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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·2.12.1987

C-415/85

ECLI:EU:C:1987:518

Súd
Súdny dvor Európskej únie
IČS
61985CC0415

COMMISSION v IRELAND

OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL DARMON delivered on 2 December 1987 *

Mr President, legislation concerning turnover taxes 5were Members of the Court, adopted. Although 'the rates and exemptions [were] not harmonized at the same time' 6the result was the establishment of a 'general tax on consumption'. 7 The Sixth Directive, 8 adopted 10 years later, had as its aim an essential objective, the 1. This action against Ireland for failure to creation of 'own resources' for the fulfil its obligations concerns the criteria for Communities, which were to include 'those the application of Article 28 (2) of the Sixth accruing from value-added tax and obtained Council Directive 77/388 of 17 May 1977 by applying a common rate of tax on a basis on the harmonization of the laws of the of assessment determined in a uniform manner

1 Member States relating to turnover taxes according to Community rules'. 9 (hereinafter referred to as 'the directive'). The essence of the claim is that Ireland applies to certain categories of goods and services 2contained in a list laid down by the Value-Added Tax Act 1972 3 a 'zero rate' which is not justified for 'clearly defined social reasons and for the benefit of the final consumer', as required by the last 3. 'So that the Communities' own resources indent of Article 17 of the Second Council may be collected in a uniform manner in all

10 Directive of 11 April 1967 4 (hereinafter the Member States' Articles 13 to 16 of referred to as Article 17), to which Article the directive lay down a list of exemptions 28 (2) of the Sixth Directive refers. common to all the Member States. However, on a transitional basis Article 28 of the directive allows them to retain, under certain conditions, inter alia the reduced rates and exemptions which were in force on 31 December 1975 and satisfy the

2. That provision was adopted as part of a criteria set out in Article 17. That possibility process initiated in April 1967, when the was left open on the ground that it was first two directives on the harmonization of 'vital to provide for a transitional period to allow national laws in specified fields to be 1 * Translated from the French. gradually adapted'. 1 1 — 'Common system of value-added tax: uniform basis of assessment', OJ L 145, 13.6.1977, p. 1. 5 — First Council Directive of 11 April 1967 on the harmon- 2 — The action concerns certain agricultural inputs (feeding- ization of legislation of Member States concerning turnover stuffs for animals other than domestic pets, certain taxes (67/227), Official Journal, English Special Edition fertilizers supplied in units of not less than 10 kg, 1967, p. 14; Second Directive, cited above. medicines for the oral consumption of animals other than domestic pets, and seeds and other products used for 6 — Eighth recital in the preamble to the First Directive. sowing in order to produce food) and supplies of electricity 7 — Article 2 (1) of the First Directive. other than to the final consumer. 8 — The third, fourth and fifth directives merely delayed the 3 — As amended most recently by the Finance Act 1985. introduction of the common VAT system. 4 — Directive 67/228 on the harmonization of legislation of 9 — Second recital in the preamble to the Sixth Directive (my Member States concerning turnover taxes — 'Structure and emphasis). procedures for application of the common system of 10 — Eleventh recital in the preamble to the Sixth Directive. value-added tax' (hereinafter referred to as VAT).

Official Journal, English Special Edition 1967, p. 16; hereinafter 11 —Nineteenth (last) recital in the preamble to the Sixth referred to as 'the Second Directive'. Directive; my emphasis.

OPINION OF MR DARMON — CASE 415/85

4. Although it was adopted on the basis of fiscal frontiers ... ' its aim is to 'limit the Article 28 (2), the system of zero-rating at use of zero rates to those transactions which issue differs from the exemption mechanism meet the criteria laid down in Article 28 (2) provided for in that article. That is to say, of the Sixth Directive and this as part of its Article 28 provides for exemption 'with overall fiscal policy of working towards the refund of the tax paid at the preceding total phasing out of all zero rates or stage' which takes effect at the retail stage. exemptions with refunds'. It considers that At the preceding stage every taxable person 'zero rates constitute one of the stumbling as defined in Article 4 of the directive must blocks on the path towards a uniform rate apply the tax. Only a retailer who sells an of VAT'. exempted product to a 'final consumer' does not pass on the VAT which he has paid but obtains a refund from the tax authorities. The zero-rating system takes a different approach. A list of goods and services designated by the national legislature is subject to purely notional taxation, under which no VAT is actually charged either on 6. According to the Commission, in deter­ delivery or at earlier stages in the marketing mining how far up the commercial chain chain. Naturally, there is nothing to refund zero-rating may be applied if it is to benefit to the retailer. According to the the final consumer, only stages corre­ Commission, some 33 % of the private sponding to 'bona fide inputs' in the consumption of households is zero-rated in production or distribution of a final product Ireland. Ireland disputes that percentage which may be exempted in accordance with and states that the real figure is 25%. The the criteria laid down in Article 28 (2) may figure in the United Kingdom is 35%. The be taken into account. It submits that the zero-rating technique exists in three other agricultural inputs at issue are not intended States, but they operate it only on a very for the final consumer and can be regarded small scale, largely in favour of the press. only as indirect agricultural inputs. It further argues that only the person who acquires the goods or services without having any right of deduction may be regarded as the final consumer.

5. Let me state right away that the system itself is not challenged by the Commission, which considers it to be equivalent to the 7. In its pleadings Ireland did not dispute system of exemption and refund. However, the Commission's interpretation of the term the Commission disputes the application of 'final consumer', although in its letter of 23 zero-rating to the goods and services July 1982, in the course of the adminis­ 12 referred to above on the ground that it trative proceedings, it stated that that inter­ does not comply with the criteria laid down pretation was too narrow and not 'neces­ in Article 17. While it admits that zero- sarily correct'. It argues first of all that rating has no effect on own resources, it zero-rating is justified where, having regard states that 'in the context of the completion to the commercial circumstances, there is a of the internal market, of the abolition of benefit, even an indirect one, for the final consumer. In any event, in so far as the 12 — Sec note 2, above. agricultural inputs at issue are concerned,

COMMISSION v IRELAND

there is a direct benefit for producers who Council, acting unanimously, to decide to consume the produce of their farm. abolish the exemptions permitted by that Secondly, Ireland argues that the determi­ article. It observes that the Commission has nation of appropriate measures in response stated that the Irish method of zero-rating to clearly defined social reasons is a matter 'impedes progress towards further harmon­ for its discretion. It observes that the ization in the VAT sphere'. It regards that exercise by the Court of supervisory power argument as a political one. It also points seems 'very difficult' in that respect. The out that when it instituted these proceedings Commission does not deny that Ireland has the Commission had not submitted to the such a discretion. It argues, however, that it Council a proposal for progressive abolition. is for the Court to define the phrase 'clearly It may be noted in that regard that such a defined social reasons' for Community proposal was submitted while these 13 purposes and to determine whether national proceedings were in progress. measures are compatible with that concept.

10. Let me say right away that these objections concerning the Commission's possible motives for bringing the action do 8. However, in its defence Ireland relies not seem relevant to the role of the Court. mainly on Article 27 (5) of the Sixth It scarcely needs pointing out that the Directive (hereinafter referred to as Article decision whether or not to bring an action 27). That provision allows Member States to against a Member State for failure to fulfil retain special derogating measures of the its obligations is in any event in the entire kind referred to in Article 27 (1), provided discretion of the Commission, as the that they were notified to the Commission custodian of the Treaties, and that it is for before 1 January 1978, in order 'to simplify the Commission 'to judge at what time it 14 the procedure for charging the tax or to shall bring an action before the Court'. prevent certain types of tax evasion or Moreover, the role of the Court in avoidance'. Ireland argues that that proceedings of this kind is to determine provision is sufficient to justify zero rates on whether or not a Member State has failed to agricultural inputs and also, in an alternative fulfil its obligations towards the Community submission, on supplies of electricity. The as defined by the law in force. It should be Commission considers in essence that from recalled in that regard that in Parliament v the point of view of their scope ratione Council, where the Council contended that materiae, the cumulative application of the Parliament was using the action for Articles 27 and 28 (2) is not possible. In failure to act as a means of furthering particular, Article 27 cannot be used in political objectives, the Court held that: order to escape the rules laid down in Article 28 (2).

'It is not possible to restrict the exercise of that right [to bring an action for failure to act] by one them [the Community institutions] without adversely affecting its . 15 9. Finally, in its rejoinder Ireland submitted status as an institution under the Treaty' generally that the Commission was improperly seeking to use an action against 13 — OJ C 250, 18.9.1987, p. 2. it for alleged failure to fulfil its obligations 14 — Judgment of 10 December 1968 in Case 7/68 Commission v Italy [1968] ECR 423. as a means of evading the provisions of 15 — Judgment of 22 May 1985 in Case 13/83 [1985] ECR Article 28 according to which it is for the 1513, at p. 1556.

OPINION OF MR DARMON —CASE 415/85

Rejecting the objection of inadmissibility with that provision. The next step must raised in that respect by the Council, the therefore be to examine that issue. Court followed the Opinion of the Advocate General, who had stated:

I — Measures taken for clearly defined social reasons and for the benefit of the final consumer 'It is not for this Court to decide whether the action has political objectives. An action is being prosecuted before the Court according to the rules of procedure on a 11. Let me emphasize right away that question of law, namely the scope of the 'clearly defined social reasons' and 'benefit duties of a Community institution. The of the final consumer' are not alternative action will be decided according to the conditions. One of them concerns the relevant provisions, namely those of the objective of the measures in question, the Treaty establishing the European Economic other its beneficiaries. They are therefore Community of 25 March 1957. It is pros­ cumulative. Moreover, a provision creating ecuted in the interests of the Community an exception to the rules on the uniform and its legal system for the purpose of basis of assessment for VAT cannot be obtaining a binding ruling on the scope of construed liberally. 16 the rights and obligations of the parties'.

A — 'Clearly defined social reasons'

Such statements of principle, emphasizing the objective nature of actions brought 12. The parties are agreed that the determi­ before the Court, make possible a correct nation of their own social policy is a matter assessment of the weight of the arguments for the discretion of the Member States. submitted in that respect by Ireland. The Commission considers, however, that it Although the Commission did refer in is for the Court to lay down a definition for rather general terms to the interests which it Community purposes of the phrase 'clearly considered to be at issue in this case, the defined social reasons' and, where fact remains that its action is directed unam­ necessary, to hold that the measures biguously at a failure to comply with Article adopted are not sufficiently well defined or 28 of the Sixth Directive in conjunction are unjustified or disproportionate in with Article 17 of the Second Directive. It is relation to the reasons relied on. obviously on the basis of those provisions alone, subject to the possible application of Article 27, that the Court can determine whether or not Ireland has failed to fulfil its 13. The application of zero-rating may obligations, since although the Sixth result in a reduction of the tax burden on Directive states expressly that it is for the the least well-off segments of society. It is Council to abolish the exemptions estab­ equally conceivable, however, that the lished under Article 28, their retention until Member States should also use fiscal such abolition depends on their conformity instruments in order better to satisfy the needs of the great majority of the popu­ lation. With regard to the concept at issue, 16 — Opinion of Mr Advocate General Lenz delivered on 7 February 1985 in Case 13/83 [1985] ECR 1515, at p. 1518. moreover, I do not think that it is the role

COMMISSION v IRELAND

of the Court to review the expediency of or services for his personal use, as opposed choices made by the Member States. With to an economic activity, which Article 4 of reference to the 'public moralit' exception the directive uses as the criterion for deter­ to the rules on the free movement of goods, mining who is a taxable person. The the Court has held that: distinction between a taxable person and a final consumer lies in the fact that a taxable person carries out transactions for 'In principle, it is for each Member State to consideration, while a final consumer is one determine in accordance with its own scale who acquires goods or services for his own of values and in the form selected by it the use. That distinction has fundamental requirements of public morality in its consequences for tax purposes: in principle territory'. 17 a taxable person deducts VAT, whereas a final consumer bears that tax 'unless there is a further transaction in which a price is 18 paid'. That consequence cannot be I propose that the Court take the same ignored in the case of a zero rate. In such a approach in this case. That is to say, if it is case the final consumer is the person who accepted that the Member States can restrict would have to bear a positive tax and would that fundamental freedom in the manner not be able to deduct it. That definition is described, it must be possible to accord not, I think, based on a narrow approach; it them, without thereby endangering to any corresponds strictly to a fiscal interpre­ greater extent the consistency of the tation, the only one which, in the context of Community legal system, a similar latitude provisions on VAT, is appropriate to the with regard to provisional exceptions to categories relevant to such taxation. It is, rules establishing a uniform basis of moreover, that which appears in Article 3 of assessment for VAT. 19 the proposal for a 16th VAT directive:

14. However, compliance with the directive in question requires that the Court should be able to intervene in the event that the exercise by the Member States of their 'For the purposes of this directive: powers in the matter, where it has no relation to the field at issue, might frustrate the Community provision itself. I therefore suggest that the Court should declare measures contrary to Community law only (a) "final consumer" means: where their objective is clearly unrelated to the satisfaction of the fundamental needs, be they individual or collective, of the popu­ lation of the Member State.

(1) any person who, with regard to the B — The final consumer importation of goods referred to in Article 2, is not deemed to be a taxable person within the meaning of Article 4 of Council Directive 77 / 388 / EEC ; 15. In my view the final consumer must be defined as the person who acquires goods 18 — Judgment of 1 April 1982 in Case 89/81 Staatssecretaris van Financien v Hong Kong Trade Development Council [1982] ECR 1277, at paragraph 9. 17 — Judgment of 14 December 1979 in Case 34/79 Regina v Henn and Darby [1979] ECR 3795. 19 — OJ C 226; 28.8.1984, p. 2.

OPINION OF MR DARMON —CASE 415/85

(2) a taxable person who was not entitled to which are revealed by an economic analysis, deduct value-added tax when should be regarded with prudence in so far purchasing goods.' as they vary according to the time-limits for deductions, the size and structure of the producers or dealers in question, credit arrangements between them, etc. The C — 'For the benefit' of the final consumer: complexity of such effects requires, in my the concept of a benefit opinion, a degree of caution in that respect in considering the notion of a 'benefit' for the final consumer for the purposes of Article 17. However, in so far as the very existence of a reduction in production costs 16. It remains for me to consider the is likely to result in a benefit for the final concept of a 'benefit' as used in Article 17, consumer, albeit a variable one, I propose where it speaks of exemptions 'for the that the Court should not reject, as a matter benefit of the final consumer'. In the case of of principle, the zero-rating of inputs which a 'normal' exemption, such a benefit results are directly and exclusively used in a from the non-application of VAT at the product which itself is properly zero-rated. retail stage. In essence, the benefit is entirely identical under the zero-rating system: the consumer pays no VAT. The application of zero-rating at earlier stages of distribution results in no additional fiscal benefit for the 18. Now that the conditions laid down in consumer since he does not pay the tax in the provision at issue have been defined, we any event. However, as the Commission may determine whether or not the contested says, zero-rating may be accepted higher in measures comply with them. the commercial chain in so far as it is applied to the product itself which is zero-rated on purchase by the final consumer. II — The contested zero rates

17. Can we go further and accept Ireland's submission that an indirect benefit results A — Agricultural inputs from the application of zero-rating to inputs used to produce goods which are themselves zero-rated? It should be emphasized that from the fiscal point of view such a benefit 19. At issue, it should be remembered, are does not exist once a zero rate is applied on feedingstuffs for animals other than purchase by the final consumer. That is to domestic pets, medicines for oral say, the extension of zero-rating higher up consumption by the same animals, most the commercial chain has no effect on the fertilizers supplied in units of not less than fiscal burden on the consumer, who in any 10 kg, and seeds and other products event benefits from a zero rate. The only intended to be sown in order to produce benefit for him, therefore, lies in a possible food. reduction in the cost of the product resulting from a reduction in cash outlays and overheads in the absence of positive rates of tax on the inputs concerned. I 20. There is no dispute with regard to the think, however, that these consequences, fact that food is zero-rated. Ireland states

COMMISSION v IRELAND

that farm households account for as much electricity, which account for 41 % of elec­ as a quarter of the total population of the tricity consumption in Ireland, is inseparable State, and that the zero-rated goods in from the rating of non-domestic supplies. question are direct inputs in the production The domestic use of electricity is significant of food which is in part consumed by the enough to justify a zero-rating of all such producers themselves. Such home supplies. It goes on to argue that the consumption, estimated by Ireland at up to application of different rates to the same 9 % of total output, seems all the more product would be impractical from a likely inasmuch as there are many small taxation viewpoint, and that there is little farms. It seems undeniable that positive point in taxing consumers who are taxation would have the effect of increasing registered for VAT whether electricity is costs in respect of that portion of final subject to a positive rate or a zero rate. The consumption. Ireland further submits that if latter assertion no doubt relates to Ireland's a positive rate of VAT were imposed on the statement that even if a positive rate of tax inputs in question producers might increase were applied to the supplies at issue, 80 % of their prices in order in particular to make electricity consumption would be either up for the cash-flow loss incurred as a result zero-rated or entitled to a tax credit. of having to wait to obtain flat-rate compensation. Such a consequence cannot be excluded out of hand. Furthermore, since these inputs are in my view used directly and exclusively for food, I suggest that the Court accept that zero-rating results in an indirect benefit for the final consumer, having regard to the 'sensitive' nature of 23. That argument is unconvincing. The retail food prices. I therefore propose that industrial and commercial sectors cannot be the Court dismiss the Commission's claim in regarded as 'final consumers'. Because of this respect. the zero-rating of supplies for industrial use the final consumer will not, of course, bear the VAT on the electricity used in the manufacture of finished products taxed at the normal rate. However, quite apart from the fact that it is difficult to see what social B — Electricity reasons might account for the zero-rating in question, I think the benefit is too indirect and remote. Moreover, while the Commission may be correct to say that zero-rating remains permissible where it only incidentally benefits a category of goods or users which are not, in principle, 21. At issue is the application of a zero rate entitled to such a measure, that proposition to electricity supplied to persons other than cannot be accepted in respect of supplies of the final consumer. electricity to the entire industrial sector of a Member State. It does not appear impossible, moreover, to distinguish among categories of users of a product and apply different rates of VAT to them depending on their status. I do not think, therefore, 22. Ireland argues in essence that the rating that the criteria for the application of for VAT purposes of domestic supplies of Article 28 (2) are fulfilled in this respect.

OPINION OF MR DARMON —CASE 415/85

However, since Ireland has argued, in an permanent exemption should, as a matter of alternative submission, that the zero-rating principle, permit a provisional exemption. of all supplies of electricity may be justified That would appear to preclude the zero- under Article 27, it is necessary to consider rating of supplies of electricity to industry, that provision. where the result is that no VAT on such supplies is reflected in the price paid on the III — Article 27 of the Sixth Directive purchase by the final consumer of finished products. 24. It must be observed first of all that Article 27, which comes under the heading 25. Furthermore, the provisions of Article 'simplification procedures', is a permanent 28 with regard to provisional exemptions provision which does not appear to provide are exhaustive. Consequently, it would be for an exemption. That is to say, a common contrary to Article 28 to establish a and exhaustive list of permanent exemptions provisional exemption not provided for in is laid down in Articles 13 to 16, and the that article, relying improperly on Article second sentence of Article 27 (1) expressly 27. I therefore think that supplies of elec­ provides that simplification measures must tricity to the industrial sector cannot be not, 'except to a negligible extent, ... affect zero-rated on the basis of Article 27. Let me the amount of tax due at the final add that if the Court considers that the 20 consumption stage'. Although that agricultural inputs at issue do not satisfy the condition does not seem to apply in respect criteria of Article 28 (2), it should hold that of measures intended to prevent tax evasion, they cannot, having regard to the exhaustive it may be observed that Ireland also nature of that provision, be justified under emphasized the simplifying role of the Article 27 either, it being borne in mind that offending measures. Consequently, it cannot the application of a zero rate has the effect be accepted that a permanent measure of eliminating all taxation of products which does not permit the adoption of a consumed by their producers.

26 . I therefore propose that the Court hold that by applying a zero rate to supplies of electricity to users other than final consumers , Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the EEC Treaty and under Article 28 (2) of the Sixth Council Directive of 17 May 1977 ( 77 / 388 ), and that it dismiss the remainder of the action . In view of the latter proposal I suggest that the parties be ordered to bear their own costs .

20 — My emphasis.

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