C-21/86
ECLI:EU:C:1987:31
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SAMARA v COMMISSION
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL SIR GORDON SLYNN delivered on 22 January 1987
My Lords, complaint under Article 90 (2) of the Staff Regulations. No decision having been given in response to it, it has been treated as implicitly rejected. She now claims the like Mrs Samara, who had been an official in interest which she says, since the sums were Grade C 5, Step 3, was appointed as an payable in the Grand Duchy of established official of the Commission in Luxembourg, should be at the rate of 9 % Grade C 3, Step 1, with effect from 1 pursuant to a Grand Ducal Regulation of 22 January 1983, following an open compe November 1984. tition in which she came first. Her request for reclassification and her complaint as to the Commission's refusal on 16 February 1983 to reclassify her were rejected by decision of 5 August 1983. Pursuant to her application, on the basis that she should have been appointed to a higher step in the grade, the Court annulled both those The Commission's first reply is that this decisions by its judgment of 15 January claim is inadmissible. If she wanted interest 1985 in Case 266/83. The Commission was she should have asked for it in the first told that it 'must reconsider the applicant's proceedings when she challenged the 1983 position and apply the criteria laid down in decision as to classification. She did not do Article 32 of the Staff Regulations'. so; the Court did not order that interest be paid on any outstanding salary found to be due; she is now out of time and cannot raise in these proceedings a matter which she could have canvassed in the first application.
On 23 April 1985 the Commission I do not accept that these proceedings are appointed Mrs Samara in Grade C 3, Step inadmissible. The object of the first 3, with retrospective effect from 1 January application was to annul the classification. It 1983. On 13 June 1985 it paid her the was not for the Court in those proceedings difference between a C 3, Step 1, salary to fix her proper classification. That was a and a C 3, Step 3, salary for the period matter for the Commission in giving effect from 1 January 1983 to 31 May 1985. On to the Court's judgment under Article 176 21 June 1985 she asked for interest on the of the EEC Treaty, albeit the result might amount of that difference from the date be inevitable. Even if she could have asked upon which each monthly payment became for interest in the first application, she was due. That request was treated as a in my view entitled to seek first the
OPINION OF SIR GORDON SLYNN —CASE 21/86
annulment and then to come a second time claims of interest for delay in payment of a to argue that the Commission has not fully debt on the one hand, and claims for delay given effect to the Court's decision. If the in the performance of another obligation, Commission had retroactively regraded her which are more in the nature of a claim for but not paid her the salary difference, she damages, on the other. Where there is a could have brought proceedings for its claim for delayed payment of a debt, the recovery. Her claim for interest, if well Court has sometimes required a serious founded, is in pari materia. error to have been made which went beyond a mere mistake in calculation (Case 3/66 Alfieri v Parliament [1966] ECR 437; Case 106/76 Deboeck v Commission [1977] ECR 1623 and Case 14/77 Van der Branden v Commission [1977] ECR 1683). In other Whether she is entitled to interest on those cases interest has been awarded for a monies in respect of back salary until the wrongful failure to pay without any date they were paid is a more difficult particularly serious error being required to question, there being nothing in the Staff be established. Moreover, interest has Regulations which expressly deals with it. sometimes been awarded only from the date of a complaint under the Staff Regulations, or from the institution of proceedings before the Court or from the date the payments fell due if later than such a complaint or application (e.g. Case 58/75 She puts her case simply. She should all Sergy vCommission [1976] ECR 1139; Case along have been classified in Grade 3, Step 9/81 Williams v Court of Auditors [1982] 3, and paid the appropriate salary. She was ECR 3301). This has not, however, always not paid it on the dates it should have been been so. Thus in Case 115/76 Leonardini v paid. She was thus kept out of her money Commission [1978] ECR 735 default interest and lost the use of it; conversely the was awarded for the late payment of a Commission had the use of it by not paying disablement award, such interest to run not her until 13 June 1985. She should be from the date of the complaint in 1976, but compensated for the loss due to the delay in from the date in 1968 when the award with payment. reasonable diligence should have been assessed. Moreover, the rate of interest has varied from time to time according to circumstances.
The Commission replies that such a claim is wrong in principle and contrary to decisions of the Court.
It seems that the practice in Member States varies as to the payment of interest in respect of a debt and nothing has been said The Court has, undoubtedly, been in this case which indicates that there is a concerned many times with claims for general rule uniformly followed in Member interest. It does not seem to me that it can States. Thus, for example, in contending be said that one universal rule has been laid that interest can never run before the date down in respect of all claims for interest. of a complaint asking for it, the Thus, a distinction has been drawn between Commission has laid stress on the need for
SAMARA v COMMISSION
a 'mise en demeure', a formai demand for it. treated as falling due month by month from That, the Court is told, is a rule of Belgian 1 January 1983 as a result of the retro and Luxembourg law, but it is not as I see it spective regrading. I consider that the a rule in all Member States. Nor, as the Commission is right so to do. Thus money, Commission accepts, is the distinction which ought to have been paid had the between 'intérêts compensatoires' and appointment been made in accordance with 'intérêts moratoires', accepted in French, the Staff Regulations, was not paid at the Belgian and Luxembourg law, to be found time when it is to be treated as having been in the law of at any rate some other due. She was thus kept out of money due to Member States. her as a debt. In my opinion interest for the delayed payment should follow.
In the absence of Community legislative provisions as to interest, and of a rule If the debt did not fall due until 23 April common to Member States, the question has 1985, when she was reclassified with retro to be decided as a matter of principle within spective effect, then it may be arguable that the discretion given to the Court in staff no interest could run before that date. For cases under Article 91 of the Staff Regu my part I would not accept that argument. lations, under which, in 'disputes of a The Commission was required to consider financial character the Court of Justice shall her position and in effect to put right what have unlimited jurisdiction'. had been wrongly done. To put her in the position she should have been in (and to comply fully with the Court's judgment), she should have been paid the differential plus interest for the delayed payment while she was kept out of her money.
The effect of the Court's earlier judgment is that Mrs Samara's initial classification was erroneous in law, since it was not in accordance with the criteria laid down in Article 32 of the Staff Regulations. The Commission points to the fact that the Following the annulment of that classifi Court in paragraph 14 of its earlier cation, the Commission on 23 April 1985 judgment refers to the 'ambiguous context' retrospectively regraded her with effect resulting from the Regulations. I do not from 1 January 1983 and subsequently paid accept that as a defence to the claim, even her the differential between the two grades. accepting that there was room for two views It is accepted that the Commission having as to the effect of the Regulation. In the end regraded her, the amount of the differential the money was, wrongly, not paid, and it was due as a debt. Did the debt fall due on seems to me inappropriate that entitlement 23 April 1985, even if calculated in respect to interest should depend on the degree of of the period from 1 January 1983, or is it fault in a case like the present where an to be treated as falling due month by month appointment has been made which is from 1 January 1983 once she had been erroneous in law. If it is necessary to find retrospectively regraded? The Commission, that the 'delay in payment of the allowance as I understand it, accepts that it is to be constitutes a wrongful act or omission on
OPINION OF SIR GORDON SLYNN —CASE 21/86
the part of the [Commission] which had in fell to be paid, it is not, in my view, just that fact caused the [applicant] damage' (Case an applicant should be deprived of it by the 101/74 Kurrer [1976] ECR 259), then in my payment of the principal before complaint view it is here established that the wrongful or application is made that interest due has classification by the Commission caused not been paid. damage, namely the loss of the use of the money, to be measured by the appropriate rate of interest on the amount due from time to time.
Although there may well be cases where justice is satisfied by limiting the interest to the period beginning with the date of the complaint under the Staff Regulations (e. g. where what is really claimed is in the nature It seems to me that different considerations of damages), it does not seem to me to be arise where an error is made in legislation equitable so to limit it in a case like the by the Council or the Commission, and present where a liquidated sum is demanded where, after its correction following a Court as a debt due and unpaid. Accepting as I do ruling, the error is removed and money is that Mrs Samara was entitled to seek the paid late. This is particularly so if there is an annulment of the erroneous decision as a element of discretion in the amount to be first step, it seems to me that when the awarded. That, as I read it, is the ratio position was rectified she was entitled to ask decidendi in the Court's judgments of 30 for interest for the period of delay. September 1986, of which Case 176/83 Alio and Others v Commission is an example. Moreover, in that case the Court accepted that 'an obligation to pay default interest can arise only where the amount of the principal sum owed is certain or can at least For my part, I would accordingly accept her be ascertained on the basis of established claim for payment of interest in respect of objective factors'. In the present case the each debt as it is treated retrospectively as amount due was certain once the grade was having fallen due. At the least, if, contrary fixed, and in the light of all the objective to my opinion, it is a rule of Community circumstances there really was no scope to law that there must be a 'mise en demeure', appoint Mrs Samara other than in Grade 3, such interest should run from the date of Step 3, once Article 32 of the Staff Regu her complaint in Case 266 / 83 , namely from lations was properly applied. Once it is 26 April 1983. accepted that the differential was due retro spectively, as a result of the decision of 23 April 1985, then the debt was of a certain amount within the meaning of that decision.
The applicant contends that the interest (if awardable) should be assessed on the basis of the rate in force in Luxembourg, where the money was due to be paid. That, in my Nor do I accept that there can never be a view, is wrong. Any interest should as a claim for interest if the principal sum is paid general rule be at the same rate for the before proceedings are brought. If interest whole Community as a matter of
SAMARA v COMMISSION
Community law. If interest is to be paid it Case 118/84 Royale Belge (judgment of 20 seems to me that the appropriate rate for June 1985) and Joined Cases 169/83 and the relevant period should be 8%, as 136/84 Leussink (judgment of 8 October awarded, for example, in the recent cases, 1986).
In my opinion, the order should therefore be that the Commission is liable to pay interest to Mrs Samara on the amount of the difference in remuneration between a person in Grade 3, Step 1, and in Grade 3, Step 3, from 1 January 1983 from the date upon which each payment of salary became due until payment of those amounts on 13 June 1985 at the rate of 8%. I would also award interest on the amount so found due from 13 June 1985 until payment. Mrs Samara's costs should be paid by the Commission.