C-294/90
ECLI:EU:C:1991:467
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O P I N I O N OF M R VAN GERVEN — C A S E C-294/90
OPINION OF M R ADVOCATE GENERAL VAN GERVEN delivered o n 10 December 1991 *
Mr President, considered only part of that amount to be Members of the Court, compatible with the common market. Moreover, the Commission's approval was granted subject to a number of conditions, of which I shall just mention those that are relevant to the present case. 1. The applicants, British Aerospace and Rover Group, request the Court to declare void a decision of 27 June 1990 addressed by the Commission to the United Kingdom Government contained in a letter of 17 July 1990, ' in so far as the Commission required The first condition was that the United that government to recover £44.4 million in Kingdom should not alter the proposed aid. terms of the sale of Rover as communicated to the Commission, in particular:
Background (i) the acquisition price paid by British Aerospace would be £150 million;
2. By Decision 89/58/EEC of 13 July 1988 2 the Commission approved aid granted by the United Kingdom Government consisting of a capital contri- (ii) British Aerospace would bear all future bution of £469 million in connection with restructuring costs; the writing off of debts of the (at that time heavily loss-making) Rover Group (here- inafter referred to as 'Rover'). The capital contribution was made with a view to the acquisition of Rover by British Aerospace. The United Kingdom Government had notified a proposed capital contribution of (iii) Rover would not use more than £500 £800 million but the Commission million of its current £1 600 million trading tax losses and those trading tax * Original language: Dutch. losses would remain within Rover; 1 — See OJ 1991 C 21, p. 2, where the 'Commission communication pursuant to Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty to other Member States and interested parties regarding aid which the United Kingdom Government provided to the Rover Group, an undertaking producing motor vehicles' was published. 2 — Commission Decision concerning aid provided by the United Kingdom Government to the Rover Group, an (iv) British Aerospace could not sell the undertaking producing motor vehicles (OJ 1989 L 25, p. 92). core business of Rover within five years
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following the decision without randum attached to the report. Those incurring a penalty of up to £650 documents revealed that the United million. Kingdom Government had made additional financial concessions to British Aerospace as a result of the Commission's decision to allow only £469 million of the notified capital contribution/debt write-off of £800 However, the amount of the proposed debt million. It appeared from the report and the write-off financed by the United Kingdom memorandum that the value of those Government was to be restricted to £469 additional concessions was an estimated £38
million. 3 million. At the request of the Commission the United Kingdom authorities forwarded to it the report of the NAO, the secret memorandum and later also the sale Secondly, approval was granted subject to contract and related documents. the condition that the United Kingdom would refrain until 1992 from granting further aid to Rover in the form of capital contributions and any other form of discre- From an examination of those documents tionary aid, with the exception of a regional and from the discussions which it had with grant not exceeding £78 million in support the Department of Trade and Industry (the of the future investment plan of Rover. 4 DTI) the Commission concluded that the DTI and British Aerospace had agreed as a result of Decision of 89/58/EEC that the United Kingdom Government would grant The Commission concluded in Decision further financial concessions to British 89/58/EEC that the remaining part of the Aerospace in connection with the proposed capital contribution notified by the acquisition of Rover. Again I mention only United Kingdom Government (namely £331 those findings which are relevant to the million) constituted aid which was incom- present case: patible with the common market within the meaning of Article 92 of the EEC Treaty and therefore should not be awarded. 5 First, it appeared from the documents forwarded to the Commission that the United Kingdom authorities had paid British Aerospace £9.5 million to cover part
3. By letter of 2 September 1988 the United of the £13.6 million cost to British Kingdom authorities indicated to the Aerospace of acquiring Rover's minority Commission that they had properly shares. 6 According to the Commission the implemented Decision 89/58/EEC and informed the Commission of the measures 6 — In addition to the United Kingdom Government's holding adopted for that purpose. On 21 November acquired by British Aerospace a further 0.2% of the shares of Rover were held by the public. It is not disputed that 1989, however, a report was published by British Aerospace could have acquired those shares under the Comptroller and Auditor General of the the applicable legislation for approximately £300 000, at least if—: in the words of the applicants — it had adopted United Kingdom National Audit Office a coldly commercial attitude (see page 12 of the (NAO), together with a secret NAO memo- application). Instead British Aerospace decided to pay the remaining shareholders £13.6 million, comprising £10.7 million in cash and the remainder in shares.
According to British Aerospace and Rover that inflated price and the 3 — See Article 1 of Decision 89/58/EEC. contribution of the United Kingdom Government were 4 — Ibid. justified on the grounds of social justice and (more speci- 5 — See Article 2 of Decision 89/58/EEC. fically in the case of British Aerospace) public relations.
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amount was fixed at £9.5 million in order to 4. After examining the abovementioned remain under the £10 million threshold for documents and information and following parliamentary approval required by the 1982 further discussions with the United Industrial Development Act. Kingdom Government the Commission sent it the disputed letter of 17 July 1990, which was published as a communication in the Official Journal 7 and in which the Commission 'informed the United Kingdom Government of its decision concerning the incorrect execution of Commission Decision 89/58/EEC of 13 July 1988'. 8 Part I of the letter sets out the conditions for approval of the aid laid down in Decision 89/58/EEC, Secondly, it appeared from the documents refers to the documents and additional that the United Kingdom Government had information which the Commission received paid Rover £1.5 million to cover costs of from 21 November 1989 onwards and legal and economic advice incurred by it summarizes the additional financial and connected with the sale. other concessions made to British
Aerospace. Part II of the letter states that the Commission 'considers' that the abovementioned financial concessions constitute aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) and that the aid was unlawful because, according to the Commission, it either did not form part of the terms of sale notified to the Commission during the procedure preceding the adoption of Decision 89/58/EEC and hence infringed Thirdly, it appeared from the documents the first condition of the decision (no that payment by British Aerospace of the amendment to the terms of sale) or it £150 million purchase price for Rover was infringed the third condition of the decision deferred from 12 August 1988 to 30 March (no further aid to Rover). 9 Part IV of the
1990. The United Kingdom authorities letter states as follows: admitted this and calculated that this deferment represented a net benefit of £22 million for British Aerospace. That figure was calculated by deducting from the gross benefit of £33.4 million saved in interest payments £11.4 million to take account of the fact that the financial costs attaching to a loan of £150 million would have reduced British Aerospace's profits by £33.4 million 7 — The reference to the communication is given in footnote 1 and consequently reduced its tax liability (at above. a corporation tax rate of 35%). The 8 — See the opening words of the communication. Commission does not however agree with 9 — The Commission also considered Decision 89/58/EEC to be infringed because the penalty to be paid by British that method of calculation, because it is the Aerospace in the event of an onward sale was relaxed and Commission's established practice to require . the United Kingdom authorities had given British Aerospace the assurance of 'sympathetic' consideration of repayments of illegal aid without taking aid applications by British Aerospace for non-Rover busi-
nesses. These matters are not, however, the subject of the account of any tax implications. In its view, present case, since the applicants solely claim the therefore, the additional financial annulment of the letter in so far as it requires the United Kingdom Government to recover the abovementioned concession amounted to £33.4 million. additional concessions already granted.
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'On the basis of the above considerations, the applicants at the hearing that the United the Commission has decided the following: Kingdom Government brought proceedings in the High Court in London for recovery of the abovementioned sums.
(a) The additional £44.4 million aid granted in the context of the sale of Rover to British Aerospace constitutes Pleas and arguments of the parties illegal aid which was paid in breach of Decision 89/58/EEC and that your authorities are required to recover it from the beneficiaries (ie the £9.5 million payment to cover the purchase cost of minority shares, the £33.4 5. British Aerospace and Rover seek a million benefit to British Aerospace declaration that the abovementioned letter is which occurred from the deferment of void. They consider that the letter the payment of the sales price, and £1.5 constitutes a decision for the purposes of million from Rover which it obtained to Article 189 of the EEC Treaty and that it is cover external advice costs linked to the void on grounds of infringement of essential sale). procedural requirements. In particular the applicants argue that the Commission wrongly failed to hear them before adopting the contested decision. Moreover, they claim that the conditions for recovery of the payments made to British Aerospace are not fulfilled and that the Commission wrongly characterized the payments as aid incom- patible with the common market.
Your authorities shall inform the Commission of the measures taken to comply with this Decision within one month from its notification. 6. The Commission does not deny that the contested letter constitutes a 'decision' and that the decision is of direct and individual concern to the applicants, so that their application for annulment is admissible. At In case of absence or reply or in case of the same time it appears from the unsatisfactory reply by your authorities Commission's defence that it does not within the indicated deadline, the consider the letter to be a fully fledged Commission shall be obliged to refer the decision for the purposes of Article 189 of matter to the European Court of Justice.' the EEC Treaty. It states that the letter or decision cannot be regarded as an inde- pendent measure because it derives its existence entirely from Decision 89/58/EEC 1 0 and in legal terms may be The United Kingdom decided to implement characterized as no more than an extension the demands made in the letter. It appears in particular from the statements made by 10 — Sec page 3 of the defence.
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of Decision 89/58/EEC implementing that concessions fall to be dealt with exclusively decision and producing no new legal in the context of the observance and effects. ' ' enforcement of Decision 89/58/EEC. The Commission concludes that the contested letter or decision merely constitutes a measure implementing or enforcing Decision 89/58/EEC and that it was not That the Commission was entitled in this therefore obliged to grant the applicants a case to adopt such an 'implementing further hearing. decision' follows, in its view, from the fact that it could have chosen to institute proceedings against the United Kingdom directly before the Court under Article 93(2) of the Treaty on account of its failure The power of the Commission to adopt to comply with Decision 89/58/EEC. 'implementing decisions' Instead the Commission chose to give the United Kingdom a last opportunity to comply with its obligations by stating in what way and to what extent the United 7. From the foregoing and from the Kingdom had failed in the Commission's arguments of the parties it appears that the view to comply with Decision 89/58/EEC. central issue in this case is to establish what Consequently, according to the legal means the Commission has at its Commission, the letter or decision identified disposal where a Member State does not and quantified the aid which had been comply with the conditions which the granted by the United Kingdom Commission lays down in an earlier decision Government in breach of Decision addressed to the Member State approving 89/58/EEC and ordered its recovery from the grant of aid. More particularly, the the parties concerned. 12 question arises whether, where those conditions are infringed as a result of the grant of additional financial concessions, the Commission is empowered, without hearing the interested parties, to adopt an In the light of that analysis of the contested 'implementing decision' on the basis of its letter or decision the Commission was not earlier decision in which it establishes that obliged to hear the applicants before the conditions have not been met and in adopting a decision. The right to be heard which it concludes, without any further was applicable previously (and was properly investigation, that the additional financial observed) in the context of the procedure concessions constitute aid incompatible with which led to Decision 89/58/EEC. The the common market and orders the recovery additional financial concessions dealt with thereof. For the applicants the right to be in the letter or decision were (i) contem- heard in that connection is therefore the plated and negotiated between the United real issue in this case. Kingdom Government, on the one hand, and British Aerospace and Rover, on the other, before the Commission adopted Decision 89/58/EEC and were not notified to the Commission and (ii) were indisso- 8. Under the system provided for by ciably linked to the terms of sale of Rover Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty there are in to British Aerospace. Consequently, the my view four Dossible courses of action open to the Commission in the event of an 11 — See pages 8 and 10 of the rejoinder. infringement of an earlier (conditional or 12 — See pages 6 and 8 of the rejoinder. negative) decision concerning State aid.
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First, under the second subparagraph of binding or at least imperative nature of the Article 93(2) of the Treaty the Commission document. Part IV of the authentic, English may, by way of derogation from Articles version of the decision states that the 169 and 170 of the Treaty, that is to say Commission 'decided' (and in that without giving the Member State formal connection I would mention that the letter notice and issuing it with a reasoned was referred to as a 'decision' of the opinion, refer the matter of the Member Commission — see Official Journal C 21, State's non-observance of its decision direct p. 2, introductory paragraph) that the to the Court of Justice. United Kingdom authorities 'are required' to recover the financial concessions from the beneficiaries. Moreover, in other para- graphs of the decision the Commission uses the mandatory word 'shall'. In addition, the penultimate paragraph of the letter or decision leaves little doubt about the true If it wishes the Commission may, before nature of the document. There it is stated instituting proceedings before the Court, that the United Kingdom authorities 'shall' informally give the Member State in inform the Commission of the measures question a last chance to remedy the taken to comply with 'this Decision' (note infringements of the earlier decision which the initial capital). it has identified. 13 A final warning of that kind is no more than a reminder and cannot of course constitute a decision for the purposes of Article 189. In other words it is not binding on the Member State to which it is addressed. If an action for annulment of such a final warning were brought before the Court, it would be inadmissible.14
The last paragraph of the contested letter or That the contested letter does in fact decision (set out in section 4 above) and the constitute a decision which produces legal fact that the letter was included in the C effects and is binding on the United series of the Official Journal as a 'communi- Kingdom Government is apparent finally cation' appear to suggest that the letter from the fact that the Commission did not should be regarded as such a warning and plead that the applicants' action was inad- not as a decision which may be the subject missible but on the contrary stated that it of a legal challenge. On the other hand, had 'no comment to make' concerning the terms used elsewhere in the contested letter applicants' argument that they were directly or decision leave no doubt about the and individually concerned by the obli- gations placed upon the United Kingdom 13 — For such a situation see OJ 1991 C 11, p. 7, where the Commission expressed its view that France had not Government. 15 For the remainder of my observed the conditions of an earlier aid decision. Opinion I shall therefore assume that the 14 — See the judgment in Case 60/81 IBM v Commission [1981] letter is to be regarded as binding on the ECR 2639, in which an action brought against a statement of objections in the context of competition proceedings was Member State to which it is addressed and dismissed on the ground that such a statement was merely a preparatory act and did not oblige the undertaking concerned to alter its trading practices. 15 — See the Commission's defence, p. 1, point 2.
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in other words constitutes a decision. The was unable to do so. It did not become Commission therefore did not avail itself of aware of the disputed payments until after the first possible course of action, since it they had been made, so that an order to immediately addressed a decision to the suspend payment would have served no United Kingdom rather than a non-binding useful purpose. 'final warning'.
9. The second possibility open to the Commission is to adopt provisional measures such as those described in the 10. The third possibility is that the 'Boussac' judgment. 16 Where as in this case Commission institutes a new procedure a Member State infringes a decision which under the first paragraph of Article 93(2) in approved aid on condition that further respect of the newly discovered payments financial concessions were not granted, the and, if appropriate, finds in a new decision Commission may, if subsequently financial that the payments constitute aid incom- concessions are in fact granted, adopt a patible with the common market. This decision requiring immediate suspension of assessment can and may be made in the the payments and the submission of all the light of the earlier decision. 19 Indeed in its information needed to assess the lawfulness recent judgment in Case C-261/89 2 0 the of the payments. The suspension of the Court accepted that the Commission may payments should give the Commission the declare aid incompatible with the common opportunity to examine whether the market on the ground that it infringes an payments are compatible with the common earlier decision which approved aid on market. , 7 If the Member State does not condition that no further aid would be comply with the order to suspend payment granted for a certain period. That finding and supply the necessary information, the was justified in the judgment on the ground Commission is entitled to assess the compat- that (i) the Commission was bound under ibility of the additional concessions with the procedure laid down by Article 93(2) to Article 92 of the EEC Treaty on the basis of take account of all relevant information, the information at its disposal (that is to say including the legal and economic context the third possibility mentioned below) or to which it assessed in an earlier decision, and refer the matter direct to the Court (that is (ii) that the investigation procedure under to say the first possibility referred to Article 93(2) provides an opportunity to above). 18 take account of all new information which is of such a nature as to alter the assessment made in the earlier decision. 21 It seems to me that the significant point in that judgment is that the 're-use' of the assessment made in the earlier decision is In the present case the Commission did not permissible only in the context of a new adopt this course of action and moreover procedure under Article 93(2), which requires the Commission to give 'notice to the 16 — Judgment in Case C-301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR 307, in particular paras 9 to 24. 17 — See para. 21 of the 'Boussac' judgment. I shall shortly 19 — I am assuming that the earlier decision was not challenged consider the question whether that assessment may be within the prescribed period and hence became definitive. made on the basis of the earlier Commission decision that 20 — Judgment of 3 October 1991 Italy v Commission [1991] has been infringed (see section 10). ECR 1-4437. 18 — See paras 22 and 23 of the 'Boussac' judgment. 21 — See paras 20 to 23 of the judgment.
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parties concerned to submit their the basis of an error which resulted from comments' 22 and to take proper account of the withholding of information by the any comments made. Member State concerned. The Commission may then re-examine the previously notified aid in the light of the new information and, if appropriate, conclude on the basis of that investigation that part of the aid that was previously approved (or even the whole of the aid) is incompatible with the common In this case the Commission did not adopt market and order its recovery. The this course of action either. It is true that in 'renewed' examination must of course be the contested decision the legality of the carried out by means of a procedure under additional financial concessions was assessed Article 93(2), so that the Member State on the basis of Decision 89/58/EEC, but concerned and all the interested parties are the Commission itself emphasizes (see given the opportunity to make their views section 6 above) that the contested decision known concerning the consequences which was not adopted under the procedure laid the unnotified aid has for the earlier down by Article 93(2) but was merely an approval of the notified aid. The investi- extension of, or measure implementing, gation will result in a new decision in which Decision 89/58/EEC. In view of this the the Commission gives its findings Commission did not call upon the interested concerning both the previously approved aid parties (namely British Aerospace and and the unnotified payments and in which Rover) to submit their comments. it, if appropriate, demands recovery of all aid (both previously approved and subsequently discovered) which it finds to be incompatible with the common market in the light of the new information.
11. The Commission also has, in my view, a fourth possibility. Where, as appears to be the case here, the Commission concludes that in adopting its earlier decision it did not-have all the relevant facts at its disposal because it was unaware that the Member State concerned, in addition to the notified In this case, however, the Commission did aid, paid a certain amount of unnotified aid not use this fourth possibility either. (for example in order to overcome the effect Nowhere in the contested letter or decision of a decision finding part of the aid to be or in its submissions before the Court does incompatible with the common market), it it refer to the withdrawal of its earlier may withdraw the partial and conditional approval and the opening of a new approval which it gave earlier to the notified procedure under Article 93(2). On the aid on the basis of the principle /raus omnia contrary, in Part II, point B, of the corrumpit. The early approval was given on contested letter or decision, the Commission concludes that, in assessing the price paid by 22 — See the fira subparagraph of Article 93(2). The Commission ahvays announces the opening of a new British Aerospace for Rover at the time in procedure in the Official Journal. In its Fifteenth Report the light of the additional information on Competition Policy (No 171) it stated moreover that such announcements would in future be accompanied by which it subsequently received, it would not considerably more information with the aim of have come to any other conclusion than that encouraging the intervention of interested third parties in any procedure opened by ¡L to which it came in Decision 89/58/EEC
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even if it had had that information at the Article 93(2), second subparagraph, that in time when it adopted that decision, that is such a case the Commission must refer the to say that 'the proposed acquisition price matter to the Court. 24 reflects fairly the real net worth of the company in the market'. 23
That does not mean, however, that the Commission may not adopt a new decision with regard to the additional financial concessions granted in breach of an earlier decision in which it makes a finding 12. In my view the possible courses of concerning the compatibility of the action outlined above, taken individually or additional concessions with the common together, provide the Commission with market. Nor does it prevent (see the effective powers to ensure that its decisions judgment in Case C-261/89 mentioned in on aid are observed. By the letter or section 10 above) that new decision from decision in question the Commission none assessing the compatibility of the additional the less chose a different method. As already financial concessions with the common stated, it adopted an 'implementing market in the light of the earlier decision. decision' on the basis of Decision However, where such a new decision is 89/58/EEC in which it found that the taken the Commission's assessment United Kingdom Government had infringed should — even in the lastmentioned case, as Decision 89/58/EEC by granting a number the Court made clear in the judgment in of additional financial concessions and Case C-261/89 mentioned in section 10 required that government to remedy the above — be carried out in accordance with infringement by recovering the concessions the procedure laid down by Article 93(2), from the undertakings which had received that is to say after advising and consulting them. In my view, however, the system laid the interested parties. It is common ground down by Article 92 and 93 of the EEC that in this case that did not occur. Treaty does not confer upon the Commission the power to adopt such a decision. The Commission's power to adopt decisions under Article 93 is intended to allow it to assess whether national aid is compatible with the common market. It cannot, on the other hand, be used solely to I therefore reject completely the establish non-observance of an earlier Commission's view that the application of decision. In particular, the Commission does the abovementioned procedure may be not have the power, once it has adopted a dismissed as an unnecessary formal decision concerning the compatibility of aid requirement. The new investigation with the common market, to adopt a new procedure and above all consultation of all decision in which it finds that that decision has not been observed (in this case because 24 — See also para. 3 of the 'Boussac' judgment (cited above in the Member State granted additional section 9), in which the Court held that, if a Member Sute continues to pay unnotified aid notwithstanding a financial concessions). It appears from Commission decision, the Commission may bring that Member Sute before the Court direct — but not, I would add, esublish the infringement of the decision of its own 23 — OJ 1989 L 25, p. 95. motion.
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the interested parties should allow the the recipients payments made in breach of Commission to take account of all the the earlier decision, infringed the principle relevant changes in the factual circum- laid down in Article 4 of the Treaty that stances which have taken place since the each institution must act within the limits of adoption of the earlier decision. That is the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty. moreover illustrated by the present case. The applicants have raised four points which were not covered by Decision 89/58/EEC and which were dealt with by the Commission in the contested decision without giving the applicants the oppor- In the alternative: the applicants' remaining tunity to submit their comments.
Those pleas points concern (1) the characterizing of the subsequently discovered additional financial concessions to British Aerospace and Rover as State aid (in the applicants' view the transactions concerned correspond to 14. In case the Court does not follow my ordinary commercial practice); (2) the main conclusion, I should like to consider quantification of the benefit which British briefly the remaining pleas put forward by Aerospace obtained from deferment of the applicants. For this purpose I shall payment of the purchase price (see section 3 assume that the Commission does in fact above); (3) the characterizing of the £1.5 have the power to adopt 'implementing million reimbursement to Rover of the cost decisions' in which it finds that an earlier of legal and economic advice as aid (in the decision on State aid has not been observed applicants' view this reimbursement also and specifies the consequences of that formed part of ordinary commercial non-observance (including recovery of the practice); and (4) the calculation of the unlawfully granted aid).
Moreover, I value of the minority shares in Rover assume, just as I did in my main discussion, subsequently acquired by British Aerospace. that the Commission may in its later As is apparent from my discussion — which decision assess the compatibility of I undertake only by way of alternative — of subsequently granted aid with the common the arguments put forward by the parties in market on the basis of its earlier decision. connection with those points, examination of the second point in particular is made difficult by the fact that the applicants were not heard before the Commission adopted
its decision. Specifically I must consider, with respect to the three points to which the applicants' action relates (namely the £9.5 million acquisition costs that were paid to British Aerospace, the £1.5 million paid to Rover in 13. On the basis of the foregoing I respect of consultancy costs and the benefit therefore conclude that the Commission, by which British Aerospace obtained as a result assuming that the Treaty granted it an inde- of the deferment for 20 months of payment pendent power of decision allowing it, of the acquisition price for Rover), whether without any prior procedure, to find in an it was correctly found in the contested 'implementing decision' that an earlier aid decision that the measures (1) were to be decision has not been complied with and to regarded as aid for the purposes of Article require in that implementing decision that 92 of the Treaty, (2) were incompatible with the Member State concerned recover from the common market and were capable of
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affecting trade between Member States, and bear. Even though British Aerospace used (3) should be recovered from the recipients. that amount wholly for paying the remaining shareholders an inflated price, it did so on the basis of a decision which it took itself for its own benefit. In response to the applicants' argument that an inflated price was paid on the basis of a contractual 15. Let me first consider the question obligation (not notified to the Commission) whether the measures constitute aid. which British Aerospace undertook towards Contrary to the applicants' view, I consider the United Kingdom Government in that the Commission correctly considered in connection with the acquisition of Rover, it each case that the benefits in question must can only be said (1) that Decision be regarded as aid for the purposes of 89/58/EEC approved the capital contri- Article 92 of the Treaty. bution by the United Kingdom Government on the express condition that the terms of sale notified would not be altered and (2) that the buying out of the minority share- holders of Rover for an inflated price did As regards the £9.5 million acquisition not form part of the notified terms of sale. costs, the applicants argue that a majority shareholder may well have an interest in acquiring the remaining shares of the minority shareholders and that the £13.6 million paid in that connection was a fair price for reasons of social justice and public In relation to the £1.5 million which was relations (see footnote 6 above). In any paid to Rover in respect of consultancy event, according to the applicants, the costs, the applicants observe that, contrary payment made by the United Kingdom to what the Commission maintains, those Government to British Aerospace of £9.5 costs were not related to the sale of Rover million could not be regarded as a benefit to British Aerospace, but to the policy for British Aerospace, since the latter objective of the United Kingdom immediately paid the amount out to the Government to privatize Rover. They add minority shareholders. that, seen in that light, the costs constituted judicious expenditure by the United Kingdom Government and in any event merely reimbursed British Aerospace for expenditure that had already been incurred. For the abovementioned reasons that That argument is certainly not convincing. argument also seems to me to be inapposite. The applicants deny neither that the obli- The amount paid by the United Kingdom gation to buy out the minority shareholders Government would normally have been lay with British Aerospace nor that the borne by British Aerospace or Rover or decision to pay £13.6 million instead of both. It is clear therefore that the payment £300 000 was that of British Aerospace and constitutes aid. provided British Aerospace with favourable publicity as regards the investing public. Seen in that light the £9.5 million paid by the United Kingdom Government is undoubtedly to be regarded as State aid, since it covers expenditure which British As regards the deferment by 20 months of Aerospace would otherwise have had to payment of the purchase price, I share the
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Commission's view that this also constitutes discovered aid with the common market on aid in favour of British Aerospace. That the basis of an earlier decision. The same deferment constitutes an infringement of the applies in my view to the assessment of condition laid down in Decision whether aid may affect trade between 89/58/EEC that British Aerospace would, Member States. The real question therefore immediately after the capital contribution, is whether Decision 89/58/EEC constituted pay £150 million to the United Kingdom a sufficient basis for the assessments made Government in return for the transfer of the by the Commission in the contested decision Rover shares held by the government. 25 The concerning the compatibility of the aid with applicants' only argument on this point is the common market. In my view that that there were sound commercial reasons question must be given an affirmative for deferment of the payment. Without that answer. Each of the three aid measures is deferment British Aerospace would have stated in the contested letter or decision to had to borrow the purchase price without be in breach of the first condition laid down being able to finance the interest on the in Decision 89/58/EEC (namely that the loan from Rover's profits. That does not, terms of sale notified to the Commission however, alter the fact that the deferment of should not be altered) and/or the third the payment was interest-free and was thus condition (namely that no further aid in the to be regarded as, aid in favour of British form of capital contributions or any other Aerospace. A private seller would allow such form of discretionary aid should be granted deferment of payment only if the buyer to Rover). The applicants put forward no undertook to pay interest on the sale price substantive arguments on this point and, on account of late payment. In other words, moreover, have not produced any evidence the aid consists in the failure to charge (see the judgment in Case C-261/89 interest on account of the deferred payment. mentioned in section 10) to suggest that the factual situation has altered after the adoption of Decision 89/58/EEC in such a way as to make the assessment made in that decision no longer valid for the aid measures now at issue. 16. The second question is whether the Commission correctly concluded that the three aid measures (1) were incompatible with the common market and (2) were capable of affecting trade between Member States.
17. The third and last question is whether the Commission in the contested decision may require the recovery of the aid which it has found to be incompatible with the As already stated, the Commission may common market on the basis of Decision assess the compatibility of subsequently 89/58/EEC. In principle this question must be given an affirmative answer if it is 25 — See the tenns of sale set out in Pan II of Decision 89/58/EEC. The applicants cannot rely on the assumed, as I do in this part of my Opinion, argument — put forward at the hearing — that the that the Commission has the power to adopt operative pan of the decision does not expressly mention • that the price must be paid immediately, since the an 'implementing decision' in which it estab- statement of reasons makes clear chat that is the case; lishes the infringement of an earlier decision moreover, in the absence of a contractual clause to the contrary, immediate payment is the normal rule. and specifies the consequences of that
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OPINION OF MR VAN GERVEN —CASE C-294/90
infringement (including recovery of That argument is unconvincing. It is clear unlawful aid). that the aid granted by the United Kingdom Government in connection with the acquisition of Rover by British Aerospace was to be used for Rover's activities. The mere fact that part of British Aerospace's turnover derives from markets outside the The applicants' argument concerning the Community or markets on which Rover is lack of any specific statement of reasons not active is not a sufficient ground for concerning the requirement to recover the regarding (part of) the aid as compatible aid from British Aerospace must therefore with the common market, since British fail. The unlawfulness of the advantages Aerospace does not claim that (part of) the granted to British Aerospace (which at the aid granted was actually used on such same time constitutes a ground for markets. recovery) follows from Decision 89/58/ÈEC, which was implemented by the contested decision. 19. Secondly, the applicants maintain that in calculating the benefit resulting from deferment of the payment the Commission used an excessively high interest rate (a rate put forward by the United Kingdom 18. There remain three specific arguments Government). They point out that the which the applicants put forward with benefit accruing from deferment of the regard to the supposedly incorrect calcu- payment consisted in the fact that British lation of the amount to be recovered from Aerospace would otherwise have been British Aerospace in respect of the obliged to borrow money at the time of the deferment of payment of the purchase price sale in order to pay the purchase price. (see section 3 above, last indent, and part Relying on an opinion given by a merchant III D of the Report for the Hearing). At bank the applicants argue that British issue here therefore is not the question of Aerospace could have obtained a long-term principle as to whether recovery was loan on the capital market in August 1988 possible but the amount which the at an interest rate of 10.97% per annum. Commission could order to be recovered. On the basis of that interest rate the interest saved amounts not to £33.4 million but to £26.8 million.
First, the applicants argue that the The Commission replies that it accepted the Commission should have taken account of calculation put forward by the United the fact that a large part of British Kingdom Government (which was based on Aerospace's turnover derives from trading the average interest rate on the market for a activities carried on outside the common loan for 20 months). The lower interest rate market or on markets which are uncon- which British Aerospace suggests it could nected with the market on which Rover is have obtained if it had made long-term active and thus cannot disrupt competition borrowings in July 1988 is not suitable on that market. In other words, the because payment was deferred only for 20 Commission should have regarded only part months, and therefore a comparison with of the benefit as falsifying competition. long-term borrowing is inappropriate.
I-516
BRITISH AEROSPACE AND ROVER v COMMISSION
Moreover, the Commission's established which the United Kingdom Government practice is to calculate aid on a general could have earned by investing the sale price basis, that is to say not specifically with for the period of that deferment at the reference to the individual undertaking average interest rate on the market in receiving the aid. August 1988. Consequently, it must be concluded that the interest rate chosen by the Commission is correct. In principle I consider that the applicants correctly state, in reply to the Commission's argument, that under Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty an undertaking which 20. The applicants argue thirdly that the receives prohibited aid can only be required Commission wrongly took no account of to pay back aid which it has actually the fiscal implications of the deferment of received. However, I do not think that they payment. For the Commission's views I refer can conclude from that that the benefit to section 3, third indent, above. In the which British Aerospace actually received is present case the applicants challenge that equal to the interest which they would have view and in my view do so wrongly. It paid for 20 months on the most favourable would be unreasonable to oblige the long-term borrowings which an undertaking Commission, wherever it discovers aid in such as British Aerospace could have the form of a saving (savings in taxation, obtained in August 1988 on the capital interest and so forth), to calculate the tax market. That does not appear to me to be implications of that benefit under the correct since deferment of payment must be applicable national law. More specifically regarded as a loan by the seller (namely the with reference to the present case, the United Kingdom Government) of the sale Commission may reasonably assume that, if price to the buyer (namely British unduly paid aid is recovered, the repayment Aerospace). The benefit obtained by British of £33.4 million by British Aerospace Aerospace from an interest-free deferment is and/or Rover will, just like an interest in other words equal to the interest (on payment of that amount, give rise to a tax account of late payment) which in normal deduction, so that the net cost of the commercial circumstances it would have had repayment (just like the net value of the to pay to the United Kingdom Government benefit) amounts to only £22 million. There in exchange for the deferment of payment is therefore no reason to take account of the for 20 months and which normally must at deductibility of the interest saved in calcu- least be equal to the amount of interest lating the amount of the aid.
Conclusion
21. O n the basis of the foregoing I propose that the C o u r t declare void the Commission decision contained in the letter of 27 J u n e 1991 on the g r o u n d of lack of powers or infringement of essential procedural requirements, in so far as that decision requires the United Kingdom to recover an a m o u n t of £44.4 million from the applicants; in addition the Commission should be ordered to pay the costs.
I-517