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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·26.2.1987

C-356/85

ECLI:EU:C:1987:113

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61985CC0356

OPINION OF MR DA CRUZ VILAÇA —CASE 356/85

O P I N I O N OF M R ADVOCATE GENERAL DA C R U Z VILAÇA delivered on 26 February 1987 *

Mr President, application of a lower rate to beer than to Members of the Court, wine made from fresh grapes infringed the second paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty. 1. A — In these proceedings, the Commission asks the Court to declare that 5. There was no reaction from the Belgian the Kingdom of Belgium has not fulfilled its Government and on 20 June 1984 the obligations under Article 95 of the EEC Commission sent it a letter calling on it to Treaty, in so far as it applies a higher rate submit its observations. of VAT to wines made from fresh grapes, which are imported, than to beer, which is for the most part produced in Belgium. 6. In its reply, the Belgian Government put forward a number of reasons to support its view that it was not in breach of the second 2. The Belgian legislation at issue is Arrêté paragraph of Article 95, claiming that there royal (Royal Decree) No 20 of 20 July was no proof that the difference in 1970, ' as amended by the Arretes royaux of rates — which did not reflect any wish to 25 March 1977 2 and 16 November 1982, 3 favour a domestic product at the expense of which laid down the rates of VAT and the an imported product — had in practice had manner in which such rates apply to any protective effect. products and services. 7. The Commission was not convinced by the arguments put forward by Belgium and 3. Under that legislation, beer is subject to therefore sent it a reasoned opinion, tax at the rate of 19%, whereas a rate of reiterating its view that Belgium was in 25% is applied to various beverages breach of the second paragraph of Article intended for domestic consumption, 95 of the Treaty and inviting it to take the including wine made from fresh grapes. necessary measures to comply with the opinion within one month.

4. B — Considering thatí following the 8. In the absence of any reply to the judgment of the Court of'Justice of 12 July reasoned opinion, the Commission brought 1983 in Case 170/78, 4 wine and beer are the present action, by application dated 15 competing products as regards consumer November 1985. preference, the Commission drew the attention of the Belgian authorities, by letter of 22 October 1983, to the fact that the 9. C — The arguments put forward by the parties — and those of the French * Translated from the Portuguese. Government, which was permitted to 1 — Moniteur beige, 31. 7. 1970. intervene in support of the Commission — 2 — Moniteur helge, 26. 3. 1977. 3 — Moniteur belge, 20. 11. 1982. are summarized in the Report for the 4 — Commission v United Kingdom [1983] ECR 2265. Hearing.

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10. At this stage, it should merely be function of that article, and its relationship pointed out that the Commission bases its with the provisions of the first paragraph. arguments on the view — which it derives from previous decisions of the Court — 16. For its part, Article 95, in its entirety, that, once it has been established that there cannot be viewed otherwise than in the is a competitive relationship between two context of the chapter in which it products, any difference in the rates of tax appears — specifically in relation to Article applied to the same taxable base (in this 99 — and indeed in the light of the general case, the value added) is contrary to the objectives of the Treaty. second paragraph of Article 95. 17. E — The Court has already made it 11. In the Commission's view, as a result of clear 6 that the first and second paragraphs the Court's earlier finding that there is a of Article 95 'supplement the provisions on competitive relationship between wine and the abolition of customs duties and charges beer, 5 for further evidence, that the having equivalent effect', since their aim is difference in the rates applied to the two 'to ensure free movement of goods between products in Belgium infringes the second Member States in normal conditions of paragraph of Article 95, and the extent competition by the elimination of all forms of the difference merely provides a basis of protection which may result from the for assessing the seriousness of the application of internal taxation which infringement. discriminates against products from other Member States'. 12. In Belgium's view, on the other hand, if the second paragraph of Article 95, as 18. Summarizing, the Court stated that opposed to the first paragraph thereof, is to Article 95 is intended to 'guarantee the be applied, a further condition must be complete neutrality of internal taxation as fulfilled, namely that the difference in tax regards competition between domestic must be likely to afford protection to products and imported products'. domestically produced products which are in competition with the imported products. 19. There is no doubt of course, at the present stage of development of Community 13. However, in this case, the difference law, as to 'the freedom of each Member in VAT rates as between wine and State to lay down tax arrangements which beer — which affects only a proportion of differentiate between certain products on the quantity of those products consumed — the basis of objective criteria, such as the is not likely significantly to influence the nature of the raw materials used or the sale price or, therefore, consumers' choices. production processes employed'. 7

6 — Judgments of 27 February 1980 (Tax arrangements 14. D — The interpretation of the second applicable to spirits) in Case 168/78 Commission v French paragraph of Article 95 is therefore of great Republic [1980] ECR 347, at p. 359, and in Case 169/78 Commission v Italian Republic [1980] ECR 385, at p. 399; importance to the decision in this case. in Case 171/78 Commission v Kingdom of Denmark [1980] ECR 447, at p. 462; judgment of 15 July 1982 in Case 216/81 Cogis v Amministrazione delle /manze dello Stalo [1982] ECR 2701, at p. 2712; judgment of 4 March 1986 15. To determine the correct interpretation in Case 106/84 Commission v Denmark [1986] ECR 833, it is necessary, in the first place, to consider paragraph 10. that paragraph in the context of Article 95 7 — Judgment of 27 Mav 1981 in Joined Cases 142 and 143/80 Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Esscvi SpA and as a whole, having regard to the general Carlo Salengo [1981] ECR 1413, at p. 1434; sec also judgments of 14 January 1981 in Case 140/79 Cbemial Farmaceutickí SpA v DAF SpA [1981] ECR I, at p. 14, and 5 — Judgment of 12 July 1983 in Case 170/78 Commission v SpA Vmal v SpA Orbat [1981] ECR 77, at p. 93; and Unilcd Kingdom [1983] ECR 2265, at p. 2288, paragraph judgment of 15 March 1983 in Case 319/81 Commission v 12. Italian Republic [1981] ECR 601, at p. 620.

OPINION OF MR DA CRUZ VILAÇA —CASE 356/85

20. In fact, such differentiation 'is prohibition on customs duties and charges compatible with Community law if it having an equivalent effect between the pursues objectives of economic policy which Member States in that it intends to eliminate are themselves compatible with the before any harmonization all national tax requirements of the Treaty and its practices which are likely to create discrimi- secondary legislation and if the detailed nation against imported products or to rules are such as to avoid any form of afford protection to certain domestic" discrimination, direct or indirect, in regard products'. Hence, the Court took the view to imports from other Member States or any that Articles 95 and 99 pursue different form of protection of competing domestic objectives: 'Article 95 aims to eliminate in products'. the immediate future discriminatory or protective tax practices, whilst Article 99 aims to reduce trade barriers arising from

21. In other words, 'the freedom which the differences between the national tax must. . . be left to Member States in the systems, even where those are applied field of domestic taxation cannot justify any without discrimination'.10 departure from the fundamental principle of non-discrimination in taxation matters laid down in Article 95 but must be exercised 23. Confirming that difference, the Court within the confines of that provision and has also stated that the second paragraph of observe the prohibitions contained therein'.8 Article 95 establishes a prohibition which is That was the position in Case 243/84 John- 'self-sufficient and legally complete and is Walker & Sons Ltd, in which the Court thus capable of having direct effects on the ruled in its judgment of 4 March 198.69 that legal relationships between Member States a system of taxation which differentiates and those subject to their jurisdiction'. n between certain beverages which are not similar products is not incompatible with the second paragraph of Article 95 'where a 24. F— However, in interpreting each of significant proportion of domestic pro- the rules laid down in Article 95 in the light duction of alcoholic beverages falls within of the function and of the general objectives each of the relevant tax categories'. which the Court has attributed to that provision, a clear distinction must be drawn between the obligations laid down in the

22. As regards the relationship between first and second paragraphs respectively. Article 95 and Article 99, the Court has also already indicated the precise difference between the aims of those two provisions. 25. The first paragraph applies to similar Finding that the differences between the products, that is to say, to those which, in various national laws 'constitute an obstacle the Court's definition,12 have 'similar to the free movement of goods and to the characteristics and meet the same needs development of trade between the Member from the point of view of the consumers'. States', it considered, however, that the The Court has thus adopted a broad inter- implementation of the programme of pretation of the concept of similarity, harmonization provided for in Article 99 could not in any way constitute a 10 — Judgment of 27 February 1980 in Case 171/78 Commission preliminary to the application of Article 95 : v Denmark, supra, at p. 447, paragraph 20. that provision 'lays down a basic 11 — Judgment of 4 April 1968 in Case 27/67 Fink-Frucht v requirement which is directly linked to the Hauptzollamt München [1968] ECR 223, at p. 232. 12 —• Judgment of 17 February 1976 in Case 45/75 Rewe v Hauptzollamt Landau [1976] ECR 181, at p. 194, paragraph 12; judgments of 27 February 1980, supra; 8 — Commission v Italian Republic, supra, pp. 620-621. judgment of 4 March 1986 in Case 106/84, supra, 9 — Case 243/84 [1986] ECR 875. paragraph 12.

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whereby the similarity of products is to be 30. In that connection, the Court went out assessed 'not according to whether they of its way to emphasize that 'even if there is were strictly identical, but according to no direct competition of any sort with a whether their use was similar and domestic product, such protection would comparable'. 13 still exist if it were established that the imported product bore a specific fiscal charge because of its state of manufacture 26. With regard to such products, the or distribution or because of any other conditions laid down in the first paragraph economic circumstance in such a way as to prohibit the imposition, directly or indi- protect certain activities distinct from those rectly, on the products of other Member used in the manufacture of the imported States of any internal taxation of any kind product' {Fink-Frucht [1968] ECR 232 and in excess of that imposed directly or indi-

233). rectly on similar domestic products. In short, 'any tax provision whose effect is to impose, by whatever mechanism, higher 31. As is stated in the Fink-Frucht judgment taxation on imported goods than on ([1968] ECR 233), 'whereas the first domestic products' H is prohibited. paragraph of Article 95 only prohibits taxation in so far as it exceeds a clearly defined level, the prohibition laid down in 27. For its part, the second paragraph of the second paragraph is based on the Article 95 'applies to the treatment for tax protective effect of the taxation in question purposes of products which, without to the exclusion of any exact standard of fulfilling that criterion of similarity laid reference'. down in the first paragraph of [Article 95], are nevertheless in competition, either partially or potentially, with certain 32. In the case of the first paragraph, the products of the importing country'. 15 standard of reference is, of course, the level of taxation directly or indirectly affecting the similar domestic products; this having

28. For such products, that provision been established, the applicability of the prohibits any Member State from applying provision will follow from a mere arith- internal taxes to the products of other metical operation comparing the tax Member States in such a way as indirectly burdens 'whether in terms of the rate, the to protect other products. mode of assessment or other detailed rules for the application thereof'. 16 29. In other words, the second paragraph of Article 95 applies to products which, even 33. 'The prohibition applies where a tax if not similar to imported products, are mechanism is of such a nature as to impose likely to be indirectly protected by higher taxation on imported products than differential taxes, to the extent to which the on domestic products' (judgment of 27 former are in competition with the latter 'by February 1980 Commission v United reason of one or more economic uses' Kingdom supra, [1980] ECR 433, paragraph (judgment in Fink-Frucht, supra, [1968] 9)· ECR 232).

34. In the case of the second paragraph of 13 — Judgment of 4 March 1986 in Case 106/84, supra, paragraph 12. Article 95, 'in view of the difficulty of 14 — Judgment of 4 March 1986 in Case 106/84, supra, making sufficiently precise comparisons paragraph 10. between the products in question', the 15 — Interlocutory judgment of 27 February 1980 in Case 170/78 Commission v United Kingdom [1980] ECR 417, at p. 432; judgment of 12 July 1983 in the same case, [19831 16 — Judgment of 27 February 1980 in Case 171/78 Commission ECR 2265, at p. 2286. v Denmark [1980] ECR 463, paragraph 7.

OPINION OF MR DA CRUZ VILAÇA —CASE 356/85

criterion is necessarily 'a more general the highest rate of taxation is conceived so criterion', in other words the protective as to apply only to imported products and is nature of the system of internal taxation. 17 intended to protect the corresponding It is therefore necessary to determine that a domestic products by applying appreciably particular kind of tax burden 'is capable of lower rates of tax to them'. having the effect referred to above' (judgment in Fink-Frucbt [1968] ECR 233) in order to be considered incompatible with the Treaty. 37. But these, in my opinion, are excep- tional cases in which discriminatory intent and effects are clearly in evidence.

35. A clear distinction between similar products and competing products for the purpose of applying one or other of the 38. G — The first question to be resolved paragraphs of Article 95 can only be regarding the application of the second dispensed with where, as held by the Court paragraph of Article 95 is, therefore, in its judgment of 15 March 1983 with whether or not a domestic product and an respect to the taxation of Italian spirits, 18 imported product are in competition with recourse is had to 'a criterion for the each other, having regard to their respective charging of higher taxation, such as desig- possible economic uses and the existing nation of origin or provenance which by degree of substitution as between them for definition cannot ever be fulfilled by the purpose of satisfying identical needs. domestic products similar to or in compe- tition with products imported from other Member S t a t e s . . . Such a system has the effect of excluding domestic products in 39. As has already been stated, the Court advance from the heaviest taxation since considers 20 that the competition involved they will never fulfil the conditions on may be simply 'partial' or 'potential'. which the higher rate is charged . . . '.

40. The Court went on to say 21 that, in 36. In the same way, without it being order to determine the existence of a necessary to consider whether the first or competitive relationship, 'it is necessary to the second paragraph was applicable, the consider not only the present state of the Court concluded in its judgment of 11 July market but also the possibilities for devel- 1985 in Case 278/83 Commission v Italy19 opment within the context of free movement in connection with the rates of VAT of goods at the Community level and the applicable to domestic and imported further potential for the substitution of sparkling wines (in particular champagne), products for one another which may be that there was 'a manifest breach of the rule revealed by intensification of trade, so as laid down in Article 95 prohibiting tax fully to develop the complementary features discrimination', since it was 'obvious that of the economies of the Member States in the definition given by Italian legislation of accordance with the objectives laid down by the category of sparkling wines subject to Article 2 of the Treaty'.

17 — Commission v Denmark [1980], supra, paragraph 7; 20 •— Judgment of 27 February 1980 Commission v United Commission v United Kingdom [1980), supra, paragraph 9. Kingdom, supra, at p. 432, paragraph 5. 18 — Case 319/81 Commission v Italy, supra, at p. 621. 2J — Commission v United Kingdom [1980], supra, paragraph 6; 19 — Case 278/83 [1985] ECR 2503. Commission v United Kingdom [1983], supra, paragraph 7.

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41. A forward-looking approach must tioned provision is linked to the nature ol therefore be adopted in assessing the the tax system in question so that it i¡ competitive relationship between products, impossible to require in each case that the having regard to the new possibilities of protective effect should be shown stat- substitution deriving from intra-Community istically. It is sufficient for the purposes ol trade and changes in consumers' tastes. the application of the second paragraph ol Article 95 for it to be shown that a given tax mechanism is likely, in view of its inhereni

42. That is why the Court emphasized in its characteristics, to bring about the protective judgment of 12 July 1983 Commission v effect referred to by the Treaty. Withoul United Kingdom, at p. 2287, paragraph 8, therefore disregarding the importance of the that 'for the purpose of measuring the criteria which may be deduced from stat- possible degree of substitution, attention istics from which the effects of a given tax should not be confined to existing consumer system may be measured, it is impossible to habits in a Member State or in a given require the Commission to supply statistical region.

Those habits, which were essentially data on the actual foundation of the variable in time and space, could not be protective effect of the tax system considered to be immutable; the tax policy complained of'. of a Member State must not therefore crystallize given consumer habits so as to consolidate an advantage acquired by national industries concerned to respond to 47. In the light of the decisions of the them'. Court to which I have just referred, the problem whether the difference in tax rates must be such as to produce a protective

43. H — A competitive relationship having effect which is appreciable, or of a given been established between two products, it is extent, becomes irrelevant. In other words, then necessary to resolve a second problem. that does not appear to me to be a further precondition for the application of the second paragraph of Article 95, in such a 44. The second paragraph of Article 95 way that 'minor' tax differences would prohibits tax practices 'of such a nature as automatically be excluded. to afford indirect protection' to products of the importing Member State.

48. What is important is that the difference in tax treatment between domestic products 45. In view of the difference between the and competing imported products must be provisions of the first and second para- likely to produce a protective effect of the graphs of Article 95, this condition essen- kind referred to by the Court. tially means that it must be decided whether the taxation levied on the competing products is of such a nature as indirectly to protect the domestic product. u 49. In my view, the greater or lesser extent of the difference in rates, in conjunction with the other relevant details — relating to

46. However, it must be emphasized — as the range of products covered, the compo- the Court has done 2 3 that 'the abovemen- sition thereof and their relationship with consumer habits, price differences, the 22 — See judgment of 27 February 1980 Commission v United Kingdom, stipru, at p. 433, paragraph 9. intensity of the competitive relationship, 23 — Sec judgment of 27 February 1980, supra, paragraph 10. trends in consumption and imports, and so

OPINION O F MR DA CRUZ VILAÇA —CASE 356/85

forth — is one of the factors on the basis of 55. Such a protective effect, as stated by Mr which it can be determined in each case Advocate General Reischl in his Opinion in whether or not a tax system is of such a Case 170/78 26 'does not however neces- nature as to protect domestic products. sarily exist if a higher tax is imposed on the imported products than on the inter- 50. This means that — by contrast with the changeable products since because of the first paragraph — the second paragraph of cost and price differences in the case of Article 95 does not require, as Mr Advocate substitute products a higher tax must not General VerLoren van Themaat 24 stated, necessarily produce an effect on the that the tax rates for domestic products and market'. imported products should be exactly the same. 56. To put it another way, in the case of 51. And the Court has already stated, in its similar products, the Treaty appears, by judgment in Fink-Fmcht in reply to a requiring equal treatment, to make a question submitted by the Finanzgericht, presumption, juris et de jure, that different Munich, that 'the Treaty does not prevent tax burdens lead to discrimination; as the national courts from deciding, where regards competing products, it must be necessary, the level below which the tax in shown that the difference of taxation is question would cease to have the protective likely to (is 'of such a nature as to') afford effects prohibited by' the second paragraph indirect protection to domestic products. 27 of Article 95.

52. Be that as it may, the Court stated 57. I — Let us see how these conclusions expressis verbis15 with regard to the first apply to the present case. paragraph of Article 95 that the criterion 'consists in the comparison of tax burdens, whether in terms of the rate, the mode of 58. In the first place, let us examine the assessment or other detailed rules for the competitive relationship between the two application thereof'. products at issue, wine and beer.

53. In the same way it seems to me that in the second paragraph as well it is an 59. In the interlocutory judgment of 27 appraisal of the tax burdens—and not February 1980 in Case 170/78 Commission merely of the rates — which is important; in v United Kingdom it was stated, in the present case the question is not relevant paragraph 14 of the decision (in terms since it is only the difference in applicable which were reiterated subsequently in the rates which is at issue. final judgment of 12 July 1983), that 'to a certain extent the two beverages in question 54. Put simply, the appraisal of the tax are capable of meeting identical needs, so burdens must now be concerned with their that it must be acknowledged that there is a impact on the competitive relationships certain degree of substitution for one between the products involved, establishing another'. And the Court added, as we have what protective effect, if any, is afforded to seen, that the assessment of the extent to domestic production. which products can be substituted for one another must take account of the possible 24 — Opinions in Cases 106/84 and 243/84. Similar views are expressed in the Opinion of Mr Advocate Generai Reischl 26 — Commission v United Kingdom [1980] ECR 417, at p. 441. in Case 170/78 Commission v United Kingdom [1980], supra, ECR 417, at p. 441. 27 — Similar views are expressed in the Opinion of Mr Advocate General Reischl in Case 170/78 Commission v United 25 — Judgment of 27 February 1980 in Case 171/78 Commission Kingdom [1980], supra, ECR 417 at p. 441 and [1983] ECR v Denmark, supra, paragraph 7. 2265 at p. 2299.

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changes in consumer habits against the 63. To what extent do these considerations background of a single Community market. apply to an assessment of the competitive relationship between the wine and beer involved in the present case? 60. However, the Court recognized that there exist as between the two drinks 'great differences . . . from the point of view of 64. It should be remembered that the tax manufacturing processes and . . . natural system with which we are concerned here is properties' which give rise to 'price the Belgian and not the British system. structures which are so extremely different that in spite of the competitive relationship between the finished products it seems particularly difficult to make comparisons 65. However, the English Channel does not from the tax point of view' (paragraph 15). in itself substantially change all popular habits. The Belgians, like the British, are, it appears, traditional beer drinkers. 61. Following the further inquiries needed According to the Belgian Government, beer for it to reach its final decision, the Court consumption is an integral part of the held, in its final judgment of 12 July 1983, customs and usages of the Belgian popu- that 'in view of the substantial differences in lation, even though in recent years it has the quality and, therefore, in the price of been seen that beer is giving some ground to wines, the decisive competitive relationship wine and spirits. between beer, a popular and widely consumed beverage, and wine, must be established by reference to those wines 66. It is, however, recognized — and both which are the most accessible to the public parties to these proceedings agree — that in at large, that is to say, generally speaking, principle there is a competitive relationship the lightest and cheapest varieties. between wine and beer. Accordingly', the Court concluded, 'that is the appropriate basis for making fiscal comparisons by reference to the alcoholic strength or to the price of the two beverages 67. If that competitive relationship is to be in question' (paragraph 12). correctly defined, it seems to me that only things which are comparable may be compared with each other. 62. The Court thus accepted the relevance of the observations submitted by the Italian Government — which intervened in that 68. In these proceedings it is not only case — to the effect that it was 'inappro- evident that the range of wines imported priate to compare beer with wines of into and consumed in Belgium is varied and average alcoholic strength or, a fortiori, that there are ample supplies, but also that with wines of greater alcoholic strength'. In Belgium has a wealth of beers of the most the Italian Government's view, the wines diverse qualities and prices. which were genuinely in competition with beer were, specifically, 'the lightest wines with an alcoholic strength in the region of 69. As far as beers are concerned, the 9°, that is to say the most popular and Commission points out that about 300 cheapest wines', and therefore those wines qualities of beer are produced in Belgium. should be chosen for purposes of Some of them are sold for more than comparison in order to measure the BFR 100 per litre, and can be classified as incidence of taxation (paragraph 11). luxury beers.

OPINION OF MR DA CRUZ VILAÇA —CASE 356/85

70. It would not seem to be correct to 78. However, that does not exclude the compare such beers with ordinary cheap possibility that in certain countries, as a wines, with which they are not in any result of particular consumer habits, there obvious competitive relationship — the may be a competitive relationship between difference in prices is great, but so are the products of this kind. methods by which they are produced, their gastronomic qualities, the tastes which they satisfy, the occasions on which they are 79. In any event, it is preferable, as both drunk and the classes of people by whom parties suggest ultimately, to disregard such they are consumed. qualities for the purposes of this discussion.

80. The Belgian Government states that 71. It would appear more logical to treat 'luxury' beers are manufactured by artisanal such 'luxury' beers in the same way as the methods and in very small quantities: one of great quality wines, which are also at the the brands is even produced by only three top of the range and are also consumed on persons (a doctor, an engineer and an special occasions by connoisseurs with architect), who devote part of their leisure substantial purchasing power and refined time to brewing. Such beers are not readily tastes. available to the public at large, since they are sold only in very specialized estab- 72. But I would not go so far as to say lishments. unreservedly that the tastes of consumers of that type would normally be such as to treat 81. The statistics provided by Belgium an excellent vintage wine as interchangeable indicate that the highest-priced beers with a high quality beer produced by represent less than 15% of total Belgian artisans. production, there being included in that group a number of special beers produced in small quantities whose ingredients include 73. Preferences in that area are generally so various types of fruit. Thus, 84% of Belgian exclusive that any 'mixing' might be production is made up of lager-type beers regarded as sacrilegious. and table beers.

74. The factors which contribute to the 82. Furthermore, the Commission suggests production of a good wine are the compo- that the 'grands crus' and exceptional sition of the soil, exposure to the sun, the vintages, which represent only a small rainfall regime, the choice of varieties and fraction of purchases, should be disre- the method of production. garded.

75. In each wine, the aroma, the colour, the 83. Belgium supports this view, stating taste and the body distinguish one year that — according to statistics provided by a from another. company which is regarded as represen- tative — sales of wines priced in excess of BFR 1 000 represent no more than 2.8% of 76. In each bottle, the temperature, light, the total value of sales (27% being position and cork are of importance. accounted for by wines costing more than BFR 200). 77. In the case of beers, the conditions for achieving excellence and the combination of 84. Moreover, as is suggested by the such conditions are very different. Belgian Government, that approach seems

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to be in line with the Court's reasoning in beers consumed in large quantities or, a its judgment of 12 July 1983 in Commission fortiori, with expensive beers. That applies v United Kingdom, where wines 'of which also to the wine costing BFR 61 which several varieties are sold in significant quan- should not, contrary to the Commission's tities on the United Kingdom market' were view, be regarded as the most usual wine: in taken as the basis of comparison. fact, in Belgium's view, it is one of the cheapest wines which it is possible to find in the shops, and it accounts for as low a proportion of consumption as the wines 85. In those circumstances, it does not seem priced at over BFR 1 000. logical to exclude one of those categories and retain the other — in both cases the products concerned are of an exceptional type. In the last analysis they are products 89. It seems to me to be reasonable to which are differentiated by their quality and conclude that the most intense competitive utility and it would not make sense to relationship exists between the most compare them with ordinary products commonly consumed wines and beers, consumed on a large scale or, a fortiori, which are representative of the widest sector with products of mediocre quality. of the market.

86. As far as the other wines and beers are 90. It is in that sector that most of the 'light concerned, Belgium suggests that the wines made from fresh grapes' for everyday comparison should be made essentially consumption are doubtless to be found. between Ordinary beers' and 'ordinary wines' which, in its opinion, are those whose price is between BFR 80 and 91. It does not however seem to me, as BFR 200 per litre, and which, on the basis Belgium itself concedes, that no competitive of the sample taken, account for 57.17% of relationship exists in the lower part of the the total value of sales. range. It will however be more tenuous and less well defined, particularly in view of the diversity of possible uses (as a beverage or 87. As regards wines priced at less than for culinary purposes) and the differences of BFR 80 per litre, according to the infor- presentation and packaging (for example the mation provided by the Belgian Govern- use of 5-litre plastic containers). ment, they account for 15.59% of sales, 2.28% being wines priced at less than BFR 60 and the remaining 13.31% being 92. J — Having established the competitive wines priced at between BFR 60 and 80. relationship between wine and beer, I shall now consider whether the second condition laid down in the second paragraph of 88. The wines priced at less than BFR 80 Article 95 is fulfilled. The question is (which, it appears, include wines sold in whether or not the difference in taxation is 5-litre plastic containers and wines used likely to have a protective effect favouring only for cooking) should, in the opinion of domestically produced beer. the Belgian Government, be compared with table beer (BFR 17 per litre and above) or with lager-type beers sold under 93. For that purpose, it is necessary to distributors' trade-marks (for example analyse the other relevant information Carapils, at BFR 21.5 per litre) and not with furnished during the proceedings.

OPINION OF MR DA CRUZ VILAÇA —CASE 356/85

94. The fact that the tax in this instance is products are most clearly in competition, an ad valorem tax makes the analysis simpler that is to say wines and beers other than than was the case in Commission v United those classified as 'luxury* products), it is Kingdom. The difference in tax derives necessary to consider those price differences simply, in this case, from the application of to determine what influence the difference different rates to the price of each of the in tax is likely to exert on the market. products. 102. In that respect, the Belgian 95. That fact does not however — contrary Government states that, on average, the to the Commission's view — make it price of a litre of ordinary wine, including unnecessary to consider the protective effect tax, is around BFR 125 (which corresponds of that system of taxation. to BFR 87.5 for a 70-cl bottle) whilst the corresponding price for a litre of beer is BFR 29.75 (BFR 178.5 for a crate of 96. The starting point for such an exam- 24 25-cl bottles). After deduction of VAT, ination is of course the difference in rates. those .amounts are BFR 100 and BFR 25 respectively. 97. That difference is at present six percentage points, since wine is subject to a 103. Thus, if a commonly consumed wine tax at the rate of 25%, as opposed to only and a commonly consumed beer of average 19% for beer. price and quality are adopted as a reference point, the price of wine exclusive of VAT will be four times that of beer (4.2 times if 98. The Belgian Government also makes it VAT is included). clear that the difference in rates affects only retail sales of wine and beer, since in the 104. These are values which are not catering sector (hotels, restaurants and bars) contested by the Commission. a uniform rate of 17% is applied. 105. If the tax structure for the two 99. However, in order to analyse the beverages were standardized, the prices protective effect it does not seem to me to would — as the Belgian Government be correct to adopt the macroeconomic states — become, respectively: approach — adopted by Belgium — of reducing the difference in rates to four 106. With a rate of 19%: percentage points. The fact that the difference in rates relates only to BFR 119 per litre of wine; consumption in the home does not mean that, in this context, the difference is not six BFR 29.75 per litre of beer; percentage points. 107. With a rate of 2 5 % : 100. It should, however, be acknowledged that that fact limits the scope of any BFR 125 per litre of wine; protective effect; it is the same as saying that the investigation of that effect does not BFR 31.25 per litre of beer. extend to the whole wine and beer market, but covers only part of it. 108. In other words, standardization of the rate at 2 5 % would reduce the difference in 101. Since the respective prices of wine and prices by only BFR 1.5 (from BFR 95.25 to beer are different (even where the two BFR 93.75); standardization at 19% would

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reduce it by BFR 6 (from BFR 95.25 to unit prices would be substantially different if BFR 89.25). that factor were taken into account.

113. And that, together with the difference 109. The difference is not very great in of six percentage points in the applicable either case. However, it is less where a rate rates, does not seem to make any decisive of 25% is applied, and the Belgian contribution towards showing that the tax Government was careful to point out that, system at issue is likely to bring about a for budgetary reasons, it is more probable protective effect. In any event, the pointers that any equalization would involve an which can be derived from a price upward rather than a downward relationship of that kind for the purpose of adjustment. forming an opinion are very different from those which would result from a comparison of competing products with equivalent 110. If the comparison were made on the prices. However, if other factors were basis not of average-priced products but of conclusive in that respect, one might the cheapest products (in respect of which it possibly be persuaded to acknowledge that may presumed, for reasons specific to them, the system is more protectionist in character that the competitive relationship is less well than is apparent from the difference of rates defined), we should find that the price and the difference of prices. relationship between wine and beer does not change substantially, being around 3: 1 or 4 : 1 , account being taken of the existence of 114. However, that is not the case. On the beers priced at BFR 17 per litre (table beer) one hand, it appears that the pattern of and BFR 21.5 per litre (Carapils) and of consumption of the two products shows an wines priced between BFR 60 and BFR 80 increase in the average consumption of wine per litre. from 14.9 litres per inhabitant in 1976 to 16.7 litres in 1977 (the year in which the 25% rate was introduced) and 20.2 in 1982 111. In other words, the difference in the and 1983; at the same time, beer prices of these two beverages — which, of consumption fell from 137.6 litres per course, reflects their different characteristics inhabitant in 1976 to 125 litres in 1978 and and production costs — whilst itself consti- 1981 and 128 litres in 1983. tuting a factor liable to attenuate the competitive relationship between them is 115. The conclusions which can be drawn nevertheless something which must be taken from those statistics must be considered very into account in assessing to what extent the carefully, in so far as the difference of tax difference in rates distorts consumer pref- rates is far from being the only factor likely erences. to influence the pattern of consumption.

112. For that purpose, it does not seem to 116. What can be said is that the increase in me to be necessary to embark upon a the rate applied to wine from 14 to 25% did discussion — which would inevitably be not have the effect, in the medium term, of conjectural and devoid of accurate infor- curbing the increase in consumption of wine mation— regarding the different quantities per inhabitant. Wine consumption may have of wine and beer consumed. Moreover, as remained practically at the same level — Belgium endeavours to show in its there was in fact a slight drop — between rejoinder, there is no evidence that the 1977 and 1978, but the increase in the rate conclusion drawn from the difference of at that time was 11 percentage points (from

OPINION OF MR DA CRUZ VILAÇA —CASE 356/85

14 to 25%, representing an increase of 121. The conclusion which may be drawn 78.6% over the previous rate). from this is that today (by contrast with what could certainly have been said 10 years ago) it does not seem that the Belgian VAT system is such as to distort competition 117. During the same period (from 1977 to between wine and beer, to the advantage of 1978), average beer consumption per the latter. inhabitant fell.

122. The effect on competition of an 118. However, it must be stated that increase in the price of one of two products, precisely in 1978 the rate of VAT on beer resulting from a rise in the rate of taxation, was increased from 14 to 16%. There were without any accompanying equivalent further increases in '1981 (to 17%) and in increase in the rate applied to the other 1983 (to 19%); and each time that the rate product depends, moreover, on the cross- of tax on beer increased a reduction was elasticity of demand for the two products noted in consumption per inhabitant, with a which, in turn, (if it is assumed that recovery in the following years (particularly consumers' incomes and other prices remain in 1979 and 1980, when it rose to 126 and constant) depends in particular upon the 131 litres and in 1982 when it rose to 133 greater or lesser extent to which the litres). products are substitutable for each other.

123. In the absence of any information 119. This fact appears to confirm a relating directly to the extent of such elas- phenomenon known to economists: ticity, all that can be said is that the statistics consumption is affected by a variation in submitted by Belgium are not such as to relative prices resulting from changes in the show conclusively that there is any great tax burden not so much because the rate of cross-elasticity of demand as between wine tax is high as because the rate is raised at and beer in Belgium. a particular time. After the increase, consumers, depending on their consumption habits and provided that the increase is not 124. It is a fact that the rates applicable to very severe or the new rate is not the two products have changed divergently, prohibitive, tend to become accustomed to giving rise to the difference of treatment as the new price and, as time goes on, recover between them which is at issue in this case. from the impact of the change of rate. It might be said that the maintenance of that difference is likely to interfere with the normal development of consumer habits in Belgium and, in an open market, that 120. It is not therefore rash to take the view situation might be to the advantage of the that a major distortion of competition imported product. would have occurred in 1977 and 1978 as a result of the steep increase in the rate applicable to wine — which, moreover, was 125. It should, however, be borne in mind from then on adjusted separately from the that the difference of rates — which reached rate applicable to beer — if it had not been 11 percentage points — became progress- tempered by the effects which, in all prob- ively smaller, falling first to 9, then to 8 and ability, followed from the increase of the subsequently to 6 points, as a result of the rate applicable to beer, which took place increase in the rate applicable to beer whilst almost at the same time. the rate applicable to wine remained

COMMISSION v BELGIUM

constant. In those circumstances, if there can scarcely constitute in the eyes of was any dissuasive effect on consumption, it the consumer a genuine alternative to would operate to a greater extent against the typical domestically produced beer than against wine. beverage'; 126. It does not therefore seem to me that it can be said that in this case the difference in taxation is likely to cause wine to become a 131. A comparison with the volume of wine luxury product, particularly since it is not sales in other markets, particularly in subject to the additional surcharge of 8%, the Benelux countries, showed — at which results in a VAT rate of 3 3 % for least according to the Commission — certain products which are regarded as that the marketing of wine had been luxury products. adversely affected by the contested tax system in the United Kingdom; 127. Finally, it should be borne in mind that — for the reasons I have mentioned and because the changes of rates were in general made by Belgium in the context of 132. By contrast with the position before wider-ranging reforms of the VAT system the United Kingdom's accession to the which, according to the Belgian Govern- EEC (wine had for a long time ment, took account of certain budgetary enjoyed a certain tax advantage, and and social preoccupations — there is no the two products were more or less on evidence of any protectionist intent, whereas an equal footing at the time of the position would have been different if the accession), the tax applicable to wine changes had been introduced for wine and was gradually increased by a beer alone. percentage greater than that applied to beer; thus, between 1 January 1973 128. K — The circumstances were different and the time when the action was in the United Kingdom case (Case 170/78) brought, the tax on wine increased by and it is not therefore surprising that the 102%, as against only 59% in the case Court's judgment in that case differs from of beer; that which I propose here. Let us consider the principal differences: 129. By comparison with beer, wine was subject to a fiscal surcharge which, 133. The tax on wine in the United depending on the basis of comparison Kingdom was brought in and adopted, was either 58% or 77%, or increased in order to offset the elimi- even 286% according to the Italian nation of the customs duties applicable Government (by reference to the at the time of accession, which, criterion of the incidence of tax on the moreover, were increased before 1 price of the products net of tax), or January 1976, the date on which the 100% (according to the criterion of new specific tax was introduced. the alcoholic content) or 400% (by reference to the volume of the two beverages); 134. None of those circumstances is present 130. The additional tax burden on wine in to a comparable degree in this case or is Great Britain was regarded by the even relied upon as proof of a protective Court as liable to 'stamp wine with the effect (that being the third aspect of the hallmark of a luxury product which, in United Kingdom case to which I have just view of the tax burden which it bears, referred).

OPINION OF MR DA CRUZ VILAÇA —CASE 356/85

135. It is not incumbent upon the any way preclude a finding that it would be Commission to furnish 'statistical proof of a appropriate to harmonize the rates of tax on protective effect', that is to say proof that wine and beer in the various Member States, the tax system in question actually under Article 99 of the Treaty, as is discriminates against an imported product to proposed by the Commission. the advantage of its domestically produced competitor. 138. But that is a decision which can be taken only by the Member States within the competent institution and which, as things 136. All that is necessary, as we have seen, stand at the moment, does not take away is that it should be shown that such a tax the freedom of those States under the system is, by its nature, capable of protecting Treaty regarding tax matters. domestic products; and, in my opinion, that has not been proved in relation to the tax 139. M— Having regard to the foregoing system in force in Belgium under which considerations, I am of the opinion that it different rates of VAT are applied to wine has not been proved that, by applying to and beer. wine, an imported product, a higher rate than that applied to beer, essentially a domestic product, the Belgian VAT legis- 137. L— I should point out that the lation is capable of affording indirect conclusion which I reach here does not in protection to beer.

140. Accordingly, it has not been shown that the Kingdom of Belgium has thereby infringed the second paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty and I therefore propose that the Court should dismiss the application and order the Commission to pay the costs.

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