C-221/88
ECLI:EU:C:1989:602
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OPINION OF MR MISCHO —CASE C-221/88
O P I N I O N OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL MISCHO delivered on 28 November 1989 *
Mr President, Recommendation 86/198/ECSC in Italian Members of the Court, law' 1 and referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 41 of the ECSC Treaty the three questions which are the subject of this Opinion. 1. On 13 May 1986 the Commission introduced Recommendation 86/198/ECSC on the establishment of preferential 4. Those three questions, for the exact treatment for debts in respect of levies on wording of which I refer to the Report for the production of coal and steel (Official the Hearing, concern in turn: Journal 1986, L 144, p. 40) which requires Member States to confer, not later than 1 January 1988 and in accordance with the (1) the 'direct and immediate effect' of, in detailed rules laid down therein, a pref- particular, Articles 1 and 2 of Recom- erential rank on debts arising from the mendation 86/198; application of the levies referred to in Articles 49 and 50 of the ECSC Treaty in all cases where national legislation provides (2) in the event that the recommendation for competition between creditors. does have such effect, its applicability to debts arising prior to the date of its introduction; 2. As Italy has not yet adopted the implementing measures necessary for it to (3) in the event that the recommendation meet that obligation, the European Coal does not have such effect, the and Steel Community, acting through the mandatory nature of the time-limit of 1 Commission, relied directly on that recom- January 1988 and the consequences in mendation in its claim, made in the context national law of the failure to observe of the decision of 3 February 1987 declaring that time-limit. Acciaierie e ferriere Busseni insolvent, that preferential treatment ought to be accorded to a number of debts owed to it under two 5. In the written observations which it decisions of 23 February 1982 and 5 submitted to the Court, the Commission September 1986. raised two prefatory questions, the first of which related to the admissibility of the third question which, in the Commission's view, concerns a problem exclusively of 3. That was the background against which national law, and the second, to the the tribunale civile e penale di Brescia admissibility of the other two questions (District Court, Brescia), to which the which, as they concern the interpretation, ECSC had appealed following the rejection rather than the validity, of an act of the of its claim by the official receiver in charge High Authority of the ECSC, appear to fall of the insolvency procedure, was called on outside the wording of Article 41 of the to consider 'the validity and effects of ECSC Treaty.
* Original language: French. 1 — P. 2 in the order for reference.
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6. Unlike the Commission, however, I am 10. The explanation for this which is not going to begin by examining the normally given is that under the ECSC admissibility of the third question, as that Treaty, unlike the EEC Treaty, the question only arises if the first question is Commission has very extensive powers of answered in the negative and can in any direct management, with the result that case be divided into two parts, of which national authorities and national courts or only the second expressly relates to a tribunals are less often called upon to question of national law, while the first part implement or apply the law of the ECSC. 2 may be treated as concerning the interpre- The need for a system enabling preliminary tation of that provision in the recommen- references to be made on matters of inter- dation which lays down the time-limits for pretation thus appears to have been less its implementation. manifest when the ECSC Treaty was being drafted than when the EEC and EAEC Treaties were being drafted.
7. Moreover, the second prefatory question is by far the more important in so far as it questions the Court's own jurisdiction under 11. Does that mean that a reference on a Article 41 of the ECSC Treaty to give matter of interpretation is not possible rulings on requests for the interpretation of under the ECSC Treaty? the ECSC Treaty and on acts implementing its provisions.
12. The judgment of the Court of 24 October 1985 in Case 239/84 Gerlach v I — The jurisdiction of the Court to give Minister for Economic Affairs [1985] ECR preliminary rulings on the interpretation of 3507, cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as the law of the ECSC having implicitly recognized the jurisdiction of the Court in that matter. Neither the first nor the third preliminary questions in that case related to problems exclusively of the interpretation of ECSC recommendations, 8. Anicle 41 of the ECSC Treaty provides as the Commission claims. The first sought that: to ascertain whether an EEC regulation also applied to products falling within the ambit of the ECSC Treaty and the third related to the validity of an ECSC recommendation of 'The Court shall have sole jurisdiction to the Commission. The fact that the Court, in give preliminary rulings on the validity of the reasons given in support of its answer to acts of the High Authority and of the those two questions, based itself on Council where such validity is in issue in secondary legal acts of the ECSC which it proceedings brought before a national court also interpreted, shows, at most, that the or tribunal.' examination of the validity of an act often implies the interpretation of that same act or of other acts.
9. The ECSC Treaty thus does not provide 2 — See, in that connection, Waelbroeck, Louis, Vignes, expressly for an optional or compulsory Dewost and Vandersanden: Le droit de la Communauté économique européenne. Vol. 10, Editions de l'université de preliminary reference on a matter of inter- Bruxelles, 1983, p. 179 and Joliét: Le droit institutionnel pretation, as do Article 177 of the EEC des Communautés européennes, le contentieux. Faculty of Law, Economies and Social Sciences of Liège, 1981, Treaty and Article 150 of the EAEC Treaty. p. 167.
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13. Thus, the question of the jurisdiction of 17. In its judgment of 11 November 1981 in the Court still awaits an answer and along the IBM case, 4the Court had already given with the Commission I believe that that a broad interpretation to the concept of answer should be in the affirmative. measures liable to actions for annulment under Article 173 of the [EEC] Treaty by reasoning that 14. Article 31 of the ECSC Treaty, which is the counterpart of Article 164 of the EEC Treaty, provides that: 'that remedy is available in order to ensure, as required by Article 164, that in the inter- 'The Court shall ensure that in the interpre- pretation and application of the Treaty the tation and application of this Treaty, and of law is observed, and it would be inconsistent rules laid down for the implementation with that objective to interpret restrictively thereof, the law is observed.' the conditions under which the action is admissible by limiting its scope merely to the categories of measures referred to in 15. While those articles do not in them- Article 189' (paragraph 8). selves constitute a basis for jurisdiction, they do define the task which devolves upon the Court under the two treaties and on that ground form part of the backbone of the 18. In its judgment of 4 October 1983 in judicial system of the European the Fediol case, 5the Court also referred to Communities. 'the spirit of the principles which lie behind Articles 164 and 173 of the Treaty' in order to acknowledge that complainant under- 16. It was for that reason that the Court takings in anti-dumping proceedings had referred in particular to Article 164 of the EEC Treaty in the reasoning which led it to hold, in its judgment of 23 April 1986 in 'the right to avail themselves . . . of a review 'Les Verts', 3that an action for annulment by the Court appropriate to the nature of may also lie against measures of the the powers reserved to the Community European Parliament which are intended to institutions on the subject' (paragraph 29). have legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, even though Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, unlike Article 38 of the ECSC Treaty, expressly mentions only acts of the Council 19. Finally, in its judgment of 22 October and the Commission. In the words of the 1987 in the Foto-Frost case, 6 the Court Court, affirmed its exclusive jurisdiction to declare acts of the Community institutions invalid on the basis of the need for a uniform 'an interpretation of Article 173 of the application of Community law and coherence Treaty which excluded measures adopted by in the system of judicial protection instituted the European Parliament from those which by the EEC Treaty, as well as on the fact could be contested would lead to a result that it is itself in the best position to rule on contrary both to the spirit of the Treaty as expressed in Article 164 and to its system' 4 — Judgment of 11 November 1981 in Case 60/81 IBM v (paragraph 25). Commission [1981] ECR 2639. 5 — Judgment of 4 October 1983 in Case 191/82 Fediol v Commission [1983] ECR 2913. 3 — Judgment of 23 April 1986 in Case 294/83 Parti écologiste 6 — Judgment of 22 October 1987 in Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v 'Les Verts'v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987]ECR 4199.
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the validity of Community acts, despite the 'essential for the preservation of the fact that Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, in Community character of the law established contrast this time to Article 41 of the ECSC by the Treaty and has the object of ensuring Treaty, does not expressly exclude a that in all circumstances this law is the same divergent interpretation which would also in all States of the Community', and confer such a competence on national concluded that 'any gap in the system so courts against whose decisions there is a organized could undermine the effectiveness judicial remedy under national law (see of the provisions of the Treaty and of the paragraphs 12 to 20). secondary Community law' (paragraph 2).
20. Those different judgments show that the Court has on a number of occasions relied on Article 164 of the EEC Treaty and 23. As the task assigned to the Court under the principles deriving from it for the the EEC and ECSC Treaties is the same purpose of giving a broad and coherent and extends in both cases to an interpre- interpretation to those provisions of the tation of the law, the Court should have the Treaty which deal with the various means of powers necessary to carry out that task redress, even going so far, when the need effectively also under the ECSC Treaty. arises, as to remedy omissions and lacunae within it.
24. Secondly, in the same way as the 21. In my opinion nothing ought to prevent application of the law cannot be divorced the Court from following the same course from its interpretation (Article 164 of the of action in the present case and from EEC Treaty and Article 31 of the ECSC affirming, with reference to Article 31 of the Treaty stress that point), no examination of ECSC Treaty, its jurisdiction to deliver the validity of an act can be made without preliminary rulings also on the interpre- an interpretation of the act itself or of the tation of the law of the ECSC. That is a law in relation to which its validity is view which I base essentially on the brought into question. We have seen that following reasons. the Gerlach judgment, already cited, provides an example in this respect. Mr Advocate General Verloren van Themaat, in his Opinion delivered on 2 March 1983 in 22. In the first place, to the extent — albeit Case 168/82 ECSC v Fernere Sant'Anna limited — to which national authorities are [1983] ECR 1681, at p. 1701, had expressed called on to implement the law of the ECSC the same view in endorsing an observation and national courts are required to apply it, made by the Commission that the need for a uniform application of Community law is every bit as vital as in the case of the EEC Treaty. In its judgment of 16 January 1974 in the Rheinmühlen case, 7 the Court affirmed emphatically that the system of references for preliminary rulings ' . . . it is not possible to appraise the validity is of a decision without at the same time inter- preting the provisions of the Treaty from 7 — Judgment of 16 January 1974 in Case 166/73 which the Commission derived the power to Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1974] ECR 33. adopt that decision' (see the section 'Facts
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and Issues' of the judgment of the Court that the Court, which has the jurisdiction to of 17 May 1983 [1983] ECR 1681, at deliver preliminary rulings on the validity of p. 1689). 8 acts of the institutions of the ECSC, must equally have jurisdiction to rule on their interpretation, and indeed also on the inter- 25. In its judgment of 21 March 1985 in the pretation of the Treaty. 10 Celestri case, 9 the Court itself declared, admittedly in the context of the separation of functions between national courts and
28. Finally, I am of the opinion that since itself under Article 41 of the ECSC Treaty, the ECSC Treaty predates the EEC Treaty, that the differences between the two Treaties cannot be used as a pretext for denying the ' . . . it is . . . for the Court to set the measure Court jurisdiction to deliver preliminary whose validity is contested in context in rulings on the interpretation of the law of Community law and to examine the criteria the ECSC. In its judgment in the Foto-Frost for interpretation established by Community case, which I have already cited, the Court law in order to be able to give the national chose to ignore the fact that Article 177 of court an appropriate answer for the pur- the EEC Treaty, despite being later in date pose of resolving the main dispute' than Article 41 of the ECSC Treaty, does (paragraph 12). not expressly confirm the Court's exclusive jurisdiction to declare acts of the Community institutions invalid.
It thereby 26. The judgment of the Court of 17 remedied a lacuna in the EEC Treaty November 1983 in Case 292/82 Merck v which, on the face of it, could not have Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1983] ECR been due to a simple omission, bearing in 3781, which was delivered pursuant to mind that the authors of the EEC Treaty Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, is a case in had before them as a model Article 41 of
point. The Court, which had been ques- the ECSC Treaty. The same may be said tioned expressly as to the validity of several with regard to the judgment in 'Les Verts', Community regulations, had first of all cited above, where the Court relied on carried out a detailed interpretation of the Article 38 of the ECSC Treaty in ruling that relevant provisions before stating that an action for annulment brought under Article 173 of the EEC Treaty may also lie against acts of the European Parliament, 'In view of that interpretation of the although the latter article, which was provisions at issue the questions concerning adopted later than Article 38 of the ECSC their validity have no purpose' (para- Treaty, may have been considered as graph 18). reflecting the more recent opinion on the matter held by the authors of the Treaty.
27. In the circumstances I have no hesi- Since it has already interpreted Articles 173 tation in agreeing with those who believe and 177 of the EEC Treaty in accordance with the requirements of both Articles 38 8 — See also the Opinion delivered by Advocate General Sir and 41 of the ECSC Treaty, I believe that Gordon Slynn on 27 March 1984 in Case 36/83 Mabanafi the Court may, a fortiori, draw guidance y Hauptzollamt Emmerich [1984] ECR 2528, at p. 2530: 'It is, in my opinion, clear that, if the validity of an act is in from Article 177 of the EEC Treaty in its Question, the first task almost inevitably is to ask what is the nature of the act in question. That involves, where the act is in a document, interpreting the words used.
If the compatibility of an act of the High Authority with 10 — See, in particular, Wohlfahrt, in Grabitz: Kommentar zum provisions of the Treaty is in question, that inexorably EWG-Vertrag, at paragraph 13 on Article 177: 'If the involves the Court in directing itself as to the proper European Court of Justice is entitled to give a preliminary meaning of the Treaty.' ruling on the validity of a legal provision, which always presupposes the interpretation of that provision, it must, 9 — Judgment of 21 March 1985 in Case 172/84 Celestri v a fortiori, be entitled to interpret such a provision, if Ministry of Finance [1985] ECR 963. requested to do so by a national court.'
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interpretation of Article 41 of the ECSC December 1960 in the Humblet case, 11 the Treaty. Court took the view that Article 171 of the EEC Treaty and Article 143 of the EAEC Treaty confirmed the limits to the juris- diction which it exercised under Article 16 29. It is not necessary in the present case to of the Protocol on the Privileges and determine the conditions governing the Immunities of the ECSC to rule on the exercise of the interpretative jurisdiction interpretation or application of that which must thus be recognized as vested in Protocol. In its judgment of 21 January the Court under the ECSC Treaty, nor to 1965 in the Merlini case, 12 the Court decide whether it is necessary to observe the implicitly transposed the provision in the distinctions laid down in the second and final paragraph of Article 192 of the EEC third paragraphs of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, which reserves to the courts of Treaty. Since the tribunale civile e penale di the Member State concerned jurisdiction to Brescia has referred to the Court the review measures enforcing decisions preliminary questions under consideration, imposing pecuniary obligations, to Article it is immaterial, for the purpose of estab- 92 of the ECSC Treaty, which is silent on lishing the Court's jurisdiction in the matter, the matter. whether it did so by its own option or because it was required so to do.
31. Since the Court therefore has juris- diction to deliver a preliminary ruling on 30. Should the Court consider it useful, questions concerning the interpretation of however, to lay down principles regarding the Treaty establishing the ECSC and of preliminary rulings on matters of interpre- acts adopted thereunder, I may now go on tation relating to the ECSC, I believe that it to examine the questions submitted in the could consider as applicable those present case. concerning Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. They have proved their usefulness in the past and to depart from them now would II — The question of the 'direct effect' of only cause confusion. Moreover, the need Commission Recommendation 86/198 to prevent the development in any Member State of national judicial practice at variance with the rules of Community law and the resultant differences in judicial practice 32. In its first question, the national court within the Community on questions of asks in particular if Articles 1 and 2 of Community law argues in favour of a Commission Recommendation 86/198 have distinction being drawn between national courts depending on whether or not a judicial remedy under national law is ' . . . direct and immediate effect in a available against their decisions and Member State so that [they] may be applied particularly in favour of the obligation on by a national court or tribunal without the the part of those against whose decisions no need for any subsequent measures giving appeal lies under national law to refer effect to the recommendation to be adopted matters to the Court of Justice. Finally, this by the State to which [they are] would not be the first time that the Court addressed . . . '. would be drawing guidance from the provisions of the EEC (or of the EAEC) 11 — Judgment of 16 December 1960 in Case 6/60 Humblet v Treaty in order to transpose them into the Belgium [1960] ECR 559 12 — Judgment of 21 January 1965 in Case 108/63 Merlmi v ECSC Treaty. In its judgment of 16 High Authoruty [1965]ECR1
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33. In order to answer that question, we required by the directive within the must first establish whether an ECSC prescribed period may not plead, as against recommendation is in principle capable of individuals, its own failure to perform the having direct effect, in the same way as an obligations which the directive entails'. EEC decision or directive. The third paragraph of Article 14 of the ECSC Treaty provides that: 36. There is thus no reason in principle why that statement should not equally be applied in the case of ECSC recommendations 'recommendations shall be binding as to the addressed to Member States. aims to be pursued but shall leave the choice of the appropriate methods for achieving these aims to those to whom the recommen- 37. The first consequence thereof is that dations are addressed'. where a Member State has failed to implement an ECSC recommendation in national law within the prescribed period or 34. An ECSC recommendation, in so far as where it has failed to implement the recom- it is addressed to Member States, is thus mendation correctly, an individual may rely, exactly equivalent to an EEC directive as against the State, on those provisions of which, under paragraph 3 of Article 189 of the recommendation which appear, as far as the EEC Treaty their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise (see paragraph 46 of the Marshall judgment). ' . . . shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the 38. With regard to the recommendation in national authorities the choice of form and question in the present case, a distinction methods'. must be drawn for our purposes according to whether that recommendation is to apply to proceedings involving competition 35. ECSC recommendations thus impose on between creditors which had not yet been Member States to which they are addressed, commenced at the date on which the in exactly the same way as do EEC recommendation came into force or to those directives, an obligation to achieve the which had already been commenced at that desired result within the prescribed period. date, which, should the recommendation As the Court pointed out in its judgment of have 'direct effect', would coincide with the 26 February 1986 in the Marshall case, 13 the date laid down for its implementation, 1 view consistently expressed by the Court on January 1988. the 'direct effect' of directives is based precisely on 39. Articles 1 and 2 of the recommendation impose on the Member States to which they ' . . . the consideration that it would be are addressed a clear and precise obligation incompatible with the binding nature which which allows for no independent action Article 189 confers on the directive to hold whatever on their part. As the Commission as a matter of principle that the obligation quite properly pointed out, those articles imposed thereby cannot be relied on by merely place Member States under the obli- those concerned. From that the Court gation of deduced that a Member State which has not adopted the implementing measures ' . . . extending to ECSC levies the treatment 13 — Case 152/84 [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 47. accorded by the legal system of each
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Member State to the tax debts owed to that court, exists only in relation to "each Member State' (final recital in the recom- Member State to which it is addressed". It mendation). follows that a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual and that a provision of a directive may not be relied 40. It is clear that those articles do not upon as such against such a person' create new types of preferential treatment (paragraph 48). for which Member States must introduce rules, nor do they oblige Member States which do not already confer a preferential rank on tax debts owed to them to 45. In the judgment of 8 October 1987 in introduce legal provisions for that purpose. Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969, the Court drew the consequence that
41. To the extent to which they apply to 'new' proceedings involving competition between creditors, Articles 1 and 2 of ' . . . a national authority may not rely, as Recommendation 86/198 are certainly against an individual, upon a provision of a unconditional and sufficiently precise for directive whose necessary implementation in individuals to rely upon them directly. national law has not yet taken place' (paragraph 10).
42. That conclusion, however, must be modified slightly with regard to the application of those two provisions of the 46. The Court has thus used alternatively, recommendation to proceedings already and, as it appears to me, interchangeably, commenced at the date of its implemen- the expressions 'to impose obligations on an tation. That is a matter to which I shall individual', 'to rely upon a directive against return later. an individual' or 'to rely as against an indi- vidual upon a provision of a directive', in order to state, substantially, that a directive which has not yet been implemented cannot 43. The most difficult problem to resolve in involve negative and direct consequences for the present case, however, relates to the an individual. second consequence of the view consistently expressed by the Court on the 'direct effect' of EEC directives, as applicable to ECSC recommendations. 47. Let us now consider what happens when the ECSC relies, before the relevant national authorities, on the preferential status conferred upon it by Recommen- 44. In the Marshall judgment, which I have dation 86/198. In that case, the ECSC is already cited, the Court also emphasized that, according to Article 189 of the EEC simply claiming a preferential rank for debts Treaty, owed to it over debts which are lower in rank than those owed to the State in respect of value-added tax. In other words, it is relying on a provision in the recommen- '. . . the binding nature of a directive, which dation 'as such' 'against' or 'as against' an constitutes the basis for the possibility of indeterminate number of individuals who do relying on the directive before a national not hold claims of a rank equal to that
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which the recommendation confers on the 53. It is necessary to avoid confusing two ECSC. types of obligations: the obligation on the State, on the one hand, to implement a directive in its national law and, on the other, the obligations which the actual text 48. The case-law cited above demonstrates of a directive imposes on the State. The that such a view is inadmissible. obligations which the State cannot shirk are those devolving on it directly vis-à-vis indi- viduals. 49. I cannot accept the reasoning of the Commission when it argues that, in the present case, it asserted its rights against the Italian State, rather than against individuals simply by applying to the liquidator, a 54. In the case before us, the ECSC is not person entrusted by the State with a requesting the liquidator to make a payment particular task. to it out of the State budget, something which in any case he would be quite unable to do. What the ECSC is seeking is that the recommendation should be treated by the 50. The person or the body to which one officers of State created to administer cases applies, or the precise legal status of that of bankruptcy and insolvency (liquidator, body, is of no relevance in the present receiver, bankruptcy tribunal), as having context. been already implemented in such a way that debts owed to the ECSC may enjoy a preferential rank over lower-ranking debts. 51. The question which arises is whether or not a directive may impose a precise obli- gation directly on a State authority which may be relied upon as against that State by 55. The case-law which I have cited above individuals. would suggest that neither the adminis- trative offices of the State, nor its judicial or quasi-judicial offices (such as that of liquidator) are obliged to entertain claims as 52. When the Court declared that the State against individuals, based on an ECSC may not plead, as against individuals, its recommendation which has not yet been own failure to perform the obligations implemented. imposed by a directive which has not yet been implemented, it meant that the State cannot continue to apply to an individual a rule of national law which it ought to have repealed for the purpose of complying with 56. To take the opposite view would be the directive (for example, the imposition of tantamount to contending that directives are value-added tax on a certain type of trans- nothing other than regulations with a action, see the judgment of 19 January 1982 delayed effect and thereby to establishing a in Case 8/81 Becker v Finanzamt Münster- new principle that, in cases where a Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53, or that the State directive has still not been implemented by a cannot refuse to an individual a right which Member State at the end of the period it ought already to have introduced in its stipulated therein, all of its provisions which national legislation (for example, the are unconditional and sufficiently precise principle of equal pay for men and women, shall take effect erga omnes as if they were see the judgment in Marshall, cited above). provisions of a regulation. I believe that
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such a result would run contrary to the 59. For all those reasons, therefore, my intentions of those who drafted the Treaty. view is that the Commission, acting as the High Authority of the ECSC, cannot rely on Articles 1 and 2 of Recommendation 86/198 as such, that is to say, before their implementation in national law, as against 57. The objection may be raised that the individual creditors of an insolvent under- Court has, in some cases, implicitly taking in proceedings before national courts acknowledged that a directive which has not or authorities of a Member State charged been properly implemented may still have with the administration of cases of bank- negative consequences for individuals. I am ruptcy and insolvency. referring in that respect to a number of judgments 14 dealing with Council Directive 71/305/EEC of 26 July 1971 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts (Official 60. Even if the Court does not share that Journal, English Special Edition 1971 (II), view, I believe that it ought none the less to p. 682). In those cases, individuals conclude that the recommendation, as such, contested before national courts decisions of cannot be relied upon as against private the 'adjudicating authority' rejecting their creditors in the context of proceedings for tender by relying on the fact that those recovery which are already in progress at decisions were based on national legislation the date of its implementation. which did not comply with the directive.
61. The second paragraph of A r t i c l e4 58. Those cases, however, differed in one provides as follows: important respect from that with which we are now dealing, in so far as the 'adjudi- cating authority', that is to say, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in the Netherlands or the Municipality of Milan, 'Member States shall provide that these were administrative bodies or decentralized laws, regulations and administrative pro- authorities which had themselves a direct visions 15 are to be applied to proceedings in and specific obligation towards the under- progress on the date of actual implemen- takings in question, namely, to award them tation of this recommendation and shall the contract if the application of the ensure, by means of appropriate transitional substantive rules and of the procedures laid measures, adequate legal safeguards for the down by the directive led to their selection. rights of other creditors of the debtor The applicants were thus pressing claims undertaking.' against public authorities and not against other individuals. The fact that acceptance of those claims might have detrimentally affected other individuals does not, however, mean that the directive was 62. The seventh recital in the preamble to directly applied against such individuals. the recommendation stipulates for its part that 14 — Judgments of 20 September 1988 in Case 31/87 Gebroedcn Beentjes v Stale of lhe Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635, and of 22 June 1989 in Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo v Comune di 15 — Thai ¡s to say, the laws, regulations and administrative Milano [1989 ] ECR 1839 provisions necessary to comply with the recommendation
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' . . . the Member States should consequently directive or an ECSC recommendation is a ensure, by means of appropriate transitional concept of Community law. A provision, in measures, adequate legal safeguards for the respect of its content, is either unconditional rights of other creditors of the undertaking or it is not. In the case before us, it is not. liable to levies, particularly in respect of means of redress against the ranking of debts carried out following the implemen- tation of this Recommendation'. 67. Moreover, it is neither clear nor specific because there is a great deal of uncertainty as to the nature of the 'appropriate transi- tional measures' and their possible effect. 63. The first conclusion which may be Was the Commission thinking of a means of drawn from those two texts is that the redress with the sole purpose of obtaining Member States do not have the option, as judicial confirmation that the liquidator had the Commission suggests, to introduce tran- correctly conferred the necessary rank on sitional measures, but are in fact obliged to debts owed to the ECSC? do so.
68. Alternatively, should the transitional 64. The second paragraph of Article 4 is measures provide that the preference not, therefore, an unconditional provision accorded to the ECSC must be exercised but it does expressly make the application of exclusively at the expense of the Member Articles 1 and 2 to proceedings for recovery State, in that the latter must 'share' its own which are already in progress dependent on rights with the ECSC by charging the pref- there being adequate legal safeguards for erential debts owed to the ECSC to its own the rights of creditors other than the ECSC. preferential debts, in such a way that other creditors find themselves in the same situation as if the preferential rank in respect of debts owed to the ECSC did not exist? 65. The Commission maintains, however, that transitional measures may possibly already exist in a number of Member States, with the result that those Member States do 69. On the other hand, does the provision not have to enact any such provisions. It is envisage a transitional measure which for the national courts, according to the provides that when liabilities of an insolvent Commission, to determine whether or not undertaking have been assessed by the that is so, and in the event that it is, the liquidator or when a pro rata allocation of second paragraph of Article 4 could have the assets has already been made, the ECSC direct effect in those Member States. may no longer call that decision into question?
66. That contention fails to convince me. On the one hand, it is difficult to imagine 70. It would appear, for those reasons, that how an existing law in a Member State may the second paragraph of Article 4 of the already contain a transitional measure recommendation, applicable in the Busseni applying to future amendments of that law. case, cannot, in principle, be regarded as an On the other hand it must be stressed that 'unconditional and sufficiently precise' the concept of the 'direct effect' of a provision.
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71. Nevertheless, cases might arise in which In the present case, the State is affected in no individual holds a debt of a rank lower its capacity as the creditor of an insolvent than or equal to that of the ECSC and in undertaking. which only the preferential status of the ECSC and that of the State are in compe- tition. Let us suppose for example that LIT 500 million remain to be distributed and that the two debts mentioned above 74. With some reservations I would even go each amount to LIT 500 million. My view a step further and observe that, even if there is that in such a case the national authorities are creditors other than the State and the would be correct in dividing the available ECSC, the competent national authorities assets in equal amounts between the State are entitled, without affecting the rights of and the ECSC, because the State itself those other creditors, to divide the amount would thereby be obliged to make a direct normally reserved for the State between it sacrifice for the benefit of the ECSC. The and the ECSC on a pro rata basis in position would be the same where the total accordance with their respective claims. assets still available were, in any case, sufficient only to meet debts owed to the State and where no individual was entitled to a portion of the assets.
75. I do not, however, believe that one should go further and allow the ECSC to set the full amount which it would have 72 Since the application of Articles 1 and 2 received (if the recommendation had been of Recommendation 86/198 in those implemented) against that of the State, potential situations entails consequences as because that would amount in practice to against the State alone, I believe that those granting to debts owed to the ECSC, not provisions should be capable of being relied the same rank as that reserved for tax debts on directly by an individual, in this case the owed to the State, as envisaged by the ECSC itself. recommendation, but rather a higher rank.
73. Support for that view is to be found in the Marsball judgment, already cited, where 76. That approach is equally valid in the it was stated that: context of proceedings for recovery which are in progress. The State cannot be allowed to shelter behind its failure to introduce adequate legal safeguards for its own rights as creditor for the purpose of denying to '. . . where a person involved in legal debts owed to the ECSC the same rank as proceedings is able to rely on a directive as that falling on tax debts owed to itself. against the State he may do so regardless of According to the case-law of the Court, the the capacity in which the latter is acting, State may not rely, as against the ECSC, on whether employer or public authority. In its own non-compliance with the obligation either case it is necessary to prevent the State devolving on it under the second paragraph from taking advantage of its own failure of Article 4 and cannot thereby take to comply with Community law' (para- advantage of its failure to comply with graph 49). Community law.
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77. In view of all the foregoing considerations, I would suggest that the Court replies as follows to the first question submitted by the tribunale civile e penale di Brescia:
‘The European Coal and Steel Community cannot rely, to the prejudice of indi- viduals, on provisions of Recommendation 86/198 which have not yet been implemented in national law. It may, however, rely on that recommendation as against the Member State concerned and the national court is obliged to entertain such a claim when it may be satisfied by dividing on a pro rata basis between the ECSC and the State that portion of the assets normally devolving on the State by virtue of its preferential status with regard to tax debts.’
III — The question of the application of between creditors provided for by their Recommendation 86/198 to debts arising national laws’ (Article 1), including, under prior to its adoption the conditions laid down in the second part of the second paragraph of Article 4, ‘proceedings in progress on the date of [its] actual implementation’. Moreover, it follows 78. In its second preliminary question, to be expressly from the seventh recital in the considered if Recommendation 86/198 does preamble to the recommendation that its have 'direct and immediate effect', the application to proceedings in progress is national court asks if the recommendation intended to ‘ensure the most extensive applies not only to debts arising after its possible recovery of debts arising from the adoption on 13 May 1986, but also to those application of levies in the years preceding which arose prior to that date. In order to the adoption of the recommendation.’ answer that question, three situations may be envisaged. 81. C — As the relevant texts are very clear and do not give rise, in general, to any diffi- 79. A — In so far as that question concerns culties of interpretation, it seems possible to the capacity of the recommendation to be me that the second question should be relied upon as against individuals, it serves understood as referring in reality to the no purpose, in my opinion, bearing in mind validity of the recommendation, in so far as the reply to the first question. the fact that it applies to debts arising prior to its adoption would confer on it an illegal retrospective effect.
80. B — Regarding its capacity to be relied upon, as against the State, to the extent 82. In that connection it is first of all outlined above, it may suffice to observe necessary to state that the recommendation that the recommendation applies to debts in has no truly retrospective effect, of such a respect of ECSC levies irrespective of the kind as might make it applicable to a date date on which they arose. Indeed, the preceding its adoption. It is intended to recommendation draws no distinction come into force at the moment when between those debts, but simply provides national provisions adopted for its that it applies to ‘all cases of competition implementation enter into effect, by 1
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January 1988 at the latest. The provision preventing new rules from applying to the that in future certain debts, even existing future effects of situations which arose ones, shall have a preferential rank, in under the earlier rules'. 16 respect of competition among creditors, certainly does not amount to a retrospective 86. Recommendation 86/198 may thus be measure. applied to situations which arose prior to its entry into force but which had not been 83. To the extent to which that may definitively settled at that date. possibly give rise to criticism based on the principle of legal certainty, two comments are necessary. 87. Finally, we have seen that, in so far as the recommendation is to apply to 84. First, since levies are the principal proceedings for recovery already in progress source of revenue of the ECSC (third at the moment of its implementation, recital), the Community may have felt Member States are required to ensure that justified in ensuring the most extensive they do not prejudice rights acquired by possible recovery of debts arising from their other creditors under the provisions of the application, including those arising in the previously applicable national law. To the years preceding the adoption of the recom- extent to which those creditors might have mendation (seventh recital). expected, in all confidence, that debts owed to them would continue to be treated in the 85. Secondly, the Court has consistently manner laid down by national law when held that they first arose, it must be pointed out that the recommendation itself prescribes the ' . . . the field of application of the principle adoption of the provisions necessary for of legitimate expectation cannot be their legitimate expectation to be duly extended to the point of generally protected.
88. On the basis of the preceding considerations, I would suggest that the Court gives the following answer to the second question referred by the tribunale civile e penale di Brescia:
‘The aforementioned recommendation could validly stipulate that measures adopted for its implementation should apply to debts arising after the date of its adoption, as well as to those arising prior to that date, on the understanding that in proceedings for recovery already in progress at the date of its implementation, adequate legal safeguards for the rights of creditors other than the ECSC are ensured.'
16 — Sec in particular the judgment of 14 January 1987 in Case 278/84 Germany v Comminimi [1987) ECR 1, paragraph 36.
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IV — The mandatory nature of the However, should the Court wish to reply to time-limit laid down for the implementation the first part of the question, it would of Recommendation 86/198 suffice to point out that while under the third paragraph of Article 14 of the ECSC 89. In its third question, the national court Treaty recommendations leave the choice of asks whether the time-limit of 1 January the methods to those to whom they are 1988 laid down by Article 4 of the recom- addressed, they are none the less binding as mendation is mandatory, so that failure to to the aims to be pursued. The latter include comply with it gives rise, according to the the entry into force, within the periods case-law of the Italian Constitutional Court, stipulated, of national provisions necessary to doubts as to the constitutionality of the for their implementation. It cannot therefore Italian legislation (on the ground of be doubted that the time-limit of 1 January infringement of Article 11 of the Italian 1988 is mandatory and that any failure to Constitution). comply with it constitutes, on the part of the Member State involved, a failure to 90. It is clear that in the context of a fulfil one of the obligations devolving on it reference for a preliminary ruling the Court under the ECSC Treaty and which is has no jurisdiction to rule on the conse- capable of giving rise to proceedings for quences in national law of a potential failure to fulfil obligations as referred in breach of a provision of Community law. Article 88 of that Treaty.
91. I therefore propose that the Court answers the third question as follows:
'The time-limit laid down by Article 4 of Recommendation 86/198 for the entry into force of national provisions necessary for the implementation of that Recom- mendation is mandatory. The Court has no jurisdiction, however, to express an opinion on the consequences in national law of a failure to comply with that time- limit.'
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