C-28/94
ECLI:EU:C:1998:409
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O P I N I O N OF MR ALBER — CASE C-28/94
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL ALBER delivered on 17 September 1998 *
A — Introduction eligible for intervention purchase only if it had a minimum salt content, by weight, of 2%. 3 Therefore, unsalted butter only quali- fied for intervention if it was made from sour cream.
1. In the present case, the Kingdom of the Netherlands is contesting a reduction of over N L G 82 million in E A G G F reimbursements in the context of the clearance of accounts for 1990. 1 The Commission, the defendant in the proceedings, justifies the reductions on the ground that, for want of an adequate system of controls, the intervention agencies of the 3. At the end of the 1970s, a new process Netherlands had bought in butter made from known as the NIZO-process, 4 by which sweet cream by a process not authorised for butter could also be made from sweet cream, intervention. was developed in the Netherlands. The acidi- fying agent is added only at a later stage in this process with the result that the butter- milk obtained is sweet.
2. Until 1987, the Community legislation pro- vided that intervention agencies were to buy in only butter which — in addition to other conditions concerning water and buttermilk content — had been manufactured from sour cream. 2 Butter made with sweet cream was 4. Following the introduction and approval of the NIZO-process in the Netherlands, the national authorities informed the Commis- * Original language: German. sion that it might in future be difficult to 1 — Commission Decision N o 93/659/EEC of 25 November 1993 check whether the butter tendered for inter- on the clearance of accounts presented by the Member States in respect of the expenditure for 1990 of the European Agri- vention was made from sweet or with sour culture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), Guarantee Section (OJ 1993 L 301, p. 13). cream. It is an undisputed fact that it is no 2 — See Article l(3)(a)(aa) of Regulation (EEC) N o 985/68 of the longer possible to determine from the final Council laying down general rules for intervention on the product whether it was made from sweet or market in butter and cream (OJ, English Special Edition 1968 (I), p. 256), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) N o 2714/72 sour cream. of the Council of 19 December 1972 amending Regulation (EEC) N o 985/68 of the Council laying down general rules for intervention on the market in butter and cream (OJ, English Special Edition, 1972, p. 15) and Article 3(a) of Regu- lation (EEC) N o 685/69 of the Commission of 14 April 1969 on detailed rules of application for intervention on the market 3 — See Article 3(l)(a)(bb) of Regulation N o 985/68 as last in butter and cream (OJ, English Special Edition 1969 (I), amended by Regulation N o 2714/72. p. 194). 4 — NIZO: Nederlands Instituut Zuivel Onderzoek.
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5. The monitoring of intervention in the erlands, published a report alleging that none Netherlands is shared between three organ of the butter which had been offered for isations. The VIB is the authority respon intervention in the Netherlands between 1982 sible for intervention for the purposes of the and 1987 had met requirements. All that butter Community rules. It is responsible for the was said to have been produced by the N I Z O buying-in and storage of butter and also car process. ries out the corresponding checks in order to ensure, in particular, that the packaging of the butter bears the special marking prescribed for intervention. The VIB has delegated part of its checks to the C O Z 6 , an inspection 8. Following that report, the Commission undertaking governed by private law. The carried out its own investigation in 1989: the main function of that undertaking is to carry findings are set out in its 1993 summary out the inspections, inter alia on the spot. report. 8 According to that report, the Neth Lastly, the AID 7 is the ministerial authority erlands authorities had never introduced a with general responsibility for the controls. It system of controls whereby the cream used in is the AID's task to check that the C O Z per the manufacture of butter sold into interven forms its task conscientiously. The AID also tion. Analysis of the documents available checks the authorisations of the individual showed that the butter brought between 1982 dairies to sell into intervention. and 1987 had been made either by the N I Z O or by the equally unauthorised half-and-half process.
6. In 1987, on the basis of an inspection by the AID, the VIB rejected over 25 000 tonnes of butter intended for intervention. According 9. Although the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Netherlands Government, that butter had been aware of the fact that there were had been made in part from sweet cream and shortcomings in its system of controls since in part by the NIZO-permeate process which 1977, it was not until early 1987 according to was banned for intervention purposes in the the Commission that they investigated the Netherlands. The minutes relating to that process used. The fact that in 1987 the AID inspection were forwarded to the Commis rejected butter which had actually been sion. accepted for intervention by the C O Z shows that the C O Z checked the process.
7. In April 1989 the Chairman of the Com 10. It is also stated in the summary report mittee on Budgetary Controls of the Euro that the Netherlands authorities had been pean Parliament, Pieter Dankert, of the Neth aware since 1982 that there had been attempts to sell butter made from sweet cream into intervention. In reviewing the authorisations 5 — Voedselvoorzienings in- en verkoopbureau. 6 — Centraal Orgaan Zuivelcontrole. 7 — Algemene Inspectiedienst van het Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij. 8 — Doc. VI/119/93-FR final.
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of the undertakings in 1987, the AID found tural Guidance and Guarantee Fund that the dairies had been selling unauthorised (EAGGF), Guarantee Section (OJ 1993 butter into intervention since 1982 at least. L 301, p. 13), in so far as it refuses clear- The Netherlands authorities should have ance to a sum of N L G 82 656 019, repre- informed the appropriate departments of the senting expenditure in respect of butter Commission accordingly. bought into intervention;
11. In view of the seriousness of the short- — order the Commission to pay the costs. comings, the decision was taken to reduce by 10% all expenditure declared for 1987 in respect of butter bought into intervention since 28 February 1985. As a result, the Com- mission disallowed expenditure in the sum of N L G 82 656 019. 14. The Commission contends that the Court should:
12. The Kingdom of the Netherlands main- tains, to the contrary, that, in particular by introducing additional controls, it had done — dismiss the action as unfounded, everything that can be required of a Member State in that regard. Since those controls had prevented irregularities, it was not under any obligation to inform the Commission.
— order the applicant to pay the costs.
13. Accordingly in 1994, the Kingdom of the Netherlands brought an action before the Court of Justice, claiming that the Court B — Pleas in law and arguments should:
— annul Commission Decision No 93/659/EEC of 25 November 1993 on the 15. The Kingdom of the Netherlands puts clearance of the accounts presented by the forward several pleas in law. First, it claims Member States in respect of the expendi- that the Commission misapplied Article 8(2) ture for 1990 of the European Agricul- of Regulation (EEC) N o 729/70 on the
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financing of the common agricultural policy. 9 17. The Kingdom of the Netherlands main Under that provision the Community is not tains that it complied with all requirements to bear the financial consequences of irregu prescribed by the Community rules for the larities or negligence attributable to adminis checks to be carried out. However, there are trative authorities of the Member States. gaps in those rules making it impossible effec tively to prevent the sale into intervention of N I Z O butter. Thus, for example, Article 2(1) of Regulation N o 685/69 requires samples to be taken only from the final product. How 16. However, the applicant submits that it ever, the process by which the butter was cannot be held responsible for any irregulari made can no longer be determined from the ties or negligence. It did everything — in final product, the butter itself. other words it carried out all the checks which can reasonably be expected of a Member State. Accordingly, the applicant considers that it has fulfilled all the requirements under Article 8(1) of Regulation N o 729/70, which provides: 18. The Commission points out in that respect that the checks prescribed by the Community were laid down at a time when the N I Z O process was still unknown. In its submission, however, the checks prescribed, which also 'The Member States in accordance with apply to the process of the manufacture of national provisions laid down by law, regula the butter, make it perfectly possible for the tion or administrative action shall take the Member States to ascertain which production measures necessary to: process was used for the manufacture. Thus the plant used in the traditional manufac turing process differs from that used in the N I Z O process. The N I Z O plant needs an opening through which the permeate can be — satisfy themselves that transactions added at a later stage, as well as a special financed by the Fund are actually carried sweet-cream reservoir. There is no need for out and are executed correctly; such a reservoir in the traditional manufac turing process since the cream employed is quite different on account of its properties. Therefore, the process by which the butter was made can be established by an on-the- — prevent and deal with irregularities; spot inspection at the dairy.
...'
19. The applicant disputes that claim, arguing that such equipment can be readily converted 9 — Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 of the Council of 21 April 1970 from one production process to the other. on the financing of the common agricultural policy (OJ, English Special Edition 1970 (I), p. 218). Consequently, inspections cannot establish if
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processes other than that in application at the 23. Lastly, the Commission maintains that time of inspection were used previously. the third possibility is to examine the books of the dairies. The Commission mentions a number of points which could shed light on the production process applied. For example, the sweet buttermilk produced by the N I Z O process is far more readily marketable than sour buttermilk. The Kingdom of the Neth- erlands disagrees, pointing out that even sour 20. The Commission disputes this. It refers buttermilk can be used as a primary product here to the minutes relating to the inspection — for example in making cheese — and is, carried out by the AID which have been pro- therefore, marketable. duced by the applicant. The minutes show that in meetings with the dairy managers, the latter had maintained that N I Z O production plant could no longer be used for the tradi- tional manufacturing process.
24. The Commission bases its position in this matter on a report submitted to it by the applicant itself. In that report it is said that it was above all the difficulties in marketing sour buttermilk that prompted the development of 21. The Commission claims that the second a new process which did not yield that product. means of checking is to analyse the cream and butterfat on the spot. The Commission is referring here to the fact that the N I Z O pro- cess uses sweet cream as a primary product, obtaining sweet butterfat in the course of production, whereas the traditional process uses sour cream from the very outset, with the result that the buttermilk produced is also sour. The Commission maintains that that can 25. As a further point the Commission men- be checked simply by tasting the cream or by tions examination of the production plans and analysing the buttermilk at the dairy. costs. The N I Z O process makes it possible for production to continue without interrup- tion with the result that there are savings in costs. That can be established by examining the books. Finally, the production process can also be deduced from the quantity of N I Z O permeate used. The applicant disputes this. It argues that, firstly, the savings in costs are not 22. The applicant considers that that is also great. Secondly, the production process cannot simply a spot-check method which can only be determined with accuracy from the per- be effective if the checking is carried out meate quantities since the same permeate is regularly. The Commission does not deny also used in making products intended for this. intervention.
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26. As regards the comprehensiveness of the mission — that butter made from sweet cream checks and controls prescribed by Commu is not sold into intervention. nity law, the applicant maintains that the Member States cannot be held responsible for the shortcomings in the Community system of controls. It is for the Commission to bring its rules into line with current technology. The Commission was particularly negligent in this respect because the applicant had drawn 29. The pleadings of the parties show that its attention on a number of occasions to the they are at least agreed that there are some fact that there could be difficulties as a result easily detectable differences in the equipment of the introduction of the N I Z O process. used in the two processes and that these can Since it could no longer be determined from be modified, albeit at some cost. It follows the final product whether that product had that frequent and unannounced inspections been made from sweet or sour cream, the might very well shed light on the production applicant had repeatedly requested that the method used by the undertaking. rules be brought into line with the new circumstances.
30. With regard to the examination of the books, it is quite possible, having regard to 27. The applicant also argues that, by intro the report, which states that the N I Z O pro ducing additional measures extending its cess was developed because of the difficulties system of controls, it had complied with its in marketing sour buttermilk, that the butter obligations under Article 8(1) of Regulation milk sales figures — and perhaps also the N o 729/70. It had thus done everything that names of the buyers — could serve to indi could reasonably be expected of it. cate whether the buttermilk in question was sweet or sour.
C — Analysis
31. Whilst it is debatable whether permeate quantities shed sufficient light on the produc tion process, I must agree with the Commis sion that a combination of the controls it has proposed constitutes a reliable means of veri fying the production methods employed. It is 28. It now falls to be considered whether it therefore not possible to agree with the appli is possible to ensure with reasonable certainty cant's assertion that even on the basis of the — if necessary, through a combination of the Commission's proposals it is impossible to checking methods mentioned by the Com determine by which process the intervention
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butter was produced, particularly since the That article thus imposes on the Member applicant itself maintains it had done every States the general obligation to take the mea thing necessary to prevent the sale of N I Z O sures necessary to satisfy themselves that the butter into intervention. It follows that even transactions financed by the Fund are actu the applicant must consider that there must ally carried out and are executed correctly, be some means of checking. even if the specific Community act does not expressly provide for the adoption of par ticular supervisory measures (Case C-8/88 Germany ν Commission [1990] ECR 1-2321, paragraphs 16 and 17).' 11
32. N o r can I support the applicant in its attempt to transfer the responsibility for those checks to the Commission. It is settled case-law that the national administrative authorities are responsible for ensuring that 33. It follows that the Member States have a the Community rules are strictly observed. 1 0 general obligation to exercise adequate super The scope of that responsibility in the con vision even if the relevant rules do not text of E A G G F financing was determined by expressly provide for this in a given situation. the Court in its judgment in Exportslachter- ijen van Oordegem. I n that judgment, the Court stated with regard to Article 8(1) of Regulation N o 729/70:
34. Particularly in cases like this, where the introduction of a new production process creates a new situation so far as controls are concerned, it is for the Member States to adapt their systems of control to that situation. As 'That provision, which expressly lays down the Commission correctly points out, that is in that specific area the obligations imposed particularly true in this case, since it was the on Member States by Article 5 of the Treaty Member State itself which created that situa defines, the Court has said, the principles tion by authorising the N I Z O process. according to which the Community and the Member States must ensure the implementa tion of Community decisions on agricultural intervention financed by the Fund and combat fraud and irregularities in relation to those operations (BayWa, cited above, paragraph 13). 35. It must now be determined whether the additional checks carried out by the applicant were indeed sufficiënt. Before examining this 10 — Case C-48/91 Netherlands ν Commisńon [1993] ECR I-5611, at paragraph 11; Case C-366/88 France ν Commission [1990] ECR 1-3571, at paragraph 20; Case C-8/88 Germany ν Commission [1990] ECR I-2321, at paragraph 17; and Joined Cases 146/81, 192/81 and 193/81 BayWa [1982] ECR 1503, 11 — Case C-2/93 van Oordegem ν BDBL [1994] ECR I-2283, at at paragraph 26. paragraphs 17 and 18.
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point in detail, it is first necessary to explain 37. The parties are correct in referring here in general terms how the Court has allocated to Case C-48/91. In that judgment, the Court the burden of proof in a case such as this. stated that: 3'The Commission is required The Commission maintains that it is for the not to demonstrate exhaustively that there are Member States to carry out the necessary irregularities in the data submitted by the checks. For that reason, the Commission Member States but to adduce evidence of cannot, it submits, substitute itself for the serious and reasonable doubt on its part national inspectors and evaluate the checks regarding the figures submitted by the national carried out by the Member State in question. authorities. The reason for this mitigation of The Commission has merely to ascertain that the burden of proof on the Commission is those measures are adequate for the purpose that ... it is the State which is best placed to of preventing irregularities. If it were to prove collect and verify the data required for the that that these were justified doubts, it could clearance of E A G G F accounts; consequently, then take appropriate action at the financial it is for the State to adduce the most detailed level. It would then be for the Member State and comprehensive evidence that its figures to show that the conditions for the expendi are accurate and, if appropriate, that the Com ture to be allowed by the Commission were mission's calculations are incorrect'. 1 4 fulfilled. The Commission makes reference here to the judgment in Case C-48/91. 1 2
38. As can be inferred from the parties' sub missions, it is not in dispute that the Com mission has at first only to make out a plau 36. The applicant also cites that judgment sible case that there are justified doubts. but arrived at a different conclusion. The Whether or not the Commission has done so applicant submits that the Commission has in this case is, however, in dispute. It must not adduced the necessary proof since not the now be examined, in this respect, whether the slightest evidence of justified doubt has been additional supervisory measures which the put forward. According to the case-law of the applicant claims to have introduced were suf Court of Justice, it is for the Commission to ficient to dispel such doubts (or indeed to show, in the event of dispute, that there has prevent them from arising at all). been a breach of the Community rules. In this case, however, the Commission has not even shown that there was a justified doubt but has merely asserted categorically that the 13 — See the judgment in Case C-48/91 (cited in footnote 10), at paragraph 17. supervisory measures taken by the Nether 14 — Accordingly, in its resolution of 13 April 1989 on preventing lands were inadequate. and combating fraud against the European Community budget in a post-1992 Europe, the European Parliament states that 'the Council has sail hitherto failed to invest the Commission with adequate monitoring powers to enable it to keep track of how Community revenue and expenditure are managed in the Member States ...' (OJ 1989 C 120, 12 — Cited in footnote 10. p. 279, point 7).
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39. The applicant points out first of all that 42. The applicant disputes this. In addition to it defined the terms 'cream' and 'sour' — checking the authorisations of the dairies, the which are not defined under the Community AID also supervised the C O Z . The applicant rules — and that in November 1986 it had submits, moreover, that it is not permissible banned the N I Z O permeate. In response the for the Commission to rely here on third- Commission rightly states that those were no party statements in adducing the evidence more than basic rules which the applicant required of it. Furthermore, the Commis- should have issued when it approved the sion's questions were taken out of context N I Z O process. and its own conclusions were attached to them.
40. However, those conditions, too, call for verification of compliance and the mere fact that they exist cannot, therefore, be adduced as evidence of effective supervision. 43. The Commission points out in response that the documents in question are official government documents which the authorities had forwarded to the Commission and which were also placed on the file. Moreover, those documents are not intended to serve as evi- dence but as grounds for justification of the Commission's doubts regarding the effective- 41. Secondly, the applicant refers to the ness of the system of controls in the Nether- inspections carried out by the AID. When lands. There can be no objection to this. N o r the AID checked the authorisations of the can it be said that the Commission took the undertakings, it also checked, according to questions mentioned by it out of context. The the applicant, whether there was a production Commission submitted the questions and plant to make butter from sour cream. answers not just individually, but as a whole. According to the Commission, that does not N o r can it be said that there was, objectively amount to an effective check either, since no speaking, a context, since the preceding and checks of the kind were carried out between subsequent questions were not concerned with 1982 and 1987. The Commission refers here the checks carried out by the AID. Further- to Minister Brake's replies to written ques- more, it cannot be said that the Commission tions of the Netherlands parliament following drew unjustified conclusions. When the com- the Dankert report. Asked whether the AID petent Minister states that the AID carried had carried out any checks between 1982 and out checks only in 1982 and 1986 and the 1987, the Minister replied in the negative. The applicant itself points out that the AID would authorisations were only checked at the VIB's carry out its checks in the context of the request. The VIB only made such requests in examination of the authorisations of the under- the case of new authorisations or when the takings, it is perfectly possible to entertain VIB's requirements were modified, as was the justified doubts regarding the regularity of case in 1982 and 1986. the AID checks.
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44. Lastly, the following point should be men 47. In response to this, the Commission points tioned. The applicant's statement, already out that those checks too were not carried mentioned, that the production process cannot out regularly. O n this point it should be said be inferred from the checks of the industrial that the applicant itself concedes that such plant carried out by the AID since the plant checks in the course of the manufacturing could be swiftly converted, might suggest that process have no point since the results are those checks were not performed at regular selective. This gives at least some reason for and short intervals. Consequently, there are doubting whether those checks were carried in fact good reasons for doubting whether the out on a regular basis and not merely checks undertaken by the AID in the period sporadically. from 1982 to 1987 were carried out on a regular basis.
48. The Commission claims, moreover, that 45. Furthermore, if it is borne in mind that the Netherlands did not adapt the instruc on the occasion of its inspection in 1987, the tions issued to the C O Z in the matter of the AID rejected a not insignificant quantity of checks to be carried out after an attempted butter on the ground that it was made from fraud in 1982. (At that time too there was an sweet cream and, at the same time, that it was attempt to sell N I Z O butter into interven not certain whether such checks were carried tion.) That fact is clear also from the replies out at all in the preceding years, justified of Minister Brak. When he was asked to doubts again arise regarding the effectiveness submit the written instructions for the C O Z of the Netherlands system of controls in the control procedures, the Minister replied that period before 1987. no such instructions existed. According to him, the questions in point had already been settled in the 1970s. Nor, again according to the Commission, had the C O Z ever system atically checked the accounts. This emerged above all in 1987 when the AID rejected N I Z O butter which the C O Z had approved. 46. The Government of the Netherlands men tions, as further supplementary controls, those carried out by the C O Z in the course of the manufacturing process. During those inspec tions, the cream and the buttermilk obtained were tasted and, in the event of doubt, the cream was analysed for its acid content. The Commission too was aware of the fact that 49. The applicant, on the other hand, submits the C O Z proceeded in this way. It was thus on this point that the very fact that the N I Z O ensured that only butter made by the author butter had been identified and rejected shows ised process was packaged and labelled Τ or that the system of controls in the Nether 'Int' as prescribed by the VIB. Only butter lands was effective. There was therefore no packaged in that way could have been sold to reason to adapt the C O Z instructions in any the intervention agencies. way.
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50. As has already been mentioned, the Com- 54. The reference made by the Commission mission considers, however, that the AID was to the audit reports communicated by the not continuously active and that it was not applicant further strengthens those doubts. until 1987 that it carried out the checks anew. Those reports were drawn up during the As a result, in the period before 1987, the AID's audits in 1987. They show that the C O Z was the only active inspection authority. managers and the staff of the dairies were not If it were now to transpire that the butter informed of the fact that butter made by the approved by the C O Z had actually been made N I Z O process did not qualify for interven- by the N I Z O process, the effectiveness of the tion. The Commission maintains it made system of controls would be placed in serious similar findings during its own inspection in doubt. 1989. Accordingly, it is impossible to be sure that undertakings producing only, or also, by the N I Z O process did not sell that butter to the intervention agencies.
51. The applicant claims, however, that the AID exercised constant supervision over the C O Z . Moreover, in the specific instance in 1987, the AID acted at the request of the COZ. 55. For its part, the applicant maintains that with each invitation to tender the VIB also published the conditions for admission to intervention. Accordingly, the ban on N I Z O butter must have been known. The fact that 52. The fact that the C O Z 15 expressly the dairy owners were nevertheless insuffi- requested the AID, which, moreover, was the ciently informed is not a ground for doubting body which was supposed to supervise it, to the quality of the checks carried out. check the production process suggests that, to say the least, the AID did not carry out its checks on a regular basis.
56. It is not possible to concur with the 53. Thus, as regards the effectiveness of the applicant on this. If an undertaking which on system of controls, justified doubts, at the its own admission produced for intervention very least, arose, above all concerning the and did so by means of the N I Z O process years before 1987, in view of the uncertainty had offered butter for intervention and if that whether the AID did in fact carry out checks offer had been rejected on the basis of effec- before that year. tive checks, then, at the latest since that time, that undertaking would have been informed of the fact that N I Z O butter does not qualify for intervention. The fact that the undertak- 15 — The VIB also requested the AID carry out such a check in ings did not know that the sale of N I Z O order to determine whether the dairies were applying in advance the expected amendments to the production rules. butter into intervention was prohibited is
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therefore a ground for justified doubts as to storage. That gives rise, to say no more, to the effectiveness of the system of controls. It the question why such an audit was never makes no difference that the applicant claims carried out. In any event, the impression cre that N I Z O butter sold so well on the free ated is that such an audit was not carried out market that there was no need to produce it in the Netherlands. Another reply shows that for intervention. The minutes of the discus proposals for making changes in the checks, sions with the dairy owners in the course of put forward by the C O Z , were implemented the audits show that the dairies also produced only very belatedly. N I Z O butter for intervention.
59. It may thus be seen from the pleadings as 57. The applicant contends, moreover, that a whole as well as from the foregoing con the audit reports are not admissible as evi siderations that there are at the very least jus dence. The fact remains, however, that those tified doubts regarding the effectiveness of reports — which the applicant itself commu the system of controls in the Netherlands; by nicated to the Commission — can perfectly putting forward submissions to that effect, well be used to see if they give rise to justi the Commission has discharged its burden of fied doubts regarding the effectiveness of the proving the irregularities alleged against the system. applicant.
58. Lastly, the Commission has maintained that even the C O Z had expressed doubts 60. The applicant also contests the Commis regarding the effectiveness of its system of sion's calculation of the reductions. The first controls. The applicant, for its part, denies issue here is the expenditure serving as the that. The Commission refers, here again, to basis of calculation. The applicant proceeds Minister Braks's reply. When he was asked on the assumption that the financial correc why an administrative control by means of tion should apply to the 1987 financial year. spot checks on the books was regarded as In the present case only the quantities bought impracticable, the Minister replied that a check in by the intervention agencies between 1 within the meaning of the relevant rules could December 1986 and 1 July 1987 and the be carried out only if accompanied by a com checks made during that period could be rel prehensive administrative audit of the evant. The first date corresponds to the begin accounts. By this he means a systematic veri ning of the 1987 financial year. The date of fication of the production in its entirety, 1 July 1987 applies since it was from that date including, therefore, purchases, sales and that butter made from sweet cream was
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eligible for intervention and thus the controls bought into intervention in the preceding at issue here were no longer necessary. Cal- years. However, if the accounts for the prior culated on the basis of the butter bought in years are definitively cleared, the expenditure during that period, the reduction would not concerned must be regarded as lawful. It fol- exceed the sum of N L G 11 million. lows that butter which had been (lawfully) bought in earlier years cannot in later years give rise to expenditure regarded as lawful.
61. The Commission argues for its part that 63. According to the Commission that argu- the expenditure presented by the applicant ment is incorrect. Moreover, it would mean for 1987 was considered on the occasion of that it is impossible for the Commission to this clearance of accounts. That expenditure take appropriate action, on the financial level, also concerned butter which had been admitted on irregularities which are only detected some to intervention in the preceding years. Since years later. The clearance of accounts for a that was done without proper checks, the financial year simply means that in clearing Commission could not allow the expenditure accounts for subsequent financial years the concerning that butter for 1987. As the Commission can no longer make a decision accounts in respect of the expenditure declared on the expenditure relating to that year. In for 1985 and 1986 had already been cleared, a other words, the clearance of accounts is final. correction for those years was inappropriate. It does not mean, however, that the Commis- However, the issue in the context of the clear- sion has accepted activities which were car- ance of accounts for 1987 was not just the ried out in the year in question but the expen- expenditure in respect of the butter bought diture on which is declared only — as in this into intervention in 1987 but rather the expen- case — in later years. N o r can it prevent the diture declared for 1987. That expenditure Commission from taking appropriate action, could also concern the purchases carried out on the financial level, on irregularities which in previous years. are detected only a few years later, provided that the correction is applied in respect of a financial year the accounts of which have not yet been cleared.
62. The applicant contests this, arguing that a clearance of accounts means both that the expenditure is recognised as properly incurred 64. Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) N o 1723/72 and that it is established that it is in compli- of the Commission of 26 July 1972 on making ance with the Community rules. A clearance up accounts for the European Agricultural of accounts may, it is true, concern butter Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guarantee
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Section provides that the decision to make ditures not incurred in accordance with the up the accounts is to cover: 'the determina Community rules. That requirement does not tion of the amount of expenditure incurred in disappear merely because the accounts are each Member State during the year in ques cleared after the expiry of the period pre tion, recognised as chargeable to the EAGGF, scribed in Article 5 of Regulation N o 729/70. 17 Guarantee Section'. That simply means that
the decision on the clearance of accounts determines which expenditure can be taken over by the EAGGF. Moreover, since Article 3 of Regulation N o 729/70 provides that only 66. It follows that the main concern of the intervention undertaken in accordance with decision on the clearance of accounts is to the Community rules is to be financed, it prevent the Commission from incurring unjus could also be inferred from the above-cited tified expenditure. Notwithstanding the pre provision that that decision also recognises scribed time-limits, that must be possible until the expenditure as having been incurred in the clearance of accounts becomes final.
It compliance with the Community rules. would be inconsistent with that aim if, for the reason that irregularities had gone unde tected, expenditure which not yet established for that year could be declared later and expenditure which was already established could engender subsequent costs, for example storage costs, in the following years without its being possible for the Commission — despite the fact that the accounts for the fol 65. According to the case-law of the Court, lowing years had not yet been cleared — to however, the essential purpose of the decision take appropriate action of a financial nature on the clearance of accounts is 'to ensure that on irregularities detected in the meantime in expenditure incurred by the national author respect of the expenditure declared for the ities is in accordance with the Community following years. In this regard, the Commis rules'. 18 The Court also stated that until the sion must be allowed to extend the correc accounts are duly cleared, Article 2 of Regu tions made on the ground of insufficient con lation N o 729/70 requires the Commission to trols also to the expenditure which was refuse to charge to the E A G G F those expen incurred in respect of the butter bought into intervention and stored after 28 February 1985 and which was declared by the applicant
for 1987. 16 — OJ L 186, p. 1. 17 — This regulation was repealed with effect from 16 October 1995 by Commission Regulation (EC) N o 1663/95 of 7 July 1995 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) N o 729/70 regarding the procedure for the clearance of the accounts of the EAGGF Guarantee Sec tion. However, pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation N o 1663/95, it remains applicable to the clearance of the accounts of the Guarantee Fund up to those of its financial year 1995. 67. The applicant also contests the amount of Article 7(1) of Regulation N o 1663/95 provides that the accounts clearance decision 'shall determine the amount of the reductions applied. The Commission, it expenditure effected in each Member State during the finan cial year in question which shall be recognised as being maintains, applied the 10% reduction arbi chargeable to the EAGGF, without prejudice to decisions trarily. That reduction is unjustified because taken subsequently in accordance with paragraph 2(c) of that Article' (which moreover provides for even more exten the Commission has not put forward any sive corrections in certain cases). specific case or facts concerning infringements 18 — Case 349/85 Denmark v Commission [1988] ECR 169, at paragraph 19. committed by the applicant.
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OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-28/94
68. In response, the Commission rightly agencies on the ground that they had not been points out that, according to the case-law of manufactured in accordance with the pre the Court, it could also have refused to charge scribed requirements. That corresponds to all the expenditure in question. Thus, the 40% of all the butter offered for intervention Court has held that, where it proves impos in 1987. For that reason, a 10% reduction sible to establish the extent to which a national cannot be regarded as too high. measure which is incompatible with Commu nity law has caused an increase in the expen diture entered under a budgetary item of the EAGGF, the Commission 'has no choice' but to disallow all the expenditure in question, not just a percentage thereof. 19 Since it is not possible, in the absence of adequate checks, to establish accurately the extent of the damage 70. The applicant replies that the Commis caused, it follows that the expenditure could sion is basing its contention here on a quan be disallowed in its entirety. The Commission tity of butter which — thanks to the appli itself makes reference here to a judgment in cant's checks — was, specifically, not sold which the Court stated: 'Since it follows ... into intervention. However, as shown above, that the inspections carried out... do not con these are good reasons for doubting whether regular and effective checks were carried out stitute thorough scrutiny ..., the Commission in the preceding years. It may, therefore, be could have disallowed charging to the E A G G F assumed that for want of effective supervision of the whole of the sums in question'. 2 0 in the preceding years the intervention agen cies also brought in butter which should not have qualified for intervention. It must be noted in this regard that none of the butter offered for intervention in the preceding years was rejected. However, it cannot be ruled out that no N I Z O butter was offered for inter vention in the preceding years before and that, all of a sudden, in 1987, 40% of all the butter offered was produced by the N I Z O process.
69. Furthermore, the Commission maintains that in this case a 10% reduction must be regarded as very modest. O n the basis of the AID inspection in 1987, over 25 000 tonnes 71. The guidelines adopted by the Commis of butter were rejected by the intervention sion for flat-rate corrections, on a proposal from an inter-directorate group (the Belle Group Report), provide for three possible 19 — Case C-50/94 Greece ν Commission [1996] ECR I-3331, at rates of reduction: 2%, 5% and 10%. A 10% paragraph 26; Joined Cases 15/76 and 16/76 France ν Com reduction is to be applied where the deficien mission [1979] ECR 321, at paragraph 32 et seq., and Case 347/85 United Kingdom ν Commission [1988] ECR 1749, at cies concern the system of controls as a whole, paragraph 13. or any key elements thereof, or where they 20 — Case C-197/90 Italy ν Commission [1992] ECR I-1, at paragraph 39. concern the implementation of controls which
I - 1990
NETHERLANDS ν COMMISSION
are indispensable for the ensuring that the sums wrongly paid. The applicant argues that expenditure is properly incurred, so that it it did not infringe those provisions since an may reasonably be assumed that there is a irregularity within the meaning of Article 3 high risk of significant losses. would only have existed if N I Z O butter had actually been bought into intervention. Only actual infringements of the Community rules must be communicated to the Commission. That is clear from the wording of the regula tion.
72. In view of the deficiencies in the system of controls and considering the fact that the butter offered unlawfully for intervention rep resented up to 40% of all the butter offered for intervention, a 10% reduction cannot be regarded as being unfair. 75. The Commission, on the contrary, sub mits that the term 'irregularity' must be inter preted broadly. It refers here to a working document of its own drafting according to which it is to be assumed that there is an irregularity when a Community rule is disre garded with the aim of wrongfully obtaining sums to the detriment of the EAGGF, whether 73. The applicant's objections against the cal or not the E A G G F actually suffers a financial culation of the reduction must therefore be loss as a result. The words 'primary admin held to be unfounded. istrative or judicial findings of fact' must also be interpreted broadly. They mean the first report of findings drawn up and signed by a competent national authority and concerning a case where it may properly be assumed that the rules have been infringed. That report is not subject to any particular formal require 74. In the context of its first plea in law, the ments. applicant also claims that another regulation was infringed. In its summary report, the Commission had alleged that the applicant had infringed Articles 3 and 5 of Regulation N o 283/72 2 1 . Article 3 requires Member States to communicate to the Commission a list of the irregularities which have been the subject 76. The Commission also maintains that, in of primary administrative or judicial findings this case, the possibility of fraud in earlier of fact. Article 5 concerns the recovery of years cannot be ruled out. Moreover, it is not just the financial effects of conduct which are important under the system established by Regulation N o 283/72, but also their serious 21 — Regulation (EEC) No 283/72 of the Council of 7 February 1972 concerning irregularities and the recovery of sums ness. This case concerns 40% of all the butter wrongly paid in connection with thefinancingof the common offered in one year. The Netherlands author agricultural poliev and the organisation of an information system in this field (OJ L 036, p.1). ities should have been able to conclude from
I-1991
OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-28/94
this that some of the butter which had already municated to the Commission with a view to been bought into intervention did not comply 'learning the nature of fraudulent practices'. with the requirements either. N o r can the possibility of fraud be ruled out in connec- tion with the butter which was not admitted to intervention because of the inspection checks. That butter could have been offered in another Member State. In this case, the risk of fraud was particularly great since it is not 78. In this context the words 'primary admin- possible to distinguish N I Z O butter from istrative or judicial findings of fact' must also butter made from sour cream. be interpreted broadly. As the Commission rightly submits, it may be assumed that the AID recorded any irregularities which were detected and that these were thus the subject of a primary administrative or judicial finding of fact.
79. Consequently, it is clear from the very 77. If one looks to the wording of Article 3, wording of the regulation that both terms are one will find in paragraph (2) that the infor- to be construed broadly and, consequently, mation to be communicated must indicate the applicant can be charged with infringing which provision has been infringed. That the regulation. That is all the more true in could be understood as meaning that only that it must have realised that there had indeed infringements of Community rules must be been cases of fraud in preceding years. The notified. Article 4, however, requires each fact that the working document to which the Member State to communicate without delay Commission refers was drawn up only in to the other Member States and to the Com- 1989 is irrelevant. mission any irregularities which are liable to have effects outside its territory. That applies also to irregularities which disclose the exist- ence of a new fraudulent practice. This sug- gests that the primary concern is to prevent new cases of fraud as far as possible. In this connection, it is important — as the Com- 80. The arguments put forward by the appli- mission has submitted — for the Commis- cant in connection with its second plea in law sion also to be informed of any instances of — infringement of general principles of law, attempted fraud. Accordingly, Article 7(3) such as the principle of care and legal cer- provides that the Commission is to organise tainty — largely concern the issues already meetings at Community level to examine the examined in relation to its first plea in law. information obtained 'in particular with regard Thus, the applicant claims that the Commis- to the lessons to be learned from it in con- sion infringed the principle of care inter alia nection with irregularities'. Lastly, the third by failing to take account the applicant's recital also requires irregularities to be com- efforts to introduce an effective system of
I - 1992
NETHERLANDS ν COMMISSION
controls. In the first part of this Opinion, I site conclusion following an investigation con have already explained that there were justi ducted two years later. That would be con fied doubts regarding the effectiveness of that trary to the principle of legal certainty. system of controls.
83. In this case the subject-matter of the inspection carried out by the Commission in 1987 is in dispute. The Commission claims in this regard that the inspection in point con cerned a matter entirely different from that 81. Moreover, the applicant, at this point, which was the subject of the 1989 inspection. again contests the rate of 10% set in calcu In 1987 a general inspection was carried out. lating the refund, claiming that the Commis The checking of the butter bought into inter sion had disregarded its own very guidelines vention was only part of a wider-ranging to that effect. However, the applicant founds examination. In 1989, on the other hand, the this claim on the assertion that there were no inspection was undertaken with the sole aim deficiencies in its system of controls. That of verifying whether the suspicions expressed assertion too has been examined in the con by a Member of the European Parliament text of the first plea in law, with the conclu concerning checking deficiencies in the con sion that there were justified doubts regarding text of the buying-in of butter were con the effectiveness of the system of controls as firmed. Moreover, the purpose of the 1987 a whole. The Commission was therefore en inspection, which was only concerned with titled, in accordance with its own guidelines, intervention in general, was to check whether to apply a 10% reduction. It must here again the rules in force at the time were being be pointed out that the Commission could — observed. As from 1987, however, butter made as I have already stated — have decided to from sweet cream was admitted to interven disallow the expenditure in its entirety. tion with the result that it was no longer nec essary to supervise checking procedures in that regard. Here again, the applicant denies the fact that the 1987 inspection concerned the new rules.
82. The applicant also makes the point that, 84. It can be taken as accepted that the 1989 following an inspection carried out by the inspection was specifically directed to estab Commission in 1987 in the context of the lishing whether or not the applicant had car clearance of accounts for 1986, the Commis ried out effective checks to ensure that only sion had found no fault whatsoever with the butter made from sour cream was sold into system of controls in the Netherlands. The intervention. In that respect, it is hard to see applicant claims that it was therefore entitled why the Commission, having found deficien to assume that the Commission also consid cies in the course of a specific inspection, ered its system of controls to be effective and should not take appropriate action of a merely adequate. Consequently, it is not possible that financial nature because those deficiencies had the Commission could have come to the oppo not yet been detected in an earlier inspection.
I-1993
OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-28/94
That would mean that an inspection con- tion whether the reasons given by the Com- cluded with a 'no complaints' finding would mission were adequate, reference should be preclude all financial consequences for the made to the case-law of the Court to the effect future even if irregularities were subsequently that decisions concerning the clearance of discovered. As I have already stated, the pur- accounts do not require detailed reasons if pose of the clearance of accounts is to ensure the country concerned was closely involved that expenditure complies with the Commu- in the process by which the decision came nity rules. It must therefore be possible, until about and was therefore aware of the reasons such time as the accounts are duly cleared, to for which the Commission considered that it take appropriate action of a financial nature must not charge the sums in dispute to the on irregularities which occurred earlier. EAGGF. 2 2Since the applicant itself has referred to extensive correspondence exchanged between the Netherlands and the Commission in the years from 1989 to 1993, it must be considered as having been suffi- ciently involved in the preliminary procedure.
85. In this respect, it must again be observed that it is the Member States which are first and foremost responsible for the organisation of controls. The Member States must struc- ture the controls in such a way as to prevent irregularities. In the present case, the appli- cant has itself pointed out that there can be 87. Accordingly, it should be held the appli- problems in control procedures. Moreover, it cant has failed to make out its case against the pointed out repeatedly that even the possi- decision of the Commission. bilities suggested by the Commission in the matter of controls did not enable effective supervision to be exercised. The applicant cannot plead the fact that the Commission did not detect any irregularities in an earlier inspection in order to avoid its responsibility for organising effective control procedures. Costs
86. By its last plea in law the applicant claims that the Commission infringed Article 190 of 88. Under the first sentence of Article 69(2) the E C Treaty because it did not give adequate of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful reasons for its decision. O n the one hand, the party is to be ordered to pay the costs. applicant here again puts forward consider- ations which in fact relate to the first plea in law. O n the other hand, as regards the ques- 22 — See Case 347/85 (cited in footnote 19), at paragraph 60.
I - 1994
NETHERLANDS ν COMMISSION
D — Conclusion
89. I therefore propose that the Court should:
(1) dismiss the application;
(2) order the Kingdom of the Netherlands to pay the costs.
I-1995