C-195/91
ECLI:EU:C:1992:344
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BAYER v COMMISSION
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL GULMANN delivered on 15 September 1992 *
Mr President, lity, that is to say, that it does not exist. I Members of the Court, shall begin by examining whether the Court can and ought to address that question on the basis of the information available.
1. Bayer AG has appealed against the judg- ment in Case T-12/90 delivered by the Court of First Instance on 29 May 1991. That judg- The non-existence of the Commission deci- ment dismissed, on the ground that it had sion been brought out of time, an applica-tion by Bayer for the annulment of a decision adopted by the Commission under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty.
2. Bayer claims that:
Bayer has argued that the judgment should be set aside and that the company's submis- sions before the Court of First Instance should be upheld or, in the alternative, that (1) in adopting the decision, the Commis- the case should be referred back to the Court sion failed to comply with Article 12 of of First Instance. its own Rules of Procedure, which pro- vides that its decisions must be signed by both its President and its Executive Secre-tary (the authentication proce- dure); and
The company claimed during the oral proce- dure that the Commission decision is a nul- (2) that failure is sufficiently serious to result in the decision being treated as * Original language: Danish. non-existent.
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OPINION OF MR GULMANN — CASE C-195/91 P
Bayer bases itself on information provided 3. In its judgments of 10 March 1992 in by the Commission during the oral proce- seven of the Polypropylene cases, 2 the Court dure in the PVC cases. That information was of First Instance examined, inter alia, a num- to the effect that Article 12 of the Rules of ber of requests by the applicant undertakings Procedure had fallen into desuetude. Bayer that the oral procedure be reopened. The bases its views regarding the legal con- ostensible purpose of this was to adduce evi- sequences of that situation on the judgment dence which might show that the contested of the Court of First Instance in the PVC Commission decision suffered from defects cases, which was delivered on 27 February which, according to the legal views expressed 1992. ' At paragraphs 71 to 76 of its judg- in the PVC judgment, would result in a find- ment, the Court of First Instance stressed the ing that the decision was non-existent. The importance of authentication of the Com- Court of First Instance rejected those mission's decisions, which in its opinion requests for what are essentially identical constitutes an essential guarantee of legal cer- reasons, from which it may be profitable to tainty. The Court based its judgment on the quote: 3 finding that the decision in question had not been authenticated, and that factor was one of several by reason of which the Court, at paragraphs 84 to 96, reached the con-elusion that the Commission decision had to be regarded as non-existent and that the appli- cations in question had for that reason to be dismissed.
'Finally, the argument put forward by the applicant ... must be interpreted as asserting ... that an original of the contested Decision, authenti-cated by the signatures of the Pres- ident of the Commission and the Executive Secretary, is lacking. That allegation, if true, would not in itself entail the non-existence of the Decision. In the present case, unlike in the PVC cases, ... the applicant has not put forward any concrete evidence to suggest that any infringe-ment of the principle of the inalterability of the adopted measure took place after the adoption of the contested Decision and that the Decision thus lost, to the benefit of the applicant, the presumption By application of 29 April 1992, the Com- mission appealed against that judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the Court's legal assessment of the significance attaching to 2 — Judgments in Case T-9/89 Hüls v Commission [1992] the authentication procedure was incorrect. ECR 11-499, Case T-10/89 Hoechst y Commisàon [1992] ECRn-629, Case T-l 1/89 Shell v Commission [1992] ECRn-757, Case T-12/89 Solvay v Commission [1992] ECRII-907, Case T-13/89 ICI v Commission [1992] ECR II-1021, Case T-14/89 Monudipe v Commission [1992] ECRI1-1155 and Case T-15/89 Chemie Linz y Commission 1 — Judgment in Joined Cases T-79/89, T-84/89, T-85/89, [1992] ECR 11-1275. T-86/89, T-91/89, T-92/89, T-94/89, T-96/89, T-98/89, 3 — Quotation from paragraph 385 of the judgment of the Court T-102/89 and T-104/89 BASF and Others v Commission of First Instance in Case T-9/89 Hüls y Commission [1992] [1992]ECRn-315. ECR II-499.
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BAYER v C O M M I S S I O N
of legality arising from its apparent existence. So far as concerns those Polypropylene cases In such a case, the mere fact that there is no in which judgment was delivered before that duly authenticated original does not in itself in the PVC cases, appeals to the Court of entail the non-existenc-e of the contested Justice have been brought in two cases — measure. Therefore, in this respect too, there one by the Commission and the other by the was no reason to reopen the oral procedure undertak-ing concerned. 6 In both appeals, in order to carry out further measures of the issue of non-existence, which was not inquiry. Since the applicant's arguments dealt with in the judgments of the Court of could not justify an application for revision, First Instance, has been raised in the light of its suggestion that the oral procedure be that Court's judgment in the PVC cases. reopened should not be upheld.'
Finally, applications have been made in two of the Polypropylene cases for revision with a view to securing a declaration that the Com- Appeals to the Court of Justice have been mission decision is non-existent on grounds brought against six of those judgments on corresponding to those set out in the PVC the ground that the decision in question judgment. One of the cases involving an ought to have been declared to be non- application for revision is still pending existent. 4 It is claimed, inter alia, that the before the Court of First Instance, 7 while absence of authentica-tion is in itself such a the second was dealt with in that Court's manifest and serious fault as to justify a dec- order of 26 March 1992 dismiss-ing the laration of non-existence and that the Court application for revision. That order has now of Justice is entitled in the appeals to address been appealed to the Court of Justice. 8 that argument after having reviewed the rel- evant evidence in each case. It is submitted that an issue of non-existence can be exam- ined by any court at any stage whatever, and the judgment of the Court in Case 15/85 Consorzio Cooperative d'Abruzzo v 4. It can thus now be assumed that the Commission [1987] ECR 1005 is cited in sup- Court of Justice will have an opportunity to port of that contention. 5 rule on whether failure to comply with Arti- cle 12 of the Commission's Rules of Proce- dure constitutes a ground for non-existence and to determine the procedural require- 4 — The cases in question are C-199/92 P, C-200/92 P, C-227/92 P, C-234/92 P, C-235/92 P and C-245/92 P. ments applicable to the adjudication of that 5 — Paragraph 10 of that judgment reads as follows: issue on appeal. It is more likely than not 'With regard to the argument that the decision ... is non- existent, it is necessary to point out that under Community that these questions will be decided by the law, as under the national laws of the various Member Sutes, an administrati-ve measure, even though it may be irregular, Full Court. is presumed to be valid until it has been properly repealed or withdrawn by the institution which adopted it. If a measure is deemed to be non-existent, the rinding may be made, even after the period for instituting proceedings has expired, that the measure has not produced any legal effects. For reasons 6 — These arc respectively Case C-49/92 P Commission v of legal certainty which are evident, that classification must consequently be restricted under Community law, as under Enichem Anic and Case C-51/92 P Hercules v Commission. the national legal systems which provide for it, to measures 7 — Case T-8/89 Rev. DSM v Commission. which exhibit particu-larly serious and manifest defects.' 8 — Case C-255/92 P BASF v Commission.
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It is for that reason clear in my opinion that existence and the consequent dismissal of the the Sixth Chamber of the Court ought not in case. It might also be pointed out in that the present case, on the information avail- regard that a necessary consequence of the able, to rule in its examination of the sub- division of jurisdiction between the Court of stance on the issue of whether the decision is First Instance and the Court of Justice is that non-existent. appellants and respondents cannot rely on facts which were not raised in the proceed- ings before the Court of First Instance.
It is less clear whether the Chamber in the present case should decide not to address the submission of non-existence or whether it However, it would in my opinion be wrong ought to stay the proceedings until the pro- for the Court of Justice in the present case cedural questions to which this submission and on the information available to rule on gives rise have been resolved in one of the the particularly problematic and important appeals referred to. question of principle concerning the proce- dural requirements governing the introduc- tion on appeal of a submission of non- existence.
In my view, it might be argued that an exam- ination of the submission of non-existence would constitute, both formally and substan- tively, an amendment to the subject-matter of the proceedings, contrary to Articles I propose for those reasons that the Court 113(2) and 116(2) of the Rules of Procedure stay the proceedings in this case under Arti- of the Court of Justice, which provide that cle 82a of the Rules of Procedure. the subject-matter of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance may not be changed in the appeal.
In case the Court should rule that it cannot uphold Bayer's contention that the decision is non-existent, or if it should decide to It might be pointed out that the case before refrain from ruling on the submission of the Court of First Instance concerned an non-existence, I shall briefly examine application for the annulment of the Com- whether the Court should uphold Bayer's mission decision, whereas an examination of contention that it ought to set aside the judg- the submission of non-existence could result ment delivered against the company by the in confirmation of the decision's non- Court of First Instance.
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BAYER v COMMISSION
The appeal against the judgment dismiss- ments as to transparency of service and that ing Bayer's application the Court of First Instance failed to draw the proper conclusions from that fact.
5. The facts of the case and the pleas in law of the parties are to be found in the judg- ment appealed against and in the Report for the Hearing. Bayer attaches particular importance to the fact that the Commission chose to combine notification of the decision by way of regis- tered letter with acknowledgement of receipt (Einschreiben mit Rückschein) with dispatch of a form headed 'Acknowledgement of Receipt/Accus é de réception' to be com- I would refer to these and intend in the fol- pleted and returned with a record of the date lowing to concentrate on what in my opin- of receipt. ion constitutes the essential problem in this case, namely the legal evaluation of what Bayer considers to be a lack of transparency in the Commission's method of service.
Bayer also points out that:
A fundamental strand in Bayer's argument is that the requirement that periods within which proceedings may be brought must be strictly adhered to necessarily implies corre- spondingly stringent requirements in respect (a) previous correspondence sent by the of the service procedure. Commission in connection with the case had been addressed to the compa- ny's legal department and the front of the envelopes in question bore the words 'Einschr-ei-ben mit Rückschein' (registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt); and That is a view with which I would concur.
(b) when sending the contested decision, Moreover, the central point in Bayer's argu- the Commission had altered this proce- ment is that the method of service chosen by dure, in so far as the decision was the Commission failed to satisfy the require- addressed to the company in general
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OPINION OF MR GULMANN — CASE C-195/91 P
and the covering letter featured at its bore the words 'Einschreiben mit Empfangs- top the words 'EINSCHREIBEN MIT bestätigung', to the fact that the decision was EMPFANGSBESTÄTIGUNG' (regis- to be treated as having been served on arrival tered letter with confirmation of of the registered letter and signature of receipt), accompanied by enclosure of receipt from the postal authorities. the stan-dard form mentioned above.
O n the face of it, to preclude Bayer from Bayer's principal contention is that service requesting the Court to examine the legality was not effected in the proper manner and of a Commission decision significandy that consequently the period within which affecting the company would appear in those proceedings had to be brought did not start circumstances to be an unreasonably severe to run until 3 January 1990. In the alterna- penalty for being three days outside the tive, Bayer argues that the conditions for the time-limit. suspension of time-limits laid down in the second paragraph of Article 42 of the Statute of the Court of Justice have been satisfied and that the failure to comply with the time- limit must be treated as excusable. Even if it can be accepted in objective terms that the immediate cause of the failure to comply with the time-limit was a misunder- standing attribu-table to the method of ser- vice chosen by the Commission, the question 6. That argument strikes me as plausible. still remains as to whether that failure to The only possible explanation for the failure comply with the time-limit could have or to comply with the time-limit is that the per- ought to have been avoided, that is to say, sons responsible in the legal department whether Bayer must not itself bear responsi- were under the impression that the Commis- bility for the misunderstanding which arose sion had changed its method of service and in its legal department. that the Commission decision had not been received until 3 January 1990. They prepared for the proceedings on that basis and were undoubtedly satisfied that the action before the Court of First Instance had been brought in good time. It may, in my opinion, be There are a number of matters of potential assumed that the immediate cause of the fail- significance in that regard. ure to comply with the time-limit was the miscon-struction by the persons responsible of the method of service and that this was attributable to a misunderstanding of the sig- nificance of the form sent by the Commis- sion concerning acknowledge-ment of Importance attaches to the fact that it may receipt. It may with some justice be argued be argued (as mentioned at paragraph 20 of that the Commission ought to have drawn the judgment of the Court of First Instance) attention in the covering letter, which that:
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BAYER v COMMISSION
(a) the personal completion and return by After a full consideration of these matters, I the recipient of a form for acknowl- have come to the conclusion that the Court edgement of receipt is not an obvious of First Instance was entitled not to take into and normal method of service when a account the possibil-ity that the lack of Commission decision is sent by regis- transparency associ-ated with the Commissi- tered post; and on's chosen method of service was a contrib- utory factor in Bayer's failure to comply with the time-limit.
(b) that fact ought to have caused the per- sons dealing with the preparation of the case to examine whether this 'method of service' was the one actually chosen by the Commission. 7. I also share the views which led the Court of First Instance to refuse to lend weight to the fact that the Commission, after receiving the acknowledgement of receipt and Bayer's letter of 15 January 1990 addressed to the Commissioner responsible, did not point out to the company that the date of receipt men- tioned in its letter was incorrect. A certain, albeit limited, significance may perhaps also be attached to the fact that the persons dealing with the case in Bayer's legal department would have realized that the decision had not been received on 3 January if they had examined the envelope, from which it was reasonably obvious that the company must have received the document in the post prior to 3 January. In my opinion, there is here insufficient rea- son to address in any greater depth Bayer's argument that mistakes by company employees which are not attributable to mis- takes on the part of the company manage- ment cannot be attributed to the company as such. That argument is not supported by the case-law of the Court of Justice 9 and would in any event have unreasonable conse- Finally and most importantly, it is clear — as quences. the Court of First Instance stressed at para- graphs 33 and 34 of its judgment — that there would have been no misunderstanding in the legal department if the handling of the 9 — In support of its view, Bayer refers to the Court's judgment in Case 284/82 Bussent v Commission [1984] ECR 557. document by Bayer's mail office had not However, that case did not involve a situation in which a been marked by a number of errors of cru- mistake had been made by an employee, but rather one in which the company management had failed to make arrange- cial significance to the case. ments to ensure that company mail would be opened.
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As appears from the Report for the Hearing, assessment of the circumstances resulting in Bayer also raises a number of objections the failure to comply with the time-limit relating to the interpretation by the Court of also, in my opinion, determines matters in First Instance of the second paragraph of this regard. Bayer's argument, to the effect Article 42 of the Statute of the Court of Jus- that the failure to comply with the time-limit tice and to the meaning attached by the was excusable by virtue of the existence of Court of First Instance to the case-law of the unforeseeable circumstances or of force Court of Justice on 'excusable errors'. majeure, cannot for that reason be accepted. This also means that the failure to comply There is no basis on which Bayer's objec- with the time-limit cannot be treated as an tions in this regard can be upheld. The above instance of 'excusable error'.
Opinion
8. I p r o p o s e for t h e above reasons that the proceedings in the case should be stayed.
S h o u l d the C o u r t find that it is in a p o s i t i o n to rule o n the appellant's submission t h a t t h e j u d g m e n t dismissing its application be set aside, I p r o p o s e that the C o u r t s h o u l d dismiss t h e appeal a n d order t h e appellant to p a y the costs of the p r o c e e d - ings.
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