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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·22.6.1994

C-44/93

ECLI:EU:C:1994:262

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61993CC0044

NAMUR-LES ASSURANCES DU CREDIT v OND

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL LENZ delivered on 22 June 1994 *

Mr President, 2. The Court d'Appel referred these ques­ Members of the Court, tions to the Court in proceedings for interim measures brought by the Belgian credit- insurance company Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit (hereinafter 'Namur') and Compagnie Belge d'Assurance Crédit (here­ inafter 'COBAC') against Office National du Ducroire (hereinafter 'the OND' ), the agency to which the advantages at issue were A — Introduction accorded, and the Belgian State. Essentially, the application for interim measures, which COBAC (but not, however, Namur) with­ drew after the order for reference was sub­ mitted to the Court, sought provisionally to restrain OND's activities in the new field.

1. The Cour d'Appel (Court of Appeal), Brussels, has referred to the Court three questions relating to aid, which, as we know, is governed by Article 92 et seq. of the 3. The facts and legal background of the Treaty. The questions relate to an establish­ main proceedings are as follows. ment which benefited by a system intro­ duced by the Member State concerned before the Treaty entered into force, and extended its activities to cover a new area. The Cour dAppel wishes to establish whether such an enlargement of the estab­ 4. OND , which was set up by the Law of lishment's activities constitutes the grant or 7 August 1921, is a public credit-insurance alteration of aid, whether its classification as establishment. The framework laying down a new or existing aid may be affected by the the content of and conditions for its activi­ fact that the Commission remained silent ties is prescribed chiefly by Royal Decree after it had requested and obtained informa­ No 42 of 31 August 1939, 1 which since the tion from the Member State concerned fol­ entry into force of the Law of 12 Janu­ lowing a threat to initiate proceedings, and ary 1981 2bears the name 'the Law on the whether, in the circumstances of the case, the OND' (to which I shall refer as the 'OND aforesaid enlargement of the establishment's Law'). That instrument has been amended activities may be imputed to the Member on several occasions, in particular on State concerned.

1 — Moniteur belge of 4 October 1939. * Original language: German. 2 — Moniteur belge of 6 February 1981.

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17 June 1991, following the institution of the is administered by a board of directors, con­ main proceedings. sisting of a chairman, a vice-chairman and 18 members. Six of those members (and their alternates) are appointed at the proposal of the Prime Minister and the Ministers respon­ sible for Economic Affairs, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Relations, Foreign Trade, 5. Article 1 of the OND Law bestows legal and Development Cooperation. Each of the personality on the OND . Article 3, in the six board members represents on the board version in force at time of the events with of directors the Minister who nominated which this case is concerned and in the ver­ him. sion in force at the time when the application was made for interim measures (to which I shall refer as 'the 1991 amended version'), defined the OND's purpose as follows:

7. According to Article 16(1) of the OND Law, the delegates of the ministers are to inform the board of directors of the general policy to be pursued by the OND .

'Article 1 The Office National du Ducroire shall promote exports and Belgian invest­ ments abroad.

8. Article 16(2) provides that, when votes are held on the board of directors, those del­ egates may suspend decisions which, in their opinion, are unlawful or conflict with the Article 2 It shall carry out its task by means rules of the organization or the interests of of the following actions: the State. If a ministerial delegate suspends a decision, he is to report to the minister who conferred his office as board member upon him. The minister then has five clear days following the suspension of the decision in order to take a decision. If he fails to take a (1) The Office National du Ducroire may decision within the prescribed period, the provide guarantees so as to reduce the suspended decision becomes binding. risks attaching to exports and Belgian investment abroad, especially credit risks ...'.

9. According to Article 13(1) of the Law, the board of directors is to have all the adminis­ trative and decision-making powers neces­ 6. Pursuant to Article 12 of the aforemen­ sary in order to achieve the OND's objec­ tioned version of the OND Law, the OND tives. Article 13(3) provides that the board is

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NAMUR-LES ASSURANCES DU CREDIT v OND

to decide upon all transactions and the con­ those bonds (Article 7); its annual financial ditions relating thereto. It follows from Arti­ deficit was covered by the State; and it was cle 13(4) that, within limits to be determined exempt from the tax levied on insurance con­ by the board, the latter may delegate to the tracts (Article 23) and corporation tax (Arti­ General Manager or the Managers of the cle 23 and Article 94(2)(d) of the Law on OND the power to grant certain guarantees Income Tax in the version of the Law of mentioned in Article 3(2)(1). In order to do 11 April 1983). so, the board requires the consent of the Minister of Economic Affairs. However, board decisions relating to the acceptance of new risks within the meaning of Arti­ cle 3(2)(1) are to be submitted to the Minis­ ter of Economic Affairs pursuant to Arti­ cle 13(5). If he does not object within two clear days of the notification of such a deci­ sion, the decision becomes binding, subject to the provisions of Article 16. 12. Within the confines laid down in this manner by the OND Law, the OND's activ­ ities gradually expanded. For present pur­ poses, it is pointed out in this connection that the OND has collaborated with COBAC on a contractual footing since 1935. On the basis of the relevant contractual agreements, the OND had been active on the market in insurance for exports to western European countries from a date — which, 10. Under Article 10(1) of the Law, the however, cannot be accurately determined OND was entitled to enter into such collab­ from the information available to the Court oration with credit-insurance undertakings — until January 1989 only in certain excep­ as the Law allowed it do for this purpose, in tional cases. According to Article 2 of the such forms and on such conditions were laid version of the cooperation agreement of down by the Royal Decree. 30 March 1982, COBAC alone was entitled to insure commercial risks attaching to the export of goods and services to the following countries:

11. Lastly, the 1939 Royal Decree conferred various advantages on the OND , which were governed by Articles 1, 5, 7 and 23 of the OND Law in force before the 1991 amend­ the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, ment. These advantages were: it operated Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Gibraltar, under State guarantee (Article 1) and was the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Ice­ endowed with State bonds as sole owner land, Italy, Malta, Norway, the Netherlands, (Article 5) together with the income from Portugal, Switzerland and Sweden.

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OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-44/93

13. Article 3 provided for the following In addition, under Article 4(1) of the cooper­ exceptions where the OND was entitled to ation agreement, COBAC was debarred provide insurance: from covering political risks, irrespective of the country of destination.

the debtor was a person governed by public law or a private person acting with the guar­ 14. On 9 March 1988, the Commission antee of a person governed by public law; informed COBAC that the cooperation agreement might be caught by the prohibi­ tion set out in Article 85(1) of the Treaty, and advised that it be notified to the Com­ mission.

the amount of the transaction to be insured exceeded BFR 100 million;

15. By letter of 27 September 1988, the OND terminated the cooperation agree­ ment 3on the ground that changes were to be expected as a result of the introduction of the single market and that issue could be the maturity of the credit for the transaction taken from any quarter at any time with the to be insured was in excess of five years; compatibility of the cooperation agreement with Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome.

the transaction to be insured related to industrial projects, articles of heavy equip­ 16. As appears from the documents before ment or works contracts; the Court, OND's board of directors resolved to terminate the agreement with COBAC on the same day. At the same time, the board decided to instruct the manage­ ment to take the necessary measures in order

the operation to be insured concerned a 3 — It is not absolutely clear whether the termination took effect transaction for which COBAC considered on 31 December 1988, as, according to the order for refer­ ence, the OND considered, or at an earlier date (October that it was not in a position to participate in 1988), in accordance with the wording of the letter of termi­ the risks as provided for in the cooperation nation in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the cooperation agreement. However, this is of no relevance to agreement. the present proceedings.

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NAMUR-LES ASSURANCES DU CRÉDIT v OND

to take up direct insurance on the European the 'instruments constituting the OND market in such a way as not to interfere with [should be amended] so as to harmonize the competition or to interfere with it as little as conditions of competition'. possible.

17. It further appears from the case-file that 19. It is clear that in 1989 — according to four Belgian ministers, namely the Ministers the OND's submissions of 1 February that of Finance, Economic Affairs, Foreign Trade year reproduced in the order for reference — and Development Cooperation asked the the OND entered the market in credit insur­ OND by letter of 4 January 1989, referring ance for exports to western Europe without to the board's resolution of 27 June 1988, to the limitations laid down in the cooperation suspend the implementation of the planned agreement. new insurance operations relating to com­ mercial risks in western Europe by 1 Febru­ ary. The signatories of the letter stated that their delegates had been instructed to act accordingly at the board meeting on 9 Janu­ ary 1989. The ministers justified this on the ground that the competition issues raised by that new activity had not yet been satisfacto­ rily resolved. They stated that a working 20. Namur and COBAC took various steps party would be set up in order to consider in order to contest the said enlargement of the future of the OND in more detail in Jan­ the OND's field of activity. uary 1989.

18. By letter of 1 February 1989, the four 21. Accordingly, in October 1989 they ministers informed the OND of the 'recom­ lodged a complaint with the Commission in mendations' which the working party had which they argued that the extension of the made and which the signatories, as appears advantages accorded to the OND to its from the letter, approved. As the order for newly adopted field of activity — insurance reference expressly states, the recommenda­ transactions relating to exports to western tions were that there should be a 'progres­ Europe — was incompatible with Arti­ sive, prudent and limited entry by the OND cle 92(1) of the Treaty. They also maintained into the market of insuring commercial risks that the Belgian State had failed to fulfil its connected with Belgian exports to western obligations under Article 93(3), according to Europe as from 1 February 1989' and that which the Commission is to be informed of

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OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-44/93

plans to grant aid and aid measures should 24. Also in October 1989, COBAC and not be put into effect until the procedure laid Namur initiated the main proceedings. As down in Article 93(2) has been concluded. appears from the order for reference, they asked in particular in their application for interim measures that the OND should be enjoined to suspend any credit insurance operations in respect of exports to the EEC so long as the Commission had not approved the aid which the Belgian State had granted the OND in connection with such opera­ tions or a final judgment or decision had not 22. As long ago as 12 January 1990, the been handed down in the main proceedings Commission had requested the Belgian State taken by Namur and COBAC in the Tribu­ for information in the course of an in-depth nal de Premiere Instance (Court of First examination of existing export aid in the Instance). Community. It reiterated that request on 4 June 1991, adding explanations: it referred expressly to the complaint which it had received and on 23 August 1991 asked the Belgian State to provide additional informa­ tion. It was stated in each of those requests for information that if no reply or an inade­ quate reply was received within the pre­ scribed period, the Commission would be 25. The President of the Tribunal de Pre­ obliged to initiate the procedure provided mière Instance, Brussels, considered that the for in Article 93(2). aid at issue was caught by Article 93(1) of the Treaty, and held that, owing to that pro­ vision's lack of direct effect, he had no juris­ diction to entertain the application. The applicants appealed to the Cour d'Appel, Brussels, which referred the following ques­ tions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

23. The Belgian State responded to the requests within the prescribed period. On 22 October 1992, the Commission notified counsel for Namur (and COBAC) that it was pursuing its investigations in the field of export credit insurance generally and those concerning the compatibility of the OND's '(1) Must Article 93(3) of the Treaty be activities with Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC interpreted as meaning that the granting Treaty in particular. It stated that it would or alteration of aid includes a decision notify the complainants of the progress made of a Member State to authorize, after with these investigations 'in the near future'. the entry into force of the Treaty, a Between the time when the complaints were public establishment, which previously received and the present date, the Commis­ engaged only incidentally in credit sion has taken no further steps. insurance for exports to other Member

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NAMUR-LES ASSURANCES DU CRÉDIT v OND

States, to exercise that activity in future governing that establishment, a without restriction, so that the aid general policy entailing enlargement which was granted by that State to the of the scope of an aid; establishment under legislation predat­ ing the entry into force of the Treaty now applies to the exercise of that activ­ ity as thus extended?

(b) not opposing, through intervention by the ministerial delegates on the board of directors of the public (2) Must Article 93 of the Treaty be inter­ establishment, a decision by the preted as meaning that it is necessary to board entailing enlargement of the regard new aid as being subject to the scope of an aid, in particular by not rules governing existing aid if new aid, bringing about the annulment of not having been notified to the that decision, when the legislation Commission in accordance with governing the public establishment Article 93(3), was the subject of a permitted such annulment by the complaint to the Commission and the State after suspension of the latter, after carrying out a preliminary decision taken by the ministerial examination of the aid and addressing delegates?' to the Member State concerned a request for information concerning the aid in which it stated that, in the event of failure to reply or receipt of an unsatisfactory reply before the end of the period allowed, it would be obliged to initiate the procedure laid down by B — Assessment Article 93(2) of the Treaty (which request was satisfied), did not initiate the said procedure within a reasonable period?

The first and third questions

(3) Must Article 92(1) of the Treaty be interpreted as meaning that the granting or alteration of aid includes conduct of a Member State consisting in: General

(a) communicating, through ministerial delegates sitting on the board of directors of a public establishment 26. As is clear from section VI.3 of the order having its own legal personality and for reference, the national court's first ques­ in accordance with the legislation tion has to do with the 'grant or alteration'

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OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-44/93

of aid within the meaning of the first sen­ Code], to prohibit temporarily the imple­ tence of Article 93(3). The national court is mentation of such a measure.' interested in the interpretation of that expression for the purposes of the prohibi­ tion which the third sentence attaches to the grant or alteration of aid:

28. More specifically, it is a question for the Cour d'Appel of legally categorizing the decision to extend the OND's field of activ­ ities if that decision means that 'the aid which was granted by [the State in question] 'The Member State concerned shall not put to the establishment under legislation predat­ its proposed measures into effect until this ing the entry into force of the Treaty now procedure has resulted in a final decision.' applies to the exercise of that activity as thus extended'. The national court therefore con­ siders the possibility that a case such as this may also involve the grant or alteration of aid where it is not the rules set out in the OND Law on the nature and content of the individual aids which are being altered but the OND's activities which those aid mea­ sures benefit. 27. The national court makes whether it grants the application made to it temporarily to debar the OND from carrying out activi­ ties in the new field dependent upon the applicability of that prohibition. It states as follows in this connection:

29. Since no other action in regard to the aid system instituted by the OND Law other than the decision to extend its sphere of activities is discernible, the outcome of the main proceedings turns on resolving this problem. This is because the system in ques­ tion existed even before the EEC Treaty '... this court must examine whether the Bel­ came into force and can therefore be imple­ gian State and the OND have prima facie mented, if it is not impugned, as an existing infringed Article 93(3) of the Treaty by aid 5 as long as the Commission has not implementing, without notification, a new or amended aid measure; if that is the case, it would, where appropriate, have jurisdiction 4 — Last paragraph of section III of the order for reference. on the basis of that provision and of Arti­ 5 — Judgment in Case C-387/92 Banco de Crédito Industrial cle 584(1) of the Code Judiciaire [Judicial [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 20.

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NAMUR-LES ASSURANCES DU CRÉDIT v OND

found it to be incompatible with the com­ light of certain matters raised in the body of mon market. Only if it is a question of the the third question. The opening words grant or alteration of aid will the prohibition emphasize the expression 'grant or alter­ on its implementation sought by Namur ation' of an aid as being the subject of the hold good (third sentence of Article 93(3)). interpretation sought from the Court. Parts (a) and (b) of the question refer respectively to a 'general policy' communicated by the ministerial delegates and to the ministerial delegates' not opposing a decision by the board of directors 'entailing enlargement of 30. The scope of the first question has the scope of an aid'. It might be considered hereby been defined. that the Cour d'Appel is seeking here to raise again — but in a new guise — the issue brought up in the first question, namely whether the enlargement of the OND's field of activity is to be regarded as the 'grant or alteration of aid'.

31. The third question is closely connected with the first. The first question assumes the existence of a 'decision' of the Member State in question 'to authorize' a public establish­ ment to exercise the relevant activity 'in future without restrictions'. The premiss as so worded assumes that the decision to extend the field of activity of the public 33. In reality, the national court is concerned establishment can be imputed to the Belgian to clarify the Belgian State's responsibility State in so far as it authorized it. for the enlargement of the OND's field of activity. This emerges first from the argu­ ments of the parties set out in part V of the order for reference: the applicants claim that the Belgian State is responsible, whereas the OND and the Belgian State take the view that the decision was that of the OND (and 32. That very premiss brings the national not of the Belgian State). Secondly, the court in its third question into doubt again. national court's third question, unlike its The third question is concerned with first, contemplates not Article 93(3) but Arti­ whether, in the light of the circumstances cle 92(1). This reference seems to be which it sets out in that question, the deci­ explained by the fact that only 'aid granted sion to extend the OND's field of activity by a Member State or through State resourc­ should be imputed to the Belgian State. es', that is to say, a measure attributable to a Admittedly, that interpretation of the ques­ (Member) State, falls within the scope of tion does not clearly follow from its word­ Article 92(1) (and Articles 93 and 94). 7

ing. The opening words raise a doubt in the

7 — Judgments in Case 72/79 Commission v Italy [I980] 6 — Sec paragraph 19 of the judgment in Banco de Crédito ECR 1411, paragraphs 23, 24 and 25, Joined Cases 67/85, Industrial (cited in the preceding footnote) and the judgment 6S/85 and 70/85 Van der Kooy v Commission [1988] in Case C-47/91 Italy v Commission [1992] ECR I-4145. ECR 219, paragraphs 36, 37 and 38, and Case C-303/88 Italy paragraph 25. v Commission [1991] ECR I-1433, paragraphs 11 to 14.

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OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-44/93

34. The interrelationship between the first third question from several points of view, and the third questions can therefore be which should be examined seriatim. First, characterized as follows: they contend that the question is concerned with the assessment of facts, with the result that the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to answer it. The Belgian Government and the OND base themselves in this respect on the judgment in Hulst v Produktschap voor The third question seeks to establish whether Siergewassen. 8 in the circumstances of the present case the State responsibility on which the expression 'grant or alteration' of aid turns can be held to exist.

37. That view cannot be accepted. It is true, In contrast, the first question is concerned however, that it is for the national court to 9 with whether the decision (imputed to the ascertain the relevant facts. That can also State) on the enlargement of the OND's field consist of drawing inferences from particular of activity can be regarded objectively as the circumstances which are (also) of a factual 'grant or alteration of aid' within the mean­ nature for the purpose of resolving the ques­ ing of the Treaty. tion of fact which is material for deciding the case. To that extent, it is possible to say that there is an 'assessment of facts' which is a 10 matter for the national court alone.

35. In these circumstances, I feel that it is appropriate to consider the third question first.

38. In the instant case, however, the Cour d'Appel is not seeking such an assessment The third question from the Court: the circumstances set out in the third question are presented as or at least assumed to be facts. Rather, in its third ques­ tion the national court is asking the Court, as I have already explained, to elaborate criteria Admissibility for interpretation on the basis of which it is

8 — Case 51/74 Hulst v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1975] ECR 79; see paragraph 12 of that Judgment. 9 — See, for example, the judgment in Case C-30/93 AC-ATEL [1994] ECR I-2305, paragraph 17. 36. The Belgian Government and the OND 10 — See Hulst v Produktschap voor Siergewassen, loc. cit. (foot­ have cast doubt on the admissibility of the note 8).

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NAMUR-LES ASSURANCES DU CRÉDIT v OND

to determine whether a sufficient relation­ Answering the third question ship for Article 92 et seq. exists in this case between the enlargement of the OND's field of activity which is at issue and the action of the State. The Court of Justice has jurisdic­ tion to provide such criteria (although it has no jurisdiction to apply Community law to a 1 specific case). 1 41. In replying to the third question, as resulting from its constructing and wording, parts (a) and (b) should be considered con­ secutively. This view is also supported by the fact that it is not apparent from the order for reference whether the Cour d'Appel itself was convinced that a general policy existed 39. Secondly, contrary to that which the Bel­ within the meaning of part (a) of the ques­ gian Government and the OND argue, the tion. third question does not relate to the inter­ pretation of national law, which, it is con­ ceded, is a matter for the national court 1 alone. 2 On the contrary, it is clear from the construction and wording of the question that the national court sought to refer to the Court of Justice the problem of the interpre­ 42. I can deal with part (a) of the question tation of Community law defined above. briefly. The only possible inference to be drawn from the wording of Article 16(1) of the OND Law in the version in point is that the general policy referred to there is binding on the OND , with the result that it has the effect of an instruction.

40. Lastly, it would not affect the admissibil­ ity of the question if, as the Belgian Govern­ ment and the OND maintain, the questions were based on factual hypotheses in dispute between the parties to the main proceedings. Indeed, it is for the national court to deter­ 43. In such case, responsibility on the part mine in the light of the particular circum­ of the State, as required by Article 92 et seq., stances of each case both the need for a pre­ cannot be doubted. liminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the 1 questions which it submits to the Court. 3

11 — Sec, for example, the judgment in Case 7/75 Mr and Mrs E 44. To my mind, such responsibility must v Belgian State [1975] ECR 679, paragraph 10. 12 — Judgment in Casc-37/92 Vanacker and Lesage [1993] ECR also be held to exist in the case of the situa­ I-4947, paragraph 7. tion described in part (b) of the question. 13 — Sec in particular the judgment in Case C-127/92 Enderby v The involvement of the State in the material Frendiay Health Authority [1993] ECR I-5535, paragraph decision for the purposes of Article 92 et seq.

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does not have to go so far as to constitute an accorded to the OND by statute were con­ instruction in the aforesaid sense. Instead it ferred on it permanently and benefit all the is sufficient that the third party (whose OND's insurance activities, albeit to a differ­ action raises the question as to whether it ing extent. None of those advantages are should be imputed to the State) could not confined by reason of its nature to a partic­ take the decision in question without taking ular market within the credit-insurance sec­ account of the requirements of public tor. The advantages differ only in point of 4 authorities. 1 their effects on individual business data. I shall make this clear.

45. According to the wording of the ques­ tion, the preconditions were satisfied for the ministerial delegates to suspend the board's decision to extend the OND's activities pur­ suant to Article 16(2) of the OND Law and for the decision to be revoked by the super­ vising ministers. Consequently, the OND's decision could be issued only if it took account of the requirements of the Belgian State which was in a position under Arti­ cle 16(2) to enforce them. As a result, in the circumstances referred to by the Cour d'Appel, a decision such as the one at issue taken by the OND's board is to be imputed 47. The State guarantee affects each individ­ to the Belgian State for the purposes of Arti­ ual insurance contract in so far as no costs cle 92 et seq. for reinsurance, which would otherwise be necessary, arise. Also the exemption from tax on insurance contracts constitutes an advan­ tage which is effective for every individual insurance contract. Those two advantages take effect irrespective of the aggregate vol­ ume of the OND's business, of the profit­ The first question ability of individual transactions and of the aggregate result of OND's operations. The capital endowment and the grant of interest thereon also have an impact irrespective of the sector of activity, although they have less of an effect as the volume of business rises unless the capital endowment is increased 46. I. The background to the first question 15 commensurately. The exemption from corpo- is the fact that the five advantages ration tax and the coverage of the financial deficit mitigate the disadvantages flowing from a positive or negative trading result, 14 — See paragraph 37 of the judgment in Van der Kooy v Com- and this effect is all the more marked the fur­ mission, cited in footnote 7. 15 — See section 11 above. ther the result is at one extreme or the other.

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NAMUR-LES ASSURANCES DU CRÉDIT v OND

48. If the OND's field of activity is would be assessed by the Commission in the extended, the scope of the aid also extends to course of its review. To equate an alteration cover the new activity. In this connection, of the field of activity with the grant or alter­ the State guarantee and the exemption from ation of aid would call in question the differ­ tax on insurance contracts also mean that the ence between paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article amount of funds made available by the State 93. Moreover, differences between Member in a given period increases with respect to States would arise in assessing such effects of the original situation if insurance contracts aid. In the final analysis, to equate an alter­ are concluded in that period in the new field ation in an establishment's field of activity of activity. In the event of such an enlarge­ with the grant or alteration of aid in this way ment of the establishment's field of activity, would mean that the undertaking benefiting the exemption from corporation tax and cov­ by the aid would have to obtain a positive erage for the annual financial deficit may decision from the Commission as soon as it possibly result in State funds flowing into the altered its activity or took a strategic deci­ OND which would not have accrued to it in sion which might change the effects of aid. the absence of the enlargement of the field of They maintain that this is not what Arti­ activity, in particular if that enlargement cle 93(3) signifies. results in increased turnover.

50. The French and Netherlands Govern­ 49. II. Whether, in view of the 'variable ments take a different view. They point out geometry' of the aid, the decision enlarging in the first place that a distinction has to be the OND's field of activity can be regarded made in the sphere of credit insurance as the 'grant or alteration of aid' is in dispute between (a) risks which are reinsurable (ces- between the parties. The Belgian Govern­ sible) and hence can be taken over by private ment and the OND take the view that the insurance undertakings and (b) other risks. question should be answered in the negative. They examine in the light of this distinction First, they point out that the system of the potential effects on the market in credit advantages, as it has been laid down in the insurance of an enlargement of the establish­ OND Law since 1939, was not altered when ment's field of activity. The Netherlands the OND's field of activity was enlarged. Government states that hitherto the OND They grant that the alteration of the field of dealt exclusively, or virtually exclusively, activity may change the effects of the aid on with non-reinsurable risks. The decision to the market. However, they maintain that this extend its field of activity means that the is covered by the express provision of Arti­ OND can now accept reinsurable risks or, at cle 93(1) of the Treaty, according to which least, that its opportunities for so doing are the Commission is to keep under constant significantly increased. This does not consti­ review existing systems of aid. Changes in tute a negligible change, since it means that circumstances which, as in this case, might the OND has become a competitor for pri­ influence the effects produced by an aid vate credit insurers.

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51. The French Government's analysis is an authorization of the Belgian State is to be largely the same. In addition, it points out equated with the alteration of an existing that, at the time when the decision was taken system of aid. to enlarge the OND's field of activity, the aid was not confined to its original field of operations, something which could have been done by taking various steps (separate accounting, arithmetical methods). In favour of its view that the OND's original activity was not such as to distort competition, it adds that the agreement between the OND and COBAC, in conjunction with the nature of the transactions earmarked for the OND , 54. Namur argues similarly. In order for ruled out any competition with the OND's Article 93(3) to apply, it turns simply on operations. Political risks and credits relating whether the State gives, by unilateral and thereto with a maturity of more than five autonomous decisions, undertakings years have been classified both by an expert resources or procures for them advantages working party at the Council and by the intended to encourage the attainment of the Commission as non-reinsurable risks. economic and social objectives sought.

55. From this angle, it considers that the aid 52. The Commission and Namur also take for transactions relating to exports to Com­ the view that the national court's first ques­ munity countries would not have existed tion should be answered in the affirmative. before the Belgian State's 1989 decision. It is However, they do not rely on an appraisal of immaterial that the provisions of the OND the potential effects on the market of the Law covered those activities in abstracto and alteration at issue, but on the fact that it hence at the same time the aid for them: the enlarged the field of application of the aid. aid was not actually implemented until after the Treaty entered into force. Article 93(3) should be interpreted in the light of its objective and of the actual economic circum­ stances. Such an approach is consistent with the Court's case-law. Consequently, matters cannot turn on the fact that there is no (new) legislative measure. It is also irrelevant that even before 1989 the OND operated in the sector of exports to Community countries to 53. The Commission considers in this con­ the extent permitted by the agreement with nection that to apply the aid provided for in COBAC, since according to the wording of abstracto in the OND Law since 1939 for the national court's question that constituted the first time to new activities on the basis of merely an incidental activity. For all those

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reasons, the decision by the Belgian State opportunity to review, in sufficient time and constitutes the grant of new aid. The view in the general interest of the Communities, might also be taken, Namur argues, that any plan to grant or alter aid. 7 there has been an alteration of the system of aid introduced in 1939. Article 93(3) equates this with the grant of aid. It is only exempt from compulsory notification as provided for in that provision if the alteration is neg­ ligible. Since the aid in question in this case is being applied for the first time to insur­ ance cover for exports to Community coun­ 58. In this connection, the purpose of the tries, the alteration cannot be regarded as third sentence of Article 93(3) is to 'prevent negligible. the implementation of aid contrary to the 18 Treaty'. It safeguards the machinery for review laid down by that article, which, in turn, is essential for ensuring the functioning of the common market. The prohibition laid down in that article on putting any proposed measures into effect is designed to ensure 56. III. Since the issue as defined above can­ that the effects of a system of aid cannot take not be resolved on the basis of the wording place before the Commission has had a rea­ of the relevant provision or in the light of sonable period in which to study the pro­ case-law, the aim of the relevant provision posed measures in detail and, if necessary, to must be examined, together with the system initiate and conclude the procedure provided 19 of which it forms a part. for in Article 93(2).

57. As regards the objective of Article 93(3), it should be observed on a general level that 59. Consequently, the expression 'grant or it supplements the review mechanism pro­ alteration of aid' characterizes an event vided for in Article 93(2). By means of the which, in view of its potential effects on the rule on notification laid down in the first common market, systematically necessitates sentence of Article 93(3), 'the draftsmen of a review of whether the advantage conferred the Treaty have sought to provide [the Com­ on the undertaking is compatible with the mission] with sufficient time for consider­ principles set out in Article 92(1). Those ation and investigation to form a prima facie potential effects on the common market opinion on the partial or complete confor­ mity with the Treaty of the plans which have 16 been notified to it'. In other words, the 17 — Judgment in Joined Cases 91 and 127/83 Heineken Brouw- purpose of the first sentence of Article 93(3) erijen v Inspecteurs der Vennootschapsbelasting, Amsterdam and Utrecht [1934] ECR 3435. paragraph 14; judgment in is to provide the Commission with an Case C-301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR I-307, paragraph 17. 18 — Paragraph 4 of the judgment in Lorenz, cited in footnote 16. 19 — See the judgments in Case C-301/87 France v Commission, 16 — Judgment in Case 120/73 Lorenz v Germany [1973] cited in footnote 17, and in Case C-47/91 /Italy v Commis- ECR 1471, paragraph 3. sion, cited in footnote 6, paragraph 24.

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OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-44/93

should not take place before the said review Germany [1977] ECR 595, at paragraph 9, has been concluded — whether at the stage that the intention of the Treaty, in providing of Article 93(3) or of Article 93(2). through Article 93 for aid to be kept under constant review and supervised by the Com­ mission, is that the finding that aid may be incompatible with the common market is to be arrived at, subject to review by the Court, by means of an appropriate procedure which 60. The purpose of the provision as so it is the Commission's responsibility to set in defined is part of the overall system of Arti­ motion. cle 93 and is inextricably bound up with it. The system is characterized by 'the system adopted in the Treaty for the division of powers by means of the procedure for keep­ ing aids under constant review as described 20 in Article 93'. As far as the role of national courts is con­ cerned, the Court held in the same judgment that proceedings may be commenced before national courts requiring those courts to interpret and apply the concept of aid con­ 61. That division of responsibilities, on tained in Article 92 in order to determine which there exists a consistent line of case- whether State aid introduced without obser­ law, 21 was summarized by the Court of Jus­ vance of the preliminary procedure provided tice in Federation Nationale du Commerce for in Article 93(3) ought to have been sub­ Extérieur des Produits Alimentaires as fol­ ject to this procedure.' 22 lows:

62. According to the case-law of the Court 'As far as the role of the Commission is con­ of Justice, the tasks connected with these cerned, the Court pointed out in its judg­ roles are different in kind. As far as the ment in Case 78/76 Steinike und Weinlig v Commission's task of determining whether or not an aid is compatible with the common market, the Court held as follows in Steinike 23 20 — See the judgment in Case 74/76 Iarmelli v Meroni [1977] and Weinlig: ECR 557, paragraph 12 in fine. 21 — See, in addition to the judgment cited below and the judg­ ment in Steinike and Weinlig referred to therein, the judg­ ments in Case 77/72 Capolongo v Maya [1973] 611, in ¡anelli, cited in footnote 20, in Joined Cases C-78/90 to C-83/90 Compagnie Commerciale de l'Ouest and Others [1992] ECR I-1847, in Case 17/91 Lornoy and Others [1992] ECR I-6523, in Case C-114/91 Claeys [1992] ECR 1-6559, in Joined Cases C-144/91 and C-145/91 Demoor 'In judging in these cases whether State aid is and Others [1992] ECR I-6613, in Joined Cases C-149/91 and C-150/91 Sanders Adour and Guyomarc'h Orthez compatible with the common market com­ Nutrition Animale [1992] ECR I-3899, in Case C-266/91 CELBI [1993] ECR I-4337, in Case C-72/92 Scharbatke plex economic factors subject to rapid [1993] ECR I-5509 and in Case C-189/91 Kirsammer-Hack [1993] ECR I-6185.

22 — Judgment in Case C-354/90 Fédération Nationale du Com- merce Extérieur des Produits Alimentaires [1991] ECR I-5505, paragraphs 9 and 10. 23 — Cited in section 61, first two sentences of paragraph 9.

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NAMUR-LES ASSURANCES DU CRÉDIT v OND

change must be taken into account and being impaired by precipitate conduct on the assessed. part of the Member States.

Article 93 of the Treaty therefore provides 65. In any event, it cannot be denied that the for a special procedure whereby the Com­ checks that are necessary on one side and the mission shall keep aid under constant other in order to carry out the various tasks review.' overlap to a certain extent. In order to be able to secure the prohibition of implemen­ tation provided for in the third sentence of Article 93(3), the national court must find whether a 'grant or alteration of aid' has taken place. In this connection, the Court has consistently acknowledged in its case- law that the concept of aid — which charac­ 63. This means in particular that the Com­ terizes the field of application of Article 92 mission has to examine the adverse effects on et seq. and therefore is to be interpreted and the common market of national aid measures applied in each individual case by the Com­ — distortion of competition and the effects mission — may also be interpreted and on trade between Member States. Those applied by the national courts within the effects constitute the actual reason for the confines of the task conferred upon them. prohibition of aid laid down in this prohibi­ tion: if the scheme of Article 92 were to be compared with the accounts of a company, it would be on the debit side.

66. The concept of aid which, accordingly, it is competent to the national courts to review, alongside the Commission, refers to the first part of the causal connection described in 64. As far as the tasks of the national courts Article 92(1) and resulting in distortion of are concerned, they have to ensure that the competition or effects on trade between aid measure is not implemented before the Member States or both. The concept of aid Commission has carried out the aforemen­ stands for the grant of certain unmarketlike tioned review. Consequently, that task is tai­ advantages attributable to the State which are lored to prevent, through the application of liable to improve the economic situation of 24 certain 'procedural criteria', the practical the undertaking which benefits from them in importance of the Commission's prerogative comparison with that of other undertakings. to check the compatibility of every new or In other words, it covers the effects to which altered aid with the common market from the State measure gives rise at the level of the

24 — Judgment in Capolongo, cited in footnote 21, paragraph 6. 25 -— Section 58 above.

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OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-44/93

undertaking or undertakings which benefit 68. Whilst that aspect is also to be checked by the advantages. The Court stated as fol­ by the national courts, the second part of the lows in the judgment in Denkavit: causal connection — the relationship between the aid and any distortion of com­ petition and effects on trade between Mem­ ber States — falls to the Commission alone. Naturally, the Commission's conduct is sub­ ject to review by the Community court.

'[Article 92(1)] refers to the decisions of Member States by which the latter in pursuit of their own economic and social objectives, give, by unilateral and autonomous deci­ sions, undertakings or other persons resources or procure for them advantages intended to encourage the attainment of the 27 economic and social advantages sought.'

69. Under the same system of Article 93, supervision of existing aid is a matter for the Commission under paragraph 1 of that arti­ cle. This covers not only aid granted by the original Member States before the EEC Treaty entered into force, to which aid 67. The Court held in Steinike and Wein- granted by new Member States before their 29 2 lig 8as follows: accession is equated. The system of para­ graph 1 also applies to aid which, after it has been reviewed by the Commission as new aid and deemed compatible with the com­ mon market, is implemented by the Member 30 State concerned. In all those cases, circum­ stances may arise in the course of time which raise the question whether the aid is still compatible with the common market. How­ 'In applying Article 92 regard must primarily ever, of those circumstances, only the 'alter­ be had to the effects of the aid on the under- ation' of (existing) aid triggers the mecha­ takings or producers favoured and not the nism provided for in Article 93(3) in which status of the institutions entrusted with the the national courts are involved in the man­ distribution and administration of the aid.' ner which I have indicated. Moreover, it is for the Commission constantly to review

26 — Judgment in Case 61/79 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Denkavit [1980] ECR 1205, paragraph 31; see, to the same effect, the definition set out in the judgment in 29 — See the judgment in Case C-387/92 Banco de Crédito Banco de Crédito Industrial, cited in footnote 5, para­ Industrial, cited in footnote 5. graph 13, on the basis of the case-law on the ECSC Treaty. 30 — Judgment in Case 84/82 Germany v Commission [1984] 27 — My emphasis. ECR 1451, paragraph 12, and judgment in Case C-313/90 28 — Cited in section 61; paragraph 21 of the judgment (my CIRFS and Others v Commission [1993] ECR I-1125, para­ emphasis). graph 25.

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NAMUR-LES ASSURANCES DU CRÉDIT v OND

those circumstances in the light of the crite­ 72. Yet, in the words used by the Court of ria set out in Article 92. 1 Justice, an individual is entitled to rely on Article 92 if the provisions of that article

'have been put in concrete form by acts hav­ 70. All those principles relating to the divi­ ing general application provided for by Arti­ sion of responsibilities, however, are subject cle 94 or by decisions in particular cases to a reservation which the Court has devel­ 34 envisaged by Article 93(2)'. oped in its case-law on the direct effect of the provisions of Articles 92 and 93.

73. The reference to the case of a decision pursuant to Article 93(2) can be construed as a harmonious addition to the division of 71. The case-law draws a distinction in prin­ responsibilities described above: if the Com­ ciple, corresponding to the considerations set mission has concluded the review of an aid out above, between Article 92 and the third by reaching a negative decision, the national sentence of Article 93(3): the third sentence courts are not only entitled, but obliged, to of Article 93(3) has direct effect and gives have regard to that decision, in particular in rise to rights in favour of individuals, which disputes concerning the recovery of the aid 35 national courts are bound to safeguard; 32 in in question. contrast, individuals are precluded from rely­ ing solely on Article 92 in order to assert before a national court that aid is incompat­ ible with Community law and claim that that court should directly or incidentally declare the aid incompatible with the common mar­ ket. 33 74. In contrast, I understand the reference to possible acts having general application within the meaning of Article 94 as mitigat­ 31 — See section 62 above. ing de facto the principle that Article 92 does 32 — See, in particular, the judgment in Lorenz, cited in foot­ note 16, paragraph 8. This has been consistently held since the judgment in Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, at 596; sec most recently the judgment in Kirsammer-Hack, cited in footnote 21, paragraph 14. 33 — Sec the judgments in lancili, cited in footnote 20, para­ 34 — Judgment in Capolongo, cited in footnote 21, paragraph 6 graph 12, Steinike and Weinlig, cited in section 61, para­ in fine; judgment in Steimke and Weinlig, cited in the pre­ graph 10, Compagnie Commerciale de l'Ouest, para­ ceding footnote. graph 33, Sanders, paragraph 25, Lornoy, paragraph 29, and 35 — See the judgment in Case C-188/92 TWD Texttlwerke Scharbatke, paragraph 19, all cited in footnote 21. Deggendorf [1994] ECR I-833.

I - 3849

OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-44/93

not have direct effect. Moreover, that is con­ 76. IV. Against this background, it should sonant with the case-law on Article 85 of the first be observed that the change on the com­ Treaty. The Court of Justice recognizes that, mon market on which the French and Neth­ in areas covered by an implementing regula­ erlands Governments chiefly rely does not as tion within the meaning of Article 87 of the such enable one to speak of the grant or 36 Treaty, Article 85(1) produces direct effect alteration of aid. Such effects do not apper­ in relations between individuals and creates tain to the concept of aid. Changes in them rights directly in respect of the individuals may, it is true, be caused by the grant or concerned which the national courts must alteration of aid, but this is not necessarily 37 safeguard. As far as the sphere of aid is so. concerned, it follows from these consider­ ations that the application of Article 92 by national courts is not completely precluded by the Treaty, but depends on the Council's adopting appropriate provisions under Arti­ cle 94. There are no such provisions as regards the sector in question here.

77. 2. In contrast, whether aid has been granted or altered depends, as also emerges from the foregoing considerations, on whether in the portfolio of measures of a Member State providing for advantages (in the nature of aid) for the benefit of under­ takings, a change has occurred which has affected the content or extent of those advan­ tages. In this connection, it is clear from a comparison between paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 93 that the term 'aid' in paragraph 3 is synonymous with the expression 'system 75. Obviously, it is not for the Court of Jus­ of aid' in paragraph 1. It follows that an aid tice to alter the aforementioned rules of the is granted within the meaning of Arti­ Treaty governing the division of responsibil­ cle 93(3) where a new system of aid is cre­ ities. But it accords with the task laid down ated, whilst the alteration of aid presupposes for it in Article 164 of the Treaty to secure a substantive change in a system of aid. for individuals the legal protection corre­ 38 sponding to the aim of Article 92 et seq.

36 — If there is no provision within the meaning of Article 87 in the area in question, then, in the absence of a decision of the national authorities under Article 88 or of the Commis­ sion under Article 89(2), Anicle 85(1) is not directly appli­ cable: judgment in Joined Cases 209 to 213/89 Ministère Puhlic v Astes [1986] ECR 1425, paragraphs 60 to 69. 37 — Judgment in Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM [1974] ECR 51, paragraph lb; judgment in Case C-234/89 Delimttis [1991] 78. It is clear that, as regards its aspects of ECR I-935, paragraph 45. 38 — This consideration seems to me to inform the judgments in interest in this case, the OND Law under­ Case C-198/89 Cook [1993] ECR I-2487 and Case went no change when the OND's field of C-225/91 M.ttra [1993] ECR I-3203, albeit in a different connection. activity was enlarged.

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NAMUR-LES ASSURANCES DU CRÉDIT v OND

79. However, a change did take place in so been taken if it had not been sought by the far as the limitation of the OND's activity Belgian State. with regard to exports to other Member States laid down in the agreement with COBAC has now been eliminated. On that ground, it should first be examined whether that limitation is part of the system of aid. If it is, it should next be considered whether 83. This seems probably to have been the that part of the system of aid was altered as a case according to the case-file. Article 15 of result of the decision on the enlargement of the cooperation agreement in the 1982 ver­ the OND's field of activity. sion produced to the Court provides that it was not to enter into force until the consent of the Minister for Economic Affairs had been obtained.

80. (a) Was the limitation of the OND's activity laid down in the agreement between the OND and COBAC part of the system of 84. Those considerations suffice in order to aid within the meaning of Article 93(1)? hold that the responsibility of the Belgian State for the limitation in question of the OND's field of activity is by no means out of the question. The task of definitively examining this question falls to the national court, which for this purpose can apply the 81. (aa) For this to be so, it presupposes first criteria elaborated with regard to the third that the limitation in question is to be question. imputed to the Belgian State.

85. (bb) Next it should be considered 82. Admittedly, the cooperation agreement whether the limitations laid down by the as such is merely in the nature of an agree­ cooperation agreement are objectively part of ment governed by private law between a pri­ the system of aid within the meaning of vate undertaking and a public establishment. Article 93(1). However, that circumstance is not conclu­ sive. The conclusion of that agreement assumed the existence of a decision to effect the limitation of the field of activity pro­ vided for in the agreement. That fact that that decision took the form of a cooperation 86. In my view, a system of aid within the agreement of the kind in question does not meaning of Article 93(1) is to be regarded in rule out its being imputed to the Belgian State. It is sufficient for the purposes of such imputation that the decision could not have 39 — Sec section 44 above.

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OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-44/93

general as the act of the Member State which with COBAC would constitute merely a constitutes the basis for the actual grant of corporate measure of the OND concerning the advantages. It may be a decision in an the utilization of the aid conclusively gov­ individual case, or, however, a measure pro­ erned by the OND Law within the frame­ viding for the grant of the advantages work laid down by Article 3(2)(1) of the defined in the measure in a number of indi­ OND Law. This is the manner in which the vidual cases. The constant review provided OND and the Belgian Government have for in Article 93(1) will usually be necessary presented the matter. only in the latter case.

89. Certainly, there would be no objection to such an approach in the case of a private 87. The system of aid also includes any pro­ undertaking. In such a case, a distinction visions relating to the use by the recipient of would have to be drawn in the way aid of the funds granted by the public described between the system of aid, on the authorities. Depending on its use, the aid one hand, and the actions of the undertaking may have quite different effects — on the by means of which the undertaking utilizes undertaking itself and consequently on the the advantages of the scheme of aid, on the common market. In the instant case, a provi­ other. sion of the system of aid concerning the OND's field of activity would fall into that category of provisions. The limitations laid down therein on the OND's field of activity would constitute at the same time limitations on the use of the aid. 90. However, in the present case it is doubt­ ful whether such a distinction is appropriate. In particular, I regard it as dubious whether the analysis of the present case can be linked solely with Article 3(2)(1) and Article 10(1) of the OND Law.

88. In attempting to answer on this basis the 41 question raised earlier, one might be tempted to infer from a comparison of Arti­ cle 3(2)(1) and Article 10(1) of the OND Law that that law alone constitutes the basis 91. This is because the Belgian State cannot of the advantages and hence the sole system only determine the legal framework of the of aid. Seen from that angle, the agreement activity of the OND , but can involve itself in its very activity by means of the powers described in the opening part of this Opin­ ion. If the limitation of the OND's field of 40 — Cf. the Opinion of Mr Advocate General Darmon in Joined Cases 166/86 and 220/86 Insh Cement v Commission activity contained in the cooperation agree­ [1988] ECR 6487, sections 2) to 31. ment could be imputed to the Belgian State, 41 — In section 86 above. this would constitute such involvement.

I - 3852

NAMUR-LES ASSURANCES DU CRÉDIT v OND

92. In those circumstances, the system of aid must be fulfilled in addition to the require- must not necessarily be confined to the con­ ment that the measure is to be imputed to the tent of the legal provisions, but may also State. cover other decisions of the Belgian State by means of which it limits the activity of the OND .

96. As appears from the judgment in Den- 43 93. What decisions may be involved? kavit cited above, an important character­ istic of aid is that the Member State uses it to attain its own economic and/or social objec­ tives. That part of the definition of the con­ cept of aid dovetails with the conception underlying the Treaty, according to which the State and undertakings play different 94. Doubtless, it would be wrong to regard roles on the market: the State determines its all decisions of the OND which are capable economic and social policy, whilst undertak­ of being imputed to the Belgian State as ings pursue private interests, namely directly being part of the system of aid simply on the towards profit-making, within the frame­ ground of the their imputation to the Belgian work of that policy. 44

State. The fact that the State involves itself directly in the management of undertakings was known to the draftsmen of the Treaty, since they laid down in Article 90(1) a spe­ cial provision for 'public undertakings' (undertakings in respect of which such a 42 possibility exists ). However, that provision merely declares Articles 7 and 85 to 94 to be applicable to such undertakings. It was not 97. The following demarcation line follows thought appropriate to subject them to dif­ as regards the present case: if the measure in fering provisions. question constitutes the expression of the State interest in defining its economic and social policy, it is part of the system of aid, as it has effects on the scope of the aid. If, in contrast, it constitutes the expression of a commercial interest, it is a corporate mea­ sure, which has effects only on the nature 95. In my view, the limits of the system of and extent of the utilization of the system of aid are to be determined with the assistance aid. of the criteria to be elaborated below which

43 — Section 66 above and footnote 26. 42 — See the ninth recital in the preamble to Commission Direc­ 44 — Cf. the Opinion of Mr Advocate General Darmon in Case tive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the transparency of C-185/91 Reiff [1993] ECR I-5823, paragraphs 33 to 38, financial relations between Member States and public which contains examples from the case-law confirming this undertakings, OJ 1980 L 195, p. 35. analysis of the EC Treaty.

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OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-44/93

98. How can it be determined which of capital constitute aid in a given case. In these two alternatives applies here? fact, there is a parallel between the two cases. In both cases, it is necessary to categorize a State measure which, on the face of it, could be classed either as an aid measure or as a commercial measure.

99. In my estimation, it depends on the cir­ cumstances of the particular case. The present case exhibits the particularity in this regard that the OND could, in principle, have operated under the OND Law in the field which the cooperation agreement 102. In applying this test, the national court reserved to COBAC and, what is more, in so will have to examine how the types of risk doing it could have benefited.by the advan­ reserved to COBAC (and therefore with­ tages provided for in that law. drawn from the OND ) were to be commer­ cially assessed. The same assessment will have to be made of the types of risk left to the OND (in particular, political risks).

100. In those circumstances, it should be asked, for the purposes of the demarcation between measures in the economic and social interest of the State and measures in the commercial interest of undertakings, whether 103. This prompts me to propose to the a private undertaking of comparable size to Court that the mechanism of Article 93 the public establishment in question could should be supplemented by an aspect of have been induced in a similar situation to cooperation between the national courts and restrict its activity in the same way. the Commission. It is unusual within the 46 division of tasks described above for a national court to undertake economic assess­ ments of this sort, especially in a strongly internationally oriented sector. That division

45 — See, in particular, the judgments in Case 234/84 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2263, paragraph 14, Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission [1990] ECR I-959, para­ 101. This test is based on the 'private inves­ graph 29, Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1603, paragraphs 19 to 23, Case C-261/89 Italy v Com- tor' test which has been developed for ascer­ mission [1991] ECR I-4437, paragraph 8. taining whether or not public injections of 46 — Sections 60 to 74 above.

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NAMUR-LES ASSURANCES DU CREDIT v OND

of tasks is evidently designed to couple the 104. Thus, the national court is faced with legal protection afforded by Article 93(3) of complex economic questions in an area in the Treaty with clear, easily managed criteria. which its responsibilities overlap with those Questions of economic assessment should, in of the Commission which cannot be resolved principle, be reserved to the Commission, by a reference for a preliminary ruling. I whilst in the case of questions relating to the therefore propose that the case-law relating interpretation of Community law it is to competition law in such cases be extended intended that the avenue afforded by Arti­ to cover the present case. cle 177 should be available. In addition, in the instant case, there is the fact that, in order for the Commission to be able to form a definitive judgment as to whether the leg­ islation and practice relating to the OND comply with Article 92, it must also carry out a commercial assessment of the transac­ tions (types of risk) which benefit by the aid. In any event, it must carry out that assess­ ment with the aim of determining the effects of the aid on the common market, in so far as they remain after the amendment of the OND Law in 1991. In so doing, it must take account of the fact that in its 1991 version the OND Law conferred a special status on transactions (in particular, taking them out­ side the State guarantee) which, depending 105. That case-law is based on the consider­ on their nature and duration and the severity ation that it is useful in such cases for the of the risk, are usually insured by private national court to know the criteria which the companies which do not work for the Commission has employed or contemplates 49 account of the State or with a State guaran­ employing. When choosing among the tee. Furthermore, since in the present pro­ various forms of cooperation recognized to 50 ceedings the Commission characterized the that end, account must be taken of the fact extension of the OND's field of activity — that proceedings under Article 93(3) before 47 for the first time — as a case covered by the national court have the function of safe­ Article 93(3), it is not excluded that the guarding the Commission's prerogatives and Commission will exercise the rights of therefore should be concluded as quickly as redress conferred on it by the judgment in possible. It seems therefore to be out of the 48 the Boussac case. For that purpose, too, it question that the proceedings should be sus­ would have to examine whether aid has been pended until the Commission has taken a granted or altered in this case. decision. Since no decision of the Commis­ sion in a parallel case is known it is also not

49 — See the judgments in Case 48/72 Brasserie de Haecht v Wiikin and Janssen [1973] ECR 77, Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM [19741 ECR 51, Case 99/79 Lamame v Etos[1980] 47 — In the correspondence between the Belgian Government ECR 2511 and Delinutis, cited in footnote 37. and the Commission, the Belgian Government argued from 50 — See Notice 93/C 39/05 on collaboration between national outset that the aid in question was existing aid. The Com­ courts and the Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86 mission did not question that view. of the EEC Treaty (OJ 1993 C 39, p. 6), in which the Com­ 48 — Judgment in Case C-301/87 France v Commutimi [1990] mission sets out the various possibilities on the basis of the ECR I-307, paragraphs 18 to 23. judgments cited in the previous footnote.

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OPINION OF MR LENZ — CASE C-44/93

meaningful to refer the national court to of 13 July 1990 in Case C-2/88 Zwartveld such a decision. [1990] ECR I-3365, paragraph 18).'

108. It must be emphasized that these con­ 106. In contrast, I consider that the decision siderations are based on the practical utiliza- in Delimitis 51 can be applied to the present tion of such information, since such informa­ situation. In that case the Court held that the tion can be neither definitive nor binding for national court may, within the limits of the the national court. applicable national procedural rules and sub­ ject to Article 214 of the Treaty,

109. (b) If the national court finds in the light of those criteria that the limitation of the OND's field of activity as determined by the cooperation agreement is part of the sys­ 'contact the Commission where the concrete tem of aid, it will have in turn to be exam­ application of Article 85(1) or of Article 86 ined whether that part of the system of aid raises particular difficulties, in order to was altered by the decision enlarging the obtain the economic and legal information 52 OND's field of activity. which that institution can supply to it'.

110. In that regard, the national court assumes for the purposes of the first ques­ 107. The Court went on to hold that tion that the said enlargement of the OND's field of activity was dependent on the autho­ rization of the State and hence is to be imputed to the State. The national court must check those assumptions in the light of the criteria elaborated with regard to the third question. 'Under Article 5 of the Treaty, the Commis­ sion is bound by a duty of sincere coopera­ tion with the judicial authorities of the Member State, who are responsible for ensuring that Community law is applied and respected in the national legal system (order 111. Subject to that reservation, the said 'authorization' would constitute the grant or (better) the alteration of aid, if the limita­ tions laid down in the cooperation agree­ 51 — See footnote 37. 52 — Paragraph 53 of the judgment in Delimitis; my emphasis. ment were part of the system of aid. Unlike

I-3856

NAMUR-LES ASSURANCES DU CRÉDIT v OND

the limitation of the OND's activities, the extended, is to be regarded as the grant or enlargement of those activities could only he alteration of aid, effected by intervening in the system created by the Belgian State itself by an act in the sphere of economic and/or social policy.

if the decision on the establishment's former — narrower — field of activity is to be imputed to the State and

112. In less abstract terms, that intervention would have consisted in no longer restricting the financial support for credit-insurance transactions, which, for their part, are intended, according to Article 3 of the OND if a private undertaking of comparable size Law, to promote exports, to certain export to the public establishment in question in a risks enumerated in the cooperation agree­ similar situation would not have taken such a ment and in allowing them to benefit other decision to restrict its activity on commercial export risks as well as a result of the enlarge­ grounds. ment of the OND's field of activity.

The second question

113. V. The reply to the first question should therefore be as follows:

114. In its second question, the Cour d'Appel asks whether the two-month period from receipt of notification laid down in the 53 Lorenz case-law during which the Com­ mission is to act and on the expiry of which the aid becomes existing aid if the Commis­ A decision of a Member State to authorize, sion fails to act, can start to run even in the after the entry into force of the EEC Treaty, absence of notification if the Member State a public establishment, which previously concerned answers questions from the Com­ engaged only incidentally in credit insurance mission concerning particulars of the system for exports to other Member States, to exer­ of aid at issue. cise that activity without restrictions so that the aid which was granted by that State to the establishment under legislation predating the entry into force of the EEC Treaty now 53 — Case 120/73 Lorenz v Germany, cited in footnote 16, which was confirmed, for instance, in Case 84/82 Germany v applies to the exercise of that activity as thus Commission, cited in footnote 30.

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115. In this connection, the Cour d'Appel 117. The Court states as follows in the rele­ wishes the following features of the present vant passages of the judgment: case to be taken into account:

'According to the last sentence of Article 93 the Member State shall not put its proposed (i) the new aid was the subject of a com­ measures into effect until this procedure has plaint to the Commission from a third resulted in a final decision. party;

The objective pursued by Article 93 (3), which is to prevent the implementation of (ii) in the course of its preliminary exami­ aid contrary to the Treaty, implies that this nation of the aid, the Commission prohibition is effective during the whole of addressed to the Member State con­ the preliminary period. cerned a request for information in which it stated that, in the event of fail­ ure to reply or receipt of an unsatisfac­ tory reply before the end of the period allowed, it would be obliged to initiate the procedure laid down by Arti­ cle 93(2); While this period must allow the Commis­ sion sufficient time, this latter must, how­ ever, act diligently and take account of the interest of Member States of being informed of the position quickly in spheres where the necessity to intervene can be of an urgent nature by reason of the effect that these Member States expect from the proposed (iii) the Member State complied with that measures of encouragement. request.

In the absence of any Regulation specifying 116. Since this question contemplates an this period, the Member States cannot unilat­ extension of the principles set out in Lorenz, erally terminate this preliminary period it is necessary to determine the ratio decid- which is necessary for the Commission to endi of that judgment. fulfil its role.

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The latter, however, could not be regarded as 118. The Court concluded from this as fol­ acting with proper diligence if it omitted to lows: define its attitude within a reasonable period.

'If the Commission, after having been informed by a Member State of a plan to grant or alter aid, fails to initiate the conten­ It is appropriate in this respect to be guided tious procedure provided for in Article 93(2), by Articles 173 and 175 of the Treaty which, by giving notice to the Member State con­ in dealing with comparable situations, pro­ cerned to submit its comments, the latter vide for a period of two months. may, at the expiration of a period sufficient to enable the aid to undergo a preliminary investigation, grant the proposed aid, pro­ vided that it has given prior notice to the Commission, and this aid will then come 5 under the system of existing aids.' 6

When this period has expired, the Member State concerned may implement the plan, but the requirements of legal certainty involve that prior notice should be given to the Commission. 54 119. It follows from the construction of the above that two requirements must be met in order to start the two-month period running within which the Commission should act.

120. First, notification must be given which puts the Commission in a position to decide what action to take with knowledge of the facts.

Aid implemented, during the Commission's silence, after a period necessary for its pre­ liminary examination, is thus subject, as an 121. Secondly, the Member State concerned existing aid, to the provisions of Article 93(1) must have a justified interest in the Commis­ and (2).' 55 sion's acting swiftly. This presupposes that

54 — Paragraph 4 of the judgment in Lorenz. 56 — Paragraph 2 of the operative part and paragraph 6 of the 55 — Paragraph 5 of the judgment in Lorenz. judgment.

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the Member State makes the implementation base on the judgment in the Boussac case of the aid dependent upon the attitude taken must be examined. by the Commission, that is to say, that it refrains from implementing the aid pending the outcome of the preliminary examination by the Commission. The situation is differ­ ent if the Member State implements the aid contrary to Article 93(3). Logically, once the 124. In the Boussac judgment, the Court aid is completely implemented, the two- afforded the Commission certain means in month period ceases to apply. cases where a Member State fails to fulfil its obligations under Article 93(3). Para­ graphs 19, 20 and 21 of that judgment read as follows:

122. The national court's question raises the problem as to whether for the purposes of the first requirement the answer to a request for 'Once it has established that aid has been information from a Member State may be granted or altered without notification, the equated with notification. If that were the Commission therefore has the power, after case, as the OND and the Belgian and giving the Member State in question an French Governments argue it is, it could opportunity to submit its comments on the only result in the application of the Lorenz matter, to issue an interim decision requiring formula, if the second of the two aforemen­ it to suspend immediately the payment of tioned requirements were satisfied as well. such aid pending the outcome of the exami­ However, that is not the case here, since the nation of the aid and to provide the Com­ OND's field of application was extended mission, within such period as it may specify, without the Belgian State's having at any with all such documentation, information time made that action dependent on a Com­ and data as are necessary in order that it may mission decision. On the contrary, since the examine the compatibility of the aid with the beginning of its correspondence with the common market. Commission it took the view that the case related to existing aid within the meaning of Article 93(1). Consequently, even if the informative value of the replies to the Com­ mission's request for information was such as to enable it to be treated as notification, The Commission has the same power in this case would not be on all fours with the cases where it has been notified of aid but case contemplated by Lorenz. the Member State in question, instead of awaiting the outcome of the procedure pro­ vided for under Article 93(2) and (3) of the Treaty, has instead proceeded to put the aid into effect, contrary to the prohibition con­ tained in Article 93(3).

123. It is in that light, too, that the argument that the Belgian Government and the OND 57 — Footnote 48.

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Where a Member State has complied in full paragraph 21 of the judgment, the Commis­ with the Commission's order, the Commis­ sion is obliged to 'examine the compatibility sion is obliged to examine the compatibility of the aid with the common market, in of the aid with the common market, in accordance with the procedure laid down in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 93(2) and (3) of the Treaty,' only Article 93(2) and (3) of the Treaty.' where 'a Member State has complied in full 5 with the Commission's order'. 8 This assumes, as can be seen by comparing that passage with paragraphs 19 and 20 of the 125. The OND and the Belgian Government judgment, that the oMember State has sus­ conclude therefrom that the 'normal proce­ pended the grant of aid — even if only after dure' under Article 93(2) and (3) and hence it has been ordered to do so by the Commis­ also the Lorenz case-law apply where the sion. Commission learns of a new, unnotified aid and the Member State adopts a 'cooperative attitude' during the preliminary examination of the aid. In my view, that conclusion is not 126. The national court's second question correct. According to the clear wording of should be answered accordingly.

C — Conclusion

127. In the light of the whole of the foregoing, I propose that the reply to be given to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Cour d'Appel, Brussels, should be as follows:

(1) A decision of a Member State to authorize, after the entry into force of the EEC Treaty, a public establishment, which previously engaged only incidentally in credit insurance for exports to other Member States, to exercise that activity without restrictions so that the aid which was granted by that State to the estab­ lishment under legislation predating the entry into force of the EEC Treaty now applies to the exercise of that activity as thus extended, is to be regarded as the grant or alteration of aid,

58 — My emphasis.

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(i) if the decision on the establishment's former — narrower — field of activity is to be imputed to the State and

(ii) if a private undertaking of comparable size to the public establishment in question in a similar situation would not have taken such a decision to restrict its activity on commercial grounds.

(2) Article 93 of the Treaty is to be interpreted as meaning that the two-month period laid down in the judgment in Case 120/73 Lorenz v Germany [1973] ECR 1471 — on the expiry of which, if the Commission fails to act, a new aid measure becomes subject to the rules on existing aid if its implementation has previously been indicated — does not start to run unless the Member State has suspended the aid measure pending the outcome of the Commission's prelimi­ nary examination.

(3) In order to impute a measure of a public establishment to a Member State for the purposes of Article 92 et seq. of the Treaty, if is sufficient if

(a) under the provisions in force, the measure was the subject of a directive from the services of the Member State which was binding on the establish­ ment, or

(b) the measure was decided upon by the administrative organ of the establish­ ment without the State's having exercised its right to prevent that decision from becoming binding.

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