C-123/83
ECLI:EU:C:1985:33
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JUDGMENT OF 30. 1. 1985 — CASE 123/83
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 30 January 1985 *
In Case 123/83
REFERENCE to the Court under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty by the Tribunal de Grande Instance [Regional Court], Saintes, for a preliminary ruling in the proceedings pending before that court between
Bureau national interprofessionnel du cognac
and
Guy Clai--
on the application of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty to inter-trade agreements
concluded within the Bureau national interprofessionnel du cognac (BNIC) fixing
the price of cognac,
THE COURT
composed of: Lord Mackenzie Stuart, President, G. Bosco and C. Kakouris (Presidents of Chambers), T. Koopmans, U. Everling, K. Bahlmann and Y. Galmot, Judges,
Advocate General : Sir Gordon Slynn Registrar: D. Louterman, Administrator
gives the following
* Language of the Case: French.
BNIC / CLAIR
JUDGMENT
Facts and Issues The facts, procedure and written obser Where a contract of supply which is subject vations submitted under Article 20 of the to an agreement that has been made Protocol on the Statute of the Court of the generally binding does not comply with the EEC may be summarized as follows: agreement, it is automatically void and the inter-trade organization concerned is 1. Facts and written procedure entitled to bring an action for a declaration 1.1. As is apparent from the national to that effect. court's order and from the other documents Finally the inter-trade organization is before the Court, French law (Law No entitled to ask the court to award it 75-600 of 10 July 1975 on the agricultural compensation for the damage it may have inter-trade organization, as supplemented suffered in the event of a breach of the rules and amended by Law No 80-502 of 4 July of agreements which have been made 1980) provides for the possibility of making generally binding. agreements within an agricultural inter- trade organization which are designed, by The plaintiff in the main proceedings, the means of standard form contracts, Bureau national interprofessionnel du marketing agreements and common action cognac [National Inter-Trade Board for compatible with the general interest and Cognac, hereinafter referred to as 'the with the rules of the European Economic Board'] is an inter-trade organization for Community, to promote: the marketing of Cognac wines and spirits The compilation of information concerning created by legislation originally enacted in supply and demand; 1941 and subsequently amended on a number of occasions. Under the provisions The adjustment and regularization of applicable at the time of the facts (Order of supplies; the Minister for Agriculture of 10 May The application, subject to State control, of 1975) the Board was composed of: marketing rules, prices and conditions of (a) two persons appointed by the Minister payment; for Agriculture to represent respectively The quality of goods; wine-growers and the trade in the area entitled to the registered designation of Inter-trade relations in the sector origin cognac; concerned, especially the establishment of technical standards and programmes of (b) delegates of wine-growers and applied research and development; and distillation co-operatives, representatives The sale of products on the domestic and of dealers and commercial distillers and external markets. delegates from associated trades, also appointed for three years by the After their adoption such agreements may, Minister for Agriculture on the basis of at the request of the inter-trade organ lists drawn up by the trade organ ization concerned, be made generally izations concerned. binding for a specified period by ministerial order. The effect of this is to make the According to the internal rules adopted by agreement binding on all members of the the Board on 19 June 1978, which were the trades making up the inter-trade organ rules in force at the time of the facts, its ization. members were assigned to groups, namely
JUDGMENT OF 30. 1. 1985 — CASE 123/83
dealers and wine-growers, each of which Law No 75-600 of 10 July 1975 (as selected a representative. supplemented and amended by Law No Pursuant to a Ministerial Order of 14 80-502 of 4 July 1980), with a view to the November 1960 the Chairmanship of the issuing of an order making it generally Board is entrusted to a general agricultural binding.' engineer appointed by the Minister for That agreement was signed on behalf of the Agriculture, who also appoints a dealers' group and the wine-growers' group. Government Commissioner to take part in the deliberations of the Board and in those The agreement was also signed by the of its permanent committee; the salaried director of the Board but did not Commissioner 'may either approve the bear the signature of the Government decisions adopted or submit them for Commissioner, who in his decision of 13 approval by the Minister'. November 1980 on the organization of the For the purpose of applying the legislative 1980-81 marketing year refers only (Article provisions relating to the above-mentioned 17) to 'an inter-trade agreement fixing a inter-trade agreements, the Board laid down minimum price for wines of the Cognac a special procedure in its internal rules, district intended for the production of which were approved by an Order of the cognac' without mentioning a minimum Minister for Agriculture dated 2 August price for new or matured spirits or a 1978. minimum price for cognac. It must first be decided in general meeting, Subsequently, as required by the second by a majority of 3/4 of the members and paragraph of Article 2 of the Law of 10 July after consultation with the meetings of the 1975, that agreement was adopted unani two groups and representatives of ancillary mously in general meeting by the various trades, to call an extraordinary general trades represented on the Board.
When that meeting. condition had been satisfied the agreement The extraordinary general meeting debates was made generally binding by Order of the a draft agreement, which 'must previously Minister for Agriculture of 27 November have been submitted to the meetings of the 1980, published in the Journal Officiel de la two groups'. République Française on 3 December 1980. The text of the agreement is the result of The agreement in question covers by way of bilateral negotiations between the wine sub-designation and on the basis of age all growers' group and the dealers' group at the the essential components of the cost price of extraordinary general meeting.
The position cognac and in particular: adopted by each of the groups is itself the result of internal negotiations followed by a In Article 2, the minimum price of wines decision reached by a qualified majority of intended for the distillation of spirits the members representing various trade entitled to the designation 'cognac'; groups. Only after it has been established that there In Article 3, the cost of distillation; is a consensus of opinion in favour of doing In Article 4, the producer price of new so, does the general meeting request the spirits, that is to say less than one year old; competent administrative authority to make the agreement generally binding. In Article 5, the price of matured spirits, In accordance with the aforementioned that is to say with an age of one or more provisions the Board reached an agreement years; on 7 November 1980 entitled: In Article 7, time-limits for payment; and 'Inter-trade agreement on the prices of distillable white wines and cognacs In Articles 8 and 9, the minimum price of submitted, pursuant to the provisions of cognac.
BNIC / CLAIR
After an inquiry carried out by its agents as Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance a result of a complaint from various wine to the Board. growers, the Board instituted proceedings against Mr Clair, a dealer in Brie-sous- As regards the Board's second contention, Matha, before the Tribunal de Grande the Tribunal de Grande Instance considered Instance, Saintes, for buying cognac from that the Board was unquestionably a quasi- various wine-growers at prices much lower administrative body in view of the fact that than the inter-trade price. In those it was financed by parafiscal levies and the proceedings, which were brought on the Government Commissioner on the Board basis of the inter-trade agreement of 7 was an executive agent of a legislative November 1980, it was claimed that authority. transactions which did not comply with that agreement were automatically void under Article 4 of Law No 75-600 of 10 July 1975. However, the Tribunal held that that Law of 1975, as amended by the Law of 4 July 1980, was legally separate from the rules The claim was opposed by Mr Clair on the governing the functioning of the Board. It ground that it was contrary to the was true that the Law applied to three cate provisions of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC gories of products, namely cognac, Treaty and he asked in the alternative that a champagne and armagnac, and that the request for interpretation be made to this trade groups concerned with those products Court. The Board opposed the request on had a quasi-administrative status; however, the ground that, on the one hand, cognac the agreement concerning cognac concluded fell outside the scope of the Community on the basis of the Law of 1975 made no provisions referred to and, on the other, the reference to that special status. measure on which the proceedings against Mr Clair were based was an administrative The national court stated that the measure which the Tribunal de Grande agreement in question was signed jointly by Instance could not interpret by reason of the representative of the dealers' group, the the principle of the separation of jurisdiction representative of the wine-growers' group between courts and administrative tribunals. and by the Chairman (Director) of the Board and that the Government Commissioner on the Board took no As regards the Board's first contention decision fixing a minimum producer price concerning the applicability of the but merely established maximum sales provisions of Articles 85 and 86 of the values, a measure quite different from the Treaty to cognac, the Tribunal de Grande fixing of minimum prices, in respect of Instance, Saintes, accepted that cognacs, which he merely provided (in Article 17 of which were derived from second stage his decision of 13 November 1980) for an processing, were not agricultural but inter-trade agreement between the parties. industrial products.
The Tribunal de Grande Instance, Saintes, The national court reached that conclusion therefore held that the measure in question on the basis that the Commission had un was separate both from the above- equivocally stated that they were of an mentioned measure of the Government industrial nature in a letter of 7 May 1981, Commissioner and from the Ministerial in which it referred to the exhaustive list of Order of 20 November 1980 making it agricultural products set out in Annex II to generally binding; it was an agreement the Treaty. Furthermore, under French between dealers and producers and the fact national legislation such spirits were that the Chairman (Director) of the Board classified as industrial products, as was clear was present could not confer upon it the from a letter of 28 July 1979 from the character of legislation.
JUDGMENT OF 30. 1. 1985 — CASE 123/83
As regards the legal status of the parties to light of the fact that the potable spirits the agreement, the national court referred referred to in the agreement of 7 to a decision of the Commission of the November 1980 conform to the European Communities of 26 July 1976 requirements for the registered (76/684/EEC). In that decision, which was designation of origin for cognac and addressed to a body similar to the Board, that cognac distilled from grapes is the Bureau interprofessionnel de l'Armagnac consumed undiluted almost without [National Inter-trade Board for Armagnac], exception?
' and which related to proceedings under Article 85 of the Treaty, the Commission 1.2. The national court's order was considered that 'Armagnac producers, received at the Registry on 1 July 1983. cooperatives, distillers and dealers which are In accordance with Article 20 of the represented within the Bureau national Protocol on the Statute of the Court of interprofessionnel de l'Armagnac by their Justice of the EEC written observations trade associations are undertakings within were lodged on 6 September 1983 by the the meaning of Article 85 (1) of the EEC Commission of the European Communities, Treaty'. represented by Mrs N. Coutrelis, acting as In view of its findings, the Tribunal de Agent, on 12 September 1983 by the Grande Instance, Saintes, addressed itself to defendant in the main proceedings, the question whether under the rules on represented by P. Kappelhoff-Lançon, competition the Board might be regarded as Advocate, and on 23 September 1983 by the an association of undertakings. Board, the plaintiff in the main proceedings, represented by X. de Roux, Advocate. On 21 June 1983 the Tribunal de Grande Instance stayed the proceedings and Upon hearing the report of the Judge Rap referred the following questions to the porteur and the views of the Advocate Court for a preliminary ruling on the inter General the Court decided to open the oral pretation of Articles 85 and 86 of the procedure without any preparatory inquiry.
Treaty: It nevertheless requested the parties to the main proceedings and the Commission of '(1) Since the wine-growers' group and the the European Communities to answer in dealers' group are both represented writing a number of questions. That was within the Bureau national inter done within the time-limits laid down. professionnel du cognac, are they to be regarded as an association of under 2. Written observations submitted under takings, having regard to the fact that Article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the agreement reached between them the Court of Justice of the European was also signed by the Chairman of the Communities
Bureau? 2.1. The Board submits the following (2) Must the fixing by the wine growers' observations. group and the dealers' group of a minimum purchase price for potable 2.1.1. It starts by defining what is meant spirits be regarded as a concerted by cognac and giving an account of its practice? production, marketing and economic importance for the areas concerned. (3) Must the fixing of a minimum purchase price for potable spirits be regarded as The Board maintains that any discussion of capable of affecting trade between the question whether cognac is an agri Member States and as having as its cultural or industrial product for the effect or purpose the prevention, puposes of the EEC Treaty is, from an restriction or distortion of competition economic point of view, artificial and within the Common Market, in the pointless since what is in question is the
BNIC / CLAIR
exploitation of an agricultural product February 1946 supplemented those rules; (white wines distilled to produce cognac) the latter order provided for the keeping of which represents the livelihood of 80 000 accounts and the monitoring of the age of people, 3/4 of whom are farmers. The cognac. Board maintains that the national court has wrongly classified cognac as an industrial product, since under French law cognac is It states that on 15 June 1945 a parafiscal an agricultural product to which the Law of levy was imposed on distillers and dealers to 10 July 1975 applies, although subjecting it cover the financing of the Board and that an to a special scheme. In that respect the order of 9 July 1946 conferred upon it the Board points out that Article 5 of the Law form which it essentially has today. It states in question distinguishes between bodies that the composition of the Board was sub created by 'laws or regulations' and bodies sequently altered several times (order of 14 which have a contractual origin (referred to November 1960 and order of 16 November in Article 1) and claims that the Board itself 1964) but that the spirit and objective of the comes under the first category. In the rules governing its activity were not altered. Board's view, since it was created by legislation or regulation before the enactment of the Law of 1975 it retained its The Board adds that it is constituted by a public status but was nevertheless entitled to commission, the members of which are avail itself of the provisions of that Law by appointed by order of the Minister for Agri virtue of Article 5 thereof, which provides culture on a proposal from the trade organi that inter-trade organizations created by zations concerned; the meeting is presided legislation or regulation before the adoption over by a general agricultural engineer, who of the Law may avail themselves of Articles is also appointed by the Minister (Article 2 2, 3 and 4, concerning the conclusion and of the order of 14 November 1960). binding nature of agreements such as the one in question. The task of the Commission, according to Article 2 of the order of 9 July 1946, was: 2.1.2. To demonstrate that it has the status of a public body the Board examines the provisions relating to its establishment, 'To study and prepare any regulations organization and operation. concerning the acquisition, distribution, distillation, marketing, storage and sale of wines and spirits produced in the region', It states that it has its origin in an order of 5 January 1941 and that an order of 4 December 1944 entrusted its powers to a that is to say its task was to study and Government Commissioner, assisted by an prepare and not to decide, since the advisory council whose members were decision remained with the representative of appointed by order and were chosen from the State, the Government Commissioner, among representatives of the wine-growers who alone was entitled to take enforceable and dealers. decisions (Article 2 of the order of 4 December Í944).
It adds that on 28 April 1945 a new ministerial order approved the rules of the It observes that implementation of those Bureau National de Répartition des Vins et decisions and the ministerial orders is Eaux-de-vie de Cognac [National Board for entrusted to the Board, the director of the Distribution of Wines and Cognacs] and which is generally a senior official of the that two orders of 21 January 1946 and 20 French State.
JUDGMENT OF 30. 1. 1985 — CASE 123/83
The Board states that it is still financed by between wine-growers and dealers forms the revenue from a parafiscal levy, the rate part of the wider task of regulating of which is approved each year by the production, which is its primary function. French Parliament in the Loi de Finances [Finance Law]. According to the Board, the objective of the public authorities in this sphere is to reduce The Board adds that, whilst at one time reserves in order to control financial costs there may have been some dispute in France by reducing the burden of overstocking regarding its legal nature, the Conseil d'Etat which weighs on wine-growers. [ State Council ] took the view that it was a public body enjoying financial autonomy It states that this policy of progressively and having legal personality and that its eliminating the disequilibrium can succeed decisions had to be referred to only if it is supplemented by a price system administrative tribunals rather than to the which allows wine-growers to bear those courts. heavy burdens during this difficult period and to survive pending the re-establishment It considers that that view is reasonable of a fundamental equilibrium in the wine since the Board has a public function growing economy of the cognac-producing inasmuch as it: area. monitors the age of cognac; It observes that to allow prices to depend on regulates the sales descriptions; supply and demand would lead to a collapse which wine-growers could not withstand ensures observance of the rules on and that the fall in the value of. stocks maturing; would mean that wine-growers would no and above all regulates the market in wines longer be able to meet their financial and cognacs. commitments with their banks.
From its status as a public body the Board From the above-mentioned considerations draws conclusions about the legal nature of the Board concludes that Article 85 of the the agreements entered into as part of its EEC Treaty does not apply to it because it functions and tasks. It observes that each is neither an undertaking nor an association year the Government Commissioner, on a of undertakings within the meaning of that proposal from the general meeting, submits article. to the Government what is customarily To show that it is not an undertaking the called a draft inter-trade agreement on the Board refers to the definitions of the term prices of distillable white wines and cognacs. contained in legal literature; according to It states that if the Government agrees with those definitions the entity concerned must the proposals made to it, it issues an order first of all have an appropriate organization which makes the proposal binding and and secondly must pursue a specific requires dealers and growers to observe the economic aim; the Court has added the prices fixed; if the Government does not notion of a 'separate legal entity' pursuing agree, it makes such amendments as it an economic aim (judgments of 13 July wishes. 1962 in Joined Cases 17 and 20/61 Klöckner v High Authority [1962] ECR 325 and Case The Board states that it is responsible, in 19/61 Mannesmann AG v High Authority conjunction with the administration [1962] ECR 357). (Departments responsible for Fraud Investigation, Taxation, Competition and The Board considers that of those factors it Prices), to ensure observance of the prices is the 'specific economic aim' which is parti fixed by the order published in the Official cularly important and that in the absence of Journal of the French Republic and adds any definition by the Court the definitions that the fixing of prices for transactions in legal literature must be adopted; although
BNIC / CLAIR
those definitions are very wide they do not It then observes that the Commission's view cover the Board's activity because they that its members are delegates of trade basically assume that an undertaking is organizations, which are themselves made involved in economic activity by way of up of undertakings, may be refuted by production, distribution or trade in goods or considering the method by which its services. members are appointed.
The Board claims that, in view of its In that respect it points out that its director statutory origin, financing, powers and and chairman and the Government public function, it cannot be regarded as Commissioner are officials appointed by the being involved in production or trade in Minister for Agriculture, who by ministerial products or services. order determines the composition of its meeting, chooses and directly appoints certain members thereof and also appoints As regards the suggestion that it is an others on the basis of lists drawn up by the association of undertakings, the Board trade organizations. observes that, in its Decision of 15 December 1982 (IV/29.883-AROW/BNIC, The Board thus draws the conclusion that it 82/896/EEC) relating to a proceeding cannot constitute an association because an brought against it under Article 85, the association presupposes a voluntary Commission took the view that it was an agreement, an 'animus societatis' with a 'association of undertakings' within the common aim, that is to say a contractual meaning of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty element which is completely absent here, and that its decisions constituted 'an act since it is a mandatory body whose creation separate from the subsequent extending and organization depend solely on the order' and in consequence imposed upon It initiative of the public authorities, which are a fine of 160 000 ECU. entitled to dissolve it at any time even contrary to the wishes of all its members. The Board observes in that respect that its Government Commissioner took the view The Board states that it differs from the that the penalty related to a measure which inter-trade bodies which were created and had been abandoned and was of little recognized on the basis of the aforesaid importance; in consequence, on instructions Law of 10 July 1975. It cites Article 1 of the from the French Ministry for Agriculture, it Law, which provides that orders may be was decided not to appeal simply to issued to recognize 'bodies constituted by establish a point of law. However, the the trade organizations most representative procedure adopted for payment of the fine of agricultural production and, where shows the eminently public nature of the appropriate, processing, dealers and distri Board. It points out that the Commission bution, representing the various interests took proceedings not against the under involved' and observes that Article 5 of the takings which were said to have agreed Law makes a distinction between those unlawfully to fix a minimum price but inter-trade groups and inter-trade organi against the Board itself on the basis that the zations 'created by legislation or regulation' Board, despite its express statute, was an such as itself. association of undertakings. That being so, the Board observes that it To refute that analysis and to show that it is cannot be regarded as an association of a public body the Board emphasizes first of undertakings on the sole ground that it all that it is financed by a parafiscal levy comprises representatives of trade organ annually approved by the French Parliament izations, since the composition of its general and is subject to public-sector accounting meeting is determined by the Minister for rules. Agriculture and contains a certain number
JUDGMENT OF 30. 1. 1985 — CASE 123/83
of members who do not directly represent for the ultimate consumer of the product; in the trade organizations concerned with the all countries of the Community cognac is production and sale of cognac. subject to heavy duties and it is those duties which are the major item in the price of the product to the consumer. Furthermore, the capacity in which a member is chosen must not be confused It states that the duties amount in the with that in which he carries out his duties United Kingdom to 64 % of the cost price, because, although the ministerial orders in Belgium 52%, in the Federal Republic of which determine its composition provide Germany 45 %, in the Netherlands 46 %, in that the majority of the members are to be Ireland 70% and in Denmark 72 %. chosen from candidates proposed by the trade organizations concerned, it does not follow that those members, in exercising the 2.1.4. In conclusion the Board proposes mandate conferred by the Minister, bind the that the following answers should be given undertakings to which they belong. to the national court:
(1) The fact that the wine-growers' group 2.1.3. To answer the question whether the and dealers' group are both represented fixing of a minimum purchase price for on the Board does not amount to an spirits must be regarded as likely to affect association of undertakings because: trade between Member States, the Board refers to Recital No 49 of the statement of (a) the fact that the dealers' group and objections issued by the Commission on 8 wine-growers' group are represen February 1982 (AROW/BNIC), which ted in the general meeting of the reads as follows: Board does not result from a volun tary association of undertakings, but from the application of French law, as laid down in Article 9 of the Law 'Certain minimum prices fixed by the Board of 27 September 1940, the order of may appreciably affect trade between 5 January 1941, the order of 4 Member States. The fixing of minimum December 1944, the order of 28 prices for the purchaser, by members of the April 1945, the order of 9 July 1946 dealers' group, of wines for distillation and and in subsequent orders amending new or matured spirits for members of the the organization of that public wine-growers' group does not in itself seem body; capable of appreciably affecting trade between Member States. Such prices relate to transactions in respect of intermediate (b) The representatives of the wine products which are not normally intended at growers' and dealers' groups on the that stage to be supplied for consumption or Board do indeed represent particu sent out of the Cognac area. They lar undertakings, but are neverthe nevertheless influence the price of the less appointed by order of the finished product likely in due course to be French Minister for Agriculture; exported; however, such indirect influence consequently they hold their manda does not lead to the conclusion in the tes and perform their duties pursu present case that trade between Member ant to the ministerial order which States may appreciably be affected.' appointed them and not as represen tatives of particular undertakings;
The Board adds further that the producer (c) The general meeting of the Board price has ultimately little or negligible effect has only an advisory role and, with-
BNIC / CLAIR
in the framework of the legislation 2.2. The defendant in the main proceedings and regulations governing its ac submits the following observations: tivity, merely proposes a number of measures, including the fixing of prices, to the French authorities; the 2.2.1. As regards the first question, since inter-trade prices become enforce the wine-growers' and dealers' groups are able on all the trades concerned represented on the Board, they constitute an only as a result of the ministerial association of undertakings and it is order; proceedings taken in respect irrelevant that the Board is a quasi-public of infringements are based not on establishment and does not itself engage in the breach of an agreement of pri trade. vate law but on the contravention of a French regulation. According to the defendant, when the representatives of the two groups meet together to conclude a common agreement on minimum prices, that completely (2) In consequence the deliberations of the informal meeting of the two groups general meeting of the Board cannot be constitutes an association of un¿»,i«..*Un¿.>. It regarded as a concerted practice within is irrelevant that subsequently the inter- the meaning of Article 85 (1) of the trade organization unanimously adopts the EEC Treaty. provisions of the agreement since the Minister for Agriculture issues an order making the agreement binding because there has first been a meeting of the two groups (3) There is therefore no purpose in and their agreement. considering whether, for the purposes of Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty, the fixing of a minimum purchase price for That view is supported by the Commission's spirits may affect trade between decision of 15 December 1972 (IV/29.883 Member States and has as its object or AROW / BNIC ) given against the Board, effect the prevention, restriction or from which no appeal was made. distortion of competition within the Common Market, since the fixing of the In that decision, which concerned a similar price : matter, the Commission took the view that:
(a) has little effect on the ultimate con the inter-trade agreements concluded within sumer; the Board, as distinct from the orders making them generally binding, constitute decisions of an association of undertakings; (b) above all meets a regional interest inasmuch as it is intended to ensure a fair standard of living for wine the members of the Board appointed by the growers, to stabilize markets and to Minister represent the trade organizations ensure the availability of supplies, or groups, which themselves are made up of whilst at the same time ensuring undertakings ; reasonable prices for consumers. the measures in question are not taken on the basis of the Government All the aforesaid aims fall within the general Commissionner's powers to issue regu objectives of Article 39 of the EEC Treaty. lations;
JUDGMENT OF 30. 1. 1985 — CASE 123/83
the Board thus constitutes an association of fortiori, its Director has the power to adopt associations of undertakings, which for the regulations. purposes of Article 85 may be treated as an association of undertakings. 2.2.2. As regards the second question put to the Court, the defendant in the main proceedings maintains that there can be no The defendant further points out that the doubt that the fixing of a minimum Commission took a similar view concerning purchase price for spirits constitutes a the status of the Bureau national inter concerted practice, but the fact that the professionnel de l'Armagnac [National inter-trade agreement is made by an Inter-trade Board for Armagnac, hereinafter association of associations of undertakings referred to as 'the BNIA'] in its decision of would seem to reduce the importance of the 26 July 1976 (IV/28.980, Official Journal L question concerning the existence of a 231 of 21 August 1976, p. 24). concerted practice.
2.2.3. As regards the third question, the In that decision, from which no appeal was defendant in the main proceedings begins by made to the Court, the Commission took describing the technical processes for the the view that: production of cognac.
The prohibition on deliveries of bulk He explains that it is a potable spirit which Armagnac of age grades 4 and 5 imposed by is made from a wine produced from the BNIA in its circular 8/74 dated 29 May particular vine varieties harvested in a 1974 is the result of a decision by an associ geographical area defined by a Decree of 1 ation of undertakings. The Armagnac pro May 1909 and which is protected by a ducers, cooperatives, distillers and dealers system of registered designations of origin who are represented through their trade laid down by the Decree-Law of 30 July associations in the BNIA are undertakings 1935; entitlement to the designation for the purposes of Article 85 (1). The fact 'cognac' is subject to regulations relating to that the BNIA is entrusted with certain inspection, distillation, age and marketing. functions by decree 62/20 to control quality does not mean that it cannot be considered He observes that the cost price of the spirits to be an association of undertakings for the sold by the wine-grower after distillation is purposes of Article 85 (1). The measure determined by two factors, namely the price impugned exceeds the scope of measures of the wine used and the cost of distillation. necessary for the performance of functions assigned to the BNIA by the decree.' He maintains that it is clear that the fixing of a minimum price for new or matured spirits which is higher than the level In the opinion of the defendant in the main resulting from the above-mentioned factors proceedings, the view taken in the present which naturally determine the price may case cannot be different from that taken in affect trade between Member States. the two decisions adopted against the BNIA and the Board itself. Although the great majority of purchasing dealers are established in Cognac or in the Finally, in the view of the defendant in the area defined by the decree of 1909, there is main proceedings, the fact that the Board's nothing to prevent a dealer established salaried Director, and not its Chairman — outside the defined area from buying spirits as stated by the national court — counter from the area for the purpose of blending signed the agreement is of no legal them without losing entitlement to the relevance, since neither the Board nor, a designation 'cognac', whether the spirits
BNIC / CLAIR
remain in France or are exported. The sale derived from fruit (plum, pear and of spirits by the wine-growers to the dealers mirabelle) produced in Germany and France is thus not a strictly national commercial or grain spirits (whisky or aquavit produced transaction, but may on occasions be inter in England and Denmark). national.
The defendant considers that in those According to the defendant, it is important circumstances the cognac dealer is at a to note that those spirits, the minimum price disadvantage in relation to French or of which is imposed on dealers, constitute foreign dealers marketing competing spirits the raw material for the finished product, since in determining his sale price he must cognac, the importance of which in inter take into account a purchase price for the national trade cannot be denied. raw material which is imposed on him instead of being freely fixed.
The defendant observes that the Commission stated in its aforementioned decision of 15 December 1982 that 80% of He observes that that argument would be cognac sales took place outside France, that weak if it related only to a secondary sales in the Common Market represented component of the cost price of cognac, such some 52% of total sales and that exports as the cost of labelling or packaging, but from France to the nine other Member that it retains its full weight where the States represented 40% of the total exports. purchase price imposed is that of the primary constituent of the finished product.
According to the defendant, the fact that the Commission in its decision of 15 He refers in that respect to financial December 1982 was examining a situation statistics which show that the purchase price which was not strictly identical to that of of spirits represents, in relation to the sale the present case is not decisive; although the price of cognac, a proportion not less than application made by AROW which led to 40 to 50% of sales in bottles (88% of the the decision in question related to the market) and 60 to 70% for sales in barrels provisions of the agreement of 7 November (12% of the sales); it is only in respect of 1980 (and to those of 12 December 1978 prices that small dealers can compete with and 18 October 1979) concerning deliveries the more powerful dealers, who with their of the finished product, cognac, and not large advertising budgets dominate the Articles 4 and 5, which determine the market, and it is in the consumer's interest production price of new or matured spirits, that such price competition should be the two situations are similar because, unfettered. although sales of spirits by wine-growers take place essentially on the French domestic market, the fixing of a minimum The defendant observes that the question price nevertheless affects international trade. put expressly refers to the fact that cognac enjoys a registered designation of origin and to the fact — which is indisputable — that it Cognac is the only spirit produced in a is drunk 'undiluted almost without country of the Community subject to a exception', which shows that the national restrictive organization, since there is no court was concerned with the question price fixing in the case of other spirits, whether the exclusive nature of the namely spirits derived from wine (French registered designation of origin 'cognac' Armagnac and Italian grappa), spirits exempted cognac from the Community rules
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in view of the fact that identical spirits could and by Italy to protect spirits obtained from not be produced in any other Member State wine and marc against spirits obtained by or at least not under the same name. the distillation of cereals and sugar cane. In that regard the defendant cites the The defendant in the main proceedings case-law of the Court (Case 168/78 maintains therefore that apart from the Commission v French Republic [1980] ECR special feature arising from the designation 347; Case 169/78 Commission v Italian of origin or the method of consumption the Republic [1980] ECR 383; Case 171/78 common characteristics of all spirits are Commission v Denmark [1980] ECR 447 sufficient for cognac to be in direct and Case 216/81 Cogis v Amministrazione competition with all other existing spirits. delle Finanze dello Stato [1982] ECR 2701) and contends that the principles propounded It thus concludes that the fixing of a in those cases, in the context of proceedings minimum purchase price for spirits intended concerning the application or interpretation for the manufacture of cognac prevents free of Article 95 of the EEC Treaty, apply in competition, adversely affects trade between the present case, because it is inconceivable Member States, restricts the market without that the concept of 'similar products' should improving quality and consequently is an be interpreted differently depending on obstacle to the economic inter-penetration whether it is a matter of assessing conditions intended by the Treaty. of commercial competition or the protectionist intervention of a State by 2.3.
The Commission of the European means of tax measures. Communities makes the following obser In those judgments the Court held that vations. 'there are nevertheless, in the case of all 2.3.1. It discusses the nature of cognac, the spirits, common characteristics which are process by which it is produced and the sufficiently pronounced to accept that in all applicable law. Under Community law, only cases there is at least partial or potential white wines intended for the manufacture of competition'.
The Court reached that spirits and subsequently cognac are agri conclusion after making the following cultural products; spirits and cognac are findings: themselves not included in Annex II to the (1) Spirits are produced by distillation and EEC Treaty, which contains an exhaustive contain, as a principal ingredient, list of agricultural products for the purposes alcohol suitable for human consumption of Article 38. Thus, according to the at a relatively high degree of Commission, the position is as follows : concentration; within the largest group (a) As regards white wines: of alcoholic beverages, they therefore form an identifiable whole united by They are subject to the rules of the common characteristics. common organization of the market in (2) Typical varieties of spirits may be wine laid down by Regulation (EEC) defined by particular characteristics, so No 337/79 and all the regulations much so that some of them are even adopted in implementation thereof; protected by registered designation of
origin. Pursuant to Article 42 of the Treaty, they were brought within the scope of That is how the Court came to condemn the the rules on competition (subject to tax measures taken: certain restrictions with regard to the By France to protect national spirits against application of Article 85) by Regulation whisky and genevas; No 26; By Denmark to protect aquavit and schnapps against gin, vodka, geneva, punch, (b) Spirits and cognac are subject to the rum and spirits distilled from fruit; general rules of Community law.
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Trade benveen the Member States is 2.3.2. As regards the first question, the appreciably affected by reason of the Commission cites its own decision of 15 volume of cognac sales in the various December 1982 (paragraphs 49 to 56) and countries of the Common Market. its decision of 26 July 1976 in relation to the Armagnac Board, to which the national The Commission adds that two other court also refers, in support of its complaints have been lodged against the contention that the Board, in fixing prices Board by the Union syndicale des by inter-trade agreement, is acting as an négociants en cognac et eaux-de-vie [Union association of undertakings within the of Dealers in Cognac and Spirits] and that meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty. one of the complaints relates to the inter-
trade agreements for 1981-82 and 1982-83 and the other is directed against the orders making those agreements generally binding. The status of the Board as a private or administrative body under French domestic The complaint against the inter-trade law determines the jurisdiction of the agreements (Case IV/30.622), which was national courts and cannot as such be taken lodged on 14 April 1982, is based on Article into account in an analysis made solely for 3 of Regulation No 17 and relates to the the purposes of applying Community law. fixing of the price to dealers of distillable
white wines and new or matured spirits entitled to the registered designation of origin 'cognac' and the costs of distillation. The Commission cites the case-law of the Court (judgment of 15 May 1975 in Case The case is at present being investigated by 71/74 Nederlandse Vereniging voor Fruit en the Commission's Directorate-General for Groentenimporthandel and Another v Competition and a letter sent to the Board Commission and Another [1975] ECR 563, on 22 September 1982 seeking information at paras 30 and 31, and the judgment of 29 on the basis of Article 11 of Regulation No October 1980 in Joined Cases 209 to 17 has still not been answered. 215/78 and 218/78 Heintz van Landewyck Sari and Others v Commission [1980] ECR The complaint against the orders dated 24 3125, at para. 88) in support of its January 1983 was sent to the Directorate- contention that the term 'association of General for Agriculture because it raised the undertakings' is to be interpreted in the question of the compatibility of the system light of the object of Article 85 (1), namely established by the French authorities with the removal of restrictions on competition the common organization of the market in resulting from the common intention of the wine. undertakings in question where they act in association in taking measures which The questions referred to the Court for a produce the effects referred to in Article 85 preliminary ruling by the national court in (1). the present case are not new for the
Commission since it has already had to decide the first question in its aforementioned decision of 15 December The Commission thus draws a distinction 1982; the second question is closely related between, on the one hand, the activities to the first and the third question falls which the Board conducts as part of its within the scope of the investigation aims, as defined in the applicable legislation, currently being conducted by the Direc and the procedures leading to the adoption torate-General for Competition following of measures by the Board's Government the above-mentioned complaint by the Commissioner in the exercise of his power dealers' union (Case IV/30.622). to issue regulations and, on the other,
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'contractual' procedures conducted with a The trend has been in the direction of view to fixing prices pursuant to Law No widening the scope of the agreements 75-600, which, as in the present case, lead (progressive inclusion of spirits and sub to the conclusion of agreements by inter- sequently the finished product, cognac) and trade organizations followed by the a gradually more pronounced desire to adoption of ministerial orders making those make them binding (the appearance of agreements binding. inspections) ; In the Commission's view that difference in Amendments or additional special measures procedure is in fact apparent from the are always presented as being desired by the decision of the Government Commissioner inter-trade groups or as directly arising on the Board dated 11 November 1980, from economic necessity without reference which contains a number of measures to amendments in the legislation or regu relating to wines and spirits (ceilings on lations. production or marketing), but as regards In that respect the Commission states that it prices themselves simply provides that 'a is only since 1978 that Law No 75-600 has minimum price for wines from the Cognac been used to make the agreement reached region intended for the production of within the Board binding on traders who cognac shall be fixed by inter-trade are not members of associations represented
agreement. . .'. on the Board and to impose penalties, thus increasing the restrictive effects on The agreement in question, which relates to competition; however, the fact that the the prices of white wines, spirits and agreements are transformed into regulations cognac, without specifically distinguishing issued by a public authority does not mean the white wines covered by the decision of that they cease to be decisions of the Government Commissioner, is described associations of undertakings within the by the signatories themselves as a con meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty. tractual document 'adopted by a unanimous decision of the trade groups represented' 2.3.3.
As regards the second question, and it is they and not the Government which is designed to establish whether the Commissioner who request that it be made fixing of minimum prices by means of generally binding (Article 11 of the agreements constitutes a concerted practice, agreement). the Commission considers that the affirm ative answer which it proposes to the first Where at a meeting of the wine-growers' question makes an answer to the second group and the dealers' group prices are question unnecessary. fixed, whether it be in relation to wines, spirits or the finished product, cognac, the Nevertheless, should it be decided that there Board, which is made up of trade groups is no association of undertakings in this that are in turn composed of undertakings, case, the Commission contends that for the is acting as an association of undertakings purposes of Article 85 of the Treaty there within the meaning of Article 85 of the are at the very least 'agreements between Treaty. undertakings' (rather than 'concerted practices' as the national court suggests). In the Commission's view, that analysis is The Commission considers that the con
supported by examination of the practice tractual nature of the agreements in issue followed by the Board in relation to inter- has been amply demonstrated and confines trade agreements concerning the fixing of itself to observing that the term 'agreement' prices; such an examination shows that: is to be understood in the abstract without From the beginning intra-trade agreements regard to the question whether under have always been of an exclusively con French law it is legally binding on the tractual nature and drawn up by the inter- parties independently of the ministerial trade groups on their own; order.
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The Commission states that under (b) the restriction of competition between Community law it is necessary and at the dealers with regard to the purchase cost same time sufficient for there to be a of spirits, which may in the long term common intent binding two or more parties lead to the elimination of those who are inter se for there to be an 'agreement'. financially smaller;
It cites the judgment of the Court of 15 July 1970 in Case 41/79 (ACF Chemiefarma NV (c) the repercussion on the price of cognac v Commission [1970] ECR 661), where it which this restriction of competition has was held that a gentlemen's agreement was in view of the fact that the price of an agreement for the purposes of Article 85 spirits is the main element in the cost if 'its clauses amount to a faithful expression price of cognac. of the joint intention of the parties', and it infers that the circumstances in which prices were fixed in the present case amounted to As regards the effect on trade between 'agreements' and, in the light of the Member States, the Commission states that aforesaid judgment of the Court in Case the Court held that 'the fact that a price- 71/74, 'agreements between undertakings' fixing agreement' covers only 'the marketing for the purposes of Article 85 (1). of products in a single Member State does not rule out the possibility that trade between Member States may be affected' 2.3.4. As regards the third question, the (judgment of 26 November 1975 in Case Commission considers that the problem 73/74 Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers raised is not so much whether there is a Peints de Belgique and Others v Commission restriction on competition, which is [1975] ECR 1491, at para. 25). indisputable, but whether the restriction falls within the scope of Community law.
It maintains that in the present case trade The question whether Community law or between Member States is affected. national law applies depends on whether Although the restriction of competition trade between Member States is affected, resulting from the fixing of minimum prices and the restriction of competition within the directly concerns spirits which are not Common Market constitutes the basic themselves the subject of such trade, the condition for the application of Article 85. spirits in question are the main element in the cost price of the finished product, As regards the restrictive effect on cognac. Thus the restrictive effects on competition within the Common Market, it competition (obstacles to free price observes that the agreement in issue fixes formation for less well-known brands, 'directly ... purchase or selling prices' and perpetuating their domination on the market falls within the first class of restrictive by better known brands and preventing their agreements covered by Article 85 (1) of the growth and the promotion of new brands) Treaty. are encountered in relation to the finished product, cognac, which is the subject of trade between Member States since some In the Commission's view the effects of that 50% of it is sold in the other Member agreement in the present case are: States of the Community.
(a) the restriction of competition between producers, who are prevented from That being so, the Commission observes selling at the price which they consider that there is no purpose in enquiring desirable; whether a product which is the subject of
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intra-Community trade does or does not (3) An agreement or decision by an have special characteristics which distinguish association of undertakings which fixes it, as regards consumption or from any a minimum price is intended to restrict other point of view, from other products competition within the meaning of which may be similar. Article 85 (1) of the Treaty. Such an agreement or decision may affect trade between Member States if, although the 2.3.5. The Commission therefore proposes product in question is not marketed in the following answers to the questions put other Member States, it is an ingredient to the Court: in a finished product which is the subject of intra-Community trade, so that its price has a significant effect on '(1) An agreement, concluded within an the sale price of the finished product.' inter-trade organization between rep resentatives of the' trades concerned with the intentioni in particular of fixing 3. Oral procedure prices falls within ¡the. term "decision by associations of undertakings' in Article At the hearing on 26 June 1984, the Board, 85 (1) of the Treaty. The fact that the represented by X. de Roux, Avocat, G. agreement is made generally binding by Clair, represented by P. Kappelhoff-Lançon, a decision of the public authority in Avocat, and the Commission of the application of the rules of national law European Communities, represented by G. cannot affect its status under Marenco and N. Coutrelis, acting as Community law. Agents, presented oral argument and answered questions put by the Court.
(2) That answer makes an answer to the The Advocate General delivered his opinion second question unnecessary. at the sitting on 2 October 1984.
Decision
1 By a judgment of 21 June 1983, which was received at the Court on 1 July 1983, the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Saintes (France), referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty three questions on the interpretation of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty.
2 Those questions were raised in proceedings brought by the Bureau national inter- professionel du cognac [National Inter-trade Board for Cognac, hereinafter referred to as 'the Board'], whose registered office is in Cognac, against Guy Clair, Director of Établissements Clair et Cie, dealers in Brie-sous-Matha, for the annulment of contracts for the purchase of potable spirits which the latter had concluded at prices lower than those laid down in accordance with the procedure described below.
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3 As is apparent from the judgment of the national court and from the other documents relating to the case, the Board is an inter-trade organization in the wine and cognac sector and was set up by an. Order of 5 January 1941. The income of the Board is provided by para-fiscal levies. According to the Order of the Minister for Agriculture of 18 February 1975 (Journal Officiel de la République Française of 26 February 1975), which was in force at the material time:
'The Bureau national interprofessionnel du cognac shall be composed of:
(a) Two persons, one representing wine-growers and the other representing dealers in the area defined by the Decree of 1 May 1909;
(b) Upon submission of lists drawn up by the trade organizations concerned:
19 delegates of wine-growers and distilling co-operatives; 19 delegates of dealers and commercial distillers; A delegate from the Syndicat des Vins Vines [Association for wines fortified for distillation]; A delegate of the producers of Pineau des Charentes; A delegate of the brokers; A delegate for ancillary industries; A delegate of the executive and managerial staff (trade) ; A delegate of workers in cognac cellars; A viticultural technician; A vineyard worker.
No person carrying on the trade of a dealer, broker, distiller or any related trade shall represent producers and vice versa.
Members of the Board shall be appointed for three years by Order of the Minister for Agriculture. Their mandate shall be renewable.
The following shall attend meetings of the Board and may take part in discussions in a consultative capacity: Regional directors for agriculture and directors of the revenue authorities of Charente and Charente-Maritime; The divisional inspector responsible for investigating fraud; The officials responsible for the economic and financial control of the Board.'
In addition, a Chairman and Government Commissioner are to be appointed by the Minister.
4 By virtue of Article 5 of Law No 75-600 of 10 July 1975 on agricultural inter- trade organizations, as supplemented and amended by Law No 80-502 of 4 July
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1980, the Board may, at its request, claim the benefit of certain provisions of the Law.
5 Under the Board's internal rules, as they stood at the time of the facts, its members were divided into two groups, namely dealers and wine-growers. After each had adopted its position by qualified majority following internal negotiations, the groups were permitted to conclude an agreement which, according to Law No 75-600 of 1 July 1975, could be aimed at promoting: the monitoring of supply and demand; the adjustment and regularization of supply; the implementation, subject to State control, of marketing rules, prices and conditions of payment; the quality of products; inter-trade relations in the sector concerned; and the sale of the product on domestic and external markets.
6 According to the aforesaid Article 5, in conjunction with Article 2, upon a request by the general meeting of the Board, the agreement may be made generally binding by ministerial order. The effect of this is that the agreement becomes binding on all members of the trades making up the trade organization.
7 According to Article 4 of the above-mentioned Law, a contract of supply between private persons which does not comply with the provisions of an agreement that has been adopted and made generally binding is automatically void, and the inter- trade organization concerned may seek a declaration to that effect from the appropriate court and also claim compensation for any damage it may have suffered.
8 In accordance with the aforesaid provisions and procedure, the Board unanimously adopted on 7 November 1980 an agreement entitled 'Inter-trade Agreement relating to the prices of distillable white wines and cognac'. The agreement, which provided that it was to apply throughout the whole of metropolitan France, fixed a minimum price for wines for distillation, the price of potable spirits distilled in 1980 and earlier years, and a minimum price for cognac. It provided that any contract concluded in breach of its provisions would be void and that the penalties provided for in Article 4 of the aforesaid Law of 10 July 1975 would apply. It was signed by the representatives of the two groups at a meeting of the Board and by the Board's director and was made generally binding by an Order issued by the Minister for Agriculture on 17 November 1980.
9 Mr Clair bought cognac from various wine-growers at prices lower than those laid down by the order in question, and the Board therefore brought an action against
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him before the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Saintes, for a declaration that the contracts in question were void.
10 Mr Clair, the defendant in the main proceedings, contended that the action was unfounded because it was based on an agreement which was incompatible with Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. For its part the Board claimed, on the one hand, that cognac did not come under the aforesaid provisions of the Treaty and, on the other, that the ministerial order which Mr Clair was charged with infringing was an administrative measure and therefore its validity could not be examined by non- administrative courts.
11 The Tribunal de Grande Instance, Saintes, proceeded on the assumption that cognac was an industrial product and that consequently Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty were in principle applicable. Furthermore, it held that, although the Board had a quasi-administrative status and the Order of 27 November 1980 making the agreement generally binding constituted an administrative measure, the agreement was nevertheless concluded and signed, without the intervention of the Government Commissioner on the Board, by the representatives of the two groups; the agreement was separate from the Order even though it was made in the presence of the Chairman of the Board, who had no power to issue regu lations.
12 On the basis of those considerations, the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Saintes, by judgment of 21 June 1983, stayed the proceedings and referred the following three questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
'(1) Since the wine-growers' group and the dealers' group are both represented within the Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac, are they to be regarded as an association of undertakings, having regard to the fact that the agreement reached between them was also signed by the Chairman of the Bureau?
(2) Must the fixing by the wine-growers' group and the dealers' group of a minimum purchase price for potable spirits be regarded as a concerted practice?
(3) Must the fixing of a minimum purchase price for potable spirits be regarded as capable of affecting trade between Member States and as having as its effect or purpose the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
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within the Common Market, in the light of the fact that the potable spirits referred to in the agreement of 7 November 1980 conform to the requirements for the registered designation of origin for cognac and that cognac distilled from grapes is consumed undiluted almost without exception?'
First question
13 The national court's first question is designed essentially to ascertain whether an agreement concluded within an organization and according to a procedure such as those described above falls within the scope of Article 85 (1) of the Treaty and in particular whether an agreement concluded by the two groups (the wine-growers and dealers) is an agreement made between undertakings or associations of under takings.
14 The Board claims as a preliminary that there is no point in discussing whether under the EEC Treaty cognac is to be regarded as an agricultural product or as an industrial product. Article 85 of the Treaty is in any event not applicable because cognac is of considerable economic importance to the farmers of the region concerned. The income of 63 000 wine-growers is directly dependent on the price of cognac. Since 1973 the wine-growing industry in Charente has been heavily burdened with debt. Moreover, it has been faced with a structural imbalance between supply and demand. Thus, the fixing of a minimum price for cognac is intended to ensure a minimum income for the farmers in Charente.
15 That argument must be rejected. As appears from Annex II to the Treaty (ex. 22.09), potable spirits are expressly excluded from the category of agricultural products. Consequently, they must be regarded as industrial products and that classification cannot be called in question by the economic importance that the products may have for farmers in the region concerned.
16 The Board maintains that the agreement between the two groups was not made on the initiative of undertakings but under the aegis of, and according to the procedure laid down by the internal rules of the Board, which, according to French administrative case-law, constitutes an institution of public law in view of the manner in which it was created, the rules concerning its financing, organ ization, functioning and the appointment of its members and the public-service mission entrusted to it. Consequently, its activity is not covered by Article 85 of the Treaty.
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17 That argument cannot be accepted. Article 85 states that it applies to agreements between undertakings and decisions by associations of undertakings. As the defendant in the main proceedings and the Commission have rightly observed, the legal framework within which such agreements are made and such decisions are taken and the classification given to that framework by the various national legal systems are irrelevant as far as the applicability of the Community rules on competition and in particular Article 85 of the Treaty are concerned.
18 The Board observes that the members who attended its general meeting and who negotiated and concluded the agreement in question were all appointed by the Minister for Agriculture. Thus they do not represent the various trade organ izations from which they come and the agreement made between them cannot be regarded as an agreement between associations of undertakings.
19 That argument cannot be accepted. Article 85 must be interpreted as covering such an agreement, since it was negotiated and concluded by persons who, although appointed by the public authorities, were, apart from the two appointed directly by the minister, proposed for appointment by the trade organizations directly concerned and who consequently must be regarded as in fact representing those organizations in the negotiation and conclusion of the agreement.
20 It must be added that an agreement made by two groups of traders, such as the wine-growers and dealers, must be regarded as an agreement between under takings or associations of undertakings. The fact that those groups meet within an organization such as the Board does not remove their agreement from the scope of Article 85 of the Treaty.
21 The Board maintains, moreover, that agreements concluded within it are not binding and that its role is solely to advise the central public authorities, which alone may make the said agreements binding by means of ministerial orders.
22 It must be pointed out in that respect that for the purposes of Article 85 (1) it is unnecessary to take account of the actual effects of an agreement where its object is to restrict, prevent or distort competition. By its very nature, an agreement fixing a minimum price for a product which is submitted to the public authorities for the
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purpose of obtaining approval for that minimum price, so that it becomes binding on all traders on the market in question, is intended to distort competition on that market.
23 As the defendant in the main proceedings and the Commission have rightly contended, the adoption of a measure by a public authority making an agreement binding on all the traders concerned, even if they were not parties to the agreement, cannot remove the agreement from the scope of Article 85 (1).
24 Finally, the national court asks whether the fact that the inter-trade agreement was signed by the Chairman of the Board affects the legal nature of the agreement for the purposes of Article 85 of the Treaty.
25 The fact that the chairman or director of a body within which an agreement intended to prevent free competition is concluded places his signature at the foot of the agreement, even though national law does not provide for such a signature, does not affect the applicability to the agreement of the provisions of Article 85 (1) of the Treaty .
26 It follows from the foregoing that the reply which must be given to the first question is that Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty must be taken to apply to an inter-trade agreement fixing a minimum price for a product such as cognac concluded by two groups of traders within the framework of, and in accordance with the procedures of, a body such as the Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac .
Second question
27 The national court asks further whether the fixing of minimum prices for potable spirits must be regarded as a concerted practice for the purposes of Article 85. In view of the answer given to the first question, it is unnecessary to reply to the second question.
Third question
28 It appears from the documents before the Court and from the arguments presented at the hearing that the third question is concerned essentially with the fixing of prices for potable spirits used in the manufacture of cognac, that is to say an
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intermediate product which is not normally sent outside the Cognac region. The national court asks in substance whether the fixing of a minimum price for such a product is capable of affecting trade between Member States and has as its purpose or effect the restriction of competition, having regard to the fact that the finished product, cognac, is protected by a registered designation of origin.
29 It must be observed in that respect that any agreement whose object or effect is to restrict competition by fixing minimum prices for an intermediate product is capable of affecting intra-Community trade, even if there is no trade in that intermediate product between the Member States, where the product constitutes the raw material for another product marketed elsewhere in the Community. The fact that the finished product is protected by a registered designation of origin is irrelevant.
30 The reply which must be given to the third question is therefore that the fixing of a minimum purchase price for an intermediate product is capable of affecting trade betweeen Member States where that product constitutes the raw material for another product marketed elsewhere in the Community, irrespective of whether the finished product is protected by a registered designation of origin.
Costs
31 The costs incurred by the Commission of the European Communities, which has submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. As these proceedings are, in so far as the parties to the main proceedings are concerned, in the nature of a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision as to costs is a matter for that court.
On those grounds,
THE COURT,
in answer to the questions submitted to it by the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Saintes, by judgment of 21 June 1983, hereby rules:
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1. Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty must be taken to apply to an inter-trade agreement fixing a minimum price for a product such as cognac concluded by two groups of traders within the framework of, and in accordance with the pro cedures of, a body such as the Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac.
2. The fixing of a minimum price for an intermediate product is capable of affecting trade between Member States where that product constitutes the raw material for another product marketed elsewhere in the Community, irrespective of whether the finished product is protected by a registered designation of origin.
Mackenzie Stuart Bosco Kakouris
Koopmans Everling Bahlmann Galmot
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 30 January 1985.
P. Heim A. J. Mackenzie Stuart Registrar President