C-23/81
ECLI:EU:C:1983:239
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (FIRST CHAMBER) 11 SEPTEMBER 1983 '
Commission of the European Communities v Société anonyme Royale Belge
(Official — Risk of accident)
Case 23/81
In Case 23/81
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, represented by Raymond Baeyens, Principal Legal Adviser of the Commission, acting as Agent, assisted by Marc Godfroid, of the Brussels Bar, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the office of Oreste Montako, a member of its Legal Department, Jean Monnet Building, Kirchberg,
applicant, in the presence of
1. Johanna van Rij, widow of the late Gerrit Jan van Kasteel, an official of the Commission of the European Communities, acting on her own behalf and as the legal guardian of her children, Ingeborg, Gerrit Jan, Huberdina and Bastiaan;
2. Henri Tieleman, acting as supervisory guardian of the aforementioned minor children;
3. Johanna Theodora van Kasteel; 4. Hans van Kasteel,
all residing in Brussels and represented by Benoît Humblet and Edmond Lebrun, of the Brussels Bar, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of Tony Biever, 83 Boulevard Grande-Duchesse-Charlotte,
interveners, v
1 — Language of che Case: French.
JUDGMENT OF 22. 9. 1983 — CASE 23/81
SOCIÉTÉ ANONYME ROYALE BELGE, an insurance company having its registered office at 25 Boulevard du Souverain, 1170 Brussels, acting on its own behalf and as the authorized agent and representative of the following insurance companies : 1. Société anonyme Generali Belgium (Concorde), Brussels,
2. Société anonyme Caisse Patronale, Brussels, 3. Société anonyme Assurantie van de Belgische Boerenbond, Louvain,
4. Société anonyme Winterthur, Brussels,
5. Société anonyme Zürich, Brussels,
6. Société anonyme Assubel, Brussels,
7. Société anonyme Securitas (formerly Le Phénix belge), Antwerp,
8. Société anonyme Rhin et Moselle, Brussels,
9. Société anonyme Le Foyer, Brussels, 10. Nationale Nederlanden, Schadeverzekeringsmaatschappij NV , The Hague, Netherlands, 11. Société anonyme Phoenix Continental, Brussels,
12. Top International Insurance Co. Ltd, Ballerup, Denmark, 13. Excess Insurance Company Ltd, c / o Glanvill, Enthoven and Company Ltd, London, England, 14. Allianz Versicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft, Munich, Federal Republic of Germany,
represented by François van der Mensbrugghe, of the Brussels Bar, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of Jean Hoss, 15 Cote d'Eich, defendant,
APPLICATION under Article 181 of the EEC Treaty for an order requiring the defendant to pay the principal sum and interest payable by the Commission under Article .73 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities as a result of the death by accident of Gerrit Jan van Kasteel, an official of the Commission,
COMMISSION v ROYALE BELGE
THE COURT (First Chamber )
composed of: A. O'Keeffe , President of Chamber , G. Bosco and 1. fvoopmans , Judges ,
Advocate General : Sir Gordon Slynn Registrar : P . Heim
gives the following
JUDGMENT
Facts and Issues
The facts of the case, the course of Communities against the Risk of the procedure and the conclusions, Accident and of Occupational Disease submissions and arguments of the parties (hereinafter referred to as "the joint may be summarized as follows: rules"), which define the circumstances in which officials are insured against the risk of accident, were adopted by I — Facts and written procedure common agreement of the institutions, recorded by the President of the Court of Justice on 22 December 1976. Article A — The provisions applicable 4 thereof sets out the various cases in which officials are not covered under Article 73 (1) of the Staff Regulations of Article 73 of the Staff Regulations: Officials of the European Communities reads as follows: " 1 . Accidents shall not be covered by Article 73 of the Staff Regulations if "An official is insured, from the date of they are due to the following causes: his entering the service, against the risk of occupational disease and of accident (a) . .. subject to rules drawn up by common agreement of the institutions of the (b) Manifestly reckless acts; Communities after consultation of the Participation by means of Staff Regulations Committee . . . Such motorized equipment in sporting rules shall specify which risks are not contests, races and official trials; covered." Practice of sports regarded as dangerous, such as boxing, Pursuant to that provision Rules on the karate, parachuting, speleology, Insurance of Officials of the European underwater fishing and explo-
JUDGMENT OF 22. 9. 1983 — CASE 23/81
ration with breathing equipment Starting from Brussels National Airport, including containers for the the three aircraft took off on the supply of air or oxygen; morning of 29 April 1978 for Lyon where they landed at about 13.45 hours local time. »)
The three pilots took off one after the other from Lyon-Bron Airport at 14.30 On 28 January 1977 the institutions of hours for Cannes whence they were due the Communities signed a collective to fly on to the Greek Islands via Rome insurance agreement against accidents and Corfu. During the flight the aircraft and occupational disease with the piloted by Mr van Kasteel with two pass defendant insurance companies. Ac engers on board crashed into Mont cording to Article 1.1 thereof, the Sainte-Victoire in the Commune of purpose of the insurance was to "cover Vauvenargues at a height of 960 metres the financial consequences of the at about 17.00 hours. The three obligations which the Communities occupants of the aircraft were killed in assume under their Staff Regulations for the accident which was investigated by accidents and occupational disease the Gendarmerie of Aix-en-Provence befalling or contracted by the persons to and was the subject of a report drawn up whom the provisions of Article 73 of the by the French Ministry of Transport. Staff Regulations ... and the rules made thereunder apply." The agreement includes an arbitration clause which That report and the minutes of the provides that: "Failing an amicable inquiry may be summarized as follows. settlement any dispute relating to the performance of this contract or annexes hereto may be submitted to the Court of Mr van Kasteel held a private pilot's Justice of the European Communities" licence restricted to flights by day only (Article 5). Relying on Article 181 of the under visual flight rules in single-engined EEC Treaty the Commission referred aircraft. The aircraft piloted by Mr van this dispute to the Court pursuant to that Kasteel was single-engined. Its logbook arbitration clause. shows that instrument flying by day or night was not permitted. The aircraft in question was not equipped with instru ments for non-visual flight but besides having an altimeter and a variometer B — Summary of the facts (which indicates whether the aircraft is climbing or descending) it had an arti ficial horizon enabling the aircraft to be kept in a horizontal position if visual Gerrit Jan van Kasteel, who was an meteorological conditions are lost. official in Directorate-General XV of the Commission, hired a Piper Cherokee aircraft, registration number 00-JPM, Before leaving Lyon Mr van Kasteel and from European Air Transport SA at the other two pilots went along together Brussels. Two of his colleagues, Daniel to the meteorological office where they Chabert and Filippo Turli, also hired were informed inter alia that visibility on light aircraft at the same time. They the route to Cannes was 10 to 15 planned to make a private trip together kilometres and that a vigorous to Greece with various passengers, all disturbance resulting in heavy local rain officials of the European Communities. beyond Montélimar was forecast
COMMISSION v ROYALE BELGE
together with strong turbulence. The requested the Commission to pay the three aircraft then took off from Lyon benefits guaranteed in the event of the for Cannes. No flight plans were filed. accidental death of an official. By an Mr van Kasteel had told the other two application lodged at the Court Registry pilots that he was going to take the on 16 October 1979 they asked the direct route by heading straight for Court to annul the Commission's Cannes once past Avignon. The other decision refusing their request (Case two pilots decided after taking off from 805/79, pending). The Commission Lyon to follow the Rhône valley and asked for an unlimited extension of the then to try to reach Cannes by the coast. period for the submission of the defence in order to be able to resolve the problem arising from the insurers' refusal The last radio contact between Mr van to cover the Commission against the Kasteel and Marseille Airport was at consequences of Mr van Kasteel's death. 16.52 hours. The pilot stated that he was That request was granted by the heading for St Tropez, maintaining a President of the First Chamber on 3 June height of 4 500 feet (1 500 metres) and 1980. that he was in cloud. The control tower at Marseille Airport instructed him to maintain good visibility. After that message had been repeated to him Mr van Kasteel replied: "Affirmative, sir, but I am in a shower". When asked: "Have you the ground in sight?" he replied: "Sometimes, yes". At 17.24 hours Marseille Airport attempted to contact The insurers had been informed by the the aircraft again, but without success. Commission of Mr van Kasteel's The report drawn up by the accident of 29 April 1978 in a telex Gendarmerie states that the aircraft had message of 3 May 1978. By a letter of been in a layer of cloud in the Vauve- 31 October 1978 they declined to accept nargues region and crashed into the liability relying on Article 4 of the joint Sainte-Victoire mountainside at a height rules and in particular the exclusion of of 960 metres approximately two and a risks of accidents caused by manifestly half hours after its departure from Lyon, reckless acts. After receiving from the that is to say at about 17.00 hours local Commission details of the circumstances time. The inspector who drew up the of the accident, the insurers, by a letter report on the instructions of the French dated 22 January 1980, confirmed their Minister for Transport, Mr Grimaud, refusal to cover the consequences of the assumed that Mr van Kasteel had accident. attempted to descend below the cloud- layer and that in doing so he probably saw the ground in front of him but not soon enough to be able to avoid the crash.
By an application lodged at the Court C — Written procedure Registry on 5 February 1981 the Commission sought an order from the Court requiring the insurers, acting Relying on Article 73 (2) of the Staff through their authorized agent, Royale Regulations Mr van Kasteel's survivors Belge SA, to pay the principal sum and
JUDGMENT OF 22. 9. 1983 — CASE 23/81
interest payable by the Commission to decide at the time against taking the those beneficially entitled to Mr van direct route to Cannes and to take the Kasteel's estate. Lyon—Marseille route and Mr Grimaud, Inspector at the French Ministry of Transport and author of the aforementioned report, to appear in In its defence the defendant requested order to provide any comments on his that the case be joined to Case 805/79 report which might be of use. In on the ground that the cases were accordance with Article 45 (3) of the related. That request was refused by Rules of Procedure the First Chamber decision of the Court notified to the assigned the task of examining those parties on 23 April 1981. witnesses to the Judge-Rapporteur.
Since an agreement on the nomination of By an application lodged at the Court a single aviation expert could not be Registry on 2 June 1981 the applicants in reached the Commission, by letter of Case 805/79 sought leave pursuant to 29 March 1982, proposed to the Court the second paragraph of Article 37 of the that it should hear S. Thouvenot, an Statute of the Court to intervene in this expert on air transport whose name action in support of the Commission. appears on the list of aeronautical Thar application was lodged in experts maintained for the Court of accordance with Article 93 of the Rules Appeal, Paris. By a letter of 1 April 1982 of Procedure. By order dated 15 July the defendants proposed R. Auffray, an 1981 the Court granted leave to aeronautical expert residing at Bretigny intervene. in France.
The examination of the witnesses and By order dated 9 December 1981, made experts, in which the Advocate General pursuant to Article 95 (1) and (2) of the participated, took place on 2 July 1982 Rules of Procedure the Court decided to at the Court. assign the case to the First Chamber.
After the hearing on 2 July 1982 the Court (First Chamber), by letter dated By order dated 9 December 1981 the 14 December 1982, requested the Court (First Chamber) decided to initiate defendants to reply to certain questions measures of inquiry. First it decided to and gave the Commission and the hear of its own motion an aviation interveners the opportunity to submit expert to be nominated by both parties their observations on the answers. The within a period of one month, or, failing answers and the observations were agreement within that period, two received at the Court within the periods experts, one to be nominated by each allowed. side, on the question as to the conclusions which an airman might have drawn from the weather information provided by Lyon-Bron Airport for a Upon hearing the report of the Judge- flight from that airfield to Cannes. It also Rapporteur and the views of the ordered Mr Turli and Mr Chabert to be Advocate General the Court (First examined as witnesses as to the reasons, Chamber) then decided to open the oral referred to above, which led them to procedure.
COMMISSION v ROYALE BELGE
II — Conclusions of the parties In the alternative, before arriving at a decision on the substance of the case,
The Commission of the European Communities, the applicant, claims that the Court should: 1. Appoint one or three specialist experts in aviation matters to give their opinion, after studying the evidence 1. Declare the action admissible and well before the Court, on the question founded and accordingly order whether between the time of his Royale Belge SA, acting on its own departure from Lyon-Bron Airport on behalf and on behalf of the other 29 April 1978 to the time of his fatal companies which signed the insurance accident Mr van Kasteel committed policy of 28 January 1977, to pay the one or more manifestly reckless acts principal sum and interest payable by resulting in the accident and to the Commission under Article 73 of specify them; the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities to the persons beneficially entitled to the estate of Mr van Kasteel following his 2. Reserve the costs. death.by accident on 29 April 1978;
2. Order Royale Belge SA to pay the costs. Ill — Submissions and argu ments of the parties in the written procedure The interveners claim that the Court should:
1. Declare the intervention in this action In its application the applicant, the Com- admissible; mission of the European Communities, states that the issue of fact and law in this case is whether or not Mr van 2. Grant the order sought by the Kasteel's fatal accident was due to a Commission after ordering if manifestly reckless act within the necessary D. Chabert and F. Turli to meaning of Article 4 (1) (b) of the joint be examined as witnesses; rules. The burden of proving that such an act was committed is on the 3. Order the defendant to pay the costs defendant. In its view there can be no of the intervention. question of such an act unless Mr van Kasteel's conduct demonstrated a total conscious lack of care. "Reckless" acts are foolhardy acts, committed with the The defendant contends that the Court knowledge of the risks involved so that it should: may be said there is a willingness to accept risks. The meaning of the adverb 1. Declare the action inadmissible or in "manifestly" is that in addition such any event unfounded; recklessness excludes insurance cover only if it is immediately obvious to anyone that the official's conduct is a 2. Order the applicant to pay the costs; sure indication of recklessness.
JUDGMENT OF 22. 9. 1983 — CASE 23/81
The Commission then states that the to an extent which is clear and certain weather information given to Mr van beyond any possible doubt. Kasteel before he left Lyon-Bron was such that it was reasonable for him to decide to fly to Cannes by the direct route. It was only once he was in the air that Mr van Kasteel was confronted by For its interpretation of the events pre suddenly deteriorating weather and ceding the accident of 29 April 1981 the •whilst he succeeded in maintaining visual defendant refers to the report of the meteorological conditions his aircraft inquiry drawn up by the French Ministry was caught in downdraughts which of Transport and written by Mr caused it to crash into Mont Sainte- Grimaud. One of the conclusions Victoire. The Commission further be reached in the report reads as follows: lieves that Mr van Kasteel did not follow the route he had originally planned to take, since in view of the sudden de terioration in the weather he changed direction, probably with the intention of reaching the coast or an emergency "The initial cause of the accident resides landing 'place. In such circumstances in the pilot's decision to fly direct from there can be no presumption of a Lyon to Cannes. A contributory cause manifestly reckless act. was that he did not maintain VMC (Visual Meteorological Conditions) even if this meant a diversion. The determining cause was that he began to descend .. . without knowing the cloud base when the route between Carpentras and Saint Tropez passes over relatively In their defence the defendant places a high ground." different interpretation on the expression "manifestly reckless act" and the events leading to Mr van Kasteel's fatal ac cident. As far as concerns the meaning of the word "reckless", it states that, failing any other rule of interpretation, the In the defendant's view, only one of word should be given the meaning which those three causes need be the result of a it has in ordinary usage. After referring manifestly reckless act for Article 4 (1) to several dictionaries it takes the view (b) of the joint rules to apply. It that a "reckless" act may be defined as contends that each of the three causes the act of a person who, overestimating was the result of unquestionable his chances, pursues a course of action recklessness. with such audacity that he fails to foresee the dangers to which he exposes himself and of which he could not have been unaware. The defendant points out that the words used in the German text of Article 4 ( 1 ) (b) of the Community In the first place the decision to fly direct rules are "offensichtlich waghalsiger from Lyon to Cannes was foolishly Handlungen", which literally mean acts reckless because Mr van Kasteel knew which are obviously those of a "dare from the information given to him just devil". An act is "manifestly" reckless before his departure from Lyon-Bron when the audacity involved is foolhardy that weather conditions on that route
COMMISSION v ROYALE BELGE
were adverse in the extreme. What is provided by Lyon-Bron Airport was such more, Mr van Kasteel knew that when that any pilot given that information given the same information other pilots could have realized that visibility was nil had decided to go down the Rhône between Lyon and Cannes. On the basis valley where visual flight was still of the information which he had received possible over the entire route. Mr van Kasteel could set out on that route without infringing visual flight rules because visibility was reported as 10 to 15 kilometres and there was ample space between the two layers of cloud situated at 600 to 1 000 metres and 2 400 The second point made by the defendant metres to fly by sight. is that when Mr van Kasteel reached the disturbance and the 8/8 cloud cover he could have undertaken a diversion as the other two pilots had done. Instead of doing so he continued to fly into in creasingly thicker cloud in technical The Commission then makes the point conditions which did not allow visual that the route followed by Mr van flight to be maintained and in disregard Kasteel was one recommended by the of the most elementary requirements of French aviation authorities to pilots prudence. flying under visual flights rules. Only shortly before the accident did he cease to keep precisely to that route: Moreover, towards the end of their flight the other two pilots also encountered weather conditions which were at times Thirdly, Mr van Kasteel decided to fly difficult. On this point the Commission below 1 500 metres in the hope of refers to a statement by Mr Turli getting below the cloud base when the explaining that after reaching the coast sky was absolutely full of cloud between he was obliged to fly on instruments 800 and 2 500 metres and visibly was from La Ciotat and managed to land at reduced or even non-existent. Such a Toulon only with assistance from the descent in those conditions verged on radar there. The criticism made of Mr stupidity, first because Mr van Kasteel van Kasteel regarding his choice of route did not know the height of the cloud is therefore irrelevant. base or therefore how far he should come down and secondly because his route lay over relatively high peaks. In this regard the defendant contests the Commission's view that the aircraft became caught in downdraughts which The Commission attaches importance to caused it to crash into Mont Sainte- the last radio contact between Mr van Victoire. The defendant maintains that Kasteel and Marseille Information a few there is no evidence to suggest that the minutes before the accident. In its view accident was due to a downdraught. that message does not indicate, as the defendant contends, that at that moment Mr van Kasteel was flying in 8/8 cloud. Mr van Kasteel said in fact that he was passing through a "shower". What is more, that conversation did not indicate In its reply the Commission first of all any kind of anxiety or especially any denies that the weather information need to descend. In this regard the
JUDGMENT OF 22. 9. 1983 — CASE 23/81
Commission claims that there is no IV •— Summary of the statements evidence to support the assertion that Mr of the experts and wit van Kasteel decided to descend below nesses 1 500 metres, the level at which he was flying at the time of the last radio contact. Although his aircraft crashed into the mountain at a height of approx imately 960 metres, the existence of a downdraught would be sufficient to ex The evidence of Daniel Chabert, who plain the loss of altitude. himself flew an aircraft on 29 April 1978, may be summarized as follows. The three pilots all went to the meteoro logical office at Lyon-Bron and they discussed together the information which The Commission's conclusion is that they were given. As regards the visibility, none of the three alleged reckless acts type of cloud and altitude at which it has therefore been proven by the was expected to be, there was nothing defendant. alarming in the information given. In those cicumstances there was no reason to expect any particular danger in the direction of Provence. Before his departure from Lyon-Bron Mr Chabert decided to follow the Rhône valley for In its rejoinder the defendant maintains Cannes because he usually followed that that the information given to Mr van route which was more pleasant and more Kasteel before his departure from Lyon- enjoyable. A flight plan was not filed as Bron was an imperative warning to any such action was not compulsory in pilot that it was quite unsafe to set out to France. Near Carpentras Mr Chabert fly to Cannes by the route chosen by Mr decided not to continue to Cannes but to van Kasteel. This was also one of the land at Marseille. That decision was conclusions reached in the report of the forced upon him by two reasons. The inquiry drawn up by the French Ministry first was that he encountered an of Transport. That report also estab unexpected deterioration in the weather lished that the loss of height shortly which had not been forecast as being so before the accident could only have been bad; there were squalls which, though due to a decision to descend. If that not dangerous from the point of view of explanation — provided by an expert in the pilot were uncomfortable for the such matters — is right, Mr van Kasteel passengers. The second reason was that was reckless. However, the alternative he had to cut short the flight because explanation advanced by the Com two passengers became airsick so that the mission, namely that the aircraft was position was extremely unpleasant. Mr caught in a downdraught, does not rule Chabert therefore decided to land at out recklessness either. Before leaving Marseille so as not to continue the flight Lyon-Bron Mr van Kasteel knew that in uncomfortable conditions. he would be flying into a vigorous disturbance and that there would be swirling winds and strong turbulence. It would be the height of folly to venture into such a situation, in an aircraft of the type he was flying, above a mountain range as high as that where the accident The evidence of the other pilot, Filippo occurred. Turli, may be summarized as follows.
COMMISSION v ROYALE BELGE
The weather forecast by the meteoro decision to fly direct from Montélimar to logical office at Lyon-Bron was not very Cannes, Mr Grimaud explained that he good. However, they were told that it did not state in his report that it was was "flyable" and that aircraft were madness to fly that route. The weather arriving from and leaving for Cannes. information provided by Lyon-Bron Neither Mr Turli nor the other two Airport might have persuaded the pilot pilots were warned that there might be not to take that route but it was not of serious danger. Initially, that is to say on such a nature as to justify the conclusion take-off from Lyon-Bron, Mr Turli that it would be abnormal to fly straight intended to follow the same route to to Cannes. As regards the loss of altitude Cannes as Mr van Kasteel; that is, in after the last radio contact, that might fact, the normal route which pilots are have been due to turbulence. It is not advised to follow. However, 20 kilo possible to confirm that, however. By metres beyond Lyon he decided to comparing the position of the wreckage follow the Rhône valley. At that time he with the route which Mr van Kasteel had could not tune in to Montélimar to been following at the time of the last obtain information with a view to taking radio contact it is possible to deduce that a more direct route. The route to the he had changed course before the south along the Rhône valley also had accident. There are two possible explan the advantage of providing a greater ations: either Mr van Kasteel deliberately margin of height above the ground and, changed course in order to follow a should turbulence occur, which he habit different route or he veered away to ually fears, of enabling him to lose avoid an obstacle which he suddenly saw altitude without danger. Mr Turli stated looming up in front of him. In Mr that he was habitually frightened of Grimaud's view there is no evidence to turbulence and that his fear was strictly a support one theory rather than the other. personal idiosyncrasy. He had always Only one thing is certain; it is very feard turbulence even when not serious. unlikely that a squall could have made For that reason he continued flying the aircraft alter course, even in the case south until abreast of La Ciotat at which of a very light aircraft like a Piper point he found himself in very low cloud. Cherokee. He then radioed for assistance, reporting that he was unable, to'find an airfield. In the end Toulon-Hyères helped him to land by radar.
The evidence of Edmond Grimaud who upon the instructions of the French Minister for Transport prepared the technical report on the circumstances of the accident in 1978, may be summarized as follows. As far as concerns the normal route for flying from Lyon-Bron to Cannes, there is no prescribed or recommended route for the type of aircraft flown by Mr van Kasteel. A pilot of that type of aircraft may choose his own route. There is no established practice of choosing one route or another.' Mr van Kasteel was entitled to file a flight plan although he was not obliged to do so. As for Mr van Kasteel's
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The statement of Raymond Auffray, an may also have led him to believe that expert witness on aviation before the there would be a certain amount of French Cour de Cassation, may be visibility. summarized as follows. From the in formation given to Mr van Kasteel on 29 April 1978 a pilot of some experience ought to have deduced that it was not possible to pass through the mountains As regards the significance of the last under visual flight rules. When a pilot communication between Mr van Kasteel suddenly encounters a situation not in and Marseille, Mr Thouvenot believes accord with visual flight rules, he turns that the pilot clearly thought that the round. In Mr Auffra/s view, the cloud in which he was flying was in fact possibility cannot be excluded that Mr a local shower. He would not have used van Kasteel tried to turn back after the the word "shower" if that had not been last radio contact, which was when he the case. After that last communication was in cloud. It is also not ruled out that Mr van Kasteel suddenly encountered the change of course near Mont Sainte- weather much worse than he had Victoire was caused by strong gusts of expected. However, it was legitimate for wind. In such circumstances a pilot may him to hope to 'cross that area of bad in fact lose control of his aircraft. visibility if it was limited in extent. If it was not, Mr van Kasteel would have been forced to look for an emergency landing area, which would not be easy because at that point he must have been ' The statement of Stéphane Thouvenot, crossing the mountains. honorary expert in aviation matters at the Cour de Cassation and Cour d'Appel, Paris, may be summarized as follows. The Provence region in the south of France is an area which, from As regards the change of course before the point of view of the weather and the accident, Mr Thouvenot stated that flying conditions, is more difficult than is strong gusts of wind may force an commonly believed. On the day of the aircraft upwards or downwards for a accident, 29 April 1978, he was on considerable distance. Consequently, it is judicial business close to the routes not impossible that such a light aircraft followed by the three pilots. Mr may have been blown off course by gusts Thouvenot encountered masses of black of wind. cloud — to be precise, over the Cévennes — which were all the more disturbing because there were gusts of wind from the south. As regards the weather information provided by Lyon- Bron, Mr Thouvenot explained that the V — Replies to the questions put very strong turbulence forecast indicated by the Court that the situation would be un comfortable but not necessarily dangerous. Moreover, a pilot with some experience could deduce from that infor mation that it was possible to make the flight, although in difficult conditions. In reply to the questions put by the The weather information which Mr van Coun the defendant stated that in view Kasteel later received from Marseille of the explanations provided by Mr
COMMISSION v ROYALE BELGE
Grimaud and Mr Thouvenot it seemed The Commission of the European difficult to maintain that an attempt to Communities and the interveners in fly directly to Cannes was "manifestly substance contest the view that Mr van reckless". Nor did it seem possible to Kasteel entered a disturbance which he reconstitute exactly the circumstances of had already seen and which he knew the accident or in particular to decide made visual flying no longer possible. whether between the last radio contact Referring to the evidence of Mr and the time of the accident Mr van Thouvenot, they claim that Mr van Kasteel deliberately chose to descend in Kasteel may have been surprised because the vicinity of the mountain peaks or the disturbance was not where it was whether he was caught by a down- forecast. What is more, Mr Thouvenot draught which propelled him on to the pointed out that, although Mr van mountain. Kasteel was in cloud at the time of the last radio contact, he believed that he was flying through a local shower of Nevertheless, the defendant still believes short duration and not a mass of cloud. that nothing can justify Mr van Kasteel's flying into the disturbance during the flight. He could not have been surprised VI — Oral procedure by it because it had been forecast and he knew the dangers which it presented. In At the sitting on 7 July 1983 the parties those circumstances Mr van Kasteel presented oral argument. ought to have turned back. By still continuing his flight direct to Cannes he The Advocate General delivered his acted in a manifestly reckless manner. opinion at the sitting on 14 July 1983.
Decision
1 By an application lodged at the Court Registry on 5 February 1981 the Commission of the European Communities , acting pursuant to an arbitration clause as provided for in Article 181 of the EEC Treaty , Article 153 of the EAEÇ Treaty and Article 42 of the ECSC Treaty , brought an action against Royale Belge SA, a company having its registered office at Brussels, acting on its own behalf and as agent for 14 other insurance companies which had signed the insurance agreement dated 28 January 1977 with the institutions of the European Communities , seeking an order requiring it to pay the principal sum and interest owed by the Commission to those beneficially entitled to the estate of Gerrit Jan van Kasteel as a result of his death by accident on 29 April 1978.
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2 In support of its application the applicant claims that Mr van Kasteel was an official in Directorate-General XV of the Commission when he was killed in an aircraft accident which occurred in the Commune of Vauvenargues in Provence, France, during a flight from Brussels to Greece in a light aircraft which he was piloting himself. Under Article 73 of the Staff Regulations officials are covered against the risk of accident subject to rules drawn up by common agreement of the institutions of the Communities. By signing on 28 January 1977 the collective insurance agreement entered into by those institutions the insurance companies for which the defendant acts as agent undertook to cover the Communities against the financial consequences of the obligations which the latter assumed under the Staff Regulations in respect of accidents befalling the persons to whom Article 73 of the Staff Regulations applies.
3 The defendant does not contest the facts alleged by the Commission. It contents however that in this case the Communities owe no obligation under the Staff Regulations to the persons beneficially entitled to the estate of Mr van Kasteel because his fatal accident was the result of a manifestly reckless act, a risk not covered by Article 73 of the Staff Regulations or by the insurance policy. In this regard ir relies upon Article 4 of the joint rules drawn up by the institutions of the Communities pursuant to Article 73 ; the first mentioned provides that accidents due to manifestly reckless acts are not covered for the purposes of the latter provision.
4 According to the defendant, an act must be regarded as "reckless" where a person, overestimating his chances, pursues a course of action with such audacity that he neglects to make allowance for the dangers to which he exposes himself and of which he could not have been unaware. Such an act is "manifestly" reckless, it states, where the rashness thus shown is clear and certain.
s In its defence the defendant has explained why Mr van Kasteel's actions in the two and a half hours between his taking off from Lyon-Bron Airport at 14.30 hours local time in 29 April 1978 and the accident evince manifest recklessness.
COMMISSION v ROYALE BELGE
6 The first evidence to which the defendant points in this regard is the pilot's decision to take the direct route to Cannes — along the Rhône valley from Lyon to a point abreast of Montélimar—Carpentras and then branching off directly to the St Tropez area — in the adverse weather conditions which prevailed over that part of France and which had been reported to him at Lyon-.Bron Airport. After studying the same weather information Mr van Kasteel's two coleagues who were in the same group of tourists travelling in touring aircraft from Brussels to the Greek islands and were also flying light aircraft preferred instead to fly down the Rhône valley as far as Marseille and then to follow the coast.
7 The Court has been provided with a summary of the weather information given by the Regional Weather Centre at Lyon-Bron Airport between 14.00 and 14.30 hours on 29 April 1978 to the crews flying to.Cannes and has ordered an expert report on the conclusions which an airman ought to have deduced from that information. The Court has also heard the evidence of the two pilots who took the Lyon-Marseille route in order to ascertain the reasons which led them to decide against taking the direct route to Cannes.
8 After the technical experts and witnesses had been examined the defendant indicated that as a result of the explanations given it no longer persisted in its contention that the decision to take the direct route to Cannes was in itself evidence of manifest recklessness.
9 The defendant's second reasons for contending that Mr van Kasteel's actions were reckless is the decision which he is alleged to have taken when his aircraft flew into the disturbance and visibility was suddenly reduced, to descend from an altitude of 1 500 metres to less than 1 000 metres.
io It is common ground that at 16.52 hours, the time of his last radio contact with Marseille-Marignane Airport, Mr van Kasteel reported his aircraft at an altitude of 4 500 feet or roughly 1 500 metres and that approximately 10 minutes later it crashed into the north slope of Mont Sainte-Victoire at a height of some 960 metres.
JUDGMENT OF 22. 9. 1983 — CASE 23/81
n However, it is not clear from the written evidence, such as the preliminary investigation report drawn up by Mr Grimaud for the French Ministry of Transport or the report of the Gendarmerie Nationale including their various appendices, that the aircraft's loss of altitude was due to a deliberate decision of the pilot to attempt to descend below the cloud. Neither Mr Grimaud, who was examined by the Court, nor the technical experts appointed by the parties, could state with certainty that the loss of altitude was due to a decision taken by the pilot rather than a violent gust of wind. In view of those circumstances the defendant has accepted that the loss of altitude might have been caused by the very strong turbulence through which the aircraft was flying.
i2 However, after the witnesses and technical experts had been examined the defendant continued to maintain that the pilot's conduct was manifestly reckless for the third reason which it had advanced. It considered such recklessness obvious from the pilot's decision to enter the disturbance which he saw ahead of him and not to turn back immediately in search of an airfield where he could land.
1 3 So as to weigh up that argument it is necessary to consider the various undisputed factual circumstances surrounding the last minutes of the flight in question as well as the views which the technical experts have expressed on them.
w The first point to be made in this regard is that the weather information provided by Lyon-Bron Airport forecast a vigorous disturbance producing heavy local rain beyond Montélimar accompanied by a strong gusting southerly wind with visibility of 10 to 15 kilometres, reduced to 6 to 10 kilometres in rain. There was nothing in that information to indicate that a sudden and considerable reduction in the visibility which is an important factor for pilots flying visually like Mr van Kasteel, would occur. According to the observations made by Marseille-Marignane at 16.00 hours local time, one hour before the probable time of the accident, visibility was 15 kilometres.
COMMISSION v ROYALE BELGE
is The severe disturbance which led to the accident in question was therefore neither forecast nor reported by the weather stations whose information was available to airmen. It is also clear from the evidence of Mr van Kasteel's two fellow-pilots who were also flying light aircraft that the decision taken by each of them to follow the Rhône valley route as far as Marseille was not prompted by the weather information available to them. Moreover, whilst following the coast one of them was caught unawares by very stormy weather at La Ciotat from which he emerged only at some risk.
is The information provided by Lyon-Bron also reported the sky covered by altostratus at roughly 2 400 metres above 4 to 6/8 stratocumulus between 600 and 1 000 metres. According to the experts' statements, in such atmospheric conditions there is normally a corridor between the cloud masses which is hardly affected by disturbances. Therefore by flying as he did at an altitude of 1 500 metres Mr van Kasteel did nothing contrary to the rules of good airmanship.
i7 It is clear from the foregoing that Mr van Kasteel cannot be accused of any rashness as regards his conduct as a pilot until the time at which his aircraft entered the unexpected disturbance in the area of Vauvenargues—Aix-en- Provence. Since that is a mountainous area in which, according to Mr Grimaud, the weather may change very rapidly in certain atmospheric conditions and in which the effects of such changes on aviation may be considerable, the Court accepts the Commission's and the interveners' argument to the effect that Mr van Kasteel could not avoid the disturbance.
is The only question still to be resolved, therefore, is whether the pilot neglected to turn back immediately after entering the disturbance, as the defendant maintains.
i9 In the last radio contact which he had with Marseille-Marignane at 16.52 hours Mr van Kasteel reported: "... I am in a shower". When asked whether he had the ground in sight he replied: "Sometimes, yes". This indicates that at that time he did not regard himself as being in a severe
JUDGMENT OF 22. 9. 1983 — CASE 23/81
disturbance. What is more, the content of the conversation does not give the impression that the pilot was afraid of losing visibility completely.
20 According to the estimate of the Gendarmerie Nationale and that made by Mr Grimaud in his report, the accident occurred at about 17.00 hours local time or not more than 10 minutes after the last radio contact. What happened in those last 10 minutes is not known but the aircraft must have changed course as the direction of flight at the time of impact on Mont Sainte-Victoire was at 90° to the line from Montélimar to Cannes.
2i According to the expert's report, it is very unlikely that an aircraft, even a light aircraft, will change course under the influence of a gust of wind. The change of course must therefore have been due either to the pilot's deliberate decision to change course — in order, for instance, to reach the coast as quickly as possible — or to a sudden movement intended to avoid the· moun tainside which the pilot suddenly saw looming up out of the cloud.
22 Both theories are tenable. Mr Grimaud has stated that examination of the wreckage showed that at the time of impact the engine was running at full speed, which might indicate that the pilot saw the mountainside at the very last moment and increased power in order to be able to manoeuvre the aircraft so as to avoid the crash. However, Mr Grimaud added that there could be no certainty on this point.
23 In those circumstances there is no means of ruling out entirely the possibility that the pilot decided to turn back just before hitting the mountain. It is also possible that he never took such a decision but lost all visibility or even all control of his aircraft only a few moments before the accident.
24 Consequently it has not been established with any certainty whether or not during the last 10 minutes of the flight the pilot committed one or more acts evincing rashness on his part .
COMMISSION v ROYALE BELGE
25 Because of that uncertainty and in view of the findings regarding the unexpected nature of the disturbance and Mr van Kasteel's conduct as a pilot up to the time at which the aircraft entered the disturbance, the application must be granted. It was in fact for the defendant to show that the facts warranted the application of one of the exemptions set out in Article 4 of the joint rules.
26 It is therefore unnecessary to examine the question of the degree of rashness required for an act to be described as "manifestly reckless".
27 Consequently the defendant, acting on its behalf and as agent for 14 other insurance companies which signed the collective insurance agreement of 28 January 1977 with the institutions of the Communities, must be ordered to pay the principal sum and interest owed by the Commission to the persons beneficially entitled to the estate of Gerrit Jan van Kasteel following his fatal accident on 29 April 1978.
28 Under Article 69 (2) of the Rules of Procedure the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if the successful party has asked for them. As the defendant has failed in its submissions, it must be ordered to pay the costs, including those of the interveners and the sums due to the witnesses and technical experts.
On those grounds,
THE COURT (First Chamber)
hereby:
1. Orders the defendant to pay the principal sum and interest owed by the Commission to the persons beneficially entitled to the estate of Gerrit Jan van Kasteel following his fatal accident on 29 April 1978;
OPINION OF SIR GORDON SLYNN — CASE 23/81
2. Orders the defendant to pay the costs, including those of the interveners and the sums due to the witnesses and technical experts.
O'Keeffe Bosco Koopmans
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 22 September 1983 .
J. A. Pompe A. O'Keeffe Deputy Registrar • President of the First Chamber
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL SIR GORDON SLYNN DELIVERED ON 14 JULY 1983
My Lords, Mr Gerrit van Kasteel, an official of the Commission, was killed in a flying Under Article 73 of the Staff Regu accident on 29 April 1978. His widow, lations, officials of the Community are on her own behalf and on behalf of their covered against the risks of accident, five minor children, together with one subject to rules made thereunder. Article other child, made a claim against the 4 of those Rules signed on 22 December Commission, which the latter passed on 1976 excludes from cover accidents to the insurers. The latter contended that resulting from acts which are "manifestly the accident was due to manifestly reckless". reckless acts of the deceased, so that The Community institutions insured they were not liable under the policy. against the risks covered with a group of Mrs van Kasteel instituted proceedings insurance companies under a policy against the Commission, which in turn which provides that any dispute arising brought this action under Article 181 of out of the performance of the contract the EEC Treaty against Royale Belge as may be submitted-to the Court of Justice. a representative of the consortium of