C-57/69
ECLI:EU:C:1972:78
- Súd
- Súdny dvor Európskej únie
- IČS
- 61969CJ0057
- Zdroj
- eur-lex.europa.eu ↗
ACNA v COMMISSION
In Case 57/69
AZIENDA COLORI NAZIONALI—ACNA S .p.A., having its registered office at 1 and 2 Largo Donegani, Milan, in the person of its Managing Director and authorized representative, Gino Sferza, assisted and represented by E. Pizzi and C. Ribolzi, of the Milan Bar, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of P. Elvinger, Advocate, 84 Grand'rue, applicant,
v
Commission of the European Communities, represented by its Legal Advisers, J. Thiesing, G. Marchesini and J. Griesmar, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of its Legal Adviser E. Reuter, 4 boulevard Royal, defendant,
Application for the annulment, or alternatively the reversal, of the decision of the Commission of the European Communities of 24 July 1969 whereby the applicant was ordered to pay a fine of 40 000 u.a. for infringement of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty,
THE COURT
composed of: R. Lecourt, President, J. Mertens de Wilmars and H. Kutscher, Presidents of Chambers, A. M. Donner, A. Trabucchi (Rapporteur), R. Monaco and P. Pescatore, Judges,
Advocate-General: H. Mayras Registrar: A. Van Houtte
gives the following
JUDGMENT
Issues of fact and of law
I — Statement of facts crease introduced by that undertaking at the beginning of the year on the Italian, The facts may be summarized as follows: Belgian and Netherlands markets for By letter of 19 August 1964, the Commis dyestuffs intended for use in the tanning sion informed the ACNA undertaking that industry. Referring to the analogous con it had received information of a price in duct which other dyestuffs manufacturers
JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 57/69
within the EEC had also adopted, the Com opinion, ACNA had also participated. mission, in reliance on Article 11 of This letter contained a statement of the Regulation No 17 of the Council, re essential facts on which the Commission quested the undertaking in question to based its opinion. It accused ACNA of supply certain information. The letter made having taken part with other undertakings it clear that this request was made 'as part in a concerted practice for the purpose of of an examination of the question whether fixing the prices of dyestuffs based on it is appropriate to commence proceedings aniline, which, it said, led to increases in under Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome'. prices in 1964, in 1965 and in 1967. The Commission asked the undertaking ACNA replied to the Commission by to state inter alia whether the increase of letter of 28 February 1968, refuting the 15% which it had introduced in Italy, objections set out against it. Belgium and the Netherlands on dyestuffs At the beginning of 1968, officials of the intended for use in the tanning industry Commission visited ACNA's agents in was to be explained by the existence of an Belgium, France and the Netherlands, and, agreement, a decision, or a concerted on 14 February of that year, its officials practice between the different producers. again visited the registered office of ACNA In addition, the Commission asked the in Milan. By decision of 24 July 1969, the undertaking to state the reasons why it Commission, whilst accepting the fact did not introduce a similar increase for the that ACNA did not increase its prices in dyestuffs sold in France and Germany. Italy in 1965, that it was late in introducing By letter of 16 September 1964, ACNA the price increases of 1967 in Belgium, and replied to the Commission pointing out furthermore that its conduct had prevented amongst other matters that the price the introduction on the Italian market of increases on dyestuffs intended for the the increase envisaged by the other tanning industry had taken place on a producers in 1967, imposed on it a fine of variable basis, according to type, quantity 40 000 u.a. for the part which it had played and other factors affecting the various in the cartel which existed amongst the markets. ACNA stated that the different producers of dyestuffs in the Common trend of prices in the various countries Market.
depended on objective market conditions The ACNA undertaking has brought an in those countries: the increase was application against that decision under intended to align prices with the increase in Article 173 of the EEC Treaty and Article costs. 17 of Regulation No 17/62 of the Council. By letter of 26 May 1965, the Commission's The said application was lodged at the Director-General for Competition in Court Registry on 6 October 1969. formed the ACNA undertaking that it would be visited by two officials of the Commission with instructions to obtain supplementary information and further II — Conclusions of the parties explanations on the questions which had given rise to the request for information In its application the applicant claims that and to ACNA's reply. This visit took place the Court should: on 11 June 1965. By letter of 11 December 1967, the Com — Annul the decision of the Commission mission informed ACNA that it had decided to commence proceedings upon of the European Communities of 24 its own initiative under Article 3 of July 1969 in so far as it affects the Regulation No 17 of the Council for applicant; alleged infringement of Article 85 of the Treaty against the undertakings which had — Alternatively, reverse it by suppressing participated in a concerted practice for the or reducing the fine imposed to fair purpose of fixing prices within the EEC proportions and order the defendant to in the dyestuffs sector and in which, in its bear the costs.
ACNA v COMMISSION
In its statement of defence the defendant objects that the laws of the Member contends that the Court should: States differ considerably as regards the types of infringement which may be — Dismiss the application as unfounded; punished, the penalties applicable, limita tion periods, and measures which can — Order the applicant to bear the costs. interrupt or suspend those periods. The only criterion common to the national laws is the principle that a limitation III — Submissions and arguments period should attach to matters in respect of the parties of which a penalty may be imposed.
It is therefore above all necessary, the defendant argues, to take the requirements of Com The submissions and arguments of the parties may be summarized as follows: munity law into account, as also the nature and purposes of the rules on competition A — Preliminary matters in the context of the EEC Treaty. The defendant asserts that even if the increase which the applicant introduced in 1. The effect of limitation on the infringe 1964 is considered in isolation, the period ment at issue, in so far as it relates to of limitation was suspended several times the price increase which took place in by the Commission either by the request for
1964 information sent to ACNA in accordance with Article 11 of Regulation No 17 The applicant argues that the period which during the same year 1964, or by the elapsed between the date of the infringe inspections carried out during June 1965 ment in question (January 1964) and the by officials of the Commission authorized first measure of the Commission suspend to do so. For, it is argued, those inspections ing the effect of limitation (namely the were undoubted 'measures of inquiry and notice of 11 December 1967) exceeds any investigation' which suspend the period of limitation period laid down by the national limitation according to the legislation of laws which may reasonably be applied in three Member States. Finally, that period the Community context in the absence of a was again suspended on 31 May 1967 by specific provision on this subject laid down the decision to commence the procedure by Community law. In particular, that for establishing an infringement.
The period goes well beyond the limitation longest interval was that running from period of 18 months laid down by Italian the investigations carried out in June law with regard to offences punishable by 1965 to the decision taken in May 1967, a fine (Italian Criminal Code, Article 157, and that period was less than two years. No 6). The defendant is of the opinion that, in The defendant observes that the tact that view of the practical and legal difficulties Regulation No 17 does not contain any inherent in the matter in question, such a provision concerning limitation means period cannot be held to involve the limita that the Commission remains free, as tion of proceedings in respect of complex part of its powers, to lay down time-limits infringements of Community rules. for the determining of infringements on an The applicant disputes the Commission's ad hoc basis subject to review by the Court. arguments according to which the Com This freedom is to be explained by the mission has discretionary powers con desire that the Commission should not be cerning limitation. This proposition would tied down by limits fixed in advance, at result in irreparable damage to the neces least when it began to exercise control sary certainty in legal relationships and over the application of the rules on com situations, and the simple consequence of petition. this would be to undermine the legal As for the applicability of the limitation foundation of the Community system of period which may be deduced from the law. Until such time as the question is body of national rules, the defendant settled by legislation, it is necessary, the
JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 57/69
applicant argues to refer to the principles fringement. Furthermore, the measures in and to the common criteria of the legisla question were not, so it is said, measures tion of the Member States. The applicant of the Commission as such, since they takes the view that in the present case it emanated from the Directorate-General would be appropriate to apply the period for Competition, no corporate initiative of 18 months laid down by Italian law for by the Members of the Commission ever offences punishable only by fines. Since having been taken on the matter.
The this period is the shortest period laid down letter of May 1965 did not specify that the by the national laws, to apply it would visit announced therein had been decided accord with the principle which requires upon under Article 14 of Regulation No that in cases of doubt the solution most 17/62. favourable to the accused must be adopted. The defendant objects that the letter of 19 To do so would also make it possible to August 1964 addressed to ACNA con avoid possible difficulties at the level of stitutes a formal notice under Article 11 of national constitutional law so far as Regulation No 17.
The investigations regards the Italian undertakings. announced in the letter of 26 May 1965 The defendant replies by pointing out that were carried out in accordance with the by its nature criminal law cannot be ex provisions of Article 14 of that regulation, tended by analogy, and that the Com even though the letter in question did not mission, to which the period of limitation expressly refer to that article. The measures applies, is outside the Italian legal order. in question, signed by the Director-General To transpose legal rules of that kind into for Competition, who acted on the basis the Community system, as the applicant of a delegation of powers granted by the proposes, would be in contradiction with Commission are, it is said, legally at the requirements of a rigorous interpreta tributable to the Commission.
It is for that tion, which is necessary on the subject of reason that the measures in question limitation. Finally, the shortest period should be considered as having been which may be taken into consideration capable of suspending the period of should at least be more than the period of limitation. three years laid down by the Member States having legislation on matters of 2. Infringement of essential procedural competition. requirements relating to the procedure The applicant argues, in the alternative, for establishing infringements under that even if the period of three years laid Article 85 of the Treaty down by Belgian and German legislation were to apply, that period has expired in The applicant argues that the Commission the present case, since the applicant has infringed the procedural provisions of received notice of the decision to com Regulation No 17 in that it served the mence the procedure only on 11 December notice of objections on it at the same time 1967, that is, more than 3 years after the as informing it of the commencement of facts, which date back to January 1964. the procedure for establishing an infringe Neither the request for information which ment; in that it undertook measures of was sent during August 1964, nor the inquiry after the notice of objections had visit to the offices of the applicant by been sent; and finally, in that it has not officials of the Commission during June produced evidence substantiating the objec 1965 can have suspended the period of tions concerning the specific conduct of the limitation because they did not constitute applicant. It is argued that these defects formal measures in the context of a are reflected in the final decision, as ap procedure brought against the applicant pears from the fact that on several points
in due form. Those measures, it is argued, the contested decision is based on events were simply in the nature of preliminary or assertions of which the applicant had no inquiries for the purpose of establishing prior knowledge, from which it follows whether it was appropriate to commence that it suffered an infringement of its right formal proceedings to establish an in- of defence. Furthermore, a certain number
ACNA v COMMISSION
of observations appearing in the contested The applicant replies that since the notice decision concern only some of the under of objections did not make it possible to takings which have participated in the reconstruct completely and entirely the alleged concerted practice, and yet the written evidence on which the Commission wording of the decision does not make it had relied for the purpose of taking its possible positively to identify the specific decision to institute proceedings, it was not undertakings to which the Commission possible for the applicant to assess the intended to impute the objections in objections adequately. Similarly, it was not
question. Thus the defendant, it is argued, possible for it to be absolutely certain has disregarded the duty which is incumbent that the contested decision was not based upon it to communicate a specific notice of on subsequent documents or facts. objections, which results in a reversal of the burden of proof. The visits made after the notice was sent cannot, it is argued, have been intended to In particular, as regards the fact that the verify the statements made by the applicant Commission believed that it could deduce subsequent to that notice, since they took evidence of the concerted nature of the place before the applicant had replied. increases from the absolute duty on the The fact that the Commission wished to subsidiaries to refuse to issue antedated adopt a single decision with reference to invoices, the applicant points out that such ten undertakings is attributable to the way a refusal is in line with proper commercial in which the measure was prepared and practice which it has constantly followed. has nothing to do with its validity.
It is The defendant observes, as a preliminary for this reason that the submission to the point, that the procedural provisions con effect that the Commission stated reasons tained in the regulations adopted on the for that decision by reference to certain basis of Article 87 of the EEC Treaty can circumstances which do not specifically not be considered to be 'rules of law relat concern the applicant remains a valid ing to the application of the Treaty' submission. and that therefore infringement of them does not necessarily constitute an in The defendant replies that the investigations fringement of essential procedural require provided for by Article 14 of Regulation ments for the purposes of Article 173. No 17 are not subject to any time-limit. The defendant also points out that no Although they usually precede the notice of rule of Community law requires it to make objections, there is no reason why they a chronological and physical separation should not follow it, either in order to between the notification of the decision verify the accuracy of the statements made to initiate a procedure to establish an by the interested parties, or in order to infringement and the notice of objections. inquire into the existence of subsequent Furthermore, a joint notice does not, it is infringements which, if found to exist, asserted, prejudice the rights of the defence would be the subject of an ad hoc notice of in any way. objections. The only important factor is, it is argued, that the final decision must be The purpose of the investigations carried based exclusively on matters of which the out after the notice of objections was sent interested parties have previously been was to verify the declarations made sub informed by the notice of objections, and sequent to that notice. The contested this requirement is met in the present decision did not take into account any case.
facts other than those complained of in the notice of 11 December 1967. Finally, Finally, the defendant observes that if the the fact that certain points in the decision applicant wishes to assert that the final concern only certain of the undertakings decision is based on documents obtained in question is not capable of invalidating by the Commission after the notice of the premises of the decision in relation to objections was sent, it must prove that the various addressees. assertion.
JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 57/69
B — Substance In its statement of defence, the defendant observes that the absence of a concerted practice, which the applicant raises in its 1. Infringement of Article 85 of the Treaty favour, for the price increases of 1965 and and of the principles and provisions of 1967, was due not to any concern on its Regulation No 17/62 of the Council part to adhere to the principles of perfect competition but rather to an intention to The applicant argues in the first place that react by this means against foreign com the Commission has not discharged the petitors which were not supplying it with burden of proof: in effect, it has not sup certain raw materials on the favourable plied any valid evidence against ACNA. terms which it has enjoyed in the past. Even after admitting that it had made a In its reply, the applicant notes that by that material error in including the applicant assertion the Commission has in effect amongst the undertakings which had placed the objections made against it in a actually increased their prices in January new context, by abandoning practically 1965, the Commission nevertheless con all its previous statements on the participa tinued to treat ACNA like all the other tion by that undertaking in the alleged undertakings to which it wished to attribute concerted practices of 1965 and 1967. without distinction the various price in The remarks concerning ACNA's inten creases, including that of 1965. In this tions are wholly irrelevant, since no objec connexion, the. applicant asserts that it did tion can be made against its actual conduct. not introduce any price increase, even on It is for this reason that in its reply the external markets, and claims that the applicant limits its observations to the facts Commission is guilty of an error of logic. which occurred in 1964. In view of the fact that the applicant The applicant also argues that no evidence clearly carries out its principal commercial has been put forward by the Commission, activity in Italy, the decision does not even as regards the increases of 1964, explain why ACNA refrained from increas
which are in any event covered by the ing its prices on the national market while effect of limitation. The decision admits as taking part at the same time in supposed regards that increase that the applicant concerted practices relating to other mar acted in Italy, in Belgium and in Holland kets which are of but little commercial after the increases decided upon by the interest to it. other undertakings had become effective or, As regards the increases of 1967, the con at all events, had already become known, tested decision states that they did not because notice of them had previously been take place on the Italian market and that given to the customers.
Therefore, it is it was indeed ACNA which, by its con argued, all that ACNA did was to align duct, prevented the increase envisaged in itself on decisions to make increases which 1967 by the other producers from taking had already been acted upon by the largest place on that market. That fact must render producers. There is no question here, so it implausible any hypothesis concerning the is asserted, of an agreement, but rather of simultaneous participation of ACNA in a the phenomenon of 'conscious parallelism', concerted practice for the purpose of justified by business considerations and not increasing prices on other markets. The in any way in contradiction with the com applicant states that in fact the Italian pletely independent nature of the ap market represents 95 % of its sales within plicant's commercial policy. the Common Market whereas the Belgian Finally, the applicant argues that, contrary and French markets do not exceed 3% to what the Commission asserts, it is
thereof. Furthermore, the text of the con practically impossible for users of dyestuffs tested decision shows that none of the on a given national market to order their factors leading to the conclusions as to the supplies from producers outside that existence of the alleged concerted practice market. This is due, inter alia, to the need may be imputed to the applicant under for continuous assistance to be given at taking. the appropriate time while the products
ACNA v COMMISSION
in question are in use, and to the need to to the many activities of the users. It is supply users quickly with products having asserted that there is a clear trend towards a multiplicity of characteristics occurring expansion in the dyestuffs market, as in many different kinds, and often in small appears from statistics of the OECD. quantities. In support of this proposition it Demand for the products in question is alleges that although in 1965 and 1967 it characterized by high mobility linked to did not take part in any increase in the intensity of competition, and by the prices, and therefore continued to charge fact that consumers hold low quantities in lower prices in Italy than those charged by stock and buy limited quantities as the its competitors on other markets, it did not need arises. Furthermore, the sector in receive a single order for supplies from the products in question displays a con customers in other Member States.
Further siderable capacity on the part of producers more, the price increases on the various to adapt themselves to variations in de national markets did not in any way mand, and this capacity is enhanced by the attenuate the overt competition existing fact that their plant can be used for a between the producers in question on each number of different purposes. There is, of those markets, which is apparent in it is said, great diversity in the position practice notably in the erosion of prices occupied by each undertaking on the charged to customers. The applicant claims market, depending on whether the pro that at the present time its average receipts ducts are at the experimental stage, or per unit are quite simply below the level are increasingly or less used, and depending prior to the increase of 1964. also on special relationships with the The defendant takes exception above all customers. Finally, it is argued that great to the proposition that the facts imputed diversity exists as regards the costs of to the applicant are to be compared with production, depending on the size of the the phenomenon of conscious parallelism undertaking, the prices of raw materials, rather than with a concerted practice. It and so on, and that therefore profits vary points out that the oligopolies for which considerably. academic writers accept the possibility For all these reasons, conscious parallelism of parallel conduct are characterized by a between producers on the dyestuffs market very high degree of interdependence when is, it is asserted, impossible. the following conditions are fulfilled: a Apart from these considerations of a limited number of producers, high fixed general nature, the defendant denies that costs, homogeneity of products, a high in the present case the 1964 increase was degree of transparency of the market, and justified by the sizeable increase in costs reduced expansion in the sector in question. and by the favourable circumstances It is argued that amongst those conditions, resulting from the initiative already taken which are all necessary, homogeneity, on by the principal competitors.
It is argued which American case-law also concentrates, that the increase decided upon the latter is of particular importance. Yet the pro presented the other undertakings with ducts in question are quite otherwise than very favourable opportunities for achieving homogeneous; about 6 000 different dye- a high rate of profit. They could have stuffs are in existence; of the undertakings adopted a pricing policy which, by means which took part in the agreement in ques of appropriate diversification of prices, tion, each applicant produces, it is said, would have given them excellent returns. a range of between 1 500 and 3 000 kinds, Therefore the different course of conduct of which some are protected by patents. which they adopted in conforming entirely Furthermore, continuing technical progress to the increases in question can only be contributes to this heterogeneity. A further explained, it is alleged, by prior concerta factor, together with the multiplicity, tion between the interested parties. heterogeneity, and rapid development of It is argued, that this conclusion is confirmed the products, is the lack of transparency by the fact that the instructions sent out of the market, which is yet further ag by the various producers concerning the gravated by the diversity of demand due increase in question were sent to Italy on
JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 57/69
9 January 1964 and to Belgium a few days announced and is immediately made known later. It appears that those instructions to all competitors and all purchasers, a were drafted in very similar terms and certain interdependence exists between that they all coincide on the subject of the producers of dyestuffs. size of the increase, the exceptions to be The applicant stresses that for its part its made for certain products, the obligations prices were aligned not on those charged to apply the increase to all current orders, by other producers, but merely on the and the prohibition on granting exceptions increased percentages announced.
This other than those agreed upon and on meant that prices which were different accepting antedated orders as a means of before the increase remained different avoiding the application of the new prices. afterwards. Therefore the defendant's Moreover, the instructions sent by the arguments based on the heterogeneity of applicant were sent at the same time as products are not relevant; nor are those those sent to Belgium by Bayer, Hoechst, relating to the lack of transparency of the Cassella. Sandoz and Francolor. market, once the decisions announced to On the subject of the alleged simultaneous their respective customers by the instiga timing of the communication sent by tors of the upward movement were publicly ACNA to its agent in Belgium and the known. instructions to the same effect sent by the The defendant replies by pointing out that other producers, the applicant points out the instructions in question not only that the telegram in question was sent on coincided in time but were drafted in the 31 January 1964, whereas Bayer, which most similar terms as to form and co was the first to act, had sent instructions to incided as to substance.
The alleged align increase prices as early as 9 January to its ment took place not only on the Belgian representatives on the Belgian market. market but also in other Member States, This fact, it is claimed, deprives the Com and the increase corresponded to that mission's argument of any probative value introduced by the undertakings controlling because ACNA's decision to raise its the largest share of the market in those prices may be explained quite simply as a countries (Bayer in Belgium, ICI in the legitimate reaction to the new situation on Netherlands, Ciba in Italy). Since the inter the market, of which it had objective changeability of the products is limited and knowledge. The undertakings concerned there is no transparency of market, the had an almost identical period available undertaking which increases its prices first within which to decide upon their conduct cannot, in the absence of a prior agree in the light of the increase announced by ment, be certain that its competitors will Bayer, and this is why their reactions were automatically adopt a parallel course of almost simultaneous. conduct. It is true that ACNA mainly It is asserted that the logic of the de produces interchangeable dyes, but in that fendant's argument would result in identify case equally, in an expanding market ing parallel conduct with a concerted characterized by differing relationships practice, and that this lightens the burden between sellers and buyers, disparities of of proof which is incumbent on it. costs and prices, continuous technical Moreover, it is said, the defendant s con progress and a difference in the degree to clusions are contradicted by the Kammer which productive capacity is used, it is gericht Berlin which held, in its judgment of inconceivable that all sellers should auto 28 August 1969, that it could not agree matically have aligned prices for all their with the interpretation of the Bundes products on the increases announced by a kartellamt, according to which it was competitor. This proposition is corrob highly improbable that the prices of all the orated, it is argued, by the attitude of the interested parties could have been in applicant itself, in that it did not follow the creased at the same time and by the same increase announced in 1965 by a number percentage without prior agreement. The of its competitors on the Italian market, a Kammergericht accepted the proposition fact which caused that initiative to fail. that when a general change in prices is Finally, the defendant points out that the
ACNA v COMMISSION
decision of 28 August 1969 of the Kam any reasonable alternative to a policy of mergericht Berlin was contested before the varying prices. The applicant points out Bundesgerichtshof on 13 October 1969 that as far as possible it has always pursued by the public prosecutor attached to the this policy, even after the increase of 1964. Kammergericht. That does not conflict, it is argued, with the decision to follow the general price 2. The situation on the Italian market and increase. The necessary precondition for the position of the applicant undertaking this 'articulated' policy was that the price movement should succeed on the market The applicant stresses that at the time in during that time. It was only thereafter, question its position was characterized by so it is said, that the optimal adjustments the following factors, which still subsist: envisaged by the Commission could have an irremediable imbalance in the relation been considered. ship between costs and profits occasioned The applicant expresses doubts as to the by the noticeable increase in costs and the evidential value of the statistics produced decrease in profits; a progressive deteriora by the defendant concerning consump tion in the undertaking's position on the tion and production of organic dyes and national market as a result of intense com the average gross hourly wages in the petition and of the highly critical situation chemicals industry. It is argued that it is existing in wide areas of demand; the improbable that the apparent consumption precarious position of the undertaking on shown in Table IA increased in Switzerland other Community markets and its lack of from $1.9 million in 1958 to 17.7 in 1963 ability to penetrate; the weak competitive and that from 1966 onwards consumption position of the undertaking's products, fell. Table IIA contains data obtained from which are fully exposed to competition, various sources, which renders a useful being almost exclusively dyes of standard comparison practically impossible.
Table types and therefore interchangeable with VI is not very representative, both because those of all other principal producers. it does not contain data prior to 1964 It appears in particular, it is said, from and because average wages do not give a figures compiled by the OECD that in satisfactory indication of the trend in 1965 production of dyestuffs in Italy labour costs. It would have been more decreased by 20.7% in quantity and 20% useful to examine general operational costs, in value. Furthermore, the statistics of including indirect charges and social ISTAT show that imports of dyestuffs security contributions, which are par into Italy more than tripled between 1959 ticularly high in Italy. As regards consump
and 1968, both in value and in quantity. tion, Tables IA and IB, which take the This is all the more relevant in that during year 1958 as their reference point, give a the course of the last few years average somewhat unrepresentative comparison, so prices conceded to buyers of imported it is said, of the trend in consumption for dyestuffs have fallen. Therefore, it is the years with which the Commission argued, the Commission's statement as to inquiries are concerned.
The same goes the expansion of the dyestuffs industry in for the tables showing production, from general does not apply to Italian industry which, moreover, it appears that from 1962 for the period under consideration. onwards production in Italy has sub The statistics in question snow, it is said, stantially decreased. that ACNA has, again in Italy, been sub It is argued in conclusion that as a whole jected to ever wider and more intense com the data supplied by the Commission petition.
According to statistics of the confirm what the applicant has itself OECD, the average value of standard stated as regards its situation and that of products, comprising almost all products the production of dyestuffs in Italy in manufactured in Italy, is US $1.93 per kg, general. whereas in Germany, for example, that In its rejoinder, the defendant accepts that value is 3.70 and in Switzerland, 5.52. In the general expansion of the dyestuffs these circumstances, ACNA did not have market did not occur in Italy in 1965
JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 57/69
but that on the contrary it has been found ficient, it is argued, to justify so severe a that there was a recession. Nevertheless, it penalty, taking into account also the fact points out that that has nothing to do that this was an isolated episode, which with the increase in question, which took occurred long ago. place at the beginning of 1964. The statis The defendant argues that the applicant tical data which it supplies, together with made a considerable profit from the in a table appearing in the rejoinder, are crease which it introduced in 1964 and alleged to show that until 1964 the market which also affected the national market. expanded progressively. Secondly, while admitting that ACNA derived less of an advantage from the
3. The excessive amount of the fine successive increases in relation to those countries to which it exports very little, Alternatively, the applicant takes the view the defendant asserts that in directing its that the amount of the fine which has been production almost entirely to internal imposed on it, which is little less than the consumption and neglecting the higher amount of the fine imposed on each of profits available elsewhere, the applicant the other undertakings, is in contradiction adhered to a balance between the markets with the considerations which the decision so that it did not in its turn have to face purportedly takes into account in order to interference arising from the action of determine the fine, namely: the gravity foreign competitors on its national market. and duration of the alleged infringements, The applicant objects that the large in the circumstances in which they took place, crease in imports of dyestuffs into Italy and the size of the various undertakings and the significant decrease in Italian within the common market.
As regards its production which occurred in 1965 show economic dimensions, the applicant under that this statement by the defendant is taking first states that it is not a subsidiary unfounded. of Montecatini-Edison, as is wrongly stated in the decision, but an associated undertaking having its own freedom of IV — Procedure action and its own legal personality. The applicant then asserts that in 1968 its The procedure took the following course: sales represented some 25% of the total By order of 8 July 1970, the Court, having sales of dyestuffs in Italy during the period regard to the report of the Judge-Rappor
in question. Its exports to other Community teur and the views of the Advocate- countries, on the other hand, were, it General, ordered as follows: says, of no significance since they did not even amount to five hundred million lire, whereas imports into the Community by 1. An expert's report shall be obtained in the other countries of the common market respect of the following questions: amounted in 1967 to Lit. 28 000 million, with imports from the EFTA countries (a) Taking into account the characteris amounting to Lit. 24 000 million. tics of the dyestuffs market in the Taking these facts into account it is in
European Economic Community, accurate, the applicant alleges, to say that especially during the period 1964 to ACNA is comparable in size to the larger 1967, would it have been a practical undertakings operating in this sector. possibility, according to normal As for the gravity of the alleged infringe commercial criteria, for a producer ments, the applicant stresses the insignifi acting independently who wished cance of its exports within the common to increase his prices to do so market (in 1964, 0.2% of apparent con otherwise than by a general uniform sumption in the Netherlands and 1.4 % of and public increase, by fixing apparent consumption in Belgium; in different rates for each product in France, 0.6% in 1967). The presumed his individual relationships with infringement of 1964 alone was not suf- each customer?
ACNA v COMMISSION
(b) For a producer acting indepen acting independently could in principle dently, what advantages and dis have increased his prices on a variable advantages result from effecting a basis in relation to each customer and general and linear increase in each product. prices, as compared with an in crease differing in respect of each — An affirmative answer may also be given customer, product and market? The answer to this question is to be to the question whether it would have been a practical possibility for such a given both on the hypothesis that producer to increase his prices on a the producer is taking the initiative variable basis in relation to each in making an increase and on the customer and product, subject to the hypothesis that the producer is following proviso: the average increase faced with a general and uniform increase announced by a competitor. in prices that a producer acting in dependently could have achieved by means of a policy of differentiated (c) Taking into account in particular the degree of transparency of the prices in a given field would probably have been lower than the average market, are dyestuffs other than speciality dyes practically inter increase in prices achieved by a general changeable and, if so, to what ex and uniform price increase.
tent? What is the approximate pro portion of speciality dyes compared — A general and linear increase in prices with the total production of dyes involves opportunities and risks both for each of the undertakings con for the producer who takes the initiative cerned? in putting prices up and for the pro ducer of dyestuffs who has to fall in with a general and uniform increase 2. The parties may, by agreement between announced by a competitor. Both as themselves, propose the name of an regards the producer who determines the expert to the Court before 1 October price and as regards those who follow
1970. him, the conclusion to be drawn is that during the period in question the By order of the same date the Court advantages to be obtained from a joined Cases48/69, 49/69, 51/69, 52/69, general and uniform increase in prices 53/69, 54/69, 55/69, 56/69 and 57/69 for were greater than the disadvantages. the purposes of the expert's report. ay order dated 13 November 1970 tne Court, having regard to the proposal — The appropriate answer to Question (c) made by common agreement between the is that the degree of interchangeability parties on the names of two experts, of dyestuffs varies: it ranges from instructed Horst Albach, Professor of products which are perfectly inter Business Management at the University changeable to products for which to of Bonn, and Wilhelm Norbert Kloten, all intents and purposes there is no Professor of Political Economy at the substitute. If, for the purposes of the University of Tubingen, to prepare the question asked, speciality dyestuffs are report jointly. those which are not interchangeable for The experts' joint report was lodged at the practical purposes, it can be said that Court Registry on 23 April 1971. The the proportion that they represent of experts summarized the results of their the total production of dyestuffs in report in the following terms: each of the undertakings concerned is
very low. However, the results of the — Question (a) should be answered in the study show that the distinction is of affirmative; according to normal com but little use in assessing the facts mercial criteria a producer of dyestuffs envisaged.
JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 57/69
Observations on the experts' report were The parties presented oral argument at lodged at the Court Registry on 3 July the hearings on 28, 29 and 30 September 1971 by the applicant and on 21 June 1971 1971 and on 2 May 1972. by the defendant. During the course of the procedure Mr On 28 September 1971 the experts named Advocate-General Mayras replaced Mr by the Court took the oath in accordance Advocate-General Dutheillet de Lamothe, with Article 49(6) of the Rules of Proce deceased. He delivered his opinion at the dure. hearing on 2 May 1972.
Grounds of judgment
1 It is common ground that from January 1964 to October 1967 three general and uniform increases in the prices of dyestuffs took place in the Community.
2 Between 7 and 20 January 1964, a uniform increase of 15 % in the prices of most dyes based on aniline, with the exception of certain categories, took place in Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg and in certain third countries.
3 On 1 January 1965 an identical increase took place in Germany.
On the same day almost all producers in all the countries of the common market except France introduced a uniform increase of 10% on the prices of dyes and pigments excluded from the increase of 1964.
Since the ACNA undertaking did not take part in the increase of 1965 on the Italian market, the other undertakings did not maintain the announced increase of their prices on that market.
4 Towards mid-October 1967, an increase for all dyes was introduced, except in Italy, by almost all producers, amounting to 8 % in Germany,, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, and 12% in France.
5 By a decision of 31 May 1967 the Commission commenced proceedings under Article 3 of Regulation No 17/62 on its own initiative concerning these increases for presumed infringement of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty against seventeen producers of dyestuffs established within and outside the common market, and against numerous subsidiaries and representatives of those undertakings.
6 By a decision of 24 July 1969, the Commission found that the increases were the result of concerted practices, which infringed Article 85(1) of the Treaty between, the undertakings
ACNA v COMMISSION
— Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik AG (BASF), Ludwigshafen, — Cassella Farbwerke Mainkur AG, Frankfurt am Main, — Farbenfabriken Bayer AG, Leverkusen, — Farbwerke Hoechst AG, Frankfurt am Main, — Société Française des Matières Colorantes SA, Paris, — Azienda Colon Nazionali Affini S.p.A. (ACNA), Milan, — Ciba SA , Basel,
— J. R. Geigy SA, Basel, — Sandoz Basel, and
— Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. (ICI), Manchester.
7 It therefore imposed a fine of 50 000 u.a. on each of these undertakings, with the exception of ACNA, for which the fine was fixed at 40 000 u.a.
8 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 6 October 1969 the undertaking Azienda Colori Nazionali Affini S.p.A. (ACNA) has brought an application against that decision.
Submissions relation to procedure and to form
Submissions concerning the administrative procedure
(a) The complaint concerning the initiation of the administrative procedure
9 The applicant argues that the Commission has infringed the procedural provisions laid down by Regulation No 17/62 in that it sent the notice of objections to the applicant at the same time as it informed the applicant of the initiation of the procedure to establish an infringement.
10 Neither the provisions in force nor the general principles of law require notice of the decision to initiate the procedure to establish an infringement to be given prior to notification of the objections adopted against the interested parties in the context of such proceedings.
11 It is the notice of objections alone and not the decision to commence proceedings which is the measure stating the final attitude of the Commission concerning undertakings against which proceedings for infringement of the rules on competi tion have been commenced.
12 Accordingly, the fact that the Commission did not separate, chronologically and physically, notification of the abovementioned decision from the notice of objec tions cannot affect the rights of the defence.
JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 57/69
13 This complaint is therefore unfounded.
(b) The complaint relating to a continuation of inquiries following notification of the objections
14 The applicant believes that the Commission has infringed Regulation No 17/62 by continuing its inquiries relating to increases in the prices of the products follow ing communication of the notice of objections.
15 The Commission has the right and where appropriate the duty to institute fresh inquiries during the administrative procedure if it appears from the course of that procedure that additional investigations are necessary.
16 Such inquiries would render it necessary to send an additional statement of objec tions to the undertakings concerned only if the result of the investigations led the Commission to take new facts into account against the undertakings or to alter materially the evidence for the contested infringements.
That is not the position in the present case.
17 This submission is therefore unfounded.
(c) The complaint concerning the disparities between the contested decision and the notice of objections
18 The applicant, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence, complains that the Commission took the contested decision on the basis of facts or assertions
of which the said applicant had never had knowledge.
19 Moreover, it is stated that certain observations appearing in the contested decision concern only certain of the undertakings, and yet the decision does not make it possible to identify them.
20 Thus the Commission, it is said, has succeeded in reversing the burden of proof.
21 Finally, it is argued that the Commission has not put forward evidence concerning the specific conduct of the applicant.
22 In order to protect the rights of the defence during the course of the administrative procedure, it is sufficient that undertakings should be informed of the essential elements of fact on which the objections are based.
ACNA v COMMISSION
23 It appears from the text of the notice of objections that the facts taken into con sideration against the applicant were clearly stated therein.
24 That notice contains all the information necessary for deciding as to the objections put forward with regard to the applicant, in particular the circumstances in which the increases of 1964, 1965 and 1967 were announced and implemented.
25 Amendments included in the contested decision concerning the precise course of the facts, which were made pursuant to information furnished by the interested parties to the Commission during the course of the administrative procedure, can by no means be relied upon to support this complaint.
26 The fact that the decision, which was taken in respect of ten separate undertakings, dealt with the arguments put forward by only some of the addressees, without identifying them, cannot impair the legality of that measure.
27 Finally, the question whether the factors put forward by the Commission in evidence of the infringement at issue are sufficient to prove the existence of that infringement is a matter relating to the substance of the contested decision.
28 These complaints are therefore unfounded.
The submission as to the limitation period
29 The applicant argues that the contested decision is contrary to the Treaty and to the rules relating to its application because the Commission, in commencing on 31 May 1967 proceedings concerning the price increase of January 1964, exceeded any reasonable limitation period.
30 The provisions governing the Commission's power to impose fines for infringement of the rules on competition do not lay down any period of limitation.
31 In order to fulfil their function, limitation periods must be fixed in advance.
The fixing of their duration and the detailed rules for their application come within the powers of the Community legislature.
32 Although, in the absence of any provisions on this matter, the fundamental requirement of legal certainty has the effect of preventing the Commission from indefinitely delaying the exercise of its power to impose fines, its conduct in the present case cannot be regarded as constituting a bar to the exercise of that power as regards participation in the concerted practices of 1964 and 1965.
JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 57/69
33 Therefore the submission is unfounded.
Substantive submissions as to the existence of concerted practices
Arguments of the parties
34 The applicant complains, first, that the contested decision accused it of having participated, outside the Italian market, in 1965 and in 1967, in concerted practices relating to price increases in other Member States.
35 It is argued that in view of ACNA's refusal to increase its prices on its national market and the small commercial importance to it of those other markets, the abovementioned allegation is not plausible.
36 During the oral procedure before the Court, the defendant replied that in the applicant's case the contested decision was based on its participation in the in crease of 1964 alone, and that its conduct in 1965 and 1967, viewed in isolation, was not of a nature such as to justify that measure.
37 Therefore, in the examination of the existence of the infringement alleged against the applicant that limitation should be taken into account.
38 The applicant also complains that the Commission has not produced valid evidence to the effect that it participated in concerted practices contrary to Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty.
39 The contested decision states that prima facie evidence that the increase of 1964 took place as the result of concerted action is to be found in the facts that the rates introduced for that increase by the different producers in each country were the same, that with very rare exceptions the same dyestuffs were involved, and that the increases were put into effect over only a very short period, if not actually on the same date.
40 It is contended that that increase cannot be explained simply by the oligopolistic character of the structure of the market.
It is said to be unrealistic to suppose that without previous concertation the prin cipal producers supplying the common market could have increased their prices on several occasions by identical percentages at practically the same moment for one and the same important range of products including speciality products for which there are few, if any, substitutes, and that they should have done so in a number of countries where conditions on the dyestuffs market are different.
ACNA v COMMISSION
41 The Commission has argued before the Court that the interested parties need not necessarily have drawn up a common plan with a view to adopting a certain course of behaviour for it to be said that there has been concertation.
It is argued that it is enough that they should previously have informed each other of the attitude which they intend to adopt so that each could regulate his conduct safe in the knowledge that his competitors would act in the same way.
42 The applicant argues that the contested decision is based on an inadequate analysis of the market in the products in question and on an erroneous understanding of the concept of a concerted practice, which is wrongly identified by the decision with the conscious parallelism of members of an oligopoly, whereas such conduct is due to independent decisions adopted by each undertaking, determined by objec tive business needs, and in particular by the need to increase the unsatisfactorily low rate of profit on the production of dyestuffs.
43 At the time covered by the contested decision the applicant's position was, it is said, characterized by a very large imbalance in the relationship between costs and profits, by a progressive deterioration in its situation on the national market as a result both of the intense competition to which its products, consisting almost exclusively of dyes of standard types and therefore easily interchangeable, were exposed, and of the highly critical situation existing in wide areas of demand, taking into account the relatively small stature of the undertaking and its lack of ability to penetrate other Community markets.
44 In that critical situation it had no reasonable alternative, so it is said, but to pursue a policy of varying prices by means of adjustments of its prices to customers.
45 It is argued that the constant erosion of prices charged to customers shows that the uniform percentage of the increase did not attenuate open competition on the market in the products in question.
46 In 1964, the applicant confined itself, even on its national market, to following decisions to introduce increases already acted upon by its largest competitors.
47 It is argued that the statistics of the OECD, according to which production of dyestuffs in Italy in 1965 decreased by 20.7% in quantity and 20% in value, con firm these assertions.
48 Therefore, it is said, the Commission's general statement concerning the expansion of the dyestuffs industry cannot apply to the particular situation of the applicant.
JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 57/69
The concept of a concerted practice
49 Article 85 draws a distinction between the concept of 'concerted practices' and that of 'agreements between undertakings' or of 'decisions by associations of undertakings'; the object is to bring within the prohibition of that article a form of coordination between undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition.
so By its very nature, then, a concerted practice does not have all the elements of a contract but may inter alia arise out of coordination which becomes apparent from the behaviour of the participants.
51 Although parallel behaviour may not by itself be identified with a concerted prac tice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a practice if it leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market, having regard to the nature of the products, the size and number of the undertakings, and the volume of the said market.
52 This is especially the case if the parallel conduct is such as to enable those concerned to attempt to stabilize prices at a level different from that to which competition would have led, and to consolidate established positions to the detriment of effec tive freedom of movement of the products in the common market and of the freedom of consumers to choose their suppliers.
53 Therefore the question whether there was a concerted action in this case can only be correctly determined if the evidence upon which the contested decision is based is considered, not in isolation, but as a whole, account being taken of the specific features of the market in the products in question.
The characteristic features of the market in dyestuffs
54 The market in dyestuffs is characterized by the fact that 80% of the market is supplied by about ten producers, very large ones in the main, which often manu facture these products together with other chemical products or pharmaceutical specialities.
55 The production patterns and therefore the cost structures of these manufacturers are very different, and this makes it difficult to ascertain competing manufacturers' costs.
56 The total number of dyestuffs is very high, each undertaking producing more than a thousand.
ACNA v COMMISSION
57 The average extent to which these products can be replaced by others is considered relatively good for standard dyes, but it can be very low or even non-existent for speciality dyes.
58 As regards speciality products, the market tends in certain cases towards an oligopolistic situation.
59 Since the price of dyestuffs forms a relatively small part of the price of the final product of the user undertaking, there is little elasticity of demand for dyestuffs on the market as a whole and this encourages price increases in the short term.
60 Another factor is that the total demand for dyestuffs is constantly increasing, and this tends to induce producers to adopt a policy enabling them to take advantage of this increase.
61 In the territory of the Community, the market in dyestuffs in fact consists of five separate national markets with different price levels which cannot be explained by differences in costs and charges affecting producers in those countries.
61 Thus the establishment of the Common Market would not appear to have had any effect on this situation, since the differences between national price levels have scarcely decreased.
63 On the contrary, it is clear that each of the national markets has the characteristics of an oligopoly and that in most of them price levels are established under the influence of a 'price-leader', who in some cases is the largest producer in the country concerned, and in other cases is a producer in another Member State or a third State, acting through a subsidiary.
64 According to the experts this dividing-up of the market is due to the need to supply local technical assistance to users and to ensure immediate delivery, generally in small quantities, since, apart from exceptional cases, producers supply their subsidiaries established in the different Member States and maintain a network of
agents and depots to ensure that user undertakings receive specific assistance and supplies.
65 It appears from the data produced during the course of the proceedings that even in cases where a producer establishes direct contact with an important user in another Member State, prices are usually fixed in relation to the place where the user is established and tend to follow the level of prices on the national market.
66 Although the foremost reason why producers have acted in this way is in order to adapt themselves to the special features of the market in dyestuffs and to the needs of their customers, the fact remains that the dividing-up of the market which
JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 37/69
results tends, by fragmenting the effects of competition, to isolate users in their national market, and to prevent a general confrontation between producers throughout the Common Market.
67 It is in this context, which is peculiar to the way in which the dyestuffs market works, that the facts of the case should be considered.
The increase of 1964
68 In 1964 all the undertakings in question announced and immediately put into effect an increase in the prices of most aniline dyes, the initiative coming from Ciba- Italy which, on 7 January 1964, following instructions from Ciba-Switzerland, announced and immediately introduced an increase of 15%. This initiative was followed by the other producers, and in particular the applicant, on the Italian market within two or three days.
69 On 9 January ICI-Holland took the initiative in introducing the same increase in the Netherlands, whilst on the same day Bayer took the same initiative on the Belgo-Luxembourg market.
70 With minor differences, these increases concerned the same range of products for the various producers and markets, namely, most aniline dyes other than pig ments, food colourings and cosmetics.
71 On the Italian market in particular, this conduct on the part of the undertakings cannot be considered to have been spontaneous.
72 In fact, from the number of producers concerned it is not possible to say that the Italian market in dyestuffs is an oligopoly in which price competition can no longer play a substantial role and in which the level of prices is fixed by conscious parallelism.
73 These producers are sufficiently numerous and some of them are sufficiently power ful to create a real risk that in times of rising prices some of them might not follow the general movement but might instead try to increase their share of the market by behaving in an individual way.
74 In fact it appears from ACNA's account of the situation on the Italian market in the years prior to 1964, which did not permit it to introduce price increases which had become necessary, that a general, uniform and spontaneous increase on that market was hardly conceivable.
ACNA v COMMISSION
75 Moreover, it is very significant in this context that by refusing to take part in the increases of 1965 and 1967 as regards the Italian market ACNA was able to prevent their being achieved.
76 Furthermore, the dividing-up of the Common Market into five national markets with different price levels and structures makes it improbable that a spontaneous and equal price increase would occur on most of the national markets.
77 Although a general, spontaneous increase on each of the national markets is just conceivable, in view of their structure, these increases might be expected to differ according to the particular characteristics of the different national markets.
78 Therefore, although parallel conduct in respect of prices may well have been an attractive and risk -free objective for the undertakings concerned, particularly for ACNA, it is hardly conceivable that the same action could be taken spontane ously at the same time, on the same national markets and for the same range of products.
79 It cannot be accepted that the increases of January 1964, introduced on the Italian market and copied on the Netherlands and Belgo-Luxembourg markets, which have little in common with each other either as regards the level of prices or the patterns of competition, could have been brought into effect within a period of two to three days without prior concertation.
so The general and uniform increase on the different markets can only be explained by a common intention on the part of the undertakings, first, to adjust the level of prices and the situation resulting from competition in the form of discounts, and secondly, to avoid the risk, which is inherent in any price increase, of changing the conditions of competition.
81 The function of price competition is to keep prices down to the lowest possible level and to encourage the movement of goods between the Member States, thereby permitting the most efficient possible distribution of activities in the matter of productivity and the capacity of undertakings to adapt themselves to change.
82 Differences in rates encourage the pursuit of one of the basic objectives of the Treaty, namely the interpenetration of national markets and, as a result, direct access by consumers to the sources of production of the whole Community.
83 By reason of the limited elasticity of the market in dyestuffs, resulting from factors such as the lack of transparency with regard to prices, the interdependence of the different dyestuffs of each producer for the purpose of building up the range of products used by each consumer, the relatively low proportion of the cost of the final product of the user undertaking represented by the prices of these products,
JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 57/69
the fact that it is useful for users to have a local supplier and the influence of transport costs, the need to avoid any action which might artificially reduce the opportunities for interpenetration of the various national markets at the con sumer level becomes particularly important on the market in the products in question.
84 Although every producer is free to change his prices, taking into account in so doing the present or foreseeable conduct of his competitors, nevertheless it is contrary to the rules on competition contained in the Treaty for a producer to cooperate with his competitors, in any way whatsoever, in order to determine a coordinated course of action relating to a price increase and to ensure its success by prior elimination of all uncertainty as to each other's conduct regarding the essential elements of that action, such as the amount, subject-matter, date and place of the increases.
85 In these circumstances and taking into account the nature of the market in the products in question, the conduct of the applicant, in conjunction with other undertakings against which proceedings have been taken, was designed to replace the risks of competition and the hazards of competitors' spontaneous reactions by cooperation constituting a concerted practice prohibited by Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
The effect of the concerted practice on trade between Member States
86 The applicant argues that the uniform price increases were not capable of affecting trade between Member States because notwithstanding the noticeable differences existing between prices charged in the different States consumers have always preferred to make their purchases of dyestuffs in their own country.
87 However, it appears from what has already been said that the concerted practices, by seeking to keep the market in a fragmented state, were liable to affect the circumstances in which trade in the products in question takes place between the Member States.
88 The parties who put these practices into effect sought, on the occasion of each price increase, to reduce to a minimum the risks of changing the conditions of competition.
89 The fact that the increases were uniform and simultaneous has in particular served to maintain the status quo, ensuring that the undertakings would not lose custom, and has thus helped to keep the traditional markets in those good s'cemented' to the detriment of any real freedom of movement of the products in question in the Common Market.
ACNA v COMMISSION
90 Therefore this submission is unfounded.
The fine
91 The applicant argues as an alternative submission that the fine which has been imposed on it, which is little smaller than that imposed on the other undertakings, is in contradiction with the considerations to which the decision refers relating to the gravity and duration of the infringement, the circumstances in which it took place, and the relative size of the undertakings within the Common Market.
52 It is only as regards the increase of 1964 that the Commission has held that there was an infringement of Article 85.
93 On the other hand, the applicant played an important part in the success of that increase on the Italian market.
94 Therefore, compared with the fines imposed on the other participants in the con certed practices in question, a sum of 30 000 u.a. appears commensurate with the gravity of the infringement of the Community rules on competition.
95 It is therefore appropriate to reduce the amount of the fine imposed to that sum.
Costs
96 Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure the unsuccessful party shall be ordered to pay the costs.
97 Since the applicant has failed in its principal submissions, it must be ordered to bear the costs of these proceedings.
On those grounds,
Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur; Upon hearing the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General; Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, especially Articles 85 and 173; Having regard to Regulation No 17/62 of the Council of 6 February 1962; Having regard to Regulation No 99/63 of the Commission of 25 July 1963; Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the Euro pean Communities; Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities,
JUDGMENT OF 14.7.1972 — CASE 57/69
THE COURT
hereby:
1. Reduces the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by the Commission Decision of 24 July 1969 to 30 000 u.a.;
2. Dismisses the remainder of the application;
3. Orders the applicant to bear the costs.
Lecourt Mertens de Wilmars Kutscher
Donner Trabucchi Monaco Pescatore
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 14 July 1972.
A. Van Houtte R. Lecourt
Registrar President
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE-GENERAL MAYRAS
(See Case 48/69, p. 000)