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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·15.10.1991

C-107/90

ECLI:EU:C:1991:384

Súd
Súdny dvor Európskej únie
IČS
61990CC0107

HOCHBAUM » COMMISSION

OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL TESAURO delivered on 15 October 1991*

Mr President, 2. Mr Hochbaum's appeal relates only to Members of the Court, the part of the judgment in which the Court of First Instance dismissed his third plea in law (paragraphs 21 to 26), based on misuse of powers. 1 In that plea, the then applicant had essentially contended that the Commission annulled ab initio the procedure declared partly invalid by the 1. By judgment of 9 July 1987, ' upholding Court of Justice and decided to publish a an application by Mr Hochbaum, this Court fresh vacancy notice (COM/83/87) not in annulled the appointment of Mr Water­ the general interest but purely in order to schoot as Head of Division in DG IV by legitimize the already certain appointment reason of the fan that the Advisory of Mr Waterschoot. And in fact the latter, Committee for appointments to grades A2 who at the time of the first procedure did and A3 had not been consulted on the basis not — according to the appellant—fulfil of complete candidates' files. Following that the requirements as to relevant experience judgment, the Commission decided to annul laid down by the vacancy notice, only vacancy notice COM/902/84, on the basis fulfilled those requirements subsequently, of which Mr Waterschoot had been specifically because of the work done by appointed; it therefore initiated a new him following the appointment which was procedure (by notice COM/83/87), at the later held to be unlawful. In support of his end of which the appointing authority reap­ allegation of misuse of powers, Mr pointed Mr Waterschoot. It should be noted Hochbaum referred to the failure to fulfil that both vacancy notices were drafted in the requirements laid down for the original identical terms. procedure.

Mr Hochbaum brought a further action before the Court of First Instance, seeking The Court of First Instance stated in reply the annulment of the Commission's decision to that argument, in general terms, that the to terminate the original procedure and Community judicature must limit its review annulment of the measures adopted under to the question whether the appointing the new appointment procedure. The Court authority has used its power in a manner of First Instance dismissed that application which is manifestly wrong; that, in the by judgment of 14 February 1990; 2 it is present case, there was no objective indi­ against that judgment that the appeal on cation that Mr Waterschoot did not fulfil which this Court is called upon to the requirements for a valid application adjudicate is directed. (paragraph 24); and that, in any event, there was no evidence that the Commission acted * Origini) language: Italian. 1 — Joined Cases 44/85, 77/85, 294/85 and 295/85 Hochblum 3 — The appticanťs other two pleas in law before the Court of iná Rives v Commission [1987] ECR 3259. Fim Instance, alleging infringement of Article 176 of the 2 — Case T-38/89 Hochblum v Commission [1990] ECR Treaty and infringement of Article 25 of the Staff Regu­ II-43. lations, are not repeated m the present appeal.

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with any objective in mind other than the It should be remembered, for the purposes interests of the service (paragraphs 25 and of this case, that Article 45 of the Staff 26). Regulations provides that 'Promotion shall be exclusively by selection from among officials who have completed a minimum period in their grade, after consideration of In his appeal, the appellant contends that the comparative merits of the officials the Court of First Instance rejected the plea eligible for promotion and of the reports as to misuse of power and thereby itself not on them'. That wording shows that the only committed a misuse of powers but, appointing authority enjoys a wide even before that, an infringement of Article discretion, which, of course, must be 45 of the Staff Regulations. The exercised within the limits laid down by that Commission has raised an objection of inad- provision. In particular, the officials missibility because, in its view, the concerned must fulfil the requirements to be appellant's pleas are intended to bring about promoted and therefore must fulfil, inter alia a discussion of the findings of fact made by the requirements laid down in the vacancy the Court of First Instance, which is not notice. available in appeal proceedings before the Court of Justice.

In that regard, let me say straight away that 3. In his first plea, which comprises two the contested statement by the Court of specific allegations, the appellant contests, First Instance is specifically supported by first, the Court of First Instance's statement settled and consistent case law; the Court of that 'The appointing authority has a discre- Justice has stated on several occasions that tionary power of appraisal in matters of the appointing authority enjoys a wide promotion and the Community judicature discretion regarding promotions and that it must limit its review to the question whether must therefore 'restrict itself to the question the appointing authority has used its power whether, having regard to the considera- which is manifestly wrong' (first sentence of tions which guided its assessment, the paragraph 24). administration kept within reasonable bounds and did not exercise its power in a manifestly erroneous manner'. 4

In Mr Hochbaum's opinion, different limits apply to the review by the Court of the discretionary power granted by Article 45 to the appointing authority: the Court of First The Court of Justice has also made clear Instance should have considered whether that 'While the appointing authority enjoys the candidate chosen by the appointing wide discretion in this matter, there is ipso authority fulfilled all the requirements of facto an assumption that the exercise of this vacancy notice COM/902/84. By so discretion will include careful examination alleging, Mr Hochbaum essentially chal- of the files and meticulous regard to the lenges the Court of First Instance's interpre- tation of Article 45 of the Staff Regulations 4 — Judgment in Case 52/86 Banner v Parliament [1987] ECR as regards the limits of the discretionary 979, paragraph 9. See also, among others, the judgment in Case 26/85 Waysse v Commission [1986] ECR 3131, power vested in the appointing authority paragraph 26; judgment ¡n Case 306/85 Huybrechts v and of the review of that power by the Commission [1987] ECR 629, paragraph 9; and judgment in Case 111/86 Delauche v Commission [1987] ECR 5345, Court. paragraph 18.

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requirements laid down in the notice of choose from among candidates eligible for vacancy*.5 In short, the appointing authority promotion the one who, in view of his is required to exercise that discretion 'within qualifications and the duties he will be the self-imposed limits contained in the required to carry out, is the most suitable notice of vacancy*;6 failure to observe the person for the vacant post. That conclusion conditions laid down in that notice would in has been confirmed by the Court of Justice fact entail annulment of the appointment which, on several occasions, has stated that made by the appointing authority since the it 'cannot substitute its assessment of the latter thereby 'breached the self-imposed merits and qualifications of the candidates legal limits contained in that notice.'7 for that of the appointing authority'.9

However, I do not consider that the dicta just quoted conflict with the contested The appellant's criticism is therefore un- statement by the Court of First Instance in founded since — in the present case — the present case. Indeed, if a precondition there is no evidence of any error in the for the submission of a valid application interpretation of Article 45 of the Staff is fulfilment of the requirements for Regulations given by the Court of First promotion, it follows that the appointment Instance in the first sentence of paragraph of a candidate not qualifying for promotion, 24 of the contested judgment. in so far as he is found entirely to lack at least one of the qualifications laid down in the vacancy notice, means that the appointing authority has exercised its discretion in a manifestly incorrect manner. However, as is apparent from previous 4. The appellant's second criticism, set out decisions of the Court of Justice in that in his first plea in law, is that the Court of regard, such a finding must be based on First Instance stated hardly any reasons, in objective information contained in the the light of Article 45 of the Staff Regu- documents before the Court.' Where, on lations and having regard to the pleas in law the other hand, there is no indication that put forward by him in the proceedings, for the applications taken into account were not its conclusion that Mr Waterschoot fulfilled valid, it follows that the appointing the requirements laid down in the first authority's exercise of its discretion cannot vacancy notice. The Court of Krst Instance be called in question. The choice to be made merely stated in the judgment appealed under Article 45 of the Staff Regulations against that 'there is no objective indication cannot be regarded as a compulsory choice in the documents before the Court of First (in other words, no choice at all): it is Instance that, prior to performing the tasks incumbent upon the appointing authority to of Head of the State Monopolies and Public Enterprises Division, Mr Waterschoot did 5 — Judgment Ín C u e IBB/73 Crani v CouacB [1974] ECR not satisfy the conditions required for 1099, paragraph 26. submitting his application for the post in 6 — Judgment in Cate MJ/87 Culin v Commission [1990] ECR 225, paragraph 19. question' (second sentence of paragraph 24). 7 — Ibid., paragraph 22. The appellant infers from this that the 8 — See for example the judgment ¡n Caie 2B2/81 Kagun v Court of First Instance failed to examine the Commission [19B3] ECR 1245, paragraph 13; judgment in Case 52/86, cited above, paragraph 9; and the pidgment in grounds of his specific complaint regarding Case C-343/87 CuKn, in m i c h the Court upheld the application since h was apparent from the documents Mr Waterschoot's qualifications. betöre the Court that the appointing authority had relied on a requirement not laid dovn in the vacancy notice as a decisive criterion for promotion (paragraph 21). 9 — Judgment in Case 282/82, cited above, paragraph 13.

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That statement gives the impression that the with the plea in law alleging misuse of Court of First Instance, relying on the infor- powers and that — essentially — it came to mation in the documents before it and the the conclusion that that plea could not be lack of any indications to the contrary, upheld even if it were shown that Mr reached the conclusion that Mr Water- Waterschoot had not, at the time of the schoot submitted a valid application in first vacancy notice, submitted a valid response to the first vacancy notice. In the application, I consider that the criticism abstract, I can agree with the view that the under review is not decisive in those circum- precise and specific objections made by the stances and, in any event, is subsumed by appellant regarding the fact that at the time the second plea in law. of the first vacancy notice, Mr Waterschoot did not fulfil all the requirements laid down in that notice, deserved a more detailed statement of reasons.

5. In that plea, the appellant maintains that the Court of First Instance itself misused its On closer examination, however, the aspea powers in so far as it failed to examine the just referred to does not appear to be true purpose of the annulment of the first decisive; in fact, the reasoning developed by vacancy notice and the consequent opening the Court of First Instance even makes it of a new competition procedure. In appear irrelevant. I would point out that the particular, in the appellant's view, the Court of First Instance went on to say that Commission opened a new procedure solely 'even if the Commission did take account of in order to be able to take account of the the experience acquired by Mr Waterschoot experience acquired by Mr Waterschoot as following his first appointment, that does a result of the first appointment, which was not mean that the institution acted with any subsequently declared unlawful by the objective in mind other than the interests of Court of Justice. the service, in such a way as to commit a misuse of powers' (paragraph 25).

Thus, the Court of First Instance not only concluded that there were no indications I would point out in the first place that, as that Mr Waterschoot did not fulfil all the the Court of Justice has reiterated many requirements laid down in the first vacancy times, 'a decision may amount to a misuse notice but then added that, in any event, of powers only if it appears, on the basis of even if the Commission had taken account objective, relevant and consistent indi- only of the experience acquired cations, to have been taken for purposes subsequently, no misuse of powers would other than those stated'.10 In the present thereby be established. case, therefore, indications of a misuse of powers would be apparent if, on the basis of evidence of the kind referred to, it were proved that the decision to commence a

In view of the fact that the Court of First 10 — Judgment in G u t 52/86, cited a b o « , paragraph 6; tee ako the judgment in Caie 135/87 VUchou v Court of Instance adopted that reasoning in dealing Auditors [1988] ECR 2091, paragraph 27.

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new competition procedure was adopted for At this point, I shall merely observe that the a purpose other than that of appointing the statement made by the Court of First most suitable candidate to the vacant post, Instance in paragraph 25 of its judgment is in particular in order to take account of the not incorrect. The case for a misuse of experience acquired by Mr Waterschoot in powers cannot be based on the mere fact the meantime. that account was taken of experience acquired as a result of an unlawful appointment, —such a case can only be made out if there are a number of objective and relevant indications that the However, as is apparent from the judgment Commission, in the present case, annulled appealed against, the Court of First Instance the initial procedure and published a second found that 'the proof required to establish a vacancy notice for the sole purpose of taking misuse of powers on the part of the account of such experience, which had not defendant has not been adduced' (paragraph been acquired at the time of the first 26). In particular, as has been seen, the only vacancy notice. argument relied on by the appellant, namely the fact that Mr Waterschoot did not fulfil the requirements of the first vacancy notice, was dismissed by the Court of First Instance However, the Court of Furst Instance speci- because there were no objective indications fically found, in the judgment appealed that Mr Waterschoot did not fulfil those against (paragraph 26), that there were no requirements (second sentence of paragraph indications that that aim was pursued by the 24); and that, in any event, acceptance of Commission in opening a new competition the experience acquired following an procedure. appointment subsequently declared unlawful was not sufficient to prove that, by annulling the initial decision and publishing a new vacancy notice, the Commission The second plea in law should therefore misused its powers (paragraph 25). also be rejerted.

6. In view of the foregoing considerations, I suggest that the Court of Justice dismiss the appeal.

As regards the question of costs, I consider that in the present case there are clear equitable grounds for their being shared; I therefore suggest, in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 2 of Article 122 of the Rules Procedure, the parties, including the intervener, should bear their own costs.

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