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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·29.9.1993

C-315/92

ECLI:EU:C:1993:823

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61992CC0315

VERBAND SOZIALER WETTBEWERB v CLINIQUE LABORATORIES AND ESTEE LAUDER

OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL GULMANN delivered on 29 September 1993 *

Mr President, 'Linique' 'in view of the case-law on Members of the Court, Paragraph 3 of the UWG (ban on mis­ leading information)';

1. The Landgericht Berlin has referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling a question on the interpretation of Article 30 of the EEC Treaty. That question has arisen in proceed­ — the defendant subsidiaries now wish to ings between a German association which market the products in Germany under has standing to bring legal proceedings with the name 'Clinique' since 'because of that a view to securing the enforcement of the difference of name, difficulties arise with German Law against Unfair Competition supplies to Germany from other coun­ (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb) tries and from Germany to other coun­ ('UWG') and the French and German sub­ tries' and 'the packaging and advertising sidiaries of the United States company Estée costs occasioned by the different names Lauder. are considerable';

2. The following facts emerge from the order making the reference: — relying on Paragraph 3 of the UWG and Paragraph 27 (1) (1) of the German Law on Foodstuffs and Consumer Items (Lcbensmittel-und Bedarfsgegens- tandegesetz) ('LMBG'), which prohibits, — Estéé Lauder produces a wide range of inter alia, the provision of misleading cosmetic products which are marketed information to consumers, the plaintiff under the name 'Clinique'; claims that the defendants should be ordered not to sell their products under the name Clinique;

— at the time when the products were launched in Europe at the beginning of the 1970s, Estéé Lauder decided to mar­ ket them in Germany under the name

— the defendants have argued that a ban would make it impossible for them to * Original language: Danish. import cosmetics manufactured under the

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Clinique name in England or Belgium of a national provision on unfair competition and that such a ban would be contrary to under which the importation and marketing Article 30 of the EEC Treaty; of a cosmetic product which has been law­ fully manufactured and/or lawfully marketed in another European country may be pro­ hibited on the ground that consumers would be misled by the product name — Clinique — the national court takes the view that 'the — in that they would take it to be a medici­ claims in the application are pertinent nal product, where that product is lawfully since it is possible that an appreciable marketed without any objection under that proportion of the sector of the market name in other countries of the European concerned might attribute prophylactic Community?' or curative medical effects on the skin to the Clinique range of cosmetics';

4. Paragraph 3 of the UWG provides that 'Injunction proceedings may be brought — the national court takes the view that it against anyone who, in the course of trade may be necessary for 'evidence thereof ... and for purposes of competition, provides to be obtained by a market research sur­ misleading information on, in particular, ..., vey commissioned by the court' and that with a view to securing an end to the dis­ 'if it were to be confirmed that some 10 semination of the information in question'. to 20% of consumers would be misled, it would be necessary to ban the use of the name Clinique';

Paragraph 27 of the LMBG provides that 'It is forbidden to sell cosmetic products under — the abovementioned measure to deter­ a misleading name or on the basis of mis­ mine whether consumers would be mis­ leading information ... Information is mis­ led would be redundant if, as contended leading in particular: (1) if effects are attrib­ by the defendants, a ban would be con­ uted to the cosmetic products which ... are trary to Community law. supported by insufficient scientific evi­ dence ...'.

3. It was against that background that the Landgericht Berlin referred the following 5. The plaintiff in the main proceedings question for a preliminary ruling: argues that marketing of the products under the name Clinique would be contrary to those two provisions in so far as that name could mislead consumers into thinking that the products had medicinal effects. It points 'Are Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty to out that in German there is a similarity in be interpreted as precluding the application sound between the words 'Clinique' and

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'Klinik' and that the word 'Klinik' in Ger­ regarded as unjustifiably attributing medici­ man unquestionably means a hospital. 1 nal properties to products. 3

6. It may be noted that the provisions relied on by the plaintiff in the main proceedings are general clauses, which means that the 8. The question referred concerns the inter­ specific content of the provisions has to be pretation of Article 30 of the EEC Treaty on determined by case-law. On the basis of the the prohibition of restrictions on intra- UWG, which dates from 1909, there has Community trade and the significance of arisen in Germany 'within the parameters of that provision for the application to a spe­ the general clauses contained in Paragraphs 1 cific case of the prohibition of misleading and 3 of the UWG, in an interplay between information laid down in the German legis­ case-law and legal writing, a closely woven lation. fabric of intersecting case situations which at least to some extent provide consumers, undertakings and society on the whole with legal certainty and leads to foreseeability in 2 matters relating to competition'.

9. While the Court cannot, in proceedings for a preliminary ruling, take a position on how a national court should decide a par­ ticular case, it can provide that court with all 7. It is undoubtedly correct that judicial appropriate material on the interpretation of decisions in Germany have — in contrast to Community law to enable it to determine, the position in most of the other Member when giving its decision, whether the States — contributed to the imposition of a national provisions are compatible with relatively strict standard with regard to what Community law. constitutes misleading information and that this can be said to have secured a relatively high level of protection for the interests of consumers and others which the legislation is designed to protect. This applies not least in the context of information which may be

In order to give the national court the most 1 — The plaintiff in the main proceedings refers in its written appropriate answer, the Court can link the observations to the definition of the word 'Klinik' in the Brockhaus Encyclopedia, 17th edition, and claims that 'in interpretation of Article 30 of the EEC German the word "Klinik" is understood as referring to Treaty closely to the specific facts of the case cither a public or private hospital; the word "Krankenhaus" is normally used to refer to ordinary hospitals, whereas before the national court. "Klinik" generally refers to a university hospital, that is to say, a hospital of a particularly high standard . 2 — Dr H. Piper, President of the Bundesgerichtshof, 'Zu den Auswirkungen des EG-Binnenmarktes auf das deutsche Recht gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb', Wettbewerb m 3 — The German Government has given an account of this case- Recht und Praxis, 11/92, p. 685. law in its observations (sec Part III of its observations).

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It is, however, necessary to bear in mind that tising. Article 2 of that directive defines the question in this case is not whether misleading advertising and is linked to national legislation is generally compatible Article 3, which provides that in determining with Article 30; rather, the question concerns whether advertising is misleading account the application of national rules to a particu­ must be taken of all its features. Article 4 lar legal situation requiring a specific assess­ requires Member States to ensure 'that ment of whether consumers are misled in the adequate and effective means exist for the particular circumstances. It would in my control of misleading advertising in the inter­ opinion be wrong for the Court, in a case ests of consumers as well as competitors and such as this, to link its interpretation of the general public'. Finally, Article 7 pro­ Article 30 too closely to the particular facts vides that the directive does not preclude of the case. If it were to do so, it would be 'Member States from retaining or adopting running the risk of interpreting Article 30 in provisions with a view to ensuring more the light of facts which have been inad­ extensive protection for consumers'. equately clarified before it or of taking a position on the particular circumstances of the case, which is not its task but that of the national court. In addition, it would be beyond the capacity of the Court, through its interpretation of Article 30, to assume the task of ensuring a uniform application of general provisions such as those in this case. Under the system of the Treaty, that task Another is Council Directive 76/768/EEC devolves on the national courts, which are on the approximation of the laws of the responsible for ensuring the correct applica­ Member States relating to cosmetic prod­ tion of Community law. 5 ucts, which, with the particular objective of ensuring free trade in those products, con­ tains rules on their composition, labelling and packaging. Articles 6 (2) and 7 (1) of that directive, which are relevant to the present case, provide respectively as follows:

10. It is relevant to the decision in this case that the Council has adopted directives requiring Member States to introduce rules prohibiting misleading advertising. — 'Member States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that in the labelling, presentation for sale and advertising of cosmetic products, the wording, use of names, trade marks, images or other signs, figurative or otherwise, suggesting a characteristic which the products in One is Council Directive 84/450/EEC relat­ ing to the approximation of the laws, regula­ tions and administrative provisions of the 4 — OJ 1984 L 250, p. 17. Member States concerning misleading adver­ 5 — OJ 1976 L 262, p. 169.

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question do not possess, shall be prohib­ what constitutes misleading advertising. ited', and Moreover, the directive does not prevent Member States from imposing more strin­ gent provisions. It is also important that the obligations under the directive should be interpreted in accordance with the require­ — 'Member States may not, for reasons ments which flow from the Treaty rules on related to the requirements laid down in the free movement of goods. this Directive and the Annexes thereto, refuse, prohibit or restrict the marketing of any cosmetic products which comply with the requirements of this Directive and the Annexes thereto'.

13. The national court was in my opinion correct to ask the Court to interpret 6 11. The German Government has pointed Article 30 of the EEC Treaty. out that the provisions of those two direc­ tives have been implemented in German law by way of, inter alia, the above rules on mis­ leading information, and that any prohibi­ tion under the German rules will be consis­ tent with the directives. It argues in that connection that the question referred to the Court must be answered on the basis of the 14. The reply to the question in the refer­ directives inasmuch as measures consistent ence must therefore be based on the estab with the directives cannot a priori infringe Article 30 of the EEC Treaty unless the Community rules in question are themselves at variance with Article 30. 6 — The Court also dismissed a (at least in some respects) similar argument by the German Government in its judgment in Case C-238/89 Pall Corp. v P. ]. Dahlbausen [1990] ECR I- 4827, which concerned the legality of a ban imposed under Paragraph 3 of the UWG on the marketing of products bear­ ing the symbol (R) next to the trade mark. The Court dis­ missed the German arguments based on the directive on mis­ leading advertising by stating that 'since the prohibition at issue nas been found not to be justified by imperative requirements relating to consumer protection or fair trading, 12. That view, in my opinion, is incorrect. It it can also find no basis in the aforementioned directive. That directive confines itself to a partial harmonization of the oversimplifies the problem and fails to take national laws on misleading advertising by establishing, firstly, minimum objective criteria for determining whether proper account of the nature of the Commu­ advertising is misleading, and, secondly, minimum require­ nity obligations which the two directives ments for the means of affording protection against such advertising'. impose on Member States. Those obligations The Court's judgment in Case C-373/90 Complaint against are couched in very general terms and X [1992] ECR I-131, which concerned the legality of adver­ tisements for cars introduced into France by way of parallel require national legal systems to protect con­ imports, cannot be cited in support of the German Govern­ ment's argument, even though the Court concentrated its sumers and others against misleading infor­ reply to the question referred in that case on an interpreta­ mation within specified areas. Thus, the tion of the directive on misleading advertising. The Court took the view that the question whether the disputed sales directive on misleading advertising lays practice was consistent with the relevant Community rules was to be understood as a question on the interpretation of down only relatively vague criteria as to the directive on misleading advertising.

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lished case-law of the Court with regard to undeniable, that a ban on the marketing in that provision to the effect that: Germany of the cosmetic products in ques­ tion under the name Clinique will in fact be restrictive of intra-Community trade.

— the prohibition covers 'all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indi­ rectly, actually or potentially, intra- Community trade' 16. It must also be assumed that if the ban is imposed, this will constitute an obstacle to intra-Community trade stemming from the application of national rules which apply to domestic and imported products without distinction. and

— Obstacles to intra-Community trade resulting from disparities between provi­ 17. As we know, the Court has also held sions of national law must be accepted in that obstacles to trade can be justified on the so far as such provisions, applicable to grounds set out in Article 36 of the EEC domestic and to imported products with­ Treaty or in the Court's case-law only if out distinction, may be justified as neces­ common rules have not been laid down at sary in order to satisfy imperative Community level in the areas in question. 8 requirements relating, inter alia, to con­ sumer protection and fair trading. How­ ever, in order to be permissible, such pro­ visions must be proportionate to the objective pursued and that objective must not be capable of being achieved by meas­ ures which are less restrictive of intra- 7 Community trade'. As already mentioned, there are common rules relevant to the question referred in this case, but in my opinion they do not preclude justifying the present measure in restraint of trade on the basis of the so-called 'rule of reason'.

15. The order making the reference is based on the assumption, which in any event is 8 — See the Court's judgment in Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltimg für Branntwein [1979] ECR649 and most recently its judgment of 18 May 1993 in Case C-126/91 Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft v 7 — Judgment in Case C-238/89 Pall Corp. cited above, para­ Yves Rocher, at paragraph 12, which concerns rules in the graphs 11 and 12. UWG on comparative advertising.

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18. It might well be argued that the cosmet­ not least where medicinal properties are ics directive, Article 6 (2) of which requires attributed to products which do not have all Member States to ensure that consumers them. are not misled and Article 7 (1) of which requires Member States not to prohibit or restrict the marketing of products which comply with the requirements of the direc­ tive, has precisely the objective of harmoniz­ ing national requirements with regard to cos­ metic products and therefore contains such common rules as, according to the Court's case-law, preclude measures in restraint of trade from being regarded as justified. No 20. There has never been any doubt in the such argument, however, is set out in any of Court's case-law that the desire to protect the observations submitted to the Court. consumers and traders against unfair or mis­ Nor, in my opinion, can it properly be leading conduct on the part of undertakings argued that the fact that the products are marketing goods is one of the imperative lawfully marketed in other Member States requirements which can justify obstacles to 10 under the name Clinique means that in Ger­ the free movement of goods. many too they must be regarded as satisfying the requirement set out in Article 6 (2) of the directive that products must not be attrib­ uted with characteristics which they do not possess. This follows already from the fact that there may exist in this field linguistic, cultural and social differences between the Member States which have the result that a name which is not misleading in one Mem­ ber State may well be misleading in another. There can also be no doubt that this argu­ ment for protection is of particular weight when the requirement arises in connection with the application of a ban on misleading information which also has a health- protection aspect, namely, the desire to pre­ vent consumers attributing to products medicinal properties which they do not have.

19. The Community rules in this case do not 9 — It is appropriate in this connection to refer to Article 2 of Council Directive 79/112/EEC on the approximation of the therefore in my opinion preclude the possi­ laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presen­ bility of justification. However, the signifi­ tation and advertising of foodstuffs for sale to the ultimate consumer (OJ 1979 L 33, p. 1), which provides that prod­ cance of those provisions (and this is the real ucts which arc not medicinal products must not under Community law give the impression that they are medicinal thrust of the abovementioned arguments of products. Article 2 (1) (b) of the directive provides that the labelling and methods of packaging used must not attribute the German Government) is that they show to any foodstuff the property of preventing, treating or cur­ that great importance is attached to the ing a human disease, or refer to such properties. I agree with the German Government in its argument that a similar desire to protect consumers and others rule must be read into Article 6 (2) of the cosmetics direc­ tive. against misleading information in connection 10 — See, most recently, paragraph 12 of the judgment in Case with the marketing of goods and services, C-126/91 Yves Rocher, cited above in footnote 8.

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21. A further requirement under the consis­ products, including the information that tent case-law of the Court, however, is that the products have undergone dermato- application of the relevant national provis­ logical or allergy tests. ions must be essential to consumer protec­ tion, that it must be proportionate to the objective pursued and that that objective cannot be achieved by measures which are less restrictive of trade. 23. I can see the cogency of the Commis­ sion's argument based essentially on the view that there is not, on an overall assessment, a real risk that individuals will be misled and that it is therefore not imperative to prohibit the marketing of goods under the name Clinique. 22. The Commission has argued that it is not necessary to prohibit the use of the name Clinique for the purposes of consumer pro­ tection and fair trading. In support of that argument, it has put forward the following 24. It is none the less my view that it would points: be wrong to answer the question in the terms suggested by the Commission, to the effect that Article 30 must be interpreted as meaning that the imposition of a ban under Paragraph3 of the UWG on the intended — The products in question are sold exclu­ marketing would be incompatible with that sively in perfumeries and the perfumery article. departments of large stores and as they are unavailable in pharmacies they cannot be assumed to give rise to medicinal asso­ ciations. 25. In the first place, such a reply to the question referred would overstep the bound­ aries of what in a case such as this is the Court's task and what is the task of the national court in connection with the appli­ — The name 'Clinique' must be understood cation of Community law to the case in hand as the commercial name of the product. (see point 9 above). Since cosmetic products are sold as lip­ stick, mascara, face-cream, and so on, the labelling makes it clear to the consumer that the product in question is a cosmetic product. Secondly, it can be argued that the Commis­ sion fails to take sufficient account of the fact that the starting point, according to the case- law of the Court, is that it is for the indi­ vidual Member States to decide the degree of — The presentation and content of the protection they deem to be correct with a advertisements are typical for cosmetic view to safeguarding the matters which

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under Article 36 of the Treaty and the be misled as to the characteristics of the Court's case-law may properly be taken into products in question. consideration by the Member States — even though the rules adopted may give rise to barriers to trade. 11

27. A specific ban would also, in my opin­ ion, not be contrary to the directive on mis­ leading advertising. One reason is simply that the directive does not prevent the Mem­ It may be appropriate in this connection to ber States from imposing a more stringent refer to an argument submitted to the Court level of protection than that laid down in the by the defendants in the main proceedings. directive. But I also do not consider that They contended that nothing can justify the such a result would in principle be contrary view expressed that German consumers to any of the specific minimum requirements require a greater level of protection than which the directive imposes on the legisla­ 1 13 consumers in the other Member States. 2It tion of Member States. should be noted in this connection that, as just mentioned above, under Community law it is primarily a matter for national leg­ islatures to determine the level of protection desired in each country. Moreover, as already 28. That does not, however, rule out the mentioned, there may be specific differences possibility that requirements may be derived in linguistic, social and cultural conditions from Community law for the application by which have the result that something which the German courts of the prohibitions in the does not mislead consumers in one country two national provisions on misleading infor­ may do so in another. mation.

It is essential that national courts, when 26. It is therefore in my opinion not possible applying the law in specific cases, bear in in this case to state from the outset that a mind the fundamental importance of the free ban on the proposed marketing of the prod­ movement of goods within Community law ucts would be unnecessary within the mean­ and that they should be aware (particularly ing of Article 30 to attain the level of protec­ in cases involving general provisions such as tion intended under German law if the those material to the present case) that meas­ market research survey envisaged by the ures which constitute obstacles to trade will national court were to show that the speci­ be lawful only if they are imperative and fied percentage of German consumers would proportionate to the objective pursued and if

11 — See, for example, the judgment in Case 188/84 Commission 13 — As already pointed out in footnote 6, the Court has inter­ v France [1986] ECR 419 (woodworking machines), para­ preted the directive in its judgment in Case C-373/90 Com- graph 15. plaint against X [1992] ECR I-131. So far as I can see, the 12 — See the written observations of the defendants, p. 9, section interpretation given there is of only limited relevance to the II (3) (b). present case.

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that objective cannot be achieved by mea­ and the danger of persons being misled with sures which are less restrictive of intra- regard to the consumer group concerned. Community trade.

It may also be appropriate in the present case This, in my opinion, means inter alia that the to stress that proper application of Commu­ national court making the reference should, nity law (including the directive on mislead­ when finally deciding whether a market ing advertising) requires that the appraisal be research survey need be conducted at all and, based on an overall assessment which takes if so, when commissioning it, take account of account of all relevant factors including the the factors to which the Commission has circumstances in which the products are sold referred above.

Conclusion

29. On the basis of the above considerations, I propose that the Court reply to the question referred in the following terms:

Article 30 of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted as meaning that it does not in principle preclude the application of national provisions on unfair competition to prohibit the marketing of a cosmetic product on the ground that consumers might be misled by the name of the product into believing that the product has medicinal characteristics, even though the product is lawfully marketed in other Member States under the name in question.

The national court must, however, when applying national provisions, ensure that their application will not lead to obstacles to trade between Member States, unless that application is imperative for consumer protection and fair trading, and unless the measure chosen is proportionate to the objective pursued and that objective can­ not be achieved by measures which are less restrictive of intra-Community trade.

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The national court must also under Community law, when considering whether the national rules must be applied, base itself on an overall assessment which takes account of all relevant factors, including the circumstances in which the products are sold and the danger of persons being misled with regard to the consumer group concerned.

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