C-175/86
ECLI:EU:C:1988:13
- Súd
- Súdny dvor Európskej únie
- IČS
- 61986CC0175
- Zdroj
- eur-lex.europa.eu ↗
OPINION OF MR MANCINI—JOINED CASES 175 AND 209/86
O P I N I O N OF M R ADVOCATE GENERAL MANCINI delivered on 19 J a n u a r y 1988 *
Mr President, status of the municipality of Haarlem on 28 Members of the Court, April 1982; (b) a judgment delivered on 8 July 1982 whereby the same court entrusted the children to their mother; (c) the fact 1. This Opinion relates to two actions in that the Raad van Arbeid (Labour Council), which M r M., a former employee of the Haarlem, had paid family allowances to his Council of the European Communities, wife for both the dependent children until 1 contests the measure adopted by the October 1982 and for the younger daughter Secretary-General of that institution from 1 July 1984; and (d) various debts imposing upon him the disciplinary measure which Mr M. had contracted, and not of removal from his post. The applicant discharged, in Belgium and the Netherlands. seeks: (a) primarily, annulment of the Because of the latter fact: measure and discontinuance of the disci- plinary proceedings; (b) in the alternative, suspension of the measure until his defence (1) his immediate superior had sent a submissions have been considered; and written warning to him by memo- (c) in the further alternative, replacement of randum of 27 September 1983; the penalty by that suggested in the opinion of the Disciplinary Board.
(2) he had been the subject of several judgments by default; The facts are as follows. Mr M. was engaged by the Council on 1 July 1982 as,a lawyer-linguist in Grade L/A 7. At that time he filled in forms and produced documents (3) his creditors had submitted requests to which showed: (a) that he was married; the Council for attachment of his salary (b) that he had two dependent children; and in order to secure the payment of more (c) that his wife did not receive family than BFR 1 350 000. allowances from her employer. The annual information sheets which Mr M. completed for 1983 and 1984 gave the same details. Having regard to those circumstances, the It was therefore on the basis of those Secretary-General of the Council, as documents that the administration appointing authority, sent a memorandum calculated and paid to the applicant the to Mr M. on 28 October 1985 containing a various allowances envisaged for married number of charges against him and indi- officials with dependent children. cating the intention to grant him a hearing on 10 January 1986. The hearing was postponed until 16 January at Mr M.'s In June and July 1985, however, there came request, on the ground that he wished to be to the Council's notice: (a) a divorce decree represented by a lawyer; but he attended the between M r M. and his wife delivered on 14 meeting alone and refused to give any November 1981 by the . Haarlem court, explanation regarding the matters of which which was entered in the records of civil he was accused. On the contrary, he
* Translated from the Italian.
M. v COUNCIL
complained that the terms used in the note forward its opinion to the appointing of 20 October and, in particular, the authority, had expired. opening passage 'J'ai été informé que depuis votre entrée en fonctions . . . vous avez In the opinion which was submitted on 16 gravement et volontairement manqué aux May, the Board, after noting that the obligations auxquelles vous êtes tenu en official had 'deliberately deceived' the vertu du Statut', were prejudicial to his right administration as to his family status by to a fair hearing in so far as they anticipated submitting 'a number of false declarations the result of the disciplinary proceedings. seeking to obtain benefits to which he was not entitled', stated that such 'repeated actions constitute a failure to comply with At that stage (on 4 March 1986), the the duty of moral integrity imposed on all appointing authority referred the matter to officials'. However, notwithstanding the the Disciplinary Board, forwarding to it a seriousness of the infringement, the Board report which described the alleged considered that it was appropriate to offer misconduct and the surrounding circum- Mr M. an opportunity to redeem himself
stances. The report was sent to Mr M. three and proposed that he should be demoted t o days later. On the same day — 4 Grade LA 8, Step 2. March — the membership of the Board was decided by the drawing of lots and on 11 After hearing Mr M. once more on 30 May March the procedure was repeated to 1986 and informing the chairman of the replace a member who was unable to act Board on 4 June of the reasons which and another to whom Mr M. objected. prompted him to depart from the opinion, on 13 June 1986 the Secretary-General of the Council issued Decision No 528/86
The Board held two meetings. During the imposing upon the official the disciplinary first (25 March 1986) the preliminary measure of removal from his post with formalities were completed and the effect,from 16 September 1986. rapporteur was chosen. The sitting at which the merits of the case were to be considered The decision makes reference to the second was fixed for 11 April and Mr M. was meeting between Mr M. and the appointing requested, by memorandum of 26 March, to authority. It states that the official gave n o remain in his office in case the Board explanation regarding the charges against
wished to call him. However, on 4 April Mr him and expressed no view on the Board's M. informed the chairman of the Board that opinion. On the contrary, adopting the on the 11th he would be on holiday on the same approach as at the meeting of 16 Côte d'Azur; nevertheless, he stated that he January, he stated that his right to a fair would return to Brussels if the protest hearing had been prejudiced and that in action taken by the Staff Committee, which addition to that breach of his rights there had decided to suspend the participation of were a number of irregularities, of which he its members on joint committees, were to be did not give specific details, in the conduct
called off. The chairman then postponed the of the Disciplinary Board. meeting until 16 May; but, notwithstanding his being requested to do so on numerous As regards the substance, it had, according occasions, the official — who inter alia had to the decision, been clearly and undeniably not given any written response to the established that Mr M.: (a) had made false charges against him — refused to attend declarations concerning his civil status; that meeting, on the ground that the period (b) had concealed from the administration of one month, within which, under the first the receipt of family allowances from paragraph of Article 7 of Annex IX to the another source, thus failing to fulfil the Staff Regulations, the Board is obliged to obligation laid down in Article 67 (2) of the
OPINION OF MR MANCINI—JOINED CASES 175 AND 209/86
Staff Regulations; and (c) had on numerous had not called attention to any mitigating occasions, contrary to the second sentence circumstances or any cause for hoping that of the first paragraph of Article 23 of the the official might redeem himself. Staff Regulations, failed to fulfil his private obligations. In addition to being in breach of those provisions, such conduct O n 14 June 1986, Mr M. reacted to the constituted a serious and deliberate breach measure (a) by submitting a complaint of the duty to abstain from any action through official channels; (b) by lodging an which might reflect on his position as an application to the Court which was received official (Articles 11 and 12 of the Staff at the Registry on 16 June (Case 175/86); Regulations). and (c) by a separate document, seeking suspension of the measure.
Moreover, by an application received on 5 August 1986 (Case In particular — the decision continued — the 209/86), the official brought a second repeated false declarations made by the action against the same decision, relating in official as to his civil status on recruitment particular to the memorandum of 4 June showed that he lacked the integrity required 1986 from the Secretary-General. by Article 27 of the Staff Regulations and was accordingly unfit to hold any post in the European Community public service. In By order of 5 September 1986 the President the light of that fact, of the aggravating of the Second Chamber of the Court circumstance that the duties referred to in dismissed the application for suspension of Article 67 (2) and the first paragraph of the operation of the contested measure. Article 23 were of a 'fundamental' nature, Similarly, the appointing authority, by and the fact that at no time during the decision of 8 September 1986, rejected the procedure did the official claim that there complaint of 14 June and a subsequent were mitigating circumstances of any kind, complaint lodged by Mr M. on 29 July. the possibility of his redeeming himself, referred to by the Disciplinary Board, seemed 'purely theoretical'. The appointing 2. In Case 175/86 the Council has raised an authority therefore considered that, having objection of inadmissibility regarding the regard to the importance of the facts, the claim made by Mr M. in the further alter- measure suggested in the opinion was not a native, by which he seeks amendment of the condign penalty and decided to remove Mr decision regarding the nature of the penalty. M. from his post. Referring to the judgment of 30 May 1973 in Case 46/72 De Greef v Commission [1973] ECR 543, and the Order of 5 It should also be pointed out that, in the September 1986, the Council states that in confidential memorandum sent on 4 June disciplinary matters the Court may annul 1986 by the Secretary-General of the the contested measure but it may not Council to the chairman of the Disciplinary substitute its own appraisal of the facts for Board, the reasons for which the appointing that of the appointing authority.
In authority considered it impossible to comply response, the applicant states that the case is with the opinion become even clearer. They of a pecuniary nature because it relates to relate above all to the seriousness of Mr his means of subsistence and the Court M."s transgressions and to the fact that, therefore has full jurisdiction. rather than explaining his conduct, he sought to protect himself by recourse to procedural quibbles and, in the second The objection is well founded.
It is true place, to the fact that the Disciplinary Board that, around 25 years ago, the Court
M. v COUNCIL
attributed a pecuniary character to a dispute matter thereof, brought about by the regarding dismissal as a disciplinary measure submission of 'reasons' which were not put and accordingly adopted the approach forward initially; and no system of adminis- advocated by Mr M. (judgment of 4 July trative justice exists which does not regard 1963 in Case 32/62 Alvis v Council [1963] this as permissible in certain circumstances. ECR 49, at p. 55).
However, the In other words, the applicant may add to his subsequent decisions are all consistent in first application by making additional stating that, once the facts alleged by the submissions or may even lodge a second appointing authority regarding the official's application, if the period for challenging the conduct are established, the Court must measure against which the action was limit itself to considering whether the brought has not yet expired (see Sandulli, / / decision is vitiated by manifest error, by acts giudizio davanti al Consiglio di Stato, ultra vires or by misuse of power (judgments Naples, 1964, pp. 354-355; Chapus, Droit of 4 February 1970 in Case 13/69 Van Eick du contentieux administratif, Paris, 1982, pp. v Commission [1970] ECR 3, paragraphs 23 247-248). to 26; of 30 May 1973 De Greef, supra, paragraphs 45 to 47; and of 29 January
1985, Case 228/83 F. v Commission [1985] 3. The submissions contained in Mr M.'s ECR 275, paragraph 34). two applications are numerous and varied, but may in essence be reduced to the following: (a) infringement of his right to a In Case 209/86, on the other hand, the fair hearing; (b) inadequate statement of the Council contends that the whole application reasons on which the decision was based; is inadmissible, in so far as its subject-matter (c) manifest errors in the appraisal of the is identical to that of Case 175/86, except as facts. The first submission comprises three regards the request for production of the criticisms: (a) the appointing authority did memorandum of 4 June 1986 mentioned not respect the principle of impartiality; (b)
earlier. The fact remains, however, the applicant had only 15 days in which to according to the Council, that that request lodge written submissions in his defence; (c) is merely a claim incidental to a measure of the Disciplinary Board did not comply with inquiry, provided for expressly by Article 45 the time-limit of one month for issuing its of the Rules of Procedure and is not opinion. separable from the first action; by bringing a new action to pursue that claim, Mr M. is conducting his case in a manner which is Let us consider them in that order.
In the regarded as vexatious by Article 69 (3) of first place, Mr M. complains of those rules and gives rise to additional infringement of Article 6 of the Human expenses which it would be improper to Rights Convention of 4 November 1950 and impose upon the Council. In reply, Mr M. more particularly of paragraph (1) thereof states that an applicant is entitled to which provides that 'in the determination of supplement his application by putting his civil rights and obligations . . . everyone forward new arguments provided that he is entitled to a . . . hearing . . . by an inde- does so within the time-limit for bringing an pendent and impartial tribunal established action. by law'.
The fact that Mr M. did not have an impartial judge is, he claims, proved by the position — which may be inferred from Unlike the previous one, this objection the opening passage of the memorandum of cannot be upheld. What the Council is 28 October 1985 — adopted with respect to objecting to constitutes a mutatio in amplius him by the Secretary-General of the Council of the proceedings or, rather, of the subject- at the commencement of the procedure.
OPINION OF MR MANCINI—JOINED CASES 175 AND 209/86
That criticism must be rejected. It is appro- situation and on correct assessments. priate to point out in the first place that Indeed, as was emphasized by Mr Advocate Article 6 of the Convention does not apply General Trabucchi in his Opinion in Case to disciplinary proceedings which do not 46/72 De Greef supra at p. 562, 'one of the give rise to the loss of a civil right, such as functions of the disciplinary procedure is to the right to exercise a liberal profession (as ascertain the relevance and evaluate held by the Court of Human Rights: Eur. correctly the facts on which the competent Court H R Engel judgment of 8 June 1976, authority has decided to commence Series A No 22, pp. 33 to 35, paragraphs 80 proceedings'. to 83; Le Compte and Others, judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A, No 43, p. 19, para-
4. In the second place, the applicant graphs 41 and 42). More specifically, complains of infringement of the first protection under that provision does not paragraph of Article 4 of Annex IX to the extend to disputes concerning recruitment Staff Regulations under which 'the official to and removal from posts in national o r charged shall have not less than 15 days international public service (see the from the date of receipt of the report decisions of the Commission of Human initiating disciplinary proceedings to prepare Rights, Strasbourg, N o 7274/76 of 8 March his defence'. Mr M. refers to an oral notifi- 1976, N o 8496/79 of 8 October 1980, and cation made to him on 7 March 1986 by N o 11056/84 of 15 May 1986). the chairman of the Disciplinary Board requesting him to produce written submissions, if he wished to do so, within a Quite apart from that, it is to be noted that,
maximum of 15 days. By interpreting that under Article 87 of the Staff Regulations provision of the Staff Regulations as if it and Annex IX thereto, the appointing said 'produce' instead of 'prepare', 'written authority cannot commence disciplinary defence' rather than 'defence' and 'a proceedings without first hearing the official maximum of 15 days' instead of 'at least 15 concerned and that, to enable the official to days', the chairman thus purported to justify his conduct, the appointing authority require Mr M. to defend himself in writing is obliged to inform him of the charges even before the expiry of the period laid against him. Action taken in compliance down in the Staff Regulations and with those rules (and in this case it is prevented him from doing so once that beyond doubt that they were complied with) period had elapsed. is therefore consonant with principles of sound administration and, far from being prejudicial to the right to a fair hearing, This criticism is also unfounded.
The safeguards the basis of that right. That right documents before the Court show incon- must then be positively guaranteed during trovertibly that Mr M. was given a much the course of the procedure commenced longer period than that provided for by the subsequently. Staff Regulations in which to submit his observations, namely the two months and more from 7 March 1986 (the day on which That is not all. Let us suppose — without the report was communicated to him) to 16 saying that such was the case — that when May 1986 (the day on which the Disci- the Secretary-General of the Council plinary Board met to consider his case).
The informed the official of the charges against official denies this, stating that on 5 March him he misapprehended the facts or used the chairman of the Board wrote to him rash expressions. Irregularities of that kind saying 'vous disposerez, à compter du jour could not in any event detract from the de la réception du rapport, de 15 jours pour validity of a final decision which was shown préparer votre défense' and that in the to be based on factors reflecting the real minutes of the meeting of the Board held on
M. v COUNCIL
25 March paragraph 3 records the expiry of This criticism is without foundation. As I the 'délai d'au moins quinze jours'. pointed out in paragraph 2 of this Opinion, However, those statements, which are the administrative authority's discretion in perhaps ill-considered or imprecise, are disciplinary matters is very broad and the contradicted and, in any event, are extent to which the Court verifies the superseded by a letter of 26 March in which lawfulness of action taken in that respect is the chairman reminded Mr M. of 'les dispo- correspondingly limited.
Much light is sitions de l'article 4, deuxième alinéa de thrown on this matter by the judgments to l'annexe IX, qui prévoient que vous pouvez which I have referred several times (of 4 présenter des observations écrites ou February 1970 Van Eick, paragraphs 23-26, verbales'. of 30 May 1973 De Greef, paragraphs 5. In the third place, Mr M. claims that the 45-47, and 29 January 1985 F, paragraph time-limit laid down in Article 7 of Annex 34). Once the facts are established — the IX was not complied with. According to Court held — 'The evaluation of the that provision, 'After consideration of the seriousness of the shortcomings of documents submitted and . . . any statements which . . . the applicant [is found] to be made . . . by the official concerned . . . , the guilty and the choice of thé disciplinary Disciplinary Board s h a l l . . . deliver a measure which appears . . . most appropriate reasoned opinion . . . and transmit the lie within the discretionary power of the opinion to the appointing authority and to appointing authority'; and the Court cannot the official concerned within one month of 'substitute its own assessment for that of the the date on which the matter was referred authority in question, except in a case of a to the Board'. clearly excessive measure or of an abuse of power'.
This criticism is no more acceptable than the others. As correctly pointed out by the Council, the Court has on several occasions Mr M. does not allege such transgressions; held that that time-limit is not mandatory. It on the contrary, as I have said, he asks the is merely a rule of good administration and Court to consider the statement of the failure to comply with it, rather than reasons on which the measure was based. attracting a measure of annulment But the results of such an inquiry certainly (judgments of 4 February 1970 Van Eick, cannot help his case.
As we have seen, in the supra, paragraphs 1 to 7; and 29 January first place the appointing authority 1985 P., supra, paragraph 30), may only emphasizes the intrinsic seriousness of the render the institution liable for any damage circumstances. There is no doubt what- which the persons concerned may have soever that the false statements made by M r suffered. And in this case, there is certainly M. regarding his civil status — conduct no damage. which the Disciplinary Board likewise
6. The second submission alleges that the severely condemned — detract from the statement of the reasons on which the trust which characterizes the relationship measure is based is inadequate, in particular between the administration and its officials; as regards the part where the appointing it is therefore reasonable to conclude from authority departed from the opinion of the such conduct that the official is not fit to Disciplinary Board and decided to impose a hold a post in the Community public severer penalty. Mr M. complains in service. particular that the appointing authority considered the possibility of his redeeming himself to be purely theoretical and imposed In the second place, the decision sets out a upon him a penalty which, having regard to number of considerations regarding Mr M.'s the charges against him, was dispropor- failure to fulfil his private obligations, a tionate. matter which the Disciplinary Board glossed
OPINION OF MR MANCINI—JOINED CASES 175 AND 209/86
over even though it appears in the report he never knew that he had been summoned submitted to it by the appointing authority. to appear before the Haarlem court for In that connection I would point out that, proceedings concerning custody of his for a Community official, the fact of not children. Moreover, Mr M. goes on to say, paying his debts in due time, of being the he always intended to settle his differences subject of judgments by default and creating with his wife, so much so that, with that aim a situation where his employers were in view, he had rented a large house.
He requested to attach part of his salary is had been prompted to think that reconcil- manifestly at variance with the official's iation might be possible by: (a) the obligation to conduct himself, even away application for permission to take special from the workplace, in a manner consonant leave in Belgium submitted by his wife on with the dignity of his office and in any 15 November 1982; (b) the guarantee which event in such a way as not to detract from she had provided on the same date for a the prestige of the administration (for a loan of over BFR 400 000 applied for by similar view, see the judgment of the him; (c) the fact that he and his wife had Administrative Court of the International become closer to each other at the end of Labour Organization of 6 October 1981 in 1982 and the beginning of 1983.
At that the case of Wakley, paragraph 7). time, in fact, the family lived together in Brussels, at least during holidays and at weekends. Finally, the appointing authority explains its refusal to adopt the proposal of the Disci- This criticism also lacks substance. The plinary Board by referring to the absence of Council rightly points out that civil status is any mitigating circumstances to be inferred an objective fact and that feelings or hopes from the official's personal file or claimed of reconciliation do not serve to change it. by the official himself in the course of the Moreover, it cannot be accepted that Mr M.
procedure. Those arguments too appear to had no notice of the divorce. From the me to be persuasive and in any event are records on the basis of which the Disci- properly explained; I do not therefore plinary Board and the appointing authority consider that the decision is open to concluded that he was guilty of an offence, criticism regarding the statement of the it is apparent that throughout the reasons on which it is based or could be proceedings he was represented by a lawyer, regarded as being disproportionate in and the latter would certainly not fail to relation to the charges. keep him informed as to the progress and outcome of the proceedings. Moreover, it is established that in those proceedings and in
7. In his third submission, the applicant the proceedings concerning custody of the claims that the contested decision is vitiated children, Mr M. appeared personally before by manifest errors. The incorrect statements the Court. His failure to inform the and omissions attributed to him are, in his institution employing him of his change of contention, ascribable not to bad faith but status until 8 August 1985 is therefore inex- rather to ignorance. His wife, he says, did cusable. not inform him that the divorce had come
through. Moreover, in divorce proceedings in the Netherlands the parties are not Mr M. also seeks to rely upon the absence required to be present and the decree does of bad faith with respect to his infringement not have to be served personally upon them of Article 67 (2). The Staff Regulations, he or at their addresses — the proceedings are argues, provide for the same benefits for a concluded merely by entering the decree in married employee as for a divorced the records of civil status. In the same way, employee with a dependent child.
He lived
M. v COUNCIL
in Belgium with his younger daughter until asked the Council to pay them to her direct. July 1984 and it was only after that date The Council also has documentary evidence that his wife began to receive family of the fact that Mr M. received sums to allowances in the Netherlands — but, as she which he knew he was not entitled, such as herself acknowledged on 15 November a number of reimbursements for travel 1986, without the applicant's knowledge. It expenses incurred by his ex-wife. follows that, since the institution was obliged in any case to pay the allowances to The leitmotiv of lack of bad faith is again one spouse or the other, the statements invoked with respect to Mr M.'s private made by him were not, as far as he could debts in so far as Mr M. claims that he determine, such as to cause it any loss. waived his right to defend himself in the proceedings in which judgment was given What can be said of that argument? It seems against him. That argument is clearly to me to be weak because it overlooks the absurd: that waiver merely shows that, even fact that Mr M. knew in any case that he in his own eyes, Mr M.'s failure to pay his was making false statements and that the debts was wholly unjustified or, worse still, relationship of trust between him and the that Mr M. attaches no importance to his Council was damaged precisely by his good name. Finally, there is likewise no duplicity and not by the loss — of which he basis for his claim that the appointing may or may not have been aware, but authority, although aware of his debts since which, all in all, was not excessive (around 1983, decided not to take proceedings BFR 200 000) — which he caused the against him. The fact is that, by a memo- institution to suffer. It should be added that randum dated 17 September 1983, Mr M.'s to have acted in good faith, if he was really immediate superior proposed to apply to unaware of the Netherlands allowances him a minor disciplinary measure — but the received by his wife, Mr M. should have document was not forwarded to the sent her the allowances of the same kind appointing authority and for that reason the received from the Council or should have matter went no further.
8. In the light of the foregoing considerations I suggest that the C o u r t s h o u l d dismiss the actions b r o u g h t o n 16 July and 5 August 1986 by M r M . against t h e Council of the E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t i e s a n d , in a c c o r d a n c e with Article 70 of t h e Rules of P r o c e d u r e , should o r d e r the parties t o bear their o w n costs.