent the draft not use statements made by those con minutes to it, giving it until 15 September cerned against them. The purpose of the to agree to that draft by sending back a hearing ought not to consist solely in copy signed by its representative together enabling the Commission to use statements with suggested alterations if any. Yet the made by those concerned against them; it contested decision was taken on 24 July should also be the purpose of the hearing of the same year, that is to say, six weeks to guarantee the rights of the defence, to before the expiry of the period given to give those concerned the opportunity of the applicant, without the applicant's ever establishing their innocence and to discuss having informed the defendant that it doubtful questions with the Commission. agreed the text of the minutes of the As for the mistake in notification made by

hearing. It is argued that therefore no the defendant, the applicant is of the lawful hearing ever took place, which opinion that the defendant should bear the means that there is no point in looking at consequences of this. Besides, the original the contents of the defendant's draft of the accompanying letter addressed to minutes, in respect of which in fact the the applicant did not set a different time- applicant did not fail to use its right to limit from that given in the text described ask for alterations, especially with a view as a 'copy' addressed to the applicant's to deleting inaccuracies in the record of counsel. The original simply asked for the what its counsel said. minutes to be agreed to 'as soon as

BAYER v COMMISSION

possible'. In those circumstances, since the — the fact that ACNA is said to have applicant did not approve the minutes and prevented this from taking place; since there was no reason why it should have approved them before the date given — the meetings for information between to it, the hearing did not fulfil its purpose the producers, especially in Basel and in as regards the applicant. London; Quite apart from the above, the procedural defect consisting in the fact that the draft — the minutes of the meeting at Basel on minutes were sent to the Advisory Com­ 18 August 1967; mittee on 19 June 1969 before they had been submitted to those concerned is in — the examination of the prices of dye- contradiction, it is argued, with the rule stuffs and the announcement of the contained in Article 9 of Regulation No increase made by Geigy; 99. The defendant replies that all the parties — the decision of the Bundeskartellamt present at the hearing were in agreement and the findings made by it. that the minutes would only be drawn up and sent to them for their approval later, The defendant replies, as regards the by reason of the length and complexity matters that the contested decision takes of the statements made in the various into consideration in favour of the ACNA languages, and because of the time neces­ company, that these cannot in any way sary for drafting. As to the mistake of com­ affect the position of the other under­ munication, the defendant observes that it takings, since the decision taken against was only the original letter asking for the them was not based in any way on the applicant's agreement as soon as possible considerations concerning the conduct of which could be valid, not an unsigned ACNA. The meeting in Basel during August 1967 was mentioned at page 9 of The fact that no statement made by those the notice of objections. The meeting in concerned was used against them also London was mentioned only in order to takes all weight away from the fact that the introduce the facts set out in the third minutes were sent to the Advisory Com­ paragraph. Furthermore, the decision mittee before being submitted to those con­ taken does not find against those concerned cerned for their approval. on the basis of their contacts for in­ formation Thestaem ntsrelatingto hed cison f

7. Complaint that the decision contains new the Bundeskartellamt were superfluous in arguments of fact the context of the contested decision. In any event there was no reason why it The applicant argues that a whole series should not have been referred to in the of essential arguments of fact appears decision, particularly since it seems un­ for the first time in the decision. The deniable that Geigy announced an increase, matters in question are as follows: as the Kammergericht Berlin also held in its decision of 28 August 1969, which — the time at which, in January 1964, overruled the abovementioned decision of those concerned allegedly sent instruc­ the Bundeskartellamt for reasons of sub- stance relating to German law. tions to raise prices to the Italian subsidiaries; The applicant claims that the Commission's assertion to the effect that the contested — the alleged similarity in the messages decision did not take into consideration sent by Telex; against Bayer its participation in an alleged concertation in October 1967 with — the alleged intention of the applicant a view to increasing prices in Italy is also to introduce an increase in Italy shown to be untrue by the fact that the in the Autumn of 1967; fine imposed on ACNA was reduced for

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

the very reason that that undertaking did The limitation periods for commencing not take part in that increase. Yet this proceedings against administrative in­ charge was not brought to the attention fringements are not longer than three of the applicant in the notice of objections. years in any of the Member States in any Even in the case of facts which are not case. Since infringements of Article 85 of denied, the applicant ought to be able to the EEC Treaty are not criminal in nature, refute the conclusions which the Com­ analogous criteria should therefore be mission believes it can draw from them. applied. In order to stop time running, the Therefore these facts should be brought to competent authorities must at least take a its attention in any event. measure of a nature such as to produce The applicant states that the Kammer­ legal effects. In the present case no such gericht Berlin did not overrule the decision measure occurred until the decision taken of the Bundeskartellamt for reasons of on 21 May 1967 to commence the proce­ substance relating to German law, but for dure. Proceedings against the increases of reasons of fact. 1964 and 1965 should therefore be con­ The defendant objects that the contested sidered to be inadmissible as being out of decision expressly states that the price time. increase of October 1967 did not cover The defendant objects that the three uni­ Italy. In the notice of objections, the form increases of January 1964, January meeting in Basel in August 1967 was set 1965 and of October 1967 were the result out as one of the facts from which the of a continuous concerted practice which concerted nature of the 1967 increase ap­ extended over the whole period from pears. The question whether a certain January 1964 to October 1967. Therefore conduct found to exist as a fact constitutes the problem of limitation does not arise a cartel or a concerted practice is not an in the present case. element of fact but a problem of legal Secondly, the defendant observes that in assessment. The sole purpose of the ref­ the absence of provisions governing time- erence to the judgment of the Kammer­ limits in the law in force, the Commission gericht Berlin was to confirm the finding retains complete authority as part of its that the undertakings concerned met in duties and in exercise of its discretionary Basel on 17 August 1967. Furthermore, the power to determine more precisely, subject defendant stands by its assertion that the to review by the Court of Justice, the Kammergericht overruled the decision of limitation periods which appear appro­ the Bundeskartellamt of 28 November 1967 priate as regards proceedings against for reasons based on German substantive infringements. To apply national law to a law. Article 1 of the German Law in fact pertaining to Community law in cases question on which the Bundeskartellamt where Community legislation is silent based its decision does not cover the con­ would render it impossible to apply Com­ cept of a concerted practice, and the munity law on a uniform basis. Kammergericht came to the conclusion The laws of the Member Mates have in

that the existence of an agreement be­ common only the principle that there tween those concerned had not been should be a limitation period. However, established with a sufficient degree of as regards putting that principle into certainty. practice there are important differences. In view of this disparity the Commission reaches the conclusion that it is impossible B — The period of limitation in relation to discern any precise criteria, and that to the facts of 1964 and 1965 therefore as regards limitation periods for infringements of the provisions of Article The applicant observes that since the prin­ 85 of the Treaty it is the needs of Com­ ciple of periods of limitation is accepted in munity law alone that should be taken into all the Member States, it also constitutes a consideration. principle of Community law, even if it is Even if it were accepted that each of the not enshrined in any express provision. three successive price increases occurred by

BAYER v COMMISSION

reason of a new concerted practice, this took place in this case were of a purely would not mean that the limitation period preparatory nature with a view to a had expired because it has been suspended possible formal measure on the part of the on several occasions since 1964 by written Commission. The principle that the rights requests for information made under of the defence must be respected requires Article 11 of Regulation No 17 and by that only formal measures may suspend investigations carried out by officials of the the period of limitation. Commission under Article 14 of Regula

The defendant replies that in order to tion No 17 at the premises of several justify the proposition that there was a undertakings, including those of the ap continuous concerted practice, it suffices plicant. that as from the price increase of 1964 The defendant is of the opinion that, taxing each of the undertakings concerned was in into account the legal and practical difficul a position to expect that the other under ties of the question, a limitation period of takings would behave in the same way upon even three years cannot be considered as the occurrence of new general increases. appropriate in cases of infringement of the Because of individual price concessions Community's rules on competition. made by the undertakings they had a The applicant denies that there was a permanent and collective interest in moving continuous link between the different in away from a relatively low level of market creases, because it never committed itself prices to a high level, by mutually fore to following in the future any increase going the practice of undercutting each introduced by other undertakings con other which they usually follow on the

cerned. In its view it is unthinkable that an market. undertaking should tie its pricing policy so The defendant asserts that the application tightly to possible individual decisions of the time-limit laid down by German taken by some of its competitors. The right law is contrary to the requirement of a claimed by the Commission to set limita uniform application of Community law. tion periods in each particular case con Furthermore, in the absence of common tradicts the requirement of legal certainty principles governing the length of the which is the whole purpose of limitations. limitation period, it is unacceptable to In the absence of a Community limitation apply the period laid down by the law of period, the applicability of the two-year one of the Member States to the whole period laid down by German law is con

Community. firmed by the right and duty of the Com Even if a limitation period of two years mission to carry out its activities in col were accepted, this period was suspended, laboration with the national administra first by the investigations of July 1965 tions competent in matters concerning and then by the commencement of the cartels. For it is paradoxical to require procedure on 31 May 1967. national administrations to perform their The distinction maintained by the ap duties according to EEC law in cases plicant between the activity of the Com where they no longer have the power to act mission and that of its officials is contrary under national law.

The period laid down to the tenor of Regulation No 17. The by German legislation is also valid if it is Director-General for Competition is em wished to apply a uniform period to the powered to take the measures provided for whole of the EEC, the reason being that by Article 14(1) and (2) of Regulation No Germany is the only Member State pos 17 by virtue of a delegation of powers by sessing legislation on competition compara the Commission. It was in the exercise of ble to that of the Community system. these powers that the officials who under As for the suspension of the period of took the abovementioned investigations limitation, the applicant observes that the were given that task. So far as the sus investigations carried out by officials of pension of the limitation period is con the Directorate-General for Competition cerned their activity does not differ in any cannot be looked upon as formal measures way from duties which they carry out on

of the Commission. The activities which the basis of a given formal decision.

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

C — Substantive submissions market. For the purpose of making this complaint clear, the applicant sets itself the 1. Complaint concerning the criterion of task of describing the more important the effect on trade between Member characteristics of the market in dyestuffs. States According to the applicant the world market in dyestuffs is characterized by the The applicant maintains that the defendant fact that the important producers are has not demonstrated that the practice relatively few in number, but that on the which has been prohibited is of such a other hand the range of products offered is nature as to deflect patterns of trade be very wide, (about three thousand one tween Member States from their normal hundred products in the applicant's case). and natural routes, and that it has done no Almost all of these products can be re more than assert that imports would only placed by a product from another under have increased if there had existed a taking, but only to a certain extent be sufficiently large difference in prices be cause of the enormous number of shades tween the Member States, without how

and other technical characteristics. This ever establishing that such a difference great diversity in the properties of dyestuffs would have been possible in the absence of has the effect of preventing prices being the alleged concertation and that it would known on the market, which means that in fact have intensified trade between the user is permanently in a position to Member States. The fact that quantities force the producer to grant individual price delivered at the frontiers increased, as concessions. In this situation, each pro appears from statistics of the OECD for ducer can only learn about price reductions the period 1963 to 1968, constitutes, ac granted by his competitors for each dye cording to the applicant, clear evidence stuff and for each customer to who he is that the increases did not affect the pattern called upon to make a competitive offer of inter-State trade. Furthermore, it is (the applicant states that it has never argued that the Commission does not claimed to know the prices charged by have the power to regulate the level of its competitors, as is wrongly alleged in prices in the various Member States, but the contested decision).

This practice of only to eliminate barriers to trade be individual concessions brings about a slow tween Member States. but constant erosion of prices of dyestuffs The defendant replies that in the light of at the international level, as is shown by the case-law of the Court the requirements the fact that on the whole average prices of Article 85 as to the effect on trade be charged by the applicant on the world tween the Member States of the restriction market in 1967 were below those charged on competition are met in this case because in 1958. the concerted practice covered the territory In this situation, the producer who wishes of several Member States. to improve the level of his prices and profits cannot do so by putting up each

2. Complaints concerning the understanding price at which he sells each of his dyestuffs. of the special characteristics of the The large number of dyestuffs makes it market in the products in question impossible to make separate price adjust ments for each dye in the case of a general The applicant complains that the Com increase in prices. Individual action at the mission did not take into account the level of each customer involving an in special characteristics of the market in the crease in price would obviously be un products in question, and that this pre acceptable for the customer.

It is for these vented it from taking into account the fact reasons that an increase can only take the that certain similarities in the conduct of form of a general and global rate of in the undertakings concerned resulted from crease. Global solutions are also applied independent decisions which those under in other sectors of the economy, as for takings were prompted to take on the example in cases of collective pay agree basis of information arising from the ments, even if, from a theoretical point of

BAYER v COMMISSION

view, it is more desirable to take individual that his competitors would act in a similar productivity into account. When a pro­ fashion. ducer has announced an increase in his The defendant maintains that the price prices on the market, his competitors can­ increases in question cannot be explained not for long increase their sales at the by the oligopolistic structure of the market. expense of that producer by refraining In referring to what is expected to happen from introducing the same increase be­ in such a market in theory, the applicant cause the latter is not in a position to has failed to consider the postulates of maintain those new prices if he is not price theory employed in the analysis of followed by his competitors. Such is the parallel conduct. These factors are not position notwithstanding the opinion ex­ applicable in the case of the dyestuffs pressed in the notice of objections accord­ industry. ing to which a producer can increase his The defendant observes that the modern

share of the market by refraining from theory of oligopolies starts from the prin action. The Kammergericht Berlin, in its ciple that in the oligopoly situation there decision of 28 August 1969, expressly are many ways of arriving at prices, and held that producers of dyestuffs are forced that it would certainly not be right to to align themselves on the lowest prices of equate the oligopoly situation with con their competitors in order not to lose a sciously parallel conduct by participants. part of the market. The theorists accept that undertakings A producer contemplating an increase has knowingly adopt parallel conduct only in a chance of success with his decision respect of oligopolies involving a very high to increase his prices without its being degree of interdependence between under necessary for him to enter into concerta takings, such that one undertaking cannot tion with his competitors in cases where he take a measure without its competitors is of the opinion that by reason of their being immediately and considerably af equivalent size and of their pattern of fected and reacting in consequence.

In production competing producers have pre this latter situation an undertaking only occupations identical to his own after a increases its prices when it expects that long period of price erosion. the others will also do so. It is mainly Individual conduct remains possible in with reference to their marginal costs, relation to a lowering of prices both as taking into account their demand curve, regards the various dyestuffs and as regards that undertakings decide whether and to each customer, by reason of the fact that what extent they will follow a price in the market is not transparent. On the crease. Therefore, even when the degree other hand, in the case of price increases of interdependence is very high, the un producers cannot do otherwise than let certainty in which an undertaking in their tactics be known and they are there creasing its prices is placed as to whether fore forced to adopt a uniform course of the others will follow does not automatically conduct, either because the other producers disappear. In order for there to be con decide to follow the one who takes the scious parallelism it is necessary for a initiative in introducing an increase, or certain number of factors to be present. because they prefer not to follow him and These include: a limited number of sellers, thus force him to withdraw that measure. high fixed costs, high mobility of demand, The defendant objects that although homogeneity and transparency of prices, parallel conduct alone does not amount ability to adapt capacity at short notice, to concertation, the parties concerned little elasticity of demand compared with need not, on the other hand, necessarily supply from all competing undertakings, have drawn up a common plan with a technical obstacles to announcements of view to adopting a given course of behav alterations to prices and customer re

iour. It is enough that they let each other sistence to frequent variations in prices. know beforehand what attitude they in Another condition should also be added; tended to adopt, so that each of them could it is that the market should be in a period regulate his conduct, safe in the knowledge of stagnation such that the interdependence

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

of the sellers is not affected by notable identical. The degree of similarity varis increases in demand. considerably: it runs from a fairly high In America both the textbook writers and degree of comparability in standard the case-law attribute a leading role to dyestuffs to the existence of near mono homogeneity of products in deciding if con polies, often protected by patents, for duct is consciously parallel. According to products having special characteristics. several writers, when the products are Furthermore, the competitive position of diversified the effects of changes in prices the various dyes and the extent to which are much slower and much less foreseeable. one can be substituted for another are Furthermore, even in the case of homo constantly undergoing rapid change be geneous products, where the prices actually cause of technical progress.

A notable charged usually differ from the prices feature of the market for the products in publicly quoted, conduct can no longer question is a low level of transparency automatically he absolutely parallel. mainly owing to the large number of The High Authority of the ECSC also products involved, the differences between adopted the principle that homogeneity of them and the variety of users (textile, products is not of itself a bar to supposing leather, paper, food, rubber and synthetic that a uniform increase in prices made by materials industries and manufacturers of several undertakings constitutes a con paints, ink, cosmetics and so on).

A further certed practice within the meaning of reason is the fact that technical services are Article 65(1) of the ECSC Treaty, as provided for purchasers, which differ in appears from the fines which it imposed degree according to the customer. It on certain steel works by a decision of 4 follows that there is no single, standard February 1969, which has not been con price for each dye since prices are negotiated tested by the parties concerned. individually with each customer, with con If the criteria elaborated by the textbook siderable differences between one pur writers concerning conscious parallelism chaser and another.

The result of this are applied to the dyestuffs industry it will practice is that the prices calculated for be seen that no such parallelism is possible. each product by each undertaking are not Competition between undertakings on the known, in most cases, to the other under dyestuffs market cannot in any way be takings, nor even amongst the purchasers considered as covering similar products; themselves, as ICI has itself agreed. There this is clear from Report No 100 of the fore changes in prices introduced by one National Board for Prices and Incomes on manufacturer are only imperfectly known the dyestuffs industry, dated 21 January on the market or only become known long 1969, annexed to the statement of defence, after the event. from the opinion of Professors Bombach As for the rate of expansion of the market, and Hill, annexed to the statement of which constitutes another test for deciding defence, from documents produced during whether conscious parallelism can exist, the preparatory inquiries by the under it appears that on the whole the dyestuffs takings ICI, Geigy and Sandoz, and from industry is expanding at a fast rate, ap various statistical data produced by the proximately corresponding to that of ex Commission (Tables annexed to the state pansion in the chemicals industry as a ment of defence). whole. The market for the products in question As for mobility of demand, according to covers about six thousand different pro Professors Bombach and Hill price com

ducts. Each of the undertakings concerned petition on the market in question is manufactures from 1500 to 3500 products particularly intense and purchasers are and these, at least in part, display various inclined to change supplier if more favour qualities, mixtures and physical forms. The able terms are offered to them. differences in strength, shade, fastness and This tendency seems to have increased solubility are such that when the products during the course of the last few years, of various manufacturers are compared according to the abovementioned Report it is rare to find two dyes that are perfectly of the National Board for Prices and

BAYER v COMMISSION

Incomes, at page 5. This mobility is drawn from the theory of oligopolies, one rendered easier by the fact that normally is forced to conclude that it is inconceivable purchasers only maintain low stocks and for undertakings on the dyestuffs market to only buy in small quantities. behave with conscious parallelism. Since purchasers carry low stocks, manu­ Since several of the products in question facturers must themselves maintain large are not interchangeable or only to a small stocks as this makes it easy for them to extent, an undertaking putting up its prices adapt themselves to changes in demand. cannot assume that its competitors will Because competition between manufac­ follow suit, at least for the products in turers is intense and undertakings are con­ question. The price increases at issue were stantly trying to increase their share of introduced indiscriminately for all pro­ the market, they find it necessary to build ducts and this cannot possibly be ex­ up their stocks in such a way as to be plained by the pressures of the market and able to take advantage of all chances of by the logic of the oligopoly situation. selling their products. It is relatively easy Moreover, the defendant argues that an for them to adapt themselves in the medium analysis of conditions on the dyestuffs term by changes in the production pro­ market shows that on that market, which gramme because the production plant can is characterized by a high rate of expansion be used for many different purposes. and rapid Technical progress, a general In view of the particular conditions on the alignment of price increases, announced market, the situation of manufacturers without prior concertation, would not be differs from one undertaking to another. possible for interchangeable products. The It follows that some undertakings have defendant refers to the example of the much more success than others in obtaining ACNA company, which for the most part the prices at which they aim to sell their manufactures standard types and which, products. after eight of the ten undertakings in The respective rates of expansion and the question had announced a general in­ fluctuations in these rates are different for crease in prices of pigments and had begun undertakings in the various Member States. to apply this increase as from 1 January Thus German manufacturers are benefiting 1965, did not fall in line with this increase in from the constant increase in the value of prices, so that thereafter the other under­ goods produced, according to information takings withdrew their increases. This supplied by Cassella and Hoechst, whereas, shows, in the Commission's view, that for example, the Italian company ACNA is even in the case of products towards which going through a crisis (declining work force sellers react in a sensitive way, interests are between 1964 and 1967, closure of one of so varied on the dyestuffs market that its factories). parallel action does not take place auto­ This disparity between undertakings means matically.

that there are important differences as In these circumstances it is inconceivable regards costs. that one undertaking would decide uni­ This necessarily results in differences in laterally on a large general increase in profits. The widest profit margins are prices without first consulting its com­ obtained with speciality products, so long petitors. Supposing that there were uni­ as they remain so. Profits vary in relation lateral, independent increases on the part to the level of prices for the different of certain undertakings, each of the other products on the market. The volume of undertakings would have been able, by sales has an influence on profits: thus for setting different prices and by taking ac­ example, ACNA can only begin to make ,a count of the position occupied on the profit on its production of special dyestuffs market by the various products being if the quantity produced reaches a volume manufactured by it, to attempt to obtain higher than that of present demand in the best results. In order to prevent com­ Italy. petitors from immediately withdrawing Taking into account these characteristics their increase, each undertaking would at of the market in dyestuffs and of the criteria the most have had to tell the purchasers of

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

totally interchangeable products that it was national nature of the market in dyestuffs. falling in line with this increase as regards The applicant also observes that as soon these products, but this would not have as any fluctuation in prices becomes known been necessary for all the other products on the market—which is not the case for since, because of the lack of transparency small alterations in prices asked of a of the market for those products, the given customer—each competitor has to various purchasers would not immediately determine its own pricing policy with have been able to react to the new prices. reference to the lowest known prices.

The The applicant in its reply, asserts that the events in Italy in 1965 confirm this inter defendant's argument based on the idea dependence of reaction of producers of that the price increases in question were dyestuffs, and they also show that any not compulsorily determined by market undertaking which takes the lead exposes forces is not relevant. The decisive question itself to the risk of not being followed by in this case is whether the uniform con its competitors. This is the reason why duct in question resulted from prior con for many years each producer drew back from the decision which had to taken. certation or whether it was solely the result of an independent decision taken by On an oligopolistic market each producer the applicant. In order that uniform, in has to determine his attitude with reference dependent and deliberate conduct of this to the presumed individual decisions of his sort be possible without prior concertation competitors, which is unlike the situation it is not necessary, in the applicant's view, of automatic reaction existing on a market that it be the result of compulsion.

Sup comprising a large number of producers, posing that the undertakings had had on which competition is atomized. The different interests, this alone would not term used in this context is 'conjectural mean that they would necessarily have elasticity', the undertakings' conjectures had to behave differently. Even if it is concerning the future conduct of their admitted that the applicant could have competitors being the only factor which conquered a larger proportion of the can upset the unstable balance existing on market by not raising its prices, it could this type of market. In order for this have obtained a better financial result by conjectural elasticity to exist certain condi tions set out by Shubik must be fulfilled. raising them, aligning its conduct on that of the other undertakings.

Individual in As to similarity of products, the applicant creases in relation to certain customers says that the defendant has not properly could only usefully be put into effect in understood the result of the economic the case of products of a particular techno analysis. It is argued that the defendant logical interest. In the applicant's case, mistakenly quotes various authors, such this condition was met only as regards as Shubik, Clark and Machlup, in asserting some ten products representing only 6 to that interdependence of reaction can only 7 % of its turnover in the dyestuffs sector. exist in respect of similar products.

Those But it considered it more in accordance same authors state that the decisive factor with its interests, particularly in order to concerning such interdependence is cross simplify its administrative work, to intro elasticity of demand. The extent of this duce a general price increase. It would be elasticity depends on the degree to which wrong to confuse, as the defendant does, the products are interchangeable, and it the apparent possibility of introducing certainly cannot be said that there is no individual price increases with the existence such interchangeability in the case of an of a compulsion to introduce such increases. oligopoly covering heterogeneous pro As for the possibility of introducing differ

ducts. According to Kantzenbach, where ent rates of increase on the various the oligopoly covers homogeneous pro markets, the applicant observes that such ducts, the potential intensity of competi diversified conduct is possible, but that it is tion is at its highest and, therefore, the highly probable that a uniform increase in real intensity of competition is generally prices introduced on a given market will at its lowest. On the other hand, it is in a extend beyond it because of the inter heterogeneous oligopoly that the real

BAYER v COMMISSION

intensity of competition is at its highest. prices of those products. Therefore the Basing itself on quotations from Kantzen­ total demand for dyestuffs is almost wholly bach and Shubik, and also on reference to devoid of elasticity, notwithstanding the Machlup and Schneider, the applicant fact that it follows the fluctuations in the comes to the conclusion that it is precisely demand for products manufactured by in the context of a heterogeneous oligopoly customers. Therefore any individual initia­ (covering different products which are tive by a producer can only have the nevertheless largely interchangeable), char­ result of altering the direction of demand. acterized by an interdependence of reac­ The result is a conjectural structure char­ tion, that the existence of conscious acterized by high interdependence. parallelism of conduct without prior con­ As for the other conditions defined by certation becomes particularly plausible. Shubik in particular, the applicant observes The degree to which dyestuffs are inter­ that they are indisputably fulfilled. changeable is variable. It is high for The defendant replies that it spoke of the

standard dyes which account for the greater pressures of an oligopoly only in order to part of the market, those products being deny that the conditions for such a situa homogeneous to a large extent. As tion were present on the dyestuffs market. Professors Bombach and Hill have pointed Such pressure exists when the under out, interchangeability is reduced by a takings, acting with reference to economic certain lack of transparency on the dye criteria, practise parallel pricing policies stuffs market.

However, the provision of by reason of the structure and conditions technical services draws the attention of proper to the market in which they operate. customers to the possibilities of substitu In order to explain the three price increases tion. Furthermore, each customer pos in question, it is not enough to accept the sesses a 'colour index' classifying dyestuffs theoretical possibility of parallel conduct by categories and informing the technician on the dyestuffs market if that corresponds of possible substitute products. If differ to irrational conduct in terms of economics. ences in prices are minimal the pressures The defendant argues that it was in the towards identical conduct on prices are interests of the undertakings and in ac nil, but if the differences in prices known cordance with their interests to adopt on the market become large enough to different methods, which is indeed what overcome the preference of customers for a they did in other cases, as has been shown product or for a given supplier, demand is by tables joined to the statement of de directed to the least expensive producer. fence. Since the applicant throws doubt on As to transparency of the market, the the content of these tables in its reply, the applicant observes that this phenomenon, defendant proposes to prove their ac which occurs when a price increase is curacy by producing the original docu announced, leads to a conjectural struc ments, and copies of the invoices on the ture, which in turn leads to the inter

basis of which these tables were established. dependence of the oligopoly. As regards the rate of expansion of the As for the rate of expansion of the market, market in dyestuffs, the question is not the applicant argues that the market in what is the share of each manufacturer of dyestuffs is a stagnant market considered the turnover of the chemicals industry or of from the point of view of the economy as the national product, but what is the a whole. For the ratio between the value possibility of increasing its turnover.

In a of dyestuffs produced and the total turn period of expansion several undertakings over of the chemicals industry remained could increase their turnover with the practically constant between 1958 and sales of their competitors being affected, 1968. The volume of the market in dyestuffs and this would have the effect of loosening depends exclusively on the demand for the interdependence of the undertakings. products manufactured by customers, and As to cross-elasticity of demand, the de the producer of dyestuffs has no influence fendant observes that it has already stressed on that demand because of the very small the importance of this factor in its defence. part played by the cost of dyestuffs in the It was precisely with this in mind that it

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

studied the conditions on the market. mon. The applicant quotes several Ameri The defendant opposes the assertions and can decisions in this context. When the conclusions concerning an oligopoly cover possibility cannot be excluded that volun ing heterogeneous products, arguing that tarily parallel conduct may be the result of the applicant's reasoning on this subject is pure business logic, without implying the contrary to all aspects of economic ex existence of a plan drawn up in common, perience and to the findings of textbook the American courts take the view that the writers and of the case-law. It is true that, evidence for a concerted practice is in as the applicant says, the real intensity of sufficient. competition reaches its maximum in a Furthermore, all the textbook writers on heterogeneous oligopoly. Interdependence the EEC rules of competition are un is sufficiently weak and the structure of animous, in requiring the existence of an the market is sufficiently broad to enable element of cooperation for the criterion of undertakings to take individual measures concerted practices to apply.

Some authors with a view to obtaining the best results even require proof of the existence of an for themselves. On the other hand intensity agreement or of a gentlemen's agreement. of competition is in reality weak when by The mere exchange of information be reason of a high degree of interdependence tween undertakings on the conduct which and similarity of interests undertakings they intend to adopt does not constitute voluntarily adopt parallel conduct in a cooperation and does not amount to the situation where there is an oligopoly for surrender of independence on the part of homogeneous products.

In these circum those undertakings. stances, the defendant does not see how The defendant argues that the concept of a the applicant can assume conscious parallel concerted practice is not equivalent to the conduct on a heterogeneous market American concept of 'concerted actions'. characterized by a high degree of intensity A concerted practice under Article 85(1) of real competition. After each increase, of the EEC Treaty is one of the constituent the normal forces of the market reasserted elements of the infringement listed in the themselves as before and prices were again provision, whereas 'concerted action' con

eroded. It is therefore obvious that parallel stitutes a particular case, elaborated by conduct and a high degree of effective American case-law, of 'conspiracy' as competition are mutually exclusive. forbidden by the Sherman Act, which presupposes that the undertakings con cerned are acting with a common will. 3. The concept of a concerted practice This notion of 'concerted action' has decided advantages as regards proof, and In its reply the applicant asserts that the it is not based on a substantive and clear defendant is now alleging, in contrast to definition of an 'agreement', that is to say, the concept of a concerted practice which the common will necessary for 'concerted it put forward throughout the administra

actions'. According to the defendant, in tive procedure, that the existence of a order for this agreement to exist for the concerted practice does not imply that purposes of 'concerted action' it is enough those concerned have established a com that there exists conscious and purposeful mon plan with a view to a given conduct cooperation between several undertakings, on the market but that it is enough that without its being necessary that there be a the undertakings should inform each common plan consisting in prior consulta other as to their future competitive con

tion. duct. The American case-law which the The citations from American case-law

defendant prays in aid of these two con­ supplied by the applicant allegedly prove clusions is diametrically opposed to its that the question whether a given business proposition: up until now no decision of action is taken pursuant to a common the American courts has condemned paral­ will is a question of evidence, and that a lel conduct when the latter was not ac­ uniform action constitutes a sufficient companied by a plan drawn up in com- indication of the existence of such a

BAYER v COMMISSION

common will when that conduct is not uniform way. This means that it has ad the necessary consequence of the structure duced sufficient proof that concerted prac of the market. On the concept of a con tices existed. Furthermore, it has shown certed practice, the defendant also refers to that the structure of the market for the an article by Tolksdorf. products in question was such that there is Even in an oligopoly, in so far as the sellers no explanation of this uniform conduct have differing interests, the fact of several other than that alleging concerted practices. decisions being taken independently by Moreover, the Commission has even the various undertakings does not neces pointed out a series of facts constituting sarily lead to similar conduct on the indications of concertation.

market. This is why, in an oligopoly also, where sellers are acting in parallel there is a presumption of fact as to the existence of 4. Complaints concerning the evidence put a concerted practice, unless the particular forward by the defendant structure of the market is such as to create economic constraints causing the various The applicant argues that in the light of undertakings to behave in a uniform way. the considerations that it has set out above, Such is the position in American case-law. the data which the Commission has taken As for Community law on competition, into account as evidence that prior con the factors constituting a cartel prohibited certation took place are to be explained under Article 85 are not based on the legal quite differently. concept of 'conspiracy'.

Nor is the con cept of an 'agreement' the right term to apply to cooperation between several (a) Concerning the increase of January 1964 undertakings by way of concerted practices. There is a concerted practice within the The applicant criticizes the evidence put meaning of that article every time the forward in the contested decision in conduct of several undertakings on the favour of the alleged concerted nature of market proceeds from a common will on the increases. the part of the interested parties, whether As regards the identity of the rates of that common will is the offspring of increase, the applicant asserts that this reciprocal action or arises because of the was parallel conduct constituting the action of a third party. There is a common logical consequence of the structure of the will not only when the undertakings come market. The applicant did no more than to an understanding as to their conduct on follow Ciba in order to make up for the the market but also when they deliberately erosion of its profit-margins.

The identity ensure that there can be no lack of knowl of the rate of increase across several edge about their future conduct by keeping national markets is to be explained by the each other informed and, in so doing, they consideration that the increase in the costs coordinate their conduct. The element of of production affects the producer as cooperation consists in the fact that, by regards his whole output and that there reason of the common will, each of the fore he attempts to recover it from his participants can rest assured that the others sales as a whole. The applicant asserts

will adopt either a uniform or a different that this uniformity of rate did not exist course of conduct according to an alloca from the moment when the producers tion of roles worked out in advance. informed their customers of the increases Therefore it is not necessary to show that which they had decided to introduce, but concertation has taken place or that a that it was the consequence of the play of common plan has been drawn up in order market forces. The differences between the to argue that there exists a concerted increases announced and the real results of practice for the purposes of Article 85. the price movement, and the fact that the In the present cases the Commission has products which the different producers proved that as regards prices the dyestuffs excluded from the increase were not iden manufacturers in question behaved in a tical prove that there was no concertation,

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

and that the uniformity of conduct which increase, which was introduced with im­ finally occurred on the markets resulted mediate effect by each of the undertakings, from the pressures of the market itself. for it was decided upon and announced As to the alleged coincidence in the timing long before the date on which it was to of the sending of the instructions to the have taken effect. Therefore the competing Italian subsidiaries, the applicant asserts producers did not need to act so.rapidly, that this complaint was not mentioned in and their parallel conduct was not simul­ the notice of objections. Therefore the taneous, as is shown by the fact that cus­ contested decision infringes Article 4 of tomers were informed on widely differing Regulation No 99/63 on this point. dates.

Alternatively, the applicant stresses that The applicant also argues that the de­ the aligning of the instructions which it fendant does not raise any new facts gave to its Italian subsidiary on the points pointing towards the conclusion that con­ of detail relating to the increase introduced certation existed as regards the increase by Ciba, which occurred following the of 1 January 1965. latter's announcement of 7 January 1964 that it intended to increase its prices, only (c) Concerning the increase of October 1967 took place later, for the information which the applicant received on 8 and 9 January The applicant asserts as regards this also from its Italian subsidiary about Ciba's that the only argument put forward by decision was neither complete nor pertinent. the defendant as evidence of the existence As to the alleged similarity of content of of prior concertation between those con­ the orders to increase prices, the applicant cerned is that of their parallel conduct. The asserts that the text of these orders has assertion that they had decided, in the con­ never been communicated to it and that text of their concertation, to introduce an therefore it has not been in a position to increase on the Italian market in Autumn submit its observations on this point in an 1967 and that they did not do so because appropriate manner. Furthermore, the the refusal of ACNA prevented them from orders which it sent to Italy on 9 January, putting it into effect is an assertion found once it had become aware of the content of for the first time in the decision. Therefore Ciba's circular and of the points of detail it cannot validly be put forward in justifica­ in the measure taken by that undertaking, tion of that decision. went beyond that circular. The applicant The meetings between the producers for the also asserts that it never declared that exchange of information, in particular those concerned copied from each other those at Basel and London, cannot con­ their instructions destined for Italy, as stitute evidence as to the existence of prior the defendant alleges in the contested concertation. The Commission cannot decision. validly rely on this fact because the notice The applicant concludes that the evidence of objections does no more than assert upon which the Commission has relied as that the increase was decided upon by all proving the existence of concertation is the producers at a meeting held at Basel proof of nothing but the existence of in August 1967 upon Geigy's initiative, conscious parallelism. without mentioning the existence of minutes, or of their contents, or of the decision of the Bundeskartellamt which (b) Concerning the increase of January asserts that Geigy went so far as to speak 1965 of an increase of 8% with effect from 16 October 1967. Thus the applicant had no The applicant, having pointed out that as opportunity to evaluate the evidence ap­ regards this increase the defendant does parently in the defendant's possession, and no more than allege in the contested thus the rights of the defence were in­ decision that those concerned engaged in fringed. parallel conduct, asserts that this increase The applicant asserts that it did not take was fundamentally different from the 1964 its decision to increase its sales prices by

BAYER v COMMISSION

8% on 16 October 1967, but only after frequently use certain fanciful or trade Francolor, which itself aligned its own names for the dyes they produce, as is position on that of Geigy, announced an confirmed by an extract from the 'colour identical price increase on the market, index'. In fact the 1964 price increase since this fact seemed to announce a covered the same categories of dyes, in so general price movement. far as the undertakings concerned manu­ In short, the applicant asserts that the factured them. Should the Court consider decision nowhere states why any given this matter important, the defendant sub­ instance of uniformity could not be a mits that the Court should allow it to put consequence of the oligopolistic structure in an expert's report as evidence. of the market. The decision merely asserts As regards the detailed rules accompanying at several places that that in 'unbelievable', the orders to increase prices sent out by or that it is 'inexplicable' or that there the various producers, the defendant exists 'no doubt that such was not the case'. observes that 13 of the 14 orders require Justice requires that matters such as these the increase to be put into effect at once; cannot condemn those concerned. cancellation of pending sales is found in As against the arguments put forward and 12 of the 14 letters; the prohibition on the set out above concerning the 1964 price issue of antedated bills is found in 8 of the increase, the defendant produces the text of 14 letters, this number being explained by the instructions to increase prices sent in the fact that this prohibition was already 1964 to Italy and Belgium by the under­ implicit in the order to make an immediate takings concerned by the contested and general increase. decision. It stresses the fact that certain Finally, according to the defendant, it is passages are the same almost word for necessary to take into account the fact word. As for the increases of 1965 and that in many cases the letters in question 1967, the defendant states that the under­ merely confirmed instructions already given takings were careful to avoid obvious by telephone. similarities;

The applicant maintains that examination of these documents supplied by the 5. Complaints concerning the fine defendant shows that the alleged similarity of content of the producers' orders do not The applicant asserts that the defendant correspond to the reality. The applicant should have taken into account the fine invites the Court to refer to a synopsis of imposed on it by the Bundeskartellamt for the texts of the different written orders the same matter by its decision of 28 which it sent out. November 1967, even though this decision As regards, in particular, the detailed rules was annulled by the Kammergericht. It is accompanying the increase, the applicant argued that this obligation is clear from observes that since the increase carried out the judgment of the Court in Case 14/68. by Ciba on 7 January 1964 in Italy took The defendant objects that those concerned effect immediately, the detailed rules appealed against the abovementioned intended to bring about this immediate decision of the Bundeskartellamt and that entry into force were also laid down. For a later the Kammergericht Berlin, by its businessman it is obvious, in the applicant's decision of 28 August 1969, annulled the view, that such detailed rules must be taken said decision of the Bundeskartellamt. into account in the case of an immediate Since the decision of the Bundeskartellamt increase in prices. was not definitive at the time when the The defendant asserts that the applicant is contested decision was adopted, there was wrong in attempting to deny that the price no danger of concurrent penalties. increases covered substantially the same dyestuffs by resorting to a comparison between the orders to increase prices sent IV — Procedure by the various undertakings. This com­ parison is not conclusive because producers The procedure took the following course.

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

By order of 11 December 1969 the Court 2. The parties may, by agreement between decided that the defendant should lodge themselves, propose the name of an separate statements of defence without expert to the Court before 1 October reference to the other cases pending on the 1970.

subject of dyestuffs. By order of the same date the Court By order of 8 July 1970, the Court, having regard to the report of the Judge-Rappor­ joined Cases 48/69, 49/69, 51/69, 52/69, teur and the views of the Advocate- 53/69, 54/69, 55/69, 56/69 and 57/69 for the purposes of the expert's report. General, ordered as follows: By order dated 13 November 1970 the Court, having regard to the proposal 1. An expert's report shall be obtained in made by common agreement between the respect of the following questions: parties on the names of two experts, instructed Horst Albach, Professor of Business Management at the University (a) Taking into account the characteris­ of Bonn, and Wilhelm Norbert Kloten, tics of the dyestuffs market in the European Economic Community, Professor of Political Economy at the especially during the period 1964 to University of Tübingen, to prepare the 1967, would it have been a practical report jointly. possibility, according to normal The experts' joint report was lodged at the commercial criteria, for a producer Court Registry on 23 April 1971. The acting independently who wished to experts summarized the result of their increase his prices to do so other­ report in the following terms: wise than by a general uniform and — Question (a) should be answered in the public increase, by fixing different affirmative; according to normal com­ rates for each product in his mercial criteria a producer of dyestuffs individual relationships with each acting independently could in principle customer? have increased his prices on a variable basis in relation to each customer and (b) For a producer acting indepen­ each product. dently, what advantages and dis­ advantages result from effecting a — An affirmative answer may also be general and linear increase in prices, given to the question whether it would as compared with an increase have been a practical possibility for such differing in respect of each cus­ a producer to increase his prices on a tomer, product and market? The variable basis in relation to each cus­ answer to this question is to be tomer and product, subject to the given both on the hypothesis that following proviso: the average increase the producer is taking the initiative in prices that a producer acting in­ in making an increase and on the dependently could have achieved by hypothesis that the producer is means of a policy of differentiated faced with a general and uniform prices in a given field would probably increase announced by a competitor. have been lower than the average in­ crease in prices achieved by a general (c) Taking into account in particular and uniform price increase. the degree of transparency of the market, are dyestuffs other than — A general and linear increase in prices speciality dyes practically inter­ involves opportunities and risks both changeable and, if so, to what extent? for the producer who takes the initiative What is the approximate propor­ in putting prices up and for the pro­ tion of speciality dyes compared ducer of dyestuffs who has to fall in with the total production of dyes with a general and uniform increase for each of the undertakings con­ announced by a competitor. Both as cerned? regards the producer who determines

BAYER v COMMISSION

the price and as regards those who the results of the study show that the follow him, the conclusion to be drawn distinction is of but little use in assessing is that during the period in question the facts envisaged. the advantages to be obtained from a general and uniform increase in prices Observations on the experts' report were were greater than the disadvantages. lodged at the Court Registry on 3 July 1971 by the applicant and on 21 June 1971 — The appropriate answer to Question (c) by the defendant. is that the degree of interchangeability On 28 September 1971 the experts named of dyestuffs varies: it ranges from pro­ by the Court took the oath in accordance ducts which are perfectly interchange­ with Article 49(6) of the Rules of Proce­ able to products for which to all intents dure.

and purposes there is no substitute. If, The parties presented oral argument at the for the purposes of the question asked, hearings on 28, 29 and 30 September 1971 speciality dyestuffs are those which are and on 2 May 1972. not interchangeable for practical pur­ During the course of the procedure Mr poses, it can be said that the proportion Advocate-General Mayras replaced Mr that they represent of the total produc­ Advocate-General Dutheillet de Lamothe, tion of dyestuffs in each of the under­ deceased. He delivered his opinion at the takings concerned is very low. However, hearing on 2 May 1972.

Grounds of judgment

1 It is common ground that from January 1964 to October 1967 three general and uniform increases in the prices of dyestuffs took place in the Community.

Between 7 and 20 January 1964, a uniform increase of 15% in the prices of most dyes based on aniline, with the exception of certain categories, took place in Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg and in certain third countries.

On 1 January 1965 an identical increase took place in Germany.

On the same day almost all producers in all the countries of the Common Market except France introduced a uniform increase of 10% on the prices of dyes and pigments excluded from the increase of 1964.

Since the ACNA undertaking did not take part in the increase of 1965 on the Italian market, the other undertakings did not maintain the announced increase of their prices on that market.

Towards mid-October 1967, an increase for all dyes was introduced, except in Italy, by almost all producers, amounting to 8% in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, and 12% in France.

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

2 By a decision of 31 May 1967 the Commission commenced proceedings under Article 3 of Regulation No 17/62 on its own initiative concerning the increases for presumed infringement of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty against seventeen producers of dyestuffs established within and outside the Common Market, and against numerous subsidiaries and representatives of those undertakings.

By a decision of 24 July 1969, the Commission found that the increases were the result of concerted practices, which infringed Article 85(1) of the Treaty, between the undertakings

— Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik AG (BASF), Ludwigshafen, — Cassella Farbwerke Mainkur AG, Frankfurt am Main, — Farbenfabriken Bayer AG, Leverkusen, — Farbwerke Hoechst AG, Frankfurt am Main, — Société Française des Matières Colorantes SA, Paris, — Azienda Colori Nazionali Affini S.p.A. (ACNA), Milan, — Ciba SA, Basel, — J. R. Geigy SA, Basel, — Sandoz SA, Basel, and — Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., (ICI), Manchester

It therefore imposed a fine of 50 000 u.a. on each of these undertakings, with the exception of ACNA, for which the fine was fixed at 40 000 u.a.

3 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 3 October 1969 Farbenfabriken Bayer AG has brought an application against that decision.

Submissions relating to procedure and to form

The submissions concerning the administrative procedure

(a) The complaint relating to the commencement of the administrative procedure

4 The applicant complains that the defendant took a decision imposing a fine, on the basis of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17/62, although it had only commenced a procedure with a view to a finding of an infringement on the basis of Article 3 of this regulation.

Furthermore, it is argued, the defendant could not rely as against the applicant on the text of the decision to commence the procedure because it failed to sent it a true copy.

BAYER v COMMISSION

5 It is the notice of objections alone and not the decision to commence proceedings which is the measure stating the final attitude of the Commission concerning undertakings against which proceedings for infringement of the rules on com­ petition have been commenced.

That notice, which was sent to the applicant, expressly stated that fines might be imposed.

6 This submission is therefore unfounded.

(b) The complaint relating to a failure to inform the applicant of essential elements offact

7 The applicant complains that during the administrative procedure the defendant did not inform it of all the elements of fact relied on in support of the conclusions contained in the notice of objections.

It is argued that this failure to provide information, despite the repeated requests of the applicant, prevented it from defending itself during the course of the administrative procedure.

8 During that procedure, the undertakings concerned must be informed of the essen­ tial elements of fact on which the Commission bases its objections against them.

However, it is not necessary for the contents of the file to be made available in their entirety.

The Commission's notice of objections, sent to the applicant by letter of 11 December 1967, sets out all the facts necessary for determining the objections taken into consideration.

9 This submission is therefore unfounded.

(c) The complaint relating to a continuation of inquiries following notification of the objections

10 The applicant asserts that the Commission, in continuing its inquiries following communication of the notice of objections, conducted itself in a manner incom­ patible with the very nature of that notice, which must constitute the final measure of inquiry.

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

It is asserted that these inquiries led the Commission, in connexion with the con­ tested decision, to amplify and make considerable alterations to the statement of the facts already sent to the applicant, particularly as regards the evidence for the existence of a concerted practice on the occasion of the 1967 increases.

11 The Commission has the right and where appropriate the duty to institute fresh inquiries during the administrative procedure if it appears from the course of that procedure that additional investigations are necessary.

Such inquiries would render it necessary to send an additional statement of objections to the undertakings concerned only if the result of the investigations led the Commission to take new facts into account against the undertakings or to alter materially the evidence for the contested infringements.

The rights of the defence of the undertakings are not infringed by such inquiries if the decision terminating the administrative procedure does not hold against the undertakings concerned any facts other than those set out in the notice of objec­ tions.

Additional evidence for the facts taken into consideration and amendments con­

cerning the precise course of the facts included in the contested decision in the light of information furnished by the undertakings concerned to the Commission during the course of the administrative procedure does not in any way constitute an infringement of the rights of the defence.

12 This submission is therefore unfounded.

(d) The complaint concerning the hearing of the undertakings concerned

13 The applicant argues that the period of two weeks given to it for the purpose of appearing before the Commission was not long enough to enable it to prepare an adequate defence.

14 Taking into account the time which had elapsed following communication of the notice of objections, it does not appear that the abovementioned period of notice was of a nature such as to jeopardize the defence of the undertakings concerned.

Furthermore, there was nothing to prevent the applicant from setting out its point of view in writing at a later date and submitting it to the Commission.

15 This submission is therefore unfounded.

BAYER v COMMISSION

(e) The complaint relating to the minutes of the hearing of the undertakings concerned

16 The applicant argues that the hearing of 10 December 1968 was irregular because the contested decision was taken six weeks before the expiry of the period which the Commission had allowed it for the submission of observations on the draft minutes of the hearing, such that Article 9(4) of Regulation No 99/63 was in­ fringed.

It is also alleged that the minutes do not contain an accurate record of the state­ ment's made by the applicant's counsel.

17 Article 9(4) of Regulation No 99/63 of the Commission provides that the essential content of the statements made by each person heard shall be recorded in minutes which shall be read and approved by him.

The purpose of this provision is to assure the persons heard that the minutes con­ tain a true record of the substance of what they have said.

Notwithstanding the failure to observe the time-limit of which the applicant com­ plains, this irregularity could only affect the legality of the decision if the record of statements made at the hearing were inaccurate in a manner such as to give rise to misunderstandings on essential points.

Such is not the case as regards the statements of the applicant's counsel, the record of which in the minutes is alleged to be inaccurate.

18 This submission is therefore unfounded.

The submission as to the limitation period

19 The applicant argues that the contested decision is contrary to the Treaty and to the rules relating to its application because the Commission, in commencing on 31 May 1967 proceedings concerning the price increases of 1964 and of 1965, exceeded any reasonable limitation period.

20 The provisions governing the Commission's power to impose fines for infringement of the rules on competition do not lay down any period of limitation.

In order to fulfil their function limitation periods must be fixed in advance.

The fixing of their duration and the detailed rules for their application come within the powers of the Community legislature.

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

Although, in the absence of any provisions on this matter, the fundamental require­ ment of legal certainty has the effect of preventing the Commission from in­ definitely delaying the exercise of its power to impose fines, its conduct in the present case cannot be regarded as constituting a bar to the exercise of that power as regards participation in the concerted practices of 1964 and 1965.

21 Therefore the submission is unfounded.

Substantive submissions as to the existence of concerted practices

Arguments of the parties

22 The applicant complains that the Commission has not proved the existence of concerted practices within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty in relation to any of the three increases mentioned in the contested decision.

23 That decision states that prima facie evidence that the increases of 1964, 1965 and 1967 took place as the result of concerted action is to be found in the facts that the rates introduced for each increase by the different producers in each country were the same, that with very rare exceptions the same dyestuffs were involved, and that the increases were put into effect over only a very short period, if not actually on the same date.

It is contended that these increases cannot be explained simply by the oligopolistic character of the structure of the market.

It is said to be unrealistic to suppose that without previous concertation the prin­ cipal producers supplying the Common Market could have increased their prices on several occasions by identical percentages at practically the same moment for one and the same important range of products including speciality products for which there are few, if any, substitutes, and that they should have done so in a number of countries where conditions on the dyestuffs market are different.

The Commission has argued before the Court that the interested parties need not necessarily have drawn up a common plan with a view to adopting a certain course of behaviour for it to be said that there has been concertation.

It is argued that it is enough that they should previously have informed each other of the attitude which they intended to adopt so that each could regulate his con­ duct safe in the knowledge that his competitors would act in the same way.

24 The applicant argues that the contested decision is based on an inadequate analysis of the market in the products in question and on an erroneous understanding of the concept of a concerted practice, which is wrongly identified by the decision

BAYER v COMMISSION

with the conscious parallelism of members of an oligopoly, whereas such conduct is due to independent decisions adopted by each undertaking, determined by objective business needs, and in particular by the need to increase the unsatis­ factorily low rate of profit on the production of dyestuffs.

It is argued that in fact the prices of the products in question displayed a constant

tendency to fall because of lively competition between producers which is typical of the market in those products, not only as regards the quality of the products and technical assistance to customers, but also as regards prices, particularly the large reductions granted individually to the principal purchasers.

It is also argued that the large number of dyestuffs produced by each undertaking makes it impossible in practice to raise prices product by product.

A further argument is that different price increases for interchangeable products either could not produce economically significant results because of the limited level of stocks and of the time necessary for adapting plant to appreciably in­ creased demand, or would lead to a ruinous price war. Furthermore, it is said that dyestuffs for which there are no substitutes form only a small part of the producers' turnover.

Taking these market characteristics into account and in view of the widespread and continuous erosion of prices, each member of the oligopoly who decided to increase his prices could, it is argued, reasonably expect to be followed by his competitors, who had the same problems regarding profits.

Finally, it is argued, if it were possible to apply different rates of increase on different markets, it is nevertheless probable that a uniform price increase in­ troduced on a given market would have repercussions outside it because of the international character of the dyestuffsmarket.

The concept of a concerted practice

25 Article 85 draws a distinction between the concept of 'concerted practices' and that of 'agreements between undertakings' or of 'decisions by associations of undertakings'; the object is to bring within the prohibition of that article a form of coordination between undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition.

By its very nature, then, a concerted practice does not have all the elements of a contract but may inter alia arise out of coordination which becomes apparent from the behaviour of the participants.

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

Although parallel behaviour may not by itself be identified with a concerted prac­ tice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a practice if it leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market, having regard to the nature of the products, the size and number of the undertakings and the volume of the said market.

This is especially the case if the parallel conduct is such as to enable the persons concerned to attempt to stabilize prices at a level different from that to which competition would have led, and to consolidate established positions to the detriment of effective freedom of movement of the products in the Common Market and of the freedom of consumers to choose their suppliers.

26 Therefore the question whether there was a concerted action in this case can only be correctly determined if the evidence upon which the contested decision is based is considered, not in isolation, but as a whole, account being taken of the specific features of the market in the products in question.

The characteristic features of the market in dyestuffs

27 The market in dyestuffs is characterized by the fact that 80% of the market is supplied by about ten producers, very large ones in the main, which often manu­ facture these products together with other chemical products or pharmaceutical specialities.

The production patterns and therefore the cost structures of these manufacturers are very different and this makes it difficult to ascertain competing manufacturers' costs.

The total number of dyestuffs is very high, each undertaking producing more than a thousand.

The average extent to which these products can be replaced by others is considered relatively good for standards dyes, but it can be very low or even non-existent for speciality dyes.

As regards speciality products, the market tends in certain cases towards an oligopolistic situation.

Since the price of dyestuffs forms a relatively small part of the price of the final product of the user undertaking, there is little elasticity of demand for dyestuffs on the market as a whole and this encourages price increases in the short term.

Another factor is that the total demand for dyestuffs is constantly increasing, and this tends to induce producers to adopt a policy enabling them to take ad­ vantage of this increase.

BAYER v COMMISSION

28 In the territory of the Community, the market in dyestuffs in fact consists of five separate national markets with different price levels which cannot be explained by differences in costs and charges affecting producers in those countries.

Thus the establishment of the Common Market would not appear to have had any effect on this situation, since the differences between national price levels have scarcely decreased.

On the contrary, it is clear that each of the national markets has the characteristics of an oligopoly and that in most of them price levels are established under the influence of a 'price-leader', who in some cases is the largest producer in the country concerned, and in other cases is a producer in another Member State or a third State, acting through a subsidiary.

According to the experts this dividing-up of the market is due to the need to supply local technical assistance to users and to ensure immediate delivery, generally in small quantities, since, apart from exceptional cases, producers supply their sub­ sidiaries established in the different Member States and maintain a network of

agents and depots to ensure that user undertakings receive specific assistance and supplies.

It appears from the data produced during the course of the proceedings that even in cases where a producer establishes direct contact with an important user in another Member State, prices are usually fixed in relation to the place where the user is established and tend to follow the level of prices on the national market.

Although the foremost reason why producers have acted in this way is in order to adapt themselves to the special features of the market in dyestuffs and to the needs of their customers, the fact remains that the dividing-up of the market which results tends, by fragmenting the effects of competition, to isolate users in their national market, and to prevent a general confrontation between producers throughout the Common Market.

It is in this context, which is peculiar to the way in which the dyestuffs market works, that the facts of the case should be considered.

The increases of 1964, 1965 and 1967

29 The increases of 1964, 1965 and 1967 covered by the contested decision are inter­ connected.

The increase of 15 % in the prices of most aniline dyes in Germany on 1 January 1965 was in reality nothing more than the extension to another national market of the increase applied in January 1964 in Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

The increase in the prices of certain dyes and pigments introduced on 1 January 1965 in all the Member States, except France, applied to all the products which had been excluded from the first increase.

The reason why the price increase of 8% introduced in the autumn of 1967 was raised to 12% for France was that there was a wish to make up for the increases of 1964 and 1965 in which that market had not taken part because of the price control system.

Therefore the three increases cannot be isolated one from another, even though they did not take place under identical conditions.

30 In 1964 all the undertakings in question announced their increases and immediately put them into effect, the initiative coming from Ciba-Italy which, on 7 January 1964, following instructions from Ciba-Switzerland, announced and immediately introduced an increase of 15 %. This initiative was followed by the other producers on the Italian market within two or three days.

On 9 January ICI-Holland took the initiative in introducing the same increase in the Netherlands, whilst on the same day Bayer took the same initiative on the Belgo- Luxembourg market.

With minor differences, particularly between the price increases by the German undertakings on the one hand and the Swiss and United Kingdom undertakings on the other, these increases concerned the same range of products for the various producers and markets, namely, most aniline dyes other than pigments, food colourings and cosmetics.

31 As regards the increase of 1965 certain undertakings announced in advance price increases amounting, for the German market, to an increase of 15 % for products whose prices had already been similarly increased on the other markets, and to 10% for products whose prices had not yet been increased. These announcements were spread over the period between 14 October and 28 December 1964.

The first announcement was made by BASF, on 14 October 1964, followed by an announcement by Bayer on 30 October and by Cassella on 5 November.

These increases were simultaneously applied on 1 January 1965 on all the markets except for the French market because of the price freeze in that State, and the Italian market where, as a result of the refusal by the principal Italian producer, ACNA, to increase its prices on the said market, the other producers also decided not to increase theirs.

ACNA also refrained from putting its prices up by 10% on the German market.

BAYER v COMMISSION

Otherwise the increase was general, was simultaneously introduced by all the producers mentioned in the contested decision and was applied without any differences concerning the range of products.

32 As regards the increase of 1967, during a meeting held at Basel on 19 August 1967, which was attended by all the producers mentioned in the contested decision except ACNA, the Geigy undertaking announced its intention to increase its selling prices by 8 % with effect from 16 October 1967.

On that same occasion the representatives of Bayer and Francolor stated that their undertakings were also considering an increase.

From mid-September all the undertakings mentioned in the contested decision announced a price increase of 8%, raised to 12% for France, to take effect on 16 October in all the countries except Italy, where ACNA again refused to in­ crease its prices, although it was willing to follow the movement in prices on two other markets, albeit on dates other than 16 Ocrober.

33 Viewed as a whole, the three consecutive increases reveal progressive cooperation between the undertakings concerned.

In fact, after the experience of 1964, when the announcement of the increases and their application coincided, although with minor differences as regards the range of products affected, the increases of 1965 and 1967 indicate a different mode of operation. Here, the undertakings taking the initiative, BASF and Geigy re­ spectively, announced their intentions of making an increase some time in advance, which allowed the undertakings to observe each other's reactions on the different markets, and to adapt themselves accordingly.

By means of these advance announcements the various undertakings eliminated all uncertainty between them as to their future conduct and, in doing so, also eliminated a large part of the risk usually inherent in any independent change of conduct on one or several markets.

This was all the more the case since these announcements, which led to the fixing of general and equal increases in prices for the markets in dyestuffs, rendered the market transparent as regards the percentage rates of increase.

Therefore, by the way in which they acted, the undertakings in question temporarily eliminated with respect to prices some of the preconditions for competition on the market which stood in the way of the achievement of parallel uniformity of conduct.

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

34 The fact that this conduct was not spontaneous is corroborated by an examination of other aspects of the market.

In fact, from the number of producers concerned it is not possible to say that the European market in dyestuffs is, in the strict sense, an oligopoly in which price competition could no longer play a substantial role.

These producers are sufficiently powerful and numerous to create a considerable risk that in times of rising prices some of them might not follow the general movement but might instead try to increase their share of the market by behaving in an individual way.

Furthermore, the dividing-up of the Common Market into five national markets with different price levels and structures makes it improbable that a spontaneous and equal price increase would occur on all the national markets.

Although a general, spontaneous increase on each of the national markets is just conceivable, these increases might be expected to differ according to the particular characteristics of the different national markets.

Therefore, although parallel conduct in respect of prices may well have been an attractive and risk-free objective for the undertakings concerned, it is hardly conceivable that the same action could be taken spontaneously at the same time, on the same national markets and for the same range of products.

35 Nor is it any more plausible that the increases of January 1964, introduced on the Italian market and copied on the Netherlands and Belgo-Luxembourg markets, which have little in common with each other either as regards the level of prices or the pattern of competition, could have been brought into effect within a period of two to three days without prior concertation.

As regards the increases of 1965 and 1967 concertation took place openly, since all the announcements of the intention to increase prices with effect from a certain date and for a certain range of products made it possible for producers to decide on their conduct regarding the special cases of France and Italy.

In proceeding in this way, the undertakings mutually eliminated in advance any uncertainties concerning their reciprocal behaviour on the different markets and thereby also eliminated a large part of the risk inherent in any independent change of conduct on those markets.

The general and uniform increase on those different markets can only be explained by a common intention of the part of those undertakings, first, to adjust the level

BAYER v COMMISSION

of prices and the situation resulting from competition in the form of discounts, and secondly, to avoid the risk, which is inherent in any price increase, of changing the conditions of competition.

The fact that the price increases announced were not introduced in Italy and that ACNA only partially adopted the 1967 increase in other markets, far from under­ mining this conclusion, tends to confirm it.

36 The function of price competition is to keep prices down to the lowest possible level and to encourage the movement of goods between the Member States, thereby permitting the most efficient possible distribution of activities in the matter of productivity and the capacity of undertakings to adapt themselves to change.

Differences in rates encourage the pursuit of one of the basic objectives of the Treaty, namely the interpenetration of national markets and, as a result, direct access by consumers to the sources of production of the whole Community.

By reason of the limited elasticity of the market in dyestuffs, resulting from factors such as the lack of transparency with regard to prices, the interdependence of the different dyestuffs of each producer for the purpose of building up the range of products used by each consumer, the relatively low proportion of the cost of the final product of the user undertaking represented by the prices of these products, the fact that it is useful for users to have a local supplier and the influence of transport costs, the need to avoid any action which might artificially reduce the opportunities for interpenetration of the various national markets at the con­ sumer level becomes particularly important on the market in the products in question.

Although every producer is free to change his prices, taking into account in so doing the present or foreseeable conduct of his competitors, nevertheless it is contrary to the rules on competition contained in the Treaty for a producer to cooperate with his competitors, in any way whatsoever, in order to determine a coordinated course of action relating to a price increase and to ensure its success by prior elimination of all uncertainty as to each other's conduct regarding the essential elements of that action, such as the amount, subject-matter, date and place of the increases.

In these circumstances and taking into account the nature of the market in the products in question, the conduct of the applicant, in conjunction with other undertakings against which proceedings have been taken, was designed to replace the risks of competition and the hazards of competitors' spontaneous reactions by cooperation constituting a concerted practice prohobited by Article 85(1) of the Treaty.

JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 51/69

The effect of the concerted practice on trade between Member States

37 The applicant argues that the uniform price increases were not capable of affecting trade between Member States because notwithstanding the noticeable differences existing between prices charged in the different States consumers have always pre­ ferred to make their purchases of dyestuffs in their own country.

38 However, it appears from what has already been said that the concerted practices, by seeking to keep the market in a fragmented state, were liable to affect the cir­ cumstances in which trade in the products in question takes place between the Member States.

The parties who put these practices into effect sought, on the occasion of each price increase, to reduce to a minimum the risks of changing the conditions of competition.

The fact that the increases were uniform and simultaneous has in particular served to maintain the status quo, ensuring that the undertakings would not lose custom, and has thus helped to keep the traditional national markets in those goods 'cemented' to the detriment of any real freedom of movement of the products in question in the Common Market.

39 Therefore this submission is unfounded.

The fine

40 The applicant claims that the contested decision did not take into account the fines which had been imposed upon it by the Bundeskartellamt by its decision of 28 November 1967.

41 Since the decision of the Bundeskartellamt has been annulled, this submission has become devoid of object.

Therefore it is not necessary to examine the substance of it.

42 In view of the frequency and extent of the applicant's participation in the pro­ hibited practices, and taking into account the consequences thereof in relation to the creation of a common market in the products in question, the amount of the fine is appropriate to the gravity of the infringement of the Community rules on competition.

BAYER v COMMISSION

Costs

43 Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure the unsuccessful party shall be ordered to pay the costs.

The applicant has failed in its submissions.

Therefore it must be ordered to bear the costs.

On those grounds,

Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General; Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, especially Articles 85 and 173; Having regard to Regulation No 17/62 of the Council of 6 February 1962; Having regard to Regulation No 99/63 of the Commission of 25 July 1963; Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the Euro­ pean Communities; Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities,

THE COURT

hereby:

1. Dismisses the application;

2. Orders the applicant to bear the costs.

Lecourt Mertens de Wilmars Kutscher Donner Trabucchi Monaco Pescatore

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 14 July 1972.

A. Van Houtte R. Lecourt

Registrar President

OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL MAYRAS

(Se Case 48/69, p. 000)

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