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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·28.4.1993

C-109/91

ECLI:EU:C:1993:158

Súd
Súdny dvor Európskej únie
IČS
61991CC0109

TEN OEVER

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL VAN GERVEN delivered on 28 April 1993 *

Summary

The Court's case-law on Article 119 of the EEC Treaty and the judgment in Barber I - 4894

Background to the present cases I 4897

The operation in time of the Barber judgment I - 4901

Does the ruling in Barber as well as the temporal limitation provided for therein also apply to occupational pension schemes other than those envisaged in that judgment? I - 4911

Is the use of actuarial calculation factors differing according to sex contrary to Article 119 of the Treaty? I - 4913

Does the payment of a widower's pension fall under Article 119 of the Treaty? I - 4923

The question whether Article 119 may be relied upon by the spouse of a deceased worker I - 4927

The question whether Article 119 may be relied upon against the trustees of an occupational

pension scheme I - 4929

Article 119 and the different methods of funding occupational pension schemes 1 - 4934

Applicability of Article 119 to pension schemes having members of only one sex I - 4935

Conclusion I -4936

* Original language- Dutch-

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O P I N I O N O F MR VAN GERVEN — CASE C-109/91

Mr President, with Article 119 of the use of sex-based actu- Members of the Court, arial factors for the purpose of calculating pension contributions and benefits. Finally, I will examine a number of other questions which are raised in these cases. They are (i) whether the payment of a widower's pension falls under Article 119 (asked in Case 1. In these cases a considerable number of C-l09/91 Ten Oever); (ii) whether Article questions have been referred to the Court 119 may be relied upon by the spouse of a for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation deceased employee and whether it may be of Article 119 of the Treaty, having regard in relied upon against the trustees of a pension particular to the judgment of 17 May 1990 in scheme (one of the key questions in the Col- the Barber case. 1 In Case C-110/91, Moroni, oroll case); and (iii) a number of questions a number of questions of interpretation have concerning the way in which the principle of also been referred on the relationship equal treatment laid down in Article 119 is between, on the one hand, Article 119 of the to be implemented in practice in the field of Treaty and the Barber judgment and, on the occupational pension schemes and concern- other hand, Council Directive 86/378/EEC ing liability for its implementation (again, of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the arising in the Coloroll case). principle of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes. 2

At the outset, however, it would be useful to look briefly at the Barber judgment and to 2. Given the scope and complexity of the examine the background to the various cases questions which have been referred for a before the national courts in so far as this is preliminary ruling and the observations sub- relevant to my Opinion. mitted to the Court, I propose to proceed as follows. First, I shall examine what I con- sider to be the most crucial question, which runs like a thread through all these cases. It is this: what precisely are the effects in time The Court's case-law on Article 119 of the of the Barber judgment. Then I will consider EEC Treaty and the judgment in Barber whether that judgment, as well as the tempo- ral limitation imposed in that judgment, also applies to pension schemes other than those in question in that case. I will then go on to examine the question — which arises in particular in Case C-152/91, Neath [1993] 3. As is well known, Article 119 of the ECR 1-6953, and Case C-200/91, Coloroll Treaty lays down the obligation that the [1994] ECR 1-4397 — of the compatibility Member States must ensure in principle that men and women receive equal pay for equal work. 'Pay' is defined in the second para- graph of Article 119 as 'the ordinary basic or 1 — Judgment of 17 May 1990 in Case C-262/88 Barber v minimum wage or salary and any other con- Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] ECR 1-1889. sideration, whether in cash or in kind, which 2 — OJ 1986 L 225, p. 40. the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in

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TEX OEVER

respect of his employment from his employ- under the concept of consideration. The er'. Since its judgment in the first Defrenne Court came to this decision on the basis of case the Court has developed a broad inter- the following characteristics of social secu pretation of the concept of pay as thus rity systems: (i) they are directly governed defined, it includes: by legislation without any element of agree- ment within the undertaking or trade con- cerned and are obligatorily applicable to gen- 'any other consideration, whether in cash or eral categories of workers; and (ii) they in kind, whether immediate or future, pro- provide workers with the benefit of a statu- vided that the worker receives it, albeit indi- tory scheme to which workers, employers rectly, in respect of his employment from his and in some cases the public authorities con- employer'. 3 tribute financially in a measure determined less by the employment relationship between the employer and the worker than by con- Moreover, in the second Defrenne case the siderations of social policy, so that the Court went on to hold that Article 119 employer's contribution cannot be regarded as a direct or indirect payment to the worker for the purposes of Article 119. 5However, 'applies directly, and without the need for in its judgment of 13 May 1986 in the Bilka- more detailed implementing measures on the Kaufhaus case, the Court, applying those cri- part of the Community or the Member teria, came to the view that benefits paid States, to all forms of direct and overt dis- under an occupational pension scheme orig- crimination which may be identified solely inating in an agreement between the with the aid of the criteria of equal work and employer and the staff committee and form- equal pay referred to by the article in ques- ing an integral part of the contract of tion.' 4 employment are to be classified as 'consider- ation' within the meaning of Article 119. 6

As far as the interpretation of 'consideration' in Article 119 is concerned, the Court had held in Defrenne (No 1) that social security 4. In the Barber case the Court had to con- schemes and benefits, in particular old-age sider a 'contracted-out' pension scheme pensions, although in principle not entirely approved under United Kingdom legislation, separate from the concept of pay, did not fall that is to say an occupational pension scheme established in consultation between the social partners or by unilateral decision of the employer, financed by the employer 3 — Case 80/70 Defrenne v Belgian State [1971] ECR 445, para- graph 6; confirmed in inter aha the judgment in Case alone or by employer and employees com- 12/81 Garland v British Rail Engineering [1982] ECR 359, bined, and which employees may join in par- paragraph 5; Case C-262/88 Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, paragraph 12; sec, most recently, tial substitution for their statutory pension. the judgment of 17 February 1993 in Case C 173/91 Com mission v Belgium [1993] ECR I-673, paragraph 13. From the principles set out above the Court 4 — The quotation comes from the judgment in Case deduced that 129/79 Macarlhys v Smith [1980] ECR 1275, paragraph 10, which on this point expressly refers to the judgment in Defrenne (No 2); as far as the judgment in Defrenne (No 2) itself is concerned, sec the judgment in Case 43/75 [1976] ECR 455, in particular paragraphs 18, 21, 24 and 40. For subsequent confirmatory judgments, sec inter aha the judg 5 — Defrenne (No 1 ) , paragraphs 7 to 9; sec the judgment in Case men! in Case 69/81 Womngham and Another v loyds Bank 170/84 Bilka Kaufhaus Gmbll v Karm Weber von Hartz [1981] ECR 767, paragraph 23, the judgment in Case ] 1986] ECR 1607, paragraphs 17 and 18; sec, more recently, 96/80 Jenkins v Kmgsgate (Clothing Productions) [1981] paragraph 14 of the judgment in Commission v Belgium, ECR 911, paragraph 17; and the judgment in Barber, para cited above in footnote 3 graph 37. 6 - Bilka, paragraph 22.

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'a pension paid under a contracted-out have taken the view that Article 119 was not scheme constitutes consideration paid by the applicable to pensions paid under a employer to the worker in respect of his contracted-out scheme. For those two rea- employment and consequently falls within sons the Court decided to limit the effect of the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty.' 7 its judgment in time:

Asked whether a scheme under which a man 'In those circumstances, overriding consider- made compulsorily redundant was entitled ations of legal certainty preclude legal situa- only to a deferred pension at the normal tions which have exhausted all their effects in pensionable age whilst a women in the same the past from being called in question where circumstances was entitled to a pension that might upset retroactively the financial which was payable immediately was compat- balance of many contracted-out pension ible with Article 119, the Court replied in schemes. It is appropriate, however, to pro- the negative. The reasons given by the Court vide for an exception in favour of individuals in paragraph 32 of its judgment were that: who have taken action in good time in order to safeguard their rights. Finally, it must be pointed out that no restriction on the effects of the aforesaid interpretation can be permit- '... Article 119 prohibits any discrimination ted as regards the acquisition of entitlement with regard to pay as between men and to a pension as from the date of this judg- women, whatever the system which gives ment.' 10 rise to such inequality. Accordingly, it is contrary to Article 119 to impose an age condition which differs according to sex in respect of pensions paid under a contracted- The Court therefore held that: out scheme, even if the difference between the pensionable age for men and that for women is based on the one provided for by the national statutory scheme.' 'The direct effect of Article 119 of the Treaty may not be relied upon in order to claim entitlement to a pension with effect from a date prior to that of this judgment, except in 5. The Court was, however, aware of the the case of workers or those claiming under tremendous financial implications of its them who have before that date initiated judgment. It also considered that, in view of legal proceedings or raised an equivalent the exceptions to the principle of equal treat- claim under the applicable national law.' 11 ment regarding pensionable age provided for in Directives 79/7/EEC 8 and 86/378/ EEC, 9 the Member States could reasonably

Upon the phrases 'legal situations which have exhausted all their effects in the past', 7 — Barber, paragraph 28. 8 — More specifically, Article 7(1) of Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive imple- mentation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, OJ 1979 L 6, p. 24. 10 — Barber, paragraph 44. 9 — More specifically, Article 9(a) of this directive. 11 — Barber, paragraph 45 and point 5 of the operative part.

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'the acquisition of entitlement to a pension the refusal to grant him a widower's pension, as from the date of this judgment' and 'a when a widow's pension would have been pension with effect from a date prior to this granted had he been a woman and his wife a judgment' the issues arising in the present man, was contrary to the principle of equal cases from the limitation in time of the pay for men and women laid down in that effects of the Barber judgment turn. provision. The Pension Fund, on the other hand, relied on the limitation in time of the effects of the Barber judgment, in which the Court held for the first time that payments Background to the present cases under non-statutory pension schemes are pay. Since the proceedings were not pending when the Barber judgment was delivered, Mr Ten Oever had no right to the pension.

6. The Ten Oever case. Mr Ten Oever was married to M. F. Heeren, who was employed in the cleaning sector. Her employer had established a pension scheme which was The Kantongerecht considered it desirable to administered by the Stichting Bedrijfspen- refer the matter to the Court of Justice for a sioenfonds voor het Glazenwassers-en preliminary ruling. 12 Schoonmaakbedrijf (Pension Fund for the Window-cleaning and Cleaning Sector, here- inafter referred to as 'the Pension Fund'). It was a collective occupational pension scheme financed by employers and workers. Until 1 January 1989 the Pension Fund's rules 7. The Moroni case. From 1968 to 1983 Mr made provision only for a widow's pension; Moroni, who was born in 1948, was an since that date a widower's pension has also employee of Collo GmbH. In 1983 he been provided for, but without retroactive entered the service of another employer. effect. After his wife had died on 13 October When taking up his employment with Collo 1988, Mr Ten Oever applied — according to he had acquired a prospective right to a pen- the judgment referring the case, before sion under that undertaking's pension 17 May 1990 — for the grant of a survivor's scheme, which provided inter alia that pension with effect from 13 October 1988. employees leaving the service of the firm and The Pension Fund rejected his request on the gainful employment in general were to be ground that at the time of his wife's death its entitled to a pension on reaching the age of rules did not provide for such a pension. 65 (60 in the case of female employees), pro- vided that by that time they had worked in the service of Collo for at least 10 years. On 6 November 1990 Mr Moroni brought an action against Collo in the Arbeitsgericht On 8 June 1990 Mr Ten Oever applied to the [Labour Court] Bonn. On the basis of Arti- Kantongerecht (Magistrate's Court), Utre- cle 119 of the EEC Treaty and Articles 5 and cht, requesting it to decide that he should be 6 of Directive 86/378 he argues that the granted a widower's pension with effect from 13 October 1988. According to Mr Ten Oever, the pension constituted pay within 12 — For the precise wording of the questions of the Kanton the meaning of Article 119 of the Treaty and gerecht, reference is made to the Report for the I Hearing.

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O P I N I O N O F MR VAN GERVEN — CASE C-109/91

occupational pension promised to him must female employee with an indefeasible right be granted to him already on reaching the vested in interest who leaves the undertak­ age of 60 and that the value of his prospec­ ing's employment prematurely suffers a pro­ tive pension is to be calculated as if the pen­ portionately lower reduction under the rules sion had been promised from that time. of Collo's pension scheme when her pension Collo, on the other hand, relies on Article entitlement is calculated: as far as the possi­ 8 of the aforementioned directive. Taking the ble length of service is concerned, in a wom­ view that the outcome of the case depends an's case only the time served up to the age on the interpretation of the relevant provi­ of 60 years (when she can leave without any sions of Community law, the Arbeitsgericht reduction of pension) is taken into account. Bonn has referred a number of questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling. 13

Mr Moroni has also the possibility under the German legislation of making an early claim, that is to say before he reaches the age of 65 (and at the earliest upon reaching the age It is useful to look at the relevant German of 60), to the occupational pension earned legislation. Under that legislation, Mr with C o l l o . , 6 However, the condition Moroni, despite having left Collo's employ­ imposed on male employees in this regard is ment prematurely, has, by virtue of his that they must be entitled to claim the statu­ length of service and the time at which tory old-age pension and actually do so, before leaving that employment he had qual­ which, besides requiring the completion of ified for future pension rights, acquired as certain insurance periods under the statutory against Collo an indefeasible right vested in old-age pension rules, also generally requires interest to benefits ('Versorgungsan- a relatively long period of unemployment wartschafť), which, as far as the old-age pen­ prior to the attainment of the age of 60. That sion at issue is concerned, is transformed condition does not apply to female employ­ into entitlement vested in possession to bene­ ees. 1 7 In making an early claim Mr Moroni fits ('Versorgungsanspruch') when he reaches must also be prepared to accept a further 14 65 years of age. Upon his early departure reduction: besides the pro rata reduction from the undertaking's employment, the cal­ mentioned above, a male employee's pension culation of that entitlement is as follows: the will also be subject to an actuarial deduction occupational pension which would be pay­ ('versicherungs-mathematische Abschlag'). able upon his reaching 65 years of age in On the other hand, a female employee can, Collo's employment is reduced in propor­ upon completion of the insurance periods tion to the ratio between the actual period of required under the statutory pension rules, that service and that which he would have automatically obtain early payment of the 15 completed by the age of 65. However, a old-age pension: if she leaves the undertaking prematurely with an indefeasible prospective

13 — For the precise wording of the questions, reference is made to the Report for the Hearing. 14 — Paragraph 1(1) of the Gesetz zur Verbesserung der betrie­ 16 — Paragraph 6 of the BetrAVG. blichen Altersversorgung (Law on the enhancement of 17 — The Arbeitsgericht refers in this regard to Paragraph occupational old-age benefits, hereinafter referred to as 'the 1248(2) and (3) of the Reichsversichcrungsordnung and BetrAVG'). Paragraph 25(2) and (3) of the Angcstclltcnvcrsicherungs- 15 — Paragraph 2(1) of the BetrAVG. gesetz.

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TEX OEVER

right to pension benefits she will be subject A member of Scheme 4 can, with the consent only to the reduction based on her early of his employer and the trustees of that pen- departure, and not to a pro rata reduction or sion scheme, retire early and take a reduced any actuarial deduction for drawing her pen- pension immediately at any time after his sion early. 50th birthday. If that consent is given, the pension is calculated on the basis of the pen- sion which the member would have received at the normal retirement date, having regard, This treatment of men and women under however, to the anticipated period of pay- occupational pension schemes reflects the ment of the pension. A reduction of 6% is position under the statutory rules on old-age applied for each year and month between the pensions, which have served as a model for actual retirement date and the normal pen- occupational pension schemes. 18 sionable age. If the employer and the trustees do not consent to a member taking early retirement, a member leaving Scheme 4 after his 50th birthday and before the normal 8. The Neath case. Mr Neath, who was born retirement date will be entitled only to a in 1935, was employed by Hugh Steeper Ltd deferred pension or to a transfer payment to until he was made redundant on 29 June another pension scheme. If the member opts 1990, which was after the delivery of the for a deferred pension, Scheme 4 is liable to judgment in the Barber case. At that time he pay the part of the pension owed which was 54 years and 11 months old. During that accrued during the member's affiliation to period Mr Neath was consecutively a mem- the scheme. If he opts for a transfer pay- ber of two occupational pension schemes run ment, an amount which is actuarially equiv- by Hugh Steeper. Between December alent to the sum of benefits which the mem- 1975 and December 1978 he was a member ber had accrued during his membership of of Scheme 5; from January 1979 until the ter- Scheme 4 is transferred to another pension mination of his employment he was a mem- scheme of the member's choice. Scheme ber of Scheme 4, a contracted-out scheme to 4 then ceases to be liable to provide any ben- which his rights acquired under the first efits to the member. scheme were transferred.

Both schemes were financed by contribu- tions paid by the employer and the employ- ees, those paid by the employees being the same for men and women. However, some scheme rules varied according to the sex of the employee. A women could retire on a When Mr Neath was made redundant, he full pension at the age of 60, whereas a man was not allowed to take an immediate pen- could not do so until the age of 65. sion; he was therefore offered the choice of a deferred pension or a transfer payment. He was told that, if he opted for a transfer pay- 18 — The Arbeitsgericht Bonn points out in this regard that both ment, the transfer value would be £30 672.59. the Bundessozialgericht and the Bundesverfassungsgericht have held that there can be no legal objections, in terms of The calculation of that transfer value was the equal treatment of men and women, to the provisions concerned of the statutory legislation on old age pensions based on the assumption that Mr Neath's before 1992. normal retirement date, in respect of benefits

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O P I N I O N O F MR VAN GERVEN — CASE C-109/9I

attributable to service after 17 May 1990 expectancy for women. Mr Neath considered (the date of the Barber judgment), was his this to be contrary to Article 119 of the 60th birthday. On the other hand, the Barber Treaty, as interpreted by the Court of Justice judgment was not considered to be applica- in the Barber case. The Industrial Tribunal ble to periods of service prior to the judg- decided to refer the matter to the Court of ment. Moreover, it was assumed that Article Justice. 19 119 of the Treaty did not preclude the use of actuarial factors. According to the calcula- tions of Scheme 4's actuary, if, for the pur- pose of calculating Mr Neath's benefits in respect of his entire service, he were assumed 9. The Coloroll case. The background to the to have a normal retirement age of 60, his main proceedings in this case is the financial transfer value would have been £39 934.56, collapse in the middle of 1990 of the Col- using male actuarial factors. If female actuar- o r o l lGroup of Companies and the conse- ial factors were used, his transfer value quential necessity to wind up certain of the would have been £41 486.25: that difference pension schemes of those undertakings. The is attributable to the fact that female actuarial proceedings are not conventional proceed- factors assume that women have a higher life ings but a test case (a representative action) expectancy so that the costs involved for which Colorali Pension Trustees Limited Scheme 4 in providing benefits to women are (hereinafter 'the Colorali Trustees'), which is regarded as being higher than in the case of still the trustee for eight pension schemes of men. the Colorali Group, has brought before the High Court. They seek directions from the High Court on matters which fall within that court's supervisory jurisdiction over trusts. The 'defendants' in the main proceed- ings are a number of persons selected by the Colorali Trustees as representative of the divergent interests and views. 20

After the options on offer had been explained to him, Mr Neath instituted pro- ceedings against Steeper before the Leeds The Colorali Trustees are confronted by a Industrial Tribunal on the ground that the whole range of factors which may influence conditions offered to him were less favour- their decisions concerning the winding-up of able than those which would have been the pension schemes. All the schemes contain offered to him had he been a woman. As different provisions for men and women. regards the option of a deferred pension, he The most important difference is that under would have to wait five more years than a all the schemes the normal retirement age for woman in order to receive the pension; even men is 65 and for women 60, which are the if he exercised his right at that time to ages at which the state pension is payable exchange part of his pension for a cash sum, he would again receive a smaller amount (£17 193.94) than if he had been a woman 19 — For the precise wording of its questions, reference is again (£21 029.02). That difference was again based made to the Report for the Hearing. 20 — For a description of the situation of these persons, see the on actuarial factors based on a longer life Report for the Hearing in this case.

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TEN' OEVER

in the United Kingdom. Consequently, dif- The operation in time of the Barber judg- ferent pension amounts are payable to men ment and women of the same age and having the same number of years of service. Further- more, where alternative benefits are provided by reference to a capital valuation of pension 10. Possible interpretations. As I have said, rights, actuarial factors are applied which the key question in these cases concerns the produce different results as between males precise operation in time of the Barber judg- and females because life expectancy and pen- ment. It is clear from the observations sub- sion commencement dates for men and mitted to the Court that the practical impor- women differ. Finally, two of the pension tance of the answer to this question is schemes have the particular feature of having enormous. I therefore propose to focus at no female members; yet the aforementioned once on the core of the problem. Apparently, there are some four possible interpretations sex-based calculation factors still affect the of the limitation which the Court sought to benefits of certain male employees. place on the operation in time of its judg- ment in the Barber case.

A first interpretation would be to apply the principle of equal treatment only to workers who became members of, and began to pay contributions to, an occupational pension scheme as from 17 May 1990. This view would deprive the Barber judgment of almost all retroactive effect. In practical Owing to these differences of treatment on terms, it would mean that the full effect of grounds of sex the Coloroll Trustees are the judgment would be felt only after a unable to determine with finality the liabili- period of about 40 years. ties for which they must provide in winding up the pension schemes. They are concerned in particular that the provisions of the trust deeds and rules may be overridden in certain A second interpretation is that the principle respects by Article 119 of the EEC Treaty. of equal treatment should only be applied to Pending further clarification by the Court of benefits payable in respect of periods of ser- Justice of the extent to which Article vice after 17 May 1990. Periods of service 119 applies in the circumstances of the prior to that date would not be affected by present case, the Coloroll Trustees consider the direct effect of Article 119. that it is not possible to say with certainty how the funds should be distributed. In view of this uncertainty, the Chancery Division of According to a third interpretation, the prin- the High Court has referred a number of ciple of equal treatment must be applied to questions to the Court. 21 all pensions which arc payable or paid for the first time after 17 May 1990, irrespective of the fact that all or some of the pension 21 - Sec the Report for the Hearing in the Coloroll case. accrued during, and on the basis of, periods

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of service completed or contributions paid support the second option. In the Coloroll prior to that date. In other words, it is not case it is also supported by two defendants, the periods of service (before or after the Judith Broughton and Coloroll Group plc. judgment in Barber) which are decisive, but the date on which the pension falls to be paid.

The fourth possible approach is advocated by four of the defendants in the main pro- ceedings in the Coloroll case (James Russell, A fourth interpretation would be to apply Gerald Parker, Robert Sharp and Joan equal treatment to all pension payments Fuller). made after 17 May 1990, including benefits or pensions which had already fallen due and, here again, as in the previous interpreta- tion, irrespective of the date of the periods of service during which the pension accrued. 12. In order to put the issues arising in these This interpretation undoubtedly has the cases in their full setting, attention must also most far-reaching effect. 22 be drawn to the 'Protocol concerning Article 119 of the Treaty establishing the European Community' annexed to the Treaty on Euro- pean Union, 23 although that Treaty, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992, is not yet 11. The argument before the Court centred in force. The Protocol provides: mainly on the second and fourth interpreta- tions. The first view is not supported in these cases by any of the intervening parties. The third interpretation was supported by the Commission at the time when it submitted 'For the purposes of Article 119 of this written observations in the Ten Oever, Treaty, benefits under occupational social Moroni and Neath cases. However, in its security schemes shall not be considered as written observations in the Coloroll case and remuneration if and in so far as they are at the hearing the Commission switched its attributable to periods of employment prior support to the second interpretation. to 17 May 1990, except in the case of work- ers or those claiming under them who have before that date initiated legal proceedings or introduced an equivalent claim under the Besides the Commission, all the intervening applicable national law.' pension funds and trustees and all the Mem- ber States which have submitted observa- tions (Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) now The significance of that protocol for the interpretation to be given to the effect in time of the judgment in Barber is a matter to 22 — See also the description of these possible interpretations by which I shall soon return. S. Honeyball and J. Shaw, 'Sex, Law and the Retiring Man', European Law Review 1991 (47), pp. 56-57. For a survey of academic opinion on this point, sec D. Curtin, 'The Con- stitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces', Common Market Law Review 1993 (17), pp. 50-51, with references. 23 — The text of this Treaty was published in OJ 1992 C 191.

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13. The case-law of the Court of Justice on lished in good faith, be moved to restrict for the temporal effect of judgments. Before I any person concerned the opportunity of take my position on the effect in time of the relying upon the provision as thus inter- Barber judgment, I consider it important to preted with a view to calling in question clarify the rationale which led the Court to those legal relationships. introduce this limitation into its judgment. That this is an unusual step needs no demon- stration, given the declaratory character which in principle attaches to the Court's interpretation of Community law pursuant Such a restriction may, however, be allowed to Article 177 of the Treaty. 24 This was for- only in the actual judgment ruling upon the mulated by the Court in its judgments in the interpretation sought. The fundamental need Salumi and Denkavit Italiana cases: for a general and uniform application of Community law implies that it is for the Court of Justice alone to decide upon the 'The interpretation which, in the exercise of temporal restrictions to be placed on the the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article interpretation which it lays down.' 2 5 177, the Court of Justice gives to a rule of Community law clarifies and defines where necessary the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be or ought to have been under- stood and applied from the time of its com- 14. It appears from that passage that in ing into force.

It follows that the rule as thus deciding to limit the scope of a judgment in interpreted may, and must, be applied by the time the Court is guided mainly by two con- courts even to legal relationships arising and siderations: a general principle of legal cer- established before the judgment ruling on tainty inherent in the Community legal the request for interpretation, provided that order and a concern to prevent serious prob- in other respects the conditions enabling an lems from arising, through an unrestricted action relating to the application of that rule retroactive application of the judgment, in to be brought before the courts having juris- respect of legal relationships established in diction, are satisfied. good faith. However, it is to be added at once that, as the Court has repeatedly con- firmed, the mere fact that a judicial decision has important practical consequences is not As the Court recognized in its judgment of in itself a sufficient reason to curtail its unre-

8 April 1976 in Case 43/75 Gabrielle stricted application. In Blaizot this was Defrenne v Société Anonyme Belge de Navi- explained, with reference to Defrenne (No gation Aérienne Sabena [1976] ECR 455, it is 2), as follows: only exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the Community legal order and in taking account of the serious 25 — Judgments of 27 March 1980 in Case 61/79 Ammmistrazi one delle finanze dello Stato v Denkavn Italiatta (1980] effects which its judgment might have, as ECR 1205, paragraphs 16 18. and Joined Cases 66/79, regards the past, on legal relationships estab- 127/79 and 128/79 Amministrazione delle Fmante dello Stato v Meridionale Industria and Others [1980] LCR 1237, paragraphs 9 11; Case 811/79 Anete [1980] ECR 2545. paragraphs 6 8 and Case 826/79 Mireeo [1980] ECR 2559, paragraphs 7 9; Case 309/85 Barra [1988] ECR 355. para graphs 11 13. and Case 24/86 Mar/ol [1988] ECR 379, 24 — Sec, m this regard. R. Joliet, lx droit institutionnel des paragraphs 27 28; Case 210/87 Padovani [1988] ECR 6177, Communautés européennes. I econtentieux.

Luik, Faculte paragraph 12 Recently, the Court summarized these prin de Droit, d'Economie et de Sciences Sociales de I iège, ciples again in a judgment of 16 J u l y1992 delivered in Case 1981, p 219 C 163/90 legros [992] ECR 1 4625, paragraph 30.

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'As the Court has held (see in particular the consider' 29 that their conduct was in accord- judgment of 8 April 1976), in determining ance with Community law, for example whether or not to limit the temporal effect of where the scope of a Community provision a judgment it is necessary to bear in mind was not entirely clear. The Court has that, although the practical consequences of accepted a fortiori that good faith exists any judicial decision must be weighed care- where the Community institutions them- fully, the Court cannot go so far as to dimin- selves had helped to create an impression of ish the objectivity of the law and compro- validity under Community law, either by mise its future application on the ground of approving a particular act of secondary the possible repercussions which might Community law which left the practices result, as regards the past, from a judicial concerned intact (judgments in Pinna (No decision.' 26 1), 30 Barber and Legros) or by not bringing an action under Article 169 against the Mem- ber State in default (Defrenne (No 2) and Legros) or by vacillating over the question of

15. The fact that the principle of legal cer- compatibility (Blaizot). tainty forms part of the Community legal order is sufficiently well-known. 27 In essence, the Court is prepared, on account of special circumstances, to avoid calling in If it is clear, however, that parties or Member question legal relationships established in the States, particularly in view of clear, well- past, notwithstanding the fact that there are known case-law of the Court, could be in no grounds for this under a clarifying ruling doubt as to their Community obligations, which the Court has given in the meantime. the condition of good faith is not fulfilled. It appears from its case-law that the Court As is clear from the judgments in Wor- recognizes the good faith, or the legitimate ringham 31 and Essevi and Salengo, 32 the expectation, 28 of the parties concerned or of Court does not then feel compelled to limit the Member States as such a special circum- its judgment in time. stance if the retroactive application of the judicial decision involves serious problems for the parties or the Member States.

Such good faith exists where those parties or Member States 'were reasonably entitled to 16. The good faith of parties concerned or Member States is thus a special circumstance which can justify limiting the effect of a judgment in time if the absence of a limita- 26 — Case 24/86 Blaizot, cited in the previous footnote, para- tion would produce serious problems for graph 30; judgment in the Defrenne (No 2) case, paragraph 71; see also the judgment in Worringham (cited above in legal relationships created in the past. footnote 4), paragrapn 31, and the judgment in Legros, cited in the previous footnote, paragraph 30. 27 — For express confirmation of this, see, inter alia, the judg- ment in Joined Cases 205/82 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkon- tor and Others v Federal Republic of Germany [1983] ECR 29 — This expression is used in the judgment in Barber, at para- 2633, paragraph 30. On legal certainty as a principle for the graph 43, as well as in the judgment in Legros, at paragraph protection of legal relationships which have come into

33. being in good faith, see, inter alia, K. D. Borchardt, Der Grundsatz des Vertrauenschutzes im Europäischen Gemein- 30 — Case 41/84 Pinna v Caisse d'Allocations Familiales de la schaftsrecht, Kehl, Schriftenreihe Europa-Forschung, Vol- Savoie [1986] ECR 1, paragraph 27. Since the Council had ume 15, 1988, pp. 135-136, and M. Schlockermann, Rechts- approved Article 73(2) of Regulation N o 1408/71, which sicherheit als Vertrauensschutz in der Rechtsprechung des was declared invalid in that judgment, France had believed EuGH, dissertation, Munich, 1984, pp. 144-151. for a long period of time that it could maintain practices which had no legal basis under Articles 48 and 51 of the 28 — This term was used by the Court in its judgment in Joined Treaty. Cases 142/80 and 143/80 Amministratzione delle Finanze dello Stato v Spa Essevi and Carlo Salengo [1981] ECR 31 — Worrington, paragraph 33. 1413, paragraph 34. 32 — Already cited in footnote 28, paragraph 34.

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According to the Court, such a problem The Court's regard for 'all the interests at arises if the judgment concerned may have stake, public and private', 35 including the important general economic and financial serious financial consequences of a judgment consequences going beyond the particular for the parties or authorities which have facts of the case in point. Thus in Defrenne acted in good faith, is also evident in a num- (No 2) the Court lent a receptive ear when ber of recent cases. In Blaizot, for example, the United Kingdom and Irish Governments the Court took account of the possibility expressed the fear that many undertakings that its judgment (in which it ruled that a might experience serious financial difficulties supplementary enrolment fee for foreign as a result of unforeseen pay claims. 33 Partly university students was incompatible with in view of the good faith (mentioned above) Article 7 of the EEC Treaty) might 'retroac- of the market participants the Court held tively throw the financing of university edu- that cation into confusion and might have unforeseeable consequences for the proper functioning of universities'. 36 In Barber, too, the Court noted (see the passage cited above in paragraph 5) that 'the financial balance of many contracted-out pension schemes' might be 'upset retroactively'. And still more recently, in the Legros case, in which a 'In these circumstances, it is appropriate to charge levied by the French overseas territo- determine that, as the general level at which ries (the 'octroi de mer') was declared pay would have been fixed cannot be known, incompatible with Community law, the important considerations of legal certainty Court was prepared to limit the temporal affecting all the interests involved, both pub- effect of its judgment on account of the cat- lic and private, make it impossible in princi- astrophic financial repercussions which the ple to reopen the question as regards the French overseas territories would face if past. unduly paid charges became repayable:

Therefore, the direct effect of Article 119 cannot be relied on in order to support claims concerning pay periods prior to the 'In these circumstances, overriding consider- date of this judgment, except as regards those ations of legal certainty preclude legal workers who have already brought legal pro- situations which have exhausted all their ceedings or made an equivalent claim.' 34 effects in the past from being called in

33 — Defrenne (No 2), paragraph 70. In its judgment in Wor- 35 — This expression is also used by the Court in its judgment in ringham, however, the Court decided that 'the number of Pinna (No 1), at paragraph 28; in this regard, sec J. Bou the cases which would be affected in this instance by the louis, 'Quelques observations à propos de la sécurité direct effect of that provision' was not sufficiently relevant juridique', in Du droit international au droit de in order, in the interests of legal certainty, to limit the tem- l'intégration. Liber amicortirn Pierre Pescatore, Baden poral effect of its judgment: Worringham, paragraph 33. Baden, Nomos, 1987 (53) p. 55. 34 — Defrenne (No 2), paragraphs 74 and 75. 36 - Blaizot, paragraph 34.

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question when such calling in question employee and/or employer in respect of spe- would upset retroactively the financing sys- cific periods of service. 38 tem of the local authorities of the French overseas departments.' 37

From the legal point of view, this accruing nature of occupational pension schemes leads to a distinction between the coming into 17. Clarifying the temporal effect of the Bar- being of pension rights, namely as a result of ber judgment. It is in the light of the case- the accrual of the pension on the basis of law cited above that the passage in the Bar- completed periods of service, and those ber judgment concerning the temporal rights' becoming exercisable, namely when limitation of the effects of that judgment the pension falls to be paid f or the first time. must be read.

In financial and economic terms, the balance of such occupational pension schemes is also However, a few preliminary observations are based on a number of premises, including necessary: in considering the issues arising in data concerning pension lifetimes and the these cases it is crucial to understand how survival probabilities of men and women occupational pension schemes (contracted- (see paragraphs 34-39). out and supplementary) are built up and run. As is clear from the observations of the gov- ernments and pension schemes appearing 38 — A distinction must be made in this regard between the before the Court, most of these pension so-called fixed-contribution schemes (frequently called schemes are characterized by their accruing 'defined contribution plans' or 'money purchase schemes') and the so-called fixed-benefit schemes (also called 'defined nature. In practice, an employee accrues pen- benefit plans'). In the first-mentioned schemes the benefit consists of the capitalized sum of — and is accordingly sion entitlements on the basis of his periods dependent on — contributions periodically made in the of service with the employer concerned. For past by the members. In schemes with fixed benefits, on the other hand, the level of the benefit is fixed in advance (in that purpose, contributions (calculated on the trust deed, constitutive rules, policy conditions or other general conditions) on the basis of the number of years of the basis of actuarial factors) are periodically service, cither as a fixed amount or as a percentage of the paid to a particular pension fund by the employee's final salary. I would, incidentally, point out that the pension schemes m the Coloroll case arc of the second type and that, according to the evidence before the Court, most occupational pension schemes in Denmark, the Neth- erlands and the United Kingdom also belong to this cate- gory. As regards the aforementioned difference between occupational pension schemes, sec, inter alia. P. E. 37 — Legros, paragraph 34. For another recent temporal limita- d'Herbais, Mémento des retraités dans la C. E. E. Analyse tion imposed on account of the important financial conse- comparée des régimes de base et complémentaires des sala- quences of a judgment, this time in relation to the invalidity riés et des fonctionnaires, Paris, CERR, 1990,pp. 17-18; see of a Community regulation in the field of agricultural pol- also, together with other categorisations, G. Tamburi and P. icy (concerning, in particular, a 'clawback' levy on products Mouton, 'Problèmes de frontières entre régimes privés et which had attracted a variable slaughter premium), see the régimes publics de pensions', Revue internationale du Tra- judgment of 10 March 1992 in Joined Cases C-38/90 and vail, 1986, (163), pp. 145-146. C-151/90 Lomas [1992] ECR I-1781, paragraphs 27-30.

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18. It seems to me that in Barber, too, the be important for a proper understanding of Court recognizes, if only implicitly, the dis- what the Court means in paragraph 44 of its tinction between the accrual and the falling judgment in Barber where it holds that 'legal due of an occupational pension. The Court's situations which have exhausted all their conclusion that pension payments made effects in the past' may not be called in ques- under a contracted-out scheme constitute tion. To give that passage a literal reading, as 'consideration paid by the employer to the certain parties to the main proceedings in the worker in respect of his employment' 39 can Coloroll case (namely James Russell, Gerald

be so understood. This is because, from the Parker and Robert Sharp) do, is quite wrong. point of view of Article 119 of the EEC On a literal reading, it may indeed be Treaty, benefits paid under an occupational asserted that the effects of an occupational pension scheme are to be regarded as a form pension are only fully exhausted once the of 'deferred' pay which the worker has pension has been paid in full to the (retired) accrued in respect of his service with one or employee. Such a reading would mean that more employers during a specific period of the temporal limitation of the judgment employment. decided on by the Court would have almost no significance and that the useful effect of the limitation imposed by the Court would

largely vanish. 40 Moreover, this distinction makes it clear what the Court meant in paragraph 44 of the Barber judgment by 'the acquisition of enti- tlement to a pension as from the date of this judgment'. Since it is the service itself and, in some cases, the relevant contributions which give rise to the employee's pension rights, on the one hand, and the obligations of the Here again, the distinction between the employer and/or (the trustees of) the pen- accrual and the falling due of the pension sion fund, on the other, the Court clearly has helps to clarify matters. Since it is the service in view here periods of service after 17 May itself and, in some cases, the relevant contri-

1990. Any sex discrimination occurring in butions which give rise to the rights and this field after that date — owing, in partic- obligations of the employee and the ular to the practice of taking account of a employer (and/or of the trustees of the pen- different pensionable age in calculating con- sion scheme), it may reasonably be assumed tributions and/or benefits payable by virtue that in using the expression 'legal situations of those contributions — thus falls under the which have exhausted all their effects in the prohibition laid down by Article 119. past' the Court had in view situations in which the right to a pension had already been acquired by virtue of periods of service prior to the judgment in Barber.

The coming 19. I also consider the distinction between into being of a pension right on the basis of a the accrual of the pension (or the coming into being of pension rights) and the pen- sion's falling to be paid for the first time (or 40 — That judgments of the Court may not be interpreted in a the pension rights' becoming exercisable) to way which deprives them of their useful effect was con firmed by the Court in inter alta its judgment of 2 March 1989 in Case 359/87 Pama (No 2) [1989; ECR 585, para graph 16; sec also the Opinion of Advocate General I.cn7 in that case, in particular at pp. 605 606, paragraph 29, in which he cites case law from which it is clear that a telco 39 - Barber, paragraph 28; sec paragraph 4 above. logical interpretation of judgments of the Court is usual

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period of service in the past leads indeed to a 'In order to satisfy the principle of legal cer- legal situation whose effects are exhausted in tainty, one of the requirements of which is the sense that the worker has definitively that any factual situation should normally, in acquired the pension right relating to that the absence of any contrary provision, be period of service. examined in the light of the legal rules exist- ing at the time when that situation obtained, the second condition [the nationality requirement contained in Article 2(1)] must be interpreted as meaning that the status of

20. The reason why the Court decided to being a national of one of the Member States opt for a limitation of its judgment to the refers to the time of the employment, of the pension rights as understood above can be payment of the contributions relating to the attributed directly to the Court's expressly insurance periods and of the acquisition of stated wish not to upset retroactively the the corresponding rights.' 41 financial balance of contracted-out pension schemes. Legal certainty means in this con- nection that the extent of those rights falls to be determined on the basis of the Commu- It is not therefore the time when an applica- nity rule which applied at the time of the tion for a pension is made that is relevant for period of service on the basis of which those the purposes of Regulation No 1408/71 and rights were acquired, that is to say Article in particular for the purposes of the nation- 119 as it was interpreted before the Barber ality requirement which that regulation lays judgment. down, but the periods of employment or insurance: it is in those periods that the insurance contributions are paid and, as the Court stated in Belbouab, the corresponding rights, including the right to a statutory pen- This is by no means an innovation in Com- sion, are acquired. 42

munity law. A precedent may be cited from Community case-law on social security schemes, namely the judgment of 12 October 1978 in Belbouab. This case related to Regu- A similar application of the principle of legal lation N o 1408/71. It concerned an Algerian certainty, this time in the field of family worker who before Algeria's independence allowances, is to be found in the judgment in had possessed French nationality and had Pinna (No 1). After reaching the view that worked as a French national in France and the former version of Article 73(2) of Regu-

Germany. When he applied for a minework- lation No 1408/71 (which, in the matter of er's pension in Germany, no account was taken of the periods of insurance which he had completed in France on the ground that 41 — Judgment of 12 October 1978 in Case 10/78 Belbouab v he no longer fulfilled the requirement, laid Bundesknappschaft [1978] ECR 1915, paragraph 7, with my down in Article 2(1) of the regulation, that emphasis; sec also the judgment of 14 November 1990 in Case C-105/89 Buhan Haji [1990] ECR I-4211, paragraph he should be a national of a Member State. 17. In its Henck judgments, delivered on 14 July 1971, the Court had already held that '[t] the principle of legal cer- The Court rejected the referring court's tainty makes it necessary to refer to the state of the law in premise that the nationality requirement laid force when the provision in question was applied':

Case 12/71 [1971] ECR 743, paragraph 5; Case 13/71 [1971] down in Article 2(1) of the regulation related ECR 767, paragraph 5; and Case 14/71 [1971] ECR 779, paragraph 5. to the claimant's nationality at the time of 42 — This principle already formed the basis of the Court's case- submission of his application for a pension. It law in relation to Regulation N o 3; see in particular the judgment of 26 June 1975 in Case 6/75 Horst v

stated: Bundesknappsehaft [1975] ECR 823, paragraph 8.

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TEN' OEVER

family allowances, laid down for workers pension schemes since account must indeed active in France rules which departed from be taken of their belief that conditions as to those laid down in Article 73(1) for other pensionable age varying according to sex Member States) was invalid, the Court never- were permissible. In Barber this was recog- theless limited the temporal effect of its judg- nized by the Court in as many words: in ment. According to the Court, Overriding view of the derogations from the principle of considerations of legal certainty involving all equal treatment contained in Directive the interests at stake, public and private' pre- 79/7 and 86/378 the Member States and the cluded the calling in question of 'the pay- 'parties concerned' were 'reasonably' entitled ment of family benefits for periods prior to to consider 'that Article 119 did not apply to the delivery of this judgment'. 43 The Court pensions paid under contracted-out schemes ruled that the invalidity of the provision in and that derogations from the principle of question could not be relied upon 'in order equality between men and women were still to support claims regarding benefits for peri- permitted in that sphere'. 45 ods prior to [the date of this judgment]'. 44

21. Proposed interpretation. On the basis of the foregoing, paragraph 45 and point 5 of the operative part of the judgment in Barber, in which the Court held that Article 119 may not be relied upon in order 'to claim entitle- The fact that the good faith of the parties ment to a pension with effect from a date concerned, in particular of employers and prior to that of this judgment' (see above, occupational pension funds, is to be taken paragraph 5), must be interpreted as meaning into account means that, before Barber, that entitlement to a pension is entitlement those parties, in the belief that Article which was acquired in relation to periods of 119 was not applicable, could promise pen- service prior to the date of the Barber judg- sions and make payments based on a differ- ment. In other words, I choose the second ent pensionable age for men and women. interpretation mentioned in paragraph The financial balance of the pension schemes 10 above. concerned could therefore be maintained on that basis before the judgment. Only in respect of periods of service after Barber did employers know that in administering occu- pational pension schemes and calculating the contributions to be made to them account This interpretation sits most easily with the had to be taken of a pensionable age which good faith of employers and of occupational was the same for men and women. If no account were taken of their good faith and that of pension scheme administrators, this 43 — Puma (No 1)· paragraph 28. would entail serious financial problems for 44 - Except by employed persons who had already brought legal pension schemes. All these factors argue in proceedings or made an equivalent claim prior to the date of the judgment: judgment in Pnnina (No 1), paragraph 33. The Court took the same position in this regard in its judg mem of 13 November 1990 in Case C 99/89 Yañez-Cam poy v Bundesanstali fur Arien [1990] ECR 1 4097. para graph 18. 45 — Barber. paragraph 43.

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favour of not allowing obligations entered 23. The interpretation of the temporal limi- into and payments made before the date of tation of the effects of the Barber judgment the Barber judgment to be affected. 46 which I propose here largely coincides with that adopted in the Protocol on Article 119 annexed to the Treaty on European Union. I would, moreover, point out that if the Court should come to a different conclu- sion, its decision would be entirely super- 22.

In passing, I would point out that, in my seded as soon as the Treaty on European view, the third interpretation, in which it is Union comes into force. suggested that the falling due of the pension after 17 May 1990 should be the decisive cri- terion (irrespective of the time when the periods of service to which the pension relates were completed), cannot be enter- tained under any circumstances. I consider Article 239 of the EEC Treaty will be appli- this option undesirable not only in view of cable to the Protocol which is to be annexed the way, described above, in which pension to the EEC Treaty: as soon as the Treaty on rights accrue but also on account of the clear European Union comes into force, that Pro- unfairness to which this interpretation would tocol will become an integral part of the lead for a large number of workers: not a

EEC Treaty. In other words, it will have the single worker whose occupational pension same legal force as a provision of the Trea- became payable or was paid for the first time ty. 47 I would, however, emphasize that the before 17 May 1990 would then be able to Protocol is not intended to amend Article rely on the principle of equal pay. Situations 119 nor does it appear to call in question the which are otherwise completely the same but decisions of the Court. Indeed, the fifth

differ only in that they lead to entitlement to indent of Article B of the Treaty on Euro- payment before or after 17 May 1990 would pean Union expressly confirms that one of then be treated in a very different way. the Union's objectives is 'to maintain in full the "acquis communautaire" and build on it', that is to say the entire body of the existing Community rules as interpreted and applied by the Court. 48 Accordingly, I see in the Protocol no more than a declaratory deter- Finally, I consider that the fourth interpreta- tion goes too far.

It has no regard at all for the financial balance of occupational pension schemes, as established in good faith on the 47 — C. Vedder, 'Artikel 239', in Grabitz Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Munich, Beck, p. 2, point 5. Breach of a basis of calculation factors based on different protocol is thus equivalent to a breach of the Treaty: M. Hilf, 'Artikel 239', in Groeben-Thiesing-Ehlermann, Kom- pensionable ages for men and women. mentar zum EWG-Vertrag, IV, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1991, p. 5947, points 7 and 8. Moreover, in international law on treaties, protocols are generally regarded as constituting parts of the Treaty to which they arc annexed: Myers, 'The name and scope of Treaties', Am. J. Int.

L., 1957, (574), 587; see also the definition of 'treaty' in Article 2(l)(a) of the 46 — The Court has repeatedly taken a similar position when Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 21 May 1969: declaring invalid acts of the institutions: it is then said that, 'an international agreement concluded between States in for the sake of 'important reasons of legal certainty', the written form and governed by international law, whether declared invalidity of the act in question cannot affect the embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related validity of payments made and commitments entered into instruments and whatever its particular designation'. in implementation of that act: see the judgment in Case 34/86 Council v Parliament [1986] ECR 2155, paragraph 48 — Sec also Article C of the Treaty on European Union, which 48 and the judgment in Case C-284/90 Council v Parlia- provides that the institutional framework of the Union is to ment [1992] ECR I-2277, paragraph 37. respect and build upon the 'acquis communautaire'.

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mination of meaning adopted in relation to According to the defendants in the main Article 119 and the case-law of the Court. 49 proceedings in the Coloroll case other than Judith Broughton and Coloroll Group pic, the Court had in view in the Bilka judgment, which concerned a non-contracted-out occu- Does the ruling in Barber as well as the tem- pational pension scheme, the entire situation poral limitation provided for therein also of such pension schemes. In other words, apply to occupational pension schemes according to these parties, that judgment other than those envisaged in that judg- concerned not only the point concerning the ment? exclusion of workers who arc members of non-contracted-out occupational pension schemes, with which that case was specifi- cally concerned, but also the point relating to 24. In the Coloroll case the High Court also the commencement date of the pension asks the Court of Justice whether the tempo- under such occupational pension schemes. ral limitation on the Barber judgment also Since the point concerning the commence- extends to occupational pension schemes ment date in non-contracted-out occupa- other than 'contracted-out' occupational tional pension schemes had accordingly been pension schemes which were considered in decided in the judgment in Bilka, thus long that judgment (Question 3), in other words before the judgment in Barber was delivered, whether it also applies to supplementary or the temporal limitation imposed in the judg- non-statutory, and not just contracted-out, ment in Barber should not, in their view, be pensions. This question also arises in the applied to non-contracted-out occupational Moroni case, although the question submit- pension schemes. ted by the Arbeitsgericht Bonn primarily seeks to ascertain whether the ruling in Bar- ber, in particular on the point concerning the incompatibility with Article 119 of an age condition varying according to sex for enti- tlement to a pension (see above, at paragraph 4), is also applicable to the occupational pen- sion scheme in that case. Judith Broughton, Coloroll Group pic and the United Kingdom and, in the Moroni case, the German Government, on the other hand, have put forward the view that the 25. Both questions are interwoven and, in scope of the judgment in Bilka is indeed my view, are particularly connected with the limited to the point concerning the exclusion scope to be given to the Bilka judgment of of workers who arc members of non- 1986. I would remind the Court that in that contractcd-out occupational pension judgment it held that benefits paid under an schemes. Unlike the German Government, occupational pension scheme applicable in a however, the other three interveners consider German undertaking constitute consider- that the judgment in Barber, including the ation within the meaning of Article temporal limitation for which it provides, 119 (paragraph 3 above). with regard to the commencement date of the pension — with which that case was spe- cifically concerned — applies to all occupa tional pension schemes, both contracted-out 49 — See, in the same sense, S Prechal, B ' ommen ruimen in Maastricht'. Nederlands Juristenblad. 1992, (349), p 354 and non-contractcd-out.

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26. I agree with Judith Broughton, Colorali date of the pension — in a general way Group plc and the United Kingdom: the rul- which is applicable to all occupational pen- ing in Barber, including the temporal limita- sion schemes and that consequently the tem- tion which it lays down, is applicable to all poral limitation laid down in the judgment is occupational pension schemes, irrespective of also applicable to pension schemes other the category to which they belong. than contracted-out schemes. I find no sup- port in the operative part of the Barber judg- ment for making a distinction between contracted-out and non-contracted-out pen- sion schemes since nowhere in points 3 and 5 thereof does there appear to be a limitation to contracted-out occupational pension schemes alone. Moveover, such a distinction would, from the economic point of view, lead to arbitrary distortion between the respective pension schemes. In any event, if In my view, in Bilka the Court ruled only on in its Bilka judgment the Court had also the question whether an occupational pen- ruled on the commencement date of the pen- sion scheme of the type in question in that sion under non-contracted-out pension case (a contractual company scheme financed schemes, it would, in my view, have also lim- exclusively by the employer and established ited the temporal effect of that judgment after consultation within the company con- rather than, as is the case, giving it retroac- cerned) fell within the scope of Article tive effect to ... 8 April 1976, that is the date 119 and on the question whether the exclu- on which the Court in Defrenne (No 2) held sion of part-time workers (mainly women) Article 119 to have direct effect. 5 0 The from such a scheme constitutes discrimi- upshot of this would then be that, as regards nation contrary to that provision. The Court the commencement date of the pension, answered both questions in the affirmative. Article 119 would be applied to the scheme Only in Barber did the Court also address with retroactive effect going back more than the question of the lawfulness of an age con- 14 years, depending on whether the occupa- dition, for the commencement of the pen- tional pension scheme in question was a sion, varying according to sex under an non-contracted-out or a contracted-out occupational pension scheme (which in that scheme. The financial consequences of such case was a contracted-out scheme) (see an interpretation would be catastrophic for above, paragraph 4). Member States in which supplementary occupational pension schemes, that is to say non-contracted-out schemes, are very com- mon. This cannot have been the intention of the Court.

50 — According to its own case-law (sec paragraph 13 above), the Although that judgment concerned a Court would not in fact have the possibility of now impos- ing a temporal limitation on the effects of the Bilka judg- contracted-out occupational pension scheme, ment. For a case in which the Court declined to impose I consider that the Court dealt with the issue such a temporal limitation with regard to a previous judg- ment, sec paragraph 14 of the judgment in Barra, cited in arising in that case — the commencement footnote 25.

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Is the use of actuarial calculation factors dif- being equal, men receive a lower amount fering according to sex contrary to Article than women. 119 of the Treaty?

27. The positions of the parties. In the Neath case (Question 3(b)) and the Coloroll case 28. The Commission, on the other hand, (Question 4) the question is raised whether it takes the view that the principle of equal pay is compatible with Article 119 of the EEC for men and women must be applied individ- Treaty for the payments made under a pen- ually and not on a category basis. The fact sion scheme to be calculated on the basis of that women generally live longer than men actuarial calculation factors, in particular has no significance at all for the life expect- actuarial assumptions about the different life ancy of a specific individual and it is not expectancy of men and women, which lead acceptable for an individual to be penalized to different results for men and women. on account of assumptions which arc not certain to be true in his specific case. More- over, there are a number of risk factors which are not taken into account: risks asso- ciated with certain occupations, smoking, state of health and so on. Finally, there is no The pension funds and pension fund admin- technical necessity for pension schemes to istrators as well as most of the intervening have a distinction based on life expectancies: Member States argue that this is completely some pension schemes, and all State pension normal. They say that such actuarial calcula- schemes, use a system of risk compensation tion factors are based on reliable and objec- which covers differences in the probable tive statistical data which are related to life lifespan of men and women. 51 The Commis- expectancy after pensionable age has been sion points out that the Supreme Court of reached. Since those factors vary from sex to the United States has held that similar dis- sex — on average women live longer and crimination in pension schemes is incompat- therefore on average receive their pension ible with the Civil Rights Act 1964. From over a longer period of time than men — this the Commission concludes that, since actuarial factors are, according to their argu- different actuarial calculation factors are con- ments, essential for evaluating the liabilities trary to Article 119 of the Treaty, neither assumed by a pension scheme and conse- employers nor trustees may rely on them to quently for the financial structuring of the justify a proportionately greater reduction of entire pension scheme. Taking into account the pension of a man than that of a woman actuarial factors — which, moreover, is a upon early retirement, to justify smaller cap- generally accepted practice in (contractual) ital sums for men than for women where schemes — thus has a direct and quite legit- these are opted for, or to justify a different imate influence on the sum of rights which measure of the reduction of the pension are transferable to another scheme and on the amounts of commutation payments (that is to say, where a scheme member opts to 51 — These arguments were also advanced by lhe Commission in receive a capital sum instead of a periodic the explanatory note of 29 April 1983 on the proposal which was to lead to the adoption of Directive 86/378: pension): in the last case, other circumstances COM (83) 217 final, pp. 7 8.

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necessary in order to pay a widow's or wid- sake of clarity, I will set out those deroga- ower's pension to an entitled person. In the tions: Commission's view, the same applies to the payment of a capital sum to the trustees of another pension scheme after a worker has changed jobs, since those trustees, too, must — Article 9(c) provides that, in derogation comply with the principle of equal pay with from the prohibition laid down in the regard to that worker. Only if the capital first subparagraph of Article 6(l)(i) on sum is paid to an insurance company or setting different levels of worker contri- another third party who is a complete bution, Member States may defer the stranger to the employment relationship and application of the principle of equal treat- not therefore bound by Article 119 may that ment on this point in order 'to take undertaking or third party be exempt from a account of the different actuarial calcula- prohibition on using different life tables for tion factors', at the latest until the expiry men and women. of a 13-year period as from the notifica- tion of the directive, that is to say until 30 July 1999;

— Article 6(1 )(h) allows levels of benefit dif- fering according to sex to be set in so far 29. Community legislation and case-law. as may be necessary to take account of Before I explain my position, I will put the actuarial calculation factors which differ issue of actuarial calculation factors in their according to sex in the case of benefits Community law context. As far as Commu- designated as contribution-defined; 53 nity legislation is concerned, there is Direc- tive 86/378. In contrast to the original Com- mission proposal for a directive, which expressly prohibited the determination of — according to the second subparagraph of benefit amounts or rates of contribution by Article 6(1 )(i), levels of employer contri- taking account of 'different factors of calcu- bution differing rules according to sex lation, actuarial or otherwise, with regard to may be set in the case of benefits desig- the phenomena of ill-health, mortality or life nated as contribution-defined 5 4'with a expectancy', 52 the directive contains various view to making the amount of those ben- derogations from the implementation of the efits more nearly equal'; principle of equal treatment in occupational social security schemes, those derogations being related to the ' use of actuarial calcula- tion factors varying according to sex. For the — according to Article 6(1 )(d), except as provided for in subparagraphs (h) and (i),

52 — Article 6(l)(h)(i) of the Commission's proposal of 5 May 1983, OJ 1983 C 134, p. 7. For this approach the Commis- sion found support from inter alia the European Parlia- ment: see the report by H. Pcctcrs on behalf of the Com- 53 — The expression 'designated as contribution-defined' refers mittee on Social Affairs and Employment of 12 March to so-called fixed-contribution schemes; on this, sec above, 1984, European Parliament, Documents de seance, 1983- footnote 38. 1984, doc. 1-1502/83 (PE 87/755/dcf.), p. 10. 54 — Sec the footnote above.

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rules differing according to sex may be treatment. 56 Again, regard must be had to laid down for the reimbursement of con- the Barber judgment in which the Court, in tributions where a worker leaves a the interests of effective judicial review of scheme without having fulfilled the con- compliance with the principle of equal treat- ditions guaranteeing him a deferred right ment, 57 expressly confirmed that to long-term benefits;

— finally, Article 6(1 )(j) allows, so far as '[t] he application of the principle of equal provided for in subparagraphs (h) and (i), pay must be ensured in respect of each ele- different standards to be laid down for ment of remuneration and not only on the workers of a specified sex as regards the basis of a comprehensive assessment of the guarantee or retention of entitlement to consideration paid to workers.' 58 deferred benefits when a worker leaves a scheme.

It is precisely this passage from the judgment on which the Commission relies in order to argue that the prohibition of discrimination Community legislation therefore contains laid down in Article 119 covers all aspects of five important restrictions on the implemen- an occupational pension scheme, including tation of the principle of equal treatment actuarial calculation factors. 59 The Commis- which are related to actuarial calculation fac- sion further argues that no account has to be tors; four of them bear no temporal limita- taken of the derogations from Directive tion. 55 Some relate to contributions of either 86/378 mentioned above, since in Bilka and employees or employers, others to the pay- Barber the Court confirmed that, as far as ment of benefits or the reimbursement of the employee is concerned, Article 119 is contributions. directly applicable to the conditions of an occupational pension scheme.

56 — I can disregard the case-law which the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance have developed in staff cases 30. As yet, there is no Community case-law with regard to the taking into account of pension rights on the relationship between actuarial calcula- acquired elsewhere, in particular the actuarial countcrvalue of such rights, by members of staff of the Community insti- tion factors and the principle of equal tutions: see inter alia the judgment in Joined Cases 118 123/82 Maria Grazia Celant and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 2995; Joined Cases 75/88, 146/88 and 147/88 Bonazzi-Bertoatlliand Others v Commission [1989] ECR 3599; Case C 137/88 Schneemann and Others v Com- mission [1990] ECR 1-369. 55 — These derogations have attracted criticism írom various authors who have doubts about their compatibility with 57 — See paragraphs 33 and 34 of the judgment in Barber. Article 119 of the Treaty: sec D. Curtin, 'Occupational pen 58 — Barber, paragraph 35 and point 3 of the operative part. sion schemes and Article 119: beyond the fringe?'. Com 59 — Whether that passage must in fact be given such a wide mon Markel Law Revmc. 1987, (215), pp. 225 229; E Ellis, ranging meaning is a question which I will leave aside here, European Community Sex Equably Law; Oxford, Claren The passage cited was referring in fact to various types of don Press, 1991, pp. 56 57; A. Laurent, 'Les CE éliminent consideration granted, according to the circumstances, to des discriminations fondées sur le sexe dans les regimes men and women. The national court was asked to assess all professionnels de sécurité sociale', Revue internationale du those types of consideration in globo, a task which it was Travail, 1986. (753), pp. 759 761; S. Prêchai and N Bur hardly able to fulfil The present cases do not, however, rows. Gender discrimination law of the European Commu concern different elements of pay but the actuarial method ruly; Aldcrshot, Dartmouth, 199C, pp. 283 282. of calculating one single element of pay.

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31. The applicability in principle of the pro- 32. As far as the last point is concerned, hibition of discrimination. We are thus imme- namely the scope attributable to the prohibi- diately confronted with the question which tion of discrimination laid down in Article Community rule applies to the issues in 119, the Court has, since its judgment in the these cases — Article 119 of the Treaty or second Defrenne case, adhered to settled Directive 86/378. Drawing the dividing line case-law, which was also confirmed in Bar- between the scope of Article 119 and that of ber: Council directives designed to implement the principle of equal treatment has always been a delicate matter. Expressed succinctly, the essence of the Court's case-law is that, where a dispute can be resolved through an inter- pretation of Article 119 alone, only that pro- vision is relevant for Community law pur- poses. 60 In other words, the directives on the implementation of the principle of equal '... a distinction must be drawn within the treatment operate only in so far as they sup- whole area of application of Article plement or extend 61 the effect of Article 119; 119 between, first, direct and overt discrimi- however, they may not in any way alter or nation which may be identified solely with restrict the meaning or scope of that arti- the aid of the criteria based on equal work cle. 62 The fact that Directive 86/387, as and equal pay referred to by the article in regards the taking into account of actuarial question and, secondly, indirect and dis- calculation factors varying according to sex, guised discrimination which can only be introduces derogations from the principle of identified by reference to more explicit equal treatment (see above, paragraph 29) implementing provisions of a Community or can therefore be no reason for considering national character'. 63 that those derogations, by way of analogy, are also applicable to the principle of equal treatment laid down in Article 119. Deroga- tions from the scope of Article 119 must spring from that article itself.

Article 119 is therefore directly applicable only to forms of discrimination which are ascertainable as such by the national court 64 60 — A clear illustration of this is to be found in the judgment in with the aid of the criteria of 'equal work' Macarthys: although the national court had specifically referred to the Court questions about the scope of Direc- and 'equal pay' mentioned in that article. 65 tive 75/I17/EEC, the Court decided that the dispute could In Defrenne (No 2) the Court made it clear be entirely resolved through an interpretation of Article 119; see paragraph 17 of that judgment. that this is the case as regards discrimination 61 — For example, mention may be made of the fact that Direc- tive 86/378 has a wider scope ratione personae than Article 119 since by virtue of Article 3 of the directive it is also applicable to self-employed persons. Ratione materiae the directive applies inter alia to all occupational schemes which provide protection against the risks of sickness, 63 — Defrenne (No 2), paragraph 18. invalidity, old age, industrial accidents, occupational dis- 64 — The reference to 'judicial' identification is made for the first eases and unemployment (Article 4(a)). time in the judgment in Macarthys, paragraph 10; sec also 62 — Sec, in relation to Directive 75/111, the judgment in Jen- the judgment in Worringbam, paragraph 23, and the judg- ment in Jenkins, paragraph 17. In paragraph 38 of the judg- kins, paragraph 22; the judgment of 3 December 1987 in ment in Barber the Court refers to 'the national court'. Case 192/85 Newstead [1987] ECR 4753, paragraph 20. This was also expressly confirmed by the Court in para- 65 — Macarthys, paragraph 10; judgment in Worringbam, para- graph 11 of Barber. graph 23; judgment in Jenkins, paragraph 17.

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which a court may detect on the basis of a taking of appropriate measures at Commu- purely legal analysis, in particular forms of nity and national level.' 69 discrimination which have their origin in leg- islative provisions or in collective labour agreements, 66 and as regards discrimination in situations in which the court is in a pos- ition to establish all the facts in order to decide whether there is pay discrimination, 33. When applied to the issue of actuarial in particular in cases where men and women calculation factors, that case-law leads to the receive unequal pay for equal work per- following result. In certain cases, as in the formed in the same establishment or service, Moroni case (paragraph 7, above), unequal whether public or private. 67 treatment due to the use of different actuarial factors in the matter of benefits (in particular upon early retirement) arises from a legisla- tive provision. In other cases, as in the Neath case (paragraph 8, above) and the Coloroll case (paragraph 9, above), differences based on actuarial calculation factors arise in trans- Although, according to the Court, the full fer payments or capital sum payments as a attainment of the economic and social aims result of the contractual conditions govern- of Article 119 68 also require that all other ing the occupational pension schemes in sex discrimination is eliminated, it considers question, even under pension schemes having in this regard that more detailed Community only male members (Coloroll case, para- or national legislative provisions are neces- graph 9). sary for this purpose:

In all these cases, it is, however, possible for the national court to ascertain the existence of unequal treatment on the basis of a purely 'It is impossible not to recognize that the legal analysis: the actuarial calculation factors complete implementation of the aim pursued are contained in a statutory provision or by Article 119, by means of the elimination form part of the conditions governing an of all discrimination, direct or indirect, occupational pension scheme (contained in between men and women workers, not only the trust deed, constitutive rules or general as regards individual undertakings but also conditions) and are clearly based on nothing entire branches of industry and even of the else than the distinction between men and economic system as a whole, may in certain cases involve the elaboration of criteria whose implementation necessitates the 69 — Defrenne (No 2), paragraph 19. That the question of the scope of the direct effect of Article 119 essentially depends on the criterion whether unequal treatment can be ascer tained on the basis of a purely judicial analysis of the cir 66 — De/renne (No 2), paragraph 21. cumstances of the case and docs not depend so much on the criterion whether 'direct' or 'indirect', 'overt' or 'disguised' 67 — Defrenne (No 2), paragraphs 22-23; Mauirtbys, paragraph forms of discrimination exist is convincingly argued by 10; Worringham, paragraph 23; Jenkins, paragraph 17. Advocate General VerLoren Van Themaat in his Opinion in 68 — As regards those aims, see the judgment in Defrenne (No the Burton case. [1982] ECR 582, paragraph 2.6., with rcf 2), paragraphs 8 12. crcnce to the judgment in Jenkins.

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O P I N I O N O F MR VAN GERVEN — CASE C-109/91

women. 70 Furthermore, the discrimination at the end of the previous paragraph. I agree can be established by a court with the aid of with the United Kingdom and the Nether- the criteria of equal work and equal pay con- lands Government that the use of sex-based tained in Article 119: where the pension ben- actuarial calculation factors with a view to efit, capital sum or transfer payment which a assessing a pension scheme's financial liabili- male (or female) worker can claim is lower ties is not prohibited per se by Article 119. In than those to which a female (or male) other words, Article 119 does not interfere worker is entitled, then, in the orthodoxy of with the method of financing an occupa- the Court's case-law, there is unequal pay for tional pension scheme in so far as this does workers of one sex with regard to that of the not result in unequal pay for the workers of other sex. 71 The conclusion must therefore one sex in relation to that of the other sex. be that, where account is taken of actuarial Unlike the United Kingdom (whose view on calculation factors varying according to sex, this point differs as a matter of fact from that this constitutes, at least in so far as such fac- of the Netherlands Government), I consider, tors result in different contributions or ben- however, that if the use of such actuarial fac- efits for men and women (see below, para- tors leads to different employee contributions graph 34), unequal treatment on the ground and/or different benefits 73 — in the form of of sex, which in principle is prohibited by transfer payments, capital sums or reduced Article 119. 72 pensions upon early retirement — Article 119 is fully applicable (see above, paragraph 33).

34. Possible grounds of justification. Never- theless, the question arises whether it is pos- sible to identify an objective reason on the basis of which such unequal treatment may be justified under Community law. It is argued by various sides that such a reason is to be found in objectively determinable dif- ferences in average life expectancy between men and women. 35. I thus come to the question whether dif- ferences in average life expectancy between men and women can justify the use of sex- based actuarial factors in the calculation of employee contributions and benefits in occu- pational pension schemes. It is true that Before going into this question, I would women as a group prove to live longer than draw attention to the reservation expressed men. It is, however, equally true that not all individual men and women exhibit the

70 — On this point, see, in relation to the sex discrimination existing in the Barber case in the matter of conditions of 73 — If the pension scheme is also financed by employers' and/or access, in particular the age requirement in the Guardian State contributions, I consider that account may be taken, pension scheme rules, paragraph 47 of my Opinion in that in calculating those contributions, of sex-based actuarial case [1990] ECR I-1934-1935. factors in so far as differences resulting therefrom do not in 71 — Barber, paragraph 38. any way lead to a different burden in respect of contribu- 72 — For examples of other, more indirect discrimination in tions for male and female employees and the payments occupational pension schemes, see D. Curtin, art. at., Com- made to men and women with the help of those contribu mon Market Law Review, 1987, p. 216. tions are not discriminatory either.

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average characteristics of their sex: many average longer than men cannot, therefore, women live for a shorter time than the aver- be a sufficient reason to provide for different age man and many men live longer than the treatment in the matter of contributions and average woman. The key question, therefore, benefits under occupational pension is whether discrimination, within the mean- schemes. ing of Article 119, exists when men and women are treated, not as individuals, but as a group and unequal treatment for individual men or women arises as a result.

36. I can put those propositions in another way. The unequal treatment of men and women may be justified, and therefore not constitute unlawful discrimination, if the dif- ference in treatment is based on objective In my view, the answer must be in the affir- differences which are relevant, that is to say mative: although Article 119 — unlike its which bear an actual connection with the American counterpart, the Civil Rights Act subject of the rules entailing unequal treat- 1964, which is expressly orientated towards ment. In this regard, I could for instance equal treatment of the individual, distinct imagine that factors having a direct impact from the sex group to which the individual on the life expectancy of a specific individ- belongs 74 — prescribes in general terms the ual, such as risks associated with a particular application of the principle of equal pay for occupation, smoking, eating and drinking 'men and women', this provision also reflects habits and so forth, would be taken into the aspiration to treat the worker as an indi- account, if this is technically possible, in vidual with regard to the worker's right to order to justify individual differences in con- equal pay for equal work, and not simply as tributions and/or benefits. As regards differ- a member of one particular sex group. 75 For, ences in average life expectancy between men as the Court confirmed in its judgment in and women, the situation is different, how- Murphy, underlying Article 119 is the princi- ever. These differences bear no relation to the ple that a worker of one sex engaged in work life expectancy of a specific individual and of equal value to that of a worker of the are thus irrelevant for the calculation of the opposite sex may not be paid a lower wage contributions and/or benefits which may be than the latter on grounds of sex. 76 The ascribed to that individual. mere fact that, in general, women live on

74 — The Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination 'against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi lions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ ual's ... sex': 42 USC § 2000c-2(a)(1). 75 — See, in the same sense, D. Curtin, 'Scalping the Community legislator: occupational pensions and "Barber"', Common Market Lau Revieu, 1990, (475), p. 495. 76 — Judgment of 4 February 1988 in Case 157/86 Murphy v Bord Telecom Eireann [1988] LCR 673, paragraph 9; see 37. The assertion that, as the Danish Gov- also the Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in that case, [1988] 684, paragraph 12. ernment points out, the propositions set out

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OPINION OF MR VAN GERVEN — CASE C-109/91

above must inevitably lead to a redistribu- schemes likewise appears to me unfounded, tion between the two sexes, so that one sex at least in so far as it is assumed that the pro- de facto 'subsidizes' the pension benefits hibition laid down in Article 119 extends to received by the other sex, I do not consider all occupational pension schemes, irrespec- to be a convincing objection. In order to tive of the legal form which they take (see negate it I would refer to the judgment of also below, paragraphs 62-63). the United States Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v Manhart, in which a similar argu- ment was rejected in these words:

38. In order to justify the use of sex-based actuarial calculation factors in the determina- tion of employee contributions or pension '... when insurance risks are grouped, the benefits some parties point out that their use better risks always subsidize the poorer is necessary in order to maintain the financial risks. Healthy persons subsidize medical balance of occupational pension schemes. benefits for the less healthy; unmarried The United Kingdom above all attempts to workers subsidize the pensions of married convince the Court of the need for this. Its workers; persons who eat, drink, or smoke argument runs as follows: the fact that to excess may subsidize pension benefits for women live on average longer than men is an persons whose habits are more temperate. essential element in assessing the financial Treating different classes of risks as though liabilities of such schemes since it must be they were the same for purposes of group assumed that women will draw their pension insurance is a common practice which has during a longer period than their male col- never been considered inherently unfair. To leagues. This necessarily gives rise to unequal insure the flabby and the fit as though they costs for a scheme, depending on whether were equivalent risks may be more common men or women are involved, which inevita- than treating men and women alike; but bly has effects on the level of benefits. The nothing more than habit makes one "subsi- imposition of a unisex method for calculat- dy" seem less fair than the other.' 77 ing the funding required for the scheme would also fly in the face of reality and impair the actuary's ability to give sound advice concerning the pension scheme's lia- bilities and the appropriate level of future contributions.

The concern also expressed by the Danish Government that workers who became aware that their contributions were to some extent benefitting workers of the other sex might not wish to become members of such 39. Although, in view of recent case-law of the Court, I cannot immediately exclude the possibility that the necessity for a financial 77 — 435 US 677, in particular at p. 710; 55 L Ed 2d 657, at p. 666. balance may in some circumstances justify

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discriminatory treatment, 78 I am not con- taking into account the lifespan of the per- vinced by those arguments. I have difficulty sons entitled to pensions. There is nothing to in accepting that it would be technically nec- prevent actuaries, when determining that bal- essary to take into account actuarial factors ance, from taking account of actuarial factors differing according to sex (in particular dif- differing according to sex (see above, para- ferences in life expectancy between men and graph 34).

What is, however, required by women) in order to determine the contribu- Article 119 is that the determination of the tions and benefits to be paid, since not a sin- amount of contributions to be paid by mem- gle state pension scheme applies such a dis- bers and the amount of benefits to be paid to tinction 79 and some occupational pension the entitled employee — thus, as far as the schemes, particularly in countries where external relations of the scheme with its their use is prohibited, do not do so either. 80 members are concerned — should take place I can well understand that it is important for on the basis of the same criteria for men and a pension fund to get an accurate picture of women. the life expectancy of the scheme members so as to assess outstanding and future liabil-

ities. But this concerns only the internal actuarial methods of administration which are used by actuaries in order to ascertain the Whilst I therefore find that the necessity to funds needed in order to maintain a financial maintain the financial balance of occupa- balance between contributions and benefits, tional pension schemes does not constitute a ground of justification for discriminatory treatment of men and women as regards con- 78 — Sec, in particular, the judgment in the Equal Opportunities tributions and benefits, it does, however, Commission case, which concerned the interpretation of the derogation from the principle of equal treatment of men seem to me to be a reason to take a broad and women provided for in Article 7(l)(a) of Directive view of the temporal limitation of the pro- 79/7; judgment of 7 July 1992 in Case C 9/91 The Queen v Secretary of Slate for Sonai Security, ex parte Equal Oppor- posed interpretation. I consider that limita- tunities Commission ¡1992] ECR 1 4297, in particular para graphs 15 18.

Just recently that judgment has been con tion to be sensible and shall now devote the firmed and clarified: sec the judgment of 30 March 1993 in following paragraphs to it. Case C 328/91 Thomas [19931 ECR I 1247, in particular paragraphs 9-12. In the recent Poucet case, too, central to which was the question whether a body charged with the administration of a special social security scheme was to be regarded as an undertaking within the meaning of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, the Court laid stress on the necessity to maintain the financial balance of such a scheme: judgment of 17 February 1993 in Joined Cases C 159/91 and C 160/91 [1993] ECR I 637. in particular

paragraph 13. Mention may also be made of the judgment 40. Limitation of the temporal effect of the in the Celant case, in which the Court, with regard to the interpretation proposed in this Opinion. taking into account, in the Community pension scheme, of insurance periods completed under a national pension Should the Court decide to adopt the pos- scheme, likewise stressed the need for 'sound financial man agement' of that scheme: judgment in Celant, cited in foot ition taken in this Opinion, it would be note 56, paragraph 27. appropriate to place a temporal limitation on 79 — Sec A. Laurent, art. at., p. 760. the operation of that interpretation and to 80 — I am here thinking of the United States, where it is estab lished that the use of actuarial factors varying according to indicate as precisely as possible the modali- sex for the calculation of contributions to pension schemes ties of the proposed limitation. is contrary to the Civil Rights Act 1964 since the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Los Angeles Depart

ment of Water anil Power v Manhan, 435, U S. 702, 55 L. Ed. 2d 657. 98 S. Ct. 1370 (1978). In 1983 the Supreme Court ruled that the use of such factors in respect of benefits under such schemes was also caught by the prohi bition of discrimination Arizona Governing Commutée for Tax Deferred Anntttly and Deferred Compensation Plans v Noms. 463 U. S. 1073, 77 E. Ed. 2d 1236, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983); sec also Elonda v Long. 487 U. S. 223. 101 E. This is in fact what the I High Court seeks Ed. 2d 206. 108 S. Ct. 2354 (1988). to ascertain in the Coloroll case with its

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OPINION OF MR VAN GERVEN — CASE C-109/91

Question 4(c) wherein it is asked to what actuarial factors was not covered by the extent (in particular, in respect of which peri- Barber judgment, it suggested that, should ods) can the trustees of a pension scheme be the Court adopt the interpretation proposed required to review and recalculate determi- above, it should limit the temporal effect of nations made by reference to actuarial con- its judgment in the present case. In its obser- siderations in relation to events prior to vations in the Coloroll case, on the other 17 May 1990. hand, the Commission takes the view that the reasoning followed in the Barber judg- ment in relation to the effects in time of that judgment must also be applicable in relation to claims challenging discrimination which Nearly all the parties intervening before the appeared to be permissible on account of Court have adopted a position with regard Directive 86/378. Should the Court uphold a to the temporal effect of a judgment in which different view, the Commission suggests that the Court ex hypothesi holds Article 119 to it should invite written observations as to the be applicable to the use of actuarial calcula- most appropriate limitation in time of its tion factors varying according to sex. Their decision. positions may be summarized as follows.

41. The German Government and the United Kingdom argue that the same princi- ples must apply as in relation to the temporal effect of the Barber judgment itself. From 42. Like the aforementioned intervening this the United Kingdom deduces that bene- parties, I consider that the principles indi- fits would fall to be reviewed and recalcu- cated in Barber in relation to temporal effect, lated only in so far as they related to service as I have explained those principles above after 17 May 1990. (paragraphs 17-20), should apply. This means that, as regards the issue of actuarial calcula- tion factors, too, it seems to me that, for overriding reasons of legal certainty and in view of the good faith of market participants The Netherlands Government does not sug- and the Member States, it is necessary to gest any date but argues that current differ- limit the temporal effect of the interpretation ences in lifelong periodic benefits upon early which I advocate in this Opinion. The reason retirement or upon the conversion of part of for this is that market participants as well as a pension into a lump sum may continue to the Member States could rely on the permis- exist if accruing in respect of periods of ser- sibility under Community law of the differ- vice prior to a point in time to be determined ences in actuarial calculation applied by by the Court, or at any rate 17 May 1990. occupational pension funds, in view of the extensive derogations which Directive 86/378 (paragraph 29, above) provided for on this point in relation to the implementa- tion of the principle of equal treatment laid The Commission's position is less clear. In down by that directive. Relying on this, pen- Neath, clearly assuming that the issue of sion fund administrators determined the

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contributions to be paid by, and the benefits of its interpretation to pension entitlements to be paid to, male and female employees in which correspond to periods of service sub- respect of periods in the past by taking sequent to the date of its judgment in the account of such actuarial differences. To alter Neath and Coloroll cases. The only excep- such determinations in respect of the past tion which I consider desirable in this regard could seriously jeopardize the financial bal- concerns the situation of persons — employ- ance of pension schemes. ees or those claiming under them — who before the date of the Court's judgment have initiated legal proceedings or raised an equiv- alent claim under the applicable national law.

As regards, more specifically, the date from which the temporal limitation is to apply, I Does the payment of a widower's pension consider — unlike the United Kingdom and, fall under Article 119 of the Treaty? so it seems, the Commission in its observa- tions in the Coloroll case — that the Court may not take the Barber judgment as its ref- erence point but must take the date of the judgment in these cases. The judgment in Barber related, after all, to a different issue, 44. In the Ten Oever case the Kantonrechter namely the question whether an age con- at Utrecht asks whether 'pay' within the dition differing according to sex for entitle- meaning of Article 119 or the 'other consid- ment to an occupational pension was permis- eration' referred to in that article is to be sible under Article 119. It is only in the understood as covering the payment of non- present cases, in particular in Neath and Col- statutory benefits to surviving relations (in oroll, that the Court was asked to address that case, the payment of a widower's pen- the issue of the actuarial calculation factors sion). applied in relation to such pensions.

Mr Ten Oever, the United Kingdom and the Commission take the view that this question 43. This brings me to the following conclu- must be answered in the affirmative. The sion. In view of the derogations provided for Pension Fund and the Netherlands and Ger- in Directive 86/378, the parties concerned man Governments, on the other hand, pro- could reasonably assume that the use of pose a negative answer. actuarial factors varying according to sex, in particular for the determination of contribu- tions to be paid by, and benefits to be paid to, employees, was permissible under Article 119. In order to prevent pension schemes 45. Before giving my view, I consider it nec- built up in the past on the basis of such fac- essary to describe the precise characteristics tors from being called in question, with all of the widower's pension in question. the considerable financial repercussions According to the rules of the Pension Fund, which this would entail, it is therefore it is a pension which is awarded to the man appropriate for the Court to limit the effect to whom the female member or the former

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O P I N I O N O F MR VAN GERVEN — CASE C 109/91

female member was married at the time of 46. Is such a widower's pension a form of her death, provided that the marriage took- pay within the meaning of Article 119 of the place before the woman in question reached Treaty? According to the Netherlands Gov- the age of 65. 81 ernment, this is doubtful or at any rate unclear: on the one hand, the Barber judg- ment — which did not concern a survivor's benefit — appears to suggest that occupa- tional pension schemes are indeed covered by Article 119; on the other hand, however, benefits for surviving relatives occupy a spe- cific place in secondary Community law. The Government is referring in this regard to Article 3(2) of Directive 79/7, which expressly excludes survivors' benefits from It also appears from the observations of the equal treatment in the matter of social secu- Netherlands Government and the Pension rity, as well as to Article 9(b) of Directive Fund that the scheme concerned is an indus- 86/378, which allows the Member States to try pension scheme which was compulsorily defer the implementation of the principle of established pursuant to the Wet betreffende equal treatment with regard to survivors' verplichte Deelneming in een Bedrijfspen- pensions 'until a directive requires the prin- sioenfonds [Law concerning compulsory ciple of equal treatment in statutory social affiliation to an occupational pension fund] 82 security schemes in that regard'. This special for the entire window-cleaning and cleaning position of benefits for the surviving spouse industry. In order for it to be made compul- was, according to the Netherlands Govern- sory — which occurs through ministerial ment, also confirmed in the proposal for a order — the aforesaid Law requires that the directive completing the implementation of representative employers' and employees' the principle of equal treatment for men and organizations in an industry which has women in statutory and occupational social established a pension fund must submit an security schemes submitted by the Commis- application for this purpose. 83 The Nether- sion to the Council on 27 October 1987. 84 lands Government has explained that the Article 4 of the proposal implements the terms of the pension scheme are determined principle of equal treatment as regards sur- by collective bargaining between employers' viving spouse's benefits. 85 and employees' organizations; the scheme is funded mainly by means of an average con- tribution, which, as in the instant case (see paragraph 6 above), is paid jointly by employers and employees. Finally, amend- ments to the order rendering the scheme compulsory, the statutes and the rules of the occupational pension fund require the prior consent of the competent minister.

84 — OJ 1987 C 309, p. 10. In the fifth recital of the preamble to this proposal, express reference is made to Article 9(b) of 81 — This is what is provided by Article 2(l)(c) of the rules of Directive 86/378. the Pension Fund, which has been in force since 1 January 1989. 85 — It is to be noted that Article 4 forms part of Title I of the proposed directive, 'Survivors' benefits', in which it appears 82 — Law of 17 March 1949, Staatsblad] 121. alongside provisions intended to implement the principle of 83 — Article 3(1) of the Wet betreffende verplichte Deelneming equal treatment in the matter of orphans' benefits (Article in een Bedrijfspensioenfonds. 5) and other survivors' benefits (Article 6).

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Finally, the Netherlands G o v e r n m e n t finds Asked in the second place whether the confirmation of its view that survivors' ben- scheme rules were compatible with Council efits occupy a specific place in C o m m u n i t y Directive 7 6 / 2 0 7 / E E C , 88 the C o u r t held — law in the C o u r t ' s judgment in Newstead. with reference to Article 3(2) of Directive According to the Pension F u n d , in its judg- 79/7 and Article 9(b) of Directive ment in that case the C o u r t proceeded from 86/378 cited above (at paragraph 46) — that the assumption that a widow's pension is not none of the directives which the Council had an element of pay within the meaning of established o n the progressive implementa- Article 119. tion of the principle of equal treatment in the field of social security was applicable to sur- vivors' pensions. 89 T h e C o u r t accordingly concluded that there was n o breach of Direc-

47. I propose to consider first of all the tive 76/207 either. T h u s , according to the argument which these parties believe they C o u r t , the case fell within the exception to can derive from the judgment in Newstead. the application of the principle of equal That case concerned the question of the treatment provided for in Article 1(2) of compatibility with C o m m u n i t y law of a Directive 76/207. 90 United Kingdom occupational pension scheme (again, a contracted-out scheme) which required only male civil servants to contribute 1.5% of their gross salary to a w i d o w s ' pension fund.

Although the gross salary of male and female civil servants was the same, the relevant contributions led to a lower net salary for men. However, the con- tributions of an unmarried official such as 48. O n e should be wary of drawing too far- M r Newstead were paid back, together with reaching conclusions from that judgment. c o m p o u n d interest, if he left the civil service After all, in that case the C o u r t was address- or in the event of his death. ing itself to the question whether a difference in net salary between men and w o m e n as a result of compulsory affiliation for men to a w i d o w s ' pension fund constituted discrimi- T h e C o u r t held that Article 119, read in con- nation contrary to Article 119; the question junction with Directive 75/117, did not pre- whether a w i d o w ' s pension itself was to be clude such a scheme. 86 It reasoned that the regarded as pay within the meaning of that disparity in net salary at issue was in fact the provision was not in point as such.

However, result of the deduction of a contribution to I consider it to be of decisive importance an occupational pension scheme. Since that that in Barber the C o u r t expressly went back scheme replaced the statutory scheme, the C o u r t concluded that such a contribution ' m u s t therefore, like a contribution to a stat- 88 - Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the utory social security scheme, be considered implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men ana women as regards access to employment, vocational to fall within the scope of Article 118 of the training and promotion, and working conditions, OJ Treaty, not of Article 119.' 87 1976 L 39, p. 40. 89 - Newstead, paragraphs 25 27. 90 — Newstead. paragraph 28. Article 1(2) of this directive refers, with a view to ensuring the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment in matters of social security, to provisions which the Council, acting on a proposal from 86 — Neu stead, cited in footnote 62, paragraph 21. the Commission, is to adopt defining its substance, its 87 — Paragraph 15 of the judgment in Neustead. scope and the arrangements for its application.

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on the view it had taken in Newstead that and employee and therefore paid to surviv- the supplementary pension concerned did ing spouses in respect of the employment of not fall under Article 119 but under Article their deceased spouses, i. e., in the words of 118: in Barber the Court ruled that 'a pen- the pension scheme rules, 'female members sion paid under a contracted-out private or former female members'. occupational scheme falls within the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty.' 91

50. There remains the question whether, as the Netherlands Government and the Pen- sion Fund argue, a pension scheme such as the one under consideration is not rather like an old-age pension, as in the first Defrenne case, and therefore still falls outside the scope of Article 119. If I apply the criteria 49. In Barber the Court came to that con- developed in the judgments in Defrenne (No clusion on the basis of an analysis of the 1), Bilka and Barber (see above, paragraph 3) contracted-out occupational pension scheme to the widower's pension in the Ten Oever in question in that case which goes back to case, then I must answer that question in the the criteria developed in Defrenne (No 1) negative. First of all, it is clear that this pen- and Bilka (see paragraph 3 above) and which sion scheme, although made compulsory by I will shortly apply to the widower's pension law, is the result of collective consultations with which the Ten Oever case is concerned. within the industry concerned and is not as First of all, however, I would make this such directly established by law. Upon appli- point: it follows from the very nature of a cation by the employers' and trade union widower's pension of the kind now in ques- organizations considered to be representa- tion that the pension is not granted to the tive, which initially drew up the actual terms employee but to the employee's surviving of the pension scheme through a process of spouse. However, I do not see in that cir- collective bargaining, the State merely stipu- cumstance any convincing objection to the lates that the scheme concerned is to be application of Article 119 to such a widow- made compulsory for an entire industry. The er's pension despite the way in which the scheme is therefore primarily 'the result ... of Court defined 'pay' for the purposes of Arti- an agreement between workers and employ- cle 119 (see above, paragraph 3) — 'consider- ers'. 93 ation which the worker receives ... in respect of his employment'. The essential point is that under the rules of the Pension Fund, membership of the scheme affords entitle- ment to the widower's pension: 92 in other Furthermore, it is not disputed that the pen- words, as the United Kingdom rightly points sion scheme in question is funded exclusively out, the pension is acquired within the by employers and employees without any employment relationship between employer contributions from the State. 94

91 — Barber, paragraph 30, and point 2 of the operative part. 93 — Barber, paragraph 25. 92 — Article 2(1), first sentence, of the pension scheme rules, as 94 — The situation was the same in Barber, see paragraph 25 of applying from 1 January 1989. that judgment.

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Finally, the scheme is not compulsorily principles which I have indicated above in applicable to general categories of workers relation to the temporal effect of the Barber but only to workers employed by certain judgment. 96 As far as the reference date is undertakings, in particular workers in the concerned, I would consider appropriate not window-cleaning and cleaning industry. In the date of the Barber judgment but that of the words of the Barber judgment, it must the judgment to be given in the Ten Oever therefore be assumed that affiliation to the case, since only in that case is the Court scheme derives of necessity from the asked to rule on this issue. employment relationship with a given employer and that the scheme, even though recognized and made compulsory by the public authorities, is governed by its own rules. 95 Concretely, the view I have taken means that, contrary to what the United Kingdom in particular argues, Mr Ten Oever is indeed entitled to the widower's pension which he claims since as a person claiming under a 51. It follows that a widower's pension, such worker he took action in good time to safe- as that concerned in the Ten Oever case, falls guard his rights, namely by initiating legal within the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty. proceedings on 8 October 1990 before the Although I think that, strictly speaking, it Kantonrechter at Utrecht. was possible, even before the judgment in Barber and particularly after the judgment in Bilka, to come to this conclusion on the basis of the Court's case-law, I agree with The question whether Article 119 may be the Netherlands and German Governments relied upon by the spouse of a deceased and the United Kingdom that the Court's worker judgment must be limited in time on this point, too. Once again, given the derogation provided for in Article 9(b) of Directive 86/378 (see above, paragraph 46), the Mem- ber States and the parties concerned could assume that discrimination in occupational 52. In the Coloroll case (Question 1), and to pension schemes as regards the granting of some extent in the Ten Oever case as well, widowers' pensions was still permissible the question arises as to whether, apart from under Community law. the worker himself or herself, persons dependent on the worker, in particular the widow or widower of the worker, may also rely on the direct effect of Article 119 of the EEC Treaty with regard to claims to benefits under a pension scheme. I accordingly consider that, as regards the application of Article 119 to widowers' pen- sions, the Court must again limit its judg- ment in time in accordance with the 96 Indeed, a similar approach is proposed by the Commission in us proposal of 27 October 1987 for a Council directive mentioned above, wherein Article 13(2) provides that with respect to the application of the principle of equal treatment to benefits of the surviving spouse, the directive may not be relied upon in respect of applications submitted before the 95 Barber, paragraph 26 date of its implementation

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Five of the defendants in the main proceed- Moreover, the Court has already taken such ings in the Coloroll case (James Russell, Ger- a view in relation to the application of Direc- ald Parker, Robert Sharp, Joan Fuller and tive 79/7, in particular in the Verholen judg- Judith Broughton), the United Kingdom, ment. That case concerned inter alia the Ireland and the Commission have answered question whether the spouse of a worker this question in the affirmative. The Nether- who falls within the scope of that directive lands Government, on the other hand, argues (but who is not a party to the proceedings) that Article 119 has in view only the rela- may rely on the provisions of that directive tionship between the employer and the if he bears the effects of a discriminatory employee. Since the surviving relatives are national provision. The Court expressly rec- outside that relationship, they cannot rely ognized that independently on that provision. However, the Netherlands Government immediately goes on to point out that the practical signif- icance of this aspect of the scope ratione per- sonae of Article 119 is not very great, since 'the right to rely on the provisions of Direc- surviving relatives will usually be able to rely tive 79/7 is not confined to individuals com- on Article 119 as heirs in so far as they may ing within the scope ratione personae of the in any case be legal successors — under directive, in so far as the possibility cannot national law on succession — as regards any be ruled out that other persons may have a claims of the deceased worker against the direct interest in ensuring that the principle former employer. of non-discrimination is respected as regards persons who are protected.' 97

Although the Court admitted that the deter- mination of an individual's standing and legal interest in bringing proceedings was a matter of national law, it referred to its set- tled case-law according to which Commu- 53. I cannot accept that last view. I have nity law requires that national legislation already reached the conclusion (in paragraph should ensure effective judicial protection 51) that a widower's pension of the type in and that the application of national legisla- question in the Ten Oever case falls within tion must not render virtually impossible the the scope of Article 119 of the EEC Treaty. exercise of the rights conferred by Commu- As far as such a pension scheme is con- nity law. 98 The Court's actual answer to the cerned, but also with regard to other occupa- question raised was that an individual may tional pensions, the question whether Article rely on Directive 79/7 before a national 119 may be relied upon by the worker's sur- court if he bears the effects of a discrimina- viving spouse usually arises in practice where tory national provision regarding his spouse the worker has died and the surviving spouse who is not a party to the proceedings, subsequently claims the benefits from the pension scheme of which the worker was a member. If, as a matter of law, this spouse could not rely on Article 119, then in such a 97 — Judgment of 11 July 1991 in Joined Cases C-87/90 to situation the principle of equal pay would C-89/90 Verholen and Others v Sodale Verzekeringsbank [1991] ECR 1-3757, paragraph 23. lose its useful effect. 98 — Verholen, paragraph 24.

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provided that his spouse herself comes practical significance and the useful effect of within the scope of the directive. 99 Article 119 would be considerably reduced — and the necessary judicial protection for the operation of that article substantially impaired — if an employee or those claiming 54. Consequently, the surviving spouse may under him could rely on that provision only also rely on the direct effect of Article as against the employer. This is especially 119 with regard to claims to benefits which true of countries like the United Kingdom in the deceased worker had under an occupa- which the use of trusts for occupational pen- tional pension scheme, although, of course, sion schemes is widespread. the temporal limitations which I have pro- posed in relation to the Barber judgment and to the issue of actuarial calculation factors also apply on this point, too.

The question whether Article 119 may be 56. Moreover, I find support for this view in relied upon against the trustees of an occu- both the wording of Article 119 and the pational pension scheme case-law of the Court. As far as the wording of Article 119 is concerned, the Commission rightly points out that 'pay' includes all con- sideration which the worker receives directly 55. The question submitted to the Court in or indirectly from the employer in respect of the Coloroll case (Question 1) is a different his employment. The Court accordingly held one: it is whether employees or those claim- in Barber that the fact that contracted-out ing under them may, in relation to claims to occupational pensions are not paid to the pension benefits, also rely on the direct effect employee by the employer himself but by of Article 119 against a person other than the the trustees of a pension scheme is irrelevant employer, namely the trustees of an occupa- for the purposes of Article 119: tional pension scheme. I will first consider the main issue itself, as to whether Article 119 may be relied upon, before going on to deal with the other problems raised in the High Court's questions.

'That interpretation of Article 119 is not Most of the defendants in the main proceed- affected by the fact that the private occupa- ings in the Coloroll case (all but Judith tional scheme in question has been set up in Broughton and Coloroll Group pic), the the form of a trust and is administered by United Kingdom and the Commission take trustees who are technically independent of the view that Article 119 may be relied upon the employer, since Article 119 also applies against the trustees of a pension scheme. I to consideration received indirectly from the can only endorse their arguments: the employer.' 100

99 — Verholen, paragraph 26, and point 3 of the operative part. 100 — Barber, paragraph 29.

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Subsequently, in settled case-law since Broughton does, that the trustees might then Defrenne (No 2), the Court has confirmed be compelled to act in a way which would be that the prohibition of discrimination laid contrary to the provisions of the trust deed down in Article 119 is mandatory and and it might become impossible for them to applies erga omnes: give effect to the deed. The fundamental nature of the principle of equal pay for men and women laid down in Article 119, which constitutes an application of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex and 'The prohibition of discrimination between therefore of a fundamental right, 102 means male and female workers contained in [Arti- that any provision which is contrary to it, cle 119 of the Treaty], being mandatory, not whether contained in national legislation, only applies to the action of public authori- administrative provisions or in a contract or ties but extends also to all agreements which (trust) deed governed by private law, must be are intended to regulate paid labour collec- overridden by that rule. To take a different tively, as well as to contracts between indi- view would make it all too easy for the prin- viduals.' 101 ciple of equal treatment to be circumvented by bringing in persons who are not parties to the employment relationship.

From that case-law it follows that the Court does not limit the direct effect of Article 119 to vertical situations (State-private indi- viduals) and contractual conditions agreed collectively or individually between the employer and employees but extends it to all contracts between individuals. These undoubtedly include contractual agreements Nor do I consider that this view is contra- which an employer has made with persons, dicted by Article 6(2) of Directive 86/378, as including trustees, who are engaged in some the Netherlands Government argues. That way or other to administer the pension provision requires the management bodies of rights accruing to an employee from the supplementary or contracted-out occupa- employment relationship with that employer. tional pension schemes to take account of the principle of equal treatment where the granting of benefits is left to their discretion. I see in that provision merely a confirmation of the Community legislature's intention to 57. In my view, this carry-over effect which give effect to the principle of equal treatment Article 119 has with regard to the trustees of an occupational pension scheme cannot be resisted by arguing for example, as Judith 102 — See the judgment of 15 June 1978 in Case 149/77 Defrenne v Sabena (Defrenne (No 3» [1978] ECR 1365, paragraph 27; judgment of 20 March 1984 in Joined Cases 75/82 and 117/82 Razzouk and Reydoun v Commission [1984] ECR 1509, paragraph 16. It is precisely the fundamental nature 101 — Judgment of 27 June 1990 in Case C-33/89 Kowalska v of the principle of equal treatment in the Community legal Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [1990] ECR I -2591, para- order that has repeatedly led the Court to interprete nar- graph 12, containing a reference to the judgment in rowly the derogations from it permitted by the Commu- Defrenne (No 2), paragraph 39; on the matter of collective nity legislature: see the judgments in Case 151/84 Roberts labour agreements, sec also the judgment of 7 February [1986] ECR 703, paragraph 35, Case 152/84 Marshall 1991 in Case C-184/89 Nimz v Freie und Hansestadt [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 54, and Case 262/84 Beets- Hamburg [1991] ECR I-297, paragraph 17. Proper [1986] ECR 773, paragraph 38.

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as effectively as possible and certainly not effect will be almost entirely neutralized by any argument a contrario according to which the limitations concerning the temporal the worker or the person (or persons) claim- effect of the Court's rulings which I have ing under him could not, as regards pay dis- proposed, and in particular of the Barber crimination directly caught by Article 119, judgment itself (paragraph 21, above) as well rely on Article 119 against trustees as well. as of the judgments to be given in the Neath In any case, that directive cannot detract and Coloroll cases in which the Court is from the effect of Article 119 (see paragraph asked to rule on the question of actuarial cal- 31 above). culation factors (paragraph 43, above). The periods of service in relation to which a worker is entitled to rely on the principle of equal treatment will then be clear for all par- ties, so that in principle no more problems should arise where transfer payments are made from one pension scheme to another. 58. For the sake of clarity, I will deal with another point raised by the Netherlands Government. This Government points out the complications which, in its view, could be produced by an extension of the horizon- tal direct effect of Article 119 where a worker is a member of different occupational pension schemes in succession — usually, but not necessarily, as a result of his chang- ing his employer. This point is also touched upon by the High Court in Question 5(2) of its order for reference. In such circum- 59. The effects of Article 119 in relation to stances, it happens quite frequently (consider the action of trustees. In the event that Arti- Mr Neath's option between a deferred pen- cle 119 may also be relied upon against the sion and a transfer payment, paragraph trustees of a pension scheme, the High Court 8 above) that the most recent pension poses a number of sub-questions about the scheme, in exchange for a transfer payment, way in which the trustees or the employer has taken over the previous scheme's obliga- should act in order to give effect to the prin- tion to pay benefits. In such a case, can the ciple of equal treatment (Question l(2)(i), (ii) last pension scheme be confronted with the and (iii)). 103 Essentially, there are two ques- claims of a worker which are based on tions to be answered: they concern (i) the unequal treatment to which that worker was effect of Community law on the way in subjected under a previous pension scheme which trustees or employers are to exercise with a different employer? their powers, and (ii) the financial shaping of the equal treatment principle, in particular whether this must be put into effect by increasing the benefits granted to the disad- vantaged sex or whether it may also be put into effect by reducing the benefits granted to workers of the advantaged sex. Like the interveners who advocate the sec- ond interpretation of the temporal effect of Barber, I consider that this feared 'domino' 103 For the exact wording, see the Report for the Hearing.

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On the first point, concerning the effect of 60. The second question, concerning the Community law on the way in which trust- financial result to be achieved as far as ees and employers are to exercise their pow- employees are concerned, appears to me to ers, I can be brief. It is clear that these per- be more delicate. A number of defendants in sons are bound to do everything within their the main proceedings in Coloroll (James powers to ensure that benefits payable to Russell, Gerald Parker, Robert Sharp and workers or those claiming under them are in Joan Fuller) rightly refer in this regard to the conformity with the principle of equal treat- judgment in Defrenne (No 2). In that case, ment, having due regard for the limitations the Court, having regard to the social aim on the temporal effect of that principle pro- underlying Article 119, as reflected in Article posed above. With this in view, they can be 117, which refers to the need to promote obliged to cooperate with one another, such improved working conditions and an cooperation being, according to the High improved standard of living for workers, Court's order for reference, generally stated that 'the objection that the terms of required in order to make amendments to this article may be observed in other ways the trust deed and to the rules of the pension than by raising the lowest salaries may be set scheme. It goes without saying that this aside'. 106 However, that ground of judgment leaves a major supervisory task to be per- must be read in its context: the main pro- formed by the national court, which must ceedings concerned a claim for compensation ensure that Community law takes full effect made by Gabrielle Defrenne against her and that the legal protection which it former employer, Sabena, on account of pay requires is available, 104 and to that end — discrimination in relation to service which making full use of the discretion conferred had taken place in the previous decade. The upon it by its own national law — must Court's statement may accordingly be interpret and apply national (legislative and, regarded as only having in view discrimi- a fortiori, contractual or constitutive) provi- nation occurring in the past. The fact that, in sions in accordance with Community law or, relation to such discrimination and pending a when this does not appear to be possible, if measure eliminating it, an increase of the necessary set aside on its own authority the lowest salaries is required has been con- legislative, contractual or constitutive provi- firmed by more recent case-law: particularly sions which conflict with it. 105 since its judgment in Razzouk and Bey- doun 107 the Court has indicated that 'the only valid frame of reference' for an immedi- ate implementation of the principle of equal treatment, so long as a scheme is still not

104 — This is settled law: see, inter alia, the judgment of 19 June 1990 in Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame and Others (Factortame 106 — Defrenne (No 2), paragraph 15. (No 1)) [1990] ECR 1-2433, paragraph 19, and the judg- 107 — Razzouk and Beydoun, cited in footnote 102, paragraph ment of 19 November 1991 in Joined Cases C-6/90 and 19: sec, with regard to the criterion of the 'only valid point C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italian Republic [1991] of reference' applied in that judgment, J. Mertcns dc Wil- ECR 1-5357, paragraph 32. mars, 'Le système communautaire dc contrôle des sanc- 105 — See the judgment in Murphy, cited above in footnote 76, tions dans le domaine dc l'égalité de traitement entre hom- paragraph 11; the judgment in Nimz, cited in footnote mes et femmes', in Egalité de traitement entre les hommes 101, paragraph 19; the judgment of 9 March 1978 in Case et les femmes, Revue du Travail, April-May-June 1990, 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 21. (731), p. 735.

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adapted to that principle, is to be found in and the detailed arrangements for their the pension scheme rules in force. This implementation'. 109 means that, pending new adjusted rules, the rule applicable under the existing scheme provisions to members of the more favoured sex must also be applied to members of the less favoured sex. 108 As regards the past, or, 61. The relation between the liability of the more precisely, as regards pension benefits pension scheme and that of the employer. In which relate to periods of service performed the event that Article 119 may be relied upon in the past, the principle of equal treatment against both the employer and the trustees of therefore requires that the benefits of the a pension fund, the High Court poses a disadvantaged sex be brought up to the level number of detailed questions regarding the of those of the advantaged sex. relation between the liability of the pension fund and that of the employer (Question 1(3)), in particular where the funds of the pension scheme or of the employer are insuf- ficient (Question 1(4)).

However, in the case of benefits based on new rules adapted to the principle of equal treatment which govern periods of service in the future, the situation is different. Like the Like Judith Broughton, Colorali Group pic, Commission, I take the view that Commu- the United Kingdom and the Commission, I nity law does not preclude a reduction of consider that, as Community law stands at such benefits, so long as those benefits are present, these questions can only be dealt set at a level which is the same for men and with at the national level. Article 119 of the women. To take any other view would entail EEC Treaty lays down a directly effective undesirable Community interference in a duty under which men and women are guar- policy area which, in the present state of anteed the same pay for the same work. Nei- Community law, belongs to the sphere of ther the Treaty nor any other Community competence of the Member States, which, as legislation regulates the respective liabilities the Court has repeatedly emphasized, 'enjoy of the employer and third parties as far as a reasonable margin of discretion as regards the performance of that obligation is con- both the nature of the protective measures cerned, in particular where an occupational pension scheme or the employer is insolvent. However, here again, it is for the national court to give full effect to Community law 108 — The Court applied this criterion in particular in order to ensure application of the principle of equal treatment laid and to guarantee the necessary judicial pro- down in Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7 for as long as this tection (see paragraph 54 above). Moreover, directive is not being implemented (in full) by the national legislature: sec the judgment of 4 December 1986 in Case it is quite clear that the rules on liability 71/85 Netherlands v Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging (FNV) [19861 ECR 3855. paragraph 22; the judgment of which apply in relation to a breach of Article 24 March 1987 in Case 286/85 McDermott and Colter v 119 may not be less favourable than those Munster for Sonai Welfare and the Attorney-General [1987] ECR 1453, paragraph 18, the judgment of 24 June 1987 in Case 384/85 Borrie-Clarke v Chef Adjudication Officer [1987] ECR 2865, paragraph 12; the judgment of 13 December 1989 in Case C-102/88 Ruzins-Wilbrink v Bedrifsvereniging voor Overheidsdiensten [1989] ECR 109 — Judgment of 12 July 1984 in Case 184/83 Hofmann v 4311, paragraph 20; the judgment in Kowalska, cited in Banner Ersatzkasse [1984] ECR 3047, paragraph 27; judg- footnote 101, paragraph 20; the judgment in Nttnz, cited ment of 7 May 1991 in Case C-229/89 Commission v Bel in the same footnote, paragraph 18; and the judgment of gium [1991] ECR I-2205, paragraph 22, judgment of 11 July 1991 in Case C 31/90 Johnson v Chief Adjudica 19 November 1992 in Case C 226/91 Molenbroek [1992' tion Officer [1991] ECR 1 3723, paragraph 36. LCR I 5943, paragraph 15.

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O P I N I O N O F MR VAN GERVEN — CASE C-109/91

which apply to similar national claims or be the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty. 1 1 1The of such a nature as to make it virtually Court came to this decision on the basis of impossible, or extremely difficult, to exercise an analysis of the pension schemes in ques- rights conferred by Community law. 110 tion, from which it ascertained inter alia that they were 'wholly financed by the employer or by both the employer and the workers without any contribution being made by the public authorities in any circumstances'. 112 Article 119 and the different methods of This shows that, for the purpose of classify- funding occupational pension schemes ing benefits as 'advantages' covered by Arti- cle 119, the Court makes no distinction between benefits paid under an occupational pension scheme depending on the method of funding such a scheme, whether exclusively 62. By its Question 5(1) the High Court also on the basis of employers' contributions or seeks to ascertain whether, in the case of on the basis of both employers' and employ- pension schemes which are not funded ees' contributions. As a matter of fact, that exclusively by employers' contributions but not only benefits paid out of employers' are also funded by compulsory and/or addi- contributions are covered by Article tional voluntary employees' contributions, 119 could already be deduced from the judg- Article 119 only applies to the benefits pay- ment in Worringham, in which the Court able out of those assets of the fund which are held that an employee's contribution to a attributable to employers' contributions or contracted-out pension scheme (under which also to benefits attributable to the aforesaid only men had to make contributions) which employees' contributions. was paid by the employer to the pension fund on behalf of the employee constitutes pay within the meaning of Article 119. 113

The answer to this question is of fundamen- tal importance, although I consider it to be obvious. First of all, we must go back to the passage in the Barber judgment cited earlier In practice, such a distinction between (paragraph 4), in which the Court held that a employers' and employees' contributions pension paid under a contracted-out scheme would be ineffective in any case. Normally, constituted consideration paid by the both forms of contribution are not kept sep- employer to the worker in respect of his arate in the pension scheme's assets and are employment and consequently fell within managed as one whole fund. Yet, even if a distinction were possible, I consider it to be completely arbitrary and undesirable: schemes which are funded exclusively by 110 — This has already been expressly confirmed by the Court in employers' contributions would then have to equal treatment cases: sec, with regard to Directive 79/7, the judgment in Verhalen, cited in footnote 97, as well as the judgment of 25 July 1991 in Case C-208/90 Emmott v Minister for Social Welfare and the Attorney-General [1991] ECR I-4269, paragraph 16. See, more particularly, as far as claims for compensation arc concerned, the judg- ment in Francovich and Bonifaci, paragraph 43. The three 111 — Barber, paragraph 28; sec, too, the last sentence of para- judgments refer on this point to the judgment of graph 25: 'Accordingly, such schemes form part of the 9 November 1983 in Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle consideration offered to workers by the employer'. Finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, in 112 — Barber, paragraph 25. particular paragraph 12. 113 — Worringham, paragraph 17.

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apply the principle of equal treatment in full, Applicability of Article 119 to pension whereas it would only partly apply — schemes having members of only one sex namely not as far as employees' contribu- tions are concerned — to schemes whose funding also depends on employees' contri- butions. This would undoubtedly lead to a large number of devices designed to circum- vent Article 119 and therefore to new forms of discrimination.

64. By its sixth and last question the High Court seeks to ascertain whether Article 119 applies to schemes which have at all times had members of only one sex. More specifically, it asks whether a member of such a scheme is entitled to additional bene- fits to which that member would have been entitled as a result of Article 119 had the scheme had a member or members of the other sex.

63. In my view, largely the same reasons support the case for not allowing, as far as the application of Article 119 is concerned, any distinction according to whether com- pulsory or voluntary employees' contributions are involved. The arguments put forward by a number of interveners to the effect that 65. From the point of view of Article 119, such optional employees' contributions are this question can be answered quite simply, managed in a separate fund and that the cor- since pension schemes having members of responding benefits arc not usually calcu- only one sex generally, if not always, relate lated on the basis of the member's service to an undertaking or company division in and pay but through the determination of a which only workers of one sex are specific sum which corresponds to the value employed. In the judgment in Macarthys the of the contributions paid cannot convince Court expressly rejected the argument that a me otherwise. Here again, these are invari- female worker can rely on Article 119 in ably benefits which are paid under a order to claim the pay to which she would contracted-out or supplementary pension be entitled if she were a man, even if there scheme and so it cannot be denied that they, are or were no male employees in the under- too, form part of the consideration which an taking or service concerned who perform or employer offers to his employees in respect performed the same work (the 'hypothetical of their employment, within the meaning of male worker' criterion). The Court held that, the Barber judgment. In other words, Article under Article 119, comparisons are confined 119 is applicable to all benefits which arc to 'parallels which may be drawn on the paid under an occupational pension scheme basis of concrete appraisals of the work actu- to employees in respect of their employment. ally performed by employees of different sex

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within the same establishment or service'. 114 Matters would be different, of course, if an In other words, if only workers of one sex employer decided to propose separate pen- work in an undertaking or division of an sion schemes to his employees depending on undertaking, those workers may not rely on their sex. In that event, which, as the United Article 119 with a view to the equalization of Kingdom rightly points out, falls outside the their pay and other consideration to the level ambit of the question asked by the High of the pay and consideration which a hypo- Court, it seems to me that Article thetical worker of the other sex would 119 requires an examination to establish receive: in such a case, the criterion of equal, whether the pension benefits granted to male or at least comparable, work by workers of and female employees — this time under dif- the other sex, which is essential for the appli- ferent pension schemes — meet the 'equal cation of Article 119, cannot be applied. pay' and 'equal work' criteria laid down in Article 119.

Conclusion

66. In view of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the C o u r t should answer the questions arising in these cases as follows:

In Cases C-109/91, C-110/91, C-152/91 and C-200/91:

The direct effect of Article 119 of the Treaty may not be relied u p o n in order to claim entitlement to an occupational pension which was acquired in connection with periods of employment served prior to the date of the judgment of 17 M a y 1990 in Case C-262/88 Barber [1990] E C R 1-1889, except in the case of workers or those claiming under them w h o have before that date initiated legal proceedings or raised an equivalent claim under the applicable national law.

In Case C-109/91:

A widower's pension of the kind in question in this case is to be regarded as 'pay' within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 119 of the E E C Treaty.

114 — Macartbys, paragraph 15.

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However, Article 119 may not be relied upon in this respect in order to claim enti- tlement to such a widower's pension in so far as this pension corresponds to periods of employment served before the date of the judgment of the Court in this case, except in the case of workers or those claiming under them who have before that date initiated legal proceedings or raised an equivalent claim under the applicable national law.

In Cases C-110/91 and C-200/91:

The prohibition resulting from Article 119 of the EEC Treaty with regard to the setting of a pensionable age varying according to sex, as well as the temporal limi- tation of that rule, as prescribed in the judgment of 17 May 1990 in Case C-262/88 Barber, are not only applicable to contracted-out pension schemes but also to all other forms of occupational pension schemes.

In Cases C-152/91 and C-200/91:

Article 119 of the Treaty precludes account from being taken, in an occupational pension scheme, of actuarial calculation factors varying according to sex, at least in so far as this leads to men and women paying different contributions or receiving different benefits. The direct effect of Article 119 may not, however, be relied upon in this regard in relation to pension entitlements which correspond to periods of employment served before the date of the judgment in these cases, except in the case of workers or those claiming under them who have before that date initiated legal proceedings or raised an equivalent claim under the applicable national law.

In Case C-200/91:

(1) The surviving spouse may also rely upon the direct effect of Article 119 of the EEC Treaty with regard to entitlements to benefits which the deceased worker had under an occupational pension scheme.

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OPINION OF MR VAN GERVEN — CASE C-109/91

(2) An employee or those entitled under him may rely upon Article 119 of the Treaty against the trustees of an occupational pension scheme.

(3) The trustees of an occupational pension scheme are obliged under Article 119 of the Treaty to do everything within their powers in order to ensure that benefits to be paid to employees or those entitled under them comply with the principle of equal treatment laid down in that article.

(4) So long as Article 119 of the EEC Treaty has not been properly implemented, the pension benefits of the disadvantaged sex must be brought up to the level of those of the advantaged sex. However, Community law does not prevent new scheme rules, adapted to the principle of equal treatment, which relate to periods of service in the future, from reducing pension benefits, so long as those benefits are set at a level which is the same for men and women.

(5) As Community law stands at present, the question as to the relation between the liability of a pension scheme and that of the employer with regard to breaches of Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, particularly where the funds of one of those parties are insufficient, can be dealt with only at the national level. However, Community law requires the national rules on liability which apply in relation to breaches of Article 119 to be no less favourable than those which apply to similar national claims and that they must not be of such a nature as to make the exercise of rights conferred by Community law virtually impos- sible or extremely difficult.

(6) It is immaterial for the purposes of Article 119 of the Treaty whether an occu- pational pension scheme is funded exclusively on the basis of employers' con- tributions or also on the basis of compulsory or voluntary employees' contri- butions.

(7) Where only employees of one sex work within an undertaking or division of an undertaking and those employees are members of an occupational pension scheme having members only of that sex, those employees may not rely on Article 119 of the EEC Treaty with a view to the equalization of their pen- sions with that which an hypothetical worker of the other sex would receive.

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