C-235/87
ECLI:EU:C:1988:412
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OPINION OF SIR GORDON SLYNN — CASE 235/87
O P I N I O N O F ADVOCATE GENERAL SIR G O R D O N SLYNN delivered on 14 July 1988
My Lords, to express themselves vocally as well as physically.
Miss Matteucci, the plaintiff in the Article 4 of the 1956 agreement provides proceedings before the Belgian Conseil that 'each Contracting Party shall grant to d'État by which this reference under Article nationals of the other party scholarships to 177 of the EEC Treaty is made, is an Italian enable them to undertake or continue national. She was born in 1960 in Belgium studies or research in the other country or where her father, an Italian migrant worker, to complete their scientific, cultural, artistic had settled. H e has since been resident in or technical education'. Relying on the Belgium as apparently has her mother. Miss nationality condition contained in that Matteucci received the whole of her article, the CGRI, the second defendant in education in Belgium. Since 1983, she has the national proceedings, refused to pass on been employed as a teacher of a discipline her application to the German authorities called 'rhythmics' at the Centre Culturel in (who, it appears, were to make the final Namur. She continued to study and selection from the candidates). Miss completed a course in rhythmics at an Matteucci's challenge of that refusal the institute in Brussels in 1985, being placed in Conseil d'État has held to be admissible. It the top 2 % of students. dismissed her case against the Communauté française, the first defendant.
In her initial pleadings, Miss Matteucci In 1984 she applied to the commissariat relied exclusively on Article 48 of the Treaty general aux relations internationales (CGRI) as implemented by Articles 7 and 12 of of the Communauté française in Belgium Regulation No 1612/68 (Official Journal, for a 'specialization' scholarship to study English Special Edition 1968-69, p. 45: the singing and voice-training in Berlin. Three 'Regulation'). However, by a supplementary such scholarships, intended not to cover pleading, she sought to rely on the Court's registration or tuition fees but for the ruling in Case 293/83 (Gravier v City of student's maintenance, were available to the Liège [1985] ECR 593), in which the Court, Communauté française under an agreement interpreting Articles 7 and 128 of the between Belgium and the Federal Republic Treaty, held that 'the conditions of access to of Germany of 24 September 1956. On her vocational training fall within the scope of application form, Miss Matteucci stated that the Treaty' and that therefore 'the impo- singing lessons would complement her sition on students who are nationals of training and experience in rhythmic dance other Member States, of a charge, a regis- and enable her to teach children and adults tration fee or the so-called "minervai" as a
MATTEUCCI v COMMUNAUTÉ FRANÇAISE OF BELGIUM
condition of access to vocational training, deal with the freedom to provide services, where the same fee is not imposed on the Commission taking the view that the students who are nationals of the host matter could be resolved by reference to Member State, constitutes discrimination on Articles 7 and 48 of the Treaty and to the grounds of nationality contrary to Article 7 Regulation. In my Opinions in Gravier of the Treaty' (paragraphs 25 and 26). and in Case 263/86 (Belgium v Humbel Vocational training was defined as 'any [1988] ECR 5365, at p. 5375), I expressed form of education which prepares for a the view that education provided by the qualification for a particular profession, State was not a service within the meaning trade or employment or which provides the of those articles because it was not provided necessary training and skills for such a 'for remuneration'. I remain of that view in profession, trade or employment.. . , the absence of further argument to the whatever the age and the level of training of contrary. the pupils or students, and even if the training programme includes an element of general education' (paragraph 30).
In its judgments in Case 39/86 Lair v Universität Hannover and Case 197/86 (Brown v Secretary of State for Scotland From the body of the order for reference, it [1988] ECR 3205) given on 21 June 1988 appears that the Conseil d'État wished to (that is, after the hearing in the present know primarily whether the Gravier case) the Court held that the Gravier principle applied to 'scholarships granted or principle only applied to grants to cover fees refused in circumstances such as those of for registration, tuition or other expenses in this case'. However, its question is more connection with vocational training and widely phrased: that, in the present state of development of Community law, State grants for main- tenance and training fell outside the scope of Article 7 of the Treaty (paragraphs 14 and 15 of Lair, repeated verbatim in para- graphs 17 and 18 of Brown). 'Must the provisions of the Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957, in particular Articles 7, 48, 59, 60 and 128, be interpreted as meaning that scholarships granted by a Member State cannot be reserved for nationals of one other Member State, as is These rulings apply with at least equal force done by Article 4 of the Cultural Agreement to the scholarship sought by Miss entered into on 24 September 1956 by the Matteucci. If maintenance grants provided Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium?' across the board to nationals are not required, as a matter of Community law, to be provided on the same terms to non-nationals, the reservation to nationals of exceptional scholarships to study abroad such as that sought by Miss Matteucci (which moreover was payable by the N o submissions have been made to the German authorities) does not contravene Court concerning Articles 59 and 60 which Article 7 read with Article 128.
OPINION OF SIR GORDON SLYNN — CASE 235/87
Different considerations apply if the CGRI and the French Government contend non-nationals in question can derive rights that Article 12 is inapplicable because she is from Article 48 of the Treaty as specifically herself a worker. The Commission's position implemented by the Regulation. is that she can claim both under Article 7 as a worker in her own right and under Article 12 as the child of a migrant worker.
Article 7 of the Regulation provides that a worker who is a national of a Member State in the territory of another Member State Article 7 of the Regulation confers rights on 'shall enjoy the same social and tax 'workers'. The order for reference does not advantages as national workers' (paragraph find specifically that she is a worker, merely 2) and 'shall also, by virtue of the same that she has taught rhythmic dance at right and under the same conditions as Namur since 1983 and that she continued national workers, have access to training in her studies at any rate until 1985 by when vocational schools and retraining centres' she had applied for the course in issue. (paragraph 3).
The fact that she was still studying did not Article 12 is in the following terms: prevent her from being a worker — part- time employment is not excluded from the rules on freedom of movement of workers so long as the employment constitutes 'the pursuit of effective and genuine activities to 'The children of a national of a Member the exclusion of activities on such a small State who is or has been employed in the scale as to be regarded as purely marginal territory of another Member State shall be and ancillary' and even if the income admitted to that State's general educational, received is less than a legal minimum, apprenticeship and vocational training whether or not supplemented by other courses under the same conditions as the income (Case 53/81 Levin v Staatssecretaris nationals of that State, if such children are van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035; Case 139/85 residing in its territory. Kempf v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1986] ECR 1741).
Member States shall encourage all efforts to enable such children to attend these courses The national court must thus determine first under the best possible conditions.' whether she was a worker on the basis of the Court's judgments. If so the question remains whether she can rely on the Regu- lation since she did not herself move from one Member State to another. Her father From the order for reference, it appears that was the migrant worker. It is clear that if Miss Matteucci seeks to rely on both when she took up employment in 1983 she Articles 7 and 12 of the Regulation as a was still dependent on him (since she was child of a migrant worker, a position over 21 years of age) she had a right to do supported by the Italian Government. The so by virtue of Article 11 of the Regulation.
MATTEUCCI v COMMUNAUTÉ FRANÇAISE OF BELGIUM
Even if she was not so dependent, it seems In Lair, the Court accepted that a main- to me that Article 48 in paragraphs 3 (a) tenance and training grant for university and (b) gives her the right, even though studies leading to a professional qualifi- already in Belgium, to accept an offer of cation constituted a social advantage within employment actually made and to move the meaning of Article 7 (2) since social freely within Belgium for that purpose. The advantages are 'all those which, whether or right of the children of migrant workers to not linked to a contract of employment, are take up employment in the Member State generally granted to national workers where they live seems to me (despite the primarily because of their objective status as limitation in Article 11 to dependants and workers or by virtue of the mere fact of children under 21) to be recognized also by their residence on the national territory and Article 1 of the Regulation which provides the extension of which to workers who are that: 'Any national of a Member State shall, nationals of other Member States therefore irrespective of his place of residence, have the seems suitable to facilitate their mobility right to take up an activity as an employed within the Community' (Case 122/84 person, and to pursue such activity, within Scrivner v Centre public d'aide sociale de the territory of another Member State . . . '. Chastre [1985] ECR 1029).
Even if she was not a worker at the relevant time, it seems from the Court's judgment of 18 June 1987 in Case 316/85 (Centre public Further, it was held that a national of d'aide sociale de Courcelles v Lebon [1987] another Member State who undertook such ECR 2811) that her father can claim as a studies in the host State, after having been social advantage under Article 7 (2) that engaged in an occupation in that State, must she should have the same educational rights be regarded as having retained his status as as the children of Belgian workers so long a worker, being entitled, as such, to the as she was dependent on him in fact, in the benefit of Article 7 (2) of the Regulation, sense that he actually maintained her irres- subject to the proviso that 'there is a link pective of the reasons for such maintenance, between the previous occupation and the and whether or not she was in fact capable studies in question' except where retraining of supporting herself. The same would seem courses are undertaken by those who are to apply to rights conferred under Article involuntarily unemployed (paragraph 37). 7 (3) of the Regulation.
Assuming that the national court finds either that she was a worker, or a In Lair it was accepted that the studies dependant, the question arises as to whether concerned led to a professional qualifi- she can claim specific rights under Article cation. Although the Court did not deal 7 (2) and Article 7 (3) of the Regulation with non-vocational courses I remain of the as interpreted by the Court's judgments, view that general education may still particularly in Lair and Brown. constitute a social advantage, though, it will
OPINION OF SIR GORDON SLYNN — CASE 235/87
presumably now have to be shown that Baden-Württemberg [1982] ECR 33) the there is a link between the studies and the Court held that 'the concept of "social worker's previous occupation, a test which advantage" referred to in Article 7 (2) of may be difficult to satisfy in order to enable the Regulation encompasses not only the a worker to 'branch out' into new fields. benefits accorded by virtue of a right but also those granted on a discretionary basis'. The fact that in providing for discretionary awards selection has to take place on criteria laid down, one of which is that the number is limited to three, does not prevent the award from being a social advantage. On the other hand, in paragraph 38 of the Even if few are chosen many may be eligible judgment the Court recognized that the to apply. concept of the free movement of workers expressed in the judgment and summarized above 'correspond d'ailleurs à une évolution actuelle des carrières professionnelles. En effet, les carrières continues sont moins fréquentes qu'autrefois. Il arrive donc que des activités professionnelles soient inter- Leaving aside the fact that this course takes rompues par des périodes de formation, de place in the Federal Republic of Germany conversion ou de recyclage'. and is paid for by the Federal Republic under a reciprocal arrangement contained in a bilateral convention, can Miss Matteucci also or alternatively rely on Article 7 (3) if she is a worker? For that purpose it is not sufficient that the course to be undertaken is one of vocational training. In Lair Although it is a matter for the national (paragraph 26) and in Brown (paragraph court and whatever may be the position in 12) the Court found that a vocational other cases, the application of these school is not simply one which wholly or in provisions does not seem likely to lead to part provides vocational training. The term problems in this particular case since the 'has a narrower meaning and refers solely course which Miss Matteucci wishes to take to establishments which provide only seems on the face of it plainly to have a link instruction sandwiched between periods of with her previous occupation and to employment or else closely connected with constitute a course of further training or employment, particularly during appren- retraining. ticeship'. The Conseil d'État must therefore consider whether the school in Berlin is such an establishment.
It is argued, however, that even if Miss Matteucci is a worker and the course of studies proposed is linked to her previous If it is such an establishment, then for the employment, the scholarship should not be reasons I gave in my Opinions in Lair and regarded as a social advantage; it is not a Brown I consider that maintenance grants general measure but one of only three given are covered and that, particularly in view of annually. I do not accept this limitation. In the restrictive nature of 'vocational school', Case 65/81 (Reina v Landeskreditbank there is no obligation to show that the
MATTEUCCI v COMMUNAUTE FRANÇAISE OF BELGIUM
course to be followed is connected with the second paragraph of Article 12 showed that worker's previous activity as a worker, given the article was 'intended to encourage the aim of the Regulation to improve special efforts, to ensure that the children workers' living and working conditions and may take advantage on an equal footing of to promote their social advancement (the the education and training facilities third recital thereto), given the express available' (paragraph 8). It deduced that the reference in Article 7 (3) to retraining, and article therefore referred 'not only to rules given the Court's acceptance in Lair that relating to admission, but also to general periods of professional activity can be measures intended to facilitate educational interrrupted by periods of training, attendance' (paragraph 9). retraining and refresher courses.
I reject the argument advanced that the reference in Casagrande to 'general If Miss Matteucci is not a worker at all but measures' renders Article 12 inapplicable to is a dependant seeking to rely on Article exceptional or limited scholarships. I 7 (2) through her father, then it seems to consider that the phrase was intended to me that she is entitled to the benefits of the comprehend all State measures relating to Belgian educational system on the same educational attendance, and not only to basis as the children of Belgian workers in those of wide application. Belgium, subject to the argument, which I deal with later, based on the fact that the course does not take place in Belgium.
Is there a point at which a child of a migrant worker ceases to be a child for the purposes of Article 12? In the first place is there an age-limit; in the second does he Whether or not she is a worker or a cease to be a child if he begins to work? dependant, relying on derivative rights under Article 7, can Miss Matteucci rely on Article 12 of the Regulation, the relationship between the two articles not having been determined in previous Since it is clear that the rights conferred are decisions of the Court? not confined to periods of compulsory general schooling or even attendance at schools followed immediately by full-time courses at university or technical colleges, as apprenticeship and vocational training courses (which may come later in time) are Article 12, by its very wording, is not specifically mentioned, I do not think that it confined to vocational training but covers can be said that there is any specific age at the host State's 'general educational, which a person ceases to be a child for the apprenticeship and vocational training purposes of the article. A child of a migrant courses'. It was explicitly held in Case 9/74 worker can obviously not claim at any age (Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt München to attend schools with age-limits; but if [1974] ECR 773) to apply to means-tested there are no age-limits then it seems to me grants. The Court there held that the that if a national has the right to enrol for a
OPINION OF SIR GORDON SLYNN — CASE 235/87
particular vocational course, or even for the Commission's submission to the effect general university education, then, as the that a child of a migrant worker can always Commission contends, the child of a rely on Article 12 to claim to be admitted to migrant worker has the same right and on the State's educational, apprenticeship and the same terms. This principle should apply vocational training courses under the same from the beginning of school to the conditions as the nationals of that State, if completion of the types of education the child is resident in that State. It may specified and is not necessarily excluded seem strange that a child of a migrant because at some stage the child has been worker who is an adult should, on the basis employed. of the Commission's argument, acquire rights to education not open to workers in the light of the Court's judgments in Lair and Brown according to which the rights to education under Article 7 (2) are limited to courses where there is a link between the previous occupation and the studies in question. On the other hand if mobility and integration of workers and their families is to be encouraged, discrimination on the grounds of nationality against the children of migrant workers is clearly contrary to the If the child is a worker and can successfully intention of the Regulation. claim the benefits of Articles 7 (2) or 7 (3) then he does not need to claim as a child. If he works occasionally but does not qualify as 'a worker' then, as I see it, he can claim as a child. The difficult question arises if he is a worker but cannot show that the proposed course is linked to his previous employment for the purposes of Article 7 (2) or if he fails in his claim as a worker for some other reason.
Balancing these factors, it seems to me that the Commission's argument should be accepted and that a child of a migrant worker can rely on Article 12 if the child is not eligible under Article 7, even if there has been intervening employment, subject to the course falling within the description 'general educational, apprenticeship or vocational training courses'. There may be difficult It is here that the question arises as to cases to be decided in the future, whether for the purposes of Article 12 the particularly as the children of first rule is once a child always a child, or once a generation migrant workers grow older. worker no longer a child. Prima facie it The present does not seem to me such a seemed to me that the two categories were difficult case since Miss Matteucci, although mutually exclusive so that once a child was she had begun work, was still continuing a worker he ceased to be a child for the her professional education at the time she purposes of Article 12. Yet, there is force in applied for the course in Berlin.
MATTEUCCI v COMMUNAUTÉ FRANÇAISE OF BELGIUM
There remain the arguments based on the 'The rights and obligations arising from fact that the course is not to be given in agreements concluded before the entry into Belgium but in Berlin and is provided force of this Treaty between one or more pursuant to a bilateral convention. Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty.
In my opinion, it is clear that if one Member State arranges for its nationals to undertake courses in another Member State, To the extent that such agreements are not which if they were held in that Member compatible with this Treaty, the Member State would constitute social advantages State or States concerned shall take all (Article 7 (2)), training in vocational appropriate steps to eliminate the incompati- schools or retraining (Article 7 (3)), or bilities established . . . " general education, apprenticeships or voca- tional training courses (Article 12), then those courses, albeit held in another Member State, respectively fall within Articles 7 (2), 7 (3) or 12. They are to be seen as part of the educational system of the State. The argument that Article 12 cannot apply because the child will no longer be resident in the State is untenable. Residence in the Member State is a condition of This article is, in my view, clearly not acceptance for the course not for its relevant since it only applies to treaties completion. Were it otherwise no child between Member States and third countries, could claim to take part in a university which is not the case here. course held, for example, partly in an English and partly in a French university or institution providing vocational courses.
It is plain, as the Commission accepts, that cultural exchanges and agreements between Member States to achieve such exchanges The last problem, raised by the CGRI and can make a significant contribution to the French Government, relates to the fact mutual understanding and to the devel- that these scholarships are made available opment of inter-Member State relations. On under a bilateral treaty pre-dating the the other hand, and even though culture, Treaty of Rome and styled a 'cultural like education, may not be specifically agreement'. The French Government seeks referred to in the Treaty, Treaty provisions to rely on Article 234 of the Treaty which may still have their effect (Casagrande, para- provides : graphs 12 and 13; Gravier, paragraph 19).
OPINION OF SIR GORDON SLYNN — CASE 235/87
In my opinion, even though fully accepting In Member States, Community law has that Member States may wish to arrange primacy; if discrimination on the grounds of exchanges of students who can both bring nationality is outlawed in a particular area, their own national culture and absorb that the Member State against which an indi- of the Member State to which they go, vidual can insist on the rule of non-discrimi- nationality per se cannot be accepted as the nation being applied must avoid taking steps test in connection with vocational training which discriminate on grounds of as defined in Gravier or the other courses nationality. referred to in Articles 7 and 12 of the Regu- lation. 'Cultural' in relation to this kind of agreement is in any event an elastic term. Where the exchange is of students of, e.g. technology or science, 'cultural background' may be less important than attainments in technology or science for the purposes of deciding candidates for the exchange. However, even if it is wished to let those with a background in Belgium see Germany and those with a background in Germany see Belgium and to bring the cultures of those States with them, it seems to me that it cannot be said of a candidate born and wholly educated in Belgium, that she cannot be eligible for such a scholarship, solely on the grounds of her nationality, on the basis that she is not someone who has experience or understanding of Belgian culture. Whether or not (i) migrant workers' Whether there is a better candidate is a children resident in Belgium could rely on wholly different question. Article 12 as against the Federal Republic of Germany, a matter I considered in Humbel, and whether or not, (ii) as the Commission argues it has, the Federal Republic has a duty under Article 5 of the Treaty to do nothing to obstruct the performance of its obligations under Article 12 of the Regu- lation by Belgium (and, therefore, to evaluate on their merits all candidates put forward by Belgium whatever their nationality), it seems to me that, if Miss Matteucci can otherwise rely on Articles 7 or 12 of the Regulation, she is not to be denied by the mere fact that the scholarship in question is provided for study in Germany pursuant to an international agreement between Belgium and Germany. Nor do I think it an answer to Miss Different issues may arise in respect of Matteucci's claim that the scholarships scholarships provided unilaterally by one are provided under an 'international Member State or in respect of arrangements convention' between two Member States made otherwise than by Member States, which was entered into before the EEC issues which it does not seem to me arise on Treaty was signed. the present reference.
MATTEUCCI v COMMUNAUTÉ FRANÇAISE OF BELGIUM
I would therefore answer the Conseil d'Étaťs question to the effect that a Member State which has concluded an agreement with another Member State under which scholarships for maintenance in order to study in the latter State are provided cannot refuse to make them available, on the terms applied to its own nationals, to a national of another Member State who is able to claim under Article 7 of the Regulation as a migrant worker or as a dependant of a migrant worker or under Article 12 as a child of a migrant worker, solely on the grounds that the applicant does not have the nationality of the first-mentioned Member State. However, no such obligation arises from Articles 7, read with 128, or from Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty.
The costs of the parties in the proceedings before the Conseil d'État are a matter for that court. Those of the French and Italian Governments and the Commission are not recoverable.