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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·15.6.1994

C-400/92

ECLI:EU:C:1994:248

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61992CC0400

GERMANY v COMMISSION

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL DARMON delivered on 15 June 1994 *

Mr President, 3. Article 4(7) is worded as follows: Members of the Court,

'Aid related to shipbuilding and ship conver­ sion granted as development assistance to a 1. In the present proceedings for annulment, developing country shall not be subject to the Court is called on for the first time to the ceiling. It may be deemed compatible interpret Council Directive 90/684/EEC of with the common market if it complies with 21 December 1990 on aid to shipbuilding the terms laid down for that purpose by the ('the seventh directive'), 1 adopted on the 2 OECD Working Party No 6 in its Agree­ basis of Article 92(3)(d) of the EEC Treaty. ment concerning the interpretation of Arti­ It provides an opportunity of clarifying the cles 6 to 8 of the Understanding referred to inter-relationship between the powers of the in paragraph 6 of this article or with any Council and the Commission in the sphere later addendum or corrigendum to the said to which that directive relates. Agreement.

2. In Chapter II of the directive, Article 4(1), The Commission must be given prior notifi­ concerning Operating aid', provides: 'Pro­ cation of any such individual aid proposal. It duction aid in favour of shipbuilding and shall verify the particular development con­ ship conversion may be considered compati­ tent of the proposed aid and satisfy itself that ble with the common market provided that it falls within the scope of the Agreement the total amount of aid granted in support of referred to in the first subparagraph.' 5 any individual contract does not exceed, in grant equivalent, a common maximum ceil- 3 ing'. That ceiling is fixed by the Commis­ sion. 4

* Original language: French. 4. That provision is at the centre of this case. 1 — OJ 1990 L 3S0, p. 27. 2 — Now Article 92(3)(c) of the EC Treaty. 3 — Emphasis added. 4 — Article 4(2). 5 — Emphasis added.

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5. In relation to a contract concluded 8. After a further exchange of correspon­ between a consortium of shipyards in Bre­ dence, the Commission decided, by letter 1 men, Wismar, Kiel and Warnemünde, and the of 22 November 1991, 1to initiate the exam­ Chinese undertaking COSCO (China Ocean ination procedure provided for in Article Shipping Company) for the construction of 93(2) of the EEC Treaty in order to verify three container ships of 3 765 TEU (twenty- the genuineness of the 'development aid' foot equivalent units) and a fourth of aspect of the project and assess its general 2 700 TEU, the German authorities envisage compatibility with the common market. That 12 granting a development aid loan in respect of letter was set out in Notice 92/C22/07. In the first three ships. it the Commission states that it is 'still not convinced of the genuine development aid character of the aid project under consider­ ation in particular due to the lack of trans­ parency of the pricing aspect'.

6. The conditions for the grant of the loan were notified to the OECD on 20 September 6 1991.

9. The German Government sent its reply 13 on 26 February 1992.

7. Following a complaint from a Commu­ nity shipyard alleging distortion of competi­ tion, and after exchanges of letters, the Com­ mission, on 14 October 1991, ordered the German Government to notify to it its 7 project for aid, in accordance with the sec­ ond subparagraph of Article 4(7) of the sev­ enth directive, which it did on 21 October 10. The United Kingdom, Denmark, various 1991. 8 The project is described as being shipowners' associations of the European intended to help the People's Republic of Community, the Danish association of ship- China cater for its considerably increased needs in the field of transport and obtain for­ eign currency through foreign trade. 9 10 — See the letter from the German Government of 4 Novem­ ber 1991 in which it seeks to show that the price charged is in line with the market price (Annex 5 to trie application). 11 — Annex 6 to the application. 12 — Commission notice pursuant to Article 93(2) of the EEC 6 — The development aid loan amounts to DM 203.22 million. Treaty to other Member States and interested parties The total price of the container ships is DM 604.14 million. regarding aid which Germany has decided to grant for the 7 — Annex 4 to the application. COSCO project (OJ 1992 C 22, p. 4). (Annex 8 to the 8 — Annex 3 to the application. application). 9 — Ibid. 13 — Annex 7 to the application.

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GERMANY v COMMISSION

builders and the Danish association of ship­ 13. As regards the second point, the reason owners submitted observations, to which the it gives for its Decision is that COSCO is German Government replied on 13 April not a company that needs development aid 1992. 14 in order to contribute to China's general development and that it has the necessary financial resources to buy new vessels on the normal market. The aid project does not therefore fulfil the condition of necessity laid down by the Court of Justice in its judgment 16 in Philip Morris.

11. In Decision 92/569/EEC of 13 July 15 1992, adopted pursuant to the first sub­ paragraph of Article 93(2) ('the Decision'), the Commission stated that it had estab­ lished that 'no development aid is involved in the COSCO contract for the construction of a 2 700 TEU container ship ... and that the export credit terms applied are compatible 14. The Commission adds that such aid with the common market' (Article 1), and involves the risk of serious distortion of that the 'proposed aid for the contract to competition to an extent contrary to the build three further container vessels for the common interest. State-owned Chinese shipping company COSCO , at the Bremer Vulkan yard, Bre­ men, and the Mathias Thesen yard, Wismar, cannot be regarded as genuine development aid within the meaning of Article 4(7) of Council Directive 90/684/EEC on aid to shipbuilding and is therefore incompatible with the common market' (Article 2). 15. By application received at the Court Registry on 26 November 1992, the Federal Republic of Germany seeks the annulment of that Decision and, in the alternative, the annulment of Articles 2 and 3, on the follow­ ing grounds:

12. As regards the first point, the Commis­ sion considers that the construction of the 2 700 TEU vessel is not the subject of devel­ opment aid and is financed under the normal conditions laid down by the OECD . — the envisaged aid is development aid within the meaning of the Article 4(7) of the seventh directive. It conforms with 14 — Annex 10 to the application. 15 — Concerning proposed aid by Germany to the Chinese ship­ ping company Cosco for the construction of container ves­ sels (OJ 1992 L 367. p. 29). 16 — Case 730/79 Pbthp itomi v Commiiswn [1980] ECR 2671.

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the definition of development aid given 16. Before refuting the applicant's substan­ by the OECD and interpreted by the tive submissions, the Commission contends Commission in its letter to the Member that the application is inadmissible in so far 17 States of 3 January 1989. The criterion as it relates to Article 1 of the Decision. of the necessity of the aid for the recipi­ ent undertaking, laid down in the judg­ ment in Philip Morris, cited above, in relation to Article 92(3)(c) of the EEC Treaty, falls outside the scope of Article 4(7);

17. Let us consider that contention.

— the contested Decision is vitiated by an error of assessment;

18. The German Government maintains that the declaration that the aid for the — it infringes three fundamental principles 2 700 TEU vessel is compatible with the of Community law: common market was superfluous because aid towards the payment of interest is automati­ cally compatible with the common market by virtue of Article 4(6) of the seventh direc­ tive.

— the principle of equal treatment;

19. Having decided to consider the whole of — the principle of the protection of legiti­ the aid project, the Commission was also mate expectations; required to state its position regarding the purchase of the 2 700 TEU container vessel. Moreover, by stating that the latter did not involve development aid and that the credit terms were compatible with the common market, the Decision does not adversely 18 — the applicant's right to a fair hearing. affect the applicant Member State.

17 — SG(89)D/311 applying the previous Council Directive 18 — It might, on the other hand, affect the interests of the com­ 87/167/EEC of 26 January 1987, the wording of which was petitors of the shipyards to which the contract was the same (OJ 1987 L 69, p. 5) (Annex 11 to the application). awarded.

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20. The application is therefore inadmissible 'The following may be considered to be in that respect. compatible with the common market:

21. As regards Articles 2 and 3 of the Deci­ (a)... sion, the following question must first be answered:

(b)...

Does the envisaged aid constitute develop­ ment aid within the meaning of Article 4(7) of the seventh directive? More particularly, in that regard, is the Commission right to take into account the criterion of the neces- (c)... sity of the aid?

(d)Such other categories of aid as may be 22. It will then be necessary to consider specified by decision of the Council act­ whether, as it contends, the applicant is enti­ ing by a qualified majority on a proposal tled to allege an error of assessment and 19 from the Commission.' breach of the principles of equal treatment, protection of legitimate expectations and the right to a fair hearing.

Is the envisaged aid development aid within 24. In its judgment in Belgium v Commis- the meaning of Article 4(7) of the seventh 20 sion, the Court held in relation to Council directive? 21 Directive 87/167/EEC, which, like the sev-

19 — Emphasis added. 20 — Joined Cases C-356/90 and C-180/91 Belgium v Commis- sion [1993] ECR 1-2323. 21 — Of 26 January 1987 on aid !o shipbuilding (OJ 1987 L 69, 23. Article 92(3) provides: p. 55).

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enth directive which superseded it, was 27. As we know, when assessing the com­ adopted on the basis of Article 92(3)(d), that patibility of aid in a given case, the Commis­ sion enjoys — subject to review by the 24 Court — vested powers. The Council, for its part, has powers which are available only in exceptional circumstances, by virtue of the 25 third subparagraph of Article 93(2).

'... the Council, in accordance with the ratio legis of Article 92(3 and on the basis of a finding of the incompatibility of the aid for shipbuilding, took account of a number of requirements of an economic and social nature which prompted it to use the power 28. Under Article 92(3)(d), the division of granted to it by the Treaty nevertheless to powers between the Council and the Com­ consider such aid to be compatible with the mission is thus clear. Whereas the Council common market, provided that it satisfies the may extend the range of aid which may be conditions for a derogation laid down in the 22 declared compatible, by fixing an abstract directive'. and general framework ('categories of aid'), only the Commission undertakes a specific examination to determine whether or not aid falling within the category defined by the Council is compatible with the Treaty. The Council does not therefore substitute itself for the Commission in making a specific 25. That reasoning can be transposed to the assessment of the compatibility of aid in a seventh directive, which differs from its pre­ given case. Moreover, when it relies on the decessor only in minor respects (the two third subparagraph of Article 93(2), it gives a directives have, essentially, the same Article decision at the request of a Member State 4). This brings the matter therefore within '... and does so unanimously, whereas, in order exceptional arrangements, which necessarily to extend the range of aid under Article presuppose that the aid in question is at the 92(3)(d), it acts by a qualified majority. outset incompatible with the common mar­ 23 ket'.

29. What are the Commission's powers under that provision? 26. How are powers shared between the Commission and the Council when the latter applies Article 92(3)(d)? 24 — See paragraph 1 of the judgment in Joined Cases C-72 and 73/91 Sloman Neptun Schiffarts [1993] ECR I-887. 25 — An example is Council Decision 73/209/EEC of 24 July 1973 concerning the present system of aid in the United 22 — Paragraph 30. Kingdom for the refining of raw sugar (OJ 1973 L 207, 23 — Paragraph 33. p. 47).

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30. As we know, in order to declare compat­ rules, based on Articles 92(3)(d) and 94 of ible with the common market aid falling the Treaty: within the categories listed in Article 92(3)(a), (b) and (c), 'the Commission has a discretion, the exercise of which involves economic and social assessments which must 26 be made in a Community context'.

'The Commission has been obliged, de facto, to take the place of the intergovernmental authority, exercising in its stead an unknown 28 type of regulatory power.'

31. With respect to those categories of aid, the Court recognizes that the Commission's discretion is rather wide: thus, 'the use of the words "abnormally" and "serious" in the exemption contained in Article 92(3(a) 33. Be that as it may, what is the extent of shows that it concerns only areas where the the Commission's discretion when the economic situation is extremely unfavour­ Council determines, on the basis of Article able in relation to the Community as a 92(3)(d), the 'categories of aid' which may be whole. The exemption in Article 92(3)(c), on considered to be compatible? the other hand, is wider in scope inasmuch as it permits the development of certain areas without being restricted by the economic conditions laid down in Article 92(3)(a), pro­ vided such aid "does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to 27 34. The Court has already implicitly taken the common interest"'. the view in its judgment in Belgium v Com- 29 mission, cited above, that that discretion extended to those categories of aid. It stated:

32. Certain authors have even maintained that the Commission enjoys considerable '... Article 92(3)(d) allows the Council, acting scope for intervention in that field, precisely by a qualified majority on a proposal from in order to compensate for the legislative the Commission, to extend the range of aid lacuna resulting from the lack of Council which may be regarded as compatible with the common market, in addition to the cate-

26 — Judgment in Philip Moms, cited above, paragraph 24, emphasis added. See also the judgment in Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission [1991] 1-1433, paragraph 34. 28 — C. Blumann, 'Regime des aides d'Etat: jurisprudence The Court's case-law is consistent in that respect. récente de la Cour dc Justice', Revue (du Marché commun, 27 — Judgment in Case 284/84 Germany v Commission [1987] 1992, p. 721. ECU 4013, paragraph 19. 29 — Footnote 20.

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OPINION OF MR DARMON — CASE C-400/92

gories indicated in subparagraphs (a), (b) and policy without causing harm to Community (C)'. 30 shipowners who carry on their activity in a market of an international nature'.

35. That power is apparent from the very wording of Article 4(7) of the seventh direc­ tive, which provides: 39. The successive Understandings con­ cluded under the auspices of the OECD have made it possible to reduce those distor­ tions by restricting and harmonizing export 33 credit conditions for ships.

'It (aid related to shipbuilding and ship con­ version granted as development assistance) may be deemed compatible with the com­ 31 mon market, ...'. 40. In an annex to the resolution of the Council of the OECD of 3 August 1981 concerning an amendment of the Understanding on export credits for ships, paragraph 6 states that a contracting party 36. Let us now examine the way in which may, in a special case, accord more favour­ 34 that provision is applied. able conditions 'for genuine aid reasons'. That aid must, in particular, be notified with 35 sufficient notice to the other partners.

37. The situation in the shipbuilding sector is sui generis.

41. By a document entitled 'Revision of the definitions and administrative procedures concerning the understanding on export

38. Distortions of competition affect this sector in the world market and the Commu­ 32 — Third recital in the preamble to Council Directive 69/262/EEC of 28 July 1969 on aid to shipbuilding nity shipbuilding industry could not protect intended to correct distortions of Community on the inter­ itself against outside competition '... by tariff national market [Journal offiael 1969 L 206, p . 25). 33 — See the sixth recital in the preamble to Council Directive measures or other measures of commercial 78/338/EEC of 4 April 1978 on aid to shipbuilding (OJ 1978 L 98, p . 19) and the fifth recital in the preamble to Council Directive 75/432/EEC of 10 July 1975 on aid to shipbuilding (OJ 1975 L 192, p . 27). 34 — Annex 12 to the application. 30 — Paragraph 26, emphasis added. 35 — For this reason the aid granted by the Federal Republic of 31 — Emphasis added. See also Article 4(1). Germany was notified to the OECD .

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credits for ships' (C/WP6(84)3) of 18 Janu­ transaction of which meets the following ary 1984, 6Working Party No 6 of the tests: Council on shipbuilding laid down the con­ ditions for the implementation of the above- mentioned paragraph 6.

(a) It is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective;

42. The aid in question must be official and development assistance. The actual owner must reside in the State receiving the aid and not be a non-operational subsidiary of a for­ eign company. Finally, it must undertake not to resell the ship without the approval of its government. (b) It is concessional in character and con­ veys a grant element of at least 25% (cal­ 3 culated at a rate of discount of 10%)' 8of the contract value.

43. In an addendum of 30 January 1985, the working party clarified the definition of public development aid: 37 44. The Council conformed to those condi­ tions by simply referring, in the first sub­ paragraph of Article 4(7) of the seventh directive, to the provisions adopted by the abovementioned working party.

Official development assistance is defined as those flows to developing countries and mul­ tilateral institutions provided by official 45. Those conditions were set out in the agencies, including State and local govern­ Commission's notice to the Member States, ments, or by their executive agencies, each SG(89)D/311 of 3 January 1989. 39

35 — Annex 13 to the application. 38 — Annex 14 to the application, point 18. 37 — Annex 14 to the application. 39 — Annex 11 to the application.

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OPINION OF MR DARMON — CASE C-400/92

46. The Commission does not deny that necessary for the company receiving it. those conditions have been observed in the Moreover, the granting of unjustified aid car­ present case. ries the 'risk of creating a serious distortion of competition to an extent contrary to the 41 common interest'.

47. The second subparagraph of Article 4(7) requires it, before checking that the aid ful­ fils the conditions laid down by the OECD , to verify 'the particular "development" con­ tent'.

51. The Federal Republic of Germany con­ tends, on the contrary, that the 'verification of the development component' involves no more than establishing that the minimum 48. What does that verification involve? Is rate of the grant element (25%) prescribed 42 the mere fact that the aid can be classified as by the OECD is observed. Moreover, the 'public development aid' within the meaning criteria of the necessity of the aid, laid down of the OECD Understanding sufficient in in Philip Morris in entirely different circum­ that regard? stances, was not referred to in the Commis­ sion's letters of 3 January 1989 and 22 November 1991 and is inapplicable in the present case.

49. In its Decision, the Commission main­ tains that, quite apart from its examination of the OECD criteria laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 4(7), it must 'estab­ lish whether the aid granted ... constitutes 4 development aid'. 0

52. The wording of the second subparagraph of Article 4(7) gives valuable guidance. Whilst the Commission must ensure that the aid is within the scope of the OECD Under­ 50. It observes that COSCO is a flourishing standing, it must also verify its particular company — it ranks fifth in the world 'development' component. It is therefore amongst container operators — and has the clear that whilst compatibility with the financial capacity to undertake any renewal OECD criteria is a necessary condition for of its fleet for itself. COSCO intends buying compatibility with the common market, ful­ the 2 700 TEU container without aid. The filment of that condition is not sufficient. If aid is therefore incompatible since it is not

41 — Contested Decision, VI, third paragraph, subparagraph 2. 40 — Contested Decision, VI, second paragraph. 42 — Paragraph 5 of the reply.

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Article 4(7) laid down no other conditions munity shipyards — 'a subsidy to the ship­ than observance of the criteria laid down by building industry' — which would thus the OECD , it would be drafted like Article not be subject to the conditions laid down in 4(6) which, with regard to aid granted in the Article 4(1) to (6). form of credit facilities, prescribes no other requirements than conformity with an OECD Council resolution. The particular 'development' component does not therefore merge with the OECD criteria.

56. The Commission found such an infringement in the procedure which gave rise to Decision 91/306/EEC of 12 Decem­ 53. In interpreting that concept, one consid­ ber 1990 concerning two aid projects of the eration appears decisive: the contrast between German Government in favour of a shipyard the conditions laid down in general by the 45 in financial difficulties, in which it seventh directive for the grant of production observed: aid — and in particular the fixing of a ceil- ing 43 — and those specifically prescribed for the grant of development aid linked with the construction and conversion of vessels, which fix A floor. Because of the development aim pursued, the aid under Article 4(7) is not subject to the same constraints as aid under Article 4(1) to (6). 'The aim of Article 4(7) of [Directive 87/167/EEC] is to allow aid to reduce the prices of ships to certain developing countries in specific circumstances, and not to grant rescue aid to yards in the Commu­ nity'. 46 54. The seventh directive allows develop­ ment aid to be linked to the construction of merchant vessels in the Community.

57. This shows the importance of the task 55. Aid under Article 4(7) of the directive entrusted by the Council to the Commis- which did not pursue a genuine development objective might disguise indirect aid to Com­

44 — Contested decision, IV, second paragraph, subparagraph 1. 45 — OJ 1991 L 158, p. 71. 43 — Article 4(1). See 2 above. 46 — Ibid., II, fourth paragraph.

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OPINION OF MR DARMON — CASE C-400/92

sion: to inquire whether the aid is develop­ 60. The check undertaken by the Commis­ ment aid or, in reality, indirect aid to the sion was of the latter kind, following which Community shipyards concerned. That is it concluded that 'COSCO is not a company also the point which the Commission raised which needs development aid in order to 47 50 in its Notice 92/C22/07. contribute to China's development'.

58. If checking the 'development' compo­ 61. In doing so, did it improperly add a con­ nent was limited, as contended by the Ger­ dition to those laid down by Article 4(7) of man Government, to establishing that 'the the seventh directive for the grant of devel­ aid ... was intended to help China to cover a opment aid? greatly increased transport need and save hard currency by boosting exports' and that 'the container ships would further the devel­ opment of an integrated transport system 48 ...', the checks undertaken would not enable any misuse of the procedure to be brought to light. 62. Admittedly, 'a measure of general appli­ cation cannot be implicitly amended by an 51 individual decision'. The Commission can­ not therefore, by its Decision, add a condi­ tion, or even a criterion, to those set out in the directive for the grant of development aid. 59. If, on the contrary, checking the 'partic­ ular "development" component' consists in examining closely the matter of the propor­ tionality (is the planned aid capable of attain­ ing the stated development objective, and could that objective be attained by a measure more in conformity with the competition 49 rules? ), and assessing the necessity for the 63. I consider that, whatever the awkward­ aid, having regard to the specific and precise ness in the drafting of the Commission Deci­ conditions for its use, the Commission could sion (which refers, in the French, italian, then determine whether the aid in question Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch versions, to was covered by Article 4(1) to (6).

50 — Contested decision, VI, third paragraph, subparagraph 2 — emphasis added. 47 — Cited above, note 12; see in particular p. 5. 51 _ Judgment of 24 March 1993 in Case C-313/90 CIRFS and 48 — Contested decision, II. Others v Commission [1993] ECRI-1125,paragraph 44. See 49 — And in particular, could the project not be financed by also paragraph 130 of the Opinion of Advocate General recourse to the market (cash flow)? Lenz.

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the criterion of necessity), that did not of Article 4(7) (without thereby asserting happen. that it came within other paragraphs of that article). Moreover, it observed the ratio legis of the directive, which seeks to limit aid granted in derogation from the rule of free competition. It also remained within the scope of the powers attributed to it for the 64. The Commission verified whether the purpose: moving from the general to the par­ envisaged aid pursued a specific development ticular and checking whether there is really objective, which is precisely what it is asked development aid where such is required. to do by the Council. The German version of the second subparagraph of Article 4(7) of the seventh directive is unambiguous in that respect: 'Die Kommission prüft, welches besondere Entwicklungsz/e/ mit der geplanten Beihilfe verfolgt wird ...'. The Ital­ ian version is even more explicit: '(La) Com­ missione ... verifica la specifica finalità di 67. Must not the Commission's discretion "sviluppo" contenuta nell'aiuto prospettato specifically enable it to refuse to declare par­ ticular aid compatible on the ground that the intended recipient has no need for it and that it is not necessary in order to attain the objectives laid down in Article 92(3)(a), (b) or (c) or those of a Council directive?

65. Finding in particular that COSCO was in a position to provide its own financing and renew its fleet under normal market conditions, it concluded that the aid in ques­ tion did not pursue such an objective and did 54 not fall within Article 4(7): the same devel- 68. Let us recall the Opinion of Advocate opment aim could be attained without State 55 aid (and therefore without the distortions of General Caportorti in Philip Morris: competition inevitably caused by it).

66. By thus examining the matter of propor­ 'there is no reason for derogating from the tionality, the Commission established that prohibition of State aids if a particular the aid project did not fall within the scope investment... may also take place irrespective 56 of that benefit'.

52 — That word docs not appear in the German, English or Greek versions. 53 ·— Emphasis added. 55 — Cited above, note 16. 54 — Contested decision, VI. 56 — At p. 2701.

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69. In its judgment in that case, the Court 72. Mention should also be made of the considered that the Commission was right to decision on the investment subsidy granted take the view that an aid granted on the basis to Deufil for the production of polyamide of Article 92(3) should be necessary in order yarns, in which the Commission refused to 57 to be declared compatible. apply Article 92(3). The Court approved it, observing that:

'The Commission in no way exceeded the limits of its discretion by considering that the granting of aid for an investment which 70. The legality of such a requirement is increases production capacity in a sector in upheld — albeit by implication in some which there is already considerable overpro­ instances — in the case-law of the Court. duction is contrary to the common interest and that aid of that sort is not of such a nature as to promote the economic develop­ 60 ment of the area at issue'.

71. Thus, in its judgment in Italy v Commis- 73. Of similar importance is the judgment of 61 sion, 58 the Court approved Decision 21 March 1991 in Italy v Commission, in 89/43/EEC by which the Commission found which the Italian Republic contended that that the aid granted to the ENI-Lanerossi the aid granted to Alfa Romeo came within group in the form of the injection of capital Article 92(3)(a) (because it was intended to into its subsidiaries engaged in the manufac­ promote economic development in the Mez­ ture of men's clothing was incompatible with zogiorno) or Article 92(3)(c) (because it was the common market. The Court held that the intended to develop certain activities or cer­ Commission had been right to take the view, tain economic regions). The Court rejected following an extremely detailed analysis, that that contention on the ground that: the aid in question was not appropriate to attainment of the Community objectives relating to sectoral aid to the textile industry or to the guidelines governing rescue aid for undertakings and could not, therefore, qual­ ify for any of the derogations provided for in 'the disputed injections of capital constituted 59 Article 92(3). rescue aid which, in the absence of a genuine

57 — Paragraphs 17 and 26. 60 — Judgment in Case 310/85 Deufil v Commission [1987] 58 — Cited above, note 26. ECR 901, paragraph 18. 59 — See paragraphs 30 to 39. 61 — Case C-305/89 [1991] ECR I-1603.

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restructuring plan, could not bring about the eral of its decisions, used as a yardstick the lasting development of regions where there approach of the private investor in a market was serious underemployment or of specific economy: the participation of the public 62 economic activities or economic areas.' authorities in the capital of an undertaking is not aid for the purposes of Article 92(1) of the Treaty where, in similar circumstances, a private investor, guided by the prospects of a return on capital, would have invested to the same extent. Does that not mean that State aid is provided only where there is no alter­ native financing by a private investor, and 74. The Commission's approach may be thus in case of need? summarized as follows:

'... aid will only be declared compatible where it contributes to the attainment of one of the development objectives referred to in 76. There is another reason for which the Article 92(3) and where it is proved that, need for aid must be examined. The directive without the intervention of the public does not merely refer to Article 92(3). It is authorities, the free interplay of market also based on Article 113 of the Treaty. forces would not alone be capable of attain­ ing the objectives in question. On the other hand, the Community authority will not authorize aid which is neither necessary nor proportionate to the attainment of those 63 objectives.'

77. As was pointed out by the Commission, the commercial policy of the Community, which includes the conditions applicable to 65 75. The concept of necessity is inherent in aid for exports to non-member countries, that of aid. Thus, prior to considering the falls exclusively within the powers of the issue of proportionality under Article 92(3), Community. Accordingly, a Member State where it is necessary to classify State aid for must not be able to frustrate that policy by public undertakings, the Court has, in sev­ means of generous State aid outside the strict

62 — Paragraph 36. 64 — For example, in Italy v Commission, cited above, note 61, 63 — G. M. Roberti, 'Le contrôle de la Commission des Com­ paragraph 23. munautés européennes sur les aides nationales', AJDA, 20 65 — Opinion of 11 November 1975 (1/75, [1975] ECR 1355, at June 1993, p. 397, at 407 — emphasis added. 1362.

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framework defined by the Council directive 80. Finally, it will be noted that the Com­ or by evading the conditions laid down by mission has set itself the objective of elimi­ the latter. nating all aid to the shipbuilding sector and that the issue here is a derogation from the general rule that aid is not permissible. Provisions under which aid may be declared compatible must therefore be interpreted strictly.

78. As the Court emphasized in Opinion 1/75:

81. It follows, in my opinion, that in such circumstances the Commission is fully enti­ tled to appraise the concept of development aid, as provided for in Article 4(7) of the 'any unilateral action on the part of Member directive, and that it will not exceed its pow­ States would lead to disparities in the condi­ ers by examining whether the aid is neces­ tions for the grant of export credits, calcu­ sary. lated to distort competition between under­ takings of the various Member States in external markets. Such distortion can be eliminated only by means of a strict unifor­ mity of credit conditions granted to under­ takings in the Community, whatever their 66 nationality.' 82. When finding that the aid granted was not needed by the recipient undertaking and that it did not therefore pursue the develop­ ment aid objective set by the Council, the Commission possessed sufficient information to say that the aid did not fall within the scope of Article 4(7) of the seventh directive and could not therefore qualify for the dero­ 79. It is therefore for the Commission, as gation allowed by the provision. guardian of the Treaty, to ensure that the Member States remain within the limits of the derogation and apply Article 4(7) only in those cases where they grant genuine devel­ opment aid. By granting aid that is not nec­ essary, a Member State would circumvent the Community rules and exercise a sort of par­ 83. If we apply here the principle laid down allel power, which is precluded by Article in the Court's judgment in Belgium v Com- 113.

67 — See the seventh recital in the preamble to the seventh direc­ 66 — Ibid., at p. 1364. tive.

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mission, failure to comply with the essen­ 87. Should the Commission also have found tial condition for aid based on Article 4(7) to a risk of serious distortion of competition in be compatible with the common market (it the sea freight sector, on the ground that the must contribute to development) means that vessels bought by COSCO will strengthen the aid concerned is ipso facto incompatible. the latter's position on routes on which Community shipping companies operate?

84. The Commission nevertheless took its reasoning further and observed that the grant of aid at issue was liable to bring about a 88. I do not think that such an objection is twofold distortion of competition: by appropriate. adversely affecting the Community ship­ yards other than those to which construction of the vessels was entrusted and also the Community shipping companies that would have to compete with COSCO .

89. By definition, the directive takes account of such a risk, it being inherent in any devel­ opment aid, which can always have a 'rebound' effect to the detriment of Commu­ 85. Let us consider these two points. nity operators. For that reason, it does not require that vessels bought with the benefit of development aid should be used on routes where there is no competition with Commu­ nity shipping companies. Even if the aid were development aid actually needed by COSCO , a risk of that kind would have 86. It is clear that once it is established that existed. the planned aid for the three container ships for COSCO cannot be regarded as genuine development aid within the meaning of Arti­ cle 4(7), the distortion of competition which it necessarily produces in the common mar­ ket for the benefit of the shipyards con­ cerned can no longer be justified. It is symp­ tomatic, in that connection, that the initial 90. However, I do not see in that finding by complaint made against the COSCO project the Commission any reason for the annul­ emanated from a Community shipyard. ment of its Decision. It may go beyond what was required, but it does not detract from the principal grounds of the Decision: the 68 — Cited above, note 20, paragraphs 32 and 33. absence of genuine development aid.

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OPINION OF MR DARMON — CASE C-400/92

The error of assessment concerned, I have just said that that finding was superfluous. Let me say, for the sake of completeness, with regard to the shipyards concerned, that the Commission pointed out, without any evidence to the contrary having been produced, that they were able to obtain 'a price ... at the upper end of the pre­ vailing market prices for this type of ship'. 91. According to the applicant, the Commis­ sion's Decision is vitiated by an error of assessment in that, contradictorily, it refers to a risk of serious distortion of competition between the Member States, both in the shipbuilding sector and in the sea freight sec­ tor, but nevertheless states that it is not in a position to show that the price charged The principles of equal treatment, protec- reflects aid to the shipyards (VI, third para­ tion of legitimate expectations and the right 69 to a fair hearing graph, 1st subparagraph).

92. The considerable discretion vested in the Commission in the matter of aid under Arti­ 94. The Federal Republic of Germany cle 92(3) means that review by the Court alleges breach of the principles of equal must be limited: 'The fact that the review is treatment, protection of legitimate expecta­ limited does not, however, mean that there is no review: the material accuracy of the facts tions and the right to a fair hearing. must be examined, as must the question of any error of assessment or any error of law, the propriety of the procedure and the pos­ 70 sibility of misuse of powers'.

95. Did the Commission take account of the need for the aid for the first time in its Deci­ sion of 31 July 1992, since it did not mention 93. As regards the risk of serious distortion that aspect — according to the Federal of competition to an extent contrary to the Republic of Germany — either in its notice common interest as far as shipowners are of 3 January 1989 on the interpretation of Article 4(7) of the seventh directive or in the notice by which it initiated the investigative 69 — Application, paragraph 9. procedure in this case, or in the exchanges of 70 — J. Biancarelli, 'Le contrôle de la Cour de Justice des Com­ correspondence which preceded the adop­ munautés européennes en matière d'aides publiques', AJDA, 20 June 1993, p. 412, at 423. tion of the contested Decision?

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96. It is apparent both from the documents Breach of the principle of equal treatment annexed to the application and from the oral procedure that the matter of the necessity for the aid was an underlying element or was referred to (1) in the letter of 22 November 71 1991 which gave rise to the notice, (2) in discussions preceding the contested Decision 99. The Court's case-law is consistent: between representatives of the Commission 72 and of the German Government, and (3) as early as the letter of 3 January 1989, in which the Commission emphasized the importance of verifying the particular 'development' component of the planned aid. '... the general principle of equality, of which he prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality is a mere specific enunciation, is one of the fundamental principles of Com­ munity law. This principle requires that sim­ ilar situations shall not be treated differently unless differentiation is objectively justi­ 73 fied.' 97. Germany's allegation as to breach of the principles of equal treatment, protection of legitimate expectations and the right to a fair hearing is closely linked with the absence of any requirement of necessity in the measures taken by the Commission before adopting the Decision. 100. According to the Federal Republic of Germany, the application of a criterion not included in Article 4(7) of the seventh direc­ tive or in the letter of 3 January 1989 is con­ trary to the principle of equal treatment and 7 is unlawful. 4

98. It having been established that the Com­ mission did refer to that requirement before 31 July 1992, the last three contentions call 101. Since examination of the need for the for only brief comment. aid is inherent in that of the development component, there was no possibility that the Commission breached the principle of equal 71 — '...it is not clear to the Commission based on the informa­ treatment by carrying it out. tion received from the market whether the aid project for the COSCO container vessel contract is not more of an operating aid to the German shipyards involved rather than genuine aid to a developing country' (OJ 1992 C 22, p. 5). 72 — At the hearing, the Agent for the Commission mentioned, without being contradicted, a meeting held on 12 February 73 — Judgment in Case 810/79 Vberschtr [1980] ECR2747, 1992 at which the representatives of DG IV expressed paragraph 16. See also the judgment in Case 147/79 Hoch- doubts as to whether COSCO was an undertaking eligible strass v Court of Justice [1980] ECR 3005. for development aid. 74 — Paragraph 7 of the application.

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OPINION OF MR DARMON — CASE C-400/92

102. It will also be noticed that the applicant proceedings initiated against a person which State does not refer to any State aid proce­ are liable to culminate in a measure adversely dure in the arguments on which it bases its affecting that person, a fundamental principle contention. of Community law which must be guaran­ teed even in the absence of any rules govern­ 75 ing the procedure in question'.

Breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations

106. Whilst that 'principle requires the Member State in question to be placed in a position in which it may effectively make known its views on the observations submit­ ted by interested third parties under Article 93(2) of the Treaty and on which the Com­ 103. To invoke this principle successfully, 76 mission proposes to base its decision', it the Federal Republic of Germany would also requires that the Commission include in have had to demonstrate a change in Com­ its decision only those matters on which the munity practice which had affected it Member State concerned has been able to adversely. give its views.

104. As we have seen, there was no such 107. It has not been shown that the German change. There is thus no evidence of any Government was not able to explain the breach of this principle. need for the aid — quite the contrary.

Breach of the right to a fair hearing

108. This allegation, like the two before it, has thus not been substantiated.

75 — Judgment in Case C-301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR I-307, paragraph 29. See the case-law cited. See also the judgment in Case 40/85 Belgium v Commission [1986] 105. It has been consistently held that ECR 2321, paragraph 28. 'observance of the right to be heard is, in all 76 — Ibid., paragraph 30.

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109. I therefore consider that the application is inadmissible as regards Article 1 of the Decision and must be dismissed as regards the remaining pleas, and that the applicant should be ordered to pay the costs.

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