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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·Rozsudok·13.11.1973

C-63/72

ECLI:EU:C:1973:121

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61972CJ0063

JUDGMENT OF 13. 11. 1973 — JOINED CASES 63 TO 69/72

In Joined Cases 63 to 69/72

WILHELM WERHAHN Hansamühle, Neuss/Rhein, Kurt Kampffmeyer, Mühlenvereinigung KG, Hamburg, LUDWIGSHAFENER WALZMÜHLE Erling KG, Ludwigshafen, Kurt Kampffmeyer Mühlenvereinigung KG, Hamburg, (as they are now known) as successors to the rights and obligations of Duisburger MÜHLEN­ WERKE AG, Heinrich Auer Mühlenwerke KG a.A., Cologne-Deutz, Kurt Kampffmeyer Mühlenvereinigung KG, Hamburg, (as they are now known) as successors to the rights and obligations of Süddeutsche Mühlen­ werke AG, Pfälzische Mühlenwerke GMBH, Mannheim,

represented by Fritz Modest of the Hamburg Bar, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of Me Félicien Jansen, bailiff, 21 rue Aldringen, applicants v

Council of the European Communities , Brussels, represented by Professor D. Vignes, Legal Adviser with the Legal Service of the Council, as agent, assisted by Professor H. P. Ipsen of the University of Hamburg, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of J. N. van den Houten, Director of the Legal Service of the European Investment Bank, 2 place de Metz,

and

Commission of the European Communities , Brussels, represented by P. Gilsdorf, Legal Adviser, assisted by Professor H. P. Ipsen of the University of Hamburg, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of Emile Reuter, Legal Adviser to the Commission, 4 boulevard Royal, defendants,

Claim for damages and interest based upon Article 215, second paragraph, of the EEC Treaty,

THE COURT

composed of: R. Lecourt, President, A. M. Donner and M. Sørensen, Presi­ dents of Chambers, R. Monaco, J. Mertens de Wilmars (Rapporteur),

WERHAHN v COUNCIL

P. Pescatore, H. Kutscher, C. Ó Dálaigh, A. J. Mackenzie Stuart, Judges, Advocate-General: K. Roemer Registrar: A. Van Houtte

gives the following

JUDGMENT

Issues of fact and of law

I — Facts and procedure imported from third countries — at the threshold prise (125-25 u.a.), whereas The facts and procedure may be their French and Italian competitors had summarized as follows: been able to obtain home-grown durum wheat at the intervention price (112-44 (a) Objects of the proceedings u.a.) or at a price approaching the same.

The applicants process durum wheat This distortion of competition is said to into cereal meal which they deliver have lost the applicants 20 % of the mainly to manufacturers of macaroni, German market in cereal meal, made up spaghetti and similar products. Whilst of manufacturers of macaroni, spaghetti common wheat production, intended for and similar products, the benefit breadmaking shows a considerable accruing in the main to French surplus within the Community, that of undertakings. durum wheat not only shows a In the first place, the applicants base considerable deficit, but is moreover their claim to compensation on a concentrated in certain regions, that is to wrongful act on the part of the say — as regards France — in Beauce Community institutions, in the main by and in the south, and in southern Italy. reason of their having fixed the The actions are concerned with a claim intervention price in respect of French jointly against the Council and the and Italian durum wheat at too low a Commission — in the terms of the level or the threshold price for durum application — and against the wheat imported from third countries at Community — in the terms of the reply too high a level. — for payment of sums amounting in all As a subsidiary point, in their reply, they to DM 9 487 281 by way of principal, further plead the principle of entitlement together with interest at 7 % from 1 to compensation arising from an illegal February 1972 by way of compensation intervention by the administration — for the damage which the applicants even if not culpable — affecting private claim to have suffered during the cereal property and amounting to expropria­ marketing year 1971/72. This damage is tion or dispossession. said to have been caused by the deficient, non-rational and illegal (b) Organization of the market in management of the common organiza­ cereals tion of the market in cereals, especially as regards durum wheat, which is said to The organization of the market in have resulted in German cereal meal cereals, comprising both common wheat producers being obliged to purchase and durum wheat, is based upon the their basic material — durum wheat following principles:

JUDGMENT OF 13. 11. 1973 — JOINED CASES 63 TO 69/72

Regulation No 120/67 of the Council of case the cereal meal producers of the 13 June 1967 (OJ No 117, 19. 6.1967, p. two Member States — ought not to have 2269/67) provides that a target price, a to pay more than the intervention price basic intervention price, derived the difference being made up by means intervention prices and a threshold price of the aid. shall be fixed annually. The applicants claim that this theory In respect of durum wheat, the fixing of corresponds to the true state of affairs, a guaranteed minimum price, in excess at any rate as regards a large proportion of the target price and intended to of the purchases.

According to the encourage production, is also provided Council and the Commission, on the for. other hand, the French and Italian flour The target price and the basic mills were competing in the durum intervention price are fixed for Duisburg wheat market and were offering more at the wholesale stage (Article 2 (3)). than the intervention price, that is to say The derived intervention prices are fixed, an additional 3 to 7 u.a. per metric ton for the same standard quality at the above that price. same stage and under the same Regulation No 1528/71 of the Council conditions as the basic intervention of 12 July 1971 (OJ L 162, 20. 7.1971 p. price, for all marketing centres in the 1) brought about an alteration to Article Community except Duisburg. Under the 4 of Regulation No 120/67 which provisions of Article 4 (1), second resulted in there being in future a single paragraph, their level is calculated in derived intervention price for durum such a way that the differences between wheat applicable at all marketing them correspond to the price disparities centres, with the exception of Duisburg, in prices to be expected in a normal 'provided that the quantities of .

. . harvest under natural conditions of price durum wheat marketed at the time of a formation on the market and allow the normal harvest are less than the free movement of cereals within the quantities consumed within the Community in accordance with the Community' (Article 4 of Regulation No requirements of the market. 1528/71). The new single derived The threshold price, calculated for intervention price was equal to the Rotterdam, is fixed for the Community lowest derived intervention price existing in such a way that on the Duisburg under Article 4 of Regulation No

120/67. market the sale price of the imported product — taking into account transport Regulation No 796/72 of the Council of costs from Rotterdam — is at the level 17 April 1972 (OJ L 94, 21. 4.1972 p. 7) of the target price. abolished the basic intervention price As regards the guaranteed minimum and replaced it by a single intervention price, Article 10 of Regulation No price equal to the derived intervention 120/67 lays down that 'where the price existing previously (Article 2). intervention price for durum wheat valid Article 4 of Regulation No 120/67 was modified to this effect. for the marketing centre of the area with the largest surplus is lower than the For the 1971/72 marketing year, the guaranteed minimum price, aid shall be prices in force on the market in durum granted for the production of this wheat were as follows:

cereal'. The payment of this aid, — Target price: 127-50 u.a./metric ton. amounting to the difference between the (Article 1 of Regulation No 1054/71 guaranteed minimum price and the of the Council of 25 May 1971, OJ L aforementioned intervention price is the 115, 27. 5.1971 p. 8). responsibility of the public authorities. In theory, purchasers of French and — Basic intervention price: 119-85 Italian durum wheat — in the present u.a./metric ton (Article 1 of

WERHAHN v COUNCIL

Regulation No 1054/71 of the The Advocate-General delivered his Council of 25 May 1971). opinion at the hearing on 18 September 1973. — Single derived intervention price: 112-44 u.a./metric ton (Article 1 of Regulation No 1530/71 of the II — Conclusions of the Council of 12 July 1971, OJ L 162, parties 20. 7.1971 p. 16).

— Threshold price: 125-25 u.a./metric The applicants claim that the Court ton (Single Article of Regulation No should: 1120/71 of the Council of 28 May 1971, OJ L 118, 31. 5.1971 p. 3). In Case 63/72

— Guaranteed minimum price: 147-90 '1. Order the defendants jointly to pay u.a./metric ton (Article 1 of the applicant by way of Regulation No 1054/71 of the compensation for the damage Council of 25 May 1971). sustained by it the sum of DM — Amount granted by way of aid to 667 894-48, plus interest at the rate durum wheat production: 35-46 of 7 % as from 1 February 1972. u.a./metric ton (i.e. the difference 2. Order the defendants to pay the between the guaranteed minimum costs.' price and the single derived intervention price: 147-90 u.a. — In Case 64/72 112-44 u.a.). '1. Order the defendants jointly to pay (c) Procedure to the applicant by way of compensation for the damage The applications, dated 8 September sustained by it the sum of DM 1972, were filed with the Registry of the Court on 13 September 1972, 3 256 931-40, plus interest at the rate of 7 % as from 1 February 1972. By Order dated 31 October 1972, the Court decided to join the present cases 2. Order the defendants to pay the for the purposes of procedure and costs.' judgment. By letter dated 8 January 1973 the In Case 65/72 applicants' representative informed the Court that the original applicants in '1. Order the defendants jointly to pay cases 64/72, 66/72 and 68/72, that is to to the applicant by way of say 'Kurt Kampffmeyer Mühlen, compensation for the damage Hamburg', 'Duisburger Mühlenwerke sustained by it the sum of DM AG, Duisburg' and 'Süddeutsche 1 081 236-76, plus interest at the rate Mühlenwerke AG, Frankfurt', had been of 7 % as from 1 February 1972. amalgamated under the common name 2. Order the defendants to pay the of 'Kurt Kampffmeyer Mühlenvereini­ costs.' gung KG. Upon hearing the report of the In Case 66/72 Judge-Rapporteur and the opinion of the Advocate-General, the Court did not '1. Order the defendants jointly to pay consider it necessary to undertake a to the applicant by way of compen­ preliminary inquiry. sation for the damage sustained by The oral observations of the parties were it the sum of DM 592 648-72, plus submitted at the hearing on 19 and 20 interest at the rate of 7 % as from June 1973. 1 February 1972.

JUDGMENT OF 13. 11. 1973 — JOINED CASES 63 TO 69/72

2. Order the defendants to pay the view of economics analysed the costs.' production, processing and consumption of durum wheat in the European In Case 67/72 Economic Community, as well as the systems for collection and distribution '1. Order the defendants jointly to pay and the methods covering the grant of to the applicant by way of aids, the applicants put forward the compensation for the damage sustained by it the sum of DM following grounds of complaint: 959 635-40, plus interest at the rate While the price system for the market in of 7 % as from 1 February 1972. cereals introduced by Regulation No 19 (OJ No 30 of 20 April 1962, p. 933/62), 2. Order the defendants to pay the costs.' reproduced by Regulation No 120/67 of the Council, has as its object common In Case 68/72 wheat and barley i.e. cereals produced throughout the Community and in '1. Order the defendants jointly to pay respect of which there exists a to the applicant by way of Community market, there exists, on the compensation for the damage other hand, no free market for durum sustained by it the sum of DM wheat in the Community. This cereal is 1 409 662-21 plus interest at the rate only produced in limited areas and is of 7 % as from 1 February 1972. bought by cereal meal producers established in or near those areas. 2. Order the defendants to pay the costs.' Moreover, fixing the target price and the basic intervention price for Duisburg In Case 69/72 makes no sense. Whilst admittedly that region has three durum wheat mills, '1. Order the defendants jointly to pay Duisburg is not the biggest importing to the applicant by way of centre, for it is altogether irrational and compensation for the damage contrary to the objectives of stabilization sustained by it the sum of DM as expressed in Article 39 of the Treaty, 1 509 272-04, plus interest at the rate to divert from French and Italian areas of 7 % as from 1 February 1972. of production the durum wheat which is 2. Order the defendants to pay the harvested there, when there are in fact costs.' cereal meal producers in those regions. The target prices and the basic The defendants contend that the Court intervention prices fixed in respect of the should: 1971/72 marketing year by Regulation 'Dismiss the applications and order the No 1054/71 accordingly do not fulfil the applicants to pay the costs.' purpose for which they are designed. The omission from Regulation No 796/72 of the basic intervention price III — Submissions and argu­ confirms this conclusion.

ments of the parties A comparison of the level of the single derived intervention price (112-44 u.a.) The submissions and arguments of the with the target price (127-50 u.a.) and parties may be summarized as follows: the basic intervention price (119-85 u.a.) shows that the derived intervention price A — The application was not intended to direct goods to Duisburg and that its practical effect was Issues of fact limited to the area surrounding the Having considered the relevant production centre. The so-called regulations and having from the point of 'derived' intervention prices were thus

WERHAHN v COUNCIL

intentionally designed as regional prices 15-38 u.a. or DM 56-29 per metric ton of restricting the circulation of durum cereal meal) and 11-53 u.a. per metric wheat to a relatively limited region. In ton of durum wheat (that is 16-30 u.a. or 1971/72 they drastically inhibited the DM 59-66 per metric ton of cereal meal). formation of a market for durum wheat Besides, whilst imports of durum wheat harvested within the Community meal from France and Italy, amounted extending into the Federal Republic and to no more than 20 % of German

the Benelux countries. consumption, they resulted in grave This so-called derived intervention price market disturbances since, by reason of in fact amounted to a true regional the dominant position of the Birkel target price, so much so that the undertaking, (the main buyer of French threshold price fixed on the basis of the and Italian cereal meal), German cereal imaginary target price likewise had no meal producers were obliged to align connexion with prices actually applied in their prices on those applicable in France production and processing markets for and Italy, which were appreciably lower.

durum wheat. In the Member States which do not The applicants complain that the defendant institutions failed to seek a produce durum wheat and which do not solution to this situation. have access to the Community market in durum wheat, the part played by the The Council ought, in the applicants' threshold price is limited to protecting view, either to have brought the the market in common wheat against threshold price down to the level of the importations of durum wheat. But, in single derived intervention price, treating France and Italy this is done by means of the latter as the target price or modifying the intervention prices which are lower Article 5 of Regulation No 120/67, or to than the threshold price. It would have reduced the aid to producers of therefore have sufficed to have fixed a durum wheat provided for by threshold price in the other Member Regulation No 135/67 (OJ No 122 of 22

States at the same level. June 1967, p. 2393), reducing it to 22-65 The fact that cereal meal producers in u.a. per metric ton instead of 35-46 u.a. Germany and the Benelux countries In this way French and Italian producers were obliged during the 1971/72 would have continued to receive the marketing year to import durum wheat guaranteed minimum price of 147-90 u.a. at the threshold price (125-25 u.a.) per metric ton, but French and Italian whilst French and Italian producers were cereal meal producers would have paid able to cover the major proportion of 125.25 u.a., instead of 112-44 u.a. their needs at the single derived In the applicants' view one could even intervention price of 112-44 u.a., resulted in a handicap of 12-81 u.a. per metric — as had been provided by Regulation

ton for the former. French and Italian No 19/62 (OJ No 30 of 20 April 1962, cereal meal producers were in a position p. 933) — have granted a preferential to offer durum wheat meal at prices margin of 1-1 u.a. per metric ton to lower by DM 38 to 50 than those of French and Italian home production as German and Benelux producers. compared with imports from third countries. On the assumption that the ratio of durum wheat imports from third Issues of law countries into France and Italy to home production, is as 20 to 80 or as 10 to 90 In the applicants' view the defendants, as the case may be then German and by legislative acts and by regulations as Benelux producers are still subject to a well as by a failure to supervise the handicap respectively of 10-25 u.a. per market in durum wheat, infringed metric ton of durum wheat (representing several important Community principles.

JUDGMENT OF 13. 11. 1973 — JOINED CASES 63 TO 69/72

The objective of stabilizing agricultural As regards the price system established markets, provided for by Article 39 (1) by Regulation No 120/67, the Council (c) of the Treaty, the prohibition of points out that a target price is always discrimination set out in Article 40 (3), unreal in character, since it amounts to second paragraph and, as regards the an ideal price. The threshold price, the fixing of the threshold price for the level of which depends upon a 1971/1972 marketing year, the principle correlation between the markets in of proportionality envisaged by Article durum wheat and in common wheat is 40 (3) first paragraph are all alleged to not excessive since the resale price of the have been infringed. French and Italian collecting agencies is In the circumstances the Council higher than the intervention price.

As incurred liability, because the fixing of regards the latter, the reduced the single derived intervention price importance of intervention operations on prevented the entry of French and Italian the French and Italian markets justified durum wheat into the Federal Republic. the removal by means of Regulation No 1528/71 of multiple derived intervention The Commission, which made the prices. Besides, the criticisms directed proposals forming the basis of the against the intervention price in any criticized acts on the part of the Council, event lack relevance, because the fixing likewise shares this liability. of an intervention price, even if The principle of proportionality, inadequate, has no effect on the enshrined in Article 40 (3), first functioning of the market since it is not paragraph, of the Treaty was infringed on the basis of this price that market by the fixing of the threshold price at an prices are established. excessive level.

Since in the present case The absence of real grounds for the part played by the threshold price complaint against the system of was limited to protecting the production Regulation No 120/67 is further shown of common wheat against imports of durum wheat and since the same in the Council's opinion, by the delay in making the complaint, showing the objective was achieved, in countries absence of a causal link between the producing durum wheat, by the fixing of system under Regulation No 120/67 and the single derived intervention price, it its application, on the one hand, and the would have been sufficient to fix the unfavourable situation of which the threshold price at the same level, i.e. applicants complain, on the other.

112-44 u.a. For a true understanding of the handicap Since by adopting the criticized measures to which German cereal meal producers the defendant institutions consciously are subject, one might, in the Council's created the division of the market which view, to take into account the following resulted in the damage suffered by the factors which to a marked degree limit applicants, those institutions must incur the real difference between the German liability. Accordingly the defendants prices on the one hand and French and should compensate the applicants for the Italian prices on the other. damage suffered. — The market price paid to French and Italian producers of durum wheat has frequently been higher than the B — Defence of the Council intervention (price on the Paris Stock Exchange there was a difference of Issues of fact between 3 and 7 u.a. in September In its statement of defence the Council in 1972). the first place makes certain objections — The German cereal meal producers of a general nature in relation to the have a lower rate of extraction, application. probably due to their attempts to

WERHAHN v COUNCIL

achieve a higher degree of purity, the Council and the Commission since which would explain in part the only one party can be liable. Besides, the higher price asked by them. proceedings are wrongly brought against the Commission since, even it if had — The cost of transport from France to made a proposal to the Council Germany for cereal meal is higher than for durum wheat. involving illegality, it is not liable in respect of an act adopted by the — The exemption from payment of last-mentioned institution. compensatory amounts from May 1971 to May 1972 on imports of As regards the general and abstract durum wheat from third countries character of the acts in relation to had in the case of the German cereal which liability on the part Of the meal producers produced an Community is alleged exchange rate advantage which could

Whilst admitting the distinction be estimated at 14 % up to the official devaluation of the dollar on 9 repeatedly asserted by the Court as May 1972 and which was still 5 to existing between the action for annulment and the action to establish 6 % subsequently. liability (Judgment of 2 December 1971, — To calculate the gap between the Case 5/71, Aktien-Zuckerfabrik threshold price (125-25 u.a.) and the Schöppenstedt v Council, Rec. 1971, p. market price, one also ought to take 975; Judgment of 13 June 1972, Case into account the profit — margin of 11/71, Compagnie d' Approvisionnement the collecting agencies, as well as the v Commission, Rec. 1972, p. 391), the possibilities of advance fixing of the Council is of the opinion that it follows levy. from the abstract and general nature of the acts on the basis of which In the Council's view, the impossibility facing the German cereal meal producers Community liability is alleged, that insofar as an action for annulment in of obtaining durum wheat in France and in Italy — insofar as one admits it to be relation to acts not affecting the real — is due not to the organization of applicants by reason of their particular characteristics is not admissible the market but to a lack of vigilance on the part of the German cereal meal (Judgment of 15 July 1963, Case 25/62, producers in not paying sufficient Plaumann v Commission, Rec. 1963, p. attention to market development and 197; Judgment of 2 July 1964, Case becoming interested only at a late stage 7/64, Glucoseries Reunies v Commis in the possibilities of entering the French sion, Rec. 1964, p. 811), an action to and Italian market in durum wheat. establish liability based upon the financial consequences of these acts is likewise not admissible since, as those Issues of law consequences do not affect the applicants directly, they also could not As regards the defendant institutions cause them a direct and special damage, and their joint liability this being a basic condition for establishing liability.

An application based upon non-contrac tual liability, within the meaning of As regards the relation of cause and Article 215, second paragraph, cannot be effect brought jointly against Council and Commission but only against the The Council furthermore denies the Community, which alone, under the existence of a causal link between the provisions of Article 210, has legal allegedly culpable acts and the damage personality. Accordingly, there can be no which is said to have resulted therefrom. question of joint liability on the part of The applicants do not show that the

JUDGMENT OF 13. 11. 1573 — JOINED CASES 63 TO 69/72

insolation of the French market by ity, when alleged against a general and reason of long-term contracts entered abstract act constituting a choice of into by the French cereal meal producers economic policy, must amount to an resulted from the system under infringement of a particularly serious Regulation No 120/67 and its kind which it is said was not the case application. here.

As regards culpability C — Defence of the Commission According to the Council, it is essentially a liability based upon culpability which Issues of fact the applicants allege, that is to say: — infringement of two higher rules of On the substance, the Commission law, that is first, respect for the supports the point of view of the Council and considers: objective of stabilization of markets (Article 39 (1)(c)) and, secondly, the — that the threshold price in respect of rule against discrimination contained durum wheat was not fixed at too in Article 40 (3), second paragraph. high a level in relation to the — infringement of the principle of intervention price applicable in the proportionality which must exist production areas and that therefore between an administrative measure there had not been either

and the effect envisaged thereby, discrimination or lack of proportion­ which as regards agriculture, is set ality; out in Article 40 (3), first paragraph, — that no sufficient link of causality of the Treaty, which provide that the between the legislative measures common organization of the markets criticized and the damage alleged had must not involve measures in excess been established; of those necessary for attaining the objectives defined by Article 39. — the price advantage of French cereal meal producers was smaller than had As regards the infringement of Article 39 been asserted by the applicants. (1)(c) (the objective of stabilization of the market) and of Article 40 (3) second paragraph (discrimination against Ger­ Issues of law man cereal meal producers), the Council As regards the defendant institutions denies that in the present case the facts and their joint liability amount to a sufficiently clear case of culpable infringement of these obliga­ The Commission points out that the tions. appeal could in any event not result in a The complaint based upon the condemnation of the institutions, when infringement of the principle of under the terms of Article 215 it is in proportionality relates to the high level fact the Community as such which is of the threshold price, which is said not liable. to have been necessary in order to attain As to which of the institutions shall have the objectives of the common policy. to represent the Community in an action The Council replies that since this level based upon non-contractual liability, the was necessary in order to avoid acute Commission rejects the idea that the disturbance on the market in durum Community shall be represented by the wheat arising from the competition of institution which promulgated the act either imported durum wheat or of criticized or which committed an error. common wheat. In general, the Community must, in Looked at from any point of view, the actions for damages and interest based infringement of the rule of proportional- upon irregularity of legal acts, be

WERHAHN v COUNCIL

represented by the Commission. In this general application, such as the creation connexion, Article 211 of the Treaty is of a system for the common no more than the expression of a organization of the market, traders must principle of wider application, i.e. it lies accept certain inequalities consequent in the nature of the 'executive' upon the adoption of organizational institution within the Community to criteria that apply to all. Accordingly, defend the economic interests of the there is no discrimination unless the Community, both before national courts inequality is out of proportion to the and before the Court of Justice. Any objective aimed at by the regulation.

A problems that arise where the irregular stricter interpretation of the principle of act was committed within the sphere of equality would limit the discretionary influence of other institutions ought to power of the legislator in an be resolved by agreement between the unacceptable manner. institutions. The consequences triggered off did not Finally, as regards admissibility, the have the effect attributed to them and Commission feels that if one accepts that did not directly result from the acts the Community may be rendered directly criticized. A handicap of DM 15 to 20 liable for legislative measures, then one per metric ton on the price of durum ought to put some limits to this wheat cannot, in the context of an principle, as had indeed been done by organization of the market, be the Court in its Judgments of 2 considered a sufficient indication of a December 1971 (Case 5/71, Zuckerfa clear infringement of the principle of brik Schöppenstedt, Rec. 1971, p. 985) equality. This is all the more true if that and 13 June 1972 (Joined Cases 9 and advantage even though undeniable 11/71, Compagnie d'Approvisionnement, derives from the totality of market Rec. 1972, p. 391). Thus the applicants' conditions and not only from the acts account did not adequately show 'a criticized. sufficiently flagrant violation of a higher The Commission compares such a rule of law for the protection of the limitation of liability for legislative acts individual'. with the French doctrine of 'particular The Commission nevertheless considers serious detriment to a small number of it preferable to examine this question persons' ('prejudice special et grave à un within the framework of the substance petit nombre de personnes'), with the of the application rather than in relation special conditions of Article 34 of the to its admissibility. ECSC Treaty and with the 'Sonderopfer' in German legal theory. As regards the legality of the acts As regards the complaint of infringement

criticized of the principle of proportionality, the Commission considers that whilst As regards the complaint of discrimination, the Commission admits admittedly it would have been possible that it was and it still is easier for French slightly to lower the threshold price producers of cereal meal to obtain without affecting Community produc indigenous durum wheat, but it tion, this does not constitute a clear considers that this is a disadvantage infringement of the principle of which must be accepted. A clear proportionality, when one takes into infringement of the principle of equality account the discretionary power of the

Administration. would imply a certain gravity both from the point of view of the extent and scope As regards the existence of intentional of the act in question and from the point and flagrant culpability of view of the importance of the consequences. The Commission rejects the argument In the case of a legislative measure of according to which the Council and the

JUDGMENT OF 13. 11. 1973 — JOINED CASES 63 TO 69/72

Commission intentionally divided the imports of durum wheat and cereal meal market and knowingly discriminated made from durum wheat are said to against German cereal meal producers in cancel each other out. terms of price. The difficulties experienced by German cereal meal producers in obtaining As regards the detriment supplies in France are said to be Finally, the Commission disputes the connected with the fact that, bearing in mind the existence of contracts entered calculation of the detriment, which it finds all too simple. In order to calculate into by the 'Symprodur' organization, it correctly, it would be necessary to durum wheat does not reach the open prove that the alleged price advantage market and cannot influence the price resulted in the loss of a definite part of levels on that market.

Besides, even the market, or in the case of a market where, as is said to be the case in the that had not been lost, in a diminution north of France, durum wheat is not the of income. subject matter of cultivation and delivery contracts, it is nevertheless delivered Finally, the Commission argues that the directly to the three cereal meal applicants had done nothing to avoid or producers in that market, both by reason limit the detriment. of their dominant position and as a matter of commercial logic. Increased exports of cereal meal to D — Reply of the applicants Germany, which became possible owing to the aids granted for durum

Issues of fact wheat production, enable French cereal The applicants say in reply that if the meal producers to spread their fixed Community institutions are entitled to costs over a bigger production and to encourage the cultivation of durum lower their cost price. They are thus wheat by the grant of aids, then these enabled to refrain from modifying their measures ought to be harmonized in a sale price within the country and to way which would not affect the lower their export prices considerably. economic interests of the citizens of the This procedure enables them also to Community. pass on solely on the French market the increase in cost due to obtaining some In the course of criticizing the 20 % of the supplies in durum wheat Commission's calculations on various from third countries und to keep export points, such as the under-valuation of prices at a low level. the importers' profit margins and the failure to include the costs of customs In practice, therefore, German cereal clearance, of phyto-sanitary inspection, meal producers could not, by reason of of providing security and of insurance, their geographical disadvantage effectiv the applicants estimate the price ely compete with the exports of French cereal meal producers to Germany, even advantage in favour of French cereal meal producers to be 13-54 u.a. per if there was a theoretical possibility of so metric ton of cereal meal, instead of 8 doing. The cost of the necessary

u.a. transport excludes any profit. The applicants deny the advantage alleged to have been obtained by them Issues of law as a result of exemption from As regards the institutions which are compensatory amounts on imports of alleged to be liable durum wheat from third countries. In practice, the advantages and disadvan An action based upon Article 215, tages resulting from the non-collection second paragraph, of the Treaty may be of compensatory amounts applicable to brought either against the Council or

WERHAHN v COUNCIL

against the Commission, depending in the Federal German Republic, the upon whether the damage is said to have Benelux countries and in the new Member been caused by the agents of one or States of the Community. There would, other institution. An action can therefore in the applicants' view, be no objection equally well be brought against the two to fixing several threshold prices. The institutions in the event where the unity of the organization of the markets damage has been caused by the agents of can only be preserved if prices are

both institutions. Compensation for the adapted to regional differences and if, damage caused can of course only be where the situation so requires, several claimed once. threshold prices are fixed. In the applicants' view there was grave As regards the illegal aspects of the negligence on the part of the Council organization of the market in durum and the Commission resulting in liability wheat on their part, in that they did not take these circumstances into account, all the Both the prohibition of discrimination more so since the particular features of and respect for the principle of propor the market in durum wheat were known tionality constitute higher rules of law to them as a result of a study made in protecting the individual and the flagrant 1965 by the Commission services. violation thereof justifies an action for

compensation. As regards the obligation to If observance of these rules so requires, compensate the applicants on the the institutions ought to fix several ground of an intervention on the part threshold and intervention prices whilst of the public authority equivalent to in fact they kept to the simplistic concept dispossession of a single threshold price, a single target The applicants argue that the legislative price and a single intervention price. measures by which aids were fixed and As regards the principle of proportional the price systems created, amounted to ity, the applicants consider that the illegal intervention striking at private provisions relating to the discretionary ownership, which was equivalent to power which under the Treaty is dispossession and created an entitlement attributed to the EEC institutions, are to damages. Such liability, recognized by limited by the meaning and object of the German law, is said to exist quite apart price-fixing mechanism and by higher from any culpability on the part of the rules of law. Thus the fixing of the intervening authority if the intervention prices ought not excessively to encroach amounts to an illegal dispossession.

The upon the private sector. applicants argue that, despite the The function of the threshold price for Bundesgerichtshof having laid down the durum wheat is to protect on the one requirement of a direct link between the hand the market in common wheat and intervention and the damage, an indirect on the other hand the domestic market link between cause and effect is in fact sufficient. in durum wheat. The first objective could have been achieved by fixing the Since Article 215, second paragraph, of threshold price at 112-44 u.a., i.e. the the Treaty in no way links liability to single derived intervention price, which the existence of a fault or to a direct is considered as protecting common link, the principle of an intervention wheat in France and Italy sufficiently. equivalent to an illegal dispossession is a The second objective could have been part of Community law and ought to be achieved by fixing a threshold price for applied in the present litigation since the Rotterdam reduced to the intervention legislative acts by which the aids were price level, this applying solely in fixed, as well as the price systems that respect of cereal meal producers installed were set up, were illegal, not being

JUDGMENT OF 13. 11. 1973 — JOINED CASES 63 TO 69/72

necessary for the purpose of achieving purchase durum wheat in France by the objects of Article 39 of the Treaty, as reason of Community regulations. long as there were other possibilities of In fact, ever since 1967 there had been fixing prices and promoting the growing an increase in exports of French durum of durum wheat without distorting wheat to the Federal Republic and the competition between cereal meal Benelux countries. The fact that this producers. increase remains on a modest scale, is due to the fact that the marketing of As regards the extent of the damage durum wheat follows the channels that exist for common wheat and because Under international law, an injured up to 1972 the applicants made no real party has the possibility of evaluating efforts to investigate the market possibil the damage sustained either in an ities. abstract or in a concrete manner. By Secondly, the price advantage enjoyed by basing themselves upon the difference French producers of cereal meal is between the threshold price fixed for appreciably reduced by reason of the 1971/72 and that which, in their view, fact that Community production does ought to have been fixed, the applicants not show a surplus. It has not been

adopted the abstract method because it proved that French cereal meal is the simplest one for all parties producers buy French durum wheat at concerned. the intervention price. Moreover, French Besides, one cannot attribute to the producers of cereal meal who export to applicants a part of the liability, on the Germany are obliged to replenish their basis of an argument that they had not stock with Canadian durum wheat. sought to bring an action against the As regards the complaint based upon the fixing of the levies. Under German allegation that the applicants are only fiscal law the applicants, not being able to restock at the threshold price importers of durum wheat, were not whilst their French competitors buy at qualified to appeal against the levies. the intervention price, the Council notes that the different solutions suggested by the applicants — such as abandoning a E — Rejoinders of the Council and of single threshold price, a single

the Commission intervention price and a single target In its rejoinder the Council argues firstly price, the fixing of a lower threshold that the argument raised by the price for non-producing States coupled with an international customs inspection, applicants concerning expropriation or the reduction of the threshold price or the encroachment on property equivalent to abandoning of the aid to durum wheat dispossession is inadmissible. Article 42 production — would hinder the (2), first paragraph of the Rules of realization of the common agricultural Procedure, in fact prohibits the raising of market and would ruin the possibilities fresh issues in the course of proceedings, of developing the production of durum unless they are based on matters of law wheat, an objective conforming with or of fact which only came to light in

Article (1) (a), (b) and (d). the course of the written procedure, which does not apply in the present case. For its part, the Commission observes that one cannot apply the term 'discrimination' to negative effects that Issues of fact result from the effort to promote durum As regards the facts presented by the wheat. Such a criticism in fact amounts applicants, the Council notes that it is to a criticism of the economic and incorrect to say that the German cereal commercial expediency of the system.

In meal producers had not been able to comparing the situation of the German

WERHAHN v COUNCIL

and French mills, when it comes to their Rotterdam of the threshold price at the possibilities of purchasing French durum intervention price level would run wheat, the Commission points out that counter to the very objective of the whatever might cause any difficulties in measure intended to aid the production obtaining supplies, whether it be of durum wheat. French prices would commercial traditions or restrictions on stagnate, the French durum wheat competition, at any rate it is not the market would show a surplus, finally regulation setting up the organization of resulting in the diminution of the the market in wheat which is at fault. production of durum wheat. A Besides, it is inaccurate to say that a differentiated threshold price for the market on which there is a deficit markets of Germany and the Benelux precludes the possibility of exports. In countries would moreover have a consequence, the increased demand discriminatory effect at the expense of the French and Italian mills which resulting from the presence of foreign buyers ought to stabilize prices at a level depend upon imports from third higher than that of the intervention countries.

price. Finally, the proposed measure would As regards the advantages that accrue to run counter to the objective of removing French cereal meal producers from their internal customs barriers and would geographical location, the Commission prompt a series of similar demands in regards this as an inevitable consequence respect of other products for which a of the enlargement of the market. It is, common price has been fixed and for as a result, perfectly natural that a which at production level there are geographical choice made in a national regional disparities. context might subsequently, in the larger It follows from the foregoing arguments common market framework, turn out to that the price advantages allegedly have been eroneous or at least less enjoyed by French cereal meal advantageous. It is certainly not the producers, are of no more than Community's imperative objective to put secondary importance, and the an end to imports of durum wheat Community is not obliged to reduce the originating from third countries and to threshold price. The fact that the attain a point of self-sufficiency, but if to Commission did not take into account further the cultivation of durum wheat is the importers' profit margins in its recognized as a reasonable objective and comparative calculations, was quite if following from this, priority is given to deliberate: the Commission had, in fact, trade within the Community, that would disregarded all the incidental costs which amount to no more than confirmation of are practically the same for French and that Community preference which is German cereal meal producers. recognized by the Court of Justice, Following an analysis of transport costs, particularly in the Beus Judgment of 13 the Commission points out that it is not March 1968 (Case 5/67, Rec. 1968, p. denied by the applicants that the 147). producer price may be and sometimes is As regards the aid granted to durum in excess of the intervention price, a fact wheat production, the applicants which shows that effectively the level of themselves admitted that it formed part the producer price depends on market of the framework of objectives aimed at conditions and on competition and by Article 39. It likewise does not violate might thus show tendency to rise. the principles of non-discrimination and The Commission likewise insists that of proportionality. during the period covered by the case, To differentiate the threshold price as there existed a monetary advantage in suggested by the applicants would have favour of German cereal meal disastrous effects. Thus the fixing for producers. On a long-term basis this

JUDGMENT OF 13. 11. 1973 — JOINED CASES 63 TO 69/72

advantage is said to have been three to If the applicants' thesis were to be four times the advantage derived by admitted then it would follow from this French cereal meal exporters and could that the liability on the part of the therefore not have been absorbed by the Community, aimed at by Article 215, higher prices that applied on the French second paragraph, would rest on a market. double legal basis, when in fact the Court ought to adhere to the uniform In fact, the price advantage enjoyed by principle of liability on the part of the French cereal meal producers could in

Community. Besides, it follows from the the Commission's view in no case have Kampffmeyer Judgment that the Court exceededDM 30/metric ton and on does not consider it possible to apply average amounted to DM 15 to 20 this German legal theory in matters of /metric ton. The Commission stresses liability. Such liability derives from the that in any event this advantage is not a principle of defence of private property determining factor. If the Court were to and cannot, in the light of the Court's

take a different view, then a careful case law, be invoked against legal acts examination of the costs situation would on the part of the Community be required so as to find out whether institutions. there had been a clear infringement of the principle of equality. Neither is it a case of the fundamental As regards Italian cereal meal producers, right of the individual provided for by the Commission denies that these the general principles of Community constituted even a potential danger for legislation, the observance of which the German producers, having regard to the Court of Justice is obliged to ensure. relatively high transport and marketing costs, and it affirms that in any case on the Italian market a not inconsiderable Besides, in the defendants' view the situation at issue, both in its factual and quantity of durum wheat from third legal aspects, does not lend itself to an countries, competing with the local application of the theory in question, production, is imported. even if — which is not the case — the theory were accepted.

For a right to As regards the right to compensation compensation to exist, there has to be an for an intervention by the authorities, intervention which if it were legal, equivalent to illegal dispossession would represent a dispossession both by its object and by its effect. On the other The claim for compensation based upon hand, the mere change in possibilities of the concept of expropriation is in the obtaining supplies, in volume of defendant's view unfounded. production and in the share of the market does not suffice; it would require a real Firstly, it is open to argument whether encroachment upon the substance of a the theory of compensation for an illegal commercial or industrial undertaking. intervention equivalent to encroachment The circumstances surrounding the upon private property forms part of the establishment of an undertaking, and 'general principles common to the laws therefore in the first place the of the Member States', mentioned in conditions of obtaining supplies of basic

Article 215. The defendants on this point materials, are not part of the elements quote the opinion of Mr Advocate-Ge necessary for its functioning, in relation neral Gand in Joined Cases 5, 7 and 13 to which it can ask for protection to 24/66 (Kampffmeyer, Rec. 1967, p. against an intervention equivalent to 358) from which it appears that, in this dispossession. That was the decision in field, a principle common to the laws of a judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof of the Member States does not exist. 31 January 1966 (BGHZ, Vol 45, p. 87).

WERHAHN v COUNCIL

The defendants argue in conclusion, that As regards the assessment of the the theory invoked is foreign to the basic damage principles of the common market since its proper functioning implies precisely The Commission denies that there exists the establishment of industries in the in international law, in private most appropriate place; they go on to international law or even in international say that the Community system does not commercial law a rule or custom

provide for compensation in respect of permitting the damage to be assessed in difficulties of adaptation caused to abstracto. As a subsidiary point, it asks enterprises by reason of the interplay of that in the event of the Court accepting economic laws. the existence of liability on the part of Finally, the Commission considers that the institutions the decision relating to the applicants have not succeeded in damage be reserved by an interlocutory establishing the direct effect of the judgment. intervention upon the functioning of The parties submitted their observations their enterprises, an element which, in at the hearing of 19 and 20 June 1973. Germany, is considered an essential The Advocate-General presented his factor for applying the theory of opinion at the hearing of 18 September intervention equivalent to dispossession. 1973.

Grounds of judgment

1 These actions have the same subject matter and it is appropriate to decide upon them in one and the same judgment.

2 The actions seek — in the terms of the applications — an order jointly against the Council and the Commission and — in the terms of the reply — an order against the Community for payment of an amount of DM 9 487 281 by way of compensation to the applicants for damage sustained by them during the cereal marketing year 1971/1972 as a result of the non-rational and illegal management of the common organization of the market in cereals, as regards durum wheat.

The Regulations particularly referred to Regulation No 120/67 of the Council of 13 June 1967 (OJ L 117, 19. 6. 1967, p. 2269/67) establishing a common organization of the market in cereals, Regulation No 1054/71 of 25 May 1971 (OJ L 115, 27. 5. 1971, p. 8), No 1120/71 of 28 May 1971 (OJ L 118, 31. 5. 1971, p. 3) and No 1530/71 of 12 July 1971 (OJ L 162, 20. 7. 1971, p. 16) fixing in relation to the cereal marketing year 1971/1972 the target price for durum wheat at 127-50 u.a., the threshold price at 125-25 u.a., the basic intervention price at 119-85 u.a., the single derived intervention price at 112-44 u. a. and the guaranteed minimum price at 147-90 u. a.

JUDGMENT OF 13. 11. 1973 — JOINED CASES 63 TO 69/72

3 The system of aid to Community production of durum wheat within France and in Italy, as set up by these Regulations, allowed the French and Italian cereal meal producers to obtain home-grown durum wheat at the intervention price (112-44 u.a.) or close thereto, whilst the German cereal meal producers were obliged to purchase durum wheat imported from third countries at the threshold price (125-25 u.a.)

Pursuant to Article 10 of Regulation No 120/67, aid granted to durum wheat producers shall be equal to the difference between the guaranteed minimum price (147-90 u. a.) and the intervention price applicable to the marketing centre of the area with the largest surplus, i.e. it amounts in the present case to the single derived intervention price, that is to say 112-44 u.a.

This provision, combined with the structure of the durum wheat market in France, in the applicants' view necessarily results in giving French mills an artificial advantage as regards their cost of production which on the German market for cereal meal produced distortions in competition to the detriment of German cereal meal producers.

4 The applicants base their right to compensation in the main on their complaint that the Community institutions organized in a defective manner the aid to durum wheat production, in particular by fixing the intervention price at too low a level in respect of home-grown durum wheat, and the threshold price at too high a level in respect of imported durum wheat, at any rate as regards imports to countries other than France and Italy.

If the intervention price had been fixed at a higher level, then the producers of durum wheat would nevertheless have been assured of receiving the mini­ mum price guaranteed to them by the aid system (147-90 u.a.), but the French cereal meal producers would in that case have paid for their basic product a price nearer to that paid by their competitors who were obliged to obtain their supplies from third countries.

In the absence of such a measure, the discrimination alleged could have been avoided by reducing the threshold price in a way that allowed the cereal meal producers who had virtually no access to the French and Italian durum wheat markets to purchase their raw material at prices near to these paid by their competitors who, at any rate indirectly, were favoured by the aid measures.

WERHAHN v COUNCIL

5 In their reply the applicants further and as a subsidiary point refer to the existence of a principle under which there should be compensation for an illegal intervention by a public authority, equivalent to expropriation.

I — As regards the admissibility of the appeal bearing in mind that it is directed against the Council and the Commission jointly

6 According to the defendants the appeal is inadmissible since it applies for an order against the Council and the Commission jointly, whilst Article 215 lays down that it is the Community which has to make good damage caused by its institutions.

According to the Council, the Community ought in such proceedings to be represented by the institution against which the allegation is made.

According to the Commission on the other hand one must by analogy to Article 211 of the Treaty hold that whatever the institution that caused the fact alleged, it is the Commission's function to represent the Community before the Court.

7 Article 211 of the Treaty deals with the legal capacity and the representation of the Community in the legal systems of the different Member States.

By reason of the differences in this respect which are inherent in these legal systems it was desirable to establish a rule applicable to all cases.

Under the Community legal system on the other hand it is in the interests of a good administration of justice that where Community liability is involved by reason of the act of one of its institutions, it should be represented before the Court by the institution or institutions against which the matter giving rise to liability is alleged.

8 The applicants allege that this matter has its origin both with the Commission and with the Council, the first for having made a proposal, the second for having legislated.

Accordingly they are justified in bringing the proceedings against the Com­ munity as represented by the two institutions.

JUDGMENT OF 13. 11. 1973 — JOINED CASES 63 TO 69/72

Furthermore, the fact that an order is applied for jointly against the two institutions and not specifically against the Community, is not of a kind that would result in inadmissibility of the application since it does not affect the rights of the defence.

9 The application is admissible.

II — On the substance

to Since the matter deals with a legislative act involving choices of economic policy, there is no liability on the part of the Community for damage which individuals may have suffered by the reason of this act, bearing in mind the provisions of Article 215, second paragraph, of the Treaty, unless there is a sufficiently flagrant infringement of a superior rule of law protecting the individual.

1. As regards the infringement of Article 39 (1) (c)

11 The applicants allege against the defendant institutions an infringement of Article 30 (1) (c), pursuant to which the common agricultural policy has inter alia the objective of stabilizing markets.

12 In creating a system of aids intended to favour the production of durum wheat in the Community the institutions sought to attain several of the objectives in Article 39, in particular assuring the availability of supplies in the Common Market and the stability of the market by encouraging the cultivation of durum wheat which is showing an unfavourable balance as compared with that of common wheat.

The concept of stabilization of the markets cannot cover the maintenance at all costs of positions already established under previous market conditions.

Besides, it emerges from parts of the record that the production of durum wheat, which before 1966 had only a local economic significance, has increased to such an extent that at the time of the application it permitted Community requirements to be covered to the extend of more than 80 %.

WERHAHN v COUNCIL

A new production of this magnitude must normally result in new movements of trade between Member States.

13 By temporarily giving priority to some of the objectives of Article 39, as compared with the maintenance of established positions, the institutions did not infringe paragraph 1 (c) of this provision.

2. As regards the infringement of Article 40 (3), second paragraph, of the Treaty and of the principle of proportionality

14 The applicants allege that the respondents infringed the rule against dis­ crimination and the principle of proportionality expressed in Article 40 (3) of the Treaty, by not ensuring that the system of aids for production of durum wheat be accompanied by measures that would guarantee to mills of Member States not producing this cereal the availability of imported durum wheat from third countries at the same price level as that paid by their French and Italian competitors.

15 The respondents do not deny that the system of aids which is the subject matter of the proceedings resulted in a advantage for French mills as regards the cost of production for cereal meal, but they consider that this advantage could not have exceeded DM 30 per metric ton, whilst according to the applicants it is of the order of DM 38 to 58 metric tons.

According to the latter this advantage arose — at any rate to a large extent — from the unusually large difference — compared with the price of other cereals — between the threshold price and the single derived intervention price for durum wheat.

16 If the authors of the Regulation — following in this respect the declarations made by the respondents at the hearing — believed that the prices demanded by French agricultural producers would notwithstanding the aid be above the level of the intervention price, then reality did not accord with this forecast, since the prices paid by the cereal meal producers in fact remained at about that price level.

Nevertheless everything seemed to encourage these agricultural producers to demand a higher price, since the aid granted to them in addition to the price they obtained did not amount to bringing their income to the level of the guaranteed minimum price, but was in fact once and for all fixed at 35-46 u.a.

JUDGMENT OF 13. 11. 1973 — JOINED CASES 63 TO 69/72

for the cereal marketing year 1971/72 (i.e., the difference between the inter­ vention price and the guaranteed minimum price) whatever the market price they could obtain from the cereal meal producers.

Accordingly the advantageous prices obtained by the latter seemed to originate in the closed structure of the French market in durum wheat and especially in the particularly close ties there existing between mills and agricultural producers.

The applicants do not seem to have seriously intended changing this situation by attempting to penetrate the French market but rather seem to have expected to secure from a fixing of Community prices the means of compensating for these disadvantages.

They further argue that even in the event of the market being freed, French cereal meal producers would have retained a de facto advantage by reason of their more favourable geographical position close to production centres.

17 This fact does not in itself constitute a prohibitive kind of discrimination but rather the consequence — that is not contrary to the rules of the Treaty — of a more advantageous location of French undertakings.

Nevertheless it does appear that the difference between the German and French market prices for durum wheat exceeds what would result from this advantage, expressed in terms of the difference in transport costs of cereal meal and durum wheat respectively between the Paris area and the German marketing centres.

Whilst this disparity in prices does not originate in Regulation No 120/67 itself, yet it is nonetheless true that the implementing provisions of this Regulation, by not taking into account the special situation of the French market, have facilitated its continuing existence.

18 It is therefore right to examine whether, faced with this situation, the Council ought not to have taken action by providing, even on a provisional basis, measures that would ensure equality of competitive conditions as between the cereal meal producers of the different Member States.

According to the applicants the objectives aimed at by the system of aids could have been attained without imposing upon them that distortion of competition of which they complain, particularly by a reduction in the thres­ hold price for durum wheat.

WERHAHN v COUNCIL

The alleged infringement of the principle of proportionality results from the excessively high level of threshold prices, that is in excess of its function of protecting the Community market, contrary to Article 40 (3) of the Treaty, according to which the common organization may include all measures 'required' to attain the objectives set out in Article 39 but 'shall be limited' to pursuit of these objectives.

Such protection it is said, does not necessitate a threshold price of 125-25 u.a.

19 There is a relationship between the cost price of durum wheat and of common wheat, the former being generally approximately 20 % higher than the latter.

At the risk of seeing an undesirable kind of interference making its appearance on the market in these cereals, this relationship must be taken into account in fixing their respective threshold prices.

The prices fixed for the marketing year 1971/1972, viz. 125-25 u.a. for durum wheat and 107-35 u.a. for common wheat, take this necessity into account.

Besides, the protection granted to Community-grown durum wheat, which is expressed by the difference of 12-81 u.a. between the single derived intervention price and the threshold price, is in fact less than the protection granted to common wheat, that being 14-01 u.a. and not 6-53 u.a. as is claimed by the applicants.

In fact, to measure the respective degrees of protection enjoyed by these two cereals, one must utilize the same terms, that is to say the threshold price and the single derived intervention price and not, as was done by the applicants, to take on one occasion the threshold price and the basic intervention price and on another occasion the threshold price and the derived intervention price.

20 Thus it does not seem that the Council, in its assessment of the level of the threshold price, went beyond what might be considered necessary for achiev­ ing the objects of the aid system for durum wheat.

21 According to the applicants, instead of lowering the threshold prices, the institution could in any event have fixed a lower threshold price applying to those Member States not producing these cereals, whilst maintaining the one in existence for the two producer States in the Community, i.e., France and Italy.

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22 Such a differentiation would not only run counter to the realization of the single market aimed at by Regulation No 120/67 of 13 June 1967 setting up a common organization of the market in cereals but would put the free circulation of goods in jeopardy.

23 It is also necessary to examine whether the objectives of the aid system for durum wheat ought not to have been achieved by fixing a higher intervention price whilst respecting the equality of competitive conditions as between German and French cereal meal producers.

24 Such a procedure could be considered as being of a kind to place in jeopardy the objective of encouraging the Community durum wheat production.

It was capable — particularly in consumer areas situated at a distance from production centres — of creating the risk of Community durum wheat production being replaced by common wheat, of either Community or imported origin.

In fact, under the system in force, the threshold price for common wheat (107-25 u.a.) was already lower than the intervention price for home-grown durum wheat (112-44 u.a.).

It follows that a further increase in the intervention price, would risk creating an inducement to substitute common wheat for Community durum wheat.

25 It has been suggested that instead of an increase of the intervention price for the whole Community, the alleged drawbacks could have been remedied by an increase of the intervention price, limited to the Rouen marketing centre.

26 In fact the intervention price in 1970/72 for this marketing centre was appreciably higher (117-50 u.a.) than it had been in 1971/72 (112-44 u.a.), so much so that the gap between the threshold price (123-13 u.a. in 1970/71 and 125-25 u.a. in 1971/72) and the intervention price has increased from 5-63 u.a. in one year to 12-81 u.a. in the next.

In the applicant's view it follows that the protection granted to Community producers during the 1971/72 year exceeded what was necessary.

WERHAHN v COUNCIL

27 The reduction in the intervention price for the secondary marketing centres arises from the fact that the multiple intervention price system was, by Article 4 of Regulation No 1528/71 of the Council of 12 July 1971 (OJ L 162, 20. 7. 1971, p. 1) replaced by a system of single derived intervention prices.

According to the sixth recital to this Regulation, the Council intended for the marketing year 1971/72 to continue making use of the possibility afforded by Article 32 of Regulation No 120/67 of introducing a single derived inter­ vention price.

Since the adoption of a single derived intervention price is permissible by reason of the deficit in durum wheat production it follows logically from the system to treat (as provided by Article 32 of Regulation No 120/67) the lowest derived intervention price — that is to say, that from the area showing the greatest surplus — as the single derived intervention price.

28 Thus, if the Council omitted to correct the disadvantages to which German meal producers were indirectly subject, by reason of the fact that their French competitors enjoyed an advantage from this system, such an omission is nevertheless not capable of rendering the provisions in question illegal.

In enacting them, the Council was at the period in question and in the light of the relevant circumstances not obliged to ascertain whether circumstances of so special a kind could militate against the application of provisions that normally would have been satisfactory.

29 By way of reply and as a subsidiary point the applicants cite the existence of a principle that calls for compensation by reason of an illegal intervention on the part of a public authority, comparable to an expropriation.

30 "Without it being necessary to decide the question whether Article 215 covers such a liability, it suffices to state that since the criticised interventions involve no illegality, the submission relating thereto must be rejected.

Costs

31 Under the terms of Article 69 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party shall be ordered to pay the costs.

JUDGMENT OF 13. 11. 1973 — JOINED CASES 63 TO 69/72

The applicants have failed in their action.

Accordingly they must be ordered to pay the costs.

On those grounds,

Upon reading the pleadings; Upon hearing the report of the Judge-Rapporteur; Upon hearing the oral observations of the parties; Upon hearing the opinion of the Advocate-General; Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, especially Articles 39, 40, 178, 211 and 215; Having regard to the Regulations of the Council Nos 120/67 of 13 June 1967, 1054/71 of 25 May 1971, 1120/71 of 28 May 1971, 1528/71 of 12 July 1971, and 1530/71 of 12 July 1971; Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community; Having regard to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, especially Article 69;

THE COURT

hereby:

1. Dismisses the actions;

2. Orders the applicants to bear the costs.

Lecourt Donner Sørensen Monaco Mertens de Wilmars

Pescatore Kutscher Ó Dálaigh Mackenzie Stuart

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 13 November 1973.

A. Van Houtte R. Lecourt

Registrar President

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