C-90/83

RONALD EDMOND BROOK , appellant ,

and

EXETER HIDE AND SKIN COMPANY LIMITED , respondent ;

ALBAN DEREK KEDWARD , appellant ,

and

FREDERICK ANTHONY LEYLAND , respondent ,

JUDGMENT

Facts and Issues

JUDGMENT OF 22. 3. 1984 — CASE 90/83

prietor of an undertaking trading in live carcases could not preclude the ap­ animals intended for slaughter, and plication of the exemption. in carcases and parts of carcases; to W. Weddel and Company Limited, wholesale butchers; and to the Exeter Hide and Skin Company Limited, which The magistrates accepted those argu­ carries out the preliminary treatment of ments and acquitted the accused. The animal skins following slaughter but appellants —• namely, Alban Derek prior to delivery to the tanners, were Kedward, a police constable, who was inspected when they were transporting later replaced by the Director of Public the following: in the first case, 21 Prosecutions, Michael Paterson, an forequarters and one brisket of beef; in officer of the Licensing Authority of the the second, sides of hind and fore- Yorkshire Traffic Area, and Ronald quarters of beef and lamb, together with Edmund Brook, a traffic examiner of the boxes containing offal, chicken legs and Department of Transport — stated the cuts of frozen beef; and in the third case, cases for the Opinion of the High Court raw sheepskins. In the first two cases it of Justice, in this instance the Divisional was found that the vehicles were not Court of the Queen's Bench Division. fitted with tachographs but that the The latter, by an order of 21 April 1983, drivers were equipped with individual stayed the proceedings and referred to control books, whereas in the last case the Court of Justice for a preliminary the driver proved to be without an ruling on the following questions individual control book. (relating to the three above-mentioned cases jointly) :

PATERSON / WUDDEL

"animal careases" include parts of part (and if so, what proportion) carcases and, if so, subject to what if of animal carcases or waste? any limitations? In particular, does the reference include: The order making the reference was (a) twenty one forequarters of beef lodged at the Court Registry on 19 May and one brisket? 1983. (b) side or quarters? (c) chicken legs? Pursuant to Article 20 of the Protocol on (d) offal? the Statute of the Court of Justice, written observations were submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom, represented by Mrs G. Dagtoglou, Treasury Solicitor, acting as Agent; by 3. Does the reference in the regulation W. Weddel & Company Limited and to "animal . . . waste . . . intended for Exeter Hide and Skin Company Limited, human consumption" apply: represented by A. Pardoe, Barrister (a) only to parts of animals which (Lincoln's Inn), instructed by R. A. are intended for oral human Roberts and G. D. Cann & Hallett, consumption, or Solicitors in London; and by the Commission of the European Com­ (b) also to those parts of animals munities, represented by its Principal which are intended for any other- Legal Adviser, George Close, acting as use, e.g. as animal food or Agent. industrial or commercial use, i.e. to all parts of animals save only those which are to be merely Upon hearing the report of the Judge- thrown away or destroyed? Rapporteur and the views of the Advocate General the Court decided to open the oral procedure without any preparatory inquiry.

4. If the answer to Question 3 is (b), By an order of 19 October 1983, the does the animal part cease to be Court further decided, pursuant to "animal waste . .. intended for human Article 95 (1) and (2) of the Rules of consumption" as soon as it is first Procedure, to assign the case to the First treated with a view to being prepared Chamber. for such use, or at a later stage, and if later, when?

read together. That may lead to the strictly literal meaning of the term conclusion that the phrase "not intended "carcases", which means the whole body for human consumption" should also be of an animal, but rather to refer to usage interpreted as referring both to the in the meat and butchery trade, ac carcases and to the waste. Consequently, cording to which animal quarters are the exemption in the general legislation also regarded as "carcases" in the wider should apply to the transportation not of sense of the word. Indeed, if the

exemption might be warranted by the requirements of transporting speedily and without formalities products which, not being intended for human con sumption, are not usually chilled or frozen and are thus more liable to decompose, thereby becoming a hazard to public health. The foregoing would argue in favour of the second alternative proposed by the court making the reference; however, the assumptions underlying the contention are by no means certain, for if it had been the Turning to the third question, the United intention of the Community legislature Kingdom notes that the expression to facilitate the transport of meat which "intended for human consumption" was neither chilled nor frozen, the regu generally means "to be eaten by lation could have said so explicitly; humans"; however, that interpretation furthermore, it is not established that encounters the difficulty that the English carcases intended as food for humans are word "waste" means something which invariably transported in a chilled or has no use at all and which is therefore, frozen state.

The

As for the third question, both the As regards the fourth question, the wording and the spirit of the provision at United Kingdom takes the view that issue indicate that the words "human animal waste must cease to enjoy the consumption" mean "consumption as exemption as soon as it has undergone food". Since almost all parts of an initial treatment by way of prep­ slaughtered animals are used in one way aration for its ultimate use, since there is or another, the opposite construction no further hazard to public health there­ would deprive the provision in question after. Turning to the last question, it of meaning and practical value. The takes the view that the exemption applies expression "waste not intended for only if the consignments being trans­ human consumption" therefore refers in ported consist exclusively of animal fact not only to waste to be thrown away carcases or waste, because the saving but also to those parts of slaughtered clause can apply only to the activity animals intended for use otherwise than specified in the relevant article, and as food for humans. because a wider interpretation might give rise to evasion and defeat the purpose of the law in question. In the light of the reply to the above question, the following (fourth) question serves no further purpose. The undertakings, hereinafter referred to as "Weddel" and "Exeter", rely in regard to the first question on the wording of Finally, with regard to the fifth question the relevant provision, especially the use Weddel and Exeter contend that the therein of a disjunctive between the exemption applies even in cases where words "carcases" and "waste", to sup­ the consignment being transported in­ port their claim that the exemption must cludes goods other than carcases or cover all animal carcases, whether or animal waste, provided that the transpor­ not they are intended for human tation of such carcases and waste is the consumption. That contention is also main purpose of the operation. That endorsed by the fact that the transpor­ interpretation is supported, in particular, tation of carcases not intended for by the objective pursued by the provision human consumption is veiy rare, and yet allowing the exemption, and by the the exemption cannot have been drafted reference in the regulation to "national to embrace solely a veiy limited set of transport operations"; in any case, it is circumstances. in keeping with essential practical requirements.

carcases and waste may carry disease, as It is clear from an examination of trade they are susceptible to infection, readily usage and from the Explanatory Notes deteriorate and often harbour many to the Common Customs Tariff that bacteria. It is desirable that such there is a large volume of trade involving products should reach their destination carcases coming from slaughterhouses as soon as possible, without being and intended for human consumption — delayed during transportation for the that is to say, by far the larger part of sake of complying with regulations the carcases, and it is part of normál regarding maximum driving periods and commercial management to ensure that minimum rest periods, or with the rules they are transported in conformity with concerning tachographs. Since that is the the legislation in force. On the other objective of the provision at issue, the hand, in the case of animal carcases not latter should be construed only in the intended for human consumption, and light of that objective. especially diseased animals, it may be very important to proceed swiftly with the disposal of carcases which may be hazardous to public health. Accordingly it would appear logical to apply the exemption only to carcases not intended for human consumption. That contention is borne out by the fact that Annex I to Having said that, the Commission notes, Council Directive No 64 / 433 / EEC of 26 in relation to the first two questions, that June 1964 on health problems affecting the wording used in the various language intra-Community trade in fresh meat versions for referring to "carcases" all (codified version: Official Journal 1975, allude to the "whole body" of the C 189, p. 31) provides for storage, in slaughtered animal, subject — in certain special lockable premises, of animals versions — to the dressing which takes slaughtered in a slaughterhouse but place in the slaughterhouse after the declared unfit for human consumption. slaughtering. In trade usage, a distinction must be drawn between animals intended for human consumption and those which are not so intended, whether by their nature or on account of their being diseased and hence a hazard to health. In the first case, the word "carcase" means the almost whole body of the animal after proper dressing. In the second case — which clearly does not concern the butchery and meat trade ·— the term in question refers to the whole body of the animal. As regards the As regards the meaning of the term phrase "not intended for human con­ "waste", which is the subject of the third sumption" and the question as to question, the Commission observes that whether it refers solely to the animal the word used in the English text waste or to the carcases as well, several generally refers to useless remnants; in language versions are ambiguous, but the the other language versions, on the other wording of the German and Dutch hand, the terms employed appear to versions indicates that the expression cover rather the by-products of the must be attached not only to the waste animal after the carcase has been but also to the carcases; the latter thesis dressed. Accordingly, the exemption must therefore prevail. appears to embrace, besides truly useless

As for the fourth question, the Com­ mission, referring to the grounds relating to the protection of public health which underlie and justify the exemption, observes that carcases and waste not 2. Strictly speaking, the second question intended as food for humans may does not call for an answer in view of constitute a hazard until they undergo an the reply given to the first question as initial treatment for preserving them the products mentioned in the second (removal of fat, rinsing, salting etc.), question are intended for human which of course applies to commercially consumption. In any case, the term useful waste but not to waste for "carcases" is not apt to include the disposal, which is not usually treated. animal parts listed in the question. In particular, it is not appropriate to apply a definition contained in a measure of national legislation for the particular purposes of that measure to Lastly, as regards the fifth question, the a Community measure whose scope first alternative proposed by the court and purposes are different.

JUDGMENT OF 22. 3. 1984 — CASE 90/83

Decision

1 By order dated 21 April 1983 which was received at the Court Registry on 19 May 1983, the High Court of Justice , Queen's Bench Division, Divisional Court , referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty several questions on the interpretation of Article 14a of Regu­ lation No 543 / 69 of the Council of 25 March 1969 on the harmonization of certain social legislation relating to road transport (Official Journal , English Special Edition 1969 (I), p . 170), as amended by Regulation No 515 / 72 of the Council of 28 February 1972 (Official Journal , English Special Edition 1972 (I), p . 134) and Council Regulation No 2827 / 77 of 12 December 1977 (Official Journal 1977 L 334, p . 1).

2 Those questions arose in criminal proceedings brought against three under­ takings which had used their vehicles for the carriage by road of certain

PATERSON / WEDDEL

animal products intended principally for human consumption, in con­ travention of the requirements of Regulation No 543/69 cited above and of those of Regulation No 1463/70 of the Council of 20 July 1970 on the introduction of recording equipment in road transport (Official Journal English Special Edition 1970 (II), p. 482). In the first case the products being transported comprised sides of hindquarters and forequarters of beef or lamb together with boxes containing chicken or imported beef, in the second case raw sheepskins and in the third case 21 forequarters of beef and one brisket contained in 31 boxes.

3 Regulation No 543/69 lays down rules regarding the composition of the crews engaged in the carriage of goods by road where certain vehicles are used (Articles 5 and 6), the limitation of driving periods (Articles 7 to 10) and daily and weekly rest periods (Articles 11 and 12).

7 Before the national court, the three respondent undertakings sought to rely upon the exemption provided for in Article 14a (2) (c). They claimed that the transport operations in respect of which criminal proceedings had been brought against them fell within the scope of that exemption and that consequently they were not bound to observe the Community requirements regarding the obligation to fit tachographs to vehicles used for the carriage of goods by road or the obligation for the crews of such vehicles to carry an individual control book.

8 In those circumstances the national court stayed the proceedings and referred the following questions to the Court:

" 1 . Does the reference in paragraph 2 (c) of Article 14a of Council Regu­ lation (EEC) No 543/69 of 25 March 1969 on the harmonization of certain social legislation relating to road transport (as amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 515/72 of 28 February 1972 and Council Regulation (EEC) No 2827/77 of 12 December 1977) (hereinafter referred to as 'the regulation') to 'animal carcases' apply: (a) to all animal carcases irrespective of whether intended for human consumption, or (b) only to animal carcases which are not intended for human consumption?

2. If the answer to Question 1 is (a), does the reference in the regulation to 'animal carcases' include parts of carcases and, if so, subject to what if any limitations? In particular, does the reference include: (a) 21 forequarters of beef and one brisket? (b) side or quarters? (c) chicken legs? (d) offal?

PATERSON / WEDDEL

3. Does the reference in the regulation to 'animal . .. waste .. . intended for human consumption' apply: (a) only to parts of animals which are intended for oral human consumption, or (b) also to those parts of animals which are intended for any other use, e.g. as animal food or for industrial or commercial use, i.e. to all parts of animals save only those which are to be merely thrown away or destroyed?

United Kingdom acknowledged that an interpretation to the effect that the qualifying words refer also to carcases is likewise possible. Weddel & Company Limited and Exeter Hide and Skin Company Limited [hereinafter referred to as "Weddel" and "Exeter"], two of the respondents in the main proceedings, favour the restrictive interpretation and also point out that if those qualifying words were to apply also to carcases, Article 14a (2) (c) would be deprived of its practical meaning since the carriage of carcases not intended for human consumption is very rare.

11 That interpretation cannot be accepted. As the Commission has pointed out, whilst it is true that, according to certain language versions of Article 14a (2) (c), both the view maintained by Weddel and Exeter and, in part, by the United Kingdom and the opposite view are theoretically possible, other versions, in particular the Dutch language version, are worded in such a way as to exclude uncertainty. In fact, in that version, the qualifying words "not intended for human consumption" precede the term "carcases" and consequently can apply only to both waste and carcases.

12 The interpretation thus deriving from the unequivocal language versions is confirmed by an analysis of Article 14a, considered in its entirety and in the light of its legal context.

13 All the cases in which an exemption from Regulation No 543/69 is rendered possible by Article L4a relate to transport operations displaying particular characteristics, by reason either of the use of specialized vehicles or of the specific nature of the articles to be transported. It was precisely in view of the latter fact that Regulation No 2827/77, by inserting paragraph 2 (c) in Article 14a, encouraged rapid transport of animal carcases not intended for human consumption.

The third question

19 By the third questionatile national court asks, essentially, whether the term "animal ... waste not intended for human consumption" contained in Article 14a (2) (c) refers also to parts of animals intended to be used for purposes other than oral consumption.

20 All the parties which have submitted observations to the Court have expressed the view that not only unusable remains of slaughtered animals but also inedible animal by-products are covered by Article 14a (2) (c).

JUDGMENT OF 22. 3. 1984 — CASE 90/83

2i In that connection, it should be noted that in ordinary language the term "human consumption" can mean only "use by humans as food". That is particularly clear in the case of Article 14a (2) (c) since the most frequent and usual purpose of animal products to which that provision refers is precisely to feed human beings.

22 That interpretation is not contradicted by the slightly different terms used in the various language versions of Article 14a. In fact, terms such as "déchets d'abattage", "scarti di macellazione", "Schlachtabfälle", "slagteriaffald", "slachtafvallen" and "waste" perfectly reflect the idea that for the purposes of utilization of the carcase of an animal, even though the inedible parts may be used in non-food industries such as the leather or fertilizer industries, they have far less value and importance than the edible products which, for their part, undeniably represent the sole "primary" products of animal slaughter.

transported of even a small number of carcases or a minimal quantity of waste would suffice to avoid the application of that regulation.

27 That result would be manifestly contrary to the objectives pursued by Article 14a, which is intended to exempt from the application of Regulation No 543/69 only specific transport operations.

28 It is therefore necessaiy to state in reply to the fifth question that the term "operations . .. for the transport of animal carcases or waste" used in Article 14a (2) (c) refers solely to operations in which only animal carcases and waste not intended for human consumption are transported.

Costs

29 The costs incurred by the United Kingdom and by the Commission of the European Communities, which have submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. As these proceedings are, so far as the parties to the main proceedings are concerned, in the nature of a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court.

On those grounds,

Koopmans Mackenzie Stuart Bosco

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 22 March 1984.

For the Registrar

D . Louterman T . Koopmans

Administrator President of the First Chamber

OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT 1 DELIVERED ON 19 JANUARY 1984