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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·13.7.1995

C-137/94

ECLI:EU:C:1995:248

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61994CC0137

OPINION OF MR ELMER — CASE C-137/94

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL ELMER delivered on 13 July 1995 *

1. In this preliminary reference the Court is may be adopted exempting various catego- asked how Council Directive 79/7/EEC of ries of persons from charges. Those catego- 19 December 1978 on the progressive imple- ries of persons may, under Section 83A(2), be mentation of the principle of equal treatment prescribed by reference to age, type of med- for men and women in matters of social ical condition, and financial circumstances. security * ('the directive') should be inter- preted in relation to national regulations according to which women are exempt from prescription charges in connection with the provision of free medicine when they attain the age of 60, whereas men are only exempt from prescription charges when they attain the age of 65.

The relevant national regulations

3. In that connection the Secretary of State made the National Health Service (Charges for Drugs and Appliances) Regulations 1989, Statutory Instrument N o 419 ('the 1989 Reg- ulations'). Thereunder a fixed charge is pay- 2. Under Section 77(l)(a) of the National able on the supply of prescription drugs. Health Service Act 1977 ('the 1977 Act'), the Further provisions are laid down regarding Secretary of State may adopt regulations for prescription charge exemption. Regulation the payment of charges in respect of the sup- 6(1 )(c) states that a man who has attained the ply under the Act of drugs, medicines or age of 65 years or a woman who has attained appliances. Under Section 83A(i)(a), inserted the age of 60 years do not have to pay by the Social Security Act 1988, regulations charges. Those age limits are, moreover, the same as the ages at which old-age pensions are payable by law. In addition, children and persons who suffer from specified conditions * Original language: Danish. 1 — OJ 1979 L 6, p. 24. are exempted from prescription charges.

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R v SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, EX PARTE RICHARDSON

Facts of the case according to Article 1, is the 'progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security'.

4. The applicant in the main proceedings, Cyril Richardson, was born on 18 August 1929. On 9 March 1993 Mr Richardson, who Under Article 3(1), the directive is to apply was not yet 65 years old and therefore did to: not satisfy the age requirement for receipt of an old-age pension, wrote to the Secretary of State for Health complaining about the pre- scription charge, in particular that there was discrimination between men and women '(a)statutory schemes which provide protec- since women between the ages of 60 and tion against the following risks: 64 were exempted from prescription charges, whereas men of the same age were not. The complaint was rejected in a letter of 6 May 1993. — sickness,

— invalidity, On 2 September 1993 Mr Richardson was asked to pay a prescription charge of UK £4.75 (corresponding to E C U 5.55) at a chemist for the supply of medicine and he subsequently applied to the Divisional — old age, Court, Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice, for judicial review, claiming inter alia that the relevant provisions of the 1989 Regulations should be quashed for infringing the directive and seeking damages. — accidents at work and occupational dis- eases,

The relevant provisions of the directive — unemployment;

(b) social assistance, in so far as it is intended 5. The directive was adopted on the basis of to supplement or replace the schemes Article 235 of the Treaty and its purpose, referred to in (a).'

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OPINION OF MR ELMER — CASE C-137/94

According to Article 4(1), the principle of The questions referred for a preliminary equal treatment means ruling

6. By order of 5 May 1994 the Divisional Court, Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice, referred the following ques- 'that there shall be no discrimination what- tions to the Court: soever on ground of sex either directly, or indirectly ..., in particular as concerns:

' 1 . Is the exemption from prescription charges for various categories of persons under Regulation 6(1) of the National — the scope of the schemes and the condi- Health Service (Charges for Drugs and tions of access thereto Appliances) Regulations 1989, Statutory Instrument N o 419, or for particular old people under Regulation 6(1 )(c), within the scope of Article 3 of Directive 79/7/EEC?

(···)' 2. If the answer to Question 1 is yes, does Article 7(1 )(a) of Directive 79/7/EEC apply in the circumstances of this case?

Article 7(1 )(a) provides that the directive 3. If there has been a breach of Directive shall be without prejudice to the right of 79/7/EEC, can the direct effect of that direc- Member States to exclude from its scope tive be relied on to support a claim for dam- inter alia 'the determination of pensionable ages for periods prior to the date of the age for the purposes of granting old-age and Court's judgment by persons who have not retirement pensions and the possible conse- prior to that date brought legal proceedings quences thereof for other benefits'. or made an equivalent claim?'

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First question between the benefit and protection against one of the risks listed in Article 3(1) of the directive is lacking, since what is involved is a benefit granted to a wide range of persons suffering from ill health and not a special scheme for old people.

7. With its first question the national court is seeking clarification as to whether Article 3(1) of the directive covers a scheme such as that contained in Regulation 6(1) of the 1989 Regulations, which exempts various persons from the payment of prescription 10. According to the Court's settled case- charges in connection with the supply of law, in order to fall within the scope of the medicine obtainable only on prescription. In directive, a benefit must constitute the whole other words, the question is whether it con- or part of a statutory scheme providing pro- stitutes a statutory scheme providing protec- tection against one of the risks specified in tion against sickness, old age and so forth. Article 3(1) or a form of social assistance having the same objective. 2

8. In support of their contention that Article 11. The exemption from prescription 3(1) covers such a scheme, Mr Richardson charges in the 1989 Regulations has its basis and the Commission have stated that in the in the 1977 Act and the benefit is granted on present case there is the necessary factual and a statutory basis with no individual and dis- direct link between the benefit and one of cretionary assessment of the recipient's the risks listed in Article 3(1), since it is a needs. The requirement that the scheme be statutory scheme the purpose of which is to statutory is therefore satisfied. afford protection against sickness. According to Mr Richardson, it is at the same time a scheme which protects old people from the financial consequences linked to old age.

12. The next issue is the term 'scheme'. In my view no special requirements can be implied into that term. It is presumably

9. The United Kingdom submits that the national regulations fall outside the purview 2 — See the judgments b Case 150/85 Drake [1986] ECR 1995, of the directive, since the scheme is aimed at at paragraph 21, Case C-243/90 Smitbson [1992] ECR 1-467, protecting health, not at providing social at paragraph 12, and Joined Cases C-63/91 and C-64/91 Jackson and Cresswell [1992] ECR 1-4737, at para- security. Furthermore, the necessary link graph 15.

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O P I N I O N OF M R ELMER — CASE C-137/94

difficult to find a more neutral expression. In whole which falls to be assessed. Exemption particular it cannot be assumed that the from prescription charges such as that con- expression means that the benefit should tained in Regulation 6(1) of the 1989 Regu- form part of a larger complex of laws having lations does not in my opinion appear to be social security as their objective. The formal a component of a benefit which constitutes inclusion of a benefit by the Member States an integral part of a category of benefit but in one or another type of law should not on the contrary implies an independent and affect the individual citizen's rights under clearly delimited benefit for the old, the Community law. 3 That can depend on tech- young, and persons suffering from specifi- nical legal questions or political or other cally Usted conditions who obtain medicine considerations and it can sometimes be quite on prescription and would otherwise have to arbitrary whether a legal provision giving pay prescription charges. citizens a certain advantage is contained in one type of law or another. Hence not much can be concluded without more as to the detailed content of the provision which must in fact depend on a closer analysis of the provision in question. 4

14. The Court has interpreted Article 3(1) as including any benefit which in a broad sense protects against one of the risks specified, 5 including sickness and old age. The mode of payment is not decisive but the scheme must be directly and effectively linked to the pro- tection provided against one of the risks specified. 6

13. In my view it should suffice that the stat- utory benefit in itself ensures protection against one of the risks referred to in the provision, hence assessment under Article 3(1) must proceed on the basis of the actual benefit. Only when the benefit in question constitutes an integral part of a category of 15. In its judgment in Case C-243/90 Smith- benefit is it that category of benefit as a son the Court held that that condition is not satisfied by a scheme providing housing ben- efit to persons whose actual income is lower 3 — In this connection I would refer to the judgments in Case than a notional income. 7 Furthermore, 249/83 Hoeckx [1985] E C R 973, at paragraph 11, and Case 122/84 Scrimer [1985] ECR 1027, at paragraph 18, which both concern the interpretation of Article 4(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) N o 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed per- sons and to members of their families moving within the 5 — See the judgment in Case 150/85 Drake [1986] ECR 1995, at Community (OJ, English Special Edition 1971 II, p . 416). paragraph 23. 4 — If significance were attached to the formal context in the 6 — See the judgments in Case C-243/90 Smithson [1992] ECR present case that would, moreover, suggest that it was a 467, at paragraph 14, and Joined Cases C-63/91 and social security regulation within the meaning of the directive, C-64/91 Jackson and Cresswell [1992] ECR 1-4737, at para- since the prescription charge exemption has its basis in the graph 16. Social Security Act 1988. 7 — [1992] ECR 1-467.

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following the judgment in Joined Cases persons suffering from illness, namely the C-63/91 and C-64/91 Jackson and Cresswell young, the old and persons with specifically a benefit forming part of a general income listed conditions, since the details of the and needs-related supplementary allowance mode of payment of a benefit are, as men- scheme falls outside the directive. 8 In those tioned, not decisive as to how it is identified cases what was involved were general in relation to the directive. 10 It must also be income-related schemes rather than schemes irrelevant that what is involved is an exemp- specifically directed to protection against the tion from payment rather than a cash benefit consequences of, for example, sickness or old since in both cases the citizen obtains a age. 9 financial benefit.

18. In summary, I take the view that the answer to the Divisional Court's first ques- 16. The benefit dealt with in Regulation 6(1) tion should be that Article 3(1) of the direc- is aimed, however, at exempting various cat- tive must be interpreted to the effect that a egories of persons who require prescription scheme such as that set out in Regulation medicines from payment of the prescription 6(1) of the 1989 Regulations which entitles charge for that medicine. Prescription medi- various persons, including old people, to cine is generally only obtained for the pur- exemption from prescription charges is cov- pose of treating, relieving or preventing ill- ered by the directive. ness. Illness is thus a conditio sine qua non for prescription charge exemption. The scheme must therefore be regarded as pro- tecting against the risk of sickness and thus be covered by the directive.

Second question

19. In the second question the national court 17. It is irrelevant that the scheme is con- is in fact asking the Court to elaborate on fined to covering only certain categories of its interpretation of Article 7(1 )(a) of the directive, according to which the directive is

8 — [1992] ECR 1-4737. 9 — In Case 150/85 Drake [1986] ECR 1995, at paragraph 24, the Court emphasized that invalidity was a conditio sine qua non 10 — See the judgment in Case C-243/90 Smithson [1992] ECR for the payment of the benefit 467, at paragraph 14.

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to be without prejudice to the right of contribution to the financing by the State of Member States to exclude from its scope the costs of drugs. The cost of drugs for inter alia the determination of pensionable Family Health Services amounted to over age for the purposes of granting old-age U K £2.3 billion (equivalent to E C U 2.7 bil- and retirement pensions and the possible lion) in 1991/92, whilst receipts from pre- consequences thereof for other benefits. scription charges amounted to about UK £278 million (corresponding to E C U 325 million) in 1993/94.

20. Mr Richardson has submitted that Arti- cle 7(l)(a) is not applicable to a scheme such 23. The Court has already had the opportu- as that contained in Regulation 6(1) of the nity of setting out its view of the content of 1989 Regulations since there is no necessary the derogating provision in Article 7(1 )(a). n and objective link between the benefit and From that case-law it is clear that the provi- the statutory pensionable age. sion, as an exception to a basic Community law principle, should be interpreted strict- ly. 12 The Court has further stated that the second phrase of Article 7(l)(a) covers only discrimination which is objectively and nec- essarily linked to a difference in pensionable ages. 13 Discrimination must therefore be objectively necessary in order to maintain financial equilibrium in the old-age pensions system or the social security system as a 21. The Commission takes the view that the whole, or in order to ensure consistency Court has already given the necessary inter- between the old-age pensions system and pretation and therefore suggests that the other benefit schemes. 14 Court simply maintain its position.

24. As far as the point concerning the financial equilibrium of the pensions system 22. The United Kingdom contends that application of Article 7(1 )(a) does not pre- suppose a necessary connection between pensionable age and another benefit in the 11 — See in particular the judgments in Case C-9/91 Equal Opportunities Commission [1992] ECR 1-4297 and Case strict sense, but must merely require a rea- C-328/91 Thomas [1993] ECR 1-1247. sonable and proportionate link. In this con- 12 — See the judgment in Case C-328/91 Thomas [1993] E C R 1-1247, at paragraph 8. nection the United Kingdom has emphasized 13 — See Case C-328/91 Thomas, cited above. that prescription charges make a substantial 14 — Ibid-, at paragraphs 12, 15 and 16.

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is concerned, the Court specified in the discrimination would lead to an increase in Thomas judgment 1 5 that there is not a the total cost of non-contributory schemes. sufficiendy direct influence on financial What is decisive, however, is whether the fact equilibrium in the case of the grant of a that the derogation was not available would non-contributory benefit to persons in mean that the beneficiary was entitled to whom certain risks have materialized, receive several benefits which in fact covered regardless of the entitlement of such persons the same needs. In the present case no evi- to an old-age pension by virtue of contribu- dence has been submitted to suggest that tions. removal of the discrimination would cause such overlapping of benefits.

25. The prescription charge exemption under Regulation 6(1) has no connection with the extent of entitlement to an old-age pension nor with the financing of that pen- sions system. To remove the discrimination would not therefore, in my opinion, affect the financial equilibrium of the pensions sys- tem.

28. As far as the question of the link between the old-age pensions system and other benefits is concerned, it is worth not- ing here that Article 7(1 )(a), qua exception to 26. As far as maintaining equilibrium in the a basic principle of Community law, should social security system as a whole is con- be interpreted restrictively. The requirement cerned, the Court concentrated in the said of a necessary and objective link 17 must thus Thomas judgment on the extent to which be interpreted to the effect that it is not grant of the benefit would cause overlapping enough that persons who have reached nor- of benefits. 16 mal pensionable age will generally suffer a fall in income and consequently have an increased need for additional benefits. There is no necessary link between normal pen- sionable age and a person's actual with- drawal from the labour market. I8 There is 27. In view of the foregoing, I consider that thus no objectively necessary link between it does not suffice, for the possibility of the normal pensionable age and a person's actual derogation to apply, that removal of the financial means, still less with that person's need for medicine. However, the exception

15 — Ibid., at paragraph 14. The case concerned the rejection of applications for severe disablement allowance and invalid care allowance by persons who continued to work after 17 — Ibid., paragraph 20. they reached the normal pensionable age for women. 18 — See the judgment in Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] ECR 723, 16 — Ibid., at paragraph 15. at paragraph 38.

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does allow Member States, in my view, to Third question provide that the de facto receipt of an old- age pension leads to another benefit being paid out or ceasing. The transition in itself to receipt of an old-age pension involves an objective change in circumstances of the per- son concerned which may justifiably be taken into account when awarding social 31. In the third question the Court is asked security benefits. in substance to decide where there is a basis for restricting the direct effect of the direc- tive as from the date of the Court's ruling. I9

32. The United Kingdom has urged the Court to restrict the judgment's temporal 29. In this case the prescription charge effects inasmuch as it justifiably relied in exemption is made conditional on the attain- good faith on the fact that the Commission ment of a certain age corresponding, more- did not react to a letter of 11 June 1985 in over, to normal pensionable age, and not on which the Secretary of State gave notification the applicant's de facto receipt of an old-age of the prescription charge exemption scheme pension. Significance may also be attached to in accordance with Article 8(2) of the direc- the fact that the exemption also benefits tive. Furthermore, it would be administra- other groups besides pensioners. The objec- tively very difficult to check the facts on tive and necessary link required under Arti- which a claim for repayment would be cle 7(1 )(a) between the prescription charge based. exemption and the statutory pensionable age is therefore, in my view, absent.

33. Cyril Richardson and the Commission submit that there is no basis for so doing, since the Court's ruling in this case will not involve any development as far as Commu- nity law is concerned and there was no con- duct on the part of a Community institution 30. To summarize, I would propose that the which could have justified reliance thereon Court answer the second question to the on the part of the United Kingdom; the effect that the second part of Article 7(1 )(a) of the directive should be interpreted as meaning that the derogation therein does not 19 — According to the judgment in Case 286/85 McDermott and apply to a scheme such as that contained in Cotter [1987] ECR 1453, at paragraph 16, Article 4(1) of the directive which prohibits discrimination on the ground Regulation 6(1) of the 1989 Regulations. of sex has direct effect.

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possible lack of reaction by the Commission finally, on the actual consequences of not does not constitute such conduct. The restricting the judgment's temporal effect. 24 financial consequences cannot per se found a restriction on the temporal effect of a judgment.

35. The financial consequences of a judg- ment for a Member State cannot per se found such a limitation. 2S

34. According to settled case-law, the effects of the Court's interpretation of a legal meas- ure are not restricted as from delivery of the judgment. The Court's interpretation of a legal measure establishes simply how the measure must be or ought to have been understood. It is for the Court alone to decide on a restriction of a judgment's tem- poral effect, 20 but it is only exceptionally, in 36. N o r does the fact that the Commission application of the general principle of legal did not react after the United Kingdom certainty, that there is reason for it to do authorities had given notification under Arti- so. 21 In examining the cases the Court has cle 8(2) provide a sufficient basis for such a given decisive weight to whether the decision limitation. 26 The citizen's rights under represents a development in Community Community law are based on the content of law, 22 to whether a Community institution's the rules of law, not on the manner in which conduct or attitude has given rise to a rea- the Commission might conduct itself. The sonably founded assumption that there was Commission's discretion as to whether to no conflict with Community law, 23 and, bring an action under Article 169 of the Treaty 2 7 must, moreover, also extend to a notification procedure such as that contained in the directive. 20 — See, for example, the judgments in Case 24/86 Blaizot [1988] ECR 379; Case C-262/88 Barber [1990] ECR 1-1889; and Case C-228/92 Roquette Frères [1994] ECR 1-1445. 21 — See, for example, the judgment in Case 24/86 Blaizot, at paragraph 28, and Case C-262/88 Barber, at paragraph 41, both cited above. 24 — See, for instance, the judgments in Case 43/75 Defrenne, at 22 — See, for example, the judgment in Case 24/86 Blaizot, at paragraph 74, and Case 24/86 Blaizot, at paragraph 34. paragraph 31. 25 — See, for example, the judgment in Case C-200/90 Dansk 23 — See, for example, the judgments in Case 43/75 Defrenne Denkavit and Poulsen Trading [1992] ECR 1-2217, at para- [1976] ECR 455, at paragraphs 72 and 73; Case graphs 20, 21 and 22. 24/86 Blaizot [1988] ECR 379, at paragraphs 32 and 33; 26 — The notification at most gives an indication of the United Case C-262/88 Barber [1990] ECR 1-1889, at paragraph 43; Kingdom authorities' view of the scope of Directive 79/7. and Case C-163/90 Legros [1992] ECR 1-4625, at para- 27 — See, for example, the judgment in Case C-87/89 Sonito graphs 31, 32 and 33. [1990] ECR 1-1981, at paragraph 6.

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37. Finally, the Court's subsequent case-law 38. There is thus no reason to restrict the concerning the interpretation of Article 7(1) judgment's temporal effects, and I would of the directive must, in the circumstances, therefore propose that the answer to the have removed any basis that the Member third question should be that there is no rea- State may have had for relying in good faith son to restrict the judgment's temporal on such a lack of reaction on the part of the effects, so that the direct effect of Directive Commission. 28 79/7/EEC may also be relied on to support a claim for damages for periods prior to the Court's judgment by persons who have not before that date brought legal proceedings or made an equivalent claim.

Conclusion

I n v i e w of t h e foregoing, I w o u l d suggest t h a t t h e C o u r t reply t o the questions referred to it b y t h e D iv is io n al C o u r t , Q u e e n ' s B e n c h Division of the H i g h C o u r t of J u s t i c e , b y o r d e r of 5 M a y 1994 as follows:

(1) Article 3(1) of D i r e c t i v e 7 9 / 7 / E E C m u s t b e interpreted t o t h e effect that a s c h e m e s u c h as t h a t set o u t in R e g u l a t i o n 6(1) of t h e N a t i o n a l H e a l t h Service ( C h a r g e s for D r u g s a n d Appliances) R e g u l a t i o n s 1989, S t a t u t o r y I n s t r u m e n t N o 419, w h i c h entitles various p e r s o n s , including old p e o p l e , t o e x e m p t i o n f r o m p r e s c r i p t i o n charges, is covered b y the directive.

28 — For the relevance of subsequent case-law reference should be made to the judgments m Case 69/80 Worringham and Humphreys [1981] E C R 767, at paragraph 33; Joined Cases 142/80 and 143/80 Essevi and Salengo [1981] ECR 1413, at paragraph 34; and Case C-200/90 Dansk Denkavit and Poulsen Trading [1992] E C R 1-2217, at paragraph 21.

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(2) Artide 7(l)(a) of Directive 79/7/EEC must be interpreted as not applying to a scheme such as that contained in Regulation 6(1) of the National Health Ser- vice (Charges for Drugs and Appliances) Regulations 1989, Statutory Instru- ment N o 419.

(3) There is no reason to restrict the judgment's effects in time, so that the direct effect of Directive 79/7/EEC may also be relied on to support a claim for damages for periods prior to the Court's judgment by persons who have not before that date brought legal proceedings or made an equivalent claim.

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