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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·Rozsudok·16.11.1977

C-13/77

ECLI:EU:C:1977:185

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61977CJ0013

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

whether, apart from abuse of a restriction on imports only if, taking any dominant position which such into account the obstacles inherent in

arrangements might encourage, such the different methods of fiscal control

introduction or maintenance in force which are used by the Member States is also likely to affect trade between in particular to ensure collection of

Member States. the taxes on those products, such a

3. Although a maximum price applicable system of fixed prices is likely to

without distinction to domestic and hinder, directly or indirectly, actually imported products does not in itself or potentially, imports between constitute a measure having an effect Member States. equivalent to a quantitative restriction, 4. Article 5 of Council Directive No

itmay have such an effect, however, 72/464/EEC of 19 December 1972 on

when it is fixed at a level such that taxes other than turnover taxes which

the sale of imported products affect the consumption of manu­

becomes, if not impossible, more factured tobacco does not aim to

difficult than that of domestic prohibit the Member States from products. On the other hand, rules in introducing or maintaining in force a

a Member State whereby a fixed price legislative measure whereby a selling is imposed for the sale to the price, namely the price stated on the

consumer of either imported or tax label, is imposed for the sale to

home-produced tobacco products, the consumer of imported or

namely the price which has been home-produced tobacco products,

freely chosen by the manufacturer or provided that that price has been importer, constitute a measure having freely determined by the manufacturer an effect equivalent to a quantitative or importer.

In Case 13/77

Reference to the Court under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty by the Belgian Hof van Cassatie (Court of Cassation) for a preliminary ruling in the action

pending before that court between

NV GB-INNO-BM

and

VERENIGING VAN DE KLEINHANDELAARS IN TABAK (ATAB) (Association of

Tobacco Retailers),

on the interpretation of Article 3 (f), the second paragraph of Article 5 and

Articles 30, 31, 32, 86 and 90 of the EEC Treaty and of Council Directive No 72/464/EEC (OJ, English Special Edition 1972 (31 December), p. 3) on taxes other than turnover taxes which affect the consumption of manufactured

tobacco,

INNO v ATAB

THE COURT

composed of: H. Kutscher, President, M. Sørensen and G. Bosco, Presidents of

Chambers, A. M. Donner, J. Mertens de Wilmars, P. Pescatore, Lord

Mackenzie Stuart, A. O'Keeffe and A. Touffait, Judges,

Advocate General: G. Reischl Registrar: A. Van Houtte

gives the following

JUDGMENT

Facts and issues

The facts of the case, the course of the 2. On 7 February 1972 ATAB arranged 'gerechtsdeurwaarder'

procedure and the written observations for a (a court

submitted under Article 20 of the official) to record the finding that the Enterprises'

Protocol on the Statute of the Court of 'GB company (to which

Justice of the EEC may be summarized GB-INNO-BM is the legal successor) was as follows: offering for sale and selling cigarettes at a price lower than that specified on the tax

label. By a writ of 24 February 1972 it I — Facts and procedure brought proceedings, under Chapter IV of the Law of 14 July 1971 on

1. The main action brought by the commercial practices, before the

limited liability company GB-INNO-BM President of the Rechtbank van

against the non-profit-making association Koophandel (Commercial Court), Vereniging van de Kleinhandelaars in Brussels, with the intention of obtaining Tabak (hereinafter referred to as 'ATAB') an order that the practice complained of

arises out of Article 58 of the Belgian be discontinued and that the decision to Law of 3 July 1969 (Value-added tax be taken be officially announced.

Code) which provides: 24 April 1972 3. By an order of the

President of the Rechtbank van 'In respect of manufactured tobacco

is imported Koophandel, Brussel, ordered the sale of which into or produced cigarettes at cut-prices to be within this country the tax shall be levied discontinued, on the grounds that such whenever excise duty has to be paid in infringed Article 58 of the sale accordance with the relevant provisions Value-added tax Code and that of tax laws or regulations. The tax shall observance of the law forms part of be calculated on the basis of the price proper commercial practice. On the stated on the tax label which must be the other hand he refused to order that the compulsory selling price to the decision be officially announced. consumer, or, if no price is specified, on the basis adopted for the imposition of 4. GB-INNO-BM lodged an appeal

excise duty'. against this decision by notice of appeal

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

of 24 Mai 1972. Its submissions cover Market within the meaning of

inter alia the incompatibility of Article Article 86 of the EEC Treaty? 58 of the Value-added tax Code with In this respect does the

certain provisions of the Treaty dealing prohibition cover inter alia the

with competition and the free movement introduction of the maintenance

of goods and also with the provisions of in force of a national legislative the Treaty relating to the objectives of provision which encourages the

the Community and with Directive No abuse by one or more

72/464/EEC of the Council of 19 undertakings of a dominant December 1972 on taxes other than position which exists because the

turnover taxes which affect the manufacturers and importers of

consumption of manufactured tobacco, manufactured tobacco can oblige

(OJ, English Special Edition 1972 (31 the retailers in a Member State to

December) p. 3). In the alternative it comply with the selling prices to

invites the Hof van Beroep (Court of the consumer fixed by the former? Appeal) to apply the procedure for (b) Is the introduction or the

obtaining a preliminary ruling under maintenance in force of a national

Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. provision such as that referred to

under (a) prohibited even if it is 5. The Hof van Beroep, Brussels, by its general in scope in that it relates

judgment of 24 December 1974 rejected to manufacturers and importers in all the submissions based on Community general, that is, even those which

law put forward by GB-INNO-BM and have no dominant position or

the application for a reference for a make no abuse thereof and a

preliminary ruling on the ground that no fortiori if the abuse of a dominant doubt arises as to the interpretation of position was neither its aim nor its the relevant provisions of Community object nor its effect?

law. In such a case must not the

provisions of the EEC Treaty 6. GB-INNO-BM challenged this referred to under (a), possibly in judgment by appeal to the Hof van conjunction with others, be Cassatie. Before delivering judgment the interpreted as meaning that the

Hof van Cassatie has stayed proceedings introduction or maintenance in by order of 7 January 1977 until the force of such national legislative Court of Justice of the European provisions is by no means

Communities has given a preliminary prohibited but simply that that

ruling on the following questions: provision can have no effect on

1. (a) Must Article 3 (f), the second the scope of application of Article paragraph of Article 5 and Article 86 of the EEC Treaty in the sense 86 of the EEC Treaty be that abuse of a dominant position

interpreted as meaning that a remains unlawful even if it is Member State is prohibited from encouraged by this legislative

introducing into or maintaining in provision in the particular

force in its legislation inter alia a circumstances?

provision whereby, for the sale to 2. Must Article 90 of the EEC Treaty be consumers of both imported and interpreted meaning that as

home-produced goods, a selling 'undertakings to which Member States is fixed by the manufacturers rights'

price grant special or exclusive exist

or importers if the provision is of where, as distinct from manufacturers

such a nature as to encourage the and importers of other products who

abuse by one or more must notify the Minister for undertakings of a dominant Economic Affairs of any increases in position within the Common price which they introduce but are

INNO v ATAB

not able to fix the compulsory selling 4. (a) Do the provisions of Directive No price to the consumer, the State 72/464 of 19 December 1972 of

imposes the same obligation to notify the Council of Ministers, in

any increases they introduce price on particular Article 5, have direct manufacturers and importers of effect with the result that, inter certain products but, by means of a alia, individuals have the right to

legislative provision which after rely on them before national

notification makes the increased price courts?

for sale to the consumer of these (b) Must Article 5 of Directive No products compulsory, gives to them 72/464 of 19 December 1972 of

indirectly the possibility of themselves the Council of Ministers on taxes

fixing the compulsory selling price to other than turnover taxes which

the consumer? affect the consumption of

If this question is answered in the manufactured tobacco be inter­

affirmative can the retention of the preted as meaning that the

above-mentioned special or exclusive Member States are prohibited from rights be contrary to the provisions of introducing or maintaining in the EEC Treaty namely those referred force a legislative measure

to in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94 whereby a selling price, namely inclusive? the price stated on the tax label, is 3. Must Articles 30, 31 and 32 of the imposed for the sale to the

EEC Treaty be interpreted as meaning consumer of imported or

that a 'measure having equivalent home-produced tobacco products, is it is effect'

within the meaning of the that to say, where not

above-mentioned Article 30 includes possible to exceed the maximum

rules in a Member State whereby a and it is not permissible to sell the

fixed price is imposed for the sale of product at a lower price?

certain products to the consumer,

namely the price stated on tax labels 7. Concurrently with the main action

and which, according to the particular GB-INNO-BM on 2 April 1974 lodged case, is determined by the two complaints with the Commission. manufacturers of these products who

are established in the State or by the The first complaint was directed against

importers of the same products in the Belgisch-Luxemburgse Federatie der particular from other Member States? tabakverwerkende industrieën (The Or should be interpreted To­ these articles Belgo-Luxembourg Federation of bacco Na­ as meaning that such rules only Industries) (Fedetab), the constitute such a measure when it is tionale Federatie van de groothandel in in fact certain that it can hinder tabakswaren (The National Federation of

intra-Community trade directly or Wholesale Traders in Tobacco Products) indirectly, ATAB actually or potentially, a (NFGT) and and requested the

matter which must be determined by Commission to initiate a procedure

the national court in each case? against these three associations in order

Is the position different if, after to compel them to put an end to various

notification of a price increase and infringements of Articles 85 and 86 of

after compliance with a specified the EEC Treaty.

waiting period the Member State permits the producers and importers The second complaint was directed to fix freely the prices including the against the Belgian State. It alleged that

retail prices, but publishes the prices Article 58 of the VAT Code is and, by means of the above­ incompatible with Articles 85, 86, 90, 30, mentioned measure, ensures com­ 31 and the second paragraph of Article 5 pliance with them? of the Treaty and with Council Directive

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

Luxem­ No 72/464/EEC and it requested the nities, the Belgian, Netherlands, Commission to initiate the procedure bourg and Italian Governments. specified in Article 169 of the Treaty.

II —

Summary of the written 8. As far as concerns the first complaint observations the Commission on 29 July 1974

initiated a procedure pursuant to Observations submitted by NV Regulation No 17 of the Council. On 18 GB-INNO-BM July 1975 it notified the associations of

undertakings concerned of its objections. GB-INNO-BM recounts the history of In this notification it gave its view that Article 58 of the VAT Code, the original certain agreements, decisions and text whereof in the draft law introduced practices of Fedetab and its members

by the Government provided that VAT contravened Article 85 of the EEC should be calculated 'on the basis of the Treaty. On 22 October 1975 a full maximum price stated on the tax label'. hearing took place. Since then nothing The present text which states that this has been heard of this complaint. price 'must be the compulsory price to

the consumer'

originated in an 9. As far as concerns the complaint

directed against the Belgian State, amendment by Mr Goeman who, as well Kamer GB-INNO-BM has only received a as being a member of the van

volksvertegenwoordigers (Chamber of written acknowledgement of receipt

Representatives) and of the Finance thereof and a provisional reply dated 15 Committee of this Chamber was December 1975. This is the only communication that it has received secretary of NFGT. Notwithstanding the Government's opposition the result, relating to the action taken on its which could be regarded as extraordinary, complaint. was that a provision which was more

likely to be found among the rules 10. Finally GB-INNO-BM commenced

governing trade practices or prices and proceedings in the Raad van State which, in so far as it imposed a (Administrative Court of last instance) on price, was out of 11 June 1974 for annulment of the compulsory selling place in existing price regulations which Ministerial Order of 9 April 1974. The primarily make use of the concepts purpose of this order was to harmonize 'normal price'

and 'maximum price', was the provisions of the regulation annexed incorporated in an instrument dealing to the Ministerial Order of 22 January with taxation. Furthermore the fact that 1948 governing the collection of excise the compulsory consumer price of duty on tobacco with the text of Article manufactured tobacco may be 58 of the VAT Code. The Raad van State determined by the person who affixes the has not yet delivered judgment in this tax label — that is to say either the action. manufacturer or the importer — and not

Procedure by the competent governmental authority is itself also an anomaly.

The order making the reference was Belgian Nevertheless, case-law requires

registered at the Court Registry on 26 that Article 58 of the VAT Code be January 1977. In accordance with Article applied in accordance with its ordinary 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the that is to as a provision meaning, say, Court of Justice of the EEC written fixing mandatory retail prices which

observations were submitted by must be adhered to. GB-INNO-BM, ATAB the Council of

the European Communities, the Com­ Proposed answer to the questions

mission of the European Commu­ referred to the Court

INNO v ATAB

A — Compatibility of Article 58 On 30 October 1967 Fedetab informed with the rules of competition (in cigarette wholesalers that the industry conjunction with Article 3 (f) had decided to suspend deliveries of

and the second paragraph of cigarettes to all large distributive Article 5 of the EEC Treaty) undertakings including the limited companies Grand Bazars d'Anvers, 1. The origin of Article 58 of the VAT Super-Bazars, Supermarkten GB. Code However some of the undertakings

GB-INNO-BM gives an outline of the managed to obtain their supplies from circumstances in which Article 58 of the certain wholesalers and to continue to

VAT Code was adopted. grant discounts on the sale of cigarettes.

On 19 and 20 February 1968 an For many years Fedetab and NFGT have made endeavour to regulate the agreement was concluded by an every exchange of letters between Fedetab and distribution of tobacco products in the three companies mentioned above. Belgium.

This was the position when the Law or 3 On 9 January 1967 Fedetab entered into July 1969 laying down the VAT Code an agreement with NFGT under which was drawn up. the members of NFGT undertook not to

buy or sell cigarettes with which gifts of Thus there was a definite link between any kind were offered; the penalty for Fedetab NFGT to the attempts by and

failing to comply with this undertaking make all the retailers enter into the same was the loss of wholesale terms. This had agreements which they concluded agreement was implemented by means of relating to compulsory selling prices and separate agreements concluded by the provisions of Article 58 of the VAT Fedetab with individual wholesalers. Code Mr Goeman's as modified by amendment. This agreement was supplemented on 22

May 1967 by a new agreement between 2. Evaluation of the agreements and Fedetab and NFGT under which acts of Fedetab and NFGT in the wholesalers with their own retail outlets light of the rules of competition of undertook to sell all their cigarettes to the EEC Treaty the consumer at the price indicated on

the tax label without any discount. On GB-INNO-BM evaluates the agreements

the same day a circular was sent to 'small of Fedetab and NFGT and concludes cigarette-distributors'

inviting each of that the prohibition set out in Article 85 them to enter into a contract whereby it (1) of the Treaty applies to them. The undertook on the same conditions not to Commission proceeded on the basis of

sell at a price less than the one indicated the same view in its notification of

on the label. 18 1975 objections of July and gave

notice that it intended to fine the On 5 October 1967 by 'an interpretative undertakings concerned. agreement on cut-price selling'

NFGT agreed on behalf of its members with The acts of Fedetab are also an abuse of a 'cut'

Fedetab not to supply retailers who dominant position prohibited by Article their prices. Individual wholesalers were 86 of the Treaty. informed of this agreement by circulars

from Fedetab and NFGT of 6 and 26 It can hardly be denied that Fedetab had October 1967. letter 26 October a dominant position within the By of

1967 NFGT notified the wholesalers that manufactured tobacco market if account

the manufacturers would discontinue is taken of its large share of that market.

deliveries to wholesalers who supplied This dominant position was strengthened the 'price-cutters'. even more by the close links which it

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

had established with NFGT which contravene Article 85 or 86. This opinion

allowed these two organizations to is shared by those authors of the Treaty regulate the distribution of manufactured who looked into the question of the

tobacco right down to the retail stage. compatibility with the Treaty of national Furthermore Fedetab fixed the measures making certain agreements distributors'

profit margins and in the mandatory.

last resort decided in which category (wholesaler Class I, wholesaler Class II, If it was not open to question whether

duly appointed distributor, ordinary Article 85 and 86, considered separately,

distributor) the individual distributors applied solely to undertakings, it is no

were to be classified. less true that under the Treaty Member States must not adopt measures which

Fedetab's dominant position on the might jeopardize the proper functioning Belgian and Luxembourg markets is in 'a of the rules of competition. The legal substantial part of the Common Market'. justification for imposing this obligation

upon Member States can be found either

The pressure exerted by Fedetab, in in the general obligation set out in the

co-operation with NFGT, on wholesalers second paragraph of Article 5 or in and retailers to force them to align their Article 90 of the Treaty. sales policy on the one which it had adopted is an abuse of a dominant The Court has already held that the position. second paragraph of Article 5 lays upon Member States a general obligation the

This abuse affects trade between Member specific nature of which depends in each

States, since some of the products sold by particular case on the provisions of the

members of Fedetab are imported from Treaty or the rules derived from the

other Member States and the obligations general system thereof. It follows from to sell on the terms laid down by this that if a national measure prevents

Fedetab, in concert with NFGT, not only effect being given to the purpose of any applies to the members of Fedetab but of the Treaty provisions, which are also to foreign manufacturers who want sufficiently clear and unambiguous for —

to sell their products in Belgium. example Articles 85 and 86 the nature —

of the consequent infringement of

3. Connexion between Community Article 5 is such that it can be the

rules of competition and national subject-matter of proceedings brought law on competition directly before national courts.

Relying on the judgment of the Court in (a) The effectiveness of Article 85 Case 14/68 (judgment of 13 February 1969, Walt Wilhelm and Others v The effect of Article 58 of the VAT Code Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1 et seq.) and of the agreements is exactly the GB-INNO-BM submits that it would not same. The aim of the latter is to compel be in keeping with the particular system retailers when selling to the public to

introduced by the Treaty to allow charge the price stated on the tax label. Member States to take, or maintain in Article 58 contains provisions similar to.

force, measures capable of preventing the stipulations in the agreements

effect being given to the purpose of the contravening Article 85 of the Treaty, Treaty. The authors of the Treaty who prevents effect being given thereto and

looked into this question were consequently infringes the second

unanimously of the opinion that a paragraph of Article 5 of the Treaty. Member State cannot compel its private

undertakings to behave in a way which, Article 58 of the VAT Vode made the

were it not for a State measure, would beforementioned agreements between

INNO v ATAB

Fedetab and NFGT unnecessary. What Therefore the only possible conclusion is was previously stipulated in the that a legal provision which encourages

agreements is now in fact law. abuses is prohibited in its entirety, even if it can also be applied in cases where there is no dominant position. It is perhaps unfortunate that the Hof van Cassatie has not raised any question For these reasons GB-INNO-BM on the interpretation of Article 85 read proposes that the first question should be together with the second paragraph of answered in the following terms: Article 5 especially as a similar question is raised in the case of Article 86. An 'Article 3 (f), the second paragraph of answer on this point by the Court of Article 5 and Article 86 of the Treaty Justice would be of interest to the Hof must be interpreted as meaning that a van Beroep to which the Hof van Member State is prohibited from Cassatie will refer the case back at a later date. introducing or maintaining in force any national legislative provision which

encourages abuse of a dominant position

(b) The effectiveness of Article 86 by one or more undertakings or

associations of undertakings in that such As far as the first question referred by the a law enables such undertakings or Hof van Cassatie is concerned associations of undertakings to obtain the GB-INNO-BM submits that the question same results — inter alia that of being for consideration is not whether Article able to force retailers to charge the 58 of the VAT Code contravened Article consumer selling prices fixed by the 86 as such, but whether it was a breach manufacturers or importers — as those States'

of the Member duty not to which they sought to obtain by abusing prevent effect being given to Article 86. their dominant position'. It was inevitable that by giving manufacturers and importers the (c) The second question (Article 90) opportunity to force retailers to charge

the selling price shown on the tax label, GB-INNO-BM calls attention to the fact Article 58 in fact permitted and that the expression 'undertakings to controlled an abuse of a dominant which Member States grant special or position in a substantial part of the exclusive rights'

in Article 90 must be Common Market (in this case Belgium). interpreted in the light of the role which The previous abuses by Fedetab are 'possible' the Treaty assigns to this article. therefore not only made but 'covered'

by the law. It emphasizes that in legal writings it is an established fact that Article 90 is Nor can it be accepted that Article 58 intended to make the obligations laid

'simply can have no effect on the scope upon undertakings applicable to Member Treaty'

of application of Article 86 of the States in that Member States cannot

to quote the words of the Hof van shield their undertakings from the effects

Cassatie in the second part of this of Treaty. Similarly it is unanimously the

question. That would in fact mean that accepted that a measure might be 'contrary'

Article 58 only applies in the case of to the rules contained in the

manufacturers and importers who do not Treaty, in particular to those provided for have a dominant position but does not in Article 86 if it induces the

apply in the case of undertakings having undertakings referred to in Article 90 to a dominant position because it infringes act in such a way that they infringe the

the Treaty. Such an interpretation would Treaty. Moreover in legal writings there is 'measure' in practice create endless confusion and unanimous agreement that the

difficulties. covers laws passed by the legislature.

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

There is no doubt that, having regard to The retention of such a special or

the actual wording of Article 90, the exclusive right is "contrary to the rules 86"

expression 'undertakings to which contained in Articles 85 and within

Member States grant special or exclusive the of Article 90 (1) of the Treaty.' meaning rights'

can also refer to private

undertakings. On the other hand the

meaning of the words 'special or (com­ B — The third question be determined rights'

exclusive should patibility of Article 58 of the with reference to the purpose of Article Articles 30, 31 VAT Code with 90 and its place in the system of the and 32 of the Treaty) Treaty.

Article 90 is designed it GB-INNO-BM, relying on the case-law (1) to make of the Court and especially on its impossible for Member States to en­

judgment of 11 July 1974 in Case 8/74, able their undertakings to restrict (Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave competition. In order to determine whether a legal position gives rise to Dassonville [1974] ECR 837) and its judgments 26 February 1976 in Case of 'special or exclusive rights', it must be 65/75 (Riccardo Tasca [1976] ECR 291) compared with the legal position of and in Joined Cases 88 to 90/75 (Societa undertakings to which the rules of SADAM and Others v Comitato competition apply. If a Member State Interministeriale dei Prezzi and Others gives undertakings the right to restrict

[1976] ECR 323) stresses that, as Article competition in whole or in part, it grants 58 of the VAT Code applies both to those undertakings special or exclusive home-produced and imported products, rights within the meaning of Article 90 the question arises whether this provision (1). could hinder intra-Community trade,

Since Article 58 of the VAT Code allows directly or indirectly, actually or

potentially. manufacturers and importers of

manufactured tobacco to fix the

compulsory selling price at which their The effect of Article 58 is that retailers

products are sold to the consumer, it can only fix selling prices their

quite clearly grants them special or themselves if they import manufactured

exclusive rights within the meaning tobacco direct. Now, since Belgian referred to above. No such power is manufacturers market more than half the

granted under Belgian law to any other cigarettes imported into Belgium, foreign category of undertakings. manufacturers cannot be expected to sell

to a Belgian retailer, especially if the

The second question can therefore be latter sells his products at a price lower answered in the following terms: than the normal Belgian price.

Furthermore if a Belgian trader wanted

'Article 90 of the Treaty must be to import into Belgium manufactured

interpreted as that "under­ tobacco he would have to request the meaning takings to which Member States grant foreign manufacturer to affix the tax

special or exclusive rights"

exist where, as labels himself in order to avoid the cost

distinct from manufacturers and of the special equipment required to affix

importers of other products who are not them. This means that the foreign able to fix the compulsory selling price manufacturer has the right to control the

to the consumer, the State gives the prices which the retailer wishes to

manufacturers and importers of certain charge. The obligation to charge the

products the possibility of themselves price on the tax label makes it therefore

fixing the compulsory selling price to the quite impossible in practice for retailers

consumer. to import direct.

INNO v ATAB

Consequently retailers are not free to fix Article 5 (1) provides that: the price level of the imported products.

'Manufacturers and importers shall be

Finally GB-INNO-BM suggests that the free to determine the maximum retail

third question be answered in the selling price for each of their products. following terms: This provision may not, however, hinder implementation of the national systems

'A legislative provision of a Member of legislation regarding the control of

State, which, in the case both of price levels or the observance of imposed imported and home-produced products prices'.

provides that the selling price to the

consumer shall be the price fixed by the The GB-INNO-BM company points out

manufacturers or importers which is that the Council did not adopt an

stated on the tax labels and which, amendment of this provision which was

according to the particular case, is tabled during the debates in the

determined by the manufacturers of European Parliament on a proposal for a

these products who are established in the Council Directive drawn up by the State or by importers of the same Commission and was designed to replace products from other Member States, is a the words 'maximum prices'

by the

measure having an effect equivalent to a words 'fixed prices'. The Council quantitative restriction on imports within therefore wanted to show that it was

the meaning of Article 30 of the Treaty, resolved that the system of free prices be if the said provision can hinder accepted by the Member States. This

intra-Community trade directly or interpretation is confirmed by the eighth indirectly, actually or potentially. This recital which states that 'the imperative occurs inter alia if, having regard to the needs of competition imply a system of

special circumstances of the market for freely formed prices for all groups of

the products in question, this provision manufactured tobacco'.

prevents retailers from importing these

products direct from other Member The reservation in the second sentence

States or from being free to fix the prices only applies to the systems of imposed of these products'. prices which are compatible with the Treaty. It is impossible to agree that the

C The fourth (com­ Council has of — question made collective systems

patibility of Article 58 of the imposed prices lawful. Otherwise it VAT Code with Council would have to be inferred that the

Directive No 72/464/EEC of 19 directive itself contravenes the Treaty and December 1972) is invalid. The Council cannot in fact legalize national measures prohibitedby 1. Incompatibility of Article 58 with the Treaty by means of a harmonizing the said directive directive.

GB-INNO-BM takes the view that the 2. The direct effect of the directive directive is designed to ensure that the

application of national taxes affecting the The first sentence of Article 5 (1) of the consumption of manufactured tobacco directive sets out an explicit and

does not distort the conditions of unqualified obligation on Member States competition and impede the free to introduce a system of free price fixing. movement of the products within the This obligation has had direct effect

Community. To this end it harmonizes since 1 July 1973 the latest date the taxation rules and also lays down in stipulated in Article 12 of the directive Article 5 (1) provisions for fixing the by which Member States shall bring it

selling prices of these products. into force.

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

The GB-INNO-BM company suggests matter in the national laws of the

that the fourth question be answered in various Member States. the following terms: 3. The disappearance of tobacco retailers

(a) Article 5 of the Council Directive of due to the abolition of a fixed price

19 December 1972 has direct effect. undoubtedly has serious socio-

(b) Article 5 of the Council Directive of economic consequences.

19 December 1972 must be 4. The abolition of an imposed price

interpreted as meaning that Member means the disappearance of genuine

States are forbidden from in­ competition based on a large number

troducing or maintaining in force a of brands in favour of competition

legislative measure whereby a selling which is unreal and presupposes that

price, namely the price stated on the a large number of brands have been tax label, is imposed for the sale eliminated.

to the customer of imported or 5. The continuance in business of

home-produced tobacco products, retailers who are specialists, which

that is to say, where it is not possible thanks to the fixed price is still

to exceed the maximum and it is not possible, constitutes, for economic and

permissible to sell the product at a public health reasons, a guarantee for lower price'. the consumer.

Observations submitted by ATAB Observations on the first question

Before commencing its legal discussion ATAB submits that, since Article 86 of

of the questions referred by the Hof the EEC Treaty gives effect to Article 3 van Cassatie, ATAB engages in an (f), if should only be interpreted in the examination of the history of the fixed light of the latter article. Attempts to price at which manufactured tobacco is attain the general objectives of the Treaty sold to the consumer. After pointing out are dependent on political measures and

that this price is not peculiar to Belgium do not impose any obligations other than it then gives an account of the system of those provided for in other articles of the

imposed selling prices in the other Treaty. original EEC Member States. Finally it considers the essential socio-economic Article 5 of the Treaty does not mean

requirements and demands of real and that a Member State is forbidden to do effective competition in the sector in anything which it is clearly not

question and also of the protection of the forbidden to do by a specific article of

consumer against certain abuses. the Treaty.

It draws the following conclusions from According to ATAB Article 86 of the its analysis of these questions. Treaty only prevents acts of undertakings 1. The fixed price of manufactured and not acts of a Member State. Article tobacco stems from the special system 86 does not prohibit a legislative of taxation applicable in this sector. It provision but the abuse of a dominant secures for the particular State the position and it makes no difference collection of the large revenue duties whether this dominant position is to which it is entitled and which are consolidated by a legislative provision.

assessed on a consumer price fixed in Consequently in relation to Article 86 advance and shown on the tax label. the introduction of a legislative measure

2. The admissibility of a fixed price for has a neutral effect: even if the measure

manufactured tobacco which is in question is bound to lead to the

explicitly incorporated in the Council establishment of a dominant position, it Directive of 19 December 1972 is the behaviour of the undertaking confirms the rules governing this which, occupying a dominant position,

INNO v ATAB

takes advantage of the situation thus this sense that it applies to any established byabusing it and not the manufacturer or importer including measure which is caught by the therefore those who do not have a

prohibition in Article 86. dominant position or do not abuse

one and a fortiori if the abuse of a

There can be no question of a dominant dominant position was neither its position because of the strength of one aim nor its object nor its effect'.

undertaking if all its competitors are

equally strong. The system introduced by Observations on the second question

Article 58 of the Belgian VAT Code puts all manufacturers and all importers on Article 90 of the Treaty does not forbid the same footing by imposing the same Member States to grant undertakings

obligations on them. In no way does it 'special or exclusive rights'. This emerges

eliminate competition by laying down from the judgment of the Court of 30 that the sale freely chosen by them price April 1974 in Case 155/73 (Giuseppe shall be adhered to Sacchi [1976] ECR 409). by the distributors. 'right'

In making that choice the manufacturer A granted to all competing or importer so far from abusing a undertakings, in this case to all

dominant is position, merely exercising competing manufacturers and importers, his rights as a competitor. is obviously neither a special nor an exclusive right.

ATAB mentions incidentally that in the

case giving rise to the reference for a However in this case the manufacturer or

preliminary ruling an association of importer far from enjoying any special

retailers is in dispute with a large rights is on the contrary under an

supermarket which, compared to them, is obligation to pay excise duty and VAT in a dominant position and is abusing on the figures shown on the tax label and that position by selling manufactured this obligation is not imposed on any tobacco at a smaller profit margin or other manufacturer or importer of other

even at loss thereby harming the products.

retailers.

ATAB, while acknowledging that 'in the

ATAB accordingly suggests that the first case of these undertakings'

the Member question should be answered in the States cannot adopt any measure contrary following terms: to Articles 7 and 80 to 94 inclusive,

'(a) Article 3 (f), the second paragraph of submits that a measure such as Article 58 Article 5 and Article 86 do not of the VAT Code is in no way prohibit a Member State from incompatible with these articles and

introducing into or maintaining in certainly not with: force in its legislation a provision

whereby, for the sale to consumers of Article 7 of the Treaty, since there has both imported and home-produced been no discrimination on the ground of

goods, a selling price is fixed by the nationality; manufacturers or importers even if the provision envourages the abuse or Article 86, as has been shown above.

by one or more undertakings of a

dominant position, but rather A statutory system of fixed prices — not

penalize the undertaking guilty of imposed prices — under which:

such abuse.

(b) In any event a national provision it is not the manufacturer or importer such as that referred to in (a) is not who imposes a price on retailers, but the prohibited if it is general in scope in Member State which prescribes that the

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

price fixed by the manufacturer or Observations on the third question

importer is binding on all concerned; According to ATAB, in order to answer

the manufacturer or importer far from the questions referred by the Hof van

enjoying any special rights is on the Cassatie, it is necessary to define: on the

contrary forced to pay the excise duty one hand the concept in Community law and VAT in advance; of a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction; on the other

the reason why the price shown on the hand the effect of the measure

tax label is binding arises directly out of introduced by Article 58 of the Belgian the system of collection does not come VAT Code. within Article 90. In order to define a measure having an Furthermore Article 90 does not have effect equivalent to a quantitative

direct effect and does not create restriction reference can be made to the

individual rights which the national consistent case-law of the Court to date, court must protect. The Court has starting with the judgment of 11 July already held without any reservations that 1974 in Case 8/74 (Procureur du Roi v Article 90 (2) does not have direct effect Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] (judgment of 14 July 1971 in Case 10/71, ECR 837 at p. 852) and going right up Ministère Public of Luxembourg v to its two judgments of 26 February Madeleine Hein, nee Muller, and Others 1976 in Case 65/75 (Riccardo Tosca [1971] ECR 719 at p. 730 and p. 731). [1976] ECR 291 at p. 308) and in Cases 88 to 90/75 [Società SADAM and Others The same argument applies to Article 90 v Comitato Interministeriale dei Prezzi (1). and Others [1976] ECR 323 at p. 339), which show that a 'measure having ATAB therefore suggests that the second equivalent effect'

means any measure

question might be answered in the which is capable of hindering directly or following terms: indirectly, actually or potentially, imports between Member States. 'Article 90 of the EEC Treaty has not

to be interpreted as meaning that The Commission defined the concept

"undertakings Member States 'measure having in effect'

to which equivalent

grant special or exclusive rights"

exist its Directive No 70/50/EEC of 22 where the State imposes on manu­ December 1969 [based on the provisions

facturers and importers of certain of Article 33 (7) on the abolition of

products a general obligation to notify measures which have an effect equivalent

proposed price increases but by means of to quantitative restrictions on imports a legislative provision of a fiscal nature and are not covered by other provisions

which after notification makes the adopted in pursuance of the EEC Treaty] increased price for the sale to the (OJ, English Special Edition 1970 (I), p.

consumer of these products compulsory 17), in which it expressed the opinion

and thus gives to them indirectly the that unlike discriminatory measures,

possibility of themselves fixing the measures which apply equally to

compulsory price to the domestic and imported products are only selling consumer. prohibited 'if their restrictive effects on

the free movement of goods exceed

The retention of these special or effects intrinsic to trade rules'.

exclusive rights cannot be contrary to the provisions of the EEC Treaty, namely If it is true that the Court of Justice has those referred to in Articles 7 and 85 to not followed this distinction, that does 94 inclusive'. not mean that the two kinds of measures

INNO v ATAB

must be placed on exactly the same fixed prices imposed by the State which footing. are equally applicable to home-produced or imported products are not a measure The Court in fact in its judgment of 30 having an effect equivalent to a

April 1974 in Case 155/73 (Giuseppe restriction on imports, UNLESS there is Sacchi [1974] ECR 409) referred nevertheless discrimination in practice.

specifically to the Commission's This latter situation cannot arise in this

directive. It emerges from the judgments case, since it isexpressly provided that in the Tasca and SADAM cases, where a manufacturers and importers are free to maximum price was at issue, that not fix the prices of their goods. This is

every fixing of a maximum price by the always the case if the State allows

authority concerned is a measure having manufacturers and importers, after

an effect equivalent to a quantitative notification of a price increase which is restriction prohibited by Article 30 but only to come into effect after a certain

that each time the specific effect of the waiting period, to be free to fix retail

disputed measure on the economic selling prices and if it imposes this price

situation has to be ascertained. after publication.

ATAB considers that the recitals to It is in any event for the national court

Council Directive No 72/464/EEC of 19 trying the main action to determine the

December 1972 clearly indicate that the effects of such national rules; if they obstacles to the free movement of apply to all products of the same kind, manufactured tobacco are created mainly whatever their origin may be, they are by the differences between the fiscal not such as to hinder intra-Community systems of the various Member States. trade, directly or indirectly, actually or

potentially. The situation is no different Under the rules specified in Article 58 if after notification of a price increase of the Belgian VAT Code each and after compliance with a specified

manufacturer is free to choose the price waiting period, a Member State permits

at which his product will in due course manufacturers and importers to fix freely be sold to the ultimate consumer, so that the prices including the retail prices

all the Community's decided cases on when that Member .State publishes the

the legality, under Article 30, of national prices and by means of the measure

rules on maximum prices apply in their referred to above ensures compliance

this case. them'. entirety to with

Unlike the facts in the Dassonville case Observations on the fourth question where the competitors were not on equal

terms the affixing of the tax label is a ATAB is of the opinion that viewed as a

perfectly normal requirement, having whole Council Directive No 72/464/EEC regard to the system which the Belgian of 19 December 1972 does not appear to State has introduced. This formality with have direct effect. which every person using the product must comply and which is required for However, even if this directive has direct the purpose of the tax at collecting effect, under the second sentence of source is in proportion to the objective Article 5 (1) thereof freedom to fix the pursued by the State, since tobacco is maximum selling price would not hinder essentially a revenue-producing product. implementation of the national systems of legislation regarding the control of ATAB suggests therefore that the third price levels or the observance of imposed question be answered as follows: prices. ATAB refers in support of this 'Articles 30, 31 and 32 of the EEC Treaty argument to a letter of 28 March 1973 are not to be interpreted as meaning that which it received from Mr Vogelaer,

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

Director General for Financial manufactured tobacco the introduction

Institutions and Taxation of the or the maintenance in force of fixed Commission. determined law is forbidden prices by under this article or not.

When the draft of Article 5 was being prepared the European Parliament Article 5 proposed an amendment to replace the

expression 'maximum retail selling ATAB proceeds to examine Article 5 and

by 'fixed retail selling prices'. The prices'

takes the view that the provisions, of

only reason why this proposal was not which this article is one, under the Principles'

adopted is that the system of fixed prices heading 'General may be did not apply in the three new Member directly applicable in so far as they fulfil States. The purpose of the second the requirements laid down by the Court,

sentence of Article 5 is therefore to avoid namely that they must be clear and

any dispute as to the validity of the specific and not be subject to any system of fixed prices. That is a very condition.

clear indication that national laws which

provide for imposed prices for It must be borne in mind that Article 5 manufactured tobacco remain in force comprises three provisions which must

and are not therefore incompatible with be considered together for the purpose of

the EEC Treaty, nor a fortiori with the these requirements.

directive itself. 1. Manufacturers and importers shall be free to determine the maximum retail

Consequently ATAB suggests the price of their products (first selling following answer to the fourth question: sentence of paragraph (1)); '(a) The provisions of Directive No 2. This provision may not, however, 72/464 of 19 December 1972 of the hinder implementation of the

Council of Ministers, in particular national systems of legislation Article 5, do not produce direct regarding the control of price levels or

effect. the observance of imposed prices

(b) Article 5 of this directive must be (second sentence of paragraph (1)); interpreted as meaning that Member 3. Member States may limit the

States are not prohibited from theoretical number of possible retail

introducing or maintaining in force a selling prices. Such a limitation may specific measure for the sale not however involve discrimi­ which, any to the consumer of imported or nation (subparagraph 2). home-produced tobacco products, imposes a selling price stated on the Although there is no doubt that Article 5 lax label'. (2), which moreover is of secondary interest in answering the question

In a supplemental pleading ATAB puts referred, satisfies the criteria laid down by forward additional observations on the the Court for it to have direct effect, it is question referred by the Hof van more difficult to decide whether

Cassatie. Its examination begins with the paragraph (1) of this article does so. The fourth question. first sentence of this paragraph is

absolutely vital for attainment of the first The fourth question stage of the process of harmonization, since under Article 4 (1) the proportional ATAB points out that this is first and excise duty on cigarettes is to be foremost concerned with the question calculated in each Member State on the

whether the directive, and in particular maximum retail selling price. If it is Article 5 thereof, is directly applicable or borne in mind on the other hand that in not. It then asks whether in the case of all Member States this tax is levied on

INNO v ATAB

the manufacturer or importer, it is that sentence of Article 5 (1) is evaluated the much easier to grasp the actual meaning system of imposed retail selling prices of

of this first sentence. It is necessary for manufactured tobacco, which is the purpose of calculating and collecting mentioned in the question referred, and importers the tax that manufacturers clearly does not come within the scope

themselves determine the retail selling of such a review, if only because this price. This requirement, which is system does not interfere with the right inherent in the system is established as a reserved to manufacturers and importers

norm by the first sentence of Article 4 to be free to determine their prices. Only (1). prices which have been freely determined can be converted into The first sentence is however more imposed prices. A fixed price imposed in difficult to understand, because it 'free' this way complies in principle with the mentions price fixing by the Community definition of an imposed manufacturer and importer in contrast to price within the meaning of the second the following sentence according to sentence of Article 5 (1) of the directive. which this provision may not hinder implementation of the national systems All the Member States which are at the of legislation regarding the control of present time applying the directive have price levels or the observance of imposed thought it necessary to introduce prices. The second sentence therefore measures these lines. along states clearly what the Hof van Cassatie wants to know: the words of the first Whatever meaning is given to Article 5 sentence do not deprive Member States the conclusion is (1) invariably reached of the right to introduce or maintain in that in the two interpretations examined force legislative provisions regarding the above it satisfies the requirements of control of price levels or the observance being clear, specific and not subject to of imposed prices. any condition. The persons concerned

can therefore invoke it with reference to Article 5 (1) creates rights which are Member States before the national courts. directly applicable but it certainly does However the direct effect of the directive not have the meaning given to it by the viewed as a whole can be questioned. As question referred. far as the rest of the question referred is ATAB nevertheless takes the view that concerned it must be answered in the

the question can also be understood in negative.

this sense that the second sentence of The third question (Articles 30, 31 and Article 5 (1) may limit the rule laid down in the first sentence. The concepts of 32) levels'

'control of price and of 'imposed Article 30 prices'

are then given what can be called

as it were a Community meaning. ATAB Article 30 prohibits any quantitative cannot accept this view. Nevertheless, if restriction on imports and measure any these concepts are to be given a having equivalent effect in trade between Community meaning, the inevitable Member States. conclusion must be that Member States have some discretion as far as concerns The Court has consistently held in its

implementating measures which have to decided cases that for the measure in be taken on a national level. This question to be caught by the prohibition discretion limits the direct effect of the it is sufficient that it is capable of

directive to the review of this discretion. hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, imports from one Member In the discretion left to State to (judgment 11 whatever manner another of July the Member States by the second 1974 in Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] undertakings to which they grant special

ECR 837). or exclusive rights.

In reliance on the judgment of the Court As these conditions are sufficient but also of 30 April 1974 in the Giuseppe Sacchi necessary the reply to the first two Case 155/73 ([1974] ECR 409) ATAB paragraphs of the third question is submits that Article 90 (1) allows therefore in the affirmative. Member States to do something for

ATAB then gives the main reasons which an undertaking having a dominant position on the market would be blamed. which led the Belgian legislature to distinguishes maintain in force the system of the This is why Article 90 (1) imposed price for manufactured tobacco. between the granting of rights by a

Member State and the exercise of those

It takes the view that national legislative rights by the undertakings concerned. provisions which for social and political The expression 'undertakings to which

reasons have some effect on competition Member States grant special or exclusive in the retail trade do not and are not rights'

must be given the narrowest

likely to have an effect equivalent to a possible interpretation. The minimum restriction on imports within the requirement without any doubt is that meaning of Articles 30, 31 and 32 of the the granting of rights is necessary. This Treaty when they are applied equally to requirement is not fulfilled if a Member domestic and imported products. State uses legislative provisions to compel

in a general way certain undertakings to Finally ATAB submits that Articles 30, behave in a particular way. In such a case 31 and 32 are to be understood as the undertakings concerned may enjoy meaning that fixed prices which are but preferential treatment, they are imposed by a Member State equally on not granted rights within the certainly home-produced and imported products meaning of Article 90 (1). are not measures having an effect

equivalent to a restriction on imports, A direct intervention by a Member State unless it is shown that in practice they on a large scale in economic affairs is somehow or other have a discriminatory not covered by Article 90 (1). This effect. The latter situation cannot arise in consideration alone may be a sufficient

this case, since it has been expressly answer to the question referred.

provided that manufacturers shall be free The first question (Articles 3 (f)), the to determine the price of their products. second paragraph of Article 5 and Article This is always the case when a Member 86 State allows manufacturers and importers, after notification of a price increase after ATAB takes the view that this question compliance with a specified waiting comes down to an examination of the period, to be free to determine the retail Article meaning of 3.(f) and the second

selling price and when it imposes such a paragraph of Article 5 in conjunction price after publication. with Article 86. It considers first of all

whether these articles have the meanings The second question (Article 90) which the questions give them and

whether they have direct effect on the According to ATAB the answer to this national legal order of the Member question can only be in the negative. States.

Article 90 (1) forbids Member States from Article 3 (f) is designed to ensure that

introducing or maintaining in force competition within the market is not

provisions contrary to the Treaty for the distorted. This objective is stated in benefit of public undertakings and several provisions including Article 86.

INNO v ATAB

Article 3 (f) considers the attainment of not only distribution but also the

this objective as one of the inescapable industrial stage and explains how excise

obligations of the Community. If it duty is levied on manufactured tobacco

governed in principle the activities of the in Belgium and it then considers the

Community no legal effect could legal nature of Article 58 of the Belgian however be inferred from it as far as the VAT Code. It takes the view that this

activities of the Member States are provision isonly an ostensible price

concerned as is suggested by the measure. Indeed because in the case of question referred. manufactured tobacco it in fact eliminates competition at the distributive The question arises whether the effects stage it belongs to the kind of

which are sought are not derived from interventions by public authorities in the second paragraph of Article 5. ATAB, competition which are sometimes called

in reliance on the case-law of the Court, compulsory cartels.

which Mr Advocate General Reischl summarized in Case 155/73, Giuseppe The Commission concludes its pre­

Sacchi, submits that it must be made liminary observations with a short

clearthat owing to the general nature of statement on the social aspect of the

its wording Article 5 does not give rise retail trade in manufactured tobacco in

directly to subjective rights in favour of Belgium. individuals. The Commission then proceeds to In the view of ATAB this interpretation, consider the questions referred and which in the question referred is given to makes the following observations: the principle of the supremacy of

Community law, goes too far. Neither 2. Interpretation of Article 3 (f), the the legislative power of the Member second paragraph of Article 5 and States nor the actual way in which they Article 86 of the Treaty apply their legal norms depends upon the question whether one or more The first question is concerned with what undertakings have a dominant position the Hof van Cassatie calls encouraging on the market or whether they are the abuse of a dominant position in the abusing it. Common Market. The Commission has serious doubts whether a system of ATAB stresses that the question referred imposed prices derived from a law such cannot be properly examined unless the as the one at issue encourages the abuse infringement of Article 86 is regarded a of a dominant position. It is true that the priori as an irrefutable fact. This applies national measure imposes a specific to the dominant position and its abuse system of price fixing but this system and also to restrictions on inter-State does not create the same degree of trade. It is not for the Court when it is subjection as a dominant position does. dealing with a reference for a preliminary

ruling to check whether this assumption On the other hand it is perfectly true is correct. that under the Belgian tax system the tax

In short the question must be answered label can in practice only be affixed by in the negative. the manufacturer. As far as this aspect of

the matter is concerned the manufacturer

Observations of the Commission certainly has a dominant position

vis-a-vis importers and possibly vis-à-vis

1. Preliminary observations the other persons and undertakings

concerned at the marketing stage. Any The Commission first of all gives a broad person or undertaking who has either in outline of the tobacco sector including law or in fact exclusive technical rights

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

on the market by comparison with his Access to the manufactured tobacco

purchasers abuses those rights from the market is free at all stages. The only moment when he attempts to influence special role assigned to manufacturers

the conduct of those purchasers on the and importers is that their choice of the

market, especially if he refuses to supply basis of assessment of excise duty also

them. The Commission refers in support determines the price level in respect of

of its argument to the judgment of the which the legislature has taken away the

Court of 13 November 1975 in Case retailer's freedom of action. It is neither a 'right'

26/75, General Motors Continental NV within the meaning of Article 90 'exclusive'

v Commission the European (1) nor is it or 'special'. This of Communities [1975] ECR 1367 at p. measure does not fall within the ratio

1378 et seq.). legis of Article 90.

On the question whether national 4. Interpretation of Article 30 measures exclusive technical creating According to the Commission the rights likely to cause an abuse are predominant factor in checking whether incompatible with Article 3 (f), the a system of imposed prices having legal second paragraph of Article 5 and Article force is compatible with Article 30 is 86 of the Treaty the Commission is of whether owing to its nature it affects the opinion that in those cases, where competition. In this field both the such exclusive rights are not as such

incompatible with Articles 30 to 37, their Community and the Member States have powers and the determinative factor in compatibility with the second paragraph defining their limits is whether there is of Article 5 may be considered and that any interference with intra-Community the effect of observance of the obligation trade as provided for in Article 85 of the therein contained is that Member States Treaty. Agreements which may affect this must, as soon as exclusive rights have trade fall within the jurisdiction of the been created, adopt reasonable protective Commission. Agreements which are not measures against foreseeable abuses of capable of having this effect fall within the dominant position inherent in any the national jurisdiction and agreements exclusive rights. In connexion with the between undertakings of the same end of Question 1 (b) the possibility of Member State may come within this justifying any abuse of a dominant category of agreements. position on the ground that it is based on

a national provision can be ruled out. Therefore it is for the competent national

authorities to apply any national 3. Interpretation of Article 90 provisions to agreements or practices

which in fact restrict competition and do The Commission takes the view that the not affect trade between Member States special or exclusive rights mentioned in even potentially. In the field of national Article 90 (1) relate to the production or competition policy it is the duty of the marketing of goods (and mutatis national legislature to decide whether or mutandis of services) by the person not public authorities are to make use of entitled to exercise the rights concerned restrictions on competition having legal himself, in other words to access to the force that is to say compulsory market. This is how the Court agreements governed by public law. interpreted Article 90 in paragraph 14 of However when Member States intervene the judgment delivered in Case 155/73 in this way they must abide by the Giuseppe Sacchi ([1974] ECR 409 at p. division of powers between themselves 429). and the Community.

The Belgian measure does not have the In the light of these considerations the

effect described in this paragraph at all. Commission goes into the question

INNO v ATAB

whether a system of imposed prices applied to the products of manufactured

based on an agreement and covering a tobacco, has an appreciable effect on

single Member may State affect trade trade between Member States in a way between Member States. which may be detrimental to the

attainment of the objectives of a single

According to the Commission collective market between Member States and

agreements for imposed prices, to which constitutes also therefore an obstacle to

manufacturers, importers and dealers of this trade.

the same Member States are parties, Such a system creates a situation in unlike individual agreements for imposed prices between a manufacturer which the share of the market taken by imported goods depends solely on the and a certain number of dealers of the importers'

sales policy. The dealers same Member State, in general come

carrying on business in the importing within Article 85 (1). The intervention of

country cannot in any way influence this importers inevitably affects trade between share of the market. This latter situation Member States, especially if it was the is an obstacle to Community trade. main importers who are parties to the

agreement. To sum up the Commission takes the

view that a system of imposed prices The reaction of the Commission, in having legal force impedes the free accordance with this view, to the movement of imported goods within the agreements for imposed prices entered of the Court's definition of a into earlier between Fedetab and the meaning measure having equivalent effect in its Belgian association of wholesalers of judgment of 11 July 1974 in Case 8/74 manufactured tobacco, was to notify its (Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave complaints to the parties concerned. This Dassonville [1974] ECR 837), especially procedure is taking its normal course. in a sector where, owing to tax

provisions, parallel imports present more If a collective system of imposed prices problems than normal imports. having legal force and such as to cover

not only all importers as well as all It is not for the Commission to set out manufacturers is considered from this here how this effect might be avoided. point of view, the conclusion which must Nevertheless it goes on to suggest some be drawn is that such a system may affect solutions. trade between Member States and for this possible

reason comes under the jurisdiction of It is also possible according to the the Commission. Commission to show that collective

systems of imposed prices having legal It is the Commission's view that to this force are compatible with Article 30 by conclusion must be added the fact that putting forward the argument which the for technical reasons, which it gives, Commission usually applies to measures arising out of the tax system introduced presumed to have equivalent effect and is for excise duties, the tobacco sector based on the principles laid down in scarcely provides any opportunity for Directive No 70/50/EEC (OJ, English possible mitigation of the effect which Special Edition 1970 (I), p. 17) of 22 this system has on intra-Community December 1969 supplemented by trade by means of parallel imports. passages from the Court s decided cases

and especially from the Dassonville Consequently the Commission is of the judgment. This approach leads to the opinion that a collective system of same conclusion. imposed prices having legal force, especially if it was combined with a tax Under the collective system of imposed system of this kind, which is normally prices having legal force the importer is

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

free to apply his own price policy. There The Hof van Cassatie at the end of the

is no direct obstacle to imports. third question considers what may happen if the producers and importers

Nevertheless, since it is impossible to sell continue to fix retail price levels which

at a lower price, the existence of an are mademandatory by a method other

indirect obstacle must be regarded as than Article 58 of the VAT Code, namely

likely. If such a prohibition applied also by publication of these prices combined

to imported products, it would in with the obligation to them. Now apply practice be impossible to prevent it from this supposition modifies the form only having an effect on patterns of trade of the Belgian measure and not its within the Community. content, so that it is unlikely to alter the

result of the examination of the

The actual circumstances the system with Article surrounding a compatibility of

collective system of imposed prices 30.

having legal force play an important part. Such a system would be much more The Commission ends its observations

likely to hinder trade between Member on the interpretation of Article 30 by States if the imported products were not stressing that, if this article is given a

freely available on the other Community more restrictive interpretation, the

markets, so that parallel imports cannot second paragraph of Article 5 read

normally be an alternative source of together with Article 85 of the Treaty supply. As has already been mentioned could become a matter of some

above this is the situation in the tobacco importance. It may be asked whether sector because of the taxation system to encroachment by Member States upon a which these products are subjected in all field where the Community alone has the Member States. jurisdiction, which affects potentially trade between Member States but cannot

The Commission gives a brief outline of be proved to be a potential obstacle to

the technical and practical obstacles to such trade is caught by the prohibition

parallel imports and concludes that the laid down in the second paragraph of

taxation system to which manufactured Article 5 of the Treaty. tobacco is subjected considerably reduces

the opportunity of effecting such imports The Commission relying on paragraph

which in general exists in the case of 30 of the judgment of 23 January 1975 other products. According to the in Case 31/74 (Mr Filippo Galli [1975] Commission it follows that the probable ECR 47 at p. 64) and on paragraph 51 of obstacle to trade between Member States the judgment of 14 July 1976 in Joined

becomes a certainty even if it is difficult Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 (Cornelius Kramer to quantify. and Others [1976] ECR 1279 at p. 1312) is tempted to answer this question in the

These complaints directed against the affirmative.

system of imposed prices having legal force are confirmed and further It is the Commission's view that even if substantiated by raising the question those restrictions on competition which

whether the objective aimed at could not may be exempted under Article 85 (3) be attained with the help of a less have been voluntarily accepted by restrictive measure. As the Commission undertakings, may not be they made

considers that the answer to this question obligatory by Member States. In the case is thatit could, at least if the objective of restrictions on competition laid down consists in protecting the traditional by law not only is the requisite

retail trade against the aggressive sales consensus of the parties concerned to

techniques large stores, it puts forward of enter into a voluntary agreement

some solutions which are less restrictive. replaced by the intervention of the

INNO v ATAB

public authorities but an element of selling price mentioned in Article 4 and

national interest comes into play over in the second place that this freedom is and above the private interests which subject to any national price control

normally are the subject-matter of exercised by Member States. agreements. The formal application of

Article 85 would be impossible while Article 5 (1) was adopted for a specific

from the practical point of view the purpose indicated in the recitals in the

problem would become complicated and preamble to the directive. The last recital

these are two factors each of which on its reads as follows: 'Whereas the imperative own is enough to jeopardize attainment needs of competition imply a system of

of the objectives of the Treaty within the freely formed prices for all groups of

meaning of the second paragraph of manufactured tobacco'.

Article 5 thereof.

Article 5 (1) gives effect to this intention. The same reasoning can be applied to The collection of excise duties requires

this case in which the potential obstacle certain rules. They must however not be to trade between Member States has used to restrict competition indirectly.

more than one source, since it stems Subject to this reservation national

partly from Article 58 of the VAT Code powers in the field of prices remain

and partly from the whole of the tax intact. rules applicable to the tobacco sector.

Viewed in this way Article 5 (1) of the

If Article 30 had to be applied to these directive does not prescribe for Member it be less States any 'particular conduct'

circumstances, would no true course of

that the the the judgment of national measure creates a within meaning of situation which although based on an the Court of2 February 1977 in Case agreement does not qualify for 51/76 (Verbond van Nederlandse exemption under Article 85 (3). The Ondernemingen v Inspecteur der prohibition in the second paragraph of Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1977] ECR Article 5 applies a fortiori to an 113), so that it can be inferred from this

intervention of this kind. The application that this provision is not directly of this provision therefore produces the applicable.

same results as does the test of

compatibility with Article 30 of the The Commission summarizes its Treaty, with this difference that it is observations as follows: impossible to plead that the Treaty '1. The prohibition of any measure

provisions have direct effect. having an effect equivalent to a

quantitative restriction on imports set

5. Interpretation of Council Directive out in Article 30 of the Treaty must No 72/464/EEC be understood as meaning that it applies to national rules restricting The Commission confines its obser­ competition on a domestic market vations to Article 5 (1) of the directive. and affecting trade between Member States in a way which may be This provision cannot be considered detrimental to the attainment of a

independently of Article 4 of the single market.

directive which provides that excise duty 2. National rules which place, in law or

must be calculated 'on the maximum in fact, some of the persons or

retail selling price'. Article 5 (1) broadly undertakings carrying on business on

enunciates two principles: in the first a particular market in a dominant place that those who introduce position compared with the others

manufactured tobacco to the market are are incompatible with the second

free to determine the maximum retail paragraph of Article 5 of the Treaty,

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

if at the same time reasonable importer from lowering the selling price precautions are not taken against erga omnes by affixing a tax label foreseeable forms of abuse of this showing the reduced price, provided that

dominant position. all the requirements of tax law are

3. A national measure some of fulfilled. whereby the undertakings carrying on business on the market may indirectly As far as the questions referred are influence the conduct of the others concerned the Belgian Government takes vis-à-vis third parties does not make the view that a measure adopted by a them undertakings within the Member State imposing a price fixed by meaning of Article 90 of the Treaty. the manufacturers or importers on the 4. Article 5 of Council Directive No sale to the consumer of a product which 72/464/EEC of 19 December 1972 is imported into or manufactured within does not have direct effect and does the Member State concerned does not not grant the natural and legal contravene Article 3 (f), the second persons to whom it applies rights paragraph of Article 5 and Article 86 of which national courts must protect.

the Treaty. Such a measure does not

however preclude the application to Observations of the Council Treaty. undertakings of Article 86 of the

The Council observations are confined to The Belgian Government submits that the fourth question relating to Directive Article 58 of the VAT Code does not in No 72/464/EEC and in particular to the fact grant any rights within the meaning meaning of Article 5 (1). The Council takes the view that Article 5 (1) of Article 90 (1) of the Treaty but imposes obligations. For this particular constitutes an obligation subject to reason which is in itself sufficient Article reservations and does not therefore have 90 (1) cannot be said to apply to the direct effect. The Council then gives an national measure. outline of how the provisions of the

directive were drawn up and suggests that

they are to be interpreted as meaning Articles 30, 31 and 32 must be is nothing in them to prevent that there understood to mean that rules imposing Member States from imposing by means fixed prices on the consumer, which are

of a legislative measure fixed prices shown on the tax labels and which

which retailers must apply. national manufacturers or the importers of the products from other Member Observations of the Belgian Government States freely determine do not contravene the abovementioned articles of the

The starting-point of the Belgian Treaty. These rules do not have an

Government's observations is the unfavourable effect on the prospects of

submission that tobacco products — and selling the imported products and cannot

especially cigarettes — have nothing in therefore affect trade between Member common with commercial products. States.

They are the only products subjected to a system of excise duties, to which an 'ad In order to determine whether the rules valorem' excise duty calculated on the at issue comply with Articles 30, 31 and

retail selling price 'including VAT is 32 of the Treaty it is sufficient to be able

applied. It is therefore forbidden to sell to infer from the function and effects of

tobacco to the consumer at a higher the national measure that there is an

price than the retail price shown obstacle to imports coming from selling on the tax label, since excise duty and Member States without having to

VAT are assessed on this price. There is establish that imports have in fact been

nothing to stop a manufacturer or hindered.

INNO v ATAB

The same applies if a Member State manufacturers or importers cannot in allows producers or importers after the any circumstances fix consumer prices.

latter have given notice of a forthcoming Such a system does not hinder price increase and complied with a intra-Community trade. Further the need specified waiting period to be free to fix for taxation purposes to maintain in force

prices, which include retail selling prices, a system of imposed prices is and at the same time to publish these acknowledged by the directive. prices and make their application

mandatory on the basis of the

abovementioned rules. III — Oral procedure

The Belgian Government concludes its At the hearing on 16 June 1977, NV inter­ observations by proposing an GB-INNO-BM, represented by Mr Van pretation of Council Directive No Bunnen, Mr Waelbroeck and Mr 72/464/EEC similar to that suggested by Dassesse, Advocates of the Brussels Bar, the Council. ATAB, represented by Mr Bayard, Mr Goffin, Mr Braun and Mr Thys, Observations of the Netherlands Advocates of the Brussels Bar and by Mr Government Kemmler, Advocate of the Frankfurt am

MainBar, the Council of the European The Netherlands Government explains Communities, represented by its Agents, that there is in Netherlands law a Mr Fornasier and Mr Brautigam, the

provision similar to the Belgian law at Commission of the European issue. According to the Netherlands Communities, by its Agent, represented

Government the relevant considerations Mr van der Esch, the Luxembourg are more social and economic than legal. Government, represented by its Agent, The retail tobacco sector consists on the Mr Emringer and by Mr Arendt, one hand of a large number of small Advocate of the Luxembourg Bar, and specialist retailers who are encountering the Italian Government, represented by serious economic difficulties. The profit its Agents, Mr Maresca and Mr Braguglia margins for manufactured tobacco are submitted their oral observations.

less than those for other retail articles, if account is taken of the fact that the tax During the public hearing ATAB put

element in the price of manufactured forward the specific submission that

tobacco is large. The removal of Article 58 of the Belgian VAT Code is the prohibition can only benefit not subject to Article 30 et seq. of the

supermarkets. Treaty. It is in fact a tax provision and

forms part and parcel of the Belgian Observations of the Luxembourg system of taxation. Article 99 of the

Government Treaty determines what is to happen to

national legislation concerning tax, The Government of Luxembourg the turnover taxes and other forms of

laws whereof also include similar indirect taxation. It follows logically that provisions submits in the main similar until tax legislation has been harmonized social and economic considerations. the whole of it continues in force.

Observations of the Italian Government In rejecting this argument the

Commission made the particular point

The Italian Government emphasizes that that, if it were adopted, it would lead to

in Italy consumer prices are fixed for tax the unacceptable result that if a Member reasons by state law and that Article 86 State wishes to secure its fiscal revenue

does not apply to Member States when and at the same time considers that the

they legislate. Under the Italian system profitability of undertakings must be

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

encouraged and that for this purpose have very serious repercussions on

competition must be eliminated, the Community trade. fiscal reasons for such legislation allow

the rules of competition in the Treaty to The Advocate General delivered his be evaded. This would amount to an opinion at the hearing on 21 September infringement of Article 30 which would 1977.

Decision

1 By an order of 7 January 1977 which was received at the Court on 26 January 1977, the Belgian Hof van Cassatie (Court of Cassation) referred under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty four questions on the interpretation of Article 3 (f), the

second paragraph of Article 5, Articles 30, 31, 32, 86 and 90 of the Treaty, and of Council Directive No 72/464/EEC (OJ, English Special Edition 1972

(31 December), p. 3) on taxes other than turnover taxes which affect the

consumption of manufactured tobacco.

2 These questions were raised in the context of an action between the Belgian

limited liability company GB-INNO-BM, which runs several supermarkets in Belgium, and the non-profit-making association Vereniging van de Kleinhandelaars in Tabak (Association of Tobacco Retailers) (hereinafter referred to as 'ATAB').

3 It emerges from the file on the case that, by an order of 24 April 1972,

following proceedings brought by ATAB, the President of the Rechtbank van Koophandel (Commercial Court), Brussels, ordered the company to which

GB-INNO-BM is the legal successor to discontinue the selling or offering for sale of cigarettes at a price lower than that stated on the tax label, on the

grounds that such practice was an unfair competitive act and infringed Article 58 of the Belgian Law of 3 July 1969 (Value-added tax Code), which is in the following terms:

'In respect of manufactured tobacco which is imported into or produced

within this country, the tax shall be levied whenever excise duty has to be paid in accordance with the relevant provisions of tax laws or regulations. The tax shall be calculated on the basis of the price stated on the tax label which

must be the compulsory selling price to the consumer or, if no price is

specified, on the basis adopted for the imposition of excise duty'.

INNO v ATAB

4 The appeal lodged by GB-INNO-BM against that order was dismissed by the Hof van Beroep (Court of Appeal), Brussels, by a judgment of 24 November 1974, and the company then appealed to the Hof van Cassatie (Court of

Cassation).

The national legislation

5 In Belgium manufactured tobacco is subject to a system of excise duties

which is characterized by the imposition of an ad valorem excise duty calculated on the retail selling price 'including VAT'.

6 The aggregate amount of these two charges is paid by the manufacturer or importer when he buys the tax labels which will be affixed to the various

manufactured or imported tobacco products and which state the retail selling price.

7 It is prohibited to sell tobacco products to the consumer at a price higher

than the retail selling price appearing on the label.

8 With regard to excise duties, the same prohibition is formally laid down in paragraph 12 of the regulation annexed to the Ministerial Order of 22 January 1948 governing the imposition of excise duties on manufactured tobacco.

9 As regards VAT, the prohibition results from the fact that Article 58 (1) of the said Law of 3 July 1969 refers to the principles governing liability to and imposition of excise duties.

10 It is also prohibited to sell tobacco products to the consumer at a price lower

than the one appearing on the tax label.

11 If, at the material time, that prohibition was not in force as regards excise duties, nonetheless it was in force as regards VAT, by virtue of Article 58 (1) of the Law of 3 July 1969, which is quoted above.

12 The questions referred by the Hof van Cassatie for a preliminary ruling must enable that court to assess the compatibility with Community law of Article

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

58 (1) of the Belgian Law of 3 July 1969, in so far as under those provisions a selling price determined by the manufacturers or importers is imposed for sales to the consumer.

General observations

13 In all the Member States, taxes on manufactured tobacco are an important

source of revenue, so that the competent authorities must possess effective

means of ensuring that they are collected.

14 In the present state of Community law, it is for each Member State to choose its own method of fiscal control over manufactured tobacco on sale in its territory.

15 Because of the need to satisfy the demands of the rigorous and often complicated controls — which differ moreover from one Member State to another — the import and export of manufactured tobacco at present come

up against inevitable obstacles and in these circumstances trade between

States in this product requires considerable resources and skill.

16 Taking into account the large tax element in the selling price to the

consumer, the profit made by the wholesaler and by the retailer is relatively small.

17 In a system in which, as in Belgium, the basis of assessment to excise duty and to VAT is the retail selling price, a prohibition on selling tobacco

products to the consumer at a price higher than the retail selling price appearing on the tax label constitutes an essential fiscal guarantee, designed to prevent producers and importers from undervaluing their products at the

time of the taxes. paying

18 On the other hand, a prohibition on selling to the consumer at a price lower appears on the tax label is not than that which necessarily imposed for fiscal reasons, but rather, according to certain governments which intervened in this

case, for socio-economic purposes, in that, by eliminating the possibility of

any kind of discounts on sales to the consumer, it aims to support a certain

retail selling structure and prevent that structure from becoming concentrated to the disadvantage of small retailers.

INNO v ATAB

been in 19 It has also argued that maintaining a fixed retail price is essential order to ensure that the Member State is certain of actually obtaining the revenue from taxes on manufactured tobacco.

20 However, since in a system such as the one at issue collection is effected

when the tax labels are obtained, that argument cannot be accepted.

21 Finally, it should also be noted that in a system such as the one which applies in Belgium, there is in theory nothing to prevent a retailer from being able to determine his own price for sale to the consumer, by obtaining tobacco

products bearing appropriate tax labels.

22 However, in practice such a transaction is possible only with the co-operation of the manufacturer or importer on the one hand, and of the national tax

authorities on the other, and such co-operation may often be difficult to

obtain.

23 The questions referred by the national court have to be answered after taking all these considerations into account.

The first question

24 In the first part of the first question the Hof van Cassatie asks whether Article

3 (f), the second paragraph of Article 5 and Article 86 of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted as meaning that Member States are prohibited from

introducing into or maintaining in force in their legislation a provision

whereby, for the sale to consumers of both imported and home-produced

goods, a selling price is fixed by the manufacturers or importers if the

provision

— is of such a nature as to encourage the abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the Common Market within the meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty;

— encourages the abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position which exists because the manufacturers and importers of manufactured

tobacco can oblige the retailers in a Member State to comply with the

selling prices to the consumer fixed by the former.

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

25 In the second part of the question it is asked first whether the introduction or maintenance in force of such a provision is prohibited even if it is general in scope in that it relates to manufacturers and importers in general, that is, even those which have no dominant position or make no abuse thereof and a

fortiori if the abuse of a dominant position was neither its aim nor its object

nor its effect.

26 It is asked secondly whether in such a case the Treaty provisions referred to in the first be interpreted part of the question must not as meaning that the introduction or maintenance in force of such a provision is by no means prohibited but that the provision can have no effect on the scope of

application of Article 86 in the sense that abuse of a dominant position

remains unlawful even if it is encouraged by this provision in the particular

circumstances.

27 The different parts of this question should be dealt with together.

28 First, the single market system which the Treaty seeks to create excludes any

national system of regulation hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade within the Community.

29 Secondly, the general objective set out in Article 3 (f) is made specific in several Treaty provisions concerning the rules on competition, including Article 86, which states that any abuse by one or more undertakings of a

dominant position shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.

30 The second paragraph of Article 5 of the Treaty provides that Member States shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the

objectives of the Treaty.

31 Accordingly, while it is true that Article 86 is directed at undertakings,

nonetheless it is also true that the Treaty imposes a duty on Member States not to adopt or maintain in force any measure which could deprive that

provision of its effectiveness.

INNO v ATAB

32 Thus Article 90 provides that, in the case of public undertakings and

undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights,

Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary inter alia to the rules provided for in Articles 85 to 94.

33 Likewise, Member States may not enact measures enabling private

undertakings to escape from the constraints imposed by Articles 85 to 94 of the Treaty.

34 At all events, Article 86 prohibits any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position, even if such abuse is encouraged by a national legislative provision.

35 In any case, a national measure which has the effect of facilitating the abuse of a dominant position capable affecting trade between Member States will of

generally be incompatible with Articles 30 and 34, which prohibit quantitative restrictions on imports and exports and all measures having equivalent effect.

36 In assessing the compatibility with the Treaty of a system for fixing retail selling prices, a national court must take into account all the conditions for

the application of the provisions of Community law which have been referred

to.

37 In this connexion, the Hof van Cassatie has taken into consideration, first, the

possibility that the fact that manufacturers and importers of tobacco products

can oblige retailers in a Member State to adhere to the prices for sale to the

consumer fixedby them could constitute a dominant position, and, secondly, that the measure regarded as possibly infringing Article 86 in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article 5 is a provision whereby on a sale to the

consumer those prices must be adhered to.

38 In order to assess the compatibility of the introduction or the maintenance in

force of such a measure with those provisions of Community law, the national court must also determine, taking into account the obstacles to trade in

manufactured tobacco between States which may result from the nature of the

fiscal arrangements in question, whether that measure as such is capable of

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

affecting trade between Member States, for this condition has to be satisfied

for the prohibitions laid down in Article 86 to be applicable.

The second question

39 In the second question, the Hof van Cassatie asks whether undertakings to

which Member States grant special or exclusive rights within the meaning of

Article 90 of the Treaty exist where, by means of a legislative provision, the

State indirectly gives manufacturers and importers of certain products, as

distinct from manufacturers and importers of other products, the possibility of themselves fixing the compulsory selling price to the consumer, and, if that question is answered in the affirmative, whether the retention of such special

or exclusive rights is contrary to the provisions of Article 7 and Articles 85 to

94 of the Treaty.

40 It should be pointed out that the fiscal system in question leaves the

manufacturer or importer free to fix for his products a retail selling price lower than the selling price of competing products of the same kind and

quality and which have the same characteristics.

41 Since that possibility is open to all those, including retailers, who become producers or importers of manufactured tobacco, and consequently to an

indefinite class of undertakings, it is questionable whether those undertakings

can properly be described as having been granted 'special', and at all events 'exclusive', rights.

42 However, since it has already been indicated in the reasons given for the answer to the first question that in any case Article 90 is only a particular

application of certain general principles which bind the Member States, it does not appear necessary to give an answer to the second question.

The third question

43 This question, which is subdivided into three parts, asks first whether Articles

30, 31 and 32 of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted as meaning that a

measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction includes rules in a Member State whereby a fixed price is imposed for the sale of tobacco

products to the consumer, namely the price stated on the tax labels and

INNO v ATAB

which, according to the particular case, is determined by the manufacturers of

these products who are established in the State or by the importers of the same products, in particular from other Member States.

44 Next it is asked whether such rules only constitute such a measure when it is in fact certain that it can hinder Community trade directly indirectly, or

actually or potentially, a matter which must be determined by the national court in each case.

45 Finally the question asks whether the position is different if, after notification of a price increase and after compliance with a specified waiting period, the Member State permits the producers and importers to fix freely the prices,

including the retail prices, but publishes the prices and, by means of the

above-mentioned measure, ensures compliance with them.

46 Article 30 of the Treaty prohibits in trade between Member States all

measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.

47 For the purpose of this prohibition it is sufficient that the measures in

question are likely to hinder, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, imports between Member States.

48 It should be pointed out that, as stated in Commission Directive No 70/50 of

22 December 1969 (OJ, English Special Edition 1970 (I), p. 17), 'measures, other than those applicable equally to domestic or imported products, which hinder imports which could otherwise take place, including measures which make importation more difficult or costly than the disposal of domestic production'

are measures which have an effect equivalent to a quantitative

restriction on imports.

However, the 'measures having equivalent in directive effect'

49 referred to the

do not include measures which by having such effect hinder trade between Member States but which are specifically referred to elsewhere in the Treaty, in particular as fiscal measures, or are per se permitted being as the visible or

hidden expression of powers retained by the Member States.

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

so Article 99 of the Treaty, which imposes on the Commission the duty to look for ways of harmonizing the legislation of the Member States on this point in the interest of the Common Market, in conjunction with Article 100 on the

approximation of laws, relates to the obstacles to trade resulting from indirect taxes.

51 On the basis of the aforementioned articles, the Council adopted Directive

No 72/464, which is the subject of the fourth question, because it precisely considered that it was in the interest of the Common Market that the rules for taxes the consumption of manufactured tobacco should be affecting harmonized, in order progressively to eliminate from the national systems

those factors which were likely to hinder free movement and distort the

conditions of competition.

52 Although a maximum price applicable without distinction to domestic and

imported products does not in itself constitute a measure having an effect

equivalent to a quantitative restriction, it may have such an effect, however, when it is fixed at a level such that the sale of imported products becomes, if not impossible, more difficult than that of domestic products.

53 On the other hand a system whereby the prices are freely chosen by the

manufacturer or the importer as the case may be and imposed on the

consumer by a national legislative measure, and whereby no distinction is made between domestic products and imported products, generally has

exclusively internal effects.

54 However, the possibility cannot be excluded that in certain cases such a

system may be capable of affecting intra-Community trade.

55 As has already been stated, imports and exports of manufactured tobacco are

subject to obstacles inherent in the different methods of fiscal control which

are used by the Member States in particular to ensure collection of the taxes on those products.

56 Accordingly, in order to assess whether rules in a Member State whereby a

fixed price is imposed for the sale to the consumer of manufactured tobacco,

namely the price which has been freely chosen by the manufacturer or

INNO v ATAB

importer, may constitute a measure having an effect equivalent to a

quantitative restriction, the national court must establish, taking into account the fiscal obstacles affecting the sector of the products in question, whether such a system of fixed prices is in itself likely to hinder, directly or indirectly,

actually or potentially, imports between Member States.

The fourth question

57 This question asks, first, whether the provisions of Article 5 of Council

Directive No 72/464 have direct effect, so that individuals can rely on them

before national courts, and, secondly, whether the Member States are

prohibited from introducing maintaining or in force a legislative measure

whereby a selling price, stated on the tax label, is imposed for the sale to the consumer of imported or home-produced tobacco products, in that it is not

possible to exceed the maximum and it is not permissible to sell the product

at a lower price.

58 The second part of this question must be considered first, since if it was

answered in the negative, there would be no need to answer the first part.

59 Council Directive No 72/464, based on Articles 99 and 100 of the Treaty, as were the directives of 11 April 1967 on the harmonization of turnover taxes

(OJ, English Special Edition 1967, pp. 14 and 16), sets out the basic rules for the first stage of the harmonization of excise duties on manufactured tobacco.

60 In the preamble to the directive, the Council first of all states as a matter of principle that, as regards manufactured tobacco, achievement of an economic

union within which there is healthy competition and whose characteristics

are similar to those of a domestic market, presupposes that the application in

the Member States of taxes affecting the consumption of products in this

sector does not distort conditions of competition and does not impede their

free movement within the Community.

61 Article 1 of the directive lays down the principle that the structure of the

excise duties on manufactured tobacco shall be harmonized in several stages

and Article 4 lays down a system of excise duties comprising a proportional

component and a specific component.

JUDGMENT OF 16. 11. 1977 - CASE 13/77

62 Article 5 (1) of the directive provides that:

'Manufacturers and importers shall be free to determine the maximum retail

selling price for each of their products. This provision may not, however, hinder implementation of the national systems of legislation regarding the

control of price levels or the observance of imposed prices'.

63 Taking the view that the essential requirements of competition imply a

system of freely formed prices for all groups of manufactured tobacco, the

Council provided in Article 5 (1) of the directive that manufacturers and

importers shall be free to determine the maximum retail selling price for each of their products.

64 Taken in context, the second sentence of Article 5 (1) cannot be interpreted as aiming to prohibit the Member States from introducing or maintaining in force a legislative measure whereby a selling price, namely the price stated on

the tax label, is imposed for the sale to the consumer of imported or

home-produced tobacco products, always provided that that price has been

freely determined by the manufacturer or importer.

65 In view of the answer given to the second part of the fourth question, there is

no need to answer the first part thereof.

Costs

66 The costs incurred by the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium, the

Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Government of the

Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Government of the Italian Republic, the

Council of the European Communities and the Commission of the European

Communities, which have submitted observations to the Court, are not

recoverable.

67 As these proceedings are, in so far as the parties to the main action are

concerned, in the nature of a step in the action pending before the national

court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court.

INNO v ATAB

On those grounds,

THE COURT

in answer to the questions referred to it by the Belgian Hof van Cassatie by a judgment of 7 January 1977, hereby rules:

1. Article 86 of the EEC Treaty prohibits any abuse by one or

more undertakings of a dominant position, even if such abuse

is encouraged by a national legislative provision.

2. In order to assess the compatibility with Article 86 of the

Treaty, in conjunction with Article 3 (f) and the second

paragraph of Article 5 of the Treaty, of the introduction or

maintenance in force of a national measure whereby the

prices determined by the manufacturer or importer must be adhered to when tobacco products are sold to a consumer, it must be determined, taking into account the obstacles to trade which may result from the nature of the fiscal arrangements

to which those products are subject, whether, apart from any

abuse of a dominant position which such arrangements might

encourage, such introduction or maintenance in force is also

likely to affect trade between Member States.

3. Rules in a Member State whereby a fixed price is imposed for the sale to the consumer of either imported or home-produced tobacco products, namely the price which has been freely chosen by the manufacturer or importer, constitute a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on

imports only if, taking into account the obstacles inherent in the different methods of fiscal control which are used by the

Member States in particular to ensure collection of the taxes

on those products, such a system of fixed prices is likely to

hinder, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, imports

between Member States.

4. Article 5 of Council Directive No 72/464 /EEC of 19 December

1972 on taxes other than turnover taxes which affect the

consumption of manufactured tobacco does not aim to

prohibit the Member States from introducing or maintaining in force a legislative measure whereby a selling price, namely the price stated on the tax label, is imposed for the sale to the

OPINION OF MR REISCHL - CASE 13/77

consumer of imported or home-produced tobacco products,

provided that that price has been freely determined by the

manufacturer or importer.

Kutscher Sørensen Bosco Donner Mertens de Wilmars

Pescatore Mackenzie Stuart O'Keeffe Touffait

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 16 November 1977.

A. Van Houtte H. Kutscher

Registrar President

OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL REISCHL <apnote>1</apnote> DELIVERED ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1977­

Mr President, tobacco. For goods produced in Belgium Members of the Court, the producers are liable for the tax

whereas for imported products the

The present proceedings for a importers are liable. The tax is levied by preliminary ruling referred by the means of tax labels which may be Belgian Hof van Cassatie (Court of obtained from the tax authorities. They Cassation) concern the interpretation of may be affixed either by the

Article 3 (f), the second paragraph of manufacturer or by the importer; Article 5, Article 86, Article 90, Articles however as they must be affixed under

30, 31 and 32 of the EEC Treaty and the cellophane cover where such cover

certain provisions of Council Directive exists (and that appears to be the rule for No 72/464/EEC (OJ, English Special cigarettes) even in the case of imported Edition 1972 (31 December), p. 3) on goods the affixation is usually carried out

taxes other than turnover taxes which in practice by the (foreign) affect the consumption of manufactured manufacturers. The basis of assessment

tobacco which entered into force on 1 for the tax is the retail price stated on the

July 1973. tax label. In principle it is freely determined by the manufacturers and

The following observations importers. However it must be noted that preliminary may be made. because there is State control over

maximum trade margins in Belgium In Belgium excise duty and value added price increases must be authorized by the tax are imposed on manufactured Minister for Economic Affairs. Similarly

1 — Translated from the German.

Text rozhodnutia bol prevzatý z verejne dostupných úradných zdrojov. Rozhodnutie je úradným dokumentom.
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