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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·15.12.1993

C-320/92

ECLI:EU:C:1993:934

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61992CC0320

O P I N I O N OF MR D A R M O N — CASE C-320/92 P

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL DARMON delivered on 15 December 1993 *

Mr President, 'Where an undertaking does not expect to Members of the Court, attain its quotas during the quarter in ques- tion, the Commission may (...) allow the undertaking an advance on the quotas for the following quarter not exceeding 20% of the quotas for the current quarter'.

1. The power of the High Authority to establish a system of steel production quotas is based on Article 58(1) of the ECSC Treaty. 3. Relying on that article, Finsider requested on 9 June 1988 an advance, during the sec- ond quarter of 1988, on production quotas for the third quarter, up to a ceiling of 20%.

2. The system of production quotas for cer- tain products of undertakings in the steel 4. Although there was never an express industry, introduced by Commission Deci- reply to that request, Finsider's production sion N o 2794/80/ECSC of 31 October during the second quarter of 1988 exceeded 1980, ' was extended for the years 1986 the quotas allocated to it. and 1987 by Commission Decision N o 3485/85/ECSC of 27 November 1985 2 and, for the first six months of 1988, by Commis- sion Decision N o 194/88/ECSC of 6 January 1988 3 which provides in Article l(3)(e) that

5. On the basis of Article 58(4) and 92 of the * Original language: French. ECSC Treaty and of Article 12 of the Deci- 1 — Decision establishing a system of steel production quotas for sion N o 194/88/ECSC, * the Commission, undertakings in the iron and steel industry (OJ 1980 L 291, by decision of 21 March 1990, found that p. 1). 2 — Decision on the extension of the system of monitoring and Finsider had exceeded during the second production quotas for certain products of undertakings in the steel industry (OJ 1985 L 340, p. 5). See in particular Article 18(2) 3 — Decision extending the system of monitoring and production quotas for certain products of undertakings in the steel 4 — Which attributes to the Commission the power to impose industry (OJ 1988 L 25, p. 1). See in particular Article 18(2)- fines in the event that production quotas are exceeded.

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quarter of 1988 the portions of production 10. The first plea criticizes the attitude of the quotas which could be delivered in the com- Commission following the request for the mon market by 50 359 tonnes in category la advance on quotas. and by 64 497 tonnes in category lb and imposed upon it a fine of E C U 2 153 550.

11. The second is based on the absence of any legal basis for the contested decision on account of the judgment of the Court of 6. By judgment of 5 June 1992, the Court of Justice in Hoogovens Groep and Others v First Instance dismissed the action brought Commission of 14 June 1989 8 which, by against that decision. 5 annulling Articles 5 and 17 of Decision 194/88/ECSC, had retroactively eliminated the criteria enabling any overshooting of quotas to be assessed.

7. By application of 28 July 1992 Finsider appealed against the judgment of the Court of First Instance, sought the annulment of the decision of the Commission and, in the 12. The third is founded on the principle of alternative, a reduction in the amount of the the right to be heard, as expressed in the first fine. Furthermore, it requested as a measure paragraph of Article 36 of the ECSC Treaty. of measure of inquiry the production of a letter. 6

13. According to the fourth plea, the deci- sion of the Court of First Instance does not 8. The Court of First Instance refused to give sufficient reasons with respect to the order that document to be produced. 7 Such application for a reduction of the fine. a decision is not included among those against which an appeal lies under Article 49 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the ECSC. That claim is therefore inadmissi- ble. 14. The first plea (see paragraphs 67 to 103 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance) may be divided into three limbs: (i) the Commission did not give a formal, rea- soned reply to the request for the advance on quotas; (ii) although the contested decision 9. Finsider puts forward four pleas in law in allows the inference to be drawn that the support of its appeal. request for an advance had been implicitly rejected, Article ll(3)(e) of Decision N o

5 — Case T-26/90 [1992] ECR 11-1789. 6 — Appeal, page 45 of the French translation. 7 — Paragraph 103 of the contested judgment. 8 — 218/87, 223/87, 72/88 and 92/88 [1989] ECR 1711.

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194/88/ECSC was infringed; (iii) finally, 17. More recently, with regard to the rules bearing in mind the practice observed by the on steel quotas in force in the second quarter Commission until then, the principle of the of 1983, the Court considered that the protection of legitimate expectations was request for the allocation of an additional infringed. annual production reference to which the Commission had not replied explicidy should be regarded as having been implicitly rejected by the first decision fixing the pro- duction quotas adopted after the submission of the request and without taking it into account. The Court further stated that only 15. May the silence of the Commission be that decision was capable of adversely affect- construed, under the ECSC Treaty, as ing the applicant. " implicit acceptance of a request for advance on quotas?

18. It follows, on the one hand, that modifi- cation of a quota must be effected by express 16. The Court has already answered that decision and, on the other, that a decision kind of question in its judgment in Boël v finding that quotas have been exceeded over Commission. 9 The Court held that a given period and imposing a fine on the steel undertaking concerned may, where appropriate, mean that a request for an increase of quotas submitted prior to the quota being exceeded was implicity refused for that period.

'(...) the system of restrictions on the pro- duction of steel undertakings allows of adjustments to individual quotas allocated to particular undertakings only in exceptional cases, and for such an adjustment a positive decision granting supplementary quotas is 19. It is to no avail that the applicant indispensable. The Commission's silence, claims , 2 that Article 15 of the ECSC Treaty regrettable though it may be, can therefore on the obligation to provide a statement of be treated only as an implied decision of reasons leaves no room for 'implicit' deci- refusal and not as tacit consent to an adjust- sions. It is sufficient to note that the third ment'. , 0 paragraph of Article 35 of the Treaty expressly mentions such decisions and, moreover, prescribes the legal regime which governs them. 9 — Judgment in Case 76/83 [1984] ECR 859, delivered in the context of the system of quotas established by Commission Decision No 1831/81/ECSC of 24 June 1981 establishing for undertakings in the iron and steel industry a monitoring system and a new system of production quotas in respect of 11 — Paragraph 21 of the judgment in Joined Cases 81/85 and certain products (OJ 1981 L 180, p. 1). 119/85 Usinar v Commission [1986] ECR 1777. 10 — Paragraph 11, my emphasis. 12 — Page 13 of the French translation of the appeal.

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20. In declaring that the reasons for that 22. With regard to the alleged error of inter- refusal had been provided to Finsider, the pretation by the Court of First Instance judgment of the Court of First Instance of Article ll(3)(e) of Decision No properly referred to the preamble to the con- 194/88/ECSC, I would make the following tested decision 13 which notes, in particular, observations. that 'the system of quotas is quarterly and mandatory and gives no automatic entitle- ment to advances' and that during a meeting which took place on 24 May 1989 between the representatives of the parties, it was emphasized that the advance on quotas was 23. As the Court of First Instance has no longer possible during the course of the clearly shown, the system of Article last quarter of application of the quota sys- 11 implies that '(...) the overshooting of the tem. The judgment also took into account quota during a quarter may be offset by not the context in which the decision had been using up the quota during the next quar- adopted, 14 in particular, a letter of 2 August ter'. 16 Consequently, Finsider could not 1988 in which the Commission explained to claim any advance on quotas after 30 June Finsider its reasons for refusing to grant 1988 since, as noted above, the system of advances on quotas for the second quarter of quotas had been brought to an end from the 1988 and the telex by which Eurofer third quarter of that year. informed its members on 6 April 1988 that it would not be granted advances on quotas from the third quarter for the second quarter of 1988, in view of the fact that the quota system would end on 30 June 1988. 24. Finsider also maintains before this Court that the conditions for an advance on quotas have been met, since an advance is offset by an actual reduction of the production or delivery quantities during the course of the quarter following that for which the advance has been granted, even if quotas have been 21. It appears from those documents, with- abolished. 17 out any possible ambiguity, that Finsider had been informed of the reasons for the refusal to grant those advances in such a way that a court could review the legality of the deci- sion and the party concerned would have sufficient information available to make it 25. In my view, such an argument gives rise possible to ascertain whether the decision to perplexity. H o w can advances be made on was well founded or whether it is vitiated by quotas which will never exist? More specifi- a defect allowing its legality to be contest- cally, how can account be taken of quotas by ed. 1 5 reference to a period during which the mar- ket is totally liberalized and production is no

13 — Paragraph 71 of the contested judgment. 14 — Paragraph 72 of the contested judgment. 16 — Paragraph 83 of the contested judgment. 15 — Sec in that respect the judgment in Case C-l81/90 Consor- gan v Commùsion [1992] ECR 1-3557. 17 — See page 17 of the French translation of the appeal.

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longer subject to the Commission's power of 194/88/ECSC, 1 9 and the Court of First surveillance and its power to impose sanc- Instance considered that it had not at all tions? been established that the Commission had earlier followed a practice to the contrary.

26. Finsider also argues that the interpreta- tion accepted by the Court of First Instance 29. It follows that all three limbs of the first of Article ll(3)(e) would have the effect of plea must be rejected. rendering the system of advances inapplica- ble during half the period of validity of Decision N o 194/88/ECSC. ' 8

30. The second plea is based on the judg- ment in Hoogovens in which the Court of Justice annulled Articles 5 and 17 of Deci- sion N o 194/88/ECSC (hereinafter referred 27. I would like to note at this point, first, to as 'Article 5' and 'Article 17'). The former that the advance is not a right which is auto- gave the Commission the power to fix each matically granted to undertakings, and sec- quarter, for each undertaking, the production ondly, that a quota may be 'moved' from one quotas and the part of such quotas which quarter to another only if those two periods could be delivered in the common market. are subject to the quota system. Thus, carry- The latter authorized undertakings, subject overs — the opposite of advances — to the to certain conditions, to convert each quarter first quota of 1988 from the fourth quarter a portion of the difference between their of 1987 was possible only because quotas production quota and the proportion of the existed for that period (see Article ll(3)(b) quota which may be delivered in the com- of 194/88/ECSC and Article 18(2) of Deci- mon market into quotas for delivery in the sion N o 3485/85/ECSC). common market at the rate of 1: 0.85 — referred to as I: P 20 —, thus allowing them to increase their deliveries on that market.

28. As regards the third limb of the plea, Finsider cannot invoke a breach of the prin- ciple of the protection of legitimate expecta- 31. That plea (see paragraphs 42 to 66 of the tions since the end of the quota system n o contested judgment) is divided into two longer enabled advances to be granted, the limbs. end was entirely foreseeable, in view of the actual wording of Decision N o 19 — See paragraph 1 of the recital and Article 18(2), as well as paragraph 97 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance. 18 — Reply, page 9 of the French translation. 20 — The ratio between production quotas and delivery quotas.

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32. In the first limb, the applicant maintains 35. In that case the Court of Justice held that the judgment in Hoogovens had retroac- that tively eliminated the criteria which allowed possible excesses over quotas to be assessed. Any excess was therefore 'radically exclud- ed'. 21 Since Article 5 had been annulled, it could not be infringed. The contested deci- sion of the Commission consequently lacked a legal basis. 'Article 5 of Commission Decision N o 3485/85/ECSC of 27 November 1985 [is declared void] in so far as it does not enable delivery quotas to be fixed on a basis which the Commission considers fair for undertak- ings having ratios between their delivery 33. The sole ground for the annulment of quotas and production quotas which are sig- Article 5 given in the judgment in Hoogov- nificantly lower than the Community aver- ens is the following: age'. 25

'Article 5 of Decision N o 194/88/ECSC takes over the wording of Article 5 of Deci- 36. Since the sole ground for the annulment sion N o 3485/85/ECSC. Consequently, it of Article 5 of Decision N o 194/88/ECSC must be annulled for the same reasons which upheld in the judgment of 14 June led to the annulment of that provision in the 1989 refers to the grounds of the judgment judgment of 14 July 1988'. 22 of 14 July 1988, the Court of First Instance could properly consider that the later annul- ment could not be more extensive than the earlier one 26 and that '(...) the Court of Jus- tice has not annulled Article 5 in so far as it constitutes the legal basis for the Commis- 34. It follows that, as the Court of First sion's power to fix the quotas of steel under- Instance rightly points out, 23 the grounds of takings quarterly, but solely in so far as the the judgment in Peine-Salzgitter and Others reference levels which it employs in order to v Commission of 14 July 1988 24 must be fix those quotas do not enable delivery quo- referred to in order to determine the scope tas to be determined on a basis which the of the judgment in Hoogovens. Commission regards as equitable for under- takings whose I: P ratios are significantly lower than the Community average'. 27

21 — Appeal, see page 29 of the French translation. 22 — Paragraph 26, cited in the judgment of the Court of First Instance at paragraph 53. 25 — Paragraph 1 of the operative part, my emphasis. See also 23 — Paragraph 53 of the contested judgment. paragraph 28 of the grounds. 24 — Joined Cases 33/86, 44/86, 110/86, 226/86 and 26 — Paragraph 55 of the contested judgment. 285/86 Peine-Salzgitter and Others v Commission [1988] ECR 4309. 27 — Paragraph 57 of the contested judgment, my emphasis.

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37. That interpretation is, moreover, corrob- 40. In the second limb of its plea, Finsider orated by the fact that Article 6 of Decision argues that it has been the victim of the N o 194/88/ECSC was not annulled. That application of Article 17 and that the exceed- article cannot be divorced from Article 5 for ing of quotas with which it is charged must which it lays down the conditions for its be the subject of a set-off in order to take application. It therefore necessarily continues account of the decrease in delivery quotas to exist '(...) as the legal basis authorizing the caused by the application of that article dur- Commission to fix quotas'. 28 ing the period from 1 January 1987 to 30 June 1988. 32 It adds that all the conse- quences flowing from the annulment of Arti- cle 17 must be applied to steel products other than those referred to in the contested decision.

38. Since Finsider does not fall within the category of undertaking having I: P ratios significantly lower than the Community average, 29 it cannot rely on the annulment — the scope of which, as has been seen, is 41. The effect of applying Article 17 was limited — of Article 5 and the Commission that the quantities which may be delivered is not under a duty '(..) either to redefine in a on the Community market were increased to general decision the parameters for fixing the detriment of undertakings whose pro- quotas or to adopt new individual deci- duction was essentially disposed of on that sions' 30 pursuant to Article 34 of the ECSC market, 33 and in particular, to the detriment Treaty with regard to that undertaking. of Finsider.

42. In the Hoogovens judgment the Court of Justice considered that the adjustment of the 39. The individual decisions fixing Finsider's I: P ratio, as it appeared in Article 17 of quotas for the second quarter of 1988 thus Decision N o 194/88/ECSC — which merely remained valid and could '(...) be used as a restates the provisions of Article 1 of Deci- reference for the calculations of the amounts sion N o 1433/87/ECSC — did not ensure by which the Commission has charged the the equitable allocation of quotas required applicant with exceeding its quotas'. 3 1 by Article 58(2) of the ECSC Treaty and the Court of Justice annulled Article 17.

28 — Paragraph 56 of the contested judgment. 29 — Paragraph 58 of the contested judgment. 32 — See paragraph 46 of the contested judgment. 30 — Paragraph 59 of the contested judgment. 33 — See on this point paragraph 18 of the judgment of 14 June 31 — Paragraph 62 of the contested judgment. 1989 in Hoogovens, supra, footnote 8.

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43. The fine was imposed on Finsider for 46. The appellant's argument may be exceeding quotas during the second quarter reduced here to three points: of 1988. It is common ground that for that period and for the category of products referred to in the decision '(...) the Commis- sion acted on that annulment in favour of the applicant by decreasing the excesses initially calculated for the two categories of product concerned'. 3* — the effects of the annulment of Article 17 must be offset against the excess over quotas noted in the second quarter of 1988; 37

— the excess could be declared only by 44. Did the Commission have to take into means of a global assessment of the quo- account the favourable consequences for the tas during the whole period of crisis; 38 applicant of the annulment of Article 17 for the period form 1 January 1987 to 31 March 1988 and for categories other than categories la and lb?

— the contested judgment notes, inaccu- rately, that the products affected by the exceeding of quotas are different to those in respect of which Article 17 was annulled. 39

45. Let me make two preliminary points: first, the calculation of the quotas cannot be reopened before the Court of Justice as Fin- sider requests since the question is one of pure fact. 35 Secondly, Finsider's analysis to the effect that the Court of First Instance gave judgment ultra petita 36 on the ground 47. That last point presupposes a finding of that it based itself on 'completely new rea- fact which lies outside the jurisdiction of the sons', that is to say, reasons which had not Court of Justice. I will restrict myself to been invoked by the parties, is wrong in law. considering the other two.

34 — Paragraph 65 of the contested judgment. 37 — Ibid., page 37. 35 — Appeal, pages 34 and 35 of the French translation. 38 — Ibid., page 38. 36 — Ibid., page 36. 39 — Ibid., page 39.

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48. As regards the first point, the two proce- wording of Article 34 of the ECSC Treaty, dures which lie at the heart of the matter the Court of Justice held that must not be confused.

'If the Court entertains the application, it may not dictate to the High Authority the 49. The decision imposing a fine concerns an decisions which should be consequent upon excess over quotas during the second quarter the judgment annulling the decision but the of 1988, 40 since it is stated that the effect of Court must confine itself to referring the the annulment of Article 17 for that period matter back to the High Authority.' 43 (and therefore the re-establishment of certain quotas for Finsider) was taken into account by the Commission. 41

53. It is clear that if the Court of First Instance had offset the exceeding of the quota of the second quarter, as Finsider had requested, against the quotas re-established 50. Moreover, in application of the first from the previous quarters in Finsider's paragraph of Article 34 of the ECSC Treaty, favour, following the judgment of the Court it was for the Commission alone to take the of Justice annulling Article 17 of Decision necessary steps to comply with the judgment N o 194/88/ECSC, it would have been exer- annulling Article 17. cising a power which Article 34 of the ECSC Treaty denies to it.

51. It follows from Article 34 that the Com- munity judicature cannot dictate to the 54. The Court of First Instance was there- Commission, the source of the annulled act, fore right to refuse to engage in that exer- what steps it must take. cise. 44

55. Finally, as regards the second point, Fin- 52. Thus in its judgment in Case 30/59 De sider is wrong in maintaining that the Com- Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg mission should have taken into account the v High Authority,42 after noting the

43 — Page 17. The case-law on Article 176 of the E E C Treaty 40 — Article 1 of the decision. — which is the counterpart of Article 34 of the ECSC Treaty — is consistent in this matter. See, for example, the 41 — See above, paragraph 43, and paragraph 65, penultimate judgment in Case 141/84 De Compte v Parliament [1985] sentence, of the contested judgment, as well as the third E C R 1951, paragraph 22, and the judgment in Hoogovens, recital of the decision of 21 March 1990. cited above, paragraph 21. 42 — Case 30/59 [1961] E C R 1. 44 — Paragraph 65 of the contested judgment.

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quotas 'during the whole of the crisis period' procedure has been initiated must have been before finding that their quotas had been afforded the opportunity, during that proce- exceeded. The quota system requires that dure, to make known his views on the truth quotas be complied with quarter by quar- and relevance of the facts and circumstances ter,*1 with the exception of carryovers, alleged and on the documents used by the advances or exceptional allocation of addi- commission to support its claim that there tional quotas. has been an infringement of Community law'.

56. In the third limb of its plea (see para- graphs 104 to 111 of the judgment), Finsider pleads infringement of the first paragraph of 59. The Court of First Instance, in findings Article 34 and the first paragraph of Article of fact which only it can make and which 36 of the ECSC Treaty and maintains that it cannot be called into question before this was never given the opportunity to submit Court, considered that (1) the Commission, its comments on the accounts which the by its letter of 23 February 1989, gave the Commission drew up before deciding to applicant an opportunity to submit its com- impose a sanction on it for exceeding quotas. ments on the alleged overshooting, (2)the applicant was able to put over its comments on several occasions. 4S

57. The Court of Justice has consistently held that Observance of the right to be heard is in all proceedings in which sanctions, in particular fines or penalty payments, may be 60. It is indeed common ground that the lat- imposed a fundamental principle of Commu- ter calculations taken into account in assess- nity law which must be respected even if the ing the overshooting of quotas were raised proceedings in question are administrative during a meeting between the parties with- proceedings'. 46 out being communicated formally to the appellant. 49

58. In its judgment in Belgium v Commis- sion of 10 July 1986, 47 the Court stated that 'in order to respect [that principle], the 61. The failure to do so would be such as to person against whom an administrative constitute an infringement of the right to be heard which might result in the annulment of the measure, if it were established that, had it not been for that irregularity, the out- 45 — Article 5(1) of Decision N o 194/88/ECSC. 46 — Judgment in Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, paragraph 9, (especially paragraph 14). See also the judgment in Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461. 48 — Paragraph 108 of the contested judgment. 47 — Case 234/84 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2263, paragraph 27. 49 — Paragraph 109 of the contested decision.

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come of the procedure might have been dif- 65. By judgment of 1 October 1991 in ferent. 50 Vidrányi v Commission, 53 the Court of Jus- tice accepted a ground of appeal based on the infringement by the Court of First Instance of the obligation to state the reasons on which its decisions are based. 54

62. Finsider acknowledged at the hearing before the Court of First Instance that the calculations carried out by the Commission 66. In refusing to reduce the amount of the in order to determine the magnitude of the fine, the Court of First Instance notes, first, quotas of which the appellant was deprived that the appellant was unable to contest the as a result of Article 17 were accurate and Commission's statements to the effect that it did not put forward any reason for doubting obtained from the unlawfulness of Article the accuracy of the calculations which 5 a benefit '[which] works against a fair shar- enabled its overshooting of quotas to be ing amongst the undertakings of the burden established. 5I of the crisis', " and secondly, that the amount of the fine imposed was 'substantial- ly lower' than the standard laid down in Article 12 of Decision N o 194/88/ECSC. 5 6

63. The Court of First Instance could there- fore properly consider that the first para- 67. According to the appellant, the Court of graph of Article 36 of the ECSC Treaty had First Instance should have taken account of not been infringed '(...) even if it would have the grounds of its decision, of the principle been preferable to communicate the latter of the protection of legitimate expectations calculations to the applicant formally (...)'. 52 and the practice followed previously. 57

68. Apart from the fact that the Court of First Instance sufficiently demonstrated 5 8 64. By a final plea (see paragraphs 112 to that there had been no breach of that princi- 116 of the judgment), Finsider claims that ple, the appellant does not explain why there the judgment, in so far as it rejects the request that the amount of the fine be reduced, is insufficiently reasoned. 53 — Case C-283/90 P Vidrányi v Commission [1990] ECR 1-4339 54 — Paragraph 29 55 — Paragraph 114 of the contested judgment. 50 — See on that point paragraph 48 of the judgment in Case 56 — Paragraph 115 of the contested judgment. C-142/87 Belgium v Commission [1990] E C R 1-959. 57 — See the third indent of paragraph 44 of the French transla- 51 — Paragraph 110 of the contested judgment. tion of the Appeal. 52 — Paragraph 109 of the contested judgment. 58 — See supra paragraph 28.

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should be a reference to that principle in the 70. In the alternative, Finsider requests the grounds given for refusing to reduce the Court of Justice to reduce the amount of the amount of the fine. fine.

69. It follows that the Court of First Instance had no duty to justify itself with regard to that principle. It provided Finsider with sufficient information to make it possi- ble to ascertain whether its decision was well founded or whether it might be vitiated by a 71. In the absence of an error in law com- defect allowing its validity to be contested mitted in that respect at first instance, the and enabling the Court of Justice to review Court of Justice may not substitute its deci- its legality. sion for that of the Court of First Instance.

72. I am therefore of the o p i n i o n that the C o u r t s h o u l d dismiss the appeal and that it should o r d e r the appellant t o p a y the costs of the proceedings.

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