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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·2.2.1993

C-249/91

ECLI:EU:C:1993:40

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61991CC0249

OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-249/91

OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL LENZ delivered on 2 February 1991 *

Mr President, Naturels et Vins de Liqueurs à Appellations Members of the Court, Contrôlées (hereinafter referred to as 'CIVDN'). That committee is made up of representatives of producers, traders and the French administration.

A. Introduction

1. The action before the Court for failure to fulfil obligations is concerned with the com­ patibility with Community law of the French rules on the organization of the mar­ ket in 'vins doux naturels' (natural sweet wines). 4. CIVDN fixes, for each marketing year, a marketing credit ('crédit de commercialisa­ tion') which determines the quantity of vins doux naturels which may be marketed by producers — per hectare under cultivation 2. The rules contested by the Commission — during the twelve months following the are described in the Report for the Hearing. date on which each 'appellation' was I can therefore merely reiterate their essential released. That marketing authorization is features in this Opinion. divided into three equal tranches, the release of which is staggered. Quantities produced within the statutory maximum yield per hectare but exceeding the marketing credit may not be marketed immediately but are The French rules allocated to a strategic and ageing stock ('stock de sécurité et de vieillissement') and retained in producers' cellars. The quantities thus stored may be utilized under a market­ ing credit for a subsequent marketing year 3. The French legislation resulted in a (which, of course, presupposes that the pro­ Comité Interprofessionnel des Vins Doux ducer's harvest is less than the marketing credit laid down for that year). Quantities earmarked for export are not subtracted * Original language: German. from the marketing credit, but from the

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strategic and ageing stock. For the Decem­ The Community legislation ber 1988 to January 1990 period, however, exceptional arrangements were applied whereby those quantities were also deducted from the marketing credit until such time as the operator produced proof of exportation.

7. Council Regulation (EEC) No 822/87 5. At the same time, CIVDN lays down of 16 March 1987 on the common organiza­ price rules intended to supplement the mech­ tion of the market in wine 1 lays down rules anism described above and thereby to secure which, in principle, apply to all wines pro­ market stability. In this way, guide prices and duced in the Community. According to Arti­ minimum and maximum intervention prices cle 1 (1) of that regulation, the common are fixed for each marketing year. The prices organization of the market in wine com­ applicable to the products are agreed by con­ prises, inter alia, a price system and rules tract between producers and dealers and the governing intervention. However, the price contracting parties do not have to adhere to system set out in Title III of the regulation the guide prices laid down. However, the applies only to table wines. This is also true quantities sold in this way may not leave — with an exception to which I shall discuss producers' cellars until the contracts in ques­ later — of the rules governing intervention. tion have been registered with CIVDN and Council Regulation (EEC) No 823/87 of 16 CIVDN has issued a certificate to that effect. March 1987 laying down special provisions If the market prices resulting from the con­ relating to quality wines produced in speci­ 2 tracts registered in this way are below the fied regions, as amended by Council Regu­ 3 minimum intervention price, the release of lation (EEC) No 2043/89 of 19 June 1989, next instalment of the marketing credit will lays down a framework of Community rules be postponed. If, on the other hand, the con­ governing the production and control of the tract prices are in excess of the maximum wines in question, which is to be fleshed out intervention price, the release of the next by specific provisions adopted by the Mem­ instalment will be brought forward. ber States. Those rules provide, inter alia, that the Member States are to fix, for each of those quality wines produced in a specified region ('quality wines psr'), a yield per hect­ are, which, if exceeded, normally entails a prohibition on the use for the whole harvest of the designation claimed (as a quality wine psr) (Article 11).

6. The aforementioned decisions of CIVDN are then approved by the competent minis­ 1 — OJ 1987 L 84, p. 1. try, as a result of which they become gener­ 2 — OJ 1987 L 84, p. 59. ally binding. 3 — OJ 1989 L 202, p. 1.

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8. According to Article 2 of Regulation 9. The first paragraph of Article 18 provides No 823/87, the specific provisions applicable as follows: to quality wines psr are based on the follow­ ing factors:

'(a) demarcation of the area of production; 'Producer Member States may, taking into account fair and traditional practices:

(b) vine varieties;

— in addition to the factors listed in Arti­ cle 2, determine such other conditions of production and characteristics as shall be obligatory for quality wines psr,

(c) cultivation methods;

— in addition to the other provisions laid (d) wine-making methods; down in this Regulation, lay down any additional or more stringent characteris­ tics or conditions of production, manu­ facture and movement in respect of the quality wines psr produced in their terri­ tory.' (e) minimum natural alcoholic strength by- volume;

(f) yield per hectare; 10. Quality wines psr also include quality liqueur wines produced in specified regions ('quality liqueur wines psr'), which in France have the traditional specific name 'vins doux naturels'. Specific rules for quality liqueur wines psr were laid down by Council Regu­ (g) analysis and assessment of organoleptic lation (EEC) No 4252/88 of 21 Decem­ characteristics.' ber 1988 on the preparation and marketing

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of liqueur wines produced in the Communi- adoption or maintenance of the French pro­ ty. 4 visions at issue relating to vins doux naturels.

The matters at issue 11. Article 17 of that regulation provides as follows:

14. The Commission takes the view that the unlawful nature of the French rules may be inferred from the system of the Community 'In addition to the provisions provided for in provisions in the field of the wine market. In this Regulation, producer Member States contrast, the French Republic considers that may, taking into account fair and traditional the Community organization of the wine practices, lay down any additional or more market is not exhaustive in this respect and stringent characteristics concerning declara­ that it therefore does not preclude the intro­ tions of activity or conditions concerning duction of measures of the sort provided for production, preparation, ageing and release by the French rules in the sphere of vins to the market for quality liqueur wines psr as doux naturels. referred to in this Title and prepared within their territory.'

Forms of order sought

12. It appears from the second recital in the preamble to Regulation No 4252/88 that quality liqueur wines psr must also comply with the provisions of Regulation 15. The Commission claims that the Court No 823/87. should:

(a) declare that by 13. It is common ground that none of the relevant provisions of Community law con­ tain any express prohibition preventing the

— fixing the price of vins doux naturels 4 — OJ 1988 L 373, p. 59. on the French market,

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— fixing a marketing quota for vins doux The French Republic claims that the Court naturels beyond which a producer should: may not market wines produced within the limits of the statutory yield per hectare but must allocate them to a strategic and ageing stock, (a) declare the application unfounded;

— making withdrawals of wines from producers' cellars conditional upon (b) order the Commission to pay the costs. prior production of a document issued by the CIVDN certifying that the contract has been registered, thus making it impossible to dispose of any quantities outside the marketing credit system, and B. Opinion

— limiting exports of quality wines psr by providing that quantities in strate­ I — Admissibility gic stock may be exported only if the required amounts are available within the marketing credit of the trader con­ cerned, 1. Subject-matter of the proceedings

ló. As I have already mentioned, vins doux naturels and quality liqueur wines psr form the French Republic has failed to fulfil its part of the group of quality wines psr within obligations under Community law and in the meaning of Regulation No 823/87. particular under the provisions of Coun­ According to Article 1 (2) of Regulation cil Regulations (EEC) No 822/87 and No 823/87, the expression quality wine psr (EEC) No 823/87 concerning quality covers other products still, such as, for wines psr; and example, sparkling wines produced in speci­ fied regions.

17. The Commission's objections to the (b) order the French Republic to pay the French legislation relate — as can be clearly costs. seen from the application — solely to vins

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doux naturels, which are the subject, more­ Should the incompatibility of the French leg­ over, of its first three complaints. In contrast, islation with Community law be inferred the fourth complaint is concerned with the from an overall examination of the provi­ exportation of 'quality wines psr' and there­ sions of Community law applicable to vins fore appears at first sight to be broader. This doux naturels, it would have been appropri­ is, however, manifestly an inaccuracy — of ate to refer to all those provisions and hence completely minor importance — which also to Regulation No 4252/88 in the form of raises no doubt about the actual scope of the order sought. proceedings.

18. In the form of order sought, the Com­ mission accuses the French Republic of fail­ ing to fulfil its obligations under Commu­ nity law and in particular under Regulations Nos 822/87 and 823/87. In contrast, Regula­ tion No 4252/88 is not mentioned in the 19. A glance at the pre-litigation procedure form of order sought, although it is exten­ may help to cast light on the reason for that sively discussed in the application and in the omission. Regulation No 4252/88 was reply. This is surprising. According to the adopted on 21 December 1988 and published terms of Article 1 (1) of Regulation in the Official Journal on 31 December 1988. No 4252/88, that regulation lays down rules The first letter by which the Commission for the preparation and marketing of liqueur asked the French Government to submit wines, which also include quality liqueur observations on the question of the compat­ wines (and hence vins doux naturels). It ibility of the national rules with Community therefore might have been expected that, as it law is dated 28 December 1988. At that time, is a question of assessing the compatibility of the author of the letter was manifestly igno­ the French legislation, it would have been rant of the existence of Regulation the provisions of that regulation which No 4252/88. Likewise, in the Commission's would have been examined first and above amplifying letter dated 24 May 1989, that all, and that the result of that examination regulation is not even mentioned. The first would have been reflected in the form of reference to Regulation No 4252/88 is con­ order sought by the Commission. The Com­ tained in a memorandum of 1 June 1989 mission's representative rightly indicated at intended to be forwarded to the Commis­ the hearing that the provisions applicable sion, by which the French Government to vins doux naturels constituted a 'web' answered the Commission's first letter. By of provisions set out in Regulations an oversight of the French authorities, that Nos 822/87, 823/87 and 4252/88. The Com­ letter was not forwarded to the Commission mission infers the illegality of the French until 29 June 1990, that is to say, after the rules from an overall assessment of those Commission had delivered its reasoned opin­ provisions, as is shown by the fact that it ion under the first paragraph of Article 169 does not refer in the form of order sought to of the EEC Treaty (on 19 June 1990). That specific provisions but — quite generally — delay may perhaps also explain the Commis­ to Regulations Nos 822/87 and 823/87. sion's further failure to tackle the issue in

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that opinion from the point of view of Reg­ provisions of Community law applicable to ulation No 4252/88. It is nevertheless curi­ vins doux naturels raised in the application. ous that more than a year and a half after the Moreover, the defendant understood the adoption of that regulation, the competent application in that way. 5At the hearing, the departments did not yet seem to have Commission's representative submitted that become aware of its existence. the heads of claim should be interpreted as covering a declaration that the French legis­ lation was contrary to Community law in the light of Regulation No 4252/88. In view of those circumstances, it seems to me to be justified to understand the form of order sought in the way that both of the parties have understood it. It is not therefore a new claim, but an objective interpretation, conso­ 20. What consequences should be drawn nant with the interests at stake, of the heads from the fact that the form of order sought of claim in the light of the application. 6 by the Commission seeks merely a declara­ tion that Regulations Nos 822/87 and 823/87 have been infringed, but not that Regulation No 4252/88 has been infringed? From a strictly formal point of view, it might be considered that the subject-matter of the proceedings is defined exhaustively by the form of order sought in the application, and that hence the Commission is not entitled to rely on Regulation No 4252/88 in order to argue that the French legislation is contrary to Community law. That would have serious consequences for the Commission's argu­ ment, since, in so far as it refers to the con­ 22. Since the Commission tackled the ques­ text and the common aims of the relevant tion of Regulation No 4252/88 for the first provisions, it would have to refrain from time in the application, the question might taking a substantial part of the said rules into obviously be raised as whether there was no account. due pre-litigation procedure in this respect. As the Court has consistently held, an appli­ cation brought under Article 169 of the EEC

5 — In its defence (p. 3), the defendant summarized the subject- matter of the proceedings as follows: 'The Commission of the European Communities questions the compatibility with the common organization of the market in wine, as laid down by Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 822/87, 823/87 and 4252/88, of certain aspects of the French legislation on natural sweet wines.' 21. Nevertheless, in my view, the decisive 6 — This case can be distinguished in this respect from the facts point is that it appears unequivocally from of, for example, the judgment in Case C-110/89 Commission v Greece [1991] ECR I-2659. In that case, the Commission the application, taken as a whole, that the had, it is true, criticized the defendant's conduct, but had at Commission is asking the Court to assess the no time intimated that it wished the Court to make a decla­ ration to that effect (cf. in that connection my Opinion in French legislation, having regard to all the that case, [1991] ECR 1-2675, at 1-2676).

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Treaty 'can be based only on the arguments No 4252/88 within the framework of the and submissions set forth in the reasoned provisions which it examined in this case, opinion'. 7 The Court may consider that without basing new submissions on that reg­ ground of inadmissibility of its own motion, ulation. Account should also be taken of the without its being necessary for the defendant fact that Regulation No 4252/88 is designed, itself to have entered an objection. However, through the content of its provisions, to in my view, this does not mean that the supplement Regulations Nos 822/87 and Court is bound to consider that question of 823/87. 10 its own motion in every infringement pro­ ceedings. I consider that the ideas expressed by Mr Advocate General Gulmann in Case 8 C-61/90 on this issue are worthy of atten­ tion. In his Opinion, the Advocate General stated that the Court's case-law as to the requirements for the pre-litigation procedure 2. Rules on exports was based on a concern to protect the rights of the Member States, and that the Member States' interests were sufficiently safeguarded by the fact that they may raise an objection 9 of inadmissibility.

24. The exceptional rules criticized by the Commission have been in force only for a limited period. In answer to a question put by the Court, the French Republic stated that the rules at issue had been applied since December 1988. 11It is common ground as 23. It seems to me, however, that it is not between the parties that those rules were necessary in this case to consider that ques­ applied only until 10 January 1990. tion in greater detail for another reason still: in its application, the Commission has not, in comparison to the reasoned opinion, made different complaints against the defendant concerning infringements of Community law or founded its arguments on a new legal basis. The Commission continues, as before, to argue that the unlawfulness of the French 25. As the Court has held, an action brought rules results from the context and system of under Article 169 is for a declaration that the the provisions of Community law. The Commission simply inserted Regulation 10 — Cf. the second recital in the preamble to Regulation No 4252/88 which, referring to Regulation No 822/87, states as follows: 'those rules should be supplemented by adopting corresponding provisions for all liqueur wines pro­ 7 — See. for example, the judgment in Case C-347/8S Commis- duced in the Community' (my emphasis). sion v Greece [1990] ECR I-4747, paragraph 16. 11 — In its letter of 29 October 1992, the French Republic stated 8 — Opinion in Case C-61/90 Commission v Greece [1992] ECR that the exceptional rules had been in force since 14 Decem­ I-2426, at 2428 et scq. ber 1988. However, it appears from the minutes of the ple­ 9 — Nevertheless, in its judgment in that case, the Court did not nary assembly of the CIVDN of 16 December 1988, follow that Opinion, but confirmed its consistent case-law appended to that letter as Annex 3, that those rules had cited above (judgment in Case C-61/90 Commission V been applied since as long ago as 2 December 1988 ('... à Greece [1992] ECR I-2407, paragraph 29). compter du 2 décembre').

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Member State concerned 'has failed to fulfil contrast, if the infringement was terminated its obligations under the Treaty and that it before that time, an action for failure to fulfil has failed to put an end to that infringement obligations is in principle inadmissible. within the time set by the Commission in its 12 reasoned opinion'. The question whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations must be examined on the basis of the posi­ tion in which the Member State found itself at the end of the period laid down in the rea­ 13 soned opinion.

16 28. As I have already stated elsewhere, exceptions to that rule must be allowed. Since the pre-litigation procedure inevitably takes some time, it would otherwise be scarcely possible for the Commission to pro­ ceed, for example, against infringements of 26. Since the pre-litigation procedure seeks the Treaty which are limited in terms of to eliminate the infringement of the Treaty time. 17 Of course, the Commission should before court proceedings are commenced, conclude the procedure rapidly in such cases there is in principle no place for an action so as not to stand accused of having caused under Article 169 for a declaration that the delays which cannot be attributed to the par­ Treaty has been infringed, if the infringement ticular circumstances of the case at issue. 18

had already ceased on the expiry of the 14 period laid down in the reasoned opinion. In this case, the application of the rules at issue ceased in January 1992, that is to say, several months before the reasoned opinion was dispatched on 19 June 1990.

29. In this case, the Commission asked the French Government as early as 28 Decem­ ber 1988 (that is to say, shortly after the entry into force of the export rules) to sub­ mit its observations, and set a two-month 27. As the Court has consistently held, there time-limit to that end. In its second letter is still an interest in pursuing the action under Article 169, even where the default has been remedied after the time-limit prescribed 15 in the reasoned opinion has expired. In 16 — See my Opinions in Case 362/90 Commission v Italy, cited in footnote 14, and in Case 240/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 1843, at 1844. 17 — See the facts in Case C-110/89 Commission v Greece, cited in footnote 6. 12 — Judgment in Case C-347/88 Commission v Greece (cited in 18 — See the judgment in Case C-362/90 Commission v Italy footnote 7), at paragraph 40. [1992] ECR 1-2353, paragraph 12: 'It should be stated, 13 — Judgment in Case C-200/88 Commission v Greece [1990] moreover, that the Commission did not act in good time in ECR I-4299, paragraph 13. order to prevent, by means of procedures available to it, the infringement complained of from producing effects and did 14 — Cf. my Opinion in Case C-362/90 Commission v Italy not even invoke the existence of circumstances preventing it [1992] ECR 1-2359, at 1-2361. from concluding the pre-litigation procedure laid down in 15 — Cf., for example, the judgment in Case C-29/90 Commis- Article 169 of the Treaty before the infringement ceased to sion v Greece [1992] ECR 1-1971, paragraph 12. exist'.

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before action of 24 May 1989 (which, admit­ II — The substance tedly, related only to the third complaint), the French Government was given one month to reply. Owing to an oversight, to which I have already adverted, on the part of the French administration, the Commission received no reply to those two letters. Nevertheless, the Commission did not 1. The French rules deliver its reasoned opinion until 19 June 1990, that is to say, just under a year after the expiry of the deadline laid down in the last letter and several months after the contested export system came to an end. The Commission has not put forward any cir­ 32. The first three complaints which should cumstances capable of explaining that delay. be examined in this connection relate to the I therefore consider that the conditions in fixing of prices (first complaint) and to the which an action for failure to fulfil obliga­ marketing quotas for vins doux naturels (sec­ tions might in such cases nevertheless be ond complaint). The rules at issue in the held to be admissible by way of exception third complaint, under which the release of are not fulfilled. wine from producers' cellars is subject to the prior production of a certificate from CIVDN attesting to the fact that the con­ tracts have been registered, serve to imple­ ment and control the system of marketing quotas. They therefore stand and fall with the rules criticized in the second complaint. Accordingly, I shall concentrate on the first two complaints and discuss, for simplicity's 30. The French Republic has not expressly sake, the price rules and the quantitative claimed that the application is inadmissible. mechanism, respectively. The Court may nevertheless verify of its own motion whether the conditions for an application for failure to fulfil obligations 19 under Article 169 were present.

2. Permissibility of the national provisions in the context of a common organization of the market

31. Consequently, to that extent the applica­ tion should be dismissed as inadmissible. 33. The question of the permissibility of national provisions in an area which is sub­ ject to a common organization of the market 19 — Sec the judgment in Case C-362/90 Commission v Italy (cited in footnote 18), at paragraph 8. has already exercised the Court on many

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occasions. In the Amsterdam Bulb case, the the Court referred to the aforementioned Court held as follows: case-law before reasoning as follows:

'From the moment when the Community adopts regulations under Article 40 of the Treaty establishing a common organization of the market in a specific sector the Member 'With a view to applying that statement in States are under a duty not to take any meas­ the case of the Pigs Marketing Scheme it ure which might create exemptions from should be borne in mind that the common 20 them or affect them adversely.' organization of the market in pigmeat, like the other common organizations, is based on the concept of an open market to which every producer has free access and the func­ tioning of which is regulated solely by the instruments provided for by that organiza- tion.

34. The Court has confirmed that case-law 2 on several occasions. 1According to that case-law, it is necessary to determine the content of the Community legislation and then to ascertain, on that basis, whether the national rules are in conformity with that legislation.

Hence any provisions or national practices which might alter the pattern of imports or exports or influence the formation of market prices by preventing producers from buying and selling freely within the State in which 35. Admittedly, there are forms of words in they are established, or in any other Member the case-law which suggest that certain State, in conditions laid down by Commu­ national measures may be incompatible per nity rules and from taking advantage directly se with the existence of a common organiza­ of intervention measures or any other meas­ tion of the market. In Pigs Marketing Board, ures for regulating the market laid down by the common organization are incompatible with the principles of such organization of 22 the market.' 20 — Judgment in Case 50/76 Amsterdam Bulb v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1977] ECR 137, paragraph 8. 21 — Cf. the judgments in Case 111/76 Officier van Justitie v Van den Hazel [1977] ECR 901, paragraph 13, in Case 177/78 Pigs and Bacon Commission v McCarren [1979] ECR 2161, paragraph 14, and in Case 237/82 Jongeneel Kaas v Nether- 22 — Judgment in Case 83/78 Pigs Marketing Board v Redmond lands [1984] ECR 483, paragraph 12. [1978] ECR 2347, paragraphs 56, 57 and 58, my emphasis.

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36. That case-law could be understood as of the Community — in this case that of the meaning that, in the field of each of the com­ free movement of goods — unless they are mon market organizations —• irrespective of justified by reasons recognized by Commun­ 23 their actual form —, the Member States are ity law.' under a duty to refrain from any price-fixing measure.

38. In the judgment given shortly afterwards 37. In its judgment of 23 February 1988 in in the Zoni case, the Court referred to that Case 216/84 Commission v France, the Court judgment and held that had to rule, in proceedings brought against France by the Commission for failure to ful­ fil obligations, on the compatibility with Article 30 of a ban on the sale of milk substi­ tutes. The French Government argued that the contested rules were consistent with the provisions governing the common organiza­ 'once the Community has established a com­ tion of the market in milk products. The mon organization in a particular sector, the Court held in that regard as follows: Member States must refrain from taking any unilateral measure even if that measure is likely to support the common policy of the 24 Community'.

'It appears from the established case-law of the Court that once the Community has established a common market organization in a particular sector, the Member States must refrain from taking any unilateral 39. In my opinion, it would not be correct, measure which consequently falls within the however, to infer from those judgments that, competence of the Community. It is there­ in the field of common organizations of the fore for the Community and not a Member 25 markets, unilateral measures by the Mem­ State to seek a solution to this problem in ber States would unquestionably have to be the context of the common agricultural pol­ icy.

23 — Judgment in Case 216/84 Commission v France [1988] ECR 793, paragraphs 18 and 19. 24 — Judgment in Case 90/86 Crtmmal proceedings against Zoni [1988] ECR 4285, paragraph 26. See likewise the judgment delivered on the same day in Case 407/85 3 Glocken and Another v USL Centro and Another [1988] ECR 4233, paragraph 26, and the judgment in Case C-86/89 Italy v Commission [1990] ECR I-3891, paragraph 19. In this connection, it must be added that, 25 — It goes without saying that the Member States may act if even if they support a common policy of the and in so far as powers have been conferred on them to that Community, national measures may not con­ end in provisions laying down a common organization of the market in the sector in question (sec the judgment in flict with one of the fundamental principles Case 89/84 Ramel [1985] ECR 1385, paragraph 25).

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unlawful. On the contrary, national rules and provisions on the common organization of measures can be regarded as unlawful only if the market can, in my view, be found in — and in so far as — the provisions on a some relatively recent judgments of the common organization of the market are Court. In its judgment of 30 May 1991 in exhaustive, which leaves no room for Case C-110/89 Commission v Greece, for national provisions. That interpretation is example, the Court held that: supported by the second subparagraph of Article 40 (3) of the EEC Treaty, according to which a common organization of a market must be limited to pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 39. This shows that the powers of the Community legislator in this field are not unlimited and that, in this field, 'in sectors covered by a common organiza­ the Member States indeed retain the power tion of the market, and a fortiori when that to legislate. organization is based, as in the present case, on a common price system, Member States can no longer take action through unilateral measures affecting the machinery of price- formation as established under the common 27 organization'.

40. The Court's judgments which I have just cited do not, in my view, preclude that inter­ pretation. In its judgment in the Pigs Mar- keting Board case, the Court referred 41. The considerations set out by the Court expressly to 'conditions laid down by Com­ in its judgment of 18 September 1986 in munity rules' and to 'measures for regulating Case 48/85 Commission v Germany are to the market laid down by the common organ­ 26 the same effect; that judgment has particular ization'. Likewise, the wording in relevance to this case, since it is concerned Case 216/84 Commission v France, according with the common organization of the market to which Member States must refrain from in wine. With regard to the powers of the taking any unilateral measure in the sphere Member State, the Court stated as follows: of a common market organization 'which consequently falls within the competence of the Community', may be understood as referring to the powers conferred on the Community by provisions establishing the common organization of the market (and to the mere fact that a common organization of the market has been established). A confir­ 'Their legislative competence can only be mation of the view that it is still necessary to residual; it is limited to situations which are examine the lawfulness of the national rules in the light of their compatibility with the 27 — Judgment cited in footnote 6, at paragraph 21; see also the judgment in Case C-35/88 Commission v Greece [1990] ECR 1-3125, paragraph 29, and the judgment in Case C-61/90 Commission v Greece, cited in footnote 9 above, at 26 — Judgment cited in footnote 22, at paragraph 58. paragraph 22.

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not governed by the Community rules and labelling'. In the judgment in Ramel, the to cases where those rules expressly give Court confirmed that view and held as fol­ 28 them power to act'. lows:

42. It should therefore be examined whether 'Therefore, subject to any special Commun­ the common organization of the market in ity provision to the contrary, the Member wine can be regarded as a complete system, States no longer have any powers in that 3 thus precluding the legality of the French field'. 0 rules.

3. The common organization of the market in 44. However, the French Government cor­ wine rectly points out that those cases were con­ cerned with the rules applicable to table wines, whereas vins doux naturels are quality wines. It is therefore doubful whether it is possible to infer from those judgments that the Court also intended to rule therein on the rules applicable to quality wines. The judgment of 18 September 1986 in (a) Case-law of the Court Case 48/85 Commission v Germany, cited 31 above, is particularly interesting in that regard. Those infringement proceedings were concerned with German rules not permitting the addition of rectified concentrated grape must in the production of local wines and quality wines psr. The Commission argued 43. In its judgment in Frantl, the Court held that this constituted an infringement of the 32 that the Community legislation on the com­ provisions of Regulation No 337/79 (the mon organization of the market in wine immediate predecessor of Regulation could be regarded as forming a 'complete No 822/87) and of one provision of system', 'especially as regards prices and intervention, trade with non-member coun­ tries, rules on production and oenological 29 — Judgment in Case 16/83 Frantl [1984] ECR 1299, paragraph practices and as regards requirements relat­ 14. ing to the designation of wines and 30 — Judgment cited in footnote 25, at paragraph 25. Cf. also in this connection the judgment in Case 48/85, cited in foot­ note 28, at paragraph 11. 31 — Cited in footnote 28. 32 — Council Regulation (EEC) No 337/79 of 5 February 1979 28 — Judgment in Case 48/85 Commission v Germany [1986] on the common organization of the market in wine, ECR 2549, paragraph 12. OJ1979 L 54, p. 1.

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Regulation No 338/79 33(the predecessor of with the question as to whether a Member Regulation No 823/87). In that context, the State may introduce price rules or a quanti­ Court held as follows: tative system for a product such as vin doux naturel. However, it cannot be inferred sim­ ply from the fact that the law is silent that the Member States are debarred from adopt­ 35 ing measures in this field. In any event, the compatibility of the national rules with the 'According to Article 1, Regulation Community regulations must be considered No 337/79 establishes a common organiza­ in the light not only of the express provi­ tion of the market in wine comprising a price sions of the regulations but also of their aims 36 and intervention system ... and rules con­ and objectives. As can be inferred from the 34 cerning ... release to the market.' judgment in Van den Hazel, the background to the adoption of the relevant rules may 37 also be material in this context. In that case, the Court referred to a communication from the Commission to the Council in which the Commission justified the absence 45. Consequently, Regulation No 338/79 of intervention measures from its proposal was not mentioned in that context. In my for a regulation on the organization of the view, therefore, clear conclusions cannot be market in poultrymeat by the consideration drawn from that judgment for the purposes that intervention on the market was not of the matter at issue in this case. The ques­ 'desirable', which prompted the Court to tion whether the Community provisions in draw the following conclusion: the wine sector preclude the introduction or maintenance by a Member State of price rules or a quantitative system can therefore be resolved only by interpreting the relevant provisions.

(b) Interpretation of the Community provi­ sions

'It may be inferred from those consider­ ations that the absence of measures concern­ ing the withdrawal, where necessary, of products from the market does not stem 46. None of the Community rules which should now be considered expressly deal

35 — Judgment in Jongeneel Kaas v Netherlands, cited in foot­ note 21, at paragraph 13; judgment in Case 148/85 Direction Générale aes Impôts v Forest [1986] ECR 3449, paragraph 33 — Council Regulation (EEC) No 338/79 of 5 February 1979 14. laying down special provisions relating to quality wines 36 — Judgment in Amsterdam Bulb, cited in footnote 20, at para­ produced in specified regions, OJ 1979 L 54, p. 48. graph 9. 34 — Cited in footnote 28, at paragraph 11. 37 — Judgment cited in footnote 21, at paragraphs 14, 15 and 16.

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from an omission or from an intention to No 823/87 submitted to the Council on 17 leave measures of this nature to the appraisal December 1987, the Commission even stated of the Member States but is rather the con­ that Regulation No 823/87 included provi­ sequence of a considered choice of economic sions the purpose of which was to 'guide' policy of relying essentially on market forces Member States in drawing up national rules 39 to attain the desired balance.' on quality wines psr. It would therefore seem that overly wide conclusions cannot be drawn from a comparison between the con­ tent of Article 1 of Regulation No 822/87 and that of Title III of that regulation.

(aa) Systematic interpretation

48. The same is true, in my view, of the statement in the twenty-first recital in the 47. According to Article 1 of Regulation preamble to Regulation No 823/87 to the No 822/87, the common organization of the effect that quality wines psr have to be sepa­ market in wine comprises, inter alia, a price rately entered in the harvest and stock de­ system and rules governing intervention. clarations (provided for in Regulation According to Article 1 (2), the common mar­ No 822/87) 'as they are not covered by the ket organization applies to, among other measures to stabilize the market'. The only things, quality wines psr and hence also to conclusion which may be drawn from that vins doux naturels. It follows from the spe­ statement is that quality wines psr are not (in cific provisions of Title III that the price principle) covered by Title III of Regulation rules laid down in the regulation apply only No 822/87. to table wines and that the rules governing intervention (with one exception, which I shall be considering shortly) also apply only to table wines. Regulations Nos 823/87 and 4252/88 do not lay down any specific rules in that regard. Consequently, the sys­ tem of those provisions suggests that the 49. The statement in the fourth recital in the application of the price and intervention preamble to Regulation No 822/87 is more rules ought in principle to be confined in fact significant: to the sphere of table wines. However, it should be observed that, in the field of qual­ ity wines psr, the legislator merely laid down a framework of rules intended to be fleshed 38 out by the Member States. In its proposal for a regulation amending Regulation 'Whereas the aim of the common agricultural policy is to attain the objectives set out in

38 — Sec in this connection the third recital in the preamble to Regulation No 823/87 and the Opinion of Mr Advocate General Gulmann in Case C-47/90 Delhaize et Le Lion [1992] ECR I-3687, at 3694. 39 — COM (87) 642 final, OJ 1988 C 14, p. 8. at p. 9.

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Article 39 of the Treaty and, in particular in especially in wine growing is bound to con­ the wine sector, to stabilize markets and tribute to the improvement of conditions on ensure a fair standard of living for the agri­ the market and, as (a) result, to an increase in 41 cultural community concerned; whereas outlets'. these objectives may be attained by adjusting resources to needs, in particular through the pursuit of a policy of quality.'

52. If those recitals are considered together, 50. That aim is cast in more concrete form it appears that the Community legislator by the preamble to Regulation No 823/87, in intended that the Community should be so far as the provisions of that regulation are empowered to intervene in the wine sector designed in order to attain its aims by 'adjusting resources to needs'. It is also clear that a quality of promoting quality was to consti­ tute the starting point.

'to maintain a minimum quality standard for quality wines psr, to avoid an uncontrollable extension of the production of such wines and to harmonize the provisions of the Member States so as to establish conditions 40 of fair competition in the Community'. 53. The Community provisions applicable to quality wines psr and to liqueur wines put that approach into effect. Those provisions aim at promoting the quality of the products which they cover. The factors to be taken into consideration in that respect are set out 51. In the next recital, it is further stated that in Article 2 of Regulation No 823/87 and 42 specified in that regulation. In the case of quality liqueur wines psr, account should also be taken of the specific provisions of Regulation No 4252/88. Manifestly, the pol­ icy on the promotion of quality pursued by

'the development of a policy of encouraging quality production in agriculture and 41 — Fourth recital in the preamble to Regulation No 823/87. 42 — In this Opinion it is unnecessary to go into the other pro­ visions of that regulation, which seek only indirectly to protect the quality of those wines, in particular the provi­ sions on authorized designations for the products in ques­ 40 — Third recital in the preamble to Regulation No 823/87. tion.

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those provisions actually brings about an 55. Those rules are justified as follows in the 'improvement of conditions on the mar­ fifteenth recital in the preamble to Regula­ ket'. It should be observed in this regard tion No 823/87: that the two regulations provide simply for 44 minimum quality characteristics. The Member States are therefore free to lay down even stricter quality requirements and thereby further to reinforce the beneficial effects of the policy of promoting quality on 45 'in order to maintain the quality standard of the wine market. the wines in question and to avoid excessive yields liable to disrupt the market-, Member States should fix a maximum yield per hect­ 46 are for each quality wine psr'.

56. This shows that the legislator was not 54. The wording of the fourth recital in the exercised simply by a concern to promote preamble to Regulation No 823/87, which quality, but that it intended at the same time refers to 'contributing' to the policy of pro­ to make a means of regulating the market moting quality with a view to attaining the available. objectives of the regulation, suggests that the Community has still other means available to it. That is in fact the case. According to Art­ icle 11 of Regulation No 823/87, Member States have to fix a maximum yield per hect­ are for each quality wine psr. In the case of vins doux naturels, this is supplemented by 57. Likewise, the provisions governing the the second indent of Article 13 (2) of Regu­ fixing of the maximum yield per hectare lation No 4252/88, which provides that the leave a broad discretion to the Member 47 description 'vin doux naturel' is to be States. According to the third subpara­ reserved for quality liqueur wines psr graph of Article 11 (1) of Regulation obtained within the limit of a yield per hect­ No 823/87, the yield per hectare may be are of 40 hectolitres of grape must. fixed at different levels for the same quality wine psr depending on the sub-region, local administrative area, or part thereof, and the vine variety or varieties from which the 43 — See the fourth recital in the preamble to Regulation No 823/87. grapes are derived. In addition, the maxi­ 44 — Sec the third recital in the preamble to Regulation mum yield per hectare may be adjusted by No 823/87 ('in order to maintain a minimum quality stan­ dard for quality wines psr ...') and the fifth recital in the preamble to Regulation No 4252/88 ('provision should accordingly be made for their minimum characteristics'). 45 — Apart from manifold individual provisions, reference should be made in this context simply to Article 18 of 46 — My emphasis. Regulation No 823/87 and to Article 17 of Regulation 47 — Those provisions are the subject of a request for a prelimi­ No 4252/88, which autho..zethe Member States to lay nary ruling in Case 289/91 Kuhn, in which Mr Advocate down additional or more stringent 'production' conditions. General Gulmann is shortly to deliver an Opinion.

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the Member State concerned (fourth sub­ 60. The requirements of the first indent of paragraph of Article 11 (1)). Here again, the first paragraph of Article 18 are not sat­ therefore, the Member States may, by laying isfied, since the French rules manifestly do down more stringent rules (in this context, a not relate to 'such conditions of production lower maximum yield per hectare), influence and characteristics as shall be obligatory for the market by adjusting supply to suit quality wines psr'. demand.

58. In view of that situation and of the pos­ 61. Neither can the French rules be based on sibilities conferred on the Member States by Article 17 of Regulation No 4252/88. Admit­ Regulations Nos 823/87 and 4252/88, I con­ tedly, the French Government has argued sider that the Member States are not entitled that what was involved in this case was rules to introduce in this sphere in addition price on 'ageing' within the meaning of that provi­ rules and a quantitative mechanism of the sion. However, the Commission has rightly type at issue, if they have not been expressly observed that producers may at any time sell empowered to do so by the Community leg­ quantities in 'strategic and ageing stocks', islator. provided that they have a commensurate marketing credit (which does not depend on the age of the wine). In addition, those quan­ tities may be sold abroad at any time. It is therefore clearly not a condition relating to the ageing of the products concerned.

59. Such a power could at most arise from Article 18 of Regulation No 823/87 or from Article 17 of Regulation No 4252/88. To be precise, it is a question as to whether the rules at issue can be based on the first indent of the first paragraph of Article 18 of Regu­ lation No 823/87 or on Article 17 of Regula­ 62. The answer to the question whether the 48 tion No 4252/88. French rules may be regarded as laying down 'additional or more stringent charac­ teristics' concerning 'release to the market' is 48 — According to the fifth indent of the second subparagraph of not quite as straightforward. It must be con­ Article 1 (1) of Regulation No 823/87 (as amended By Reg­ ceded to the French Government that those ulation No 2043/89), the second indent of the first para­ graph of Article 18 does not apply to quality liqueur wines rules (namely the price rules and the quanti­ psr (and other categories of quality wines) for which spe­ cific Community provisions exist. However, it should be tative mechanism contested in the first com­ observed that the second indent of the first paragraph of plaint), whose beginnings go back to 1943, Article 18 of Regulation No 823/87 and Article 17 of Reg­ ulation No 4252/88 are very similar. were probably laid down 'taking into

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account fair and traditional practices'. It may rules on the 'marketing' ('commercialisa­ also be assumed that they are not contrary to tion') of liqueur wines. the Treaty provisions on the free movement 49 of goods between Member States.

64. However, in my view it is the aim pur­ sued by the Community provisions in authorizing Member States to adopt addi­ tional or more stringent rules which is decisive. It is clear from the preambles to Regulation No 823/87 and Regulation No 4252/88 that that aim is to preserve the 63. The Commission's argument that the special qualitative features of the products in provisions at issue are not rules on 'circula­ question: tion' (namely, movement) but marketing ('commercialisation') provisions does not appear particularly cogent to me. There is, admittedly, a temptation to assume that the legislator had in mind provisions of the sort set out in Title V of Regulation No 822/87 ('Rules concerning free circulation and release to the market'), such as for example provisions on accompanying documents nec­ essary in order for the products in question 'Whereas, in order to preserve the special to be released to the market (cf. Article 71 of qualitative features of quality liqueur wines Regulation No 822/87) and not, for instance, psr, Member States should be allowed to price rules or a quantitative mechanism. apply additional or more stringent rules gov­ Consideration of the wording of the various erning the production, preparation, ageing language versions of the provisions shows, and circulation of quality liqueur wines psr, however, that in some cases very different forms of words have been used and, in addi­ tion, that Article 1 of Regulation No 4252/88 50 — In the French version — as has ¡ust been indicated itself states that that regulation lays down — Article 1 of Regulation No 4252/88 refers to 'commer­ cialisation', whereas the fourteenth recital in the preamble states that the Member States may adopt rules governing 'circulation' and Article 17 accordingly also refers to rules on 'circulation'. This is also true of the Dutch version, where the words used arc 'afzet' (Article 1) and 'verkeer' 49 — In its judgment in Case C-47/90 Delhaize et Le Lion [1992] (fourteenth recital and Article 17), and of the Italian ver­ ECR I-3669, paragraph 26, the Court had to consider sion, which uses the term 'commercializzazione' in Arti­ whether the rules at issue (which stipulated that wine had cle 1, but employs 'circolazione' in the fourteenth recital to be bottled in the region of production) could be based and in Article 17. The English version differs, in that the on Article 18 of Regulation No 823/87. It held as follows: word 'marketing' is used in Article 1, the word 'circulation' 'Toutefois, l'article 18 du règlement no 823/87 ne saurait in the fourteenth recital and the expression 'release to the être interprété come autorisant les États membres à imposer market' in Anicie 17. As for the German version, it is par­ des conditions qui seraient contraires aux règles du traité ticularly unclear, since the word 'Vermarktung' is used both relatives à la circulation de marchandises (However, in Article 1 and in the fourteenth recital, whereas Article 17 Article 18 of Regulation No 823/87 cannot be interpreted as refers to 'Inverkehrbringen'. Examination of the corre­ authorizing Member States to impose conditions contrary sponding provisions of Regulation No 823/87 yields a sim­ to the Treaty rules on the movement of goods). ilar result.

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account being taking of traditional practic­ Regulation No 823/87 and the relevant es'. national implementing measures. At the same time, the price rules affect producers' right freely to negotiate prices for their products. The French rules are therefore contrary to the principle of an open market — which also applies in the sphere of the common organization of the market in wine — 'to which every producer has free access and the 65. The French rules are intended to stabi­ functioning of which is regulated solely by lize the markets by seeking to obviate a the instruments provided for by that organi­ 52 sharp fall in prices during the marketing zation'. year. As the French Government has stated, in the final analysis those rules are calculated to protect the existing structure of the pro­ duction of vins doux naturels. It appears to me that these are completely legitimate con­ cerns, which fall within the aims of the com­ mon agricultural policy set out in Article 39 of the Treaty. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the French rules are not requirements designed to preserve the quality of the prod­ ucts concerned. Consequently, the French rules cannot be based on Article 17 of Regu­ lation No 4252/88. 67. The objections which the French Gov­ ernment bases on the nature of the price rules and quantitative mechanism which it has introduced do not affect that conclusion. Thus, the Government argues that the price rules should not be regarded as systematic market intervention, since producers and 66. The Commission has rightly observed traders are free to agree prices below the that the price rules and quantitative mecha­ minimum price or above the maximum price. nism at issue result, or may result, in its In addition, the French Government main­ being impossible to market products pre­ tains that contracts concluded at the begin­ pared within the limits of the maximum ning of the marketing year account for a yield per hectare laid down in Article 11 of considerable fraction of the marketing credit for that year. Those circumstances do not alter the fact that producers may initially uti­ lize only the first part of their marketing 51 — Fourteenth recital in the preamble to Regulation No 4252/88. The German version erroneously refers to quality wines psr, whereas, regard being had to the context and to the wording of the other language versions, it should of course refer to quality liqueur wines psr. The same wording appears with regard to the same point in the 52 — See the Court's judgment in Pigs Marketing Board v Red- (French and German versions of) the twenty-second recital mond, cited in footnote 22, at paragraphs 56 and 57, and the in the preamble to Regulation No 823/87 ('afin de con­ Opinion of Mr Advocate General Gulmann in Case server le caractère qualitatif particulier ...'/'zur Erhaltung C-47/90, cited in footnote 36 above, at 3696 et seq. Cf. also des besonderen qualitativen Charakters...', rendered in the the third recital in the preamble to Regulation No 4252/88, English version as 'in order to preserve the particular qual­ according to which that regulation is intended to enable ity characteristics ...'). 'free circulation of such products to be facilitated'.

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credit and that the release of subsequent (bb) Historical background parts may be delayed, which is liable to have a substantial effect on price formation.

70. The argument which I have just devel­ oped, to the effect that the provisions on the common organization of the market in wine 68. The French Government has also argued — inter alia with regard to quality wines —· that a conflict between the maximum yield constitute a complete system which pre­ per hectare and the yield provided for by the cludes national price rules and quantitative marketing credit could arise only if the mechanisms, is also confirmed by Article 51 quantity of vin doux naturel eligible for mar­ of Regulation No 822/87 and by the histori­ keting under the marketing credit were in cal background to the Community-law pro­ excess of the quantity produced within the visions. Article 51 (1) provides as follows: limits of the maximum yield per hectare. I shall simply state with regard to this that it is precisely in a case such as the one at issue that an infringement of the principle of the open market occurs, namely when a Member State prohibits producers from marketing part of the wine which they have lawfully prepared.

'To the extent necessary to support the mar­ ket in table wines, intervention measures may be taken in respect of the products listed in Article 1 (2) (b) other than table wine.'

69. The French Government has also sug­ gested that producers were voluntarily sub­ ject to the price rules and quantitative mech­ anism applicable to vins doux naturels and that they are at liberty to decide to produce table wines, which are not covered by those 71. According to Article 51 (2), such meas­ rules. I would simply observe in that regard ures are to be taken by the Council acting by that producers' freedom to elect to prepare a qualified majority on a proposal from the quality wines may not be impaired by Commission. The products covered by that national requirements which are incompat­ provision, for which intervention meas­ ible with the provisions of Community law ures may be taken, also include quality wines applicable in that sector. psr and hence vins doux naturels.

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72. The fact that provision is made for inter­ details are set out in the Report for the Hear­ vention measures for those products to the ing. To my mind, it appears from the Com­ necessary extent on the market in table mission's description that the legislator wines, whereas no comparable power is pro­ deliberately refrained (apart from the excep­ vided for in case such intervention should tion set out in Article 51 of Regulation prove necessary to support the market in No 822/87) from laying down a price or quality wines psr themselves, in itself sug­ intervention system for quality wines psr. gests that, in the legislator's intention, inter­ The fact that the version of Article 55 of vention measures should be permitted only Regulation No 822/87 currently applicable exceptionally in the field of quality wines provides merely for intervention measures psr. The Commission has rightly observed in (and not for a price or trading system) is this connection that that provision originates probably attributable to the idea that, for the in Article 19 of the proposal for a regulation purposes of Article 51 — maintaining bal­ on the common organization of the market ance on the market in table wine —, the pos­ in wine, submitted by the Commission to sibility of taking intervention measures in 53 the Council on 24 June 1967. That provi­ the sector of quality wines psr is enough. sion reads as follows:

'In the event that a price system or interven­ tion measures or a trading system should prove necessary for products referred to in Article 1 (2) other than table wine, additional provisions may be adopted in accordance 74. In addition to the legislative materials with the procedure referred to in Article 43 mentioned by the Commission, another — (2) of the Treaty' (unofficial translation). more recent — document seems in my view to be relevant, in so far as it confirms that the legislator did not intend to lay down in the field of quality wines psr provisions ana­ logous to those contained in Title III of Reg­ ulation No 822/87, but relied on a policy of improving quality. The document in ques­ tion is the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Commission's pro­ 73. In reply to a question from the Court, posal for a Council regulation amending the Commission provided particulars in its Regulation No 823/87. 54 Referring to the document of 26 October 1992 of what hap­ fact that the production of quality wines psr pened to that provision during the subse­ had reached a high level following the quent course of the legislative procedure; the

54 — This proposal resulted in Regulation No 2043/83 amending 53 — Journal Officiel No 201 of 21 August 1967, p. 13. Regulation No 823/87 (see footnote 3).

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enlargement of the Community, the Com­ with the provisions on the common organ­ mittee stated as follows: ization of the market in the wine, and that the Commission's application should be upheld in this respect.

'Given that:

76. I would add, however, that it has not been easy for me to reach this conclusion. Among other things, I was perplexed by the fact that the rules at issue were in force for — it seems neither possible nor opportune to many years without prompting the Commis­ consider a formal organization of the sion to contest them. Moreover, one might market in quality wines psr, and have expected that the Commission — at least in connection with the travaux préparatoires for Regulation No 4252/88 — would have become aware of those rules and that that question would have been dealt with in the regulation itself. Neither is it — there is a certain saturation of the market, possible to ignore that, in the final analysis, the rules on the conditions needed to the French rules pursue objectives which encourage the production of original and might be regarded as being compatible with quality wines should be tightened up.' 55 the aims of the common agricultural policy set out in Article 39 of the Treaty. Likewise, to my mind, some weight should be given to the French Government's reference to the importance of the rules at issue to the pro­ ducers (generally relatively small holdings) and to the region concerned.

4. Conclusion

77. However, the French Government has not shown that it was essential to retain the 75. In view of the foregoing considerations, rules at issue in order to attain those objec­ I take the view that the French price rules tives. Account should be taken in that con­ and quantitative mechanism are incompatible nection of the fact that, according to the actual submission of the French Government at the hearing, the rules at issue at present 55 — OJ 1988 C 208, p. 18 (my emphasis). apply to only two of the ten most important

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'appellations'. With regard more specifi­ Article 34, which is to be regarded as form­ cally to the argument that, in view of the ing an integral part of the common organiza­ 57 strength of large purchasers on the market, tion of the market. However, as the Court producers of vins doux naturels should be has repeatedly held, Article 34 concerns given a measure of protection, I am not con­ national measures vinced that the rules at issue are necessary to that end. It appears to me to be definitely possible for producers to offset purchasers' strength, if only by virtue of the provisions of competition law and of the possibility to grouping together, while complying with 'which have as their specific object or effect those provisions, in order to effect sales the restriction of patterns of exports and jointly. thereby the establishment of a difference in treatment between the domestic trade of a Member State and its export trade, in such a way as to provide a special advantage for national production or for the domestic mar­ 58 ket of the State in question'.

5. The export rules

80. In this case, the export rules at issue cer­ tainly constitute a measure which impedes exports. The fact that exports represent only an extremely small fraction of the produc­ 78. As I have already mentioned, I consider tion of vins doux naturels and the French that the part of the application relating to the Government's objection that it is not diffi­ export rules should be dismissed as inadmis­ cult to obtain the requisite certificates does sible. In case the Court should disagree, I not alter this. Neither does the French Gov­ shall consider whether those rules are com­ ernment's argument that a major part of patible with the provisions of Community exports is carried out by traders who are not law. affected by the rules.

81. However, in my view the decisive point 79. It might be possible in particular to con­ is that the rules in question do not put sider the possibility of an infringement of

57 — Cf. the judgment in Pigs Marketing Board v Redmond, cited in footnote 22, at paragraph 55. 56 — However, according to the particulars provided by the 58 — Judgment in Jongeneel Kaas v Netherlands, cited in foot­ French Government's agent, those two 'appellations' are the note 21, at paragraph 22; judgment in Case C-47/9D Del- most important ones from the quantitative point of view. baize et le Lion [1992] ECR 1-3669, at paragraph 12.

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exports at a disadvantage vis-à-vis domestic sions should suffer the same fate. As I have sales. On the contrary, they merely have the already held that the price rules and the effect of applying to exports the rules apply­ quantitative mechanism are not compatible ing to marketing on the domestic market. with Community law, this is also true of the 60 Consequently, those rules do not constitute export rules. in my view a measure having effect equi­ valent to a quantitative restriction on exports 59 within the meaning of Article 34.

III — Costs

82. To my mind, that question is not of great importance in any case. In so far as they sub­ ject exports to the same rules as are applica­ 83. The decision on costs depends on Arti­ ble to domestic sales, the contested provi­ cle 69 (3) of the Court's Rules of Procedure.

C. Conclusion

84. I therefore propose that the Court should

(1) Declare that by

— fixing the price of vins doux naturels on the French market,

59 — The same is true, as far as exports to non-member countries 60 — In any event, those rules cannot be justified by the need to are concerned, of a possible infringement of Article 60 (2) ensure fair trade. In so far as the French Government states (b) of Regulation No 822/87. that it was a question of checking transactions whereby quantities exported were reimported into France by way of customs fraud, it is sufficient to observe that it is easy to deal with such abuses by adjusting the customs rules in an appropriate manner.

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— fixing a marketing quota for vins doux naturels beyond which a producer may not market wines produced within the limits of the statutory yield per hectare but must allocate them to a strategic and ageing stock,

— making withdrawals of wines from producers' cellars conditional upon prior production of a document issued by the CIVDN certifying that the contract has been registered, thus making it impossible to dispose of any quantities outside the marketing credit system,

the French Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Community law and in particular under the provisions of Council Regulations Nos 822/87 and 823/87 concerning quality wines produced in specified regions;

(2) Dismiss the remainder of the application as inadmissible;

(3) Order the French Republic to pay three-quarters of the costs and the Com­ mission to pay a quarter.

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