C-178/94
ECLI:EU:C:1995:410
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OPINION OF MR TESAURO — JOINED CASES C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 AND C-190/94
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL TESAURO delivered on 28 November 1995
1. The Landgericht (Regional Court) Bonn State in breach to make good loss and dam has asked the Court whether failure to age. As regards that last point, the Court is implement Council Directive 90/314/EEC of asked in particular whether, and if so to what 13 June 1990 on package travel, package extent, any reasons put forward by the holidays and package tours 1 ('the directive') Member State to vindicate itself can possibly within the period prescribed constitutes an exonerate it from the obligation to pay com infringement giving rise to financial liability pensation; in short, therefore, whether the on the part of the Member State in breach infringement which the State is alleged to towards individuals who have suffered loss have committed must, for these purposes, be as a result of that infringement. serious and/or involve fault.
This is, therefore, a situation corresponding to that on which a decision has already been 2 given in the well-known Francovich judg In this context, I would point out forthwith ment, in which the Court, as I scarcely need that some of the questions in this case are repeat, held that a State is required to make similar in part to those referred to the Court good damage caused by failure to implement in Joined Cases C-46/93 (Brasserie du a directive and specified the conditions Pêcheur) and C-48/93 (Factortame III), on which are sufficient in such a case to give which also I am delivering an Opinion today. individuals a right to compensation. In the course of the following analysis, I shall therefore refer to that Opinion for more detailed consideration of certain points.
2. This time, the Court is asked, in no fewer than 12 questions, not only to rule as to whether the conditions laid down in Fran- Relevant legislation, facts and questions covich have been fulfilled also in the present referred case, but also to make it clear whether those conditions are always sufficient, where there is failure to implement a directive, to estab lish an obligation on the part of the Member
* Original language: Italian. 3. According to Article 1, the purpose of the 1 — OJ 1990 L 158, p. 59. directive is 'to approximate the laws, regula 2 — Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357. tions and administrative provisions of the
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DILLENKOFER AND OTHERS v FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Member States relating to packages sold or payment. Paragraph 651k(4) provides that offered for sale in the territory of the Com 'apart from a deposit no greater than 10% of munity'. Article 7, which the Court is asked the cost of travel, subject however to a maxi to interpret, provides that 'the organizer mum of DM 500, the organizer may demand and/or retailer party to the contract shall or accept payments from the traveller before provide sufficient evidence of security for the completion of the travel only if he has issued refund of money paid over and for the repa a security document'. The law in question triation of the consumer in the event of came into force on 1 July 1994: it is appli insolvency'. Article 8 states that the Member cable to contracts entered into after that date States may adopt or retain more stringent which concern travel commenced after 31 provisions in the field covered by the direc October 1994. tive to protect the consumer. Finally, Article 9(1) provides that 'Member States shall bring into force the measures necessary to comply with this Directive before 31 December 1992. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.'
Lastly, to complete the picture, I might use fully refer to the case-law on 'advance pay 4. The Federal Republic of Germany did not ments', namely the judgments of the Bundes comply with the time-limit imposed by the gerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) of 20 directive. It was only on 24 June 1994 that it March 1986 4and 12 March 1987. 5For our adopted the 'Law implementing Council purposes, those judgments arc relevant Directive of 13 June 1990 on package because they annulled tour organizers' gen 3 travel'. That law inserted in the Civil Code eral conditions under which the traveller Paragraph 651k, under which 'the travel could be obliged to pay the entire cost of the organizer must ensure that the package trav travel even where he had not yet received his eller obtains a refund of (1) the travel price travel documents. Following those cases, paid if travel services arc not provided as a therefore, purchasers of package travel arc result of the insolvency of the organizer and not obliged to pay more than 10% of the (2) expenses necessarily incurred by the trav total cost of the travel before documents are eller in repatriating himself as a result of the issued giving them the right to demand the insolvency of the organizer'. The organizer services due from the various providers may fulfil his obligations by means of insur (airline/hotel). ance or a credit institution's promise of
4 — NJW 1986. p. 1613 et seq. 3 — BGBl., p. 1322. 5 — BGHZ 100, p. 157.
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OPINION OF MR TESAURO — JOINED CASES C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 AND C-190/94
5. I shall now turn to the facts giving rise to package tours, the plaintiffs brought actions these proceedings. The plaintiffs all bought for damages against the Federal Republic of package travel; because of the insolvency of Germany. In essence, they seek reimburse Mp Travel Line International GmbH and ment of the price paid for holidays which Florida Travel Service GmbH, from which were never taken or, in the Knors' case, of they had bought their respective packages, the expenses incurred in order to return they were either unable to take the holiday home from holiday. or had to return from their holiday destina tion at their own expense, and did not suc ceed in obtaining reimbursement of the sums already paid.
6. At this point it should be noted that com pensation for damage is governed in Ger To be more specific, Mr Dillenkofer (Case many by Paragraph 839 of the Bürgerliches C-178/94), Mr Erdmann (Case C-179/94), Gesetzbuch (Civil Code), in conjunction Mr Schulte (Case C-188/94), Ms Heuer with Article 34 of the Grundgesetz (Basic (Case C-189/94), and the Knors (Case Law). The latter provides that 'if a person C-190/94) had booked package travel in the infringes, in the exercise of a public office first half of 1993, paying at the time of book entrusted to him, the obligations incumbent ing, either the entire cost of the package upon him as against a third party, liability (Dillenkofer, Schulte, Heuer and Knor), in therefor shall attach in principle to the State order to receive a 3 % discount, or at least or to the body in whose service he is the deposit requested (Erdmann). Some of engaged.' Paragraph 839(1) of the Civil Code them never left, because they themselves can provides in contrast that if an official wilfully celled the booking, either on health grounds or negligently commits a breach of official (Dillenkofer) or because of information in duty incumbent upon him as against a third the press about the financial difficulties being party, he is to make good the damage con experienced by the operators from whom cerned. If he acted negligently, he is respon they had bought their packages (Erdmann sible for damage only where the injured and Heuer). Others were asked to get off the party has no other possibility of obtaining aeroplane before take-off because of the compensation. declared insolvency of the tour organizer (Schulte). The luckiest ones, who actually managed to reach their desired holiday des tination, had to their surprise to return at their own expense, even though they had a proper return ticket (the Knors). The applicability of the rules in question depends, therefore, not only on the exercise of a public office and a breach of official duty, but also on the further requirement Arguing that if the directive had been trans that the official duty breached should be posed within the prescribed period, that is to 'referrable to the third party' (Drittbezogen- say, by 31 December 1992, they would have heit). That means that the State is responsible been protected against the insolvency of the only for breaches of official duties the exer operators from whom they had bought the cise of which is expressly directed at a third
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DILLENKOFER AND OTHERS v FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
party, and therefore has the aim of protecting referred the following questions to the Court a right of the third party. It is however of Justice for a preliminary ruling: exactly this last requirement which is usually 6 absent in the case of a legislative wrong; especially when the wrong consists of an omission, since in such a situation it must be established that the legislature had a precise legal duty to adopt certain measures vis-à-vis '(1) Is the EC Council Directive of 13 June a given citizen or, in any event, a well- 7 1990 on package travel, package holi defined class of persons. days and package tours (90/314/EEC) intended to grant individual package travellers, via national transposing pro visions, the individual right to security for money paid and repatriation costs in the event of the insolvency of the travel organizer (see paragraph 40 of the judgment in Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357)?
7. The Landgericht (Regional Court) Bonn, before which the abovementioned cases arc pending, considers therefore that German (2) Is the content of that right sufficiently law affords no basis for upholding the plain identified on the basis of that Directive? tiffs' damages claims. Moreover, as it is uncertain whether the State's obligation to pay compensation for damage caused to individuals by failure to transpose the direc tive within the prescribed period, as required by the Fmncovich judgment, is also appli (3) What arc the minimum requirements cable to the cases pending before it, it has for the "necessary measures" to be taken by the Member States within the meaning of Article 9 of the Directive? 6 — A legislative wrong (legislatives Unrecht) is governed by the same rules as liability of the public authorities (Amlshaf- tung). It is precisely because of this that the amenability to compensation of damage arising out of a legislative wrong, still a highly controversial subject in Germany, is unques tionably allowed where individual-case laws (Einzel- fallgesctze) arc involved, or a legislative measure such as a land development plan (Bebauungsplan.) The picture which emerges is not very different from that concerning the dis tinction between diritti soggettivi (individual rights) and (4) In particular, did it satisfy Article 9 of interessi legittimi (protected interests), frequently repre sented as peculiar to the Italian system. the Directive if the national legislature 7 — In this connection, however, sec Papier, 'Art. 34, Rn 181', in by 31 December 1992 provided the leg Maunz-Dürig-Hcrzog-Scholz, CG Kommentar, Munich, 1987, in which it is argued that there would be a failure to islative framework for imposing a legal perform official duties and a correlative right to compensa obligation on the travel organizer and/ tion for damage, in the event of a serious omission on the part of the legislature (qualifiziertes Unterlassen). or retailer to take measures for security
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within the meaning of Article 7 of the 12 March 1987 (BGHZ 100, 157; Directive? NJW 86, 1613), have omitted alto gether to transpose Article 7 of the Directive by means of legislation?
Or did the necessary change in the law, taking into account the lead times involved in consultation of the travel, insurance and credit sectors, have to come into effect sufficiently in advance of 31 December 1992 for that security actually to function in the package travel market from 1 January 1993?
(b) Is there no "security" within the meaning of Article 7 of the Direc tive even where, on payment of the travel price, travellers were in pos session of documents of value con (5) Is the protective purpose, if any, of the firming a right to performance Directive satisfied if the Member State against those responsible for pro allows the travel organizer only to viding particular services (airline require a deposit towards the travel companies, hotel operators)? price of up to 10% of the travel price with a maximum of DM 500 before documents of value are handed over?
(6) To what extent are the Member States obliged under the Directive to act (by legislating) in order to protect package travellers against their own negligence? (8) (a) Does the mere fact that the time- limit specified in Article 9 of the Directive has been exceeded suffice to confer a right to compensation involving State liability as defined in the Francovich judgment of the (7) (a) Could the Federal Republic of Ger Court of Justice, or can the Member many, in view of the "advance pay State put forward the objection that ment" judgment (Vorkasse-Urteil) the period for transposition proved of the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) of to be inadequate?
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DILLENKOFER AND OTHERS v FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
(b) If that objection fails, does the the right to compensation on grounds response to the previous question of breach of Community law is not apply even where the Member State dependent on a finding of fault in gen concerned cannot achieve the pro eral, or at any rate of wrongful non- tective purpose of the Directive adoption of legislative measures, on the simply by a change in the law (as part of the Member State? for instance with payments in lieu of wages to employees in the event of insolvency), the cooperation of private third parties (travel organiz ers, the insurance and credit sector) being essential?
(12) If that conclusion is not correct, could the "advance payment" judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof have been an accept able reason justifying or excusing the Federal Republic of Germany for trans posing the Directive, as defined in the answers of the Court of Justice to (9) Does liability on the part of a Member Questions 4 and 7, only after expiry of State for an infringement of Commu the time-limit specified in Article 9?' nity law presuppose a serious, that is to say a manifest and grave, breach of obli gations?
General considerations
(10) Is it a precondition of State liability that a judgment in infringement proceedings 8. In these proceedings the Court is in establishing a breach of Treaty obliga essence asked to give a ruling as to whether tions has been delivered before the the State is obliged to compensate individu event giving rise to damage? als who have suffered damage as a result of failure to implement a directive.
(11) Does it follow from the Francovich As indicated above, the facts of this case are judgment of the Court of Justice that similar to those settled in the Francovich
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OPINION OF MR TESAURO — JOINED CASES C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 AND C-190/94
judgment. On that occasion, as I recall, the of Article 7 of the directive is to confer on Court recognized State liability subject to individuals rights whose content is suffi the existence of the three following condi ciently precise and well defined; always pro tions: 'First, the purpose of the directive vided, of course, that there is a causal link must be to grant rights to individuals. Sec between the failure to implement the direc ond, it must be possible to identify the con tive within the period prescribed and the tent of those rights on the basis of the provi damage suffered by the individuals. sions of the directive. Finally, there must be a causal link between the breach of the State's 9 obligation and the damage suffered.' Answers to the individual questions
10. As we have seen, the national court has referred no fewer than twelve questions, some of which are closely connected. For the 9. Moreover, the Court stated that those purposes of the following analysis, I consider conditions are 'sufficient to give rise to a that they may reasonably be summarized right on the part of individuals to obtain and arranged as follows: reparation, a right founded directly on Com 10 munity law'. Accordingly, a Member State which has failed to transpose a directive is in every case obliged to compensate damage suffered by an individual, provided that the (a) is it possible to infer from Article 7 of conditions set out by the Court have been the directive the existence of a right satisfied. appertaining to individuals, having a sufficiently precise content and an identifiable subject-matter? (Questions 1 and 2);
(b) what are the measures necessary, for the For our purposes, this means that it would purposes of Article 9, to ensure that the be enough to establish whether the purpose directive is properly implemented? (Questions 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7);
8 — For specific observations concerning the Francovich case, as well as the basis and scope of the principle of liability on the part of a Member State which has failed to fulfil obligations and its duty to pay compensation, as laid down in that judgment, I refer to my Opinion in Joined Cases C-46/93 {Brasserie du Pêcheur) and C-48/93 (Factortame (c) is failure to comply with the time-limit HI), also delivered today, in particular points 15 to 22. prescribed by the directive sufficient in 9 — The three conditions in question, set out by the Court in Francovich (paragraph 40), are however quoted here as itself to give rise to compensation for repeated and summarized by the Court in its judgment in individuals who have suffered damage or Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori v Recreb [1994] ECR I-3325, paragraph 27, and in Case C-334/92 Wagner Miret v Fondo must other circumstances be taken into di Garantía Salarial [1993] ECR I-6911, paragraphs 22 consideration? (Questions 8, 9, 10, 11 and 23. 10 — Francovich, cited above, paragraph 41. and 12).
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DILLENKOFER AND OTHERS vFEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
A — The existence of an individual right Article 7 requires the organizer and/or having a sufficiently precise and well-defined retailer party to the contract to provide suf content (Questions 1 and 2) ficient evidence of security for the refund of money paid over and for the repatriation of the consumer in the event of insolvency. As can plainly be seen just from a literal reading of that provision, such an obligation is clearly and unambiguously imposed in order to protect consumers, who therefore are the 11. By its first two questions the national beneficiaries of the provision; nor could it be court seeks to ascertain whether Article 7 of otherwise. Moreover, the directive clearly the directive satisfies the first two conditions identifies those beneficiaries under the defi set forth in the Francovich judgment. nition 'consumer', 11 from which it follows Clearly, that court starts from the assump that all purchasers of travel or rather all tion that what is at issue is, as in Francovich, those travelling under a package have the legislation without direct effect, in the sense right to reimbursement or repatriation at no that any rights granted thereunder may not extra cost to themselves in the event of the be relied on directly by individuals if it has insolvency of the organizer from whom they not been implemented in national law. purchased the travel.
I would observe, initially, that the first con dition, to the effect that the result prescribed by the directive should entail the grant of rights to individuals, is concerned with iden tifying the legal position of the individuals, the infringement of which may give rise to 13. That conclusion is not invalidated by the compensation. With regard to the case at fact, put forward by a number of govern issue, it must therefore be established ments in the course of these proceedings, whether Article 7 of the directive confers a that since the legal basis of the directive is right on individuals, that is to say, whether Article 100a of the Treaty, its objective is that provision was adopted in order to pro essentially to guarantee freedom to provide tect purchasers of package travel. services and, more generally, freedom of competition, as is borne out by the recitals in 12 the preamble to the directive.
11— Article 2(4) of the directive defines 'consumer' as 'the per son who takes or agrees to take the package ("the principal contractor"), or any other person on whose behalf the prin 12. In my view, it is undeniable that the pur cipal contractor agrees to purchase the package ("the other beneficiaries") or any person to whom the principal con pose of Article 7 of the directive aims at pro tractor or any of the other beneficiaries transfers the pack tecting purchasers of package travel against age ("the transferee")'.
the risks caused by the insolvency of the 12 — See, in particular, the first three recitals, which emphasize the importance of harmonizing the relevant national laws in organizers from whom they purchased the order to eliminate obstacles to the freedom to provide ser vices and distortions of competition amongst operators travel in question. established in different Member States.
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On this point I shall merely note, first, that need be, to make it possible to refund money the statement of reasons on which the direc paid over or the cost of repatriation. In tive is based repeatedly stresses the aim of short, it does not seem to me that there can 13 protecting consumers, and, secondly, that possibly be any serious doubt about this the fact that the rules laid down in the direc irrefutable fact: the objective of the provision tive are intended to safeguard other interests at issue is precisely to protect the financial as well, in this case freedom to provide ser interests of consumers against the risks vices in the sector in question, does not of involved in the insolvency of the operator itself preclude their being rules adopted for from whom they bought the package travel the protection of individuals. concerned.
15. The second condition laid down in the 14. In the course of these proceedings it has Francovich judgment, which seems at first also been asserted, in particular by the Ger sight merely to specify the first, emphasizes man Government, that the actual wording of the need for the right resulting from the Article 7 makes it clear that it is confined to directive to have a precise content, that is to imposing on the organizers and/or retailers say, its subject-matter must be capable of of package travel the obligation to provide determination. sufficient security. The absence of any refer ence to a right for consumers to benefit by such security indicates, therefore, that any such right can only be an indirect and derived one.
It must be acknowledged that the content of the right given to individuals by Article 7 certainly has an identifiable objective. It is only too obvious that the purchaser of pack age travel is clearly and precisely entitled to That situation cannot be so interpreted as to receive a refund or be repatriated at no cost lead to the — indeed sterile — conclusion to him if the organizer and/or retailer of the that the obligation imposed on operators in travel fails in his obligations in the event of the relevant sector by the provision in ques insolvency. tion is an end in itself. The truth is that that obligation has meaning and reason only in so far as the security required is intended, if
13 — See, in particular, the eighth to eleventh recitals which point 16. It is of course quite true, as the German out for example that 'disparities in the rules protecting con Government points out, that the security sumers in different Member States are a disincentive to con sumers in one Member State from buying packages in referred to in Article 7 can be provided in another Member State' and that 'the consumer should have the benefit of the protection introduced by this Directive'; many forms, from the provision of a bond see also the last two recitals specifically concerning con by the organizer and/or retailer himself to sumer protection in the event of the travel organizer's insolvency. bank guarantees or sureties, or to insurance,
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DILLENKOFER AND OTHERS v FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMAN
the cost of which could be borne by the went on to state that 'the right of a State to numerous undertakings in the insurance sec choose among several possible means of tor or jointly by a consortium of travel orga achieving the result required by a directive nizers and/or retailers. Financial securities, does not preclude the possibility for indi moreover, may in their turn take on different viduals of enforcing before the national forms, for example a fund, reserves, deposits, courts rights whose content can be deter or cover provided by the undertaking's capi mined sufficiently precisely on the basis of tal. 1 the provisions of the directive alone.' 4
Starting from that premiss, the Court recog This all implies that the Member States are nized that the content of the guarantee for left a wide margin of discretion, but only as the benefit of employees as provided for by regards the means to be adopted in order to the directive relating to the protection of make the security work. So, such discretion employees in the event of the insolvency of does not in any way affect the result sought the employer was sufficiently clear, since it by Article 7, nor can it be used in such a way left the Member State only the choice of the as to change the substance of the right thus date as from which the guarantee that claims conferred on consumers. In conclusion, the would be paid had to be provided. The fact is that in the event of the travel organiz Court accordingly reached the conclusion er's and/or retailer's insolvency, consumers that it was possible at least to determine the arc entitled to reimbursement of sums paid minimum guarantee provided for by the over or to repatriation. employer's insolvency directive, namely by taking the date whose choice entailed the least liability for the guarantee institution.
17. Just in case it should be necessary, I would now point out that, despite the dis tinctions drawn by some Member States, the 18. In the case now before the Court, the terms of the problem are exactly the same as situation is even simpler. The discretion in Francovich, in that the directive relating to allowed to the Member States actually relates the protection of employees in the event of only to the means by which security may be the insolvency of the employer, at issue in that case, likewise left Member States a sig nificant margin of discretion. The Court 14 — Francovich, cited above, paragraph 17.
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provided and thus, in the final analysis, to (Question 3); whether it was sufficient for the identity of the person liable to provide the Member State merely to provide a legis the security, whereas the content of the secu lative framework for imposing an obligation rity is in itself clear, precise and unambigu on the organizer and/or retailer to take mea ous. sures for security within the meaning of Article 7 (Question 4); whether the directive can be regarded as properly transposed if a Member State allows the travel organizer to require a deposit of 10% of the total travel price, up to a maximum of DM 500 (Ques tion 5); whether the Federal Republic of Germany could omit to transpose Article 7 In short, the relevant provisions of the direc of the directive, taking into account the tive are sufficiently precise and unconditional national case-law on advance payments both as regards identification of the persons referred to above, or whether it must on the intended to benefit by the security and as contrary be held that there is no security regards the actual content of the security. within the meaning of Article 7 even if trav Accordingly, Article 7 of the directive con ellers are in possession of documents evi fers a right appertaining to individuals on dencing claims against the various providers consumers (purchasers of package travel), of services (Question 7), and finally whether whose subject-matter is easily identified, the directive requires the Member States to since quite simply it is the right to reim act to protect purchasers of package bursement of sums already paid over and the travel even against their own carelessness right to be repatriated in the event of the (Question 6). insolvency of the organizer and/or retailer of the package travel concerned.
Those questions might at first sight seem positively irrelevant with regard to determin ing whether a Member State is obliged to B — The measures necessary for proper pay compensation because it has failed to transposition of the directive (Questions 3, 4, transpose a directive within the prescribed 5, 6 and 7) period, in that they seek to establish in gen eral terms the means by which a directive may be correctly transposed into national law.
19. In Questions 3 to 7 the national court seeks in essence to ascertain the correct method of complying with the directive at issue. More specifically, it asks: what is to be 20. In fact, as is apparent from the order for understood by 'necessary measures' for reference, it is the national court's intention the purposes of Article 9 of the directive to ascertain, first, whether the damage
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DILLENKOFER AND OTHERS v FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
suffered by the plaintiffs would have precision and clarity required (...) in order to occurred even if Article 7 of the directive satisfy the requirement of legal certainty'. had been correctly implemented in time (Questions 4 and 5), a hypothesis which can, in the light of the interpretation of that pro vision which I have already provided, be ruled out straight away; and, secondly, whether the plaintiffs' conduct could be called negligent, taking account of the national case-law on advance payments (Questions 6 and 7). The implication would be, in the first of those hypotheses, that there It follows, for our purposes, that in order to was no causal link between the failure to implement Article 7 properly the Member transpose the directive and the damage com States were required to take all suitable mea plained of, and in the second, that damages sures no later than 31 December 1992 in could not be awarded, regard being had to order to ensure that purchasers of package the plaintiffs' own negligence. travel arc refunded sums paid over or repa triated where the organizer and/or the retailer of such travel fails in his obligations on account of insolvency.
Consequently, I consider that those ques tions call for an answer only in so far as it is relevant to the question of the causal link.
22. The answer just given makes it clear that the Member State's obligation cannot be construed as being confined to providing before the date in question a legislative framework requiring the organizer and/or 21. Having said that, I would observe first retailer of package travel to provide evidence of all that the wording of Article 9 of the of guaranteed reimbursement of deposits and directive, which provides that 'Member repatriation. What was actually required, States shall bring into force the measures since an obligation to achieve a result is at necessary to comply with this directive issue, was that within the period prescribed before 31 December 1992', is a standard for by the directive, the Member State should mula. Such a provision indicates that, within adopt all measures necessary in order to the period prescribed, the Member States arc guarantee individuals effective protection required to adopt all the measures necessary against the risks involved in the insolvency to give full effect to the provisions of the of organizers and/or retailers of package directive and thus to ensure that the result travel. required by them is achieved. I would add that, as the Court has held, the provisions of a directive must be implemented 'with 15 — Case C-59/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I 2607, unquestionable binding force (... and the), paragraph 24.
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The answer to the national court's fourth Article 7 of the directive is to protect con question must therefore be that the Member sumers against all risks arising from the States were required to adopt, by 31 Decem insolvency of the travel organizer and/or the ber 1992, all measures necessary to ensure retailer. This means that legislation allowing that the chosen system of guarantees was travellers to be required to make an advance actually implemented. payment equal to 10% of the total package cost, but no greater than DM 500, before a security document is issued, is consistent with Article 7 only in so far as reimburse ment of the deposit in question as well is guaranteed in the event of the insolvency of the travel organizer and/or retailer. 23. The fifth question concerns the way in which the directive was then actually trans posed into national law by the abovemen- tioned Law of 24 June 1994. Clearly, since that law was adopted after the time-limit prescribed by the directive and after the damage for which the applicants seek com pensation occurred, it is irrelevant in these proceedings. As is apparent from the order for reference, however, the national court is uncertain whether the national implementing legislation is satisfactory, precisely because if it is correct, then it follows that consumers 24. The Bundesgerichtshof's case-law on are legitimately bound to bear at least the advance payments, which is the subject of risks connected with the 10% deposit. As a Question 7, must be assessed from the same further result, in some of the cases pending perspective for the present purposes. The before it, it would have to be found that Landgericht asks the Court whether, having there was no causal link between the failure regard to that case-law, the Federal Republic to transpose the directive and the damage of Germany could have refrained altogether 16 complained of. from implementing Article 7 of the directive.
In this context, I think one observation, brief and to the point, will suffice. As I have already said more than once, the aim of
16 — For instance, since Mr Erdmann (Case C-179/94) had paid only the 10% deposit on the total travel cost, following the The answer to this question must be no. I national legislation there would be no compensation for his loss, precisely because the directive allows individuals to be would first remark that it is doubtful obliged to carry the risk of losing their deposits in the event whether that case-law is capable of securing of insolvency. I need hardly add that that would also be the result even if the directive had been implemented in time. proper implementation of the directive, if
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DILLENKOFER AND OTHERS v FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
only on grounds of legal certainty. Fur level of protection for travellers, so that thermore, by virtue of that case-law, con Member States are not obliged to adopt mea sumers are in any case obliged to bear a sures of that kind. This is borne out by series of risks; I refer not only to the fact Article 8 of the directive, which permits already pointed out that consumers are not Member States to adopt or retain more strin guaranteed the refund of deposits paid, but gent provisions in order to protect the con also and above all, to the fact that the full sumer. consumer protection guaranteed by Article 7 might be jeopardized if consumers were obliged to make use of documents evidenc ing claims against third parties, who would then in their turn be exposed to the risk of 18 insolvency. 26. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the Court has recognized, in rela tion to the non-contractual liability of the Community institutions, that there exists 'a general principle common to the legal sys tems of the Member States to the effect that 25. Lastly, and still in relation to the mea the injured party must show reasonable dili sures necessary to ensure that the directive is gence in limiting the extent of his loss or risk correctly implemented, it remains to be con having to bear the damage himself'. 19The sidered whether the Member States were also injured party is therefore required to act dili required to adopt measures to protect con gently, a duty which consists in taking steps sumers against their own negligence. This to avoid damage or, at any rate, reduce its question is related to the preceding one from 2 scale. 0 the point of view of the causal link.
It is clear from the wording of the directive, Having said that, I must however point out in particular from Article 7, that this is a in the light of the answers given to Ques provision intended to ensure a minimum tions 5 and 7 that a traveller who has paid the full cost of travel without demanding to be given the corresponding document cannot
17 — On the subject, see for example the judgment in Commis- sion v Germany, cited above, paragraph 28, where the Court held that 'the fact that a practice is in conformity with the requirements of a directive may not constitute a 19 — See the judgment in Joined Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90 reason for not transposing that directive into national law Mulder and Others v Council and Commission [1992] by provisions capable of creating a situation which is suffi ECR I-3061, paragraph 33. ciently clear, precise and transparent to enable individuals to ascertain their rights and obligations. As the Court held 20 — For an application of that principle in case-law on (...), in order to secure the full implementation of directives Article 215, see, inter alia, the judgment in Joined Cases in law and not only in fact, Member States must establish a 5/G6, 7/66 and 13/66 to 24/66 Kampffmeyer and Others v specific legal framework in the area in question.' Commission [1967] ECR 245, in particular at 265; see also the judgment in Case 238/78 Ireks-Arkady v Council and 18 — In this regard, it is scarcely necessary to add that a pur Commission [1979] ECR 2955, paragraph 14. More gener chaser of package travel cannot, of course, claim to be ally, for a more detailed examination of the various aspects entitled to compensation from the State if he has already of the causal link, sec my Opinion delivered today in Joined succeeded in asserting against the providers of the relevant Cases C-46/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and C-48/93 Factor- services the claims evidenced in the documents in his pos tame 111, [1996] ECR 1-1029, 1-1066, especially points 97 session. to 100.
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OPINION OF MR TESAURO — JOINED CASES C-17S/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 AND C-190/94
be held to be negligent merely because he (Question 11) and, if not, whether the has not taken advantage of the opportunity national case-law on advance payments can not to pay more than 10% of the total travel justify failure to transpose the directive cost before being issued with documents evi within the prescribed period, thus ruling out dencing claims against the various providers conduct involving fault, or in any event, a of services, in accordance with the case-law serious breach (Question 12). on advance payments. As pointed out above, that case-law cannot be regarded as consti tuting sufficient transposition of Article 7 of the directive, with the result that 'failure to comply' with it does not justify a reduction in the amount of compensation or an out right refusal of compensation. In short, the point is to determine whether, for the purposes of the obligation to pay damages imposed on a Member State in breach, any infringement of Community law whatsoever is enough — in the present case failure to transpose a directive within the prescribed period — or whether something more is needed. (c) Unlawful conduct on the part of the State (questions 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12)
28. I think it enough, in this context, simply to make a few brief remarks, once again 27. Questions 8 to 12 concern the unlawful starting out from the Francovich judgment. ness of the harmful conduct attributed to the There, as I recall, the Court held that the State, a matter which the Court is asked to three conditions, referred to above, which it clarify further. More particularly, the had identified and laid down were 'sufficient national court asks whether merely exceed to give rise to a right on the part of individu ing the time-limit prescribed by the directive als to obtain reparation, a right founded is sufficient to give rise to liability on the directly on Community law' (paragraph 41). part of the State, bearing in mind that in the On the other hand, the Court gave no fur circumstances of the case the cooperation of ther clarification of the unlawfulness of the private third parties was necessary in order conduct of the perpetrator of the damage, to achieve the protective result sought by the the national court not having been asked to directive (Question 8); or whether on the carry out any review in that regard. contrary it is necessary for the State to have committed a manifest and serious breach of its obligations (Question 9) or for a prior finding that the State was in breach of its obligations to have been made (Question 10). Lastly, the national court asks whether it fol lows from the Francovich judgment that In my view, the choice made by the Court in State liability does not depend on conduct Francovich was due very simply to the fact constituting fault on the part of the State that in that case there could be no doubt as
I - 4862
DILLENKOFER AND OTHERS v FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
to whether the omission on the part of the too short, does not alter the terms of the State was unlawful: the result sought by the problem. In that regard, I shall merely point directive, — in respect of which the State had out that, as the Court has held, 'if the period no margin of discretion, at any rate, not in allowed for the implementation of a directive relation to the period within which the proves to be too short the only means of directive had to be implemented — was not action compatible with Community law attained. This does not mean that the Court available to the Member State concerned took a view on the question whether or not a consists in taking the appropriate initiatives manifest and serious breach was required. It within the Community in order to obtain is significant in this regard that different, the necessary extension of the period by the even opposite, responses are to be encoun 23 competent Community institution'. tered in academic writings: according to some commentators, the Court intended only to target serious infringements involv 2 ing fault; 1 others, in contrast, take the view that it appears from Francovich that any infringement of Community law gives rise to liability and an obligation to make repara The fact that other Member States did not 22 tion. In any case, there can be no doubt as transpose the directive within the period pre 24 to the result arrived at by the Court with scribed either is likewise irrelevant, as is regard to the case under consideration: State the alleged lack of cooperation on the part of liability and the obligation to pay damages the sectors of the economy concerned. It is arise whenever the infringement consists of a the Member State which is obliged to trans failure to transpose a directive within the pose the directive within the prescribed prescribed period. period, even if the State concerned chooses to consult other persons or traders in the sector or is required to do so by the direc tive. It follows that the State may not in any event plead 'circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a fail ure to comply with the obligations and time- 25 limits under Community directives'.
29. It is impossible not to reach the same conclusion in this case. The circumstance relied on by the German Government, that the period laid down by the directive proved
30. In short, where the conditions identified and laid down by the Court in Francovich 21 — It shows, among other things, that failure to implement a directive constitutes a conscious breach, consequently a deliberate one and lor that very reason one involving fault. Temple Lang, 'New Legal Effects Resulting from the Fail ure of States to Fulfil Obligations under European Com munity Law: The Francovich judgment', in Fordham Inter- 23 — See the judgment in Casc 52/75 Commission v Italy (19761 national Law Journal, 1992-1993, p. 1 et seq. ECR 277, paragraph 12/13. 22 — In the sense that strict liability is involved in which fault 24 — To this effect, sec for example the judgment cited in the pre plays no part, sec for example Carama, 'Governmental vious footnote, where it states that 'any delays there may Liability after Francovich', in Cambridge Law Journal, have been on the part of other Member States in perform 1993, p. 272 et scq.; sec also Talham, 'Les recours contre les ing obligations imposed by a directive may not be invoked atteintes portées aux normes communautaires par les pou by a Member State in order to justify its own, even tempo voirs publics en Angleterre', in Cahiers ¡le Droit Européen, rary, failure to perform its obligations' (paragraph 11). 1993, p. 597 et seq. 25 — Sec the judgment cited in footnote 23, paragraph 14.
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OPINION OF MR TESAURO — JOINED CASES C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 AND C-190/94
are satisfied, infringement consisting of a 32. As regards the questions at issue, there failure to transpose a directive is in any case fore, I shall merely outline the following such as to give rise to liability on the part of summary: the State in breach and therefore to an obli gation to pay compensation to individuals who have suffered damage, without there being any need to undertake further inquir ies. — failure to transpose a directive within the period prescribed thereunder constitutes a manifest and serious breach (Question 9 ); 26
31. This makes it unnecessary to consider the other questions referred by the national — a finding of manifest and serious breach court. It appears to start from the assump does not depend on a prior judgment tion that the failure to transpose the directive having been given under Article 169 at issue does not constitute a manifest and against the Member State in breach serious breach of the State's obligations and (Question 10); 27
is not, therefore, a breach capable of giving rise to liability and an obligation to pay compensation. From the same perspective, it adds that if there has to be conduct involving fault on the part of the State in breach in order for there to be an obligation to pay — fault, as a subjective component of compensation, it remains to be ascertained unlawful conduct, is without relevance whether the national case-law on advance payments may be deemed to rule out the for the purposes of establishing liability existence of such conduct. on the part of the Member State in 28 breach (Question 11);
— the national case-law on advance pay ments may not be taken into account in order to exclude fault (Question 12). Since I have already explored those points at length in my Opinion in Joined Cases C-46/93 (Brasserie du Pêcheur) and C-48/93 (Factortame III), also delivered today, I 26 — As to the manifest and serious nature of the breach of Community provisions, see points 74 to 84 of the Opinion think it expedient and adequate, apart from in Joined Cases C-46/93 (Brasserie du Pêcheur) and their relevance to the outcome of this case, to C-48/93 (Factortame III). 27 — Sec, in particular, point 81 of the Opinion cited in the pre refer to that Opinion for the relevant reason vious footnote. ing. 28 — See, in this connection, points 85 to 90 of that Opinion.
I - 4864
DILLENKOFER AMD OTHERS v FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
33. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I therefore propose that the Court reply as follows to the questions referred by the Landgericht Bonn:
(1) Article 7 of Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours confers on purchasers of such travel a right to the guaranteed reimbursement of sums already paid over and repatria tion costs in the event of the insolvency of the travel organizer and/or retailer; the subject-matter of the content of that right can be identified on the basis of the provisions of the directive itself.
(2) Articles 7 and 9 of Directive 90/314/EEC require the Member States to adopt by 31 December 1992 all measures necessary to guarantee the consumer as of that date the reimbursement of sums deposited or repatriation in the event of the insolvency of the travel organizer and/or retailer party to the contract.
(3) Article 7 of Directive 90/314/EEC must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude a Member State from authorizing travel organizers to require consumers to make an advance payment of 10% of the total cost of the travel even before documents evidencing claims are issued, provided that in the event of insolvency reimbursement of that advance payment is likewise guaranteed; inasmuch as the national case-law on 'advance payments' leaves consumers to bear both that risk and the risk ensuing from the potential insolvency to which third parties against whom consumers may assert documents evidencing claims are exposed, it does not constitute proper transposition of Article 7 of the directive.
(4) Directive 90/314/EEC does not require Member States to take measures to protect consumers against their own negligence.
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OPINION OF MR TESAURO - JOINED CASES C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 AND C-190/94
(5) Where the other conditions are satisfied, failure to transpose a directive within the period prescribed is of itself sufficient to give rise to an obligation to pay compensation on the part of the State in breach, which may not therefore jus tify any delay in transposition by claiming either that the period prescribed proved too short or that transposition required interested third parties to be consulted.
(6) Failure to transpose a directive constitutes a manifest and serious breach of the obligations imposed on Member States by Community law; it is not necessary for this purpose that judgment should have been given against the State under Article 169 before the harmful event occurred.
(7) The liability of the Member State in breach and its obligation to pay compen sation are not dependent on fault, in the sense of a subjective factor m the unlawful conduct attributable to it; consequently, the national case-law on 'advance payments' cannot justify the delay in transposing Directive 90/314/EEC as far as the obligation to pay compensation is concerned.
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