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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·13.3.1991

C-300/89

ECLI:EU:C:1991:115

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61989CC0300

OPINION OF MR TESAURO — CASE C-300/89

O P I N I O N OF M R ADVOCATE GENERAL TESAURO delivered on 13 M a r c h 1991 *

Mr President, But the fundamental differences between the Members of the Court, two provisions are to be apprehended at the procedural level. On the one hand, Article 100a provides that the Council is to adopt measures under the co-operation procedure, which involves, albeit only in certain 1. In seeking the annulment of Directive circumstances, recourse to voting by a 89/428/EEC on the ground that it has no qualified majority, together with, on a more legal basis, the Commission has raised a general level, more effective participation of substantially new issue which is of the Parliament in the decision-making undoubted interest: the borderline between process; on the other hand, Article 130s the scope of Article 100a and that of Article provides for mere consultation of the 130s of the Treaty. 1 Parliament and, unless the Council determines otherwise (see the second paragraph of Article 130s), for unanimous voting.

2. It is worthwhile pointing out at this stage that the choice between the two provisions concerned is not a merely formal matter. From the substantive point of view, in fact, In those circumstances it is clear that the Articles 100a and 130s are concerned with choice of the legal basis has a considerable different powers of the institutions, since the impact on the process by which the measure new environmental legislation referred to in comes into being and may therefore be Article 130r et seq. merely entails the grant reflected in its content. It follows that, as of subsidiary powers to the Community and the Court has consistently held (for the first is inspired by a philosophy of minimum time in its well known 'generalized pref- protection whereas the action to be taken erences' 2 judgment, the most recent under Article 100a is based on powers confirmation being Case 62/88, above), in which are certainly not subsidiary and are circumstances such as those of the present required to be directed towards high levels case the choice of an incorrect legal basis is of protection. not merely a formal defect but amounts to an infringement of essential procedural * Original language: Italian. requirements of such a kind as to render the 1 — It will be remembered that although the Court has on measure unlawful. several occasions considered the scope of Article100 it has not yet taken a position concerning Article 100a, a new provision introduced by the Single European Act for the purpose of approximating national legislation (the scope of Article 100a — in relation to Article 31 of the EAEC Treaty — is also the issue in Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council, at present pending before the Court, in relation to Council Regulation (Euratom) No 3954/87 of 11 December 1987 laying down maximum permitted That having been said, it is important to levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs and of feedingsstuffs following a nuclear accident or any other note the significant practical aspect of the case of radiological emergency). As regards Article 130s, question. What is 'at stake' is, of course, not the Court recently analyzed its scope in relation to the provision concerned with commercial policy, Article 113, in its judgment in Case 62/88 Hellenic Republic v Council 2 — See judgment in Case 45/86 Commmion v Council [1987] [1990] ECR I-1527. ECR 1493, in particular paragraph 11.

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merely the contested directive; the wider there is a clear demarcation between the issue involved is the determination of the two provisions precisely because they are procedure, and in particular the voting intended to pursue distinct objectives. As a rules, to be applied to the adoption of result, any confusion or overlapping measures of the same kind (as regards their between them is inconceivable. content and effects) as the directive in question here, which, as will become apparent shortly, constitute a category of measures for the harmonization of national legislation on environmental protection that Having thus stated its position, the Council is certainly not of secondary importance. recognizes that a particular measure may at the same time pursue diverse aims envisaged in different provisions of the Treaty. Therefore, in order to identify the legal basis specific to a measure it is necessary to The arguments of the parties determine its 'main purpose' or 'centre of gravity'. In particular, the Council concedes that measures for the protection of the environment, like the contested directive, which regulate production conditions in a 3. The parties interpret differently both the particular industrial sector are also, in so far provisions and the legislative measure at as they harmonize the conditions of compe- issue. tition between the undertakings concerned, in some degree intended to promote the establishment and functioning of the internal market; however, the latter objective is wholly subordinate to the main purpose of protecting the environment from The Council argues from the premise that, pollution resulting from the industrial by introducing Article 130r et seq., the production processes in question. Community acquired powers to take specific action on environmental matters. Accordingly, Article 130s should be regarded as the appropriate legal basis for measures which pursue one of the objectives As regards the contested directive, an mentioned in Article 130r, namely preser- analysis both of its content and effects and vation, protection and improvement of the of its legislative context confirms that its quality of the environment, the protection 'centre of gravity' lies in the requirement of human health and the prudent and that the pollution caused by waste from the rational utilization of natural resources. production of titanium dioxide be elim- inated. Therefore, in the Council's view, Article 130s is the only correct legal basis.

Conversely, in the Council's view, Article 100a constitutes the legal basis for the adoption not of specifically environmental The Commission — supported by the measures but rather of measures directed Parliament — agrees with the Council that towards the establishment and functioning Article 130s et seq. conferred on the of the internal market, as defined in Article Community wide-ranging powers in 8a of the Treaty. It therefore considers that environmental matters. It maintains,

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however, that Article 130s is not the appro- The Commission also considers that the priate legal basis for the adoption of view put forward by the Council restricts measures which, by virtue of their subject- the scope of Article 100a as compared with matter, relate to the internal market: such that of Article 130s in an unjustified way: measures should, in fact, be adopted solely the Council in fact is of the opinion that on the basis of Article 100a, the only speci- Article 130s may be used as a basis for fically relevant provision. The latter thus measures intended to equalize conditions of represents a sort of lex specialis in relation competition between undertakings, but to Article 130s and in relation to all the nevertheless considers that Article 100a may other Treaty provisions which are not not be used as a basis for harmonizing intrinsically directed towards the estab- measures for the protection of the lishment and functioning of the internal environment. market.

It follows, as a matter of principle, that environmental protection measures should Finally, the Commission, like the Council, be adopted in accordance with the analyses the contested directive but comes procedure laid down in Article 100a in cases to the opposite conclusion. In the where three conditions are met: the Commission's view, the main purpose of the measures concerned must be harmonizing measure (or its 'centre of gravity') is the measures; the harmonized provisions, improvement of the conditions of compe- although laid down for environmental tition in the titanium dioxide industry.

It protection, must contribute, by virtue of should therefore have been adopted only on their subject-matter, to the establishment the basis of Article 100a.3 and functioning of the internal market (the subject-matter must be identified by 3 — At the hearing, the Commission partly amended its inter- pretation of the relationship between Articles 100a and reference to the content and effects of the 130s. It maintained that the two provisions have different measure); and, finally, no provisions must purposes. Article 100a is concerned with the harmon- ization of national legislation, including that relating to the be available which, in relation to the environment, designed to ensure attainment of the single internal market, provide an even more market. By contrast, Article 130s is the basis for measures concerning environmental protection as such, that is to say specific legal basis (such as Articles 56(2), those measures which are not concerned with harmon- ization of the rules relating to the functioning of the 57(2) or 69, which would take precedence market. It follows, in the Commission's view, that the by virtue not only of that fact that they are principle whereby special provisions are to be preferred is not appropriate to determination of the correct provision special provisions but also by virtue of the to be applied in a specific case. That principle is applicable to cases where the scope of a provision embraces that of reservation — 'save where otherwise another, more specific provision (for example the general provided in this Treaty' — contained in principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 7 is specifically embodied in other provisions of the Treaty, Article 100a but which are no different, such as Articles 40(3) or 48). Conversly, there is no from the procedural point of view, from overlap between the scope of Article 100a and that of Article 130s.

Thus, all that is necessary is to establish Article 100a, at least as far as majority whether, having regard to the subject-matter of the measure that it is intended to adopt, one provision or the voting is concerned). The very wording of other is found to be relevant. It should be emphasized, Articles 100a and 130s, in the Commission's however, that despite that change in its reasoning, the Commission maintains substantially the same approach. view, supports this interpretation in so far as Whether it is argued that Article 100a is a special provision it indicates that the requirements of environ- or whether it is assumed that the scope of that provision is entirely distinct from that of Article 130s, in both cases the mental protection are to form an integral decisive question — in the Commission's view — is whether or not the directive in question, by virtue of its part of the harmonizing action undertaken 'main purpose' or 'centre of gravity', comes within the under Article 100a. material scope of Classification of the legislation at issue.

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Classification of the legislation at issue parties, although purporting to have relied solely on 'objective factors which are amenable to judicial review' (in accordance with the principle established by the Court in the 'generalized preferences' case cited earlier), then arrived at diametrically 4. There is thus a clear difference of opposed results? opinion between the parties concerning both the interpretation of the provisions and the classification of the contested measure. Let us consider the latter aspect first. It must first be stated that the opposing (as regards the result) readings by the parties of the 5. In order to answer that question it must directive at issue derive only apparently be borne in mind that the Council and the from a difference of analytical approach. It Commission agree that the directive is is true that the Commission laid emphasis concerned with two matters, namely on determination of the main 'subject- harmonization of the conditions of matter' of the measure whereas the Council production, and therefore of competition, in considered that the decisive factor in the titanium dioxide industry, and the classifying the measure was to be found in pursuit of action to combat pollution. The its main 'objective'. However, that real difference between the parties relates difference is, if anything, purely termino- only to the relative importance of the two logical. On the one hand, the Commission aspects and consequently the determination does not fail to take account also of the aim of the preponderant or main aspect of the of the measure in question and, on the measure. other, the Council, precisely in order to avoid the risk (and the charge) that its analysis was based on a subjective criterion (its conviction as to the purpose of the measure) is careful to make clear that the 'purpose' of the measure can be seen only That said, let us now examine the measure. by reference to its content and its effects, It is appropriate to point out that the these being aspects which are also directive at issue forms part of and adds to considered by the Commission in its analysis the rules provided for by the preceding of the subject-matter of the directive. Council Directive, 78/176/EEC. That Moreover, from the terminological directive had already given rise to a dispute standpoint as well the differences between concerning its legal basis. The Commission the two institutions appear to diminish, to had proposed that it be adopted only under the point where they disappear, in that they Article 100 and the Council — following a both regard as necessary and as decisive the practice to which I shall revert — added identification of what they describe as the Article 235 as a second legal basis. 'centre of gravity' of the contested measure.

Recourse to the twofold legal basis is There is thus no real divergence as to the justified in the third and fourth recitals in analytical criteria employed. How, the preamble to Directive 78/176/EEC in therefore, can it be explained that the the following terms:

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'. . . any disparity between the provisions on Directive 75/442/EEC, which lays down waste from the titanium dioxide industry general harmonizing rules regarding waste already applicable or in preparation in the disposal (first and second recitals) and thus various Member States may create unequal constitutes a precedent which is certainly conditions of competition and thus directly relevant to the present case. affect the functioning of the Common Market; . . . it is therefore necessary to approximate laws in this field, as provided for in Article 100 of the Treaty;

In all those measures, the need for Article 100 (in addition to Article 235) is justified by the consideration that the dissimilarity between the national provisions to be . . . it seems necessary for this approximation harmonized creates disparities of compe- of laws to be accompanied by Community tition and therefore has a direct impact on action so that one of the aims of the the functioning of the market. 4 On the Community in the sphere of protection of other hand, where this aspect of protection the environment and improvement of the of the market and elimination of distortions quality of life can be achieved by more of competition did not seem important, the extensive rules; . . . certain specific Council relied only on Article 235, properly provisions to this effect should therefore be omitting any reference to Article 100. That laid down; . . . Article 235 of the Treaty approach is exemplified by Council Decision should be invoked as the powers required 75/441/EEC, which lays down procedures for this purpose have not been provided for for the exchange of information concerning by the Treaty'. atmospheric pollution caused by certain compounds and suspended particulates and Council Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds.

It must be emphasized that the recitals that I have just cited merely repeat a stereotyped formula which is normally found in those measures which, as part of (more or less Turning, after that brief digression, to specific) action to ensure environmental Directive 78/176/EEC, I should point out protection, harmonize national legislation in the first place that it is perfectly concerning production conditions for consistent with the usual practice followed undertakings. There come to mind, for by the institutions. Moreover, the statement example, Council Directive 75/439/EEC on of the reasons for the adoption of Directive the disposal of waste oils (second and third 78/176/EEC (and for the measures that are recitals), Council Directive 75/440/EEC substantially analogous to it) fully confirms concerning the quality required of surface water intended for the abstraction of 4 — Similarly, for the same reasons (impact on competition drinking water in the Member States (third and on the market) Article 100 (alone) is used as the basis for directives that harmonize national legislation which, in and fourth recitals), Council Directive areas other than the environment, in any way affects the conditions under which undertakings operate. See for 82/501/EEC on the major-accident hazards example Council Directive 85/374/EEC concerning of certain industrial activities (first and producers' liability for damage caused by defective products, or Council Directive 75/117/EEC concerning second recitals) and, above all, Council equal pay for men and women.

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that in such cases Community action, But the provision of Directive 78/176/EEC together with the environmental component, which is most important to the present also includes a market component, and that analysis is contained i n Article 9, which the latter is an equally essential part of the provides that the Member States are to measure, undeniably requiring recourse to draw up national programmes for the Article 100; and that is so despite the fact progressive reduction, and eventual elimi- that Article 1 of that directive states that its nation, of pollution from titanium dioxide aim is 'the prevention and progressive plants. Article 9(3) provides, however, that reduction, with a view to its elimination, of such programmes are merely to form the pollution caused by waste from the titanium basis for further harmonization, to be dioxide industry'. implemented at Community level within precise time-limits; this harmonization — let it be emphasized — is intended to secure the reduction, and thereafter the final elimi- nation, of pollution, both in order to secure 'improvement of the conditions of compe- tition in the titanium dioxide industry'.

The content of the directive also shows how the two essential components are inter- related and merge with each other. As well as repeating, in Articles 2 and 3, the funda- 6. It is precisely that harmonization which mental principles underlying Community forms the subject-matter of the contested action on the treatment of waste, that is to directive. It is appropriate to point out that say disposal of waste without risk to health Directive 89/428/EEC was originally or to the environment, prevention and proposed by the Commission on the twofold recycling (principles that were already laid legal basis of Articles 100 and 235 already down in Articles 3 and 4 of the general selected by the Council for the earlier directive on waste, Directive 75/442/EEC Directive 78/176/EEC. Following the entry which I mentioned earlier), Directive into force of the Single European Act, the 78/176/EEC prohibits, unless authorization Commission amended its proposal by using is granted, the discharge, dumping, storage, as the sole legal basis Article 100a, for tipping and injection of waste from the which provision the Council subsequently titanium dioxide industry (Article 4); the substituted Article 130s. It should also be directive harmonizes conditions for authori- observed that those changes of legal basis zation (Articles 5 and 6) and lays down the did not derive from changes made to the conditions for monitoring operations actual provisions of the directive. (Article 7) and for action to be taken in certain emergency situations (Article 8). In other words, the directive does harmonize national requirements for protection of the environment but at the same time, and by means of the same provisions, it lays down In order now to determine the legal classifi- uniform rules for all Community under- cation of the contested directive, it is takings producing titanium dioxide, thus necessary, as required by the judgment in contributing to the elimination of disparities Case 62/88 Hellenic Republic v Council, in costs and conditions of competition; and cited earlier, to examine its objectives and it was for that reason — I say yet content. The objectives are seen to be the again — that the Council referred to Article same — it could not be otherwise — as 100 (as well) as a legal basis. those already set out in Article 9(3) of the

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earlier Directive 78/176/EEC, namely on 'existing industrial establishments') the one hand environmental protection and, regarding the treatment of waste from the on the other, the elimination of distortion of production process, on the one hand limits competition in the common market. That pollution levels and, on the other, lays down emerges clearly from the second recital in more uniform conditions concerning the preamble to Directive 89/428/EEC, production, costs and, as a result, compe- which, moreover, uses the same terms as tition. Article 9(3) of Directive 78/176/EEC, which I quoted earlier; and this is clearly confirmed by Article 1 of the contested directive, which provides as follows:

An analysis of the content of the measure thus confirms, once again, the existence of a twofold component, relating on the one 'This directive lays down, as required by hand to environmental protection and, on Article 9(3) of Directive 78/176/EEC, the other, to protection of the market. Moreover, as already noted with respect to procedures for harmonizing the Directive 78/176/EEC, those two programmes for the reduction and eventual components have the same status: they are elimination of pollution from existing both presented as essential and inseverably industrial establishments and is intended to linked, since the anti-pollution rules regulate improve the conditions of competition in the the market at the same time, in order to titanium dioxide industry.' ensure greater balance in its operation.

The text of Article 1 is thus absolutely unequivocal: Directive 89/428/EEC pursues 7. The validity of that conclusion is not a twofold aim, of protecting the undermined by any of the matters raised by environment and safeguarding the func- the Commission and the Parliament to show tioning of the internal market; and, unless that, in the shaping of the contested part of Article 1 is arbitrarily disposed of, directive, a leading role was played by the there are no grounds for concluding that requirement of harmonization of conditions either of those aims is more important than of competition. Both the Commission and the other. the Parliament emphasised that provisions to combat pollution by waste from titanium dioxide production were already included in the national programmes adopted under Article 9 of Directive 78/176/EEC. The As far as content is concerned, the contested subsequent harmonization brought about by directive prohibits, or reduces in accordance Directive 89/428/EEC therefore met, above with strict rules, the discharge of waste by all, the requirement of preventing distortion establishments producing titanium dioxide of competition deriving from the differing and lays down a number of time-limits for economic impact of national requirements final implementation of the various which were somewhat disparate. In support provisions. The final result is a harmonized of that view, the Commission produced the system which, by imposing specific obli- results of studies carried out in 1984 and gations on Member States and more 1989 which show that the various bodies of particularly on industries (specifically anti-pollution rules had a direct impact on

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prices in the various Member States of 8. Those considerations, however, although between 10 and 20% in 1984 and that price relevant — and not substantively challenged divergences had increased between 1984 by the Council — cannot, I believe, be and 1989. decisive as regards interpretation of the measure at issue. It is no accident that they relate mainly to the preparatory stages. By reference to them, it is thus possible to establish the specific reasons for which, at a The resultant distortion of competition and given time, the legislature was prompted to the consequent need to find a remedy were intervene (occasio legis) but they are not, also specifically confirmed in the views according to the usual canons of interpre- expressed, as the contested directive tation, of decisive importance in identifying progressed through its preparatory stages, the intention underlying the measure. That by the Economic and Social Committee and intention is embodied and disclosed in the by the European Parliament. The latter in legislative text and essentially must be particular, in a resolution of 10 April 1984, gathered from the actual meaning of the deplored the delays on the part of the words, from the function of the measure Member States and the Commission in itself and from the system of which it forms adopting the harmonizing measures part. An analysis of these aspects shows envisaged in Directive 78/176/EEC and immediately that harmonization of stressed that 'il est indispensable conditions of competition is a fundamental d'harmoniser le plus rapidement possible sur component of the directive; that fact is le plan communautaire les programmes simply confirmed by the observations nationaux de réduction de la pollution, en concerning the early stages of the directive. vue, notamment, d'éviter les distorsions de However, it is also undeniable that the concurrence entre producteurs de dioxyde contested directive contains new anti- de titane dans la Communauté' and that pollution rules and, therefore, that this 'une prorogation du délai de 1987 à 1993 second element must also be taken into provoquerait des distorsions de la consideration in identifying the correct legal concurrence, dont bénéficieraient les entre- basis. prises qui, jusqu'à présent, n'ont pris aucune mesure ou très peu de mesures pour se conformer à la directive de base 78/176/CEE'. 5

Finally, the Commission cited various statements made by national delegations within the Council as Directive 89/428/EEC went through the legislative It seems to me, in fact, that, short of inter- process, from which it is apparent that the preting the measure solely on the basis of Member States were particularly aware of subjective, and for that reason arbitrary, the need to improve conditions of compe- data, it must necessarily be recognized that tition in the titanium dioxide industry. 6 it is impossible to identify in the directive one main or predominant component and 5 — OJ 1984 C 127, p. 34 another which is merely incidental or 6 — The Council did not oppose the inclusion of those statements in the file on the case but denied that they secondary, but that there are two served to demonstrate that economic considerations played a more important role than those of an environmental components which are both essential and nature are inseparably linked.

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The clear wording of the directive does not Moreover, it is the very difference between permit any other interpretation. I must add the Commission's and the Council's inter- that this observation applies not only to the pretations of the scope of those two product at issue here. It is inevitable that, in provisions that explains why the institutions general, where there is harmonization of arrived at opposite conclusions concerning national measures for environmental the legal basis of the directive in question. protection, which regulate the charac- teristics of products or the conditions under which they are manufactured, Community intervention displays two aspects, the environmental and the economic; and, again, it is extremely difficult to discover, case by case, whether the 'centre of gravity' Interpretation of the provisions of a measure adopted by the Council is to be found in one requirement or the other. Now, this difficulty — or impossibility — of identifying the predominant component means that any analysis is certainly influenced, in a decisive manner, by considerations of a subjective nature and of 9. The difficulties involved in defining the an undoubtedly political nature, linked as scope of these provisions were focused upon they are with the differing voting by a number of authors before the present procedures and rules associated with the action was brought. 7 However, agreement legal bases in question. must be reached as to the actual scope of

those difficulties. In fact, there is no doubt as to the applicability of Article 130s alone (and, before the entry into force of the Single European Act, of Article 235 alone) as the legal basis for environmental protection measures which do not involve harmonization of measures affecting the internal market; such measures are numerous, ranging from those which establish programmes to those which This leads to a situation of uncertainty provide for specific action to be taken at which is irreconcilable with the principle Community level, for the purpose of more repeatedly upheld by the Court whereby the or less directly protecting flora, fauna and choice of the legal basis for a measure must the environment in general (for examples of be amenable to judicial review. This funda- measures adopted after the Single European mental requirement of certainty thus makes Act, see those mentioned below in part 14). it necessary to seek a more comprehensive and certain solution to the problem which 7 — See: B. Langeheine, le rapproachemem des legislations

confronts us. A solution, therefore, which nationales selon l'article IODA du traité CEE: l'harmoni- sation communautaire face aux exigences de protection does not stop at an attempt to identify a nationales, Revue du marché commun, 1989, p. 347; C D . hypothetical 'centre of gravity' of the Ehlermann, The Internal Market Following the Single european Act, Common Markel Law Review, 1987, p. 361; measure; a solution which places the R. Kromarcck, Commentaire de l'Acte unique européen en matière d'environnement, Revue juridique de l'environ- problem of determination of the legal basis nement, 1988, p. 76; F. Roelants du Vivier c J. P. not only in the context of interpretation of Hannequart, Une nouvelle stratégie européenne pour l'environnement dans le cadre de l'Acte unique, Revue du the measure but also in that of interpretation marché commun, 1988, p. 205; A. Saggio, le basi giuridiche of the rules which are considered relevant, della politica ambientale nell'ordinamento comunitario dopo l'entrala in vigore dell'Atto unico, Rivista di diritto

namely Article 100a and Article 130s. europeo, 1990, p. 39.

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It is also undisputed, in legal literature and question. It has been stated more than once in the practice of the institutions, that that measures of the same kind as the Community environmental protection contested directive were, before the Single measures which involve the harmonization European Act, usually based on Articles 100 of national requirements concerning and 235. Now, if it is taken for granted products are normally based on Article 100a that, after the Single European Act, Article alone, just as, before the entry into force of 235 was replaced (in so far as is relevant to the Single European Act, those measures the present proceedings) by Article 130s, were normally based on Article 100 alone can it also be concluded that, for the (the example usually cited is that of Council purposes of such measures, Article 100 was Directive 70/220/EEC, which harmonizes replaced by Anicie 100a? national provisions to combat atmospheric pollution from motor-vehicle exhaust emissions).

In that regard I should point out first of all that recourse to Article 100 was justified by the direct impact which those measures had on competition and on the Member States On the other hand, the problem of defining (see the preamble to Directive 78/176/EEC the scope of Article 100a and Article 130s and those of the analogous directives cited respectively arises essentially with respect to earlier in part 5). That approach is the rules for the harmonization of national confirmed in the judgments in Cases 91/79 environmental legislation relating not to and 92/79 Commission v Italy (in both products but to industrial installations which cases) [1980] ECR 1099 and 1115, in which manufacture them, they being rules which, the Court stated that: before the changes made by the Single European Act, were usually issued — as we have seen — on the basis of Articles 100 and 235 together. This third category of measure clearly includes harmonized legislation 'Provisions which are made necessary by which — like the directive at issue — relates considerations relating to the environment to the treatment and disposal of industrial and health may be a burden upon the waste. undertakings to which they apply and if there is no harmonization of national provisions on the matter competition may be appreciably distorted.'

On a practical level, it is thus in the area of harmonization of environmental rules concerning industry that the need is So, in determining whether measures like apparent to establish clear criteria to govern the directive at issue here now fall within the relationship between Article 100a and the scope of the new provision on harmon- Article 130s. ization of national laws, Article 100a, it must first be observed that the scope of that provision is not determined ratione materiae but rather by reference to a criterion of a functional nature, extending laterally to all measures designed to ensure attainment of 10. In examining this problem it is the 'internal market'. Article 100a in fact necessary to deal with a preliminary concerns 'measures for the approximation of

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the provisions laid down by law, regulation development of competition on the basis of or administrative action . . . which have as real equality within the Community. their object the establishment and func- tioning of the internal market'; in more general terms, it is confirmed that the purpose of that provision is the That interpretation essentially bases the 'achievement of the objectives set out in concept of 'internal market' on that of the Article 8a'. 'common market', as defined by the Court both in its two judgments cited earlier in Cases 91 and 92/79 and, from a more general standpoint, in the judgment in Schul, 8in which is it stated that: Article 8a defines the internal market as an 'area without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with 'The concept of a common market as the provisions of this Treaty'. defined by the Court in a consistent line of decisions involves the elimination of all obstacles to intra-Community trade in order to merge the national markets into a single market bringing about conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal It is clear, therefore, that definition of the market.' term 'internal market' is an essential step in determining the scope of Article 100a, just as a definition of the term 'common market' is fundamental in establishing the limits It should follow that, just as, before the within which Article 100 applies. Single European Act, the Council and the Commission always considered that the harmonization of environmental provisions capable of having an impact on production costs and competition 'directly affected the establishment or functioning of the common It seems to me to be fully consistent with market' within the meaning of Article 100, the logic underlying the Single European therefore giving rise to recourse to that Act to conclude that the 'area without provision as a legal basis, then after the internal frontiers' referred to in Article 8a is Single European Act entered into force it to be seen as a truly integrated area where would necessarily be the case that such the prevailing conditions are as close as harmonization, for the same reasons (impact possible to those of a single internal market: on the burdens borne by undertakings and an area, therefore, in which there is on competition), should be regarded as harmonization not only of the rules functionally linked with the establishment concerning products but also of those which and functioning of the 'internal market' more generally affect the conditions of within the meaning of Article 100a, so that competition between undertakings. Indeed, that provision had to be regarded as appro- I do not see how it is possible to achieve a priate in place of Article 100. In other genuinely single, integrated market without words, no difference — from the present eliminating divergences between national standpoint, needless to say — can exist legislation which, by having a differing impact on production costs, prevents the 8 — Cade 15/81 ScAn/[1982] ECR 1409, paragraph 33.

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between the concept of 'common market' 11. Once it is established that both Article and that of 'internal market'; the two 100a and Article 130s are, in theory, concepts differ in breadth, in that the relevant to the adoption of measures like the 'common market' extends to areas which contested directive, it is then necessary to are not part of the 'internal market', but not define the criteria according to which the in depth, in that both concepts relate to the relationship between those two provisions is same level of integration. to be regulated.

In that regard, the first hypothesis to On the other hand, to conclude that the consider is that of both provisions being harmonization of conditions of competition applicable. That solution — which has not falls outside Article 100a, even though it is been advocated in the course of the common ground that such harmonization proceedings — might be supported by the previously fell within the scope of Article following considerations. First of all, 100, would be equivalent to concluding that recourse to a dual legal basis would be the concept of 'internal market' in Article consistent with the practice followed before 100a involved a less advanced level of inte- the Single European Act of relying on both gration than that of 'common market' Article 100 and Article 235 for the adoption within the meaning of Article 100. And that, of measures of that kind. The question in the absence of textual confirmation in the might in fact be asked whether, after the Single Act, seems to me to be quite unac- Single European Act, Articles 100 and 235 ceptable, particularly since such a reading should not merely be replaced by the new involves a restrictive interpretation of the relevant provisions, namely Articles 100a scope of Article 100a to which, inter alia for and 130s respectively. the fundamental reasons which I shall consider shortly, I certainly cannot subscribe. Moreover, this solution finds support in a previous decision in which the Court stated:

In short, I consider that the harmonization of national environmental legislation 'where an institution's power is based on relating to industrial installations two provisions of the Treaty, it is bound to contributes, no less than and no differently adopt the relevant measures on the basis of from that relating to products, to the the two relevant provisions' (Case 165/87 'achievement of the objectives set out in Commission v Council [1988] ECR 5547, Article 8a' and therefore falls within the paragraph 11). scope of Article 100a.9

9 — Sec, lo ihat effect, C D Ehlermann, op cit., p. 369, according to whom the concept of an internal market 'implies the creation of conditions of competition which allow the free circulation of goods '; similarly, B Langehcine, op. cit., p. 350, who states that 'la creation du It must however be stated in that regard marche interieur ne s'epuise pas dans la suppression des that that case concerned the relationship frontières interieures mais englobe de façon nécess- airement complémentaire un rapprochement des between two provisions, Articles 28 and conditions de concurrence, afin de permettre une exploi- 113, which could be applied together, tation efficace et non discriminatoire des libertes fondamentales garanties par le traite' merely by adopting the more rigorous

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voting system, the unanimity required by used together for the adoption of the same Article 28 (before the Single Act) rather measure. then the easier procedure, the qualified majority provided for in Article 113.

But above all, with respect to the procedural aspect, it must be emphasized that the cooperation procedure, which is an essential feature of Article 100a, does not appear to be reconcilable with a legal basis that The same cannot be said of Articles 100a imposes the requirement of a unanimous and 130s. The application of those two vote. In those cases where the Council is provisions gives rise to somewhat different required to act unanimously, the mech- procedural and substantive consequences. anisms which allow this complex procedure From the substantive point of view, the to bring about the close involvement of the competence of the Community in matters of Parliament in the decision-making process environmental policy is subject to limits appear largely deprived of their effec- which do not apply to harmonizing tiveness. In particular, the cooperation measures under Article 100a. The procedure presupposes that the Council can competence provided for in Article 130r et accept, by a qualified majority vote, the seq. is in fact purely subsidiary since, amendments made by the Parliament and pursuant to Article 130r(4), it is to be taken up by the Commission in its reviewed exercised only if the objectives of environ- proposal, whereas it must achieve unanimity mental protection cannot be better achieved in cases where it intends departing from the at national level, whilst the harmonizing Commission's modified proposal (which measures under Article 100a clearly escape may embody the Parliament's amendments) any such limitation and may be adopted or where it intends considering a common whenever this proves necessary for position that the Parliament has rejected in attainment of the 'internal market'. its entirety. It thus seems to me that the Moreover, powers concerning environ- inter-institutional dialectics which these mental matters are minimal in character mechanisms — perhaps somewhat intricate since, as provided in Article 130t, the mechanisms — are intended to bring into Member States are entitled to depart from play would be undermined if, as a result of the common rules if they wish to adopt the cumulative application of another legal measures which provide an even higher level basis, the Council were required, of protection; however, it is precisely that throughout the procedure, to vote unan- power to depart from the common rules imously. which, in principle, is excluded in cases where harmonizing provisions have been adopted.

Serious doubts thus exist as to whether Article 100a may be used together with another legal basis which, like Article 130s in this case, provides for unanimous voting, since that joint basis would seriously It therefore seems to me that, in that jeopardize the very functioning of the respect, Articles 100a and 130s are inspired cooperation procedure. Furthermore, at the by different, if not diametrically opposed, hearing, both the Commission and the philosophies and it is therefore difficult to Council appeared to me to agree on this imagine that the two provisions might be point.

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However, that does not seem to me to be harmonizing measures concerning the the decisive issue. Perhaps precisely because environment, subject of course to fulfilment of the difficulty of reconciling two of the preconditions for the application of provisions that give rise to such divergent that provision and therefore to the legal consequences, the Member States requirement that the harmonizing legislation expressly regulated the relationship between contribute functionally to the attainment of the new provision on the approximation of the internal market. laws and the new environmental provisions, precisely by stating that the requirements of environmental protection form an integral part of the harmonizing process directed towards attainment of the internal market. In short, if the interpretation of these textual aspects is correct, it follows that if Article 100a can be regarded as appro- priate — as in the case of the contested directive — recourse to Article 130s may be regarded as superfluous.

In the first place, Article 130r(2) provides that 'environmental protection requirements 12. Naturally, the result of this construction shall be a component of the Community's of the relationship between Article 100a and other policies'; and although on the one Article 130s is that the application of the hand that means that in the exercise of the latter is limited solely to measures which are powers entrusted to them the Community not already based on some other provision institutions may not disregard consider- of the Treaty. It seems to me that that very ations of environmental protection, it result is confirmed by the decisions of the implies, on the other, that measures which Court on Article 130s. In paragraphs 19 and reflect those considerations may also be 20 of its judgment in Case 62/88, above, it adopted in the exercise of powers other stated that: than those provided for in Article 130r et seq. and, in particular, in the exercise of the powers relating to attainment of the internal market. '19. Articles 130r and 130s are intended to confer powers on the Community to undertake specific action on environmental matters. However, those articles leave intact the powers held by the Community under other provisions of the Treaty, even if the measures to be taken under the latter The 'principle of integration' of environ- provisions pursue at the same time any of mental action in other Community policies the objectives of environmental protection. or action is specifically confirmed in Article 100a(3) where it is stated that the Commission, in its proposals concerning 'environmental protection . . . will take as a base a high level of protection'. It follows 20. Moreover, that interpretation is from that provision that Article 100a was confirmed by the second sentence of Article regarded as an adequate basis for 130r(2), pursuant to which "environmental

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protection requirements shall be a powers and in particular within the scope of component of the Community's other the harmonizing powers provided for in policies". That provision, which reflects the Article 100a. principle whereby all Community measures must satisfy the requirements of environ- mental protection, implies that a Community measure cannot be part of 13. That concludes the textual analysis. But Community action on environmental I must emphasize that that interpre- matters merely because it takes account of tation — which extends the scope of Article those requirements.' 100a and thereby necessarily cuts down that of Article 130s — appears to be fully consistent with the fundamental objectives of the reforms pursued by the Single Act.

Those observations, which were made by the Court concerning the relationship between Article 130s and Article 113, apply also, it seems to me, to the powers vested in In the first place, it is well known that the the Community by Article 100a; indeed, I more important innovations introduced by would say that they apply with greater force the Single European Act include the in the case of Article 100a, in view of the extension of majority voting by the Council fact that paragraph 3 of that article and reinforcement of the Parliament's expressly, and significantly, provides that participation in the Community harmonizing measures directed towards decision-making process, by means of the attainment of the internal market include cooperation procedure. These innovations measures 'concerning . . . environmental rank as principles since they are intended, respectively, to accelerate the process of protection'. Community integration and to strengthen the democratic safeguards attached to the legislative process.

In conclusion, I am of the opinion that:

It is also well known that the new provision on the approximation of national laws, Article 100a, represents, by virtue of its harmonizing measures of the same kind as central importance to the attainment of the the contested directive relate functionally internal market, perhaps the most significant both to environmental protection and to case in which majority voting and the attainment of the internal market; cooperation procedure are applicable.

It follows that a restrictive interpretation of legislation of that kind can nevertheless be Article 100a — as advocated by the adopted under the procedure provided for Council — would have the effect of in Article 100a alone since the Treaty reducing, in a particularly delicate area (that expressly provides that environmental of harmonization relating to the protection requirements may also be environment), the scope of those two pursued in the exercise of other Community essential procedural innovations.

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It is clear that such a result is in sharp goods or the conditions of competition conflict with the fundamental reasons within the Community. Essentially, the underlying the Single European Act: measures in question — as stated renewed integration through greater repeatedly — are essentially measures recourse to faster decision-making which, before the Single Act, were based procedures and the enhancement of demo- exclusively on Article 235. cratic guarantees through more effective involvement of the Parliament in the legis- lative process.

Numerous examples are to be found in practice. Among those adopted prior to the And it is precisely this point of principle, to entry into force of the Single European Act which I referred earlier, that prompts me to and based specifically on Article 130s I reject the restrictive interpretation of Article would mention, among the many, Council 100a which has been postulated and, in Directive 90/313/EEC on freedom of particular, to agree with those who claim access to information on the environment, that the scope of that provision is not Council Regulation No 1210/90 on the limited merely to harmonization of the rules establishment of the European Environ- relating to products but also extends to the mental Agency and the European harmonization of conditions of competition environment information and observation between undertakings within the network, Council Decision 90/150/EEC on Community. the adoption of the Commission work programme concerning an experimental project for gathering, coordinating and ensuring the consistency of information on the state of the environment and natural resources of the Community, Council 14. There is another factor which finally Directives 89/429/EEC and 89/369/EEC convinces me that that solution is correct. concerning air pollution from municipal The application of Article 100a to the waste-incineration plants and Council product at issue here, and in general to the Regulation No 2242/87 on action by the harmonization of environmental measures Community relating to the environment. relating to industrial installations, has abso- lutely no prejudicial effect either on the effectiveness of Article 130s or, still less so, on the effectiveness of the Communities' environmental policy. On another point, it should be emphasized that the fact that measures like the contested directive are adopted under Article 100a and not Article 130s appears Within its own sphere, Article 130s is and consistent not only with the objective of full continues to be applicable to all environ- attainment of the internal market but also mental matters provided that they do not with development of the Community involve harmonization of national environmental policy. That policy can only requirements relating to production benefit from the fact that the measures in processes or products resulting from them question are adopted by a majority rather and therefore do not regulate (through than unanimously and with more effective harmonization) either the movement of involvement of the Parliament.

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Finally, I consider that the solution outlined fulfilled. That is so simply because Article here does not involve any real sacrifice of 100a too contains more than adequate safe- the Member States' interests. No interests of guards to protect the interests of the an economic nature are adversely affected Member States which are more alert to since the legislation in question does not environmental problems. Article 100a(3) in impose any burdens on them but merely has fact requires the Commission to 'take as a an impact on the production costs of under- base a high level of protection' in that area; takings, precisely by ensuring that those Article 100a thus appears perhaps to be even costs do not vary from one country to more protective than the specific environ- another. mental rules which, as evidenced by Article 130t, tend rather to take their inspiration from the philosophy of minimum protection. Article 100a(3), favoured, as is well known, Moreover — and above all — environmental particularly by Germany and Denmark, is interests are not in any way undermined. specifically intended to ensure that Naturally, in that respect, the interest harmonizing measures adopted (inter alia) worthy of protection may be perceived only in relation to the environment do not adopt in the need to ensure that the environment a level of protection which is too low in is effectively safeguarded. However, it is relation to certain national systems. clear that that need is felt particularly strongly by the Member States, and by some of them in particular. There is no doubt, therefore, that adequate protection in that To this specific guarantee are then added regard must be assured. the safeguard clauses provided for in Article 100a(4) and (5). In particular, Article 100a(4) guarantees — albeit only in the context of a review carried out in the last Having said that, I must, however, stress instance by the Court of Justice — that a that those preoccupations are not in them- Member State which found itself in a selves sufficient to prevent the Community minority when a harmonizing measure was from adopting harmonizing measures under adopted can apply national provisions which Article 100a in cases where the conditions are justified by important needs relating to for the application of that provision are all environmental protection.

Conclusion

In the light of the foregoing considerations, I consider that the contested directive was adopted on an incorrect basis and should therefore be annulled. I therefore propose that the application be upheld and that the Council be ordered to pay the costs.

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