C-192/89
ECLI:EU:C:1990:205
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OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL DARMON delivered on 15 May 1990*
Mr President, Mr Sevince applied to the Staatssecretaris Members of the Court, van Justitie for a residence permit, indi cating as the ground for his application the fact that he was working as an employed person and relying on a provision of Decisions Nos 2/76 and 1/80 of the 1. By judgment of 1 June 1989, the Raad EEC-Turkey Association Council, van State (Netherlands court of last instance according to which a Turkish worker duly in administrative matters) referred to the registered as belonging to the labour force Court for a preliminary ruling three of a Member State is entitled, after a questions on provisions contained in specified period of legal employment, to decisions of the EEC-Turkey Association free access to any employment of his choice. Council, an authority established by the It is important to note that Mr Sevince EEC-Turkey Association Agreement. 1 The considers that the periods of employment questions relate to a dispute between Mr completed under the authorization issued by Sevince, a Turkish national, and the Staats the Minister for Social Affairs whilst the secretaris van Justitie (State Secretary of effect of the non-extension of his residence Justice) of the Netherlands. permit was suspended pending final judgment on his appeal should be taken into account in calculating his period of legal employment within the meaning of the abovementioned decisions. 2. Mr Sevince, who on 22 February 1979 obtained a residence permit allowing him to live in the Netherlands by reason of his marriage to a fellow national residing there, was refused an extension of his permit on 11 September 1980 by the Staatssecretaris 3. In appeal proceedings brought by Mr van Justitie. The extension was refused Sevince against the decision of the Staats because Mr and Mrs Sevince had separated. secretaris van Justitie rejecting his The application for review lodged by Mr application of 13 April 1987, the Raad van Sevince and his appeal against the implied State decided to refer questions to the decision rejecting his request, brought Court on the scope and meaning of the before the Raad van State, suspended the provisions of Decisions Nos 2/76 and 1/80. effect of the refusal to extend his residence Essentially, the national court asks whether permit. Under Netherlands legislation, that the relevant provisions of those decisions are suspensory effect is automatic in the case of ones which the Court has jurisdiction to appeals. 2Mr Sevince's appeal was dismissed interpret under Article 177 of the EEC by a judgment delivered on 12 June 1986 by Treaty, if so whether they are directly the Raad van State and on 13 April 1987 applicable in the Member States of the EEC, and, if they are, whether the term * Original language: French. 'legal employment' used in them refers only 1 — Agreement establishing an Association between the to compliance with the legislation on the European Economic Community and Turkey, signed at Ankara on 12 September 1963, concluded on behalf of the employment of aliens or whether it also Community by Council Decision of 23 December 1963 relates to the possession of a residence (published in English in OJ 1973 C 113, p 1). 2 — Article38 of the Vreemdelingenwet (Aliens Law). permit.
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I — The first preliminary question institutional framework of the Association and that
4. The first question, it seems to me, does not present any real difficulty. As pointed out at the hearing by the Netherlands 'since it is directly connected with the Asso Government and the Commission, the ciation Agreement', judgment of the Court of 14 November 1989 in Greece v Commission 3 appears to have dispelled any doubts which might have persisted regarding the jurisdiction of the Decision No 2/80 formed, Court to interpret under Article 177 the EEC Turkey-Association Council decisions at issue. 'from its entry into force, an integral part of the Community legal system'. 6 5. What does that judgment tell us? The Court stated first that, as it has consistently held, most recently in the judgment in Demirel, 4precisely with regard to the EEC 6. I consider that the acts of the Association Turkey-Association Agreement, Council with which this case is concerned, namely Decisions Nos 2/76 and 1/80, fall to be classified in the same way and form part of the Community legal system. The 'the provisions of an agreement concluded relevant provisions of those decisions, which by the Council under Articles 228 and 238 relate to the circumstances of Turkish of the Treaty form, as from the entry into workers duly registered as belonging to the force of the Agreement, an integral part of labour force of a Member State, are linked the Community legal system'. 5 with the objectives laid down in Article 12 of the Association Agreement, according to which the contracting parties agreed to be The Court then stated that, guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the EEC Treaty for the purpose of progressively securing freedom of movement for workers 'for the attainment of the objectives laid between them, and by Article 36 of the down by the EEC-Turkey Association additional protocol, 7 which provides that Agreement and in the circumstances free movement is to be secured by provided for by that Agreement, Article 22 progressive stages between the end of the thereof confers a power of decision on the 12th year and 22nd year after the entry into Association Council'. force of the Association Agreement. The second recital in the preamble to Decision No 2/76 makes clear that the abovemen- Thus, with regard to Association Council tioned provisions of the Agreement and of Decision No 2/80, laying down the the Additional Protocol imply that the conditions for the provision of aid to Member States of the Community and Turkey, the Court considered that the Asso Turkey accord each other priority as ciation Council placed that aid within the 6 — Ibid., paragraph 13.
3 — Case 30/88 [1989] ECR 371). 7 — Additional protocol signed at Brussels on 23 November 1970, concluded on behalf of the Community by Council 4 — Case 12/86 [1987] ECR 3719. Regulation No . 2760/72 of 19 December 1972 (OJ 1973 5 — Case 30/88, supra, paragraph 12. C 113, p. 18).
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regards access by their workers to their Decisions Nos 2/76 and 1/80 relate does respective employment markets. As not place them outside the Community legal indicated in the third recital, the agreement order or, accordingly, mean that the Court implements that principle as a first stage. has no jurisdiction to interpret them. The second stage was brought about by the social provisions of Decision No 1/80. 8. The previous decisions of the Court clearly establish that its jurisdiction to interpret provisions of an agreement concluded by the Council derives directly 7. It will also be seen that Decisions Nos from the fact that the latter form part of the 2/76 and 1/80 are directly associated with Community legal order. The Demirel the Association Agreement and its judgment referred expressly in that regard Additional Protocol. I see no reason not to to the judgment of the Court of 30 April draw the same conclusion as for Decision 10 1974 in Haegeman and drew the No 2/80, namely that they are included in conclusion indicated above. The Court's the Community legal system. In particular, jurisdiction to interpret the provisions at it cannot be objected that, with respect to issue of Decisions Nos 2/76 and 1/80 may freedom of movement for workers, also be inferred from the fact that, as from Decisions Nos 2/76 and 1/80 remain their entry into force, they form part of the outside the Community legal order by Community legal order. Therefore, I reason of the fact that it is incumbent upon suggest that the Court answer the first the Member States to issue the necessary question submitted by the Raad van State in implementing rules. In the Demirel the affirmative. judgment, referring back to the Kupferberg judgment of 26 October 1982, 8the Court stated that, II — The second preliminary question
9. The second question seeks to determine 'in ensuring respect for commitments arising whether the provisions at issue of Decisions from an agreement concluded by the Nos 2/76 and 1/80 are directly applicable Community institutions the Member States in the territory of the Member States. This fulfil, within the Community system, an issue was the focus of greatest attention obligation in relation to the Community, both in the written procedure and at the which has assumed responsibility for the due hearing. Whilst Mr Sevince and the performance of the agreement', 9 Commission consider that it should be answered in the affirmative, the Governments of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany take the opposite view. and drew the conclusion that it did indeed have jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement and of the protocol on the free movement 10. Since the provisions at issue are neither of workers. I therefore consider that the in a Community Treaty nor in a 'traditional' matter to which the relevant provisions of measure of a Community institution but appear in decisions adopted by an authority 8 — Case 104/81 [1982] ECR 3641. 9 — Case 12/86, supra, paragraph 11 10 — Case 181/73 [1974] ECR 449.
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set up under an agreement concluded by the containing directly applicable provisions. Community with a non-member country, it Thus, the criteria laid down in the Demirel is first necessary to clarify the principles to judgment must be relied on in this case, a be referred to in deciding whether or not view expressed, moreover, by the parties to they are directly applicable. the main proceedings and the Commission, and, for its part, the Federal Republic of Germany submitted that it was impossible to transpose them to the decisions of the Asso ciation Council only because, in its view, 11. In the Demirel judgment, the Court they did not belong to the Community legal stated in general terms: order. In other words, their inclusion in the Community legal order having been estab lished, there can no longer be any dispute as to the relevance to the present case of the criteria laid down in the Demirel judgment. 'A provision in an agreement concluded by the Community with non-member countries must be regarded as being directly applicable when, regard being had to its 12. It is therefore necessary now to examine wording and the purpose and nature of the the relevant provisions in the light of those agreement itself, the provision contains a criteria, nevertheless bearing in mind that clear and precise obligation which is not the purpose and nature of Association subject, in its implementation or effects, to 11 Council decisions must be appraised against the adoption of any subsequent measure'. the background of the Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol.
Applying those principles, the Court considered, in that same decision, whether 13. For the purpose of attaining the certain provisions of the EEC-Turkey Asso objectives set by the Agreement and in the ciation Agreement were directly applicable. circumstances envisaged in it, Article 22 of Those principles seem to me likewise to be the Association Agreement confers on the relevant to a decision as to the direct appli Association Council a 'power to take cability or otherwise of provisions contained decisions', also indicating that each of the in decisions of the Association Council set parties is to 'take the measures necessary to up by the EEC-Turkey Agreement. The implement the decisions taken'. The decisions of that Council, as we have seen, provisions of the Association Council form part, like the Association Agreement, decisions whose direct applicability is at of the Community legal order and therefore issue relate, as I have pointed out, to the there is no apparent reason for taking the free movement of workers. On that subject, view, a priori, that they cannot contain Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement states directly applicable provisions, and in any that 'the Contracting Parties agree to be event the Agreement itself ruled out any guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the such impossibility. On the contrary, I Treaty establishing the Community for the consider that the fact that a provision purpose of progressively securing freedom belongs to the Community legal order rules of movement for workers between them'. out any automatic impossibility of its For its part, Article 36 of the Additional Protocol provides that 'freedom of 11— Case 12/86, supra, paragraph 14. movement for workers between Member
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States of the Community and Turkey shall State 'shall enjoy free access in that Member be secured by progressive stages in State to any paid employment of his choice, accordance with the principles set out in after four years of legal employment'. As is Article 12 of the Agreement of Association apparent, the second provision differs essen between the end of the 12th and 22nd year tially from the first in so far as it reduces after the entry into force of that the requirement of legal employment from Agreement', adding that 'the Council of the original five years to four years. Association shall decide on the rules necessary to that end'.
14. Article 1 of Decision No 2/76 'estab 17. Article 7 of Decision No 2/76 provides lishes for a first stage the detailed rules for that 'the Member States of the Community the implementation of Article 36 of the and Turkey may not introduce new Additional Protocol', that first stage lasting restrictions on the conditions of access to four years, as from 1 December 1976. employment applicable to workers legally According to Article 1 thereof, Decision No resident and employed in their territory'. By 1/80 is intended to provide for 'the revital- contrast, Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 ization and development of the Association'. inserts, after the word 'workers', the words For that purpose, it includes provisions on 'and members of their families'. agricultural and economic and technical cooperation, which enter into force on 1 July 1980, together with social provisions, which apply as from 1 December 1980. 18. If, to start with, we rely solely on the letter of the provisions, it would be difficult not to recognize that the provisions just 15. The national court's questions relate cited are, prima facie, clear. Article 2(b) of specifically to Article 2(b) of Decision No Decision No 2/76 and Article 6(1), third 2/76 and / or Article 6(1) of Decision No indent, of Decision No 1/80 seemed to me 1/80, on the one hand, and, on the other, unambiguously to lay down the requirement to Article 7 of Decision No 2/76 and/or that free access to any employment of his Article 13 of Decision No 1/80. In order to choice must be granted to a Turkish worker determine the effects of those provisions, it who has been legally employed for a clearly is essential to cite their precise terms. specified period in a Member State. Articles 7 of Decision No 2/76 and 13 of Decision No 1/80 appear unequivocally to impose a standstill clause on the Member States and 16. Article 2(b) of Decision No 2/76 Turkey regarding the conditions of access provides that 'after five years of legal to the employment of workers legally employment in a Member State of the resident and employed in their territories. Community, a Turkish worker shall enjoy free access in that country to any paid employment of his choice'. For its part, Article 6(1), third indent, of Decision No 1/80, which is included amongst the social provisions of that decision, provides that a 19. But appearances can be deceiving and it Turkish worker who is duly registered as is necessary to verify whether the purpose belonging to the labour force of a Member and nature of the Association Agreement or
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the scheme of Decisions Nos 2/76 and 1/80 the Court analysed the content of Articles preclude the conclusion that the obligations 12 of the Agreement and 36 of the protocol at issue are clear, precise and unconditional. before concluding that In other words, the provisions at issue must be placed in their context.
'[those articles] essentially serve to set out a programme and are not sufficiently precise and unconditional to be capable of 20. Does the general spirit of the Asso governing directly the movement of 4 ciation Agreement, as evinced by its workers'. 1 essential approach, disclose any features which are incompatible with direct applica bility of the provisions concerned? The 21. Thus, it was from the legal approach Court's judgment in Demirel does not, it adopted, the method — one might would appear, allow that question to be say — employed by the Agreement and the answered positively. If, in its basic approach, protocol, in particular by means of Article the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement 12 of one and Article 36 of the other, that excluded from the legal framework created the Court inferred that there was no direct by it any directly applicable rule, the applicability. On the other hand, the Court Demirel judgment would have taken that did not make the slightest mention of fact into account and stated that Article 12 anything relating to the actual foundations of the Agreement and Article 36 of the of the Agreement which militated against Additional Protocol were not directly the direct applicability of its provisions. I applicable. However, it did not do so. In therefore consider that there is nothing in fact, essentially, the Court stated that the basic approach underlying the Agreement to exclude direct applicability.
'in structure and content, the Agreement is 22. That impression is not changed by a characterized by the fact that, in general, it comparison between, on the one hand, the sets out the aims of the Association and lays EEC-Greece Association Agreement and, down guidelines for the attainment of those on the other, the EEC-Turkey Association aims without itself establishing the detailed Agreement and the Additional Protocol 12 rules for doing so'. thereto. In fact, such a comparison discloses fairly broad similarities. It is to be noted that the preambles to the two Agreements are almost entirely identical, and in particular it should be noted that the fourth Then, after observing that paragraph in the preamble to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement, 'recognizing that the support given by the European Economic Community to the efforts of the Turkish people to improve 'only in respect of certain specific matters their standard of living will facilitate the are detailed rules laid down by the protocols accession of Turkey to the Community at a annexed to the Agreement', 13 later date', is drafted in exactly the same terms as the fourth paragraph in the 12 — Case 12/86, supra, paragraph 16. 13 — Ibid. 14 — Case 12/86, supra, paragraph 23.
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preamble to the EEC-Greece Association need to ensure an accelerated development Agreement, except of course that in the of the Turkish economy and to improve the latter reference is made to the Greek people level of employment and the living and the accession of Greece. That certainly conditions of the Turkish people' is drafted accounts for the fact that the actual content in almost identical terms to those of Article of the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement, 2(1) of the EEC-Greece Association supplemented by the Additional Protocol, is Agreement, and the second paragraph of often very close to that of the EEC-Greece Article 2 in both cases shows that, in Association Agreement. principle, each of the agreements is devoted to the attainment of the 'objectives' mentioned in the first paragraph. It will also be seen that, in the EEC-Turkey Agreement, in order to attain those Objectives' a 'customs union shall be
16 progressively established', and the 23. Thus, in view of the similarities of basic Contracting Parties are to 'align the approach in the preambles to the economic policies of Turkey' and the Agreements, it would be difficult to find in Community more closely in order to ensure one reasons for excluding direct applica the proper functioning of the Association bility which are absent from the other. It and the progress of the joint measures 17 will be remembered that, in its judgment in which this requires' whereas in the
5 Pabst & Richarz, 1 the Court decided that EEC-Greece Agreement, the attainment of Article 53(1) of the EEC-Greece Asso the abovementioned 'objectives' will involve 8 ciation Agreement was directly applicable. the 'establishment of a customs union' 1 and That result would have been inconceivable if 'the promotion of joint measures by the the basic approach set out in the preamble Parties and harmonization of their policies
9 to that Agreement, in terms almost identical in the fields mentioned in this Agreement'. 1 to those of the preamble to the EEC-Turkey In fact, the significant differences between Agreement, had excluded direct applica the two agreements, as regards matters of bility. Accordingly, there is no reason, a principle, appear to reside above all in the priori, to conclude that the basic approach speed at which the objectives pursued are to underlying the latter agreement, for its part, be attained. In that regard, the EEC-Turkey excluded such direct applicability. Association Agreement provides for a preparatory phase prior to a transitional phase, whereas the EEC-Greece Association Agreement provides for no preparatory
phase. These specific 'rates' account for the adverb 'progressively' used in the EEC-Turkey Agreement in relation to the 24. A similar conclusion must be drawn establishment of a customs union. They also regarding the general objectives set out in account for the fact that the EEC-Turkey Title I of the EEC-Greece Association Agreement, the content of which is, in Agreement and Title I of the EEC-Turkey numerous respects, more general than that Association Agreement. Article 2(1) of the of the EEC-Greece Agreement, was latter agreement, which states that 'the aim supplemented, at the end of the preparatory of this Agreement is to promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of 16 — Article2(2) of the EEC-Turkey Agreement trade and economic relations between the 17 — Second indent of Article 4(1) of the EEC-Turkey Parties, while taking full account of the Agreement. 18 — Article 2(2) of the EEC-Greece Agreement 15 — Case 17/81 [1982] ECR 1331 19 — Ibid.
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phase, by an additional protocol which Greece, a function identical to that of the clarified most of those points. latter article. The Court added that
'it forms part of a group of provisions the purpose of which was to prepare for the 25. Thus, as far as the general objectives of entry of Greece into the Community by the the two Agreements are concerned, as set establishment of a customs union, by the out in each of them in Title I, the heading harmonization of agricultural polices, by the of which is 'Principles', the similarities again introduction of freedom of movement for seem to predominate, particularly in the workers and by other measures for the context of the transitional phase of the gradual adjustment to the requirements of 22 EEC-Turkey Agreement, which is what is at Community law'. issue in the present case. Apart from the question of 'rates' of progress, it is apparent that, in the definition of general objectives, Then, stating that accordingly it followed the only noteworthy difference lies in the fact that the EEC-Turkey Agreement places greater emphasis on the need for 'coordi nation of the economic policies of the 'from the wording of Article 53(1) ... and 20 Contracting Parties' whereas, as pointed from the objective and nature of the Asso out earlier, the EEC-Greece Agreement lays ciation Agreement of which it forms part' 21 greater stress on 'harmonization' of policies. I do not think that such a difference in the enumeration of principles is sufficient, in principle, to deprive of any that that provision precluded a national direct applicability the provisions by means system of relief from providing more of which the general objectives of the favourable tax treatment for domestic spirits EEC-Turkey Agreement are to be attained. than for those imponed from Greece and that it contained
'a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to 26. If we now move on from the question 23 the adoption of any subsequent measure', of basic approach and general objectives of the EEC-Turkey Agreement to the question of implementation of its specific objectives, we find that a further comparison must be the Court concluded that, 'in those circum 24 made with the EEC-Greece Association stances' the provision in question was to Agreement, by reference to the be regarded as directly applicable. Pabst & Richarz judgment cited earlier. As I said, the Court analysed Article 53(1) of that Agreement and held that that provision, 27. As we have seen, the preamble to the drafted in similar terms to those of Article EEC-Turkey Association Agreement 95 of the Treaty, served, for the purposes of contains nothing to indicate a priori that the the association between the Community and 22 — Case 17/81, supra, paragraph 26. 20 — Article 5 of the EEC-Turkey Agreement. 23 — Paragraph 27. 21 — Article 2(2) of the EEC-Greece Agreement. 24 — Ibid.
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provisions of the Agreement do not pursue Association Agreement, which to some the objective of preparing for the possible extent reflect a concern for the 'gradual entry of Turkey into the Community. It adjustment' just referred to. should also be noted that those provisions are, as far as the conditions for establishing a customs union are concerned, broadly similar to those of the EEC-Greece 28. Undeniably, the EEC-Turkey Asso Agreement. On the other hand, the ciation Agreement, although containing, provisions of the EEC-Turkey Agreement with its Additional Protocol, a set of concerning agriculture do not relate to provisions which reflect the aim of gradual harmonization of agricultural policies, as in adjustment by Turkey to the requirements the EEC-Greece Agreement, but to the of Community law, goes less far in that adoption by Turkey of common agricultural direction than the EEC-Greece Agreement. policy measures 'which must be applied in It does not thereby follow that the Turkey if free movement of agricultural provisions in the first Agreement referring products between it and the Community is to the attainment of that objective cannot, 25 in principle, be directly applicable.
The to be achieved'. With respect to freedom of movement for workers, the third matter previous decisions of the Court indicate that expressly referred to in the Pabst & Richarz it is not necessary for a provision to be judgment, it must be noted that, according included in an 'in-depth' Association to Article 44(1) of the EEC-Greece Asso Agreement, if you will pardon the ciation Agreement, 'freedom of movement expression, for it to be capable of direct for workers under Articles 48 and 49 of the application. In fact, the Court recognized Treaty establishing the Community shall be the direct applicability of a provision of the
27 secured between the Member States and Yaounde Convention of 1963 and of a Greece at a date and in accordance with provision of the Free Trade Agreement 28 rules to be determined by the Council of concluded in 1972 with Portugal, even 26 though, in those two cases, which, Association'. Article 12 of the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement, for its moreover, related to circumstances very part, merely provides that the Contracting different from each other, the degree of Parties agree to be guided by Articles 48, 49 adjustment to the requirements of and 50 of the Treaty establishing the Community law was clearly less Community for the purpose of progressively far-reaching than in the case of the securing freedom of movement for workers EEC-Turkey Association Agreement and
between them. It is clear that, in this area as there was no mention of the objective of in that of agriculture, the wording of the subsequent accession to the EEC, by EEC-Turkey Agreement reflects a lesser contrast with the indication given in the concern for 'gradual adjustment to the preamble to the latter Agreement. requirements of Community law', to use the precise words of the Pabst & Richarz judgment. It must be emphasized, however, that that Agreement, supplemented by the 29. I am therefore of the opinion that there Additional Protocol, contains, with regard is nothing in the content of the to approximation of economic policies, in EEC-Turkey Association Agreement as a particular competition, and approximation whole, supplemented by its Additional of laws, provisions which are fairly close, if Protocol, to indicate, despite the provision not similar, to those of the EEC-Greece for less extensive adjustment to the
27 — Judgment of 5 February 1976 in Case 87/75 Bresciani 25 — Article 33(1) of the Additional Protocol. [1976] ECR 129. 28 — Case 104/81, supra. 26 — Emphasis added.
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requirements of Community law than in the Decision No 1/80 of 19 September 1980 case of the EEC-Greece Agreement, that which, with regard to Turkish workers who the principle of direct applicability does not are already duly integrated in the labour extend to its provisions. Consequently, it force of a Member State, prohibits any likewise does not seem to me that the direct further restrictions on the conditions applicability of the decisions of the Asso governing access to employment', ciation Council provided for by the Agreement can be excluded.
and then pointed out that 30. May one then rely on the essentially programmatic nature that the Court attributed to Article 12 of the Association 'in the sphere of family reunification, on the Agreement and Article 36 of the Additional other hand, no decision of that kind was Protocol and infer as a result that the 30 adopted', provisions of the decisions of the Asso ciation Council which add the detail thereto cannot be directly applicable? It seems in fact that such an analysis cannot be based before concluding that the articles in on the Court's judgment in Demirel. In that question of the Agreement and of the decision the Court expressly accounted for protocol 'serve to set out a programme'. the purely programmatic scope of those articles by referring to the fact that the specific rules applicable in that area are a matter to be dealt with by the Association 31. I thus consider that, far from excluding Council by means of decisions. In a priori the direct applicability of decisions particular, the Court stated that of the Association Council on free movement of workers, the Court's judgment in Demirel in fact makes it clear, in the light 'Article 36 of the Protocol gives the Council of the provisions of the Agreement and of of Association exclusive powers to lay down the Protocol, that those decisions to some detailed rules for the progressive attainment extent have the junction of laying down of freedom of movement for workers in precise rules in that regard. One might also accordance with political and economic ask whether in fact it did not expressly considerations arising in particular out of attach a clarifying 'label' to Decision No the progressive establishment of the customs 1/80 in so far as it prohibits the imposition union and the alignment of economic on Turkish workers already duly integrated policies, pursuant to such arrangements as into the labour market of the Member the Council of Association may deem States of any new restrictions concerning 29 conditions of access to employment. In so necessary'. far as the decisions of the Association Council on freedom of movement for workers are intended to serve that purpose, The Court added that it seems wholly irrelevant to claim that the mere fact of recognizing that Article 12 of the Agreement and Article 36 of the 'the only decision which the Council of Protocol serve to set out a programme Association adopted on the matter was stands in the way, by definition, of the
29 — Case 12/86, supra, paragraph 21. 30 — Paragraph 22.
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direct applicability of the decisions which came within the competence of the expound on those articles. Community or within that of the Member States, was necessary in any case in order to give effect to decisions of the Association Council in the Member States and there is 32. Having reached this stage of the thus no question of the direct application of discussion, I consider that it is impossible to decisions of that type. detect in the external context of Decisions Nos 2/76 and 1/80 strictu sensu any obstacle which as a matter of principle prevents clear, precise and unconditional provisions 35. Those statements regarding the need, as of those decisions which implement Article a matter of principle, for transposition of 12 of the Agreement and 36 of the the decisions of the Association Council Additional Protocol from being directly appear to be contradicted by the judgment applicable. of the Court in Greece v Commission, supra. The Court, after analysing the provisions of Decision No 2/80 of the EEC-Turkey 33. It is now appropriate, therefore, to Association Council, expressed the view that focus on the scheme of the provisions in they question within the context of the abovementioned decisions of the Association Council. It is in that connection in 'enabled them to be implemented without particular that the Governments of the Netherlands and of the Federal Republic of the prior adoption of supplementary Germany regard those provisions as neither measures', precise nor unconditional.
and concluded therefore that 34. The objections of the Government of the Netherlands and of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany relate to 'Article 2 of the inter-governmental the scope of the provisions in question. The agreement does not have to be applied in Federal Republic of Germany laid particular 31 any circumstances'. emphasis on the fact that the Agreement, whilst not wholly excluding the adoption of decisions directly conferring individual advantages, nevertheless took as its starting It is not therefore, in my opinion, at all point the principle that transposition was necessary as a matter of principle that necessary of the decisions of the Association 'transposition measures' be adopted to Council and emphasized that, pursuant to enable provisions contained in decisions of the agreement on the measures to be taken the Association Council to be implemented. for implementation of the Association As illustrated by the judgment of the Court, Agreement concluded by the representatives the question whether implementing of the Governments of the Member States measures are to be taken by the Community on 12 September 1963, and in particular or by the Member States depends on the Article 2 thereof, it was provided that, with degree of precision of the terms in which regard to the EEC, all decisions of the the provisions at issue are expressed. But Association Council require a measure such measures do not constitute an abso transposing them. Accordingly, a measure of lutely essential requirement. that kind, the type of which would vary according to whether the field in question 31 — Case 30/88, supra, paragraph 16
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36. The same judgment also gives some 2(1)(b) of Decision No 2/76 and of Article inkling of an answer to the arguments of the 6(1), third indent, of Decision No 1/80 two governments which emphasize that appears, in particular, to make it possible to Article 12 of Decision No 2/76 and Article determine whether a situation is in breach 29 of Decision No 1/80 provide that the of the terms of those provisions by Contracting Parties are, each for their own hampering freedom of access to any part, to take any measures required for the employment covered by them. Similarly, the purposes of implementing the provisions of standstill clause contained in Article 7 of the decision, and to the specific observations Decision No 2/76 and Article 13 of of the Government of the Netherlands Decision No 1/80 appears to constitute a based on Article 2(2) of Decision No 2/76 precise prohibition whose application does and Article 6(3) of Decision No 1/80. not, in itself, call for recourse to According to the latter provisions, the implementing measures. Here again, it procedures for applying those articles are to seems to me that the terms of those be those established under national rules. provisions make it possible to determine For my part, I consider, in the light of the whether a given situation is in breach of judgment of the Court, that a provision them. It should also be observed that the contained in a decision of the Association last-mentioned articles do not even contain Council may be drafted in terms such that specific provisions concerning determination its application is not conditional upon of the procedures for implementation by implementing measures. The Contracting national rules. Parties must implement the provisions of the decisions of the Association Council but it is certainly not established that, in all cases, the application of those provisions is condi- tional upon implementing measures.
That depends, as the Court indicated, on the scheme of the provisions in question. The implementing measures affect the application of the provisions in question 38. That does not mean that certain only if they are necessary and not because procedures do not have to be laid down to they are in all cases, a priori, necessary. deal with certain details or to specify the conditions for implementation in cases which display certain particular features. But the fact that a provision does not contain as many specific rules as there are types of situations to be governed by it does not mean that it should be regarded as imprecise or conditional and, as such, not capable of
37. If we consider the very terms of the being directly applicable. The case-law of specific provisions in question, I confess that the Court contains a plethora of examples I do not see in them any clear indication of provisions whose general nature, which that the obligations formulated by them are made necessary an interpretation by the too vague or too imprecise to be applied Court as to whether they apply to a without recourse to implementing measures. particular type of case, did not in any way Freedom for a lawfully employed Turkish prevent their being recognized as directly worker to undertake any employment of his applicable. If it were necessary to deny choice, after a particular time, on the labour direct applicability to any provision of market of a Member State appears to Community law which did not give an constitute a sufficiently precise rule to be exhaustive description of the cases in which applied as such. The wording of Article it applied, whole sections of the case-law of
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the Court would disappear. Moreover, is it 'whilst Article 5 leaves the Member States a necessary to point out that the undeniable discretion with regard to methods, it pres competence of the Member States to cribes the result which those methods must 34 determine the means of attaining the result achieve'. pursued by a directive has not prevented the Court, in many cases, from recognizing the direct applicability of the provisions of a directive in the absence of national measures The Court thus concluded that Article 4(1) of transposition which are, nevertheless, of the directive in question necessary to provide the details of the implementing procedures?
'does not confer on Member States the power to make conditional or to limit the 39. A parallel may, in that respect, be application of the principle of equal drawn with the reasoning followed by the treatment within its field of application' Court in its judgment of 4 December 1986 in FNV. 32 Called on to give a decision on the direct applicability of Article 4(1) of Council Directive 79 / 7 / EEC of and that that provision 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of 33 social security, the Court stated that it is 'is sufficiently precise and unconditional to not possible, from the terms of Article 5 of allow individuals ... to rely upon it before that directive, which requires the Member 35 the national courts'. States
40. It seems to me that that analysis may, 'to take the measures necessary to ensure mutatis mutandis, be transposed to the that any laws, regulations and administrative present case in which, having regard to the provisions contrary to the principle of equal terms of the provisions at issue of Decisions treatment are abolished' Nos 2/76 and 1/80, the fact that the latter provide that the Contracting Parties are to take the measures required for their implementation and, if necessary, that the to infer that it lays down Member States are to lay down procedures for application is not sufficient to found the view that the application of the rule ensuring access to employment or 'conditions to which the prohibition of application of the standstill clause may be discrimination is subject', restricted or made conditional by the Member States. The clear content of those rules does not grant the Member States any power to make modifications thereto or to adding that add conditions.
32 — Case 71/85 [1986] ECR 3855. 34 — Case 71/85, supra, paragraph 20. 33 — OJ 1979 L 6, p. 24. 35 — Paragraph 21.
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41. The Government of the Netherlands 'apart from specific situations which may also referred, in arguing against recognition involve their application, the existence of of direct applicability, to the presence in such clauses which, moreover, do not affect Article 6 of Decision No 2/76 and Article the provisions prohibiting tax discrimi 12 of Decision No 1/80 of a safeguard nation, is not sufficient in itself to affect the clause. According to the first provision, direct applicability which may attach to 36 'where a Member State of the Community certain stipulations of the agreement'. or Turkey experiences or is threatened with disturbances on its employment market which might seriously jeopardize the standard of living or level of employment in a particular region, branch of activity or occupation, the State concerned may refrain Admittedly, the safeguard clauses contained from automatically applying Article 2(1)(a) in the EEC-Turkey decisions differ from and (b)'. The second is identical, apart from those in the free-trade agreement at issue in a change in the numbering of the provisions Kupferberg in so far as the latter applied 'as which it is possible not to apply auto a general rule' only after consideration matically. The Netherlands Government within the joint committee in the presence considers that the unilateral power thus of both parties, whereas no such reserved to the States which are parties to consideration is necessary before the former the Agreement, without prior authorization are applied. It will be noted, however, that or consultation and with notice merely it does not follow from the terms of the being given to the Association Council, Kupferberg judgment that that fact is alone must prompt the inference that the rule sufficient to exclude the direct applicability granting access to any employment, which is of the provisions in question. The Court's among those which it is possible not to decision states that 'as a general rule' there apply automatically in the circumstances was prior consideration in the presence of referred to earlier, cannot be directly both parties within the joint committee, but applicable. not in all cases. Above all, it seems to me that the judgment places emphasis on the specificity of the situations which may involve the application of the safeguard clauses. That specificity is also apparent in the relevant provisions of Decisions Nos 42. In its judgment in Kupferberg, the Court 2/76 and 1/80. They refer to the threat of noted, with respect to safeguard clauses 'disturbances on its employment market contained in the free trade agreement which might seriously jeopardize the between the EEC and Portugal, that standard of living or level of employment in a particular region, branch of activity or occupation', and it is also indicated therein that only those circumstances make it possible to 'refrain from automatically applying' certain provisions of the decisions. 'they apply only in specific circumstances This emphasizes, in my view, the fact that and as a general rule after consideration the safeguard clauses must be allowed to within the joint committee' cover only exceptional situations and that, for such situations, the rule is automatic application by the Member States of the provisions in question.
and that 36 — Case 104/81, supra, paragraph 21.
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43. In passing, it should be observed that Then, after examining more specifically such automatic application, referred to a certain provisions of the Agreement, the contrario in those safeguard clauses, appears Court concluded that the provision at issue, to detract from the view that the power of when examined in such a context, was the Member States to adopt measures to implement decisions of the Association Council or, as appropriate, to adopt detailed arrangements for applying certain of their provisions implies that they are empowered 'not capable of conferring on citizens of the to expound the content of the provisions at Community rights which they can invoke 40 issue in this case, in particular by adding before the courts'. conditions, and that would prevent their direct application. The adjective 'automatic' suggests rather, in my view, that the implementing conditions are no longer open to discussion. The Court has reaffirmed that position on several occasions, relying on the general context of GATT, with respect to other provisions of the Agreement, in particular in the Court's two judgments of 16 March 41 1983. 44. An analysis of the safeguard clauses contained in the Association Council decisions calls for reference to the position adopted by the Court in its judgment in 7 International Fruit Company* as to whether 45. It should be noted in the first place that the provisions of the General Agreement on the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement Tariffs and Trade (GATT) confer on indi does not appear to display the same general viduals in the Community the right to rely flexibility as that expressly referred to in the on them in legal proceedings. Having case of GATT. Without reverting to the regard, in replying to that question, to 'the overall context of the Association spirit, the general scheme and the terms' of Agreement, it is nevertheless important to 38 GATT, the Court stated that the latter note, parenthetically, that that context is clearly much more restrictive. It is apparent from a reading of paragraphs 22 to 26 of the judgment in International Fruit Company, focusing in particular on Article XXII (1) of GATT, according to which 'which, according to its preamble, is based 'each Contracting Party shall accord sympa on the principle of negotiations undertaken thetic consideration to, and shall afford on the basis of single "reciprocal and adequate opportunity for consultation mutually advantageous arrangements" is regarding, such representations', Article characterized by the great flexibility of its XXV (1) of the same document, which provisions, in particular those conferring the provides that the Contracting Parties 'may possibility of derogation, the measures to be consult with one or more Contracting taken when confronted with exceptional Parties on any question to which a satis difficulties and the settlement of conflicts 39 factory conclusion cannot be found through between the Contracting Parties'. 40 — Paragraph 27. 37 — Joined Cases 21/72 to 24/72 [1972) ECR 1219. 41 — Case 266/81 SIOT v Minutero delle finanze [1983] ECR 38 — Paragraph 20- 731, and Joined Cases 267 to 269/81 Amminntrazione delte 39 — Paragraph 21 finanze dello Stato v SPI and SAMI [1983] ECR 801
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the consultations provided under paragraph the matter is urgent and on a temporary 1', and the measures for settling disputes basis, without prior consultation'. 3 which, in the Court's own words include
A comparison with the safeguard clauses in 'written recommendations or proposals the Association Council decisions prompts which are to be "given sympathetic the observation, in the first place, that their consideration', investigations possibly overall context is more restrictive than that followed by recommendations, consultations of GATT and, secondly, that they are between or decisions of the Contracting expressly defined as exceptions to the rule Parties, including that of authorizing certain that the provisions in question are to be Contracting Parties to suspend the automatically applied, whereas those of application to any others of any obligations GATT, which appear to be in harmony with or concessions under the General 42 the generally 'flexible' overall system of Agreement', which they form part, could hardly be classified as exceptions to a rule of automatic application which, in fact, does that, on the other hand, the provisions of not form part of that system. the Association Agreement are considerably more directive in character.
47. In view of these various considerations, I consider that the safeguard clauses in 46. But, with regard more particularly to Decisions Nos 2/76 and 1/80, the use of safeguard clauses, it must be emphasized which, being reserved for specific above all that those contained in the Asso emergency situations, is not purely discre ciation Council decisions do not display the tionary, do not appear to be so conceived same degree of flexibility as those of GATT that the direct applicability of certain and that it would not therefore be at all provisions of those decisions could be justified to draw an analogy with the latter affected. and conclude that the provisions of those decisions were not directly applicable. In International Fruit Company the Court stated that 48. Finally, a last objection must be discussed, namely that the decisions of the EEC-Turkey Association Council are not 'where, by reason of an obligation assumed published. It is true that those decisions are under the General Agreement or of a not subject to publication rules and are not concession relating to a benefit, some published in the Official Journal. producers suffer or are threatened with Admittedly, the question might be asked serious damage, Article XIX gives a whether the fact that those decisions form Contracting Party power unilaterally to part of the Community legal order would suspend the obligation or to withdraw or justify arrangements being made for their modify the concession, either after publication. However, I would observe with consulting the Contracting Parties jointly regard to the question at issue here that, to and failing agreement between the my knowledge, the Court has never Contracting Parties concerned, or even, if formally declared the direct applicability of
42 — Joined Cases 21/72 to 24/72, supra, paragraph 25. 43 — Paragraph 26.
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a provision to be conditional upon publi the provisions referred to the Court in my cation of the text containing it. Moreover, view is wholly in conformity with that once the parties to the Association judgment which, as I have already stated, Agreement, including the Member States, pointed out that the Association Council have notice of the decisions of the Asso had ciation Council, since they are represented therein by virtue of Article 23 of the Agreement, it would be difficult to rely, as 'exclusive powers to lay down detailed rules against a Turkish national, merely on the for the progressive attainment of freedom of absence of publication of a decision of the 44 Association Council in order to deny him movement for workers'. the possibility of invoking one of its provisions in legal proceedings against a Member State, when that decision, The contrast drawn by the Court's moreover, satisfies the requirement of judgment between the provisions of the clarity, precision and unconditionality laid Agreement, which essentially set out a down by decisions of the Court in that programme, and those of the Council regard and he has notice thereof. That is decisions, the purpose of which was, in why I suggest that the Court should not some degree, to be precise, thus gave an attach decisive importance to the lack of indication that the latter were intended to publication in replying to the second be directly applicable. question.
50. I therefore propose that the national court's second question be answered in the affirmative. 49. Having regard to the various consider ations relating to the second question submitted by the Raad van State, I am persuaded that, in view of the apparently III — The third question clear and precise terms of the provisions at issue of Decisions Nos 2/76 and 1/80, no consideration relating to the fundamental objects of the Association Agreement, its 51. We now come to the third question. It overall structure or the very scheme of those seeks to establish whether the expression provisions within the decisions in question 'legal employment' contained in Article has emerged as being capable of causing 2(1)(b) of Decision No 2/76 and in Article them ultimately to be regarded as insuffi 6(1), third indent, of Decision No 1/80 in ciently precise or conditional. I therefore see fact covers employment of a Turkish no reason to justify not recognizing the national who is in possession of a residence direct applicability of the provisions referred permit issued under the legislation relating to in the national court's question. It should to aliens or is simply legally authorized to also be observed that, by stating that work solely by virtue of the requirements Decision No 1/80 had, by virtue of the concerning the employment of aliens. The provisions in the present case, prohibited scope of the question is clearly illustrated by 'any further restrictions governing access to the circumstances which gave rise to the employment', the Court's judgment in main proceedings. Mr Sevince was officially Demirel did not appear to express any authorized to work — and apparently did doubts regarding the precise meaning of that provision. The direct applicability of 44 — Case 12/86, supra, paragraph 21
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work — for a period in which, having no of the authors of Decisions Nos 2/76 and residence permit properly so called, he 1/80 to grant rights to people complying nevertheless benefited from the suspension with the legal requirements concerning of the effects of the administrative decision employment, without their position under whereby extension of his residence permit the legislation on residence having any was refused until a final decision had been effect whatsoever. given in the Court proceedings instituted by him. Thus, Mr Sevince worked lawfully in accordance with the legislation on the employment of aliens, under which he had
53. The Governments of the Netherlands received a 'certificate' enabling him no and the Federal Republic of Germany do longer to be regarded as an alien for the not subscribe to that analysis. In particular, purposes of that legislation and conse the Netherlands Government indicated, quently was entitled to access to any activity 45 with respect to the third indent of Article as an employed person, but his circum 6(1) of Decision No 1/80, that registration stances were not at the same time in as belonging to a labour force and the conformity with the legislation on aliens, exercise of regular activity imply that 'the because he had no residence permit. activity as an employed person is carried on by virtue of a residence permit issued (in particular) for the purposes of exercising an
46 activity as an employed person'. It added, with respect to Article 13 of the same decision, that the term 'legally resident' within the meaning of that provision should 52. In support of the view that the legality be taken to refer to the fact of satisfying the of the employment in question relates only conditions for the issue of a residence to compliance with the requirements of the permit, in particular in order to exercise an legislation on the employment of aliens, activity as an employed person, and that the regardless of the legality or otherwise of rule did not therefore cover residence auth residence, the plaintiff in the main orized under court proceedings whose very proceedings and the Commission attach purpose was to establish whether the person particular importance to a comparison of concerned satisfied the conditions for the the wording of several provisions of the issue of a residence permit. decisions of the Association Council at
issue. In particular, they claim that, in Decision No 1/80, for exampie, certain articles contain an express reference to the right of residence. They refer, for instance, 54. In view of those contradictory to Article 13 which refers to 'workers and arguments, I would point out, by way of members of their families legally resident preliminary, that I consider that reasoning and employed' and to Article 8(2) based on an analogy with Community law concerning 'Turkish workers who are on freedom of movement for workers is not, registered as unemployed and legally prima facie, relevant. Let us bear in mind, resident in the territory of [a] Member once again, that Article 12 of the Asso
State'. They therefore consider that the ciation Agreement, to which Article 36 of mention in other provisions, including those the Additional Protocol refers, provided to which the preliminary question relates, that the Contracting Parties agreed to be only of legal employment without any guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the EEC reference to residence reflects the intention Treaty with a view to progressively securing
45 — Article 3 of the Wet Arbeid Buitenlandse Werknemers. 46 — Netherlands Government submissions, p. 9, paragraph 24.
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freedom of movement for workers between such residence included in the concept of them. Thus, the principles laid down by legal employment? It is undeniable that, those articles and the rules which whereas Article 2(1)(b) of Decision No implemented them are not de plano 2/76 and 6(1), third indent, of Decision No applicable to freedom of movement for 1/80 refer only to legal employment, workers covered by the Association Articles 7 and 13 of the same respective Agreement. The right to such freedom of decisions appear to distinguish between the movement derives essentially from precise concepts of residence and employment. A rules to be laid down by the Association literal interpretation might thus lead one to Council. It is those rules which must be think that, where only legal employment is analysed, and it is only to the extent to referred to, the appraisal of legality should which they are precisely inspired by not take account of whether or not the Community law on freedom of movement residence is legal. for workers that there is any possible room for reasoning based on analogy.
57. It seems to me, however, that there should be some hesitation about following 55. It must be clearly appreciated that the such reasoning, in view of certain conse rules laid down by the Association Council quences which would follow from it. A appear to draw their inspiration from a purely 'independent' concept of legal source too remote from the EEC rules for employment appears to me to produce reasoning by analogy to be admissible here. somewhat absurd results, or even a They are intended, in fact, not to govern distortion of the applicable law. Let us the conditions for freedom of movement for examine the course of the procedure in a workers between Turkey and the Member case like that of Mr Sevince. The extension States, in particular for the benefit of of a Turkish worker's residence permit is Turkish nationals, but simply to consolidate refused. He appeals against that decision. the position of Turkish workers who are Pending judgment, the effect of the already duly integrated into the labour force expulsion order deriving from the of one of the Member States. The objectives non-extension is suspended. During the here are thus much more modest, at the period of suspension, the person concerned stage of operation of the Association is given the opportunity to work under Agreement under consideration, than in the conditions envisaged by the law on the context of the EEC Treaty, and the EEC employment of aliens, and therefore in Treaty cannot therefore be regarded as a conformity with that law. The suspension is suitable basis at this stage for interpretation brought to an end by the final judgment. If of the decisions of the Association Council. the refusal to extend is annulled no particular comment is called for, since that would entail recognition of the contested right of residence and would bring the 56. Must an examination of the provisions dispute to an end. But confirmation of that at issue of the Association Council decisions refusal by the court, as occurred in the lead to acceptance of the analysis, which present case, could prove fruitless if the relies particularly on a contrario reasoning, work done during the period of suspension made by Mr Sevince and the Commission? made it possible to complete the prescribed Is compliance with the laws concerning period of 'legal employment' within the residence required only where express meaning of the provisions in question, inter reference is made to legal residence, which preted 'independently'. Such a situation is not the case in the said provisions, or is would make it possible to frustrate the
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judicial confirmation of the refusal to the burden of proof' is not conceivable here, extend the residence, since the person since the reason for suspending the effects concerned, by acquiring the right provided of a decision withholding a residence permit for by the Association Council decisions to until a final judgment has been given on the undertake any activity of his choice as an validity thereof is to 'freeze' the situation employed person, could thereafter not be until judgment. Such 'freezing' must operate denied entitlement to residence. in both directions. The position of the Turkish national is protected in so far as it is decided not to prejudge the issue before the court by immediately enforcing the expulsion order, but that cannot simulta
58. Thus, the time taken by legal neously have the effect of creating rights proceedings concerning the existence or which definitively compel the Member otherwise of a right of residence is not State, regardless of the result of the 'neutral', since otherwise, if the period were proceedings, to keep the person concerned sufficiently long, another right of residence in its territory. could arise, negating the judicial decision denying the earlier right. In other words, a suspension of the effect of the expulsion
60. An interpretation taking account of this order whose purpose is protective, being concept of 'freezing' also seems to me to be designed to ensure that the situation of the perfectly in conformity with the principle of person concerned is not excessively impaired the protection of legitimate expectations, before it has been defined judicially, would since, by virtue of the fact that a refusal of a then give rise to rights and could be relied residence permit is, by definition, protective, on as against the national administration. it must be concluded that the person On the one hand, the suspension measure concerned is unequivocally prevented from temporarily neutralizes the expulsion order, acquiring, during the period of suspension, in order to preserve the situation of the any right of residence deriving from the person concerned, and yet, on the other
employment. hand, it is active, since the work done during that period by the person concerned will ultimately give rise to a right of residence. I cannot think that the Asso 61. Moreover, an interpretation of the ciation Council sought such a result. concept of legal employment in a purely 'independent' sense would certainly not fail, subject to compliance with the standstill clause referred to earlier, to encourage Member States not to grant, either under 59. Might the objection be raised that it is their legislation or regulations or by virtue incumbent on the national courts hearing an of administrative practice, suspensive appeal in proceedings which suspend the measures involving such 'costly' benev effect of the contested decision to give olence. The suspensive effect, before judgment with sufficient promptness to judgment, of decisions on matters as serious ensure that the period of employment as expulsion seems to me to be extremely lawfully completed during the suspension is praiseworthy since it causes the law, which not sufficient to confer the right to is to be laid down by the court, to prevail undertake any paid employment and the over the administrative intent initially consequent right of residence? I do not expressed. The provisions at issue must not think that such a consideration can be coun be endowed in that respect with a dissuasive tenanced in determining the interpretation effect as far as the Member States are of the provisions at issue. Such a 'reversal of concerned.
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62. How, in such circumstances, can concerned to reside therein. Failure to account be taken, in interpreting those renew any such permit, if due solely to provisions, of the protective or 'freezing' the inadvertence of the person nature of the suspension of the effect of an concerned, shall not cause him to cease expulsion order? The most obvious solution to be entitled to assistance. is that evoked by the very wording of the question from the national court. According to that approach, it would be appropriate to state essentially that legal employment, (b) Lawful residence shall become unlawful within the meaning of the provisions at from the date of any deportation order issue, includes the requirement of legal made out against the person concerned, residence and that a person benefiting from unless a stay of execution is granted.' the suspension of the effects of a refusal to extend his residence permit until a definitive judgment has been given on his appeal against that decision is not thereby legally It is apparent from paragraph (b) of that resident. provision that residence is not regarded as legal if the enforcement of an expulsion order is suspended.
It must however be observed that the precise purpose of the 63. In case the Court adopts that solution, convention may perhaps justify the solution it is necessary to dwell for a moment on the adopted, without amounting to the specific arguments advanced by Mr Sevince who, application of a general principle. The other referring to a number of international international instruments referred to by the instruments, expresses the view that, whilst plaintiff in the main proceedings confirm legal employment presupposes a legal that view. Thus , Article 12(1) of the Inter situation as regards residence, a legal national Covenant on Civil and Political situation cannot, however, be taken to refer Rights, adopted on 19 December 1966, solely to residence by virtue of a residence provides that: 'Everybody lawfully within
permit. In fact, an examination of the the territory of a State shall, within that instruments to which Mr Sevince refers and territory, have the right to liberty of of the decisions of the European movement and freedom to choose his Commission of Human Rights provides only residence' and Article 13 states that: 'An slight support for his point of view, as we alien lawfully in the territory of a State shall see. party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons
64. According to Article 11 of the of national security otherwise require, be European Convention on Social and allowed to submit the reasons against his Medical Assistance of 11 December 1953: expulsion'. I do not see in that wording any embodiment of the idea that a distinction is to be drawn between legal residence and residence authorized by a permit. '(a) Residence by an alien in the territory of any of the Contracting Parties shall be considered lawful within the meaning of the Convention so long as there is in force in his case a permit or such other 65. Article 19 of the European Social permission as is required by the laws Charter, also referred to by Mr Sevince, and regulations of the country likewise does not uphold that distinction.
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According to Article 19(4) (5) and (6), the "lawfully within the territory of a State". Contracting Parties give an undertaking to This condition refers to the domestic law of 'workers lawfully within their territories' the State concerned. It is for the domestic and Article 19(8) requires them to 'secure law and organs to lay down the conditions that such workers lawfully residing within which must be fulfilled for a person's their territories' are not expelled except in presence in the territory to be considered certain circumstances.
Article 19(6) concerns "lawful". The Commission, in this respect, a commitment to facilitate as far as possible recalls its constant case-law according to the reunion of the family of a migrant which there is no right of an alien to enter, worker 'permitted to establish himself in the reside or remain in a particular country, as territory'. I do not see anything to prevent a such, guaranteed by the Convention (see contracting party from taking the view that No 9285/81, Dec. 6.7.1982, DR 29, the various terms used must be interpreted p. 205). The Commission is of the opinion as referring to residence authorized by a that aliens provisionally admitted to a residence permit. certain district of the territory of a State,
pending proceedings to determine whether or not they are entitled to a residence permit under the relevant provisions of domestic law, can only be regarded as 66. Finally, Article 2(1) of Additional "lawfully" in the territory as long as they Protocol No 4 to the Convention on the comply with the conditions to which their Protection of Human Rights and Funda admission and stay are subjected.' mental Freedoms, which provides that: 'Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence', does not point to any Thus, far from upholding an interpretation different conclusion. Moreover, the of Article 2 of Protocol No 4 which would case-law of the European Commission of found the contention that a person's Human Rights certainly does not provide residential circumstances may be lawful even any basis for the conclusions which the though he does not hold the residence plaintiff in the main proceedings purports to permit required by the national legislation, draw from it.
In Application 11825/85, in the Commission, in that decision to which which two Sri Lankan nationals complained the plaintiff in the main proceedings of an infringement of Article 2 of the expressly refers, formally stated that it is a abovementioned Protocol No 4 by the auth matter for national legislation and the orities of the Federal Republic of Germany national authorities to lay down the which, pending a definitive decision on their conditions to be fulfilled for the presence of application for asylum, granted them a a person to be regarded as lawful under the temporary residence permit limited to the provision in question.
It is not possible district of the City of Neuss and imposed a therefore to rely on Article 2 of Protocol penalty for failure to comply with that No 4 to support the view that residence geographical limitation, the Commission without the residence permit required by gave a ruling of inadmissibility, observing in national law is lawful. particular that:
67. Consequently, I consider that the inter national instruments to which Mr Sevince 'Article 2 paragraph 1 of Protocol No 4 refers do not support the view that legal secures the freedom of movement to persons residence may be distinct from residence by
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virtue of a permit required by national legis employment in question, objectively lation, in the event of the Court's provided for by legislation or resulting from considering that legal employment, within an individual administrative authorization, is the meaning of the provisions at issue of the linked with the temporary suspension of the Association Council decisions, presupposes effects of the refusal of the residence permit legal residence. A private individual brought about by an application to the certainly cannot claim, on the basis of them, Court and represents, in some degree, a that residence which, though admittedly concomitant or a 'conscious' modification permitted, as it is in the circumstances at of that situation, or whether it is inde issue in the main proceedings, where it pendent from that situation. The latter derives from the provisional suspension of hypothesis was not, it seems, a priori an expulsion measure, produces the same excluded from legal employment within the effects as legal residence where the State meaning of the provisions at issue. The concerned makes such legality conditional somewhat unclear particulars of the dispute upon the issue of a residence permit. in the main proceedings give the impression that the Netherlands administration might have mistakenly issued Mr Sevince with a 68. However, there may be some hesitation certificate whose effect appeared to exceed about making a general pronouncement that of the work permits which, in the concerning such a close association of the Netherlands, are normally granted to aliens concepts of legal residence and legal during a period of suspension of the type employment, even if it is even limited to the concerned here. The reply which the Court specific context of the provisions at issue. It should give to the third question should not, is hardly possible to measure all the in my opinion, take account of that fact. It potential effects and all the consequences is for the Member States to ensure thereof in situations other than those at compliance with their own legal systems, issue here, which cannot be envisaged in the having recourse if necessary to internal abstract. Thus, an alternative solution might procedures which make it possible to simply be to say that the concept of legal eliminate decisions which are incorrect and, employment does not cover employment thereby, illegal. If they have not done so, under an authorization granted where the Community law must not thereby be inter effects of the refusal of a residence permit preted in such a manner as to safeguard have been suspended by reason of legal them. proceedings instituted against that refusal, and the suspension is therefore necessarily uncertain. If that approach were adopted, it 69. I propose that the Court reply in those would be for the national court to decide somewhat more detailed terms to the last whether the permission to undertake the question submitted by the Raad van State.
70. In view of the foregoing, I propose that the Court rule as follows:
' ( I ) A question on the interpretation of Decision No 2 / 76 or Decision No 1/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council , raised before a Court of one of the Member States, falls within the jurisdiction for preliminary rulings conferred
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on the Court of Justice of the European Communities by Article 177 of the EEC Treaty.
(2) Article 2(1)(b) of Decision No 2/76 and Article 6(1), third indent, of Decision No 1/80, and Article 7 of Decision No 2/76 and Article 13 of Decision No 1/80, are directly applicable and capable of conferring on indi viduals rights which the courts are obliged to safeguard.
(3) Legal employment within the meaning of Article 2(1)(b) of Decision No 2/76 and Article 6(1), third indent, of Decision No 1/80 does not cover a situation in which the authorities of a Member State have granted permission to a Turkish national to work only because of the suspensive effect, until final judgment, of the appeal lodged by him against a decision refusing to extend his residence permit.'
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