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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·28.10.1987

C-102/86

ECLI:EU:C:1987:466

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61986CC0102

APPLE AND PEAR DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL v COMMISSIONERS OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE

O P I N I O N O F ADVOCATE GENERAL SIR G O R D O N SLYNN delivered on 28 October 1987

My Lords, Council) to be likely to increase efficiency and productivity in the industry, to improve and develop the service that it renders or could render to the community and to enable it to render that service more econ- omically' (Article 3 of the 1980 Order). This reference under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty is made in proceedings between the Apple and Pear Development Council ('the Council') and the Commissioners of Customs and Excise ('the Commissioners'). Its members consist, apart from independent members, of representatives of growers and persons employed in the industry and of persons with special knowledge of the marketing of apples and pears.

The Commissioners are responsible for the assessment of liability for, and the collecting of, VAT in the United Kingdom pursuant to the Finance Act 1972, as amended in particular by the Finance Act 1977. Growers in England and Wales of apples and pears for sale who occupy not less than two hectares of land planted with 50 trees or more are required by the Order to register with the Council and they can be required to furnish returns as to their production and sales. The Council was established pursuant to the Industrial Organization and Development Act 1947 by the Apple and Pear Devel- opment Council Order 1966 (SI 1966, N o 1579) and continued in being by the Apple and Pear Development Council By Article 9 of the 1980 Order 'For the Order 1980 (SI 1980, No 623). The latter, purposes of enabling them to meet adminis- as subsequently amended, defined the trative and other expenses incurred or to be Council's powers and functions at the times incurred in the exercise of their functions material to this reference. Those functions the Council may, with the approval of the include promoting the production in Minister, impose an annual charge at a rate England and Wales and the marketing of not exceeding' an amount prescribed (as standard apples and pears, the definition of amended from time to time) in respect of trade descriptions and research into many each hectare planted with trees, the growers aspects of the growing and marketing of being able to elect to pay a charge per 50 apples and pears; they are to be exercised trees rather than per hectare where the 'in such manner as appears to them (the density is less than 125 trees per hectare.

OPINION OF SIR GORDON SLYNN — CASE 102/86

Growers with less land or less trees than the Between 1973 and 1981 the Commissioners minimum prescribed pay no charge. accepted that the Council was not liable for VAT in respect of the annual charges save as to those made in respect of the Kingdom Scheme, and that since the exercise of its functions in promoting the sale of apples and pears amounted to 'business activities', The charge has been imposed annually in tax incurred on purchases for that purpose the light of current conditions. It appears might be deducted or repaid as 'input tax', that the charges imposed in 1982 produced whether or not those expenses related to the under this scheme UKL 585 000 which was Kingdom Scheme or to the general scheme. spent largely on publicity and research, In 1981, however, the Commissioners though obviously administrative costs had t o changed their minds. They ruled that acti- be met. vities under the general scheme did not constitute business activities for the purposes of VAT so that input tax relating to such activities could not be repaid to the Council.

The Council was also empowered to impose an additional charge to meet the costs of particular schemes adopted. Such a scheme The matter came before a value-added tax was launched to promote the sale of tribunal which ruled that the Council standard top quality apples. This, known as carried on a business with regard to all its 'the Kingdom Scheme', was a voluntary activities promoting the sale of apples and scheme and apart from an initial pears of the growers so that it could claim government grant was self-financing. credit for all input tax.

That result was reversed by the Divisional Under the Finance Act 1972 as amended, Court of the High Court of Justice, whose the supply of goods or services in the decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. United Kingdom by a taxable person in the The latter ruled that there was no course of his business is subject to VAT consideration for the supply of services by unless that supply is an 'exempt supply' or is the Council except as to the Kingdom made otherwise than for a consideration. Scheme and that accordingly there were no Tax paid on the receipt of goods or services taxable supplies. Input tax paid on receipt of is known as input tax: tax charged on the goods or services attributable to the general provision of goods and services is known as scheme could not, therefore, be deducted or output tax. Inputs can be set off against repaid. outputs to the extent that the goods or services received are used or to be used for the purposes of a business carried on. If they are to be used partly for such, purposes and partly for other purposes then the On appeal the House of Lords took the Commissioners must apportion such part of view that the first question was whether the the input tax as is attributable to the taxable charges under the general scheme supplies. constituted consideration for the purposes

APPLE AND PEAR DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL v COMMISSIONERS OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE

of section 6 (2) (a) of the Finance Act 1972, The Council, supported by the Commission, as amended. This provides that 'Subject to contends that the charges paid by the [certain exemptions] "supply" in this Part of growers under Article 9 of the 1980 Order this Act includes all forms of supply, but not constitute consideration for the supply of anything done otherwise than for a services by the Council to the growers consideration'. Since the 1972 Act was within the meaning of the Directive. If that amended in 1977 to give effect to the Sixth is right, output tax will be payable on such Council Directive (77/3 8 8 /EEC) 'on the supply (which in many cases can be set off harmonization of the laws of the Member by the growers as input tax against their States relating to turnover taxes — Common own output tax) but the Council will be able system of value-added tax: uniform basis of to set off against it the input tax on goods assessment' (Official Journal 1977, L 145, p. or services supplied to the Council. 1) it was considered necessary to ask:

'Does the exercise by the Apple and Pear Development Council of their functions The United Kingdom and the Federal pursuant to Article 3 of the Apple and Pear Republic of Germany contend that the Development Council Order 1980, SI No charges are not consideration for services. If 623 (as amended by the Apple and Pear that is right the Council will not charge tax Development Council (Amendment) Order on the sums levied under the general scheme 1980, SI No 2001), and the imposition on but it will not be able to recover the input growers pursuant to Article 9 (1), of an tax on services or goods supplied to it. In annual charge for the purposes of enabling the result, it will be worse off than if it were the Council to meet administrative and liable for tax on the charges levied. T h e other expenses incurred or to be incurred in charge to growers would ultimately have t o the exercise of such functions, constitute be increased to enable the Council to pay "the supply of. . . services effected for the VAT on goods and services supplied t o consideration" within the meaning of it. Article 2 of the Sixth Council Directive of 17 May 1977? '

Article 2 (1) of the Sixth Directive provides: For there to be liability to tax there must be both a taxable transaction and a taxable person. There is a link between these two concepts as the Court's judgment in Case 'The following shall be subject to 89/81 (the Hong-Kong Trade Development value-added tax: Council case [1982] ECR 1277) shows, and a consideration of one may help in the resolution of the other in any particular case. They are, however, distinct concepts. The question raised here is not whether the (1) the supply of goods or services effected Council is a taxable person but whether for consideration within the territory of there is a taxable transaction. Does the the country by a taxable person acting exercise of the functions described and the as such.' payment of the charges imposed by the

OPINION OF SIR GORDON SLYNN — CASE 102/86

Order constitute 'the supply of services Article 2 is generally descriptive of the scope effected for consideration'? of the tax. The necessary characteristic of the transaction subject to VAT is that there should be a quid pro quo. Article 8 (read with paragraph 13 of Annex A) of the Second Directive and Article 11 of the Sixth Directive have the more precise function of defining how the taxable amount is to be Consideration is not defined in the Sixth assessed and what it is to include in Directive as such, though paragraph 1 (a) of particular cases. Article 11 (A) specificies that the taxable amount shall be 'in respect of supplies of goods and services other than those referred to in (b), (c) and (d) below, everything which constitutes the consideration which has been or is to be obtained by the supplier The object of both directives was to from the purchaser, the customer or a third harmonize the laws of the Member States party for such supplies including subsidies relating to turnover taxes, to establish a directly linked to the price of such supplies'. common system and a uniform basis of assessment.. Each of the language versions must have been intended to have the same meaning and to achieve the same object. It would, therefore, be wrong to construe the phrase 'supply . . . effected for consideration' in the light of the technical meaning of the The Second Directive, which the Sixth words in English domestic law, as it would Directive replaced as and when Member equally be wrong to construe the other States brought it into operation, was in language texts by reference to their different terms. By Article 2 VAT was technical meaning in the appropriate imposed on '(a) the supply of goods and the ' domestic law. T o give such technical provision of services . . . by a taxable person meanings to the words would be capable of against payment'. By Article 8 of the Second producing, if not likely to produce, diversity Directive the basis of assessment of the tax rather than harmonization. The words must was to be '(a) in the case of supply of goods thus be construed in their Community law and of the provision of services, everything context as a Community law phrase, regard which makes up the consideration for the being had to the different language versions. supply of the goods or the provision of services, including all expenses and taxes except the value-added tax itself'. By paragraph 13 of Annex A: 'The expression "consideration" means everything received in return for the supply of goods or the provision of services, including incidental As already noticed the phrase 'against expenses (packing, transport, insurance, payment' in Article 2 of the Second etc.) that is to say not only the cash Directive was changed to 'for consideration' amounts charged, but also, for example, the in Article 2 of the Sixth Directive. That value of the goods received in exchange or, change seems likely to have been made to in the case of goods or services supplied by make it clear that what is received in return order of a public authority, the amount of for services does not necessarily have to be the compensation received'. cash. If reference is made to the language

APPLE AND PEAR DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL v COMMISSIONERS OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE

versions which were official at the time showing that no change in meaning was when the Second Directive was adopted intended. (since the United Kingdom was not at that stage a member of the Community) it is to be seen that they provided in Article 2, of the French text, 'à titre onéreux', of the German, 'gegen Entgelt', of the Italian, 'a titolo oneroso', of the Dutch, 'onder The English language version of the Second bezwarende titel'. Directive in Article 8 speaks of 'the consideration for the supply' and defines it in more detail in paragraph 13 of Annex A ; Article 11 of the Sixth Directive defines the taxable amount in terms of the consideration which has been or is to be The Dictionnaire Littré (1951) defines 'titre obtained by the supplier from the purchaser onéreux' as 'celui par lequel on acquiert une and includes all taxes and duties and chose sous la condition d'acquitter certaines packing and other expenses. charges', Petit Robert (1979) as 'la condition d'acquitter une charge, une obligation'. Its opposite is 'à titre gratuit' and, as I understand it, the phrase denotes the obli- gation to give or the giving of, something in It has been suggested in argument that it is return for a benefit received as opposed to necessary to carry over the definition of gratuitously. The Italian and Dutch texts, I consideration in paragraph 13 of Annex A understand, have similar meanings. 'Gegen of the Second Directive to Article 2 of the Entgelt' is defined as 'against payment' Sixth Directive. Having regard to the (Langenscheidt's Dictionary 1979) as different functions of Article 11 and Article opposed to 'ohne Entgelt' which is 'free of 2 of the Sixth Directive, I am not satisfied charge'. 'Entgelt' is 'the performance which that this a relevant or necessary exercise, the parties regard as the economic equi- though obviously if the supply is for a valent for another performance' (Die consideration, the full consideration will be Struktur des vertraglichen Schuldverhältnisses that obtained by applying the rules in im anglo-amerikanischen Recht, Rheinstein, Article 11. It is sufficient for the purposes of 1932, p. 100.) Article 2 that the services should not be rendered gratuitously but should be for some form of payment. Ascertaining the precise value of the payment is a later exercise.

Looking at these other versions it seems to me that the phrase 'against payment' subsequently adopted in the English version of the Second Directive fell to be construed more broadly than 'for money' and that it The difference between the functions of the meant the same as 'for consideration' in the Articles is shown by the other language Sixth Directive adopted after the United versions. Article 8 of the Second Directive Kingdom joined the Community. This latter speaks of 'tout ce qui constitue la contre- conclusion is supported by the fact that in valeur de la livraison', 'tutto ciò che the other language versions the relevant compone il controvalore della cessione', words in Article 2 were the same in both the 'alles was den Gegenwert für die Second and the Sixth Directives, thus Lieferung . . . bildet' in German to which, I

OPINION OF SIR GORDON SLYNN — CASE 102/86

understand, the Dutch text is similar. T h e general scheme is almost the sole source of key words are then defined in Annex A. I the Council's income. The growers pay for give merely by way of example the French what they get and it is likely that the larger and German texts. 'Contrevaleur' is defined growers who pay the most will get the most as 'tout ce qui est reçu en contrepartie de la benefit from the activities of the Council. livraison'; 'Gegenwert' as 'alles . . . was als There is a link between the concept of a Gegenleistung für die Lieferung . . . erhalten taxable person (which the Council can be wird'. In Article 11 of the Sixth Directive under Article 4 (5) of the Sixth Directive) the words used are simply 'contrepartie' and and the supply of services for consideration. 'Gegenleistung'. There is thus no identity of If the Council is to treated as a taxable language between Article 2 and the words person, it can be argued that it is likely that defining the taxable amount in the later its activities constitute the supply of services Article. It is only the English version which for consideration. has the same term though used for different purposes.

There are, however, no less forceful arguments the other way and in the end I have come to the conclusion that these At the end of the day, in view of the contrary arguments should prevail. different purposes of the provisions and of these linguistic differences, I consider that Article 2 can be looked at alone, and the essential question is whether the payment of a statutory charge based on land holding or number of productive units, here trees, is to In the first place development councils of be treated as payment for the exercise of the kind in question are to be set up in the functions of the kind specified. interests of the relevant industry as a whole and in the interest of the community as a whole. The 1947 Act itself empowers the minister to assign functions to increase effi- ciency or productivity in particular industries and to improve or develop the I find the arguments put forward by the service that they render to the community. Council and by the European Commission If regard is had to the details of Article 3 of in favour of an affirmative answer, and by the 1980 Order it is clear that the functions the United Kingdom and the Federal to be exercised (e. g. in the research to be Republic in favour of a negative answer to done, in the promotion of production and the question referred by the House of Lords marketing and the methods of labour utili- almost evenly balanced. zation and of export, and in the better defi- nition of trade descriptions) are in the interests of the industry as a whole and the service it renders to the community.

On the behalf of the former it can be said with force that the Council could not perform its functions unless the growers paid the levy. The sole purpose of the levy is Secondly, it is to be noted that by Article 9 to enable it to do so and the levy for the of the 1980 Order the purpose of the charge

APPLE AND PEAR DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL v COMMISSIONERS OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE

is to enable the Council 'to meet adminis- in Case 89/91 Hong-Kong Trade Devel- trative and other expenses incurred or to be opment Council (supra). incurred in the exercise of the functions referred to in Article 3 which the Council is obliged to exercise. The charge is only made if the Council decides to impose it and if the minister approves. It seems likely that the It seems to me that the payment here is only charge will be imposed annually, though not indirectly for the benefit, if any, received by necessarily certain that the proportion used a particular grower. Although, as is argued, for publicity, advertising and promotion it may well be that growers with larger should continue to constitute approximately holdings will pay more and receive more two-thirds of total expenditure as benefit from the improvement of the apparently it does at present. The fact that industry, and although small growers can be the levy is obligatory may not be conclusive charged according to the number of trees against it being consideration, but the and will pay less and may receive less absence of any consensual element in the benefit, there is no necessary correlation payment and the lack of control by indi- between size and benefit. The obligation is vidual growers over what the Council does to pay towards the Council's expenses of for them are pointers to the levy not being improving the industry. It is not to pay for in any real sense a payment for particular what is individually received. services.

It is possible for persons to pay the same amount for different degrees of benefit and Thirdly, the essence of the supply of for that payment to be consideration. Such a services for consideration is that the position seems more likely to indicate that payment should be 'for' the services the money paid is more in the nature of an rendered. As the Court put it in Case across-the-board tax than a true payment 154/80 the Dutch Potato Storage oust [1981] for services. ECR 445, at p. 454: 'A provision of services is taxable within the meaning of the Second Directive, when the service is provided against payment and the basis of assessment for such a service is everything which makes Although I do not consider that it is up the consideration for the service; there necessary to be able to attribute particular must therefore be a direct link between the parts of a consideration to particular service provided and the consideration services, since a direct overall charge for an received'. overall service could be sufficient, I am not satisfied that the necessary reciprocity or direct link has been established between the payment and the services in this case.

The need for a direct link is also to be seen, in relation to consideration under Article 8 of the Second Directive, in Case 222/81 In Case 15/81 (Gaston Schul [1982] ECR (Bausystem v Finanzamt München für 1409, at paragraph 14) the Court recognized Körperschaften [1982] ECR 2527) and, in the distinction between 'a transaction' relation to the concept of a taxable person, necessary for an internal supply under

OPINION OF SIR GORDON SLYNN — CASE 102/86

which there is a supply of goods for persons in respect of the activities or trans- valuable consideration and the mere actions in which they engage as such public importation of goods, itself a chargeable authorities, even when they collect dues, event 'whether or not there is a transaction fees or payments connected with those acti- and irrespective of whether the transaction vities or transactions, unless treatment of is carried out for valuable consideration or them as non-taxable persons would lead to free of charge'. significant distortions of competition. Similarly they are considered taxable persons in respect of activities listed in Annex D which include 'the transactions of agricultural intervention agencies in respect of agricultural products carried out pursuant In this case (where what is in issue takes to regulations on the common organization place within the territory of a Member State of the market in those products' and 'the and importation is not involved) there is no activities of commercial publicity bodies'. transaction to which a particular payment can be related and indeed it is perfectly possible for some growers to be unable to point to services specifically supplied to them as opposed to the industry as a whole. Some brands of apples may not be These provisions relate to the question advertised or promoted; the apple growers whether someone is or is to be treated as a may get no benefit from the promotion of taxable person. If he is, that may indicate pears and conversely. that what he does is the supply of goods or services for consideration. It does not, however, decide the question. If, as I have concluded, in a situation of the kind illus- trated by the present case there is no such supply, then there is no liability to VAT It does not seem to me that the obligatory even if the person involved in what has been payment of the levy and the obligatory done is a taxable person. In any event, the discharge of statutory functions unrelated to question whether the Council is a taxable individual growers constitute the necessary person is not referred to this Court; it is a transaction let alone any form of bargain. matter for the national court as to whether T h e position seems to me to be very if the Council is not to be considered as a different in relation to the Kingdom Scheme taxable person significant distortions of where growers voluntarily pay for services competition would arise. It does not seem to directed to their specific products. me to have been so far demonstrated in this case.

I do not consider that this position is affected by reference to Article 4 of the So far as Annex D is concerned it seems to Sixth Directive. That article provides in me that the Council is plainly not an agri- paragraph 5 that State authorities and other cultural intervention agency, nor is it bodies governed by public law (which I carrying out transactions pursuant to regu- assume the Council to be or to be deemed lations on the common organization of the to be) shall not be considered taxable market.

APPLE AND PEAR DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL v COMMISSIONERS OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE

Whether it is carrying out the activities of a Nor does Article 13 of the Sixth Directive commercial publicity body in regard to the (referred to by the Council) help in deciding kind of publicity information it engages in is the question. That article merely enables once more a question for the national court. exemptions to be made. It contemplates Even if it were, it seems to me that it would that some activities carried out by public be necessary to consider what part of the bodies and paid for pursuant to a statu- levy related to those publicity activities as tory obligation may be, if not exempted, opposed to its other activities, such as, for liable to VAT. It leaves open the essential example, research, which could not be said question under Article 2 of the Direc- to be those of a commercial publicity body. tive.

Accordingly, I am of the view that the question referred by the House of Lords should be answered along the following lines:

'The phrase "the supply o f . . . services effected for consideration" in Article 2 of the Sixth VAT Directive does not apply to the situation where a body set up by the legislation of a Member State exercises pursuant to that legislation the functions of improving the efficiency of production, keeping up the quality of the products and enhancing the sales of the products in a particular sector of agri- culture and imposes on growers pursuant to that legislation an annual charge for the purpose of enabling it to meet administrative and other expenses incurred or to be incurred in the exercise of such functions.'

The costs of the parties to the main proceedings are a matter for the national court. The costs of the Commission and of the Member States which have submitted observations in these proceedings are not recoverable.

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