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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·19.9.1991

C-303/90

ECLI:EU:C:1991:350

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61990CC0303

O P I N I O N O F MR TESAURO — C A S E C-303/90

O P I N I O N O F M R ADVOCATE GENERAL TESAURO delivered on 19 September 1991 *

Mr President, 2. In this regard, the first provisions to be Members of the Court, considered are those of the Treaty on economic and social cohesion (Articles 130a to 130e), which lay down the general prin- ciples regarding the operations of the funds and the other financial instruments and entrust the Community institutions with their implementation. 1. In these proceedings the French Republic seeks the annulment, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, of a measure adopted by the Commission, entitled 'Code of conduct on the implementing provisions for Article 23(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) N o 4253/88 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 of relating to irregularities, and the organ- 24 June 1988 on the tasks of the Structural ization of an information system for irregu- Funds and their effectiveness and on coordi- larities'. ' nation of their activities between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments 2 and Council Regu- lation (EEC) No 4253/88, 3 laying down provisions for implementing that regulation, contain the essential rules governing the matter. According to the French Government, the Code of conduct in question alters the nature of the obligation incumbent upon Member States under the rules in force to inform the Commission of irregularities affecting the Community budget in the field of operations financed by the structural In particular, and as far as is relevant here, funds; at all events, the adoption of such a the first subparagraph of Article 23(1) of set of rules is not within the competence of Regulation No 4253/88 establishes an ob- the Commission. ligation for Member States to take all the necessary measures to (a) verify on a regular basis that operations financed by the Community have been properly carried out; (b) prevent and take action against irregu- larities; and (c) recover any amounts lost as

The origins of the dispute are therefore to 2 — OJ 1988 L 185, p. 9. be found in the context of the Community 3 — Council Regulation (EEC) N o 4253/88 of 19 December 1988 laying down provisions for implementing Regulation legislation concerning the structural funds. (EEC) N o 2052/88 as regards coordination of the acti- vities of the different Structural Funds between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank * Original language: Italian. and the other existing financial instruments (OJ 1988 I — OJ 1990 C 200, p. 3. L 374, p. 1).

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a result of an irregularity or negligence. The opinion as to the legality of the Code, the Member State is liable in the alternative for delegations agreed that the Code, as the reimbursement of sums unduly paid drafted, would be confined to laying down unless the Member State and/or the inter- the means of implementing Article 23(1) of mediary and/or the promoter provide proof Regulation N o 4253/88. However, as it that they were not responsible for the irre- emerged at the hearing, some Member gularity or negligence. Pursuant to the States insisted that the Code should take the second subparagraph of Article 23(1), form of a regulation, primarily in order to Member States are required to inform the have clearly mandatory rules, given the Commission of the measures taken for those extreme importance and sensitivity of the purposes and, in particular, of the progress matter, binding in the same way on all of administrative and judicial proceedings. Member States. France, in particular, while declaring itself in agreement on the content of the draft Code, expressed reservations with regard to its legal form, which were explained in a telex from its Permanent Representation. Finally, the Code was officially notified to the Member States by 3. It is precisely on the basis of the letter dated 30 July 1990 and subsequently provisions referred to above that the dispute published in the 'C' Series of the Official in question arose. When Regulation Journal. N o 4253/88 was adopted, the Commission placed in the minutes a declaration to the effect that it would take the necessary measures, within its competence, to ensure the application of uniform arrangements in the various Member States for the mon- itoring of any irregularities concerning Community assistance. Some months later the Commission announced its intention to formulate a Code of conduct; for that 4. Given those facts and the further circum- purpose it set up a working group charged stances described in the Report for the with laying down the means of applying the Hearing to which reference is made, it must provisions of Article 23(1) of Regulation be observed that the applicant submits first N o 4253/88. of all that the measure to which it objects is, in substance, a regulation containing provisions implementing Article 23(1) of Regulation N o 4253/88, a measure which the Commission was not competent to adopt, given that the regulation in question gives no powers to the Commission and On 18 December 1989 the Commission that, under Article 3(4) of Regulation approved the resulting draft and then No 2052/88, the specific provisions submitted it to the Community Committee governing operations under each structural for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention fund, including the arrangements for the (hereinafter referred to as 'the Fraud monitoring, assessment, financial Prevention Committee'). Both in this management and checking of measures, are Committee and in the Ecofin Council, the those laid down in the implementing delegations of Member States discussed the decisions adopted pursuant to Article 130e legal form that the Code in question would of the Treaty; the latter provision grants have to take; despite some differences of sole competence to the Council.

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5. In its defence, the Commission has raised 7. Given those circumstances, it should be an objection of inadmissibility, contending recalled that the Court's case-law on this that the Code of conduct at issue is not a point is in effect that the external form of measure which can be challenged under the measure is of little importance as far Article 173 of the Treaty. In the alternative, as the admissibility of legal review is it asks the Court to dismiss the application. concerned, and that it is the effects and content of the measure that should be considered. 4

Admissibility In particular, with regard to the concept of measures open to review under the first paragraph of Article 173, the Court has held since the AETR judgment 5 that an action for annulment must be available in the case 6. The Commission's objection of inad- of 'all measures adopted by the institutions, missibility is based on the fact that the Code whatever their nature or form, which are of conduct in question is a non-binding act, intended to have legal effects'. This and therefore not open to review under the approach was confirmed more recently in first paragraph of Article 173, which, as is the 'internal instructions' case, 6 in which the well known, empowers the Court to review Court held that 'internal instructions' the legality only of 'acts . . . other than adopted by the Commission, which were at recommendations or opinions'. issue in that case, were open to review in so far as they were intended to have legal effects.

In this case, however, the measure in question is one described as a Code of conduct and one not having any legal basis 8. In the Opinion which I delivered in that and not bearing the signature of any very case, I suggested that the Court should Member of the Commission, but it was give an explicit answer to a preliminary adopted by the Commission on a collegiate question, namely whether, in the absence of basis, published in the ' C ' Series of the a minimum of essential formal elements and Official Journal and addressed to all the therefore irrespective of whether, after a Member States. Another extremely relevant 4 — It was precisely in taking this view that the Court element is the fact that such a measure was considered open to review, for example, a resolution of the notified to each Member State by a letter European Parliament in that it produced legal effects with regard to third parties (judgment in Case 108/83 from the competent Commissioner, in which Luxembourg v European Parliament [1984] ECR 1945), it is stated that the measure comes into force proceedings of the Council in so far as they were intended to produce legal effects (judgment in Case 22/70 on the date of notification and that, 'as the Commission v Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263), and an provisions of the Code of conduct oral decision adopted with regard to an official (judgment in Joined Cases 316/82 and 40/83 Kohler v Court ol are . . . the expression of the obligations / W i í o r s [1984] ECR 641). stemming from Article 23(1) of Regulation 5 — Judgment in Case 22/70, above, paragraphs 38-43. N o 4253/88, compliance with that article 6 — Judgment in Case 366/88 France v Commission [1990] ECR 3571, at paragraph 8. For a more detailed exam- requires, in the opinion of the Commission, ination of the relevant case-law in this regard, see the fUll compliance with the said provisions'. Opinion I delivered in that case [(1990] ECR 3579, especially paragraphs 7-9).

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concrete examination of the content of the taken into account the Commission's measure, it is found that the measure is manifest lack of powers to adopt the intended to have legal effects, it can be held contested measure when assessing the that the measure itself is capable of producing argument that the measure was incapable of legal effects. 7 producing legal effects.

10. In this latter regard, moreover, it must be observed that the other argument Whilst not ruling expressly on this question, adduced by the Commission in support of the Court has confirmed that form is its claim that the application is inadmissible, entirely irrelevant as a criterion and that the namely that it has no powers to adopt measure must therefore be classified solely binding acts in the matter in question (see and exclusively on the basis of its content. pages 3 and 4 of the rejoinder), cannot be accepted. A lack of powers is a defect which affects the substance and not the admiss- ibility of the application.

9. It is true that in such circumstances, and despite certain peculiarities of substance that often cause the question of admissibility to 11. That having been said, I would recall be considered differently, the Court appears that the measure in question was notified to to have taken note of the absence of the each Member State, and hence was brought elements indispensable for characterizing an officially to the notice of the addressees. act as contestable and, on that basis, Moreover, the letter of notification declared the application in question to be expressly stated that compliance with Article inadmissible. However, upon closer exam- 23(1) of Regulation N o 4253/88 required ination it is clear that in such cases the full compliance with the provisions of the Court has taken account both of the formal Code, thus making it clear to Member elements and of the content of the measure, States that an infringement of the Code concluding that manifestly it was not capable would, in the opinion of the Commission, of producing legal effects, nor intended to automatically entail an infringement of the do so. 8 For the same reason, the Court has article in question.

7 — The need to answer this question was dictated by the belief that, although it is true that the choice of the form cannot alter the nature of the measure itself, it is equally true that the absence of a minimum of essential formal requirements, in other words those that make it possible to identify an act as binding, would mean that it could not be In substance, therefore, the measure which relied upon against third parties, even if an examination of we must consider in this case was one which the content of the measure revealed it to be capable of producing legal effects. In substance, such acts would in was drawn up and announced in a way such any case have no legal effects as against individuals or Member States, irrespective of the fact that the as to render unequivocal the intention for it Commission was empowered to issue binding acts in the sector under consideration. to be binding on the addressees. It is therefore necessary to examine the content 8 — See the judgment in Case 133/79 Sucrimex v Commission [1980] ECR 1299, paragraph 16; the judgment in Case of the measure in order to establish whether 182/80 Gauffv Commission [1982] ECR 799, paragraphs 16-18; the order in Case 151/88 Italy v Commission [1989] it contains legal obligations additional to ECR 1255, paragraphs 21-22; and, most recently, the those laid down by Article 23(1) of Regu- order in Case 50/90 Sunzest v Commission [1991] ECR 1-2917, paragraph 13. lation No 4253/88; for this reason, the

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question of admissibility should be not necessarily. If this were not so, there considered in conjunction with the would be no need for implementing rules. substance of the case.

Substance 13. In the light of the above, it is now necessary to move on to examine briefly the content of the measure in question, recalling that Article 23(1) of Regulation N o 4253/88 requires Member States to inform the Commission of all the measures 12. The measure in question lays down taken to verify that operations financed by implementing provisions for Article 23(1) of the Community have been properly carried Regulation N o 4253/88: the very title of out, to recover any amounts lost as a result the measure has this wording, the of an irregularity or negligence, to prevent Commission and the French Government and to take action against irregularities, and have both repeatedly maintained this, both to inform it of the progress of administrative in their written submissions and at the and judicial proceedings. hearing, and an examination of the content of the measure confirms this, as we shall see.

The Code of conduct first defines its scope by confirming that the reporting Before moving on to such an examination, I requirement applies only to irregularities would like to make some preliminary involving more than ECU 4 000 (paragraph remarks concerning, more generally, the 1); the concept of irregularity is then means of implementing a provision of law. defined as 'any infringement of a The rationale of having provisions for Community or national provision by a implementing a rule consists, in my opinion, natural or legal person and affecting the in the fact that a rule may be applied in Community budget' (paragraph 2). different ways; it follows in principle that a measure laying down implementing provisions at the very least reduces the element of discretion arising from the wording of the rule in question. It is equally true that provisions for applying a rule comprise by definition at least a specification Paragraph 3 provides that Member States of the obligations entailed by the rule and should communicate, within three months thus a set of detailed rules that necessarily after notification of the Code of conduct, not create a series of specific obligations. In only the provisions adopted with a view to substance, therefore, the main purpose of a preventing and taking action against irregu- measure containing implementing provisions larities (an obligation expressly laid down by is to specify and harmonize Member States' Article 23(1)), but also the services obligations, which are assumed to exist from responsible for preventing and taking action the basic rule but which certainly d o not against irregularities and the procedural derive from it automatically, and in any case provisions of their administrative authorities.

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Paragraph 4 relates more specifically to 14. The content of the Code of conduct reports on cases of irregularity, which are to confirms that it does indeed consist of be made every four months both on cases of provisions for implementing Article 23(1) of irregularity that have been discovered by Regulation N o 4253/88. Even a superficial administrative authorities and on those that examination of the provisions of the Code are the subject of prosecutions. For this shows, in fact, that it establishes specific purpose, Member States are asked to obligations linked to the more general and provide a whole set of information: the generic obligation to provide information, identification of the operation in question, as laid down in the basic rule. In substance, the period during which or the moment at the Code regulates in detail the obligation which the irregularity was committed, the to provide information by laying down, identity of beneficiaries and natural and in particular, the information to be legal persons involved in the irregularity, the communicated, and the frequency and practices used to commit the irregularity, means of notification. the way in which the irregularity was discovered, the financial consequences and likelihood of recovery, etc.

Unless it is to be considered that implementing provisions are always and in every case merely declaratory and therefore do not require the adoption of a regulation in so far as the obligations stated therein derive from the basic rule, it must be estab- The Code also lays down that Member lished whether, in the case in point, the States should inform the Commission obligations set out in the Code of conduct immediately of irregularities that reveal the automatically follow from Article 23(1) or use of a new fraudulent practice or where whether instead the Code provides an inter- there is reason to believe that implications pretation which is not limited to making could rapidly arise outside the Member clear the obligations definitely inherent in State's own territory (paragraph 5). All the the basic rule (that is to say, the essential information passed to the Commission is to minimum not affecting its content) but be examined jointly by the Commission and entails an alteration or at the very least representatives of the Member States at makes the obligation laid down in the basic periodic meetings, especially in order to rule more onerous for Member States. It is draw lessons for preventive measures from that viewpoint that the following (paragraph 6); information on the number observations are made. of cases notified to the Commission, the number of cases completed, the sums recovered or in the process of being recovered is to be passed to the Fraud Prevention Committee and to the con- sultative committees of the structural funds concerned (paragraph 8). Finally, the Code 15. It must be observed first of all that provides that Member States and the Article 23(1) of Regulation N o 4253/88 Commission must take the measures confines itself, in so far as is relevant here, necessary to ensure the confidentiality of to requiring Member States to inform the information exchanged between them Commission of the measures adopted to (paragraph 7). prevent and take action against irregularities

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and of the progress of administrative and information as laid down by the basic rule judicial proceedings. The Code of conduct, is vitiated should the identity of the on the other hand, specifies periods in beneficiaries or the manner in which the which such information should be provided irregularity was discovered not be notified. and requires additional information as well Moreover, such a conclusion has been as details of the irregularities committed. corroborated by the Commission itself, which maintained during the hearing that a Member State can infringe the Code of conduct without thereby violating Article 23(1) of Regulation No 4253/88.

This obviously amounts to an acknowledgement that the 'obligations' laid down in the Code First, the obligation to provide information go beyond those laid down in the regulation on the measures adopted to prevent and in question and contradicts the statement take action against irregularities does not contained in the abovementioned letter of necessarily also imply an obligation to notification to Member States to the effect supply a list of the services responsible for that compliance with Article 23(1) requires implementing such measures, nor to full compliance with the provisions of the communicate the main procedural Code in question. provisions of their administrations.

Secondly, it is legitimate to ask whether notification of the progress of administrative and judicial proceedings can be equated to — or at any event can automatically include — detailed information on irregu- larities, in substance a sufficiently detailed description of each irregularity encountered. 16. In the light of the above, and in order I refer, in particular, to information such as to highlight certain problems raised by the the identity of beneficiaries, the way in Code of conduct, I believe that it would be which the irregularity was discovered, and useful to look briefly at other regulatory the services or bodies that made the arrangements similar to those in question.

discovery. It does not appear to me, in fact, I refer in particular to Regulation that information of this kind can be N o 595/91, 9 which recently replaced considered to be already covered by the Regulation No 283/72 (cited several times reporting requirement laid down in the basic in the parties' submissions and at the rule. hearing) and which defines the means of implementing Article 8(1) of Regulation N o 729/70, 1 0 which is in fact almost identical to Article 23(1) of Regulation No 4253/88. Regulation No 595/91,

concerning a system — similar to that introduced by the Code — for notifying It is certainly possible to maintain that such irregularities committed against the EAGGF information is ancillary to the obligation to Guarantee Section, lists the information that inform the Commission of the progress of administrative and judicial proceedings, but 9 — Council Regulation (EEC) N o 595/91 of 4 March 1991 concerning irregularities and the recovery of sums it is equally evident that such information wrongly paid in connection with the financing of the cannot be considered a mere clarification of common agricultural policy and the organization of an information system in this field and repealing Regulation the obligation in question.

In other words, I (EEC) N o 283/72 (OJ 1991 L 67, p. 11). do not consider it possible to uphold the 10 — Council Regulation (EEC) N o 729/70 of 21 April 1970 on the financing of the common agricultural policy (OJ argument that the obligation to provide 1970 L 94, p. 13).

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Member States are required to communicate infringement of the abovementioned to the Commission (the information provision of the Code), it follows that in- coincides with that provided for by the formation of this kind may not be kept Code) and goes on to provide that if confidential, which would have important national provisions provide for the consequences, especially for the individuals confidentiality of that information, its involved. communication is to be subject to the au- thorization of the competent judicial au- thorities. " The same regulation also qualifies the obligation to reveal the identity of the persons involved in the irregularity by providing, in the final indent of Article 3(1), that the obligation does not apply if such The importance and delicacy of such a information is of no relevance in the problem are, by contrast, always highly campaign against irregularities. evident in similar legislation. For example, Article 10 of Regulation No 595/91 not only states the principle that the confiden- tiality of such information must be guaranteed (paragraph 1) but also regulates this aspect in detail by providing, in particular, that information communicated 'shall be covered by professional confiden- tiality and be protected in the same way as similar information is protected by the national legislation of the Member State that received it and by the corresponding provisions applicable to the Community 17. Another aspect deserves to be institutions' (paragraph 4). The same article emphasized. Paragraph 7 of the Code also provides a series of safeguards for indi- provides that 'Member States and the viduals; for example, the names of natural Commission must take all the security or legal persons involved in irregularities measures necessary to ensure that in- can be disclosed to another Member State formation exchanged between them remains or Community institution only in so far as confidential'; such a provision is under- this is necessary in order to prevent or standable, given the nature of the in- prosecute proven or alleged irregularities formation required, but even a superficial (paragraph 3); or again, if on further examination shows that it is insufficient to inquiry it is found that a person initially achieve the objective it sets. Indeed, if, as considered to have been implicated in a the Commission claims, the measure is fraud was not involved, all those to whom non-binding and can therefore be infringed the name had previously been disclosed without violating Article 23 (which would must be immediately informed of this fact certainly be true in the case of an (paragraph 6).

11 — The importance of such i provision is confirmed by the case-law of the Court, which its judgment in Case 267/78 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR 31 stated at paragraph 22 that: 'Rules which in the national systems of criminal law prevent the communication to certain persons of documents in the criminal proceedings may therefore be relied upon against the Commission in so far as the same restrictions may be relied upon against the national au- thorities', and accordingly held that Italy had not failed to 18. For the sake of completeness, I would meet its obligations by not communicating to the add that on the basis of paragraphs 4 and 5 Commission information covered by the confidentiality of investigations. of the Code of conduct, in order to

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facilitate the submission of the required Member States are invited to provide such information, a form was sent to all the details to the extent that they are useful for Member States, which they must complete an effective campaign against fraud. and send to the Commission in accordance with a set timetable. The applicant considers this form to be further proof of the fact that the contested measure is not simply a recommendation. The Commission, on the 19. The foregoing observations confirm that other hand, maintains that it is a standard the Code of conduct is not confined to clar- form, identical to those already existing in ifying the obligations set out in Article 23(1) other sectors. of Regulation N o 4253/88, but interprets them and widens their scope without never- theless providing appropriate safeguards, especially as regards the protection of indi- viduals.

In this respect, it is sufficient to note that as regards the form for irregularities involving It is therefore necessary to examine the the EAGGF, Guarantee Section, the in- question of the competence of the Commission to issue the measure in formation required therein is that expressly question. specified in Regulation No 595/91 and previously in Regulation No 283/72.

20. The position of the Commission is very ambiguous in this regard. On the one hand, it claims that the Code has no binding effect, while on the other it nevertheless affirms, both on the basis of Article 155 of As regards the form for irregularities the Treaty and on the basis of Article 4(2) affecting own resources, it is to be noted of Regulation No 2052/88, that it has the that this is based on Article 6(3) of Regu- power and hence the competence to adopt lation No 1552/89, 1 2 which expressly measures of this kind. provides for the Member States to send the Commission a half-yearly statement giving a brief description of cases of frauds and irregularities of over ECU 10 000, in- dicating the measures taken or under I do not consider it possible to share such a consideration in order to prevent the position. Article 189 of the Treaty permits recurrence of cases already detected. T h e the adoption of non-binding acts and Article form imposes an obligation to communicate 155 of the Treaty gives the Commission only this information; indeed, the request power to formulate recommendations or for additional information is accompanied deliver opinions not only on matters by the explanation that this is not expressly dealt with in the Treaty but also compulsory information in the meaning of whenever it considers it necessary; the Article 6(3) of Regulation No 1552/89: the Commission therefore has absolutely no need to demonstrate its competence to 12 — Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) of 29 May 1989 recommend one course of action rather than implementing Decision 88/376/EEC, Euratom on the another: this competence is incontestable. system of the Communities' own resources ÍOI 1989 L 155, p. 1). Moreover, if it is true, as the Commission

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contends several times in its defence 21. Nor do I consider that the submissions, that the measure in question is Commission's reference to Article 5 of the no more than a recommendation, an Treaty is such as to alter the terms of the opinion addressed to Member States on the issue. In this regard, it must be observed manner in which to apply Article 23(1) of that the obligation placed on Member States Regulation No 4253/88, it is difficult to by this Article to 'facilitate the achievement understand why the Commission did not of the Community's tasks' is a general ob- describe the measure as such in the title or ligation which, as the Court itself has stated, present it in such a way as to demonstrate cannot be invoked 'in the absence of a clearly, over and beyond the nomen iuris, particular provision in the Treaty or in that it was purely and simply a recommen- binding acts adopted by the institutions'; 14 dation to Member States, 13 thus avoiding this applies in the sense that such an ob- possible confusion and uncertainty, and an ligation on Member States cannot in any artificial dispute. case be invoked to adopt acts of a regu- latory nature. Finally, the Commission may undoubtedly ask Member States, on the basis of Article 5 of the Treaty, to provide specific information on a particular case and it may institute proceedings for breach of the Treaty if a Member State refuses to supply such information, but it certainly cannot use such a legal basis to harmonize, clarify and widen the obligations imposed by a rule, in this instance Article 23(1) of Regulation No 4253/88.

In general, one cannot but be surprised that the Commission, albeit in the context of a defence before the Court, persists in main- taining that in a matter as sensitive as that involved in this case, in which the severity and compulsory nature of the measures were to be reinforced, it created a measure with no binding force for Member States, in 22. As to the competence which the other words a measure which, if this were Commission infers from Article 4(2) of so, would not only be useless but also, for Regulation N o 2052/88, it is hardly that very reason, harmful in that it was necessary to emphasize that such a provision likely to sow confusion and lead to relates to the so-called partnership, a disparities in the conduct of Member States. concept defined in the regulation as 'close consultations between the Commission, the 13 — Permil mc to add, however banal this remark may appear, Member State concerned and the competent thai as a rule, as is right and obvious, the Commission authorities designated by the latter at adopts formal acu in accordance with Article 189 of the Treaty when it has competence to do so. On the other national, regional, local or other level, with hand, acts with an atypical nomen are, in mv opinion, a each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a sign of a certain ambiguity, especially where the subject to be regulated is so typical that it does not require an common goal'. According to the same regu- atypical act. In this regard, let me recall the judgment in Case 322/88 Grimaldi v Fondi des Maladies Professionnelles lation, 'the partnership shall cover the pre- [1989] ECR 4407, in which the Court stated at paragraph paration, financing, monitoring and 13 that recommendations 'are generally adopted by tne institutions of the Community wiien they do not have the assessment of operations'. power under the Treaty to adopt binding measures or when they consider that it is not appropriate to adopt more mandatory rules'. Such an affirmation seems equally 14 — Order of 30 September 1987 in Case 229/86 Brother valid in principle for the innumerable atypical acts existing Industries v Commission [1987] ECR 3757, especially in practice. p. 3763.

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Finally, on the supposition that structural in question; moreover, and above all, such a action by the Commission complements or measure would be alien to the system contributes to corresponding national op- guaranteed by the Treaty, given that the erations, a kind of permanent dialogue has adoption of normative acts agreed between been instituted between the Commission and the Commission and the Member States or the Member State concerned in order to agreements of any kind among the same distribute the tasks with a view to greater parties, even in particularly simplified form, efficiency and to pool the human resources is entirely alien to the system. I do not involved in Community structural action. believe that this singular and contradictory The concept of partnership therefore by no position adopted by the Commission means implies that the partners can by deserves further comment. common accord adopt binding acts or even binding interpretations of existing acts and regulations. Moreover, the partnership relates not to the verification of operations but, as has already been stated, only to the preparation, financing, monitoring and assessment of operations. It follows that the legal basis in question does not permit the issuing of binding acts, but confines itself to 24. Given the considerations set out above, providing for close consultations among all the Commission's statement that it will the interested parties in order to ensure the never institute proceedings for breach of the successful completion of each operation Treaty on the basis of non-compliance with undertaken. the Code of conduct is completely irrelevant and in patent contradiction with the terms of the letter of notification, which, it will be recalled, expressly states that compliance with Article 23(1) of Regulation N o 4253/88 requires full compliance with the Code of conduct. It is unnecessary, however, to dwell further on this aspect since, as we have seen, an analysis of the 23. One final aspect remains to be content of the measure has revealed that it considered: the Commission has repeatedly consists in implementing provisions which contended, both in its defence submissions create for Member States obligations which and at the hearing, that the contested are not laid down as such in the basic rules. measure was adopted by consensus; this would therefore be a new type of act, which the Commission has defined as a kind of 'gentleman's agreement'. Such a construction does not appear acceptable, nor such as to alter the legal situation, without its being necessary to ascertain whether in fact the measure in question was 25. The important point for the purposes of a negotiated measure. In failing to observe this case is that the contested measure, any provisions that such a measure may containing provisions for the implemen- contain, Member States could at most tation of Article 23(1) of Regulation assume political responsibility for such No 4253/88, makes the obligations failure without for that reason being imposed by the regulation in question more considered in breach of their obligations onerous for Member States in that it arising under Community rules in the field extends and specifies them in detail.

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Article 23 confines itself to indicating the Treaty. Furthermore, Article 7(2) of the obligations of Member States, but does not same regulation confirms that the attribute any power to the Commission to harmonized rules for strengthening checks specify, interpret or increase the obligations on structural operations are to be estab- in question. N o other relevant provision lished on the basis of the provisions in the confers similar competence on the aforesaid Article 3(4) and (5). It follows that Commission. Indeed, Article 3(4) and (5) of in so far as the Code of conduct in question Regulation N o 2052/88 provides that the is intended to have legal effects it must arrangements for checking operations are to be annulled on the grounds of the be laid down in the implementing decisions Commission's lack of competence. adopted pursuant to Article 130e of the

Conclusion

O n the basis of t h e foregoing considerations, I propose that the C o u r t grant the application a n d o r d e r the Commission to pay the costs.

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