C-133/93
ECLI:EU:C:1994:208
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CRISPOLTONI
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL JACOBS delivered on 19 May 1994 *
2 My Lords, No 1738/91 of 13 June 1991 fixing, for the 1991 harvest, the norm and intervention prices and the premiums granted to purchas ers of leaf tobacco, the derived intervention prices for baled tobacco, the reference quali ties, the production areas and the guaranteed maximum quantities and amending Regula 1. In these related cases, the Pretura Cir tion (EEC) No 1331/90. In Case C-362/93, condariale di Perugia and the Pretura Cir the referring court has also requested a pre condariale di Caserta have referred questions liminary ruling on the validity of the regula on the validity of certain regulations con tions adopted in order to implement Regula cerning the common organization of the tion No 1738/91. market in raw tobacco.
2. In particular, in Case C-133/93, the Pretura Circondariale di Perugia has requested a preliminary ruling on the validity of Council Regulation (EEC) 4. By order of 4 February 1994, the Presi No 1114/88 of 25 April 1988 1 amending dent of the Court decided to join these cases Regulation (EEC) No 727/70 on the com for the purposes of the oral procedure and mon organization of the market in raw the judgment. tobacco and on the validity of the regula tions adopted in order to implement that regulation.
3. In Case C-300/93 and Case C-362/93, the Pretura Circondariale di Caserta has 5. I shall first examine the Community leg requested a preliminary ruling on the islation which is relevant to these proceed validity of Council Regulation (EEC) ings. I shall then consider the issues arising from the questions referred.
* Original language: English. 1 — OJ 1988 L110, p. 35. 2 — OJ 1991 L. 163, p. 13.
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The legislation No 1114/88 provided for the introduction of maximum guaranteed quantities. It added a fifth paragraph to Article 4 of Regulation No 727/70 which stated as follows:
6. A common organization of the market in raw tobacco was first established by Council Regulation (EEC) No 727/70, 3which pro vided for a support system based on norm and intervention prices. The Council was 'Each year ... the Council shall fix a maxi responsible for fixing each year a norm price mum guaranteed quantity, in particular in and an intervention price for Community the light of market requirements and the leaf tobacco for the crop of the following socio-economic and agricultural conditions calendar year. The intervention price was of the regions concerned, for each variety or fixed initially at 90% of the norm price and group of varieties of Community-produced represented the minimum price at which tobacco for which prices and premiums are producers disposed of their products. Pro fixed. The overall maximum quantity for the ducers could either sell their products to the Community shall be fixed at 385 000 tonnes intervention agencies, which were under an of leaf tobacco for each of the 1988, 1989 and obligation to purchase at the intervention 1990 harvests. price, or sell on the market. In order to encourage purchases by users directly from producers at a production price as near as possible to the norm price, Article 3(1) pro vided that, subject to certain conditions, a premium would be granted to persons who purchased leaf tobacco directly from Com munity producers and who undertook the Without prejudice to Articles 12a and 13, for first processing and market preparation of each 1 % by which the maximum guaranteed tobacco. Article 3(2) extended that premium quantity is exceeded per variety or group of to individual producers or associations of varieties, the intervention prices and the pre producers who subjected their own leaf miums concerned shall suffer a reduction of tobacco to first processing and market prep 1%. A correction corresponding to the aration. reduction of the premium shall be applied to the norm price of the harvest in question.
7. With a view to controlling the increase in Community production, Regulation The reduction referred to in the second sub paragraph shall not exceed 5% for the 1988 harvest and 15% for the 1989 and 3 — OJ, English Special Edition, 1970 (I), p. 206. 1990 harvests.
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7 8 For the purposes of applying this paragraph, Regulations (EEC) Nos 2158/89, 2046/90, 9 10 the Commission shall establish before 2267/91 and 2178/92 established the 31 July whether production exceeds the quantities actually produced and determined maximum guaranteed quantity for a variety the prices and premiums payable for the or group of varieties. 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991 harvests respec tively.
10. Council Regulation (EEC) No 2075/92 of 30 June 1992 11repealed Reg ulation No 727/70 and introduced a new common organization of the market in raw tobacco with effect from the 1993 harvest. 8. The first subparagraph of Article 4(5) was The new common organization of the mar amended by Council Regulation (EEC) ket differs substantially from the previous 4 No 1251/89 which, so as to enable produc one. The preamble to Regulation ers to plan their production, provided that No 2075/92 states, in the third recital, that the Council should each year fix the maxi the present situation on the tobacco market mum guaranteed quantity for the harvest of calls for a substantial overhaul of the Com the following year. Article 4(5) was further munity arrangements, while ensuring the amended by Council Regulation (EEC) continuation of tobacco growing by the tra 5 No 1329/90 which fixed the overall maxi ditional producers; it also refers to the need mum guaranteed quantity at 385 000 tonnes to limit production in line with the require for each of the 1988 to 1993 harvests; it also ments of the market and the demands of the provided that the reductions referred to in Community budget. Article 1 states that the the third subparagraph of Article 4(5) must common organization of the market shall not exceed 15% for the 1989 to 1993 har comprise, inter alia, measures to orientate 6 vests. and limit production.
9. In accordance with the fourth subpara graph of Article 4(5), the Commission by 11. Article 8 fixes a maximum global guaran tee threshold for the Community and pio-
4 — OJ 1989 L 129, p. 16. 5 _ OJ 1990 L 132, p. 25. 6 — Subsequently, Council Regulation (EEC) No 1737/91 (OJ 7 — OJ 1989 L 207, p. 15. 1991 L 163, p. 11) fixed tile overall maximum guaranteed 8 — OJ 1990 L 187, p. 23. quantity at 390 000 tonnes of leaf tobacco for each of the 9 — OJ 1991 L 208, p. 26. 1991 to 1993 harvests. Council Regulation (EEC) No 860/92 (OJ 1992 L 91, p. 1) provided that that reduction 10 — OJ 1992 L 217, p. 75. must not exceed 23 per cent for the 1992 harvest. 11 — OJ 1992 L 215, p. 70.
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vides that, every year, the Council must fix a quantity of leaf tobacco of the 'Bright' vari specific guarantee threshold for each group ety harvested in 1991. He received, by way of varieties. In order to ensure observance of of advance payment and subject to the lodg the guarantee thresholds, Article 9 provides ing of a security, the premium laid down in for a system of processing quotas for the Article 3(2) of Regulation No 727/70. Fol harvests of 1993 to 1997. For each harvest, lowing the finding by the Commission that the Council must allocate among the pro the maximum guaranteed quantity for ducer Member States the quantities available tobacco of the 'Bright' variety for the 13 for each group of varieties. In general, Mem 1991 harvest had been exceeded, that pre ber States have two options. On the basis of mium was reduced by 15%. By a letter dated the quantities available to them, they may 14 December 1992, the Azienda di Stato per distribute processing quotas among 'first gli Interventi sul Mercato Agricolo processors'. Alternatively, subject to certain ('AIMA'), the Italian intervention agency, conditions being fulfilled, they may distrib demanded reimbursement corresponding to ute quotas directly to producers. the 15% reduction of premiums from the Fattoria which passed that demand to its members, including Mr Crispoltoni. By a let ter dated 18 January 1993, the Fattoria spec ified the amount due from Mr Crispoltoni at LIT 4 400 000.
12. By Regulation (EEC) No 3477/92, the Commission laid down detailed rules for the application of the raw tobacco quota system 12 for the 1993 and 1994 harvests.
14. In the main proceedings, Mr Crispoltoni disputes the demand for reimbursement that he received from the Fattoria on the ground that Regulation No 1114/88 ('the Regula Case C-133/93 tion') is invalid. As a result, the referring court has requested a preliminary ruling on the validity of that regulation 'and the regu lations adopted in order to implement it'.
13. Mr Crispoltoni is a tobacco planter at Lerchi in the province of Perugia. He deliv ered to the Fattoria Autonoma Tabacchi di Città di Castello ('the Fattoria'), a profes sional association to which he belongs and 15. In the order for reference, the referring which carries out the first processing and court expresses doubts with regard to the market preparation of leaf tobacco, a certain validity of the Regulation and the regulations
12 — OJ 1992 L 351, p. 11. 13 — See Regulation No 2178/92, above, note 10.
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adopted for its implementation. It questions the questions referred are not hypothetical whether those regulations are appropriate in and that the preliminary reference procedure 17 order to attain the objectives which they is not used in an abusive manner, in decid seek to pursue and raises the issue whether ing whether to answer the questions referred, they should be declared invalid on the the Court is guided primarily by a functional ground that they are vitiated by a misuse of criterion, that is to say, whether it can pro powers. vide a useful answer to the national court.
16. Before dealing with the substance of the case, it is necessary to examine a preliminary objection raised by the Council.
18 19. In Telemarsicabruzzo, the Court held that the need to arrive at an interpretation of Community law which is useful for the 17. The order for reference gives little infor national court requires that court to define mation on the facts of the case. The Council the factual and legislative context of the claims that that runs counter to the principle questions, or at least to explain the factual of judicial cooperation established by Arti hypotheses on which they are based. In cle 177. It refers to the judgment of the Vaneetveld the Court held, however, that Court in Telemarsicabruzzo 14 and argues that requirement is less pressing where the that the Court should decline to answer the questions are of such a nature as to enable question referred. the Court to give a useful reply even where the national court has not given an exhaus tive description of the legal and factual situ ation. 19In that case, the Court answered the questions referred on the ground that the case-file forwarded by the national court and 18. As I stated in my recent Opinion in the submissions of the parties to the main 15 Vaneetveld, it is helpful, and in some cases proceedings gave the Court enough informa necessary, for the national court to set out tion to enable it to interpret the rules of succinctly the factual background on the Community law in question in respect of the basis of which the questions referred have situation which was the subject-matter of the arisen. That is not to say, however, that an main proceedings. order for reference which provides little or no information on the facts of the case should necessarily be rejected. Provided that 16 — Sec Case C-343/90 Lourenço Dua [1992] ECR I-4673, para graphs 17 to 18 of the judgment. 17 — See Case 104/79 Follia v Novello [1980] ECR 745. 18 — Telemarsicabruzzo, cited in note, paragraph 6 of the judg 14 — Joined Cases C-320 to C-322/90 Telemttrsicabruzzo and ment. See also Case C-157/92 Bandiera [1993] ECR I-1085; Others [1993] ECR I-393. Case C-386/92 Monin Automobila v French State [1993] 15 — Case C-316/93 Vaneetveld v SA Le Foyer, Opinion of ECR I-2049. 17 January 1994, paragraphs 6 to 11 of the Opinion. 19 — Judgment of 3 March 1994, paragraph 13.
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20. In my view, similar considerations apply 22. I turn therefore to examine the question in the present case. The order for reference referred. defines the legal background to the case. The essential facts, which are not disputed, emerge from the submissions to the Court of Mr Crispoltoni and of the Italian Govern ment and the Commission. Unlike the situa 20 tion in Telemarsicabruzzo and in Monin, in this case the issue is a straightforward one 23. Mr Crispoltoni and the Greek Govern pertaining to the validity of Community ment claim that the Regulation is invalid on measures and it is not difficult to see the rel the ground that it is vitiated by a misuse of evance of the question referred to the main powers. The Greek Government also claims proceedings. Also, at least in part, the legal that the Regulation should be annulled on and factual background to the case is known the ground that it runs counter to the prin to the Court from a previous reference made ciple of equality and the principle of protec by the same court concerning the same pro tion of legitimate expectations. The Italian ducer, which led to the judgment of the Government claims that the Regulation 21 Court in the previous Crispoltoni case, as infringes the principle of proportionality. is pointed out in the present order for refer The Council and the Commission dispute ence. Nor can the present case be compared those arguments. 22 with Meilicke where it appeared from the order for reference that the questions referred had a hypothetical character.
24. I will examine first the allegation that the Regulation is vitiated by a misuse of powers. I will then examine the allegations that it infringes the principle of proportionality and the principle of equality. I will examine last the argument that it runs counter to the principle of protection of legitimate expecta 21. Considerations of procedural economy tions. also support the view that the Court should answer the question referred in this case. If the Court declined to answer it on the ground that the order for reference provides little information on the facts of the case, it is probable that a new reference would be The allegation of a misuse of powers made. That would lead to more delay, would increase costs and would run counter to the objectives of Article 177.
20 — Monin, cited in note . 21 — Case C-368/89 [1991] ECRI-3695.See below, paragraph . 25. Mr Crispoltoni states that he does not 22 — Case C-83/91 Meilicke [1992] ECR I-4871. challenge the underlying objective of the
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Regulation, which is to control Community ties is vitiated by a misuse of powers. It production in tobacco. He states that a refers to Article 39(1)(b) of the Treaty which responsible producer cannot but share the states that one of the objectives of the com view that production of tobacco should be mon agricultural policy is to ensure a fair reduced. He claims, however, that the mea standard of living for the agricultural com sures adopted are ineffective and unsuitable munity, in particular by increasing the indi to achieve that objective. vidual earnings of persons engaged in agri culture. It also refers to Article 40(3), second paragraph, which states that the common organization shall be limited to pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 39 and shall exclude any discrimination between produc ers or consumers within the Community.
26. He points out that, under the system introduced by the Regulation, if the maxi mum guaranteed quantity for a certain vari ety of tobacco is exceeded that has as a result a reduction in the prices and the premiums which affects all producers of that variety 28. The argument of the Greek Govern including those who are not responsible for ment, as I understand it, is that the Regula the excess production. In order to control tion infringes those provisions. The failure of 'any increase in production' as stated in the the Regulation to provide for the allocation preamble to the Regulation, 23it is not suffi of individual quotas to producers makes it cient to fix a maximum guaranteed quantity impossible to guarantee a fair standard of liv and penalize indiscriminately all producers ing for producers and leads to a reduction of for the excess production. The fixing of max their income. imum guaranteed quantities must be accom panied by measures such as those laid down in Regulation No 2075/92 providing for the allocation by the Member States of those quantities to processing undertakings or to producers. Mr Crispoltoni concludes that the system established by the Regulation is 29. The Court has consistently held that a unsuitable to achieve its objectives because it measure may amount to a misuse of powers is incomplete. only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent factors, to have been taken with the exclusive purpose, or in any event the main purpose, of achieving an end other than that stated or of evading a proce dure specifically prescribed by the Treaty for 24 dealing with the issue in question. In order for an act to be annulled on the grounds of a 27. The Greek Government also claims that the system of maximum guaranteed quanti
24 — Case C-331/88 Fedesa und Ollien [1990] ECR I-4023, paragraph 24 of the judgment; Case 69/83 Lux v Court of 23 — See Regulation No 1114/88, preamble, first recital. See Auditors [1984] ECR 2447, paragraph 30; Case below, paragraph . C-323/88 Serines [1990] ECR I-3027, paragraph 33.
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misuse of powers, therefore, it must be the importance of that aim and whether they proved that it was adopted in order to are necessary for its achievement. achieve a purpose other than that for which it was intended.
30. Mr Crispoltoni argues that a measure is 33. It is true, as Mr Crispoltoni points out, vitiated by a misuse of powers not only that if a measure is patently unsuited to the where it pursues a purpose foreign to its objective which the competent institution objectives but also where it is patently seeks to pursue that may affect its legality. 27
unsuitable to achieve those objectives. That is not to say, however, that in such a case the measure will necessarily be vitiated by a misuse of powers. If a measure is patently unsuitable to achieve its objectives, that may well provide a strong indication that the institution adopted it in order to attain an objective other than that which it 31. In my view, it is better to make a distinc was entitled to pursue. As a general rule, tion between a misuse of powers and a however, where the means used are patently breach of the principle of proportionality. In unsuitable to achieve the desired aim that order to establish that an act is vitiated by a would lead to a breach of the principle of misuse of powers, the applicant must prove proportionality. that the institution adopted it in order to pursue a purpose other than that which it is lawfully entitled to pursue. It follows that the allegation of a misuse of powers involves an inquiry as to the motives of the institu 25 tion which adopted the act in question.
34. According to its preamble, the Regula tion pursues a twofold objective. It seeks to curb any increase in the tobacco production 32. By contrast, the principle of proportion of the Community and at the same time to ality requires the application of an objective discourage the growing of varieties which are 28 test. In order to establish whether a provi difficult to dispose of. The preamble also sion of Community law is consonant with refers to the need to 'continue to implement the principle of proportionality, it is neces sary to establish whether the means it employs to achieve the aim correspond to 26 — See e. g. Case 66/82 Fromançais v FORMA [1983] ECR 395, paragraph 8 of the judgment; Case 15/83 Den- kavit Nederland v Hoofdproaitktscbap voor Akkerbouw- produkten [1984] ECR 2171, paragraph 25. 27 — Case 138/78 Stoking v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas 25 — See Hartley, The Foundations of European Community [1979] ECR 713, paragraph 7 of the judgment. Law, Second ed., pp. 415-417. 28 — Regulation No 1114/88, preamble, first recital.
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a policy aimed at encouraging the most agricultural policy. They must seek to rec sought-after varieties and to take account of oncile any conflicts between the objectives specific socio-economic and regional features laid down in Article 39 taken individually, 29 of tobacco production'. and where necessary allow any one of them 31 temporary priority. The market in tobacco is characterized by over-production. Mea sures designed to control production, and therefore to bring the market back into bal ance, not only serve the objective of stabiliz ing the market and that of ensuring the ratio 35. No argument has been submitted in this nal development of agricultural production, case to show that the system of maximum which according to Article 39 are among the guaranteed quantities introduced by the Reg objectives of the common agricultural policy, ulation seeks to attain objectives other than but ultimately serve the interests of all pro those stated in its preamble. The argument of ducers. It is notable that, as we have seen, the Greek Government is essentially that the Mr Crispoltoni states that a responsible pro Regulation infringes Article 39(1)(b) of the ducer cannot but share the view that produc Treaty. tion of tobacco should be reduced.
36. That argument cannot be accepted. It is clear that a support system which seeks to control Community production does not necessarily run counter to the objectives of the Treaty. Measures may be necessary to limit surplus production, and measures may legitimately be taken to limit the quantities 38. In view of the state of the market, if the of products which benefit from Community Council took no measures to control pro support. duction with the sole objective of maintain ing the income of producers at its existing level, it would risk pursuing only one of the objectives of the common agricultural policy in isolation in such a way as to render impossible the realization of the others. 37. The Greek Government claims that the According to the case-law of the Court, that 32 system of maximum guaranteed quantities runs counter to Article 39. introduced by the Regulation leads effec tively to a reduction in the income of pro ducers. The Court has held, however, that 30 — See e. g. Joined Cases 279, 280, 285 and 286/84 Ran v Com- the Community institutions have a wide dis mission [1987] ECR 1069, paragraph 34 of the judgment. 31 — Case 5/73 Balkan-lmport-Export v Hauptzotlamt Berlin- cretionary power in regard to the common Packhof [1973] ECR 1091, paragraph 24 of the judgment; Case 203/86 Spain v Council [1988] ECR 4563, paragraph 10. 32 — Joined Cases 197 to 200, 243, 245 and 247/80 Lndwig- shafener Walzmrihle v Council and Commission [1981] 29 — Op . cit., second recital. ECR 3211, paragraph 41 of the judgment.
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39. The arguments 01 the Greek Govern 41. It is not correct to say therefore that the ment are all the more difficult to accept seen Regulation runs counter to Article 39. in the light of the recent reform of the com mon agricultural policy. Traditionally, finan cial support to producers was linked to the volume of production. That had undesirable consequences: it stimulated output beyond the market's absorption capacity thus leading to a building up of stocks; it encouraged the intensification of production, which had 42. With regard to the submissions made by adverse consequences for the environment; Mr Crispoltoni, it is clear from what I have and it led to a substantial increase in Com said above that, if they are accepted, that munity expenditure. By contrast, the pur would not lead to the invalidity of the Reg chasing power of agricultural income ulation on the ground that it is vitiated by a improved very little over the period 1975 to misuse of powers, but on the ground that it 1989. In view of those developments, the runs counter to the principle of proportion Community institutions decided to reform ality. For that reason, I shall examine those the common agricultural policy, a new key 33 arguments together with the arguments sub objective being to control production. The mitted by the Italian Government. system of maximum guaranteed quantities is linked to those developments.
The principle of proportionality
40. It is notable that Community expendi ture to subsidize tobacco growing and first 43. Mr Crispoltoni and the Italian Govern processing has increased dramatically since ment claim that the Regulation is invalid on the adoption of Regulation 727/70, so much the ground that the system of maximum so that a recent report of the Court of Audi guaranteed quantities is unsuitable to achieve tors refers to tobacco as being by far the its objectives. The Italian Government also Community's most expensive crop: the argues that it runs counter to the principle of expenditure in 1993 amounted to no less proportionality because it penalizes indis 34 than ECU 1 274 million. criminately all producers for the excess pro duction irrespective of whether, and if so the degree by which, they contribute to the max 33 — See Commission, The development and future of the com imum guaranteed quantity being exceeded. It mon agricultural policy, COM(91) 258, EC Bulletin, Sup does not enable the reduction of premiums plement 5 of 1991, pp. 9-12 and especially for the sector of tobacco pp. 27-28. and prices to be adjusted taking into consid 34 — See Special Report No 8/93 concerning the common orga eration the individual circumstances of each nization of the market in raw tobacco, OJ 1994 C 65, para graph 1.1. producer.
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44. The Italian Government points out that discretion which the Community legislature Community production in tobacco increased has in matters concerning the common agri between 1988 and 1991, leading to an cultural policy, the legality of a measure increase in Community expenditure. In its adopted in that sphere can be affected only if view, the increase in production occurred it is manifestly inappropriate having regard precisely because of the failure of the Regu to the objective which the competent institu 37 lation to provide for the allocation of indi tion is seeking to pursue. vidual quotas to processing undertakings and producers. The Government and Mr Cri- spoltoni claim that the adoption of Regula tion No 2075/92 confirms by implication the unsuitability of the system of maximum guaranteed quantities to attain the objective of controlling production.
47. In my view, it is not correct to say that the system of maximum guaranteed quanti ties was manifestly inappropriate to achieve its objectives.
45. The validity of a measure must be deter mined taking into account the circumstances prevailing at the time of its adoption. The Court has held that the validity of a Com munity measure cannot depend on 'retro 35 spective considerations of its efficacy'. Where the Community legislature is obliged, in connection with the adoption of rules, to 48. It is true that that system did not have assess their future effects, which cannot be the desired results in that it failed to control accurately foreseen, its assessment is open to production sufficiently. The reform effected criticism only if it appears manifestly incor by Regulation No 2075/92 became necessary rect in the light of the information available precisely for that reason. It is not correct to to it at the time of the adoption of the rules say, however, that the system introduced by in question. 36 the Regulation proved totally ineffective. A comparison between the maximum guaran teed quantities set for each variety of tobacco for the 1989 to the 1991 harvests and the quantities actually produced in those har vests shows that for the majority of the vari eties the maximum guaranteed quantities 46. The Court has also held that, in view of were not exceeded. If the system of maxi the political responsibilities and the broad mum guaranteed quantities had not been introduced, production might well have increased even more.
35 — Case 40/72 Schroeder v Germany [1973] ECR 125, para graph 14 of the judgment. See also Joined Cases 9 and 11/71 Cie d'Approvisionnement v Commission [1972] ECR 391, paragraph 39. 37 — Case 265/87 Schrader [1989] ECR 2237. paragraphs 21 and 36 — Joined Cases C-267/88 to C-285/88 Wuidart and Others 22 of the judgment; Wuidart, cited in note, paragraph 14; [1990] ECR I-435. Case C-331/8S Fedesa, cited in note, paragraph 14.
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49. In any event, at the time when the imum rate permissible, that is to say, 15%. Council decided to introduce the system of The Council was entitled to wait for another maximum guaranteed quantities, it could not year with a view to seeing whether that reasonably be foreseen that it would prove reduction would have an effect on produc inadequate. The results of the first two years tion. Once the quantities actually produced during which the system was in force did not in the 1991 harvest were established in 1992, provide conclusive evidence to that effect. and it was clear that the system of maximum With regard to tobacco of the 'Bright' vari guaranteed quantities had not succeeded in ety in particular, which is produced by controlling production sufficiently, the Mr Crispoltoni, the maximum guaranteed Council promptly adopted Regulation quantity set for the 1989 harvest was not No 2075/92. exceeded. That quantity was 44 250 tonnes whereas the quantity actually produced was 38 36 685 tonnes.
52. The fact that, after the Regulation was in force for some years, it became clear that it was not sufficient to curb the increase in pro 50. By contrast, the maximum guaranteed duction does not mean that that regulation quantities set for the 1990 and for the must be declared invalid. In adopting the 1991 harvests were exceeded. The maximum Regulation, the Council had to make an guaranteed quantity set for the 1990 harvest assessment as to its possible impact on pro was 46 750 tonnes whereas the actual quan duction and no evidence has been adduced to tity produced was 54 023 tonnes. There was 39 show that its assessment was manifestly therefore an excess of 15.6%. The maxi incorrect. mum guaranteed quantity set for the 1991 harvest was 46 750 tonnes whereas the actual quantity produced was 60 094 tonnes. 40 There was therefore an excess of 28.54%.
53. The Commission points out that, when the Council decided to introduce measures with a view to controlling production, there 51. The excess of the maximum guaranteed were good reasons which made the choice of quantity for the 1990 harvest led to a reduc the system of maximum guaranteed quanti tion of the prices and premiums by the max ties an attractive one. In its view, that system is less restrictive for the individual producer than a system of individual quotas. Mr Cri spoltoni and the Italian Government dispute 38 — See Regulation No 2046/90, cited in note, Annex I. 39 — See Regulation No 2267/91, cited in note, Annex I. that view. They claim that the system of 40 — See Regulation No 2178/92, cited in note, Annex I. maximum guaranteed quantities has an arbi-
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trary character in that the amount of the pre 56. Contrary to what Mr Crispoltoni and mium to which a producer is entitled the Italian Government suggest, under the depends on whether other producers have system of maximum guaranteed quantities it led to the maximum guaranteed quantity is very difficult to identify those producers being exceeded. who contribute to the maximum guaranteed quantity being exceeded. That is because it is not possible to know with certainty what the individual quota of a given producer would have been if the maximum guaranteed quan tity fixed for a specific variety had been allo cated to producers. It is wrong to assume that in a system of individual quotas the maximum guaranteed quantity for a given 54. As a general rule, the system of maxi variety will necessarily be allocated equally mum guaranteed quantities provided for by among all producers of that variety. A Mem the Regulation is less restrictive for the indi ber State might legitimately favour certain vidual producer than the system of individ production regions or certain classes of pro ual quotas introduced subsequently by Reg ducers. ulation No 2075/92. Under the first system, although the producer runs the risk of suf fering a proportionate reduction in prices and premiums in case the maximum guaran teed quantity set for a variety is exceeded, he is none the less certain that he can receive support for all his produce, albeit at a reduced rate. He is also certain that, irrespec 57. The Italian Government claims, how tive of how much the maximum guaranteed ever, that the system of maximum guaranteed quantity is exceeded, the reduction of premi quantities suffers from an inherent flaw. It ums and prices will not exceed a certain encourages producers to be careless because threshold. That threshold was set at 15% for they know that the consequences of excess the 1989 to 1991 harvests. By contrast, under production will not affect them individually the system introduced by Regulation but will be spread among all producers. In No 2075/92 a producer receives no support answer to that argument, it is sufficient to for production in excess of his individual point out that, in introducing a measure for quota. the benefit of producers, the Community legislature can expect them to act prudently so as to lead to its success. The failure of producers to do so cannot be a ground for invalidating that measure.
55. Although the possibility cannot be excluded that certain producers would bene fit more if a system of individual quotas had been introduced than under the system of maximum guaranteed quantities that is not a 58. As we have already seen, the system of ground for invalidating the Regulation. maximum guaranteed quantities is in general
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less restrictive than the system of individual Article 1 infringed the principle of propor quotas introduced subsequently. By adopting tionality on the ground that it did not enable the Regulation, therefore, the Council the additional amount to be set at different sought to satisfy the requirements of the levels according to the quality of the goods principle of proportionality, which requires and the circumstances in which they were that where there is a choice between several imported. appropriate measures recourse must be had 41 to the least onerous. The Council also sought to comply with Article 39(2)(b) of the Treaty which requires that, in working out the common agricultural policy, account must be taken of the need to effect the appropriate adjustments by degrees.
61. There are two material differences between those cases, on the one hand, and 59. Both Mr Crispoltoni and the Italian the present case, on the other hand. Werner Government cite the judgments in Werner Faust and Wünsche concerned the imposition 42 43 Faust and Wünsche. I cannot see, how of a charge which the Court found was ever, how those judgments could support the effectively an economic penalty on traders. claim that the Regulation is invalid. That is not the case in the present proceed ings. In my view, there is a clear difference between the imposition of a flat-rate eco nomic penalty and a sharing in the reduction of subsidies once the maximum guaranteed quantity has been exceeded. The second dif ference is that, in Werner Faust and in Wün- sche, the additional amount had been intro duced pursuant to a regulation of the 60. In those cases the Court was concerned Council which provided for the application with the validity of Commission Regulation of protective measures only to such an extent (EEC) No 3429/80, Article 1 of which pro as was strictly necessary. The Court applied vided for the levy of an additional amount at the principle of proportionality as expressed a fixed rate where preserved mushrooms 44 specifically in the enabling regulation. were released into free circulation in the That is not so in the present case. For the Community in excess of the quantities laid reasons which I gave above, the imposition down in its provisions. The Court held that of a flat-rate reduction in the prices and pre miums where the maximum guaranteed
41 — See e. g. Fedesa, cited in note, paragraph 13 of the judg ment. 42 — Case C-24/90 [1991] ECR I-4905. 44 — See Werner Faust, cited in note, paragraphs 19 and 29 of the 43 — Case C-25/90 [1991] ECR I-4939. judgment; Wünsche, cited in note, paragraphs 20 and 30.
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quantity is exceeded cannot be regarded as The principle of non-discrimination manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objectives which the Regulation sought to pursue.
63. The Greek Government claims that the system of maximum guaranteed quantities set up by the Regulation leads to discrimina tion between producers and infringes the principle of equality laid down in Arti cle 40(3) of the Treaty.
64. The argument of the Greek Government 62. By contrast, the view that the Regulation is closely connected with the argument of is valid is supported by the judgment of the 45 the Italian Government examined above. Court in Zardi. In that case, the Court was Both the Italian Government and the Greek concerned with Article 4b of Council Regu Government point to the fact that an excess lation (EEC) No 2727/75, which provided of the maximum guaranteed quantity laid for a levy to be collected from cereal produc down for a certain variety results in a pro ers for all quantities of cereal placed on the portionate flat-rate reduction in the prices market. The levy would be reimbursed in and premiums with regard to that variety. full only if production in the marketing year Whereas the Italian Government considers in question did not exceed the maximum that that runs counter to the principle of guaranteed quantity. It was argued that it proportionality, the Greek Government con was not necessary to require payment of the siders that it results in discriminatory treat levy as soon as the cereals were placed on the ment in that it extends the adverse conse market since other, less restrictive, means quences of an excess in production to all existed. The Court held, however, that the producers irrespective of whether, and if so collection of the additional levy when the the degree to which, they contribute to that cereals were placed on the market was likely, excess. by reducing the price paid to producers, to persuade them not to increase production during the marketing year and that the Com munity legislature had not committed any manifest error of assessment in rejecting 46 other options.
65. Article 40(3) is a specific expression of 45 — Case C-8/89 Zardi [1990] ECR I-2515. the general principle of non-discrimination. 46 — Paragraph 13 of the judgment. Discrimination occurs not only when com-
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parable situations are treated differently but corresponding to a certain quantity of pro also when different situations are treated in cessed tomato products and provided that, if the same way unless such treatment is objec that threshold were exceeded, the aid payable 47 tively justified. I do not agree, however, to producers would be reduced for the fol that in this case the principle of non lowing marketing year, depending on the discrimination has been infringed. extent to which the threshold had been exceeded. It was argued that the reduction in aid made by the Commission, following a finding that the threshold had been exceeded, infringed the prohibition of discrimination. It applied uniformly throughout the Com munity so that French processors who were not responsible for the fact that the thresh olds were exceeded were treated in the same way as producers in other Member States 66. According to the case-law of the Court, who were so responsible. In response to that 50 the fact that the introduction of a measure argument, the Court held: under the common organization of the mar ket may affect producers in different ways, depending upon the particular nature of their production or on local conditions, cannot be regarded as discrimination if the measure is determined on the basis of objective rules, formulated to meet the needs of the general 48 common organization of the market. '... in a common organization of markets with no system of national quotas all Com munity producers, regardless of the Member State in which they are based, must together, in an egalitarian manner, bear the conse quences of the decisions which the Commu nity institutions are led to adopt, in the exer cise of their powers, in order to respond to the risk of an imbalance which may arise in the market between production and market 67. In SITPA, 49 the Court examined an outlets.' argument similar to that under consideration. In that case, the Court was concerned with the validity of Council Regulation (EEC) No 989/84 introducing a system of guarantee thresholds for certain processed fruit and vegetable products. That regulation fixed a guarantee threshold for each marketing year 68. The Court took a similar view in Erida- 51 nia. An argument submitted in that case
47 — See e. g. Case 106/83 Sermide v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero [1984] ECR 4209, paragraph 28 of the judgment. 48 — Case 179/84 Bozzetti v Invemizzi [1985] ECR2301 , para 50 — Paragraph 20 of the judgment. graph 34 of the judgment. 51 — Case 250/84 Eridania v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero [1986] 49 — Case C-27/90 [1991] ECR I-133. ECR 117, paragraph 32 of the judgment.
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was that, under the quota system for sugar vided that separate maximum guaranteed set up by Council Regulation (EEC) quantities might be fixed for specific produc No 1785/81, Italian producers were required tion areas. to assist in the financing of surpluses for which they were not responsible and that the burden imposed upon them was contrary to Article 39(1)(d) of the Treaty. The Court held, however, that that view was incompat ible with the very principle of a common market, where the undertakings or the Mem 71. I conclude that the claim that the Regu ber State responsible for any surplus produc lation infringes the principle of non tion could not be identified. discrimination should fail.
The principle of protection of legitimate expectations
69. It follows from those judgments that a flat-rate reduction in premiums and prices which affects all producers, in cases where the maximum guaranteed quantity is exceeded, does not infringe the principle of 72. The Greek Government claims that the non-discrimination. failure of the Regulation to provide for the allocation of individual quotas to producers infringes the principle of protection of legit imate expectations because it makes it impossible for a producer to plan his pro duction. It runs counter to the ultimate objectives of the common organization of the market in tobacco which, under Regula tion No 727/70, are to safeguard a fair 70. The system of maximum guaranteed income for producers and to increase that quantities is based on general and objective income. criteria. Under Article 4(5) of the Regulation, in fixing the maximum guaranteed quantity for each variety, the Council must take into account the market requirements and the 52 specific conditions of different regions. Also, with a view to taking into account dif ferences in quality in a variety of tobacco 73. As we have already seen, the Regulation depending on the characteristics of the soil does not run counter to the objectives of the and the climate, Regulation No 1251/89 pro common agricultural policy laid down in Article 39. Nor is it correct to say that it infringes the principle of protection of legit 52 — See Article 4(5), above, paragraph 7. imate expectations.
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74. Traders cannot have a legitimate expecta fact that the maximum guaranteed quantity tion that an existing situation which is capa fixed for a given variety is known to produc ble of being altered by the Community insti ers in advance. It is also satisfied by the fact tutions in the exercise of their discretionary that the producers know that they will 53 power will be maintained. That is particu receive support for all their production and larly so in an area such as the common orga that, irrespective of the amount by which the nization of the markets whose purpose maximum guaranteed quantity is exceeded, involves constant adjustments to meet the reduction in prices and premiums cannot 54 changes in the economic situation. There exceed an upper threshold fixed in advance. fore traders cannot claim a vested right to The argument of the Greek Government the maintenance of an advantage which they should therefore be rejected. derive from the establishment of the com mon organization of the markets and which 55 they enjoyed at a given time. It follows that, even if the application of the system of maximum guaranteed quantities led to a reduction in the income of producers, that did not infringe the principle of protection Cases C-300/93 and C-362/93 of legitimate expectations.
76. It will be remembered that in these cases 75. Nor has that principle been infringed by the Pretura Circondariale di Caserta has the failure to provide for the allocation of requested a preliminary ruling on the valid individual quotas to producers. The system ity of Regulation No 1738/91. of maximum guaranteed quantities has an inherent degree of uncertainty in that pro ducers do not know in advance the exact amount of the prices and premiums which they will receive, that amount being depen dent on whether, and to what extent, the maximum guaranteed quantity has been exceeded. That uncertainty, however, is a normal commercial risk which producers can 77. Mr Natale and Mr Pontillo are growers be expected to bear. The requirement to pro of tobacco of the 'Burley' variety in the tect legitimate expectations is satisfied by the province of Caserta. They sold their produc tion from the 1991 harvest to Donatab Sri, an undertaking which carries out the first processing and market preparation of 53 — Case C-350/88 Delacre and Others v Commission [1990] tobacco. They received, by way of advance ECR I-395, paragraph 33 of the judgment, Case 245/81 Edeka v Germany [1982] ECR 2745, paragraph 27. payment and subject to the lodging of a 54 — Delacre, op. cit., Case 84/78 Tomadini v Amministrazione security, the premium laid down in Arti delle Finanze dello Stato [1979] ECR 1801, paragraph 22 of the judgment. cle 3 of Regulation No 727/70. Following the 55 — Delacre, op. cit., paragraph 34 of the judgment, Case finding by the Commission that the maxi 230/78 Eridania v Minister of Agriculture and Forestry [1979] ECR 2749. mum guaranteed quantity for tobacco of the
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'Burley' variety for the 1991 harvest had 80. In the orders for reference, the referring been exceeded, the prices and premiums court questions the validity of Regulation were reduced by 15%. Mr Natale and No 1738/91 on the ground that it infringes Mr Pontillo received from Donatab Sri a the principle of protection of legitimate demand for reimbursement corresponding to expectations. The contested regulation is the reduction of premiums. dated 13 June 1991 and was published in the Official Journal dated 26 June 1991. The referring court states that it applied retroac tively in that it fixed the maximum guaran teed quantity for tobacco of the 'Burley' variety for the 1991 harvest at a time when the producers of that variety had already planted the tobacco and had already con cluded contracts with first processing under 78. In the main proceedings, they dispute takings and registered them with AIMA. the reduction of premiums on the ground that Regulation No 1738/91 is invalid. It is as a result of that argument that the Pretura has made these references.
79. By Regulation No 1738/91, the Council 81. If the maximum guaranteed quantity for fixed for the 1991 harvest the norm and the 1991 harvest had been fixed retroactively, intervention prices and the premiums i. e. after producers had to make their deci granted to purchasers of leaf tobacco, the sions regarding production for that year, that derived intervention prices for baled tobacco, would indeed run counter to the principle of the reference qualities, the production areas protection of legitimate expectations. In the and the guaranteed maximum quantities and 59 previous Crispoltoni case the Court exam amended Council Regulation (EEC) 57 ined the validity of Regulation No 1331/90. In Case C-362/93 the refer No 1114/88 and of Council Regulation ring court requests a ruling also on the valid (EEC) No 2268/88 by which the Council ity of the regulations implementing Regula fixed, for the 1988 harvest, the maximum tion No 1738/91. The national court is guaranteed quantities. Both regulations were presumably referring to Regulation published after farmers had made their deci No 2178/92 by which the Commission sions for the 1988 harvest. The Court held established the quantities actually produced that they were invalid in so far as they laid and determined the prices and premiums 5 down a maximum guaranteed quantity for payable for the 1991 harvest. 8 tobacco of the 'Bright' variety harvested in 1988. It came to that conclusion on the
56 — See Regulation No 2178/92. cited in note 10. 57 — OJ 1990 L 132, p. 28. 58 — Cited in note 10. 59 — Case C-368/89, cited above in note 21.
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ground that those regulations had retroactive Germany. With regard to the variety 'Bur effect, that that effect was not justified by the ley I', Regulation No 1738/91 did not affect purpose to be achieved and that the legiti the maximum guaranteed quantity set by mate expectations of the economic operators Regulation No 1331/90. 60 concerned had been infringed.
84. It is clear, therefore, that Regulation No 1738/91 cannot be declared invalid on 82. In the present cases, however, the doubts the grounds referred to in the orders for ref expressed by the referring court as to the erence. In their submissions to this Court, validity of Regulation No 1738/91 are based however, Mr Natale and Mr Pontillo dispute on an erroneous assumption. As the Council the validity of the contested regulation on and the Commission point out, the maxi the ground that that regulation fixed retroac mum guaranteed quantity for the variety tively for the 1991 harvest the amount of the 'Burley I', which is in issue in the main pro premiums granted to purchasers. ceedings, harvested in 1991 was fixed for the first time not by Regulation No 1738/91 but by Regulation No 1331/90 which was pub lished in the Official Journal on 23 May 1990, that is to say, long before producers had to make their decisions for the 1991 har vest. That regulation fixed the maximum guaranteed quantity for the 'Burley I' variety 85. They point out that the prices and pre 61 miums fixed by Regulation No 1738/91 for at 46 750 tonnes. the 1991 harvest are lower than those which applied by virtue of Regulation No 1331/90 for the 1990 harvest and they claim that that reduction of prices and pre miums brought about a deterioration in their legal situation. They argue that the reduction could not have been foreseen either at the time when producers had to make their deci 83. It is true that Regulation No 1738/91 sions regarding production for the 1991 har amended Regulation No 1331/90 by increas vest, that is to say, in November 1990, or at ing the maximum guaranteed quantities for the time when the tobacco had to be sown in the 1991 harvest for certain varieties. How seed beds, that is to say, in February 1991. ever, that increase was made in the interests They conclude that, at the time when they of producers, in view of the unification of had to make a decision whether to cultivate tobacco of the 'Burley' variety for the 1991 harvest, the information which they
60 — The Council gave effect to the judgment of the Court by adopting Regulations (EEC) Nos 1570/92 (OJ 1992 L 166, p. 6) and 1571/92 (OJ 1992 L 166, p. 7). 61 — See Regulation No 1331/90, cited in note, Article 3(3) and 62 — See Regulation No 1738/91, cited in note, preamble, sixth Annex V. recital.
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possessed encouraged them to continue to priate for the Court to examine the issue cultivate that variety. They conclude that whether the fixing of the prices and premi Regulation No 1738/91 runs counter to the ums by the contested regulation runs principle of legitimate expectations. counter to the principle of protection of legitimate expectations. As already stated, that issue has not been referred by the national court but has been raised only by the applicants in the main proceedings in their submissions before this Court. 86. At the hearing, the Council and the Commission argued that that issue should not be discussed since it is not raised by the national court in the orders for reference. The question arises therefore whether the Court should examine the validity of the contested regulation in so far as it fixes the prices and premiums for the 1991 harvest.
89. However, it is the national court alone which can determine the questions to be 87. On a reference for a preliminary ruling submitted to this Court, the parties to the the Court will sometimes, with a view to main proceedings being unable to change the 65 assisting the national court, rule on questions scope of those questions or to require the 66 formulated differently from those put by the national court to refer a specific question. national court. For the same purpose, the Article 177 establishes direct cooperation Court may consider provisions of Commu between this Court and the national courts nity law to which the national court has not by way of a non-contentious procedure 63 referred in its question. The Court has excluding any initiative of the parties to the gone as far as to provide a ruling on the national proceedings who are merely invited validity of a Community provision where to be heard in the course of that proce 67 the national court posed only a question of dure. If the Court examined the issue interpretation: see for example Schwarze v raised by Mr Natale and Mr Pontillo, that 6 Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide. 4 would run counter to the above principles. More importantly, it would run counter to the rights of defence. The information con tained in an order for reference not only enables the Court to answer the questions referred but also enables the Governments of 88. In my view, however, in the circum stances of this case, it would not be appro 65 — Case 44/65 Hessische Knappschaft v Singer [1965] ECR 965, p. 970; Joined Cases C-134 and C-135/91 Kerafina- Keramische mid Finanz-Holding et Vioktimatiki [1992] ECR I-5699, paragraph 16 of the judgment. 63 — Case C-241/S9 SARPP [1990] I-1695, paragraph 8 of the judgment. Case C-315/92 Verband Sozialer Wettbelieb eV 66 — See Case 283/81 CILFIT v Ministry of Health [1982] v Clinique Laboratories SNC and Estéé Lauder Cosmetics ECR 3415, paragraph 9 of the judgment. GmbH, judgment of 2 February 199-í, paragraph 7. 67 — Sec e. g. Hessische Knappschaft v Singer, cited in note, 64 — Casc 16/65 [1965] ECR 877. p. 971.
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the Member States and the Community 91. Mr Natale and MrPontillo do not institutions to make submissions to the merely challenge the validity of the contested Court in accordance with Article 20 of the regulation on different grounds from those Statute of the Court. Article 20 provides for referred to by the national court. They dis the submission of written observations with pute the validity of a different aspect of the no opportunity for written reply In Hold- contested regulation from that to which the 68 ijk, the Court stated that it has a duty to question of the national court relates. Unlike ensure that the opportunity to submit obser other cases where the Court examined issues vations provided for by Article 20 is safe not expressly raised by the order for refer guarded, in view of the fact that only the ence, in this case no ambiguity arises as to decision making the reference is notified to the meaning or the precise scope of the ques the interested parties. tion posed by the referring court. The present case can be distinguished from cases such as Schwarze: there, the Court examined the validity of the measure in question on the ground that, although the question referred enquired as to the interpretation of a Community measure, it was clear from the order for reference and the dispute in the main action that the real purpose of the questions submitted was to obtain a ruling on validity. In this case, there is no indication that the referring court intended to request a ruling with regard to the fixing by the con tested regulations of the prices and premi ums.
90. The opportunity for Member States and the Community institutions to make written submissions must be safeguarded in particu lar where the Court is asked to rule on the validity of a Community act. In such a case, 92. In any event, I do not accept the argu save perhaps in a wholly exceptional case ment that the fixing of prices and premiums where a Community act is patently invalid, it by Regulation No 1738/91 for the 1991 har would not be appropriate to deny to the vest runs counter to the legitimate expecta institution which is the author of the act the tions of the producers concerned. right to make submissions. It follows that the Court should only examine the issues which expressly or by implication arise from the order for reference and on which the institution in question could be expected to comment.
93. First, it is clear that, under the system of maximum guaranteed quantities, the exact 68 — Joined Cases 141 to 143/81 [1982] ECB. 1299, paragraph 6 of the judgment. amount of the prices and premiums which
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producers receive with regard to a certain ers. The prices and premiums payable for the variety is not known until after the decision 1990 harvest were higher than those payable to cultivate that variety has been made. That for the 1989 harvest. The premium for is so because the amount of the prices and tobacco of the 'Burley I' variety for the premiums depends on whether the maximum 1989 harvest was fixed at ECU 1 653 per guaranteed quantity has been exceeded and if kg 69 whereas for the 1990 harvest it was 70 so by how much. Therefore, an element of fixed at ECU 2 013 per kg. Nor was the uncertainty is inherent in the support system reduction for the 1991 harvest so large as to established by Regulation No 1114/88. justify a claim that it runs counter to the principle of protection of legitimate expecta tions. With regard to tobacco of the 'Burley I' variety, the premium for the 1991 harvest 71 was fixed at ECU 1 748 per kg. Those 94. Secondly, although it is true that the variations constitute normal commercial prices and premiums fixed for the 1991 har risks which are inherent in a system intro vest were lower than those fixed for the duced for the benefit of producers and which 1990 harvest, the amount of prices and pre producers can reasonably be expected to miums payable is fixed by the Council on a bear. It is not correct to say that a prudent yearly basis and variations may occur to the and informed producer was unable to foresee benefit as well as to the detriment of produc them.
Conclusion
95. I am accordingly of the opinion that:
In Case C-133 / 93 the question put by the Pretura Circondariale di Perugia should be answered as follows:
Consideration of the matters examined has disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of Council Regulation ( EEC ) No 1114/88 and the regulations adopted for its implementation .
69 — See Council Regulation (EEC) No 1252/89, OJ 1989 L 129, p. 17, Annex FV. 70 — See Regulation No 1331/90, cited in note. Annex IV. 71 — Regulation No 1738/91, cited in note, Annex IV.
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In Cases C-300/93 and C-362/93 the questions put by the Pretura Circondariale di Caserta should be answered as follows:
Consideration of the matters examined has disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1738/91 and the regulation adopted for its implementation.
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