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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·2.6.1992

C-370/89

ECLI:EU:C:1992:234

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61989CC0370

OPINION OF MR GULMANN — CASE C-370/89

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL GULMANN delivered on 2 June 1992 *

Mr President, from the Community under the provisions Members of the Court, of the Lomé Convention. The Community decided to finance part of the project out of the resources of the Sixth European Devel­ opment Fund. Mali then requested financing 1. A French company, SGEEM, and its from the European Investment Bank (herein­ director have brought proceedings against after 'the Bank' or ΈIB' ) in the form of a the European Investment Bank, asking that loan of risk capital under Article 199 of the the Bank be ordered to compensate the Lomé Convention. The financing contract applicants for the loss which they claim to between Mali and the EIB, acting on behalf have suffered through its tortious conduct. of the Community, was signed in 1988. The The case has been brought under Article project was put out to tender and the appli­ 178 and the second paragraph of Article cant company was one of the tenderers. Its 215 of the EEC Treaty. The Bank has argued tender was the lowest. The authorities in that the case against it should be dismissed. Mali had entrusted a Canadian company The Commission has intervened in support with the task of preparing the tender pro­ of the Bank. cedure and assisting in the decision as to which of the tenderers should be awarded the contract. The Canadian company initially advised against awarding the contract to the applicant company. The competent authori­ The Sixth Chamber, to which the case was ties in Mali nevertheless decided after a long assigned, has found cause to apply Article period of consideration to award the con­ 95(3) of the Rules of Procedure and has tract to the applicant company. The Bank referred the case back to the full Court in took note of that decision, but pointed out order that the latter may determine whether that it would be unable to finance the project the case is admissible. if that company's tender were accepted. The Bank explained its view by pointing out that there were, in its opinion, a number of prob­ lems associated with the company's tender. 2. The facts of the case can be summarized as follows:

The Republic of Mali planned the construc­ tion of a high-voltage electricity line between two towns and applied for financial support The authorities in Mali thereupon decided to award the contract to a company other than the applicant. The applicants in this case con­ * Original language: Danish. tend that the Bank's conduct was the reason

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for the company's not being awarded the In the circumstances it cannot be argued that contract and that such conduct was unlawful. the issue is one of major practical impor­ tance. However, the issue is important in principle and also because it raises the ques­ tion of the Bank's special position within the system established by the Treaty, which may Introductory remarks on the Court's jurisdic- also have significance in other areas. The tion to examine the substance of the case fundamental question is whether the Bank can be treated, for the purposes of Article 215, as one of the Community institutions, in respect of which the Community can thus 3. Article 178 of the EEC Treaty provides incur non-contractual liability. that:

'The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in disputes relating to compensation for damage provided for in the second paragraph 4. The parties to the proceedings and the of Article 215.' Commission agree that that question ought to be answered in the affirmative. Such agreement is naturally persuasive, the more so since the arguments in favour of an affir­ The second paragraph of Article 215 pro­ mative answer are particularly strong. This vides that: agreement, however, also gives rise to certain difficulties. It is clear that the question of the Court's jurisdiction is a question which the Court must decide of its own motion and 'In the case of non-contractual liability, the that the Court in its decision must also Community shall, in accordance with the weigh up any arguments for an answer in the general principles common to the laws of the negative. It is for that reason also incumbent Member States, make good any damage upon me to examine whether such argu­ caused by its institutions or by its servants in ments exist. the performance of their duties.'

The Court has not hitherto had occasion to consider whether it has jurisdiction under Article 178 and the second paragraph of The parties have contended that it follows Article 215 to rule in cases brought against from the Court's case-law that the second the EIB for compensation in respect of non­ paragraph of Article 215 can be interpreted contractual liability. Over the 30 years and in such a way that that provision also covers more since the Bank came into existence, no the Bank and that there are no significant such case has been brought before the Court arguments against such an interpretation, but nor, so far as I can ascertain, before any that there exist, on the contrary, sound other court or jurisdiction. reasons for coming to such a decision.

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5. In my opinion, it is clear that the question The choice of the second interpretation is not as straightforward as would appear would mean that: from the procedural documents of the par­ 1 ties. The Bank has a special position within the organizational system of the Treaty and (i) the applicant could choose to bring pro­ there were fundamental reasons for that ceedings before the courts having juris­ choice. As I shall discuss below, the Court diction at the Bank's address for service has stressed the ambivalent position of the or before the courts for the place where Bank within the organizational system of the 2 the harmful event occurred, and Treaty, and it is a far from simple matter to determine whether the Bank should be treated, for the purpose of the second para­ graph of Article 215, as a Community insti­ (ii) the substantive rules for the determina­ tution, or whether such an interpretation tion of the case would be those which should be rejected. The first interpretation follow from the rules of private interna­ would have the following consequences: tional law applicable in accordance with the lex fori.

(i) the Court of Justice would have exclu­ The interpretation selected can therefore be sive jurisdiction to determine all pro­ of substantive importance not only for the ceedings brought against the Bank for Bank, but also for the natural or legal per­ compensation in respect of non­ sons who believe they are entitled to com­ contractual liability, that is to say, that national courts (at least in the Member pensation from the Bank. States) would have to dismiss such pro­ ceedings brought against the Bank, and 6. The obvious point at which to begin an examination of the question is Article 29 of the Bank's Statute, which is included in a protocol to the EEC Treaty. Article 29 pro­ (ii) the substantive rules on the basis of vides as follows: which the merits of the case would have to be decided would be 'the general prin­ ciples common to the laws of the Mem­ ber States'. 'Disputes between the Bank on the one hand, and its creditors, debtors or any other person on the other, shall be decided by the 1 — The majority of commentators who have at all addressed the competent national courts, save where juris­ problem take the view that the Bank is not covered by the second paragraph of Article 215; see, for example, Wohlfarth diction has been conferred on the Court of in Wohlfarth and Others Die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemein- Justice. schaft, 1960, at page 566, and Grabitz in his Commentary on the Treaty, Note 20 in fine on Article 215. In Groebens and Others Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, (1983), Gilsdorf argues that the Court of Justice cannot have jurisdiction, but that the competent national courts must apply the general principles common to the laws of the Member States under 2 — The Bank is required under Article 29 of its Statute to have Article 215 in respect of the Bank's liability to pay compen­ an address for service in each Member State, sation: see Note 19 on Article 215. A few commentators take The right of an applicant in cases relating to compensation in the view that the second paragraph of Article 215 must be respect of non-contractual liability to choose between the interpreted as meaning that the Bank is covered by that pro­ domestic courts of the defendant and the courts for the place vision; see, for example, Hilf Die Organisationsstruktur der where the harmful event occurred follows, of course, from Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 1982, page 41, and Henrion in the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Les Novelles, Droit des Communautés Européennes, 1969, Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels Con­ page 971. vention); see OJ 1990 C 189, p . 2.

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The Bank shall have an address for service in subject to a number of restrictions, be each Member State. It may, however, in any brought before national courts. The reason contract, specify a particular address for ser­ normally given for this is that such a legal vice or provide for arbitration.' arrangement is necessary in order to safe­ guard the confidence of the lender in the context of the raising of a loan by the finan­ cial institution. 3 Notwithstanding that reasoning, it is assumed that any type of That provision corresponds in principle to proceedings may be brought against financial Article 183 of the EEC Treaty, which pro­ institutions, that is to say, even proceedings vides that: which do not arise from contractual rela­ tions. That is the legal position which applies, for example, to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ('the World Bank'), established in 1947, and 'Save where jurisdiction is conferred on the the European Bank for Reconstruction and Court of Justice by this Treaty, disputes to Development, which was established in which the Community is a party shall not on 1990. 4 that ground be excluded from the jurisdic­ tion of the courts or tribunals of the Member States.'

It may on that basis be argued that the EIB must have the same legal status, in respect of procedure, as international financial organi­ The basic premiss of the Treaty is therefore zations, in so far as the Bank may be sued that the institutions and bodies established before national courts in the same way as by the Treaty are not immune from suit. international financial organizations. This, Proceedings may be brought before national however, is to overlook the fact that under courts, unless the Treaty provides that the Article 29 of the Bank's Statute national proceedings must be brought before the Court of Justice. 3 — See, inter alia, J. Duffar Contribution à l'étude des privilèges et immunités des organisations internationales, 1982, pages 59 to 68, D. W, Bowett The law of international institutions, 1982, pages 345 to 353 and R. Lavalle La Banque mondiale et ses filiales, 1972, pages 118 and 119. 4 — Article VII(3) of the 'Articles of Agreement of the Interna­ 7. The Community legal order also differs tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development' (DINTS, appreciably on this point from the rules volume 2 (1947), p. 134 et seq.) provides as follows: 'Actions may be brought against the Bank only in a court of which apply in the case of international competent jurisdiction in the territories of a member in which the Bank has an office, has appointed an agent for the organizations. It is the general practice for purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed securities. No actions shall, however, be States, when they establish international brought by members or persons acting for or deriving claims organizations, to confer on those organiza­ from members ...' Article 46 of the Agreement establishing the European Bank tions extensive immunity from suit which for Reconstruction and Development (the Agreement is applies whether the organizations act jure annexed to the Council Decision of 19 November 1990 on the conclusion thereof: see OJ 1990 L 372, p. 1) provides as imperii or jure gestionis. There is in each follows: 'Actions may be brought against the Bank only in a court of case, however, an important exception. competent jurisdiction in the territory of a country in which Immunity from suit is not conferred on the Bank has an office, has appointed an agent for the pur­ pose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued international financial organizations. Pro­ or guaranteed securities. No actions shall, however, be brought by members or persons acting for or deriving claims ceedings against such organizations may, from members ....'.

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courts may decide disputes 'save where juris­ Court ruled in that connection that its juris­ diction has been conferred on the Court of diction to deal with such disputes was not Justice'. excluded by reason of the provisions in Arti­ cle 180 of the Treaty, which expressly confers jurisdiction on the Court to deal with certain 8. The central question in respect of the disputes to which the Bank is a party. The Bank is therefore not whether its conduct is Court ruled on that point as follows: exempt from judicial review, but whether such review should be carried out by the Court of Justice or by national courts. It fol­ 'This provision merely confers upon the lows from the wording of Article 29 of the Board of Directors of the Bank powers anal­ Bank's Statute that that question must be ogous to those conferred upon the Commis­ resolved on the basis of an interpretation of sion by Article 169 and renders measures the EEC Treaty provisions which confer adopted by the Board of Governors and jurisdiction on the Court of Justice. those adopted by the Board of Directors subject to the same jurisdiction of the Court of Justice as that conferred by Article This means that an interpretation of the sec­ 173 with regard to the measures of the ond paragraph of Article 215 of the Treaty is Council and of the Commission. necessary in order to resolve the issue whether the Court has jurisdiction to enter­ tain proceedings brought against the Bank for compensation in respect of non­ This complementary nature of Article contractual liability. 180 thus confirms the conclusion that when in Article 179 mention is made of the Com­ munity this does not exclude the Bank' (Paragraphs 16 and 17). Is the Bank covered by the second paragraph of Article 215 of the Treaty?

It must for the same reason be assumed that 9. The case-law of the Court provides valu­ the existence of Article 180 of the Treaty also able assistance for an understanding of the does not preclude the Bank from coming Bank's position in the jurisdictional and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Jus­ organizational system of the Community. tice under Article 178 in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article 215.

10. In Case 110/75 Mills v European Invest- 5 ment Bank, the Court examined the ques­ The Court also justified its jurisdiction to tion whether Article 179 of the Treaty, under deal with disputes between the Bank and its which 'the Court of Justice shall have juris­ servants under Article 179 by pointing out diction in any dispute between the Commu­ that the Bank's servants had, under Article nity and its servants ...', also applied to dis­ 22 of the Protocol on the Privileges and putes between the Bank and its servants. The Immunities of the European Communities, a legal position corresponding to that which the Protocol confers on servants of the 5 — [1976] ECR 955. Community institutions.

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The judgment, which is obviously correct, in which the Court is called on to decide demonstrates a readiness on the part of the whether proceedings may be brought before Court to apply the jurisdictional provisions the Court of Justice against the Bank in of the Treaty also in respect of the Bank, at respect of its external relations, that is to say, least in cases where the position of the Com­ its relations to natural or legal persons who munity institutions and the Bank are compa­ do not come within the organizational sys­ rable in all relevant respects. tem of the Community.

11. In its judgment in Case 85/86 Commis- It is also important to note that the Court sion v Board of Governors of the European 7 emphasized in the Mills case that the Bank is Investment Bank, the Court was given an a Community body, while at the same time it opportunity to analyse the Bank's position stressed the distinction between the Com­ within the organizational and operational munity institutions on the one hand and the system of the Treaty. The case concerned the Bank on the other. The Court stated at Para­ issue of whether the tax paid by servants of graph 14 of its judgment: the Bank was to be levied for the benefit of the Bank or for the benefit of the Commu­ nity. It was hardly in doubt that the relevant tax provisions were to be understood as meaning that the tax should be allocated to 'It must thus be concluded that by the words the Community. The Bank, however, argued "any dispute between the Community and that its servants" Article 179 is not restricted exclusively to the institutions of the Com­ munity and their staff but also includes the Bank as a Community institution established 'it is neither an institution nor a department and with a legal personality conferred by the of the Communities; rather, it enjoys auton­ Treaty.' 6 omy vis-à-vis the Communities by virtue of its legal status, its composition and its insti­ tutional structure, as well as by virtue of the nature and origin of its resources, which are absolutely independent of the Communities' It may perhaps at this point be worth men­ budget' (Paragraph 27). tioning that the provisions which clearly confer jurisdiction on the Court of Justice to deal with cases to which the Bank is a party, On this point, the Court ruled, inter alia, as that is to say, Articles 179 and 180, deal with follows: disputes in respect of the internal relations of the Community. The present case is the first

'It is true that under Article 129 of the Treaty the Bank has legal personality distinct 6 — The language of the case in Millswas French. The expression 'la Banque en tant qu'organisme communautaire' was some­ from that of the Community and that it is what unfortunately rendered in the English translation of the administered and managed by organs of its judgment as 'the Bank as a Community institution'. How­ ever, the judgment in Case 85/86 Commission v Board of Governors of the European Investment Bank, discussed below, alters that translation to 'the Bank [as] a Community body' at paragraph 24, where it refers to the above paragraph in Mills. 7 — [1988] ECR 1281.

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own in accordance with its statute. In order is collected for the benefit of the Communi­ to perform the tasks assigned to it by Article ties' budget. Contrary to the contentions of 130 of the Treaty the Bank must be able to the Board of Governors, the fact that the tax act in complete independence on the finan­ is allotted to that purpose is not liable to cial markets, like any other bank. Indeed, the undermine the operational autonomy and Bank is not financed out of the budget but reputation of the Bank as an independent from its own resources, which consist in par­ institution on the financial markets since it ticular of the capital subscribed by the Mem­ does not affect the capital or the actual man­ ber States and funds borrowed on the finan­ agement of the Bank' (Paragraphs 28, 29 and cial markets. Lastly, the Bank draws up 30). annual accounts and a profit and loss account which are audited annually by a committee appointed by the Board of Gov­ ernors. Of fundamental significance is the fact that the Court points out in those paragraphs that the legal position of the Bank within the system of the Treaty is ambivalent. It is, on the one hand, undisputed that the Bank is required under the Treaty (Article 130 inter Nevertheless, the fact that the Bank has that alia) to contribute to the pursuit of Commu­ degree of operational and institutional nity objectives, for which purpose it is part autonomy does not mean that it is totally of the Community, and on the other hand it separated from the Communities and exempt is undisputed that the Bank has legal person­ from every rule of Community law. It is ality under Article 129 of the Treaty and that clear in particular from Article 130 of the that legal personality is separate from that of Treaty that the Bank is intended to contrib­ the Community, the legal personality of ute towards the attainment of the Communi­ which is established in Article 210 of the ty's objectives and thus by virtue of the Treaty. The Court points out that the Bank's Treaty forms part of the framework of the independent status as a legal person is based Community. on the need to ensure that the Bank must be able to act in complete independence like any other bank on the financial markets, in such a way that it can fulfil the duties imposed on it by Article 130 of the Treaty. The reasoning of the Court demonstrates that it attaches The position of the Bank is therefore ambiv­ importance in its interpretation of the rele­ alent inasmuch as it is characterized on the vant Community rules to the question one hand by independence in the manage­ whether the application to the Bank of those ment of its affairs, in particular in the sphere rules can damage its operational autonomy of financial operations, and on the other by a or its reputation as an independent institu­ close link with the Community as regards its tion on the financial markets. objectives. It is entirely compatible with the ambivalent nature of the Bank that the pro­ visions generally applicable to the taxation of staff at the Community level should also apply to the staff of the Bank. This is true in 12. Those two judgments thus make an particular of the rule that the tax in question important, but inconclusive, contribution to

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the proper interpretation of the second para provisions governing the Bank are to be graph of Article 215. found in Articles 129 and 130 of Title IV in Part 3 of the Treaty on the policy of the Community. This distinction between the Bank and the Community institutions is a natural reflection of the Bank's special posi tion in the organizational system of the 13. Of particular importance for this inter Treaty, which is emphasized by its status as pretation is the fact that the Court has con an independent legal person.

That position sidered the Bank to be a Community body. has not been significantly modified by the That implies, in my opinion, that the Bank's amendments to the Treaty laid down in the status as an independent legal person can Treaty on European Union signed in Maas hardly in itself preclude an interpretation of tricht on 7 February 1992. Admittedly, the the second paragraph of Article 215 to the introductory provisions in the Treaty are effect that the Bank can render the Commu supplemented by a new provision in Article nity liable, subject, obviously, to the require 4b, under which a European Investment ment that the actual manifestation of that lia Bank is to be established, and Articles bility, that is to say, the payment of 129 and 130 of the Treaty are transferred to compensation, must be made out of the Part 5 of the Treaty, which deals with the Bank's own funds and not out of the Com institutions of the Community.

However, the munity budget. Bank is still not designated as a Community institution under Article 4, and the inclusion of the Bank in Part 5 of the Treaty occurs in an independent Chapter 5 which is quite separate from Chapter 1 dealing with the institutions of the Community. 14. More problematic is the attempt to over come the difficulty posed by the fact that the Community, according to the words of the second paragraph of Article 215, is liable only The Bank cannot accordingly be treated as a in respect of damage caused by its institutions Community institution, as that concept is or by its servants. 8As mentioned above, the used in Article 4 of the Treaty, and the most Court assumed in the Mills case, correctly in obvious step is to proceed on the basis that it my view, that the Bank is not a Community is in this sense that the concept is also used

9 institution. The enumeration of the Commu in the second paragraph of Article 215. nity institutions in Article 4 of the Treaty does not include the Bank, and there is also at present no mention of the Bank in Part 9 — No^ major significance attaches in my opinion to the cases in 5 of the Treaty, which deals with the institu which the Bank is expressly placed on the same footing as the Community institutions. One example is the above anal tions of the Community. The fundamental ogy between the Community institutions and the Bank in the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the European

Communities. Another example is the analogous reference to the Bank and the Community institutions in Article 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. These and other examples demonstrate that there have been reasons to draw 8 — The Bank argued that the second paragraph of Article analogies in a range of contexts. However, it h not possible 215 must be applicable to it, even though it could not be to infer from this that such an analogy is correct in all cases. treated as a Community institution. It argues that it must in It may perhaps even be argued that the examples — if they any event be covered by the term '(Community) servants'. I arc at all relevant to the case at issue — confirm, on the one do not believe that it is necessary to examine that submission hand, the distinction between the Bank and the Community in any greater detail. It is in my view clear that the decisive institutions and, on the other, demonstrate the perceived question is whether the Bank is an institution of the Com need to state expressly that the Bank must in particular cir munity within the meaning of the second paragraph of Arti cumstances be treated in the same way as the Community cle 215 or whether it can be treated as one of the institutions. institutions.

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It is, however, possible, in my opinion, for EIB in the Treaty on European Union in the second paragraph of Article 215 to be view of the fact that it has existed since the given a wide interpretation such that the original Treaty was adopted and the issue of Bank may, in the context of that provision, its non-contractual liability has not hitherto 1 be treated as one of the Community institu given rise to problems. 1 tions. The Treaty provisions on the jurisdic tion of the Court of Justice have to a limited extent been given an extensive interpretation in cases where the Court has identified cogent reasons for such an interpretation; It is in my opinion clear that the new provi one example is the Court's judgment in Case sion cannot in any event be used as a positive

10 C-70/88 Parliament v Council. An exten argument in support of the contention that sive interpretation of the second paragraph the EIB comes under the jurisdiction of the of Article 215 would therefore, in my opin Court of Justice pursuant to the second para ion, be justified if there were convincing graph of Article 215. The Maastricht Treaty reasons to treat the Bank in the same way as includes Articles 4a and 4b as new provisions the Community institutions and there were in the EEC Treaty; these establish respec no pertinent arguments against such similar tively a European Central Bank and a Euro treatment. pean Investment Bank, which may act only in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the Treaty and their Statutes.

The two banks are not included in the enumera 15. Before I examine that question, I wish to tion of Community institutions which con refer to an argument put forward by the tinues to feature in Article 4. That fact pre Bank in support of its contention that it is sumably explains why it was felt necessary covered by the second paragraph of Article expressly to include the Central Bank in 215. It has pointed out that the following Article 215. It is worth noting that the two provision is added by the Treaty on Euro banks, which are treated together in the pean Union as a new third paragraph to introductory provisions of the Treaty, are Article 215: not so treated in Article 215.

It may of course be that the reason for that situation is that which the Bank has alleged. However, the explanation may also be that the reasons 'The preceding paragraph shall apply under which have led to the European Central the same conditions to damage caused by the ECB [European Central Bank] or by its ser vants in the performance of their duties.' 11 — The Bank has also pointed out that Article 9 of the Statute of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, which was established with independent legal personality in 1973 by way of Regulation (EEC) No 907/73 of the Council (OJ 1973 L 89, p . 2), expressly provides that the second para graph of Article 215 shall apply in the case of the Fund's The Bank claims that there is no reason why non-contractual liability. The Bank contends that the Council cannot confer new areas of jurisdiction on the the two banks should be treated differently Court of Justice and that the Council therefore must neces in respect of the second paragraph of Article sarily have interpreted the second paragraph of Article 215 as already covering the Monetary Fund. That argument

215 and that it is understandable that the is not valid, since it is based on a false premiss. The practice of the Council shows that new areas of jurisdiction can be Member States did not expressly include the conferred on the Court of Justice without any amendment to the Treaty. The Court ruled in another context that that practice was lawful in its Opinion 1/91 of 14 December 1991 concerning the draft agreement on the creation of the European Economic Area [1991] ECR 1-6079 (Paragraph

59). 10 — [1990] ECR 1-2041.

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Bank being treated in the same manner as Be that as it may, my view, nonetheless, is Community institutions for the purposes of that the interpretative contribution of the compensation were not put forward in new provision in Article 215 on the Central respect of the European Investment Bank, Bank is so doubtful that it cannot be of con­ with the result that it was considered proper clusive significance for the interpretation of to treat the two banks differently for the the existing provision with regard to the purposes of Article 215. The European Cen­ EIB. tral Bank has been given duties and powers by the new Treaty, which, owing to their public-law nature, make it necessary to include the Central Bank in the Treaty rules relating to the jurisdiction of the Court (see 16. In my view, decisive importance for that the amendments to Articles 173, 175, 177 interpretation attaches, as outlined above, to and 180 of the Treaty), and which make it the question whether there are positive natural to draw an analogy between the Cen­ reasons to allow the Bank to come within tral Bank and the Community institutions the Court's jurisdiction under the second for the purpose of matters relating to com­ paragraph of Article 215 in the light of pensation. The new Treaty does not alter the relevant considerations based on the Bank's duties of the Investment Bank, which only to duties and its position in the organizational a limited extent, if at all, involve the exercise system of the Treaty, and whether any of public authority in a restricted sense. cogent arguments can be adduced against such a result.

17. The Bank has argued forcefully that an affirmative answer to the question would best guarantee its independence and is in any event desirable because it would ensure a uniform assessment of the Bank's conduct in the interest of legal certainty and would accordingly have sufficient regard for the fact Even though it is unclear how far one is enti­ that the Bank was acting as a Community tled to interpret the existing rules in the light body for the purpose of pursuing Commu­ of a new Treaty which has not yet been rat­ nity objectives. ified, it can at least be stated that it is hardly logical from the point of view of legislative technique to include a provision only on the Central Bank in Article 215 if the intention was that that provision should also cover the I have already mentioned that the Court EIB. If the second paragraph of Article attached importance in the case between the 215 is to be interpreted in the manner Commission and the Board of Governors of claimed by the EIB, it would have been the European Investment Bank to the issue desirable and appropriate in all the circum­ of whether acceptance of the Commission's stances to have treated the two banks in the argument was 'liable to undermine the oper­ same way during the formal drafting of Arti­ ational autonomy and reputation of the Bank cle 215. as an independent institution on the financial

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markets'. It is difficult to imagine anyone financial autonomy] . When it came to a claiming that the autonomy or reputation of choice between the idea put forward at the the Bank could be undermined if proceed­ Conference of Messina of entrusting the pro­ ings against it in respect of non-contractual motion of investment in Europe to a special liability were to be brought before the Court fund and the proposal to pursue that aim by of Justice. setting up a genuine bank, the latter proposal was successful for a number of reasons. These reasons included resistance on the part of the rich Member States which would have borne the greater part of the burden of There is also, in my view, good reason to financing the fund, the scope of the commit­ accept the Bank's additional argument that it ments assumed by the new Community, may be appropriate to leave it to the Court which was much larger than in the case of of Justice to decide all cases concerning com­ the ECSC, and the desire to adopt a solution pensation in respect of non-contractual lia­ for which international precedents already bility. existed (the Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for one). However, once it had been decided to set up the European Investment Bank it was an obvious, and in 18. That, however, is not necessarily conclu­ some ways, an obligatory step to give it legal sive for the resolution of the problem. It can­ personality, if only to enable the new body not be ruled out that the Bank's special sta­ to operate within the various Member States tus within the organizational system of the in the same way as any other credit institu­ Community may have been based on other, tion.' more far-reaching considerations than those discussed above; alternately, there may be arguments in favour of conferring jurisdic­ tion on national courts.

The reference to the Bank for Reconstruc­ tion and Development (the World Bank) is interesting, not least in the light of the fact The Court stated in the paragraphs cited mentioned above that proceedings may be above in the case between the Commission brought against that bank before national and the Board of Governors of the EIB that courts for compensation in respect of con­ the Bank had to be able to act in complete tractual and non-contractual liability. The independence on the financial markets, 'like obvious assumption is that it was intended to any other bank'. The background to that treat the EIB in the same way as any other statement was developed in the Opinion of credit institution even from the procedural Advocate General Mancini in the case. At perspective. point 11 of his Opinion, the Advocate Gen­ eral made the following statement:

Furthermore, there appears to be less need to 'It is not a difficult question to answer [that leave it to the Court of Justice to decide is to say, the question why the primary leg­ disputes involving conduct of the Bank islation gave the Bank legal personality and which attracts non-contractual liability. The

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SGEEM AND ETROY v EIB

primary reason for conferring jurisdiction on 20. In view of the foregoing, it appears to the Court of Justice in the case of the Com­ me doubtful that there are sufficiently cogent munity institutions was probably that it is reasons to give a broad interpretation to the necessary to have a uniform judicial assess­ second paragraph of Article 215 in respect of ment of their legal measures in view of their the Bank. 12 public-law nature. In accordance with its functions, the EIB operates primarily in the private-law sector, where there is not the same need for the Court of Justice to give a uniform legal appraisal of its activities in the On the other hand, I believe that it is both light of the special considerations which possible and appropriate for the Court of apply within the legal system of the Euro­ Justice to refrain from expressing an opinion pean Communities. on this question of principle.

It is possible, because the present case can be treated as admissible in the special context of Community law within which the Bank 19. Finally, one cannot overlook the fact that acted in connection with the loan to Mali. the interests of the person suffering damage may argue in favour of allowing national courts to have jurisdiction to deal with cases involving non-contractual liability on the part of the Bank. All other things being equal, the person suffering the damage may It is also appropriate, because it can hardly have a legitimate interest in being able to be entirely ruled out that relevant new bring proceedings against the person or body aspects may be added to the Court's reason­ causing the damage before the courts in the ing in a new case where this fundamental place where the damage occurred. question must necessarily be decided, which quite possibly can happen on the basis of a reference for a preliminary ruling from a national court before which proceedings for 12 — The reason generally given for the different treatment under Article 215 of cases involving contractual and non­ compensation have been brought against the contractual liability is as follows: Bank. Furthermore, the possibility cannot 'International organizations normally enjoy immunity from judicial proceedings in the Member States. The purpose of entirely be discounted that the issue may that immunity is to guarantee their independence. For its part, the EEC does not enjoy total immunity: so far as its expressly be resolved in the context of a sub­ contractual relations arc concerned, proceedings may be sequent amendment to the Treaty, which brought against it before the courts of the Member States. National rules on contractual liability arc sufficiently simi­ may be desirable not least when account is lar to dispel the fear of major differences in treatment. There is accordingly no cogent reason to deprive national taken of the express provision in Article courts of jurisdiction in this area. On the other hand, pro­ 13 ceedings relating to non-contractual liability concern Com­ 215 relating to the Central Bank. munity policy much more directly, since they involve an assessment of the unlawful or negligent nature of the con­ duct from which they originate. It was for that reason log­ ical to remove such proceedings from the Jurisdiction of national courts in order to bring them under that of the 13 — If it is desired to establish the jurisdiction of the Court Court of Justice.': sec J. Mégret and Others Le droit de la under the second paragraph of Article 215, that may be Communauté économique européenne, 1983, volume 10, done through an amendment to that provision similar to page 266. A similar view is expressed by H . G. Schermers, that made with regard to the Central Bank. If the opposite Judicial Protection in the European Communities, 1983, result is desired, that can be done through a clarification of page 287 et scq. Article 29 of the Bank's Statute.

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OPINION OF MR GULMANN — CASE C-370/89

The Bank acted in the present case 'on behalf follows expressly from the finance contract of the Community' that it was entered into by the Republic of Mali and the EIB 'acting in the present con­ tract on behalf of the European Economic Community'. It is clear from Articles 22 and 23 of the Internal Agreement that the Bank administers loans of risk capital in close It was argued in particular by the Commis­ cooperation with a committee consisting of sion, but also directly or indirectly by the representatives of the governments of the parties to the case, that the second paragraph Member States. of Article 215 is in any event applicable in the present proceedings if account is taken of the special legal context in which the Bank acted.

It follows from the rules in the Lomé Con­ 21. The Bank acted on the basis of rules set vention on financial and technical coopera­ out in the first place in the Lomé Conven­ tion that the Bank is subject to the same 14 rules as the Commission, unless different tion, secondly, in an Internal Agreement on the Financing and Administration of provisions had been adopted in individual 15 cases (see Article 193(10) of the Convention). Community Aid and, thirdly, in the Finan­ cial Regulation applicable to the Sixth Euro­ For example, both the Bank and Commis­ 16 sion are required to ensure that there is no pean Development Fund. The aid, which is granted in the form, inter alia, of loans of discrimination in the invitation to tender risk capital, comes from Community funds. dossier and that the tender selected is eco­ The rules referred to establish a division of nomically the most advantageous (see Arti­ functions between the Commission and the cles 226 and 236(1) of the Convention). Bank with regard to the administration of the aid. The loans covered by the finance contract at issue in the present case involved risk capital, and it follows from the relevant rules that such loans are administered by the 17 Bank on behalf of the Community. It also

22. In view of the foregoing, there are good reasons to support the view that the Bank 14 — OJ 1986 L 86, p . 3. 15 — OJ 1986 L 86, p . 210. should in the present case be treated in the 16 — OJ 1986 L 325, p . 42. same way as the Community institutions in 17 — Article 10 of the Internal Agreement on the financing and respect of the second paragraph of Article administration of Community aid provides that loans of risk capital 'shall be administered by the Bank on behalf of 215. The Bank lends Community funds. The the Community in accordance with its Statute and the rules laid down by the Financial Regulation referred to in Article Bank administers funds on behalf of the 28.' Community, a fact which is also made clear Article 14(2) of the Agreement provides that: 'The Bank shall undertake, on behalf of the Community, the financial to the outside world. The Bank administers execution of operations carried out with the Fund's resources in the form of risk capital. In this context, the those funds on the basis of Community Bank shall act on behalf and at the risk of the Community. rules, under which its independent decision­ Any resulting rights, and particularly rights as creditor or owner, shall Be vested in the Community.' making competence is limited vis-à-vis the

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SGEEM AND ETROY v EIB

competence which it has when lending its Article 215. Even if the Bank does administer own funds on the basis of the EEC Treaty. Community funds, and even if it does act on Furthermore, the Commission and the Bank behalf of the Community, it is both neces­ act in this area essentially on the basis of the sary and possible in my opinion to interpret same set of rules, and it is for that reason the second paragraph of Article 215 in such a particularly logical that the Court of Justice way that the Bank, if it is ordered to pay should have jurisdiction to deal with pro­ compensation, should pay such compensa­ ceedings concerning non-contractual liability tion out of its own funds. brought not only against the Commission, but also against the Bank. That fact is, in my opinion, the determinant factor in favour of the Bank's being treated in the present con­ 23. The substance of the case should be dealt text as one of the Community institutions with by the Sixth Chamber, in view of the for the purpose of the second paragraph of fact that the parties in the case submitted 18 Article 215. The Court of Justice ought for their arguments on that question before that that reason to examine the substance of the Chamber during the oral procedure on present case under the second paragraph of 23 October 1991.

Conclusion

24. I accordingly propose that the Court should rule that it has jurisdiction under Article 178 of the EEC Treaty, in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article 215 thereof, to decide the substantive issues in the present case.

18 — I find inconclusive the fact that there are provisions, such as Article 52(2) of the Financial Regulation cited above, which state expressly that the Bank acts 'for and on behalf of the Community'. No significance should be attached in the present context to the fact that the Bank may be said, in a restricted sense, to be acting with the full authority of the Community. In the first place, I find it questionable whether it is proper to apply the rules of agency existing in private law to the relationship between the Bank and the Community in the area under discussion; secondly it strikes me as doubtful whether such a position of authority, con­ sidered in vacuo, can render the second paragraph of Arti­ cle 215 applicable.

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