C-145/86
ECLI:EU:C:1987:358
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OPINION OF MR DARMON — CASE 145/86
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL DARMON delivered on 9 July 1987*
Mr President, 5. Relying on the decree of divorce, the Members of the Court, husband instituted proceedings before the Amtsgericht, Heidelberg in order to 1. In the questions which it has referred to terminate the maintenance order. His the Court for a preliminary ruling, the application was refused by a judgment of 25 Hoge Raad of the Netherlands seeks an January 1983 on the ground that the interpretation of a number of provisions of divorce had not been recognized in the the Brussels Convention of 27 September Federal Republic of Germany but the 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement amount of maintenance was reduced. of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. I shall begin by setting out the background to the main proceedings. 6. On 28 February 1983 the wife served an attachment of earnings order on the husband's employer in the Netherlands, 2. In 1978, after 28 years of marriage, a pursuant to the German judgment, in German national, Mr Hoffmann (here respect of which an order for enforcement inafter referred to as 'the husband'), went to had been granted. The husband brought live in the Netherlands. His wife, Mrs Krieg interlocutory proceedings and the (hereinafter referred to as 'the wife'), also a attachment of earnings order was German national, remained in the Federal discharged by the President of the Arrondis Republic of Germany, where, by a judgment sementsrechtbank, Almelo, by an order of 7 of the Amtsgericht (Local Court), Heidel July 1983. On an appeal brought against berg of 21 August 1979, she obtained a that decision by the wife, the Gerechtshof maintenance order as a separated spouse. (Regional Court of Appeal), Arnhem, quashed it by a judgment of 24 September 3. An order for the enforcement of that 1984, which was the subject of an appeal in judgment was granted pursuant to the cassation. Convention on 29 July 1981 by the President of the Arrondissementsrechtbank (District Court), Almelo (Netherlands), and 7. It is in those proceedings that the Hoge was served on the husband on 29 April Raad has submitted five questions to this 1982. He did not appeal against that order. Court. In examining them I shall be following a slightly different order from 4. On 1 May 1980, the Arrondissement that chosen by the Netherlands court. It has srechtbank, Maastricht, dissolved the asked the Court, first, two questions marriage on application by the husband, the relating to the effects of a judgment which wife not having entered an appearance. The has been recognized, then a question on decree of divorce was entered in the Civil whether it is possible to plead grounds for Register in The Hague on 19 August 1980. refusing recognition or enforcement, and The divorce, which does not fall within the lastly two questions on the remedies scope of application of the Convention, has available in proceedings subsequent to the not yet been recognized by the German order for enforcement. The procedural authorities. 1 order, however, is the following:
* Translated from the French. (a) recognition, which takes place auto 1 — In fact, it appears from the statements of the parties at the hearing that the divorce was recognized at some time in matically under the terms of the 1985. Convention;
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(b) the order for enforcement, granted paragraph (3) of Article 27 with paragraph according to the rules laid down in the (5), which requires recognition to be refused Convention; where the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a non-Contracting State (c) execution proper, which is governed by involving the same cause of action and the rules of national law as the Court between the same parties, which are the confirmed in its judgment in Deutsche traditional criteria for res judicata. What, Genossenschaftsbank. 2 then, are the characteristic elements of irreconcilability for the purposes of Article I shall therefore be examining first the 27 (3)? circumstances in which it is possible to plead grounds for refusing recognition or an 10. Any approach based on the substantive order for enforcement (I) before going on content of judgments runs the risk of to try to ascertain the effect of a judgment leading to an unduly restrictive result. For which has been recognized (II). Lastly I example, two judgments may be based on shall be considering Questions 4 and 5 divergent reasoning without their effects which deal with the issues which may be being irreconcilable. For an example, I need raised in proceedings relating to execution only refer to the case where an appellate (III). court upholds the judgment at first instance on different grounds, that is, on the basis of I — Article 27 of the Convention (Question a different or even diametrically opposed 3 submitted by the Hoge Raad) legal reasoning. 8. I should first of all point out that the second paragraph of Article 34, which deals 11. In my view irreconcilability should with the refusal of enforcement, refers therefore be sought at the level of the legal expressly to the five grounds for effects which recognition of the judgment non-recognition provided for in Article 27. would produce in the State of enforcement. The Hoge Raad is asking the Court to More specifically, the question to be determine whether two of them, namely determined is whether the combined effects irreconcilability (subheading A below) and of the two judgments would lead to a public policy (subheading B), are applicable contradiction incompatible with the logical in the main proceedings. For the time being, consistency of the legal order of the State in let me simply say that in this instance those which enforcement is sought. grounds were raised at a procedural stage where an order for enforcement had already 12. A few examples, some fictitious and been granted and the appeal provided for by some taken from the judgments of national the Convention had not been exercised. courts, will serve as illustrations of the solution which I am proposing. Thus a A — Irreconcilable judgments judgment ordering performance of a contract is clearly irreconcilable with a 9. Article 27 (3) provides that a judgment is judgment declaring the contract invalid. 3
not to be recognized if it is irreconcilable Similarly it would seem that a judgment with a judgment given in a dispute between granting a divorce and containing a main the same parties in the State in which recog tenance order in favour of the ex-wife nition is sought. That definition is clearly would be irreconcilable with a judgment wider than the concept of res judicata. refusing recognition of that judgment. 4The Should there be any possible doubt on that point it would be sufficient to compare 3 — See Jenard Report, Official Journal 1979, C 59, 5 March 1979, at p. 45. 2 — Judgment of 2 July 1985 in Case 148/84 Deutscht Genos- 4 — Oberlandesgericht, Hamm, judgment of 29 July 1981, senschaftsbank v Brasserie du Pechem ((1985)) ECR 1981, at Digest of case-law relating to the European Communities, D paragraph 18. Series, I-27 — B 3.
OPINION OF MR DARMON — CASE 145/86
same is not the case, however, with a suggested by the Commission, which is to judgment ordering a purchaser to pay the say that the decisions are reconcilable in purchase price and a judgment ordering the themselves without considering what would vendor to pay compensation for hidden be their combined effects within a given defects, because the two judgments are not legal sytem, is not consistent in my view contradictory and the amounts may be set with Article 27 (3). The irreconcilability of off. 5 judgments for the purposes of that provision must be assessed in the specific context according to the criterion of legal consistency in the State in which 13. I therefore think that it is for the court enforcement is sought. before which enforcement is sought to evaluate each individual case in the light of its own legal system. B — Public policy
16. Under the terms of Article 27 (1), a 14. In this instance the German main judgment is not to be recognized if it is tenance order logically presupposed that the contrary to public policy. I do not think it parties were married and that legal situation necessary to suggest a reply on the was terminated by the subsequent application of that provision to this case; Netherlands judgment. The dissolution of clearly it is for the national courts alone to the marriage takes effect only for the future define the scope of public policy. and cannot call into question the automatic recognition enjoyed by the German order in the Netherlands as soon as it has become 17. Thus I shall confine myself to making effective in the Federal Republic of two general remarks with regard to Article Germany. The fact that that order was prior 27 (1): to the decree of divorce establishes that there was indeed a period during which the husband was liable to pay maintenance. In (a) within the scheme of the Convention, that regard the situation is no different from that clause is intended to apply only in 6 that under national law where a husband is exceptional cases, which will be all the ordered to pay maintenance and then rarer in that from a statistical point of obtains a divorce. The ex-husband clearly view judgments in property matters are cannot rely on the decree of divorce as a unlikely to raise issues of public policy; ground for refusing the payment of main tenance for the period separating the two (b) it should be specified that the meaning judgments. of that provision is that the question is not whether a judgment is itself contrary to public policy but whether its recognition or an order for its 15. I shall therefore take it to be an enforcement would have that effect. essential factor in favour of reconcilability That is an application of the doctrine that there was a period prior to the divorce known as the 'diluted effect of public when the maintenance could be enforced; as polic' , 7according to which a national a result the ground set out in Article 27 (3) can be held inapplicable and an order for 6 — See Jenard Report, ibid, at p. 44; M. Weser, Convention enforcement granted. The abstract approach communautaire sur la compétence judiciaire d'exécution des décisions, Centre international de droit compare, Brussels, 1975, p. 330. 5 — French Cour de cassation, judgment of 3 November 1977 7 — Gothot and Holleaux, La Convention de Bruxelles du 27 Sofraco v Pluimvee, Digest, D Series, I-27.3 — B 1. septembre 1968, Paris, 1985, No 256, p. 146.
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court may order the enforcement of a founded on the need to harmonize interpre judgment which it could not have tations and the desirability of preventing delivered itself. excessive recourse to the public policy exception.
II — The effects of a judgment which has been recognized (Questions 1 and 2 21. I shall now try to ascertain the conse submitted by the Hoge Raad) quences of the approach which has been advocated in situations analogous to that in 18. In so far as they ask for a ruling on the the main proceedings. First of all, it cannot scope of a judgment which has been be for the court before which enforcement recognized, I shall be examining the first is sought to determine the practical effects two questions jointly. of a judgment which has been recognized; it must confine itself to authorizing or refusing its enforcement. The power to
19. In the main proceedings there is a order partial enforcement is restricted to the fundamental difference between the German two cases set out in Article 42 of the and Netherlands legal systems as to the Convention: where enforcement is limited existence of the divorce and the correlative to certain heads of the application, which extinction of the duty to pay maintenance. logically requires that they may be 12 It is therefore essential to ascertain whether separated, or where the applicant requests the effects of a judgment which has been partial enforcement. If, however, it is recognized are to be determined by the law sought, as in this case, to determine the of the State of origin or the law of the State period during which the judgment which in which enforcement is sought. has been recognized is applicable, I think that it is then for the court dealing with execution to spell out the practical conse
20. As G. A. L. Droz points out, 8 the quences of the authorization of enforcement Convention is silent on that point. The previously granted in the court where Jenard Report explains : 9'Recognition must enforcement was sought. In my view that have the result of conferring on judgments approach is dictated by the need to avoid the authority and effectiveness accorded to extensive application of Article 42, which them in the State in which they were given' ; would present the obvious risk of a review
10 it further states: 'Article 31 does not of the substance, contrary to the express purport to determine whether it is the wording of Article 29. judgment given in the State of origin, or the decision authorizing the issue of the enforcement order, which is enforceable in 22. On the other hand it does not seem to the State in which enforcement is sought'. I me in any way contrary to the Convention agree with G. A. L. Droz 11that a dual limit for the court dealing with execution to seek should be imposed: the judgment cannot to discover, applying its own national have greater effects in the State in which law — in accordance with the principles laid enforcement is sought than it would have in down by the Court in Deutsche Genossens- the State in which it was delivered, nor can chaftsbank 13—how the effects of the it produce greater effects than similar local judgment which has been recognized can judgments would. That second limitation is best be combined or reconciled with the effects of another measure of enforcement 8 — Compétence judiciaire et effets des jugements dans le marche granted in the State in which execution is commun; No 440, p. 276. 9 — Officiai Journal 1979, C 59, 5 March 1979, at p. 43. 10 — Ibid., p. 49. 12 — Droz, op. cit., No 584, p. 373. 11 — Op. cit., No 448, p. 280. 13 — Cited above.
OPINION OF MR DARMON — CASE 145/86
sought, as it would in the case of two another Contracting State is irreconcilable national judgments. At all events, the with a judgment given in the State where its Convention cannot lead to the result that a enforcement is sought. Where that is not the court in the State in which execution is case, the foreign judgment, being 'natu sought is precluded from giving effect to a ralized' by the order for enforcement — to national judgment on the ground that it has use the terminology adopted by Premier not been recognized in the State in which Président Bellet14— is incorporated into the the judgment to be executed was given. national legal system in which it is to be executed, taking effect in conjunction with
23. According to the scheme of the any national judgment. It would be no Convention, recognition and the order for different in the case of two national enforcement of a judgment have the effect enforceable instruments. If I may use a of transposing the effects of that judgment metaphor: where the Convention is into the legal system of other Contracting intended to ensure the 'free movement of States. This does not of itself enable the judgments', my analysis, mutatis mutandis, is legal system of the State of origin to take the expression of the rule of 'national precedence over that of the State of treatment'. execution by subjecting the execution of judgments given in the latter State within its own territory to the requirement of prior III — Objection to execution (Questions 4 recognition in the legal system of the and 5 submitted by the Hoge Raad)
former. In the circumstances of this case such a requirement would effectively subor 26. The Hoge Raad has asked in essence dinate if not negate the Netherlands legal the following question. Can the party system. The Convention requires against whom the order for enforcement Contracting States to ensure the 'free was granted rely, in proceedings relating to movement' and execution of judgments in execution, on grounds which would have property matters but cannot on that account been sufficient to prevent its being granted call into question the effect of national but which that party failed to put forward in judicial decisions. proceedings relating to the order for enforcement within the period laid down by
24. I am therefore unable to share the Article 36 of the Convention? approach taken by the Commission, which would in practice make the legal effec tiveness of a Netherlands decree of divorce 17. The appeal provided for by Article 36 in the Netherlands dependent on its recog must be brought, according to the circum nition in the Federal Republic of Germany. stances, within one or two months from It is not a question of recognizing the service of the order authorizing divorce in that State but simply of drawing enforcement. The appeal must be lodged the necessary conclusions in the with a court specified in Article 37 for each Netherlands where it was granted. Contracting State. The judgment given on Accordingly, the maintenance order must, the appeal may be contested only by the like an analogous Netherlands judgment, be procedure laid down for each State by the taken in conjunction in the State where second paragraph of Article 37. Lastly, in execution is sought with the effects any event it is only the grounds set out in following from the divorce. Article 27 that may be adduced. Indeed the issue in this case is precisely whether it is
25. The solution which I am proposing possible to rely on one of those grounds would seem consistent with the logic of the outside the procedural system laid down by Convention. The Convention provides that the Convention. recognition or an order for enforcement is to be refused if the judgment given in 14 — Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, 1975, p. 41.
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28. I should say at once that such a possi 30. Furthermore, the Court expressed itself bility, which would amount to allowing a in particularly clear terms in its judgment in defence to execution by means of an Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank when it said: objection of non-recognition, would seem contrary to the scheme of the Convention as 'The Convention merely regulates the interpreted in the judgments of the Court. procedure for obtaining an order for the 15 In its judgments in Brennero and Deutsche enforcement of foreign enforceable Genossenschaftsbank, the Court made it clear instruments and does not deal with that the rights of appeal provided for by execution itself, which continues to be the Convention, which constitutes an governed by the domestic law of the court autonomous and complete system, cannot in which execution is sought. . . '. 17 be given effect outside the terms of its provisions or 'complemented' by the 31. In my view that principle is the logical provisions of national law. corollary of the previous one in the sense that it creates a watertight partition between
29. In its judgment in Brennero, the Court the Convention and national law. The stated : former deals with recognition and orders for enforcement by laying down an 'The second paragraph of Article 37 exhaustive list of the rights of appeal which provides that the judgment given on the are available. Execution is governed solely appeal may be contested only by an appeal by the latter. The logic of that framework in cassation . . . Under the general scheme of precludes the possibility of lifting a the Convention, and in the light of one of particular ground of appeal out of the its principal objectives which is to simplify Convention and using it outside the scheme procedures in the State in which of its provisions. The system of the enforcement is sought, that provision cannot Convention necessarily means that any such be extended so as to enable an appeal in 'transplant' would be rejected. cassation to be lodged against a judgment
16 other than that given on the appeal.' 32. I should, however, define carefully the extent of that rule. The expiry of the period for appealing does indeed remove the right That passage makes it clear that since the to rely on the grounds provided for by the Convention is intended to facilitate the Convention. Nevertheless it does not negate procedure for recognition and enforcement, the underlying factual situation, namely the the rights of appeal for which it provides situation which, from a legal point of view, cannot be exercised outside the framework corresponds to the provisions in question. expressly laid down by Article 36 and those After all, that is merely a logical conse immediately following. It would be to quence of the classical distinction between disregard that rule to rely on grounds the legal rule and the operative event. contained in the Convention in proceedings subsequent to the order for enforcement. Merely to hold a submission based on the 33. Thus the irreconcilability of judgments grounds for non-recognition admissible in can no longer be argued under Article 27 proceedings relating to execution would be (1) before the court dealing with execution. to accept that it is possible to challenge the However, the situation which might have order for enforcement even though it had been characterized by that provision — in become definitive on the expiry of the this instance the existence of a divorce — is period laid down by Article 36. not thereby affected. The decree of divorce is an established fact in the Netherlands 15 — Case 258/83 Brennero vWendel[1984]ECR 3971. 16 — At paragraph 15 of the decision. 17 — Cited above, at paragraph 18 of the decision.
OPINION OF MR DARMON — CASE 145/86
legal system. For that reason there is '[The Convention] applies auto nothing to prevent it from being relied upon matically ... It was decided by the in support of any objection which national committee of experts that the Convention law makes available against execution. should apply automatically'. Indeed, the Court stated as much in its 20 judgment in Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank 35. In its judgment in De Wolf, the Court when, after pointing out that the did not fail to point out that the system Convention did not touch on execution instituted by the Convention precluded proper, it went on: recourse to any other procedure and hence did not permit a request for a new judgment on the substance in the State in which '. . . interested third parties may contest execution was sought. execution by means of the procedures available to them under the law of the State 36. Reliance on one of the grounds 17 in which execution is levied' . contained in Article 27 outside the framework laid down by Articles 36 et seq. 34. This does not necessarily make would seriously prejudice the autonomous irrelevant the last question submitted by the and complete character of the provisions of Hoge Raad, which asks whether the court the Convention. The inadmissibility which of the State in which execution is sought is must operate as a bar to such a practice required to apply of its own motion the rule constitutes a sanction guaranteeing the that a submission pleading grounds balance of the mechanism instituted by the contained in the Convention is inadmissible Convention. By the same token, its in proceedings against execution. The application by a national court of its own 18 motion would appear to be the logical and commentators point out that, until the final stage in the negotiations, the necessary corollary of the rule requiring application of the Convention of a court's recourse to the Convention wherever it is own motion was provided for in Article 1 sought to obtain recognition or an order for and that its absence from the final text was enforcement of a judgment. As is stated in the result of translation difficulties in one of the Jenard Report, the Contracting States. The Jenard Report, 'The courts [of the Contracting States] must which refers to the binding nature of the 19 apply the rules of the Convention whether Convention, states: 21 or not they are pleaded by the parties'.
37 . Even though I have thought it necessary to examine all the questions submitted to the Court , I propose that in its reply to the Hoge Raad the Court address only the issues of law relevant to the determination of the main proceedings . In view of the fact that the proceedings before the Hoge Raad relate to execution , the questions of recognition and enforcement already being defini tively settled, I propose that the Court rule as follows :
17 — Cited above, at paragraph 18 of the decision. 18 — See in particular Droz, op. cit., Nos 426 et seq., p. 264. 20 — Case 42/76 de Wolf Cox [1976] ECR 1759. 19 — Cited above, at p. 656, Official Journal [1979] C 59. 21 — Cited above, at p. 656.
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'The effects of a judgment recognized by virtue of the Convention of 27 September 1968 cannot go beyond those which a similar national judgment would have in the State in which execution is sought. Where necessary it is solely for the court dealing with execution to define those effects, if need be by combining the effects of the judgment which has been recognized with those of a national judgment. Grounds for non-recognition based on Article 27 of the Convention cannot be pleaded outside the framework defined by Articles 36 et seq. The inad missibility of a submission based on such grounds, which must be declared by the court of the State in which execution is sought of its own motion even if its national law does not provide for such a possibility, does not preclude a party from relying on the facts or the situation which might have been covered by such grounds in exercising any other right of appeal against execution provided for by national law'.