C-334/94
ECLI:EU:C:1995:393
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O P I N I O N O P MR FENNELLY — CASE C-334/94
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL FENNELLY delivered on 16 November 1995 *
Introduction restricting crewing, in a specified pro portion, to French citizens, the French Republic is in breach of Articles 6 (on non-discrimination), 48 (on free move ment of workers), 52, 58 and 221 (on freedom of establishment and participa 1. This case concerns French laws on the tion in companies) of the Treaty, and of registration and crewing of fishing and plea legislative provisions setting out more sure boats and of merchant ships. It raises detailed prescriptions on free move interesting questions about, inter alia, the ment; 1 jurisdiction of the Court in respect of infringement actions after the coming into force of the Treaty on European Union, and the application of the prohibition on dis crimination on grounds of nationality within the scope of application of Community law.
2. The Commission asks the Court, in accordance with Article 169 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (ii) to find that the French Republic is in (hereinafter ‘the Treaty’): breach of Article 171 of the Treaty by its failure to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court 2 in Commission ν France (by which the French Republic has already been found to be in breach of its obligations under the Treaty in respect of the crewing (i) to find that, by the maintenance in force requirement); and of laws or other measures restricting reg istration and the right to fly the French flag to ships in which a majority stake is owned by persons with French national 1 — The Commission relies in particular on Commission Regu lation (EEC) No 1251/70 of 29 June 1970 on the right of ity, or owned by legal persons with cer workers to remain in the territory of a Member State after tain specified links with France, and having been employed in that State; OJ, English Special Edi tion 1970 (II), p. 402; Council Directive 75/34/EEC of 17 December 1974 concerning the right of nationals of a Member State to remain in the territory of another Member State after having pursued therein an activity in a self- employed capacity; OJ 1975 L 14, p. 10. * Original language: English. 2 — Case 167/73 [1974] ECR 359.
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(¡ii) to order the French Republic to bear (ii) belong wholly to a company with its the costs of the proceedings. headquarters in France, or a company which, having its headquarters in another State where, pursuant to a con- vention concluded with France, French companies are permitted to exercise their activities, elects French domicile for all administrative and judicial purposes rela- The French Government docs not contest tive to the vessel (in either case, and irre- the Commission's position, save to point out spective of the location of the company that steps are being taken to rectify the mat- headquarters, certain management and ter by legislation. There was no oral hearing. supervisory officers, or a majority thereof, or a majority of the sharehold- ers, depending on the type of company, must be French nationals); or
Factual and legislative background
(iii) belong wholly to a combination of nat- ural and legal persons fulfilling the con- ditions in categories (i) and (ii); or 3. French law makes the flying of the French flag by maritime vessels contingent on regis- tration (francisation). 3 To be registered, a vessel must:
(iv) be destined to belong to persons in cat- egories (i) to (iii) above after the exer- cise of an option to acquire the vessel under a leasing agreement; or
(i) belong (in respect of at least a majority stake) to French nationals, who, if resi- dent in France for less than six months a year, must elect French domicile for all administrative and judicial purposes rela- tive to the vessel; or (v) in the case of a vessel flying a foreign flag, become French property in total after shipwreck on the French coast and after repairs amounting to at least four 3 — Article 217. Code Français des Douanes (French Customs Code). times the purchase price.
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Registration may also be accorded with the vessels must be of French nationality. 6 The agreement of the Ministers for the Marine Court has already found this national rule to and for the Budget: be in breach of Article 48 of the Treaty and of Article 4 of Council Regulation (EEC) N o 1612/68 7 in Commission ν France. 8 A ministerial circular adopted subsequent to that decision provides that the terms of this decree are not applicable to nationals of other Member States of the Community. 9 (a) where natural and legal persons in catego ries (ii) to (iv) above own only a majority interest in the vessel in circumstances where a total interest is required, so long as the management of the vessel is entrusted to them, or to other persons fulfilling the conditions set out; or Procedure
(b)the vessel has been taken under a bare boat charter by a French undertaking which controls, fits and manages it, where 5. The Commission commenced the pre- such a change in flags is permitted in such contentious phase under Article 169 of the circumstances by the State whose flag it Treaty by addressing to the French Govern originally flew. 4 ment four formal letters of notice, respec tively, on 21 August 1989 (on the registration of pleasure boats); on 16 May 1990 (on reg istration by legal persons); on 21 May 1990 (on the registration of fishing vessels, and on the crewing requirements condemned
6 — Decree 67-690 of 7 August 1967. This decree (upon which the Commission relies in the instant case) is a different meas 4. Certain French legislative provisions ure from that at issue in Case 167/73 Commission ν France, require that the crews of maritime vessels be cited in footnote 2 above, which concerned (as stated at para graph 3 of the judgment) a Ministerial Order of 21 Novem of French nationality, in proportions defined ber 1961, as amended by that of 12 June 1969, which, apart from certain local exemptions, reserved employments on the by ministerial order. 5Article 4 of a decree of bridge and in the engine and wireless rooms of French mar 7 August 1967 provides that (subject to cer itime vessels to persons of French nationality, and reserved employment generally to French nationals in the ratio of tain derogations permitted by Article 3 of three to one; however, these orders were made under Arti cle 3 of the Law of 1926, and in so far as they permit crewing the Law of 1926) crew members of French by non-French nationals i n t h e proportion of one to three, it is possible that they can be deemed in French law to consti tute derogations from that article in the sense referred to in the decree of 1967. 7 — Regulation on freedom of movement for workers within the 4 — Article 219, French Customs Code. Community; OJ, English Special Edition 1968 (II), p. 475. 5 — Article 3 of the Law of 13 December 1926, on the Code de 8 — Case 167/73, cited in footnote 2 above. Travail Maritime (Maritime Labour Code); Article 221 of 9 — Circular of 29 April 1975, Journal Officiel de la République the French Customs Code. Française, 2 May 1975.
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¡η Commission ν France); '° and on 24 April breaches of Community law alleged by it in 1992 (on the registration of merchant ves the instant case. (The projected law would sels). There was no reply to the first two let reserve the posts of captain and second cap ters. The French Government replied to the tain to French nationals, but the Commis letter of 21 May 1990 on 30 July of that year, sion concedes that this exception is justified seeking an extension of the time-limit for under Article 48 of the Treaty because the reply; in a letter of 17 January 1991, it stated functions of these officers include the effec its belief in the principle requiring a real tive exercise of public authority.) However, economic link between a ship and the State the Commission received no further com whose flag it flies, but added that it was munication in respect of the proposed legis planned to replace the existing ownership lative changes, and commenced the present rules with conditions based on nationality of proceedings pursuant to Article 169 of the a Community Member State. The French Treaty, on 22 December 1994. The French Government replied to the letter of notice of Government lodged its defence on 15 March 24 April 1992 on 7 July 1992, referring to a 1995. The parties having indicated their con draft law which would bring French law into sent, the Court decided pursuant to conformity with Community law in this Article 44a of the Rules of Procedure to dis field, and also in that of the employment of pense with an oral hearing. nationals of other Member States on ships flying the French flag.
6. Having received no further communi 7. Part (ii) of the Commission application, cation from the French Government, in par summarized in paragraph 2 above, invokes ticular concerning changes in the French Article 171 of the Treaty and is expressly legal regime, the Commission issued a single based on non-compliance by the French reasoned opinion, relating to the four letters Republic with a judgment of the Court con of notice, on 11 October 1993, and laid demning the French law on crewing nation down a period of two months for compli ality requirements as outlined in para ance. The French Government replied by a graph 4 above. Part (i) of the application in brief note of 24 December 1993, stating that part concerns the same French law, but it had not been possible to debate the pro alleges the breach of a different provision of jected legislative reforms in the French Par Community law (Article 52 of the Treaty). liament. On 22 July 1994, the French Gov The coming into force of the Treaty on ernment sent to the Commission a copy of European Union (sometimes referred to the draft law which the Commission consid hereinafter by its colloquial title, 'the Maas ers would, if enacted, remedy all of the tricht Treaty') requires me to consider the effect, if any, on these aspects of the present action of the resulting amendment of Arti 10 — Case 167/73, cited in footnote 2 above. cle 171 of the Treaty.
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Relevance of Article 171(2) of the Treaty to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice.
8. Article 169 of the Treaty empowers the Commission to ask the Court to declare that 2. If the Commission considers that the a Member State is in breach of any provision Member State concerned has not taken such of Community law (including the Treaty). measures it shall, after giving that State the The obligation of Member States to comply opportunity to submit its observations, issue with judgments of the Court was, and still is, a reasoned opinion specifying the points on stated in Article 171 of the Treaty. Prior to which the Member State concerned has not the coming into force of the Treaty on Euro complied with the judgment of the Court of pean Union on 1 November 1993, it stood Justice. on the same footing as all other Treaty pro visions, imposing obligations on Member States. N o special procedure was provided for the enforcement of this obligation, and action was taken by the Commission, as for all alleged breaches of Community law, under Article 169. 1 1 Article 171 now con If the Member State concerned fails to take tains a distinct procedure in paragraph 2 for the necessary measures to comply with the actions for failure to comply with a previous Court's judgment within the time-limit laid judgment of the Court. down by the Commission, the latter may bring the case before the Court of Justice. In so doing it shall specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member State concerned which it con siders appropriate in the circumstances.
9. As amended by the Maastricht Treaty, Article 171 of the Treaty now states:
If the Court of Justice finds that the Member State concerned has not complied with its judgment it may impose a lump sum or pen alty payment on it. '1. If the Court of Justice finds that a Mem ber State has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty, the State shall be required
11 — The first such case was Case 48/71 Commission ν Italy [1972] ECR 527 ('Art Treasures'). The volume of such cases This procedure shall be without prejudice to increased greatly after 1985. Article 170.'
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10. The second paragraph, inserted into compliance laid down in the reasoned opin Article 171 of the Treaty, replicates in many ion expired on 11 December 1993, and the respects the Article 169 procedure: it envis Court was seised of the contentious proceed ages a notification seeking observations, and ings on 22 December 1994, that is after that a reasoned opinion setting a time-limit for Treaty had come into force. Member State compliance, before the com mencement, at the Commission's discretion, of the contentious phase before the Court. The outstanding distinguishing feature of this new provision is the respective roles it envisages for the Commission in proposing, and for the Court in imposing, a financial sanction on a Member State. 12 Its intent is clearly to encourage compliance with judg ments of the Court. A recalcitrant Member State will already have had several opportu nities, first through the Article 169 pro cedure, pre-judgment, and then, through Article 171(2), post-judgment, to observe the requirements of Community law.
12. Since the issue of the continued compe tence of the Commission to employ Arti cle 169 of the Treaty, in a case to which Arti cle 171(2) may arguably apply, has not been raised, I have to consider whether I should do so in advising the Court. 13 If the Com mission's competence has been affected by 11. The question which, in my view, must be the amendment to Article 171, the Court's addressed is whether the Commission should jurisdiction is equally affected. The Court have employed this new procedure, specific cannot be given jurisdiction merely by con 1 to Article 171 of the Treaty, rather than, as it sent of the parties. 4The Court may raise of has done, the traditional procedure under its own motion any absolute bar to proceed Article 169. O n the one hand, the Court ing with a case, as is made clear by Arti decision whose enforcement is at issue, in cle 92(2) of the Rules of Procedure; it which judgment was given on 4 April 1974, emerges, further, from the consistent case- predates the coming into force of the Treaty law of the Court, that matters going to the on European Union, as do the Commission's jurisdiction of the Court are matters of formal letter of notice and reasoned opinion (21 May 1990 and 11 October 1993, respec tively). O n the other hand, the period for 13 — It was not to be expected cither that the Commission would plead the inadmissibility of its own action, or that the French Government would plead that a form of action with more serious potential consequences should be employed against it. 12 — For Adiscussion of the other chief textual difference in the 14 — Sec. for example. Case 101/7') Fogha ν Novello [1980] procedural prescriptions of Articles 169 and 171(2), sec ECR 745, and Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello [1981] paragraph 20 below. ECR 3045.
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public policy, and must be so raised. 15 The fortiori where appreciably different conse Court also feels bound of its own motion to quences for the parties may ensue from the reject as inadmissible applications in which use of the one procedure rather than the oth an inappropriate procedure is used (often in er. 1 7 order to escape the application of rigorous time-limits or other conditions to a case brought in the proper fashion). 1 6 It is there fore the duty of the Court to raise the matter of admissibility where a procedure is used other than that which is mandatory under the Treaties for a case of that type, and a
13. I must therefore ask whether the pro cedure set out in Article 171(2) of the Treaty is mandatory in cases in which it is sought to enforce Article 171(1), or whether the Com mission can continue, at its discretion or in transitional cases, to act in such cases through proceedings instituted under Arti 15 — See, for example, Case T-84/91 Meskens ν European Parlia cle 169. I believe that use of the new pro ment [1992] ECR II-2335, in which the Court of First Instance felt bound of its own motion to reject as inadmis cedure under Article 171(2) of the Treaty is sible a request that it impose a penalty payment on a Com munity institution to ensure observance of an earlier mandatory in cases to which it applies, decision of the Court. See also Case 31/69 Commission ν because a specific procedure has now been Italy [1970] ECR 25, paragraph 8 of the judgment, in which the Court remarked that a particular submission (that Arti provided, which on the ordinary principles cle 169 proceedings could not be taken in respect of simple omissions to implement directly applicable legislation) was of construction derogates from any provi out of time, but as it related to the Court's jurisdiction, it sion of more general application in so far as 'must be examined by the Court of its own motion'.
For further examples of cases in which the Court interpreted they are inconsistent. 1 8 Such inconsistency is Article 92(2) of the Rules of Procedure as obliging it to raise matters of admissibility of its own motion, see Case disclosed by the mandatory character of the 55/64 Lens ν Court of Justice [1965] ECR 837, pp. 840 and 841 (on staff case time-limits); Case 200/87 Giordani ν language employed in the first indent of Commission [1989] ECR 1877, paragraph 10 (in a case Article 171(2). That language (which also where it was unclear whether the Commission was pleading inadmissibility); Case T-19/90 Von Hoessle ν Court of appears in the second indent) requires, in my Auditors [1991] ECR II-615, paragraph 23 (time-limits are opinion, that certain steps be taken before intended to ensure legal certainty: '[t] hey are therefore a matter of public policy and cannot be left to the discretion the Commission can act under Arti of the parties or the Court'); cf. cases where alleged non- observance of due pre-litigation procedure in Arti cle 171(2): it must give the Member State the cle 169 proceedings, which was designed only to protect Member State rights, need not be raised by the Court in the opportunity to submit observations; it must absence of objection on the part of the Member State issue a reasoned opinion; and at a later point,
affected: Advocate General Lenz in C-249/91 Commission ν France [1994] ECR 1-787, paragraph 22; Advocate General if it exercises its discretion to bring the mat Gulmann in Case C-61/90 Commission ν Greece [1992] ECR I-2407, paragraph 16. ter before the Court, the Commission must specify its view of the appropriate amount, 16 — See, for example, Joined Cases 114/79 to 117/79 Foamier ν Commission [1980] ECR 1529, in which the family of a in the circumstances, of a lump sum or pen Community official sought to bring proceedings under Articles 175 and 178 of the Treaty in respect of matters
alty payment. The first two steps may be properly governed by the provisions on staff cases; Joined Cases 21/61 to 26/61 Moroni ν High Authority [1962] ECR 73, pp. 76 and 78, in which the Court considered of its own motion that an action for failure to act was a 'pro cedural artifice' and did not lie against the High Authority in respect of refusal to rescind a decision against which an 17 — This was not the case in Chevalley, cited in foot action for annulment was time-barred; Joined Cases note 16 above. 10/68 and 18/68 Eridania ν Commission [1969] ECR 459, 18 — This view is shared by D. Ritleng, 'Article 171' in V. Con- p. 483, to similar effect. It is only where the conditions rel stantinesco, R. Kovar and D. Simon cds., Traité sur l'Union
ative to the use of both Article 173 and Article 175 of the Européenne: Commentaire Article par Article (Paris, 1995), Treaty are satisfied that the Court will take the view that p. 577. On the principle of the lex specialis, see for example both provisions 'merely prescribe one and the same method the remarks of Advocate General Verloren van Themaat in of recourse', as in Case 15/70 Chevalley ν Commission Case 239/84 Gerlach v Minister for Economic Affairs [1985] [1970] ECR 975, paragraph 6. ECR 3507, p. 3510.
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affected, as we shall see, by the possibility of 15. It is, in my opinion, a corollary of the the imposition of such sanctions. mandatory character of the new procedure under Article 171(2) of the Treaty that the Commission cannot bring a new action under Article 169 against the Member State concerned based on the substantive Commu nity law provisions which have already been the subject-matter of an earlier judgment. In the absence of a change in material facts, the existing judgment of the Court establishes that breach, and it would be otiose to request the Court to restate it. The Court refuses to make a declaration to precisely the same effect as an earlier judgment which has the force of res judicata. 2 0 It is the further dis 14. This view is not inconsistent with the tinct breach by a Member State of its Treaty obligations, in failing to take the necessary similar mandatory language of Article 169. measures to comply with the judgment of Article 171(2) of the Treaty is specific to the the Court, which justifies a further action failure of a Member State to take measures to based on Article 171(1) of the Treaty. comply with a Court judgment and requires the Commission to follow its procedure in pursuit of such failure. This new Arti cle 171(2) procedure is stated (in the fourth indent) to be 'without prejudice to Article 170', a provision of general applica tion, while no such reference is made to Article 169. Thus, while Article 171(2) expressly envisages the continued possibility 16. However, the Commission and the of Member State enforcement action pursu Court are primarily concerned to ensure the ant to a general enforcement provision, with observance of Treaty obligations, rather than out the imposition of pecuniary sanctions, it with the content of the offending national is implicit that no such option remains open provision, practice or omission per se. There to the Commission under Article 169. It fol fore, I believe that, even after a Member lows that the procedure set out in Arti State has been the addressee of a judgment of cle 171(2) must now be employed in any case the Court, finding it to be in breach of a par where the Commission seeks to enforce ticular obligation under the Treaty, the Com Article 171(1) of the Treaty. 19However, this mission remains competent to invoke further general proposition is subject, in my view, to distinct Treaty obligations in proceedings an exception in respect of transitional cases taken under Article 169 in respect of the such as the present, for the reasons outlined same national provision, practice or omis below. sion. Consequently, the Commission is
19 — I believe that the replication in many respects in the first 20 — See Joined Cases 24/80 and 97/80 R Commission v France indent of Article 171(2) of the wording of Article 169, first [1980) ECU 1319, paragraphs 16, 17 and 19 of the order, indent, implies that the decision whether to take an action where the Court declined to order interim measures so as for the enforcement of Article 171(1) of the Treaty before to ensure compliance with the judgment it had already the Court rests similarly within the Commission's discre given in Case 232/78 Commission v France [1979] tion. ECR 2729.
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within its rights in bringing before the Court appropriate pre-contentious procedure is that part of part (i) of its application which observed in respect of any post-Maastricht concerns the French crewing requirements period of non-compliance. 25 condemned in the 1974 judgment, but on the basis of their alleged incompatibility with different Treaty provisions. 21
17. I must now ask if the Article 171(2) pro- cedure applies to the alleged non-execution 18. The obligation expressed in Arti- of Court judgments pre-dating the entry into cle 171(1) remains unchanged, so that there is force of the Treaty on European Union. If no question of Member States being placed not, its mandatory application (to the under a new primary obligation. However, enforcement only of those judgments issued they are subject to a potential new obligation after 1 November 1993) would be irrelevant to pay a lump sum or penalty payment in the in the circumstances of the present case. At event of failure to fulfil this primary obliga- least one commentator has espoused the tion. In my view, it is quite clear that the view, with which I agree, that the possibility Court cannot impose a penalty in respect of of financial sanctions under the new pro- a period of disobedience to a judgment prior cedure is inapplicable in such cases, on the to 1 November 1993. Any sanction imposed basis of the principles of legal certainty and on a Member State under Article 171(2) of against retrospective operation of laws. 22 the Treaty for a continuing breach of Arti- These are general principles of Community cle 171(1) should relate only to the period law, which apply with particular force to the after 1 November 1993. I would expect the retroactive imposition of penal sanctions, 23 Commission to take account of these princi- but also prohibit (subject to justified excep- ples when specifying to the Court the tions) retroactive legal measures of a civil amount of the lump sum or penalty payment nature. 24 Subject to this important point, I to be paid by the Member State concerned believe, none the less, that the procedure is which it considers appropriate in the circum- applicable to infringement proceedings in stances. However, it remains my clear view respect of what might be called pre- that the Commission's power to pursue Maastricht judgments, provided that the Member States for any post-Maastricht period of non-compliance with Court judg- ments of any date derives, since 1 November 1993, from Article 171(2) of the Treaty and 21 — See paragraph 7 above. not from Article 169, regardless of whether 22 — See J. Diez-Hochleitner, 'Le Traité de Maastricht et l'Inexécution des Arrêts de la Cour de Justice par les Etats the Court can impose a penalty for earlier Membres' (1994) Revue du Marché Unique Européen 111, p. 130. periods of non-compliance. 23 — See Case 63/83 Regina v Kirk [1984] ECR 2689, para- graphs 21 to 23 of the judgment. 24 — See, for example, Case C-337/88 Società Agricola Fattoria Alimentare [1990] ECR I-I, paragraph 13 of the judgment; Case 331/88 Regina ν Minister for Agriculture, ex 25 — The terms 'pre-' and 'post-Maastricht' relate to periods parte Fedesa [1990] ECR I-4023, paragraph 45. before and after the coming into force of that Treaty.
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19. In view of what I have just said, I must procedure. As the Court stated recently in now consider whether the otherwise manda Commission ν Spain, '[t] he proper conduct tory application of Article 171(2) of the of the pre-litigation procedure constitutes an Treaty in cases such as the present is essential guarantee required by the Treaty excluded by the particular facts summarized not only in order to protect the rights of the at paragraph 11. Member State concerned, but also so as to ensure that any contentious procedure will have a clearly defined dispute as its subject- matter'. 2 8 The principle that the subject- matter of the litigation should crystallize during the pre-contentious phase applies to the temporal as well as the substantive scope of the case, although in different ways.
20. I will first make a preliminary point about the fact that the text of Article 171(2) of the Treaty is, in one respect, expressly more demanding than that of Article 169, in that it requires the Commission in its rea soned opinion to specify the points on which the Member State concerned has not com plied with the judgment of the Court. How ever, while Article 169 is silent on the degree to which the Commission must specify the 22. The delivery by the Commission of its failure of a Member State to fulfil an obliga reasoned opinion under Article 169 repre tion under this Treaty, it has been interpreted sents a watershed in that procedure. The in practice to require the Commission to events that precede it may include com give a coherent exposition of the reasons plaints against a Member State by a private which led it to this conviction. 26 The party or another Member State, or an inde requirements of both articles are therefore pendent investigation by the Commission. In identical in this respect, and were, in my any of these events, the Commission will view, complied with in the instant case. have taken the first step of inviting observa tions from the Member State concerned. We need not here consider those cases where the Member State immediately offers either a
27 — Sec, for example, Case 31/69 Commission ν Italy, cited in footnote 15 above, paragraph 12 of the judgment; Case 232/78 Commission ν France, cited in footnote 20 above, paragraph 3; Case 193/80 Commission ν Italy [1981] ECR 3019, paragraph 12; Case 211/81 Commission ν Den mark [1982] ECR 4547, paragraph 14; Case 124/81 Com 21. The Court has made clear in its consis mission ν United Kingdom [1983] ECR 203, para tent case-law that the parameters of an Arti graphs 6 and 7; Case 325/82 Commission ν Germany [1984] ECR 777, paragraphs 8 and 9; Case 166/82 Commission ν cle 169 action are set by the pre-contentious Italy [1984] ECR 459, paragraphs 16 and 17; Case 186/85 Commission ν Belgium [1987] ECR 2029, para graph 13; Case C-347/88 Commission ν Greece [1990] ECR 1-4747, paragraphs 16 and 17; Case C-52/90 Commis sion ν Denmark [1992] ECR 1-2187, paragrapli 17. 26 — Case 7/61 Commission ν Italy [1961] ECR 317, p. 327 28 — Order in Case C-266/94 [1995] ECR I-1975, paragraph 17.
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convincing and decisive answer or immediate action, even after belated compliance, in compliance. We will assume non-compliance. order to establish the basis of liability which The next step is for the Commission to take a Member State may incur as a result of its a stand in the form of its reasoned opinion. default towards other Member States, the 29 It states its complaint, calls for a remedy, and Community or private parties. sets a time-limit. The response of the Mem ber State often takes one or other form of inaction. It may positively contest the Com mission's complaint, or may indulge in one of the varied forms of temporizing which can so readily be found in the case-law.
24. I acknowledge that the terms employed in judgments and Opinions can occasionally be ambiguous with regard to the precise moment of crystallization of the subject- 23. In either of these cases, the Commission matter of Article 169 litigation. For example, may — though it is not bound to —· pursue in Commission ν Germany, the Court the matter by invoking the Court's jurisdic observed that 'the subject-matter of the pro tion under Article 169. In the alternative, the ceedings in an action for failure to fulfil obli Member State may take a step which I regard gations is limited in time to the end of the as conclusive in the interpretation of Arti pre-litigation phase'. 30 Advocate General
cle 169. It may elect to comply with the Reischl remarked, in similar terms, in Com terms of the reasoned opinion within the mission ν Italy that 'the scope of the com period laid down by the Commission. The plaint cannot be enlarged after closure of the power of the Commission to 'bring the mat preliminary procedure'. 3 1 This may be con ter before the Court of Justice' arises only trasted with the view of the Court in that where the Member State fails to comply case that a draft law could not be considered within the specified period, which acts as a within the scope of the proceedings because sort of period of grace for the Member State, it was submitted to the Commission 'after which thus has the opportunity to deprive the delivery of the reasoned opinion'. 32 the Commission of its power and the Court Unless the end, or closure, of the prelimi of its jurisdiction. Thus, the reasoned opin nary procedure is marked by the issue, rather ion, on the date of delivery, by specifying the than by the expiry, of the reasoned opinion breach of Community law which must be (which is implausible, and is contradicted by rectified and within what period, defines the the French text of the remark quoted above subject-matter of any subsequent Arti from the judgment in Commission ν Germa cle 169 proceeding. If the Member State in ny), there is some inconsistency between question takes action to comply with its these dicta. However, the cases from which I obligations after the expiry of the period, it have quoted concerned circumstances in remains subject to the jurisdiction of the Court upon the application of the Commis sion, in respect of breaches of its obligations 29 — See, for example, Case C-361/88 Commission v Germany before the date of issue of the reasoned opin [1991] ECR I-2567, paragraph 31 of the judgment.
See also ion. This confines to the period laid down in Case 39/72 Commission v Italy [1973] ECR 101; Case 309/84 Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 599. the reasoned opinion the possibility of expi 30 — Case C-317/92 [1994] ECR 1-2039, paragraph 3 of the judg ation, and represents a balance between the ment. I note that the French text of this statement is more specific than the English, referring to the date of expiry of opportunity provided to the defence by that the period specified in the reasoned opinion. period, and the interest in pursuing an 31 — Case 166/82, cited in footnote 27 above, p. 477. 32 — Paragraph 17 of the judgment, emphasis added.
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which the question whether the case's tem the obligation widens. In such cases, the poral bounds are set by the delivery or by Court has ruled that generalized allegations the expiry of the reasoned opinion was not in the Commission's application of the relevant. They involved attempts (rejected by breach of the obligation in question cannot the Court) to alter the substantive scope of be extended to similar breaches alleged to proceedings after the expiry of the period have occurred after the issue of the formal laid down in the reasoned opinion — in the letter of notice to the Member State con first case, by the Member State attempting to cerned, as this would prejudice the rights of rely on later fulfilment of obligations, in the the defence. However, even if the present second by the Commission seeking to extend case fell into either class (which it does not), the scope of the case to the draft law men these cases would simply confirm that the tioned above. 3 3 In the instant case, the fixing subject-matter of the litigation had crystal of the temporal scope of the contentious lized before the entry into force of the proceedings at the end rather than the begin Treaty on European Union. ning of the period specified in the reasoned opinion could have significant consequences. In the event, I agree with the Court's state ment in Commission ν Italy that the moment of delivery of the reasoned opinion repre sents the most logical point at which to define the temporal scope of any ensuing Commission application.
26. On the other hand, the Court has acknowledged in a more exceptional set of circumstances the possibility of extending proceedings to events which took place after the reasoned opinion was delivered, or expired, provided they are 'of the same kind as those to which the opinion referred and . . . constitute the same conduct'. 3 6 This possible 25. There is a series of cases in which the extension of the temporal scope of proceed Court has given definitive temporal effect to ings ought to be strictly construed, but the letter of notice rather than to the rea seems to me to be applicable in principle to soned opinion. These concern either repeated cases of continued failure to take the neces annual breaches, for example of payment sary measures to comply with a judgment of obligations under the common organization the Court in breach of Article 171(1) of the of agricultural markets, 3 4 or breaches of a Treaty. So long as there is no change in the general obligation, allegations of which are material facts, the rights of the defence are extended in scope over time as the scope of not prejudiced by the inclusion of com plaints based on continuous identical acts or omissions after the delivery of the reasoned
opinion. In such cases, a Member State 33 — Sec also the similar dictum in quite a different case, Case 309/84 Commission ν Italy, cited in footnote 29 above, paragraph 14 of the judgment; however, as will be seen immediately below, this was a case in which the issue of the formal letter of notice defined the temporal scope of the contentious proceedings. 35 — Sec, for example, Case 31/69 Commission ν Italy, cited in footnote 15 above, in which an export refund system was 34 — Sec, for example. Case 309/84 Commission ν Italy, cited in footnote 29 above, on annual payment of premiums for the extended front some products to others a few days before abandonment of wine-growing, and Case C-217/88 Com- the issue of the letter of notice. mission ν Germany [1990] ECK I-2879 on compulsory dis 36 — See Case 42/82 Commission ν France [1983] ECR 1013; tillation of wine stocks in certain wine-growing years. Case 113/86 Commissionν Italy [1988] ECR 607.
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which does not take advantage of the period inadmissible to that extent. However, as it is of grace afforded by the reasoned opinion to couched in general terms, I prefer to read it set its house in order may find itself the sub- as relating only to the period up to the deliv- ject of a judgment of the Court in respect of ery of the reasoned opinion on 11 October the entire period up to the date of com- 1993, and as not seeking to rely on the mencement of the contentious phase (or up exceptional extension of the temporal scope to the date of eventual compliance, if earlier). of infringement actions to periods beyond that date. On that reading, the case concerns only alleged breaches of Article 171(1) before 1 November 1993, and no question of sanc- tions arises.
27. This exceptional possibility is as applica- ble now to actions to enforce Article 171(1) of the Treaty under Article 171(2) as it was before the coming into force of the Maas- 28. Consequently, as the subject-matter of tricht Treaty to actions with the same object the present action crystallized before the under Article 169. However, the possibility coming into force of the Treaty on European of sanctions in respect of continuous breach Union, I believe that Article 169 of the after 1 November 1993 distinguishes the new Treaty was the correct basis on which to procedure. I believe that the Article 169 rea- seise the Court even after 1 November 1993. soned opinion in the instant case is inade- Article 169 prescribed at the material time quate to ground an action which concerns, if the Commission's competence and the only in part, what I have called a post- appropriate procedure for bringing such Maastricht period of non-compliance, and matters before the Court. While I concluded which might consequently result in the above that the scope ratione materine of imposition of sanctions: as part of its rights Article 169 has been implicitly reduced by of defence and to legal certainty, the Member the addition to the Treaty of Article 171(2), I State concerned is entitled to notice (if only am of the view that this change should take by the citation of Article 171(2) of the effect prospectively only: prospectively from Treaty) of the possibility of such sanctions. 37 the issue of reasoned opinions in relevant If the Commission had sought in terms in its cases after 1 November 1993 (or possibly application to include in the subject-matter from the issue of the notification seeking of this case allegations of continuous post- observations in cases like those described at Maastricht breach of Article 171(1) of the paragraph 24 above). To decide otherwise Treaty, I would have been forced to recom- could have the effect of rendering ineffective mend that the application be held to be any infringement actions in respect of Arti- cle 171(1) of the Treaty for which the rea- soned opinion was delivered before 1 November 1993, but of which the Court 37 — Sec the Commission's Twelfth Annual Report on Monitor- was seised only after that date. It would be ing the Application of Community Law; OJ 1995 C 254, p. 1, at p. 7 on its practice of alerting Member States in both contrary to the objectives underlying the the letter of notice and the reasoned opinion to the possi- new Article 171(2) of the Treaty if the effect bility of sanctions under the new procedure.
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of its introduction were, even in a small Court judgments before 1 November 1993. number of transitional cases, the undermin Article 169 of the Treaty therefore provides ing of the Commission's efforts to ensure the appropriate procedure for the enforce compliance with judgments of the Court. ment of Article 171(1) where a reasoned opinion was issued and the subject-matter of the action was, consequently, fixed before 1 November 1993. Furthermore, even where Article 171(2) of the Treaty applies to the enforcement of a judgment of the Court, Article 169 may be employed to establish 29. If the Court takes the view that Arti breach of different provisions of Community cle 171(2) of the Treaty was the only appro law by the national provision, practice or priate basis on which to commence the con omission which was the subject of the earlier tentious phase in this case, because the Court judgment. The Commission's application in was seised after 1 November 1993, I would the instant case is therefore admissible in so recommend in the alternative that the action far as it seeks to enforce Article 171(1) of the be treated as having been taken on that basis. Treaty and the judgment of the Court in Except for the matter of sanctions, Arti Commission ν France, 4 0 and seeks an order cles 169 and 171(2) constitute in terms of of the Court that the French provisions on their procedural requirements 3 8 a n d their the nationality of ships' crews are contrary potential outcomes (more obviously even to provisions of Community law other than than in Chevalley) 'one and the same those invoked in that judgment (viz. the pro method of recourse'. 3 9As the imposition of visions on freedom of establishment). No sanctions docs not arise in a case which con question of inadmissibility arises in respect cerns in its entirety breaches of Arti of the other aspects of the case. cle 171(1) before 1 November 1993, and there is no infringement of the rights of the defence, and a finding of inadmissibility would be contrary to the general interest in the enforcement of Community law, the action should be found to be admissible. Substantive contentions of the parties
30. I conclude that Article 171(2) provides a mandatory procedure for the enforcement of 31. Although French law does not make Article 171(1) of the Treaty in cases where such a distinction, the Commission has dis the Commission issues its reasoned opinion tinguished between vessels used for the exer after 1 November 1993. However, the Court cise of an economic activity, and those not so may not impose sanctions on Member States used, in making its case under Community in respect of periods of non-compliance with law against the French legal regime for the registration of such vessels.
38 — See paragraph 20 above. 39 — See Chevalley, cited in footnote 16 above. 40 — Case 167/73, cited in footnote 2 above.
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(i) Vessels used for the exercise of an econ establishment in another Member State. omic activity The Commission adds that the requirement that companies have their headquarters in France constitutes an obstacle to the estab lishment there of agencies, branches or sub sidiaries with the object of running a com mercial vessel, contrary to Article 58 of the Treaty.
32. The Commission considers that the French registration regime is contrary to Articles 6, 52, 58 and 221 of the Treaty in so far as it concerns vessels used for the exercise of an economic activity. The Commission relies chiefly on the judgment of the Court in The Queen ν Secretary of State for Trans port, ex parte Factortame and Others (Fac- tortame II). 4 1 The Court there decided that, where the use of a vessel for economic pur poses required the operator to have a fixed 33. In respect of fishing vessels, the Com establishment in the Member State con mission recalls the case-law of the Court on cerned, its registration entailed observance of the competence of the Member States to the rules on freedom of establishment; regis specify the conditions on which their fishing tration rules which discriminated between quotas may be exploited, indicating that the persons on grounds of their nationality were exercise of this competence must be compat therefore prohibited: specifically, registration ible with Community law. While it may be rules which required that the owners or specified that vessels licensed to exploit their charterers of vessels have a particular nation fishing quotas must have a 'real economic ality, or, if a company, have a certain propor link' with the Member State in question, the tion of shareholders or directors of that objectives of the Community quota system nationality, were therefore contrary to Arti permit that required link to concern only cle 52 of the Treaty. Such rules in respect of relations between the vessel's fishing activi companies were also contrary to Arti ties and the local populations dependent on cle 221 of the Treaty on equal treatment of fisheries and related industries. 4 3 It is clear Member State nationals as regards participa from the case-law that national rules impos tion in the capital of companies or firms ing nationality or residence requirements in within the meaning of Article 58. Rules mak respect of the ownership or management (or ing registration contingent on the domicile in the Member State in question of natural per sons were equally contrary to Article 52, as 42 — Factortame 11, cited in footnote 41 above, paragraphs 22, 29 were rules on the location of the centre of to 31, 33 to 35 of the judgment. See also Case C-246/89 Commission ν United Kingdom [1991] ECR I- direction and control of the vessel in the 4585, and Case C-93/89 Commission ν Ireland [1991] Member State concerned in so far as they ECR I-4569. It is clear from the judgment of the Court in Case 305/87 Commission ν Greece [1989] ECR 1461, para precluded a secondary establishment from graph 12, that any rules incompatible with Article 52 of the Treaty are also incompatible with Article 6. operating under instruction from a primary 43 — See Case C-3/87 The Queen ν Ministry of Agriculture, Fish eries and Food, ex parte Agegate [1989] ECR 4459, para graphs 17 and 27 of the judgment; Case C-216/87 The Queen ν Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Jaderow [1989] ECR 4509, paragraphs 18 and 43; Case C-246/89 Commission ν United Kingdom, cited in 41 — Case C-221/S9 [1991] ECR I-3905. footnote 42 above, paragraphs 12 and 35.
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crewing) of fishing vessels are unrelated to that even national legislation in fields which these objectives. 4 Thus, where a citizen of are in principle the responsibility of Member the Union seeks to avail of the right of estab States (including criminal law and procedure) lishment in a Member State in order to may not discriminate against persons to exploit its fishing quotas, such rules may not whom Community law gives the right to be applied. equal treatment. It found that those who travelled to another Member State to receive services there were entitled, inter alia, to protection from harm on the same basis as nationals and residents of the Member State (ii) Vessels not used for the exercise of an in question, and thus to compensation for economic activity harm suffered under a national scheme on the same basis as nationals and residents, even though the provision of such compen sation was within national competence. ''' Discrimination in respect of admission con 34. The Commission considers that the ditions to museums in Spain was condemned French registration regime is contrary to by the Court in Commission v Spain as being Articles 6, 48 and 52 of the Treaty, and to the in breach of Articles 59 and 6 (as it now is) guarantees of equal treatment in Article 7 of of the Treaty. Regulation N o 1251/70 45 and Article 7 of Directive 75/34/EEC 4 6 in so far as it con cerns vessels not used for the exercise of an economic activity. While registration of a vessel for leisure purposes does not concern employment conditions in the strict sense, the possibility of pursuing leisure activities in a Member State is the corollary of the freedom of workers to go there to exercise employment. A person should not be the subject of discrimination on grounds of nationality in fields which are connected with the exercise of a Community law right. The Commission relies upon the judgment of the Court in Cowan ν Tresor Public,47 as 35. The Commission also argues for the confirmed by the judgment in Commission v enforcement pursuant to Article 171(1) of Spain. 4 8 The Court made clear in Cowan the Treaty of the judgment of the Court in Commission v France 5 0 in respect of the French legal regime on the crewing of mari time vessels. It argues that a ministerial cir 44 — On registration, headquarters, control and ownership of cular is not sufficient to amend a legislative companies, and on nationality of natural persons, Jaderow, citēti in footnote 43 above, paragraph 42 of the judgment; text which is contrary to the Treaty, relying Case C-246/89 Commission v United Kingdom, cited in on the consistent case-law of the Court on footnote 42 above, paragraphs 31 anu 39; Case C-93/89 Commission v Ireland, cited in footnote 42 above, the inadequacy of such instruments to paragraphs 10, 11 and 15 (in respect of company registra tion only); on the residence of crews, see Agegate, cited in footnote 43 above, paragraphs 24 to 26. 45 — Cited in footnote 1 above. 46 — Cited in footnote 1 above. 49 — Cited in footnote 47 above, paragraphs 17 to 19 of the judg 47 — Case 186/87 [1989J ECR 195. ment; see also Case 203/80 Casati [1981] ECR. 2595. 48 — Case C-45/93 [1994] ECK I-9I1. 50 — Case 167/73, cited in footnote 2 above.
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implement directives in a legally effective Substantive conclusions fashion. It adds that the French law is con trary to Article 52 of the Treaty as well as Article 48 (which was the ground for the decision in the Court's judgment of 1974 in 52 conjunction with Regulation No 1612/68), as it presents obstacles to entrepreneurs from other Member States who wish to establish themselves in France (and in particular an obstacle to access to the fishing sector). 37. As regards maritime vessels used in the exercise of economic activities, I accept the arguments of the Commission, which I have summarized and developed herein, and con clude that the French legal regime governing the registration of such vessels is in breach of the Treaty.
36. The French Government accepts the substantive arguments of the Commission as expressed in its application. It points out that the administrative practice of non- 38. The Commission's application also application to Community nationals of the requires me to consider the registration of French nationality requirement in respect of maritime vessels for use other than in the crewing was reinforced after the decision in exercise of economic activities. I believe that Commission ν France 5 3 by a circular of the the French Republic is also in breach of its Transport Minister. The French Government obligations under the Treaty, although the also outlines in its defence the contents of a Court has not had the benefit of detailed draft law relative to transport in general arguments from the parties. The Cowan which, according to the Commission, principle, 54 enunciated by the Court in the addresses adequately its various grievances in context of free movement to avail of services, respect of registration and crewing. How clearly applies equally to other areas gov ever, the exigencies of the parliamentary cal erned by the Treaty: freedom of establish endar and the decision to incorporate provi ment and the free movement of workers, and sions relative to air and road transport the right to remain in Member States after prevented its enactment in time.
54 — It is unclear from the text of the judgment in Case C-45/93 Commission ν Spain, cited in footnote 48 above, 51 — See Case 168/85 Commission ν Italy [1986] ECR 2945, whether the Court considered the discrimination in paragraph 15 of the judgment; Case C-361/88 Commission museum admission prices to relate to ancillary advantages ν Germany, cited in footnote 29 above, paragraph 24; Cases which affect the conditions under which services are pro C-13/90, C-14/90 and C-64/90 Commission ν France [1991] vided to or received by tourists (as was clearly the case in ECR 1-4327, 1-4331 and I-4335 respectively. Cowan), or to the conditions of provision to or receipt by tourists of a service; see paragraphs 5 and 7, respectively, of 52 — Cited in footnote 7 above. the judgment, in which the submissions of the Commission 53 — Case 167/73, cited in footnote 2 above. are summarized.
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the exercise of those rights. As was estab restriction of criminal injuries compensation lished in Cowan in respect of services, pri to French nationals and to foreign nationals 56 mary economic rights can generate certain resident in French territory. consequential entitlements to equal treat ment even in areas which, substantively, are within Member State competence, of which equal protection from harm is among the most significant. Areas of Member State competence come within the scope of appli cation of the Treaty to the extent to which equality in those areas is an essential corol lary of the primary economic right to move to or reside in a Member State for economic purposes. Equality is then guaranteed, in the absence of more detailed provisions, by the prohibition in Article 6 of the Treaty of dis 40. Migrant workers already benefit from crimination on grounds of nationality within extensive rights by virtue of the legislative the scope of application of the Treaty. guarantee of equality in respect of 'social and tax advantages'. 57 Social advantages include all advantages 'which, whether or not linked to a contract of employment, are generally granted to national workers primarily because of their objective status as workers or by virtue of the mere fact of their resi dence on national territory and the extension of which to workers who are nationals of other member countries therefore seems suitable to facilitate their mobility within the 39. If anything, the argument is stronger in Community'. 58 They include (where such respect of those who have established resi rights are accorded to nationals of the Mem dence in another Member State to pursue ber State in question) reduced public trans economic activities there, than in the case of port fares for large families, 59 use of a those whose presence in a Member State is minority language in proceedings before a transient, as in the case of tourists. They Member State court, 6 0 the right to be joined exhibit that 'closer bond' with the host State in a Member State by a non-marital compan upon which the French Government relied ion, 6 1 and the right to study finance for unsuccessfully in Cowan to defend the dependent children in another Member State. 6 2
55 — The Commission docs not invoke, and I do not here address, the rights of other citizens of the Union who arc 56 — Cowan, cited in footnote 47 above, paragraph 16 of the entitled to reside in a Member State by virtue of other judgment. rights conferred by Community law and now reinforced by Article 8a of the Treaty; see Council Directive 90/365/EEC 57 — Article 7(2), Regulation No 1612/68, cited in foot of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence of employees and note 7 above. self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational 58 — Case 207/78 Mimiure Public v Even [1979J ECR 2019, activity; OJ 1990 L 180, p. 28; Council Directive paragraph 22 of the judgment. 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence of 59 — Case 32/75 Criston v SNCF [1975] ECR 1085. persons who do not enjoy this right under any other pro vision of Community law; OJ 1990 L 180, p. 26; and Coun 60 — Case 137/84 Ministère Public v Munch (1985] ECR 2681. cil Directive 93/96/EEC of 29 October 1993 on the right of 61 — Case 59/85 Netherlands v Reed (1986] ECR 1283. residence of students enrolled in vocational training 62 — Case C-3/90 Bernini v Minuter van Onilcrwi/s [1992] ECR courses; OJ 1993 L 317, p. 59. I - 1071.
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41. However, the adoption of secondary 43. Union citizens who move to take up an Community legislation in order to secure economic activity in another Member State such rights to workers does not exclude the should be able to settle and integrate in the existence of a residual category of rights to society of the Member State concerned, and equal treatment which are corollaries under they should not be deterred from the exer the Treaty of the free movement of workers, cise of their economic rights by discrimi as well as of freedom of establishment. Such nation in other areas that are essential to corollary rights to equality would operate, in their well-being. 6 5 Iregard this as the logical the case of workers relying on Article 48, in result of the decision in Cowan. Thus, they respect of matters which do not constitute should be able to avail not only of opportu social advantages under Regulation nities for employment and self-employment, N o 1612/68; they would be of greater signif or of simple residence upon retirement from icance in the field of freedom of establish such economic activities, but also of oppor ment under Article 52, where there has been tunities for social and leisure activities. no equivalent legislative intervention by the Community.
42. The bounds of such corollary rights to equal treatment must be defined by reference 44. The registration of maritime pleasure to the essential human as well as economic boats does not seem to me to be a social needs of those who avail of the primary advantage within the meaning of Regulation Treaty right. The denial of many social N o 1612/68. None the less, while it will advantages (as that term is used in Regu almost inevitably be a pursuit only of a small lation N o 1612/68) to self-employed persons minority, it is clearly part of the broad cate and providers of services may be seen to gory of leisure activities that can be enjoyed affect their competitiveness, and thus to in a Member State. Access to such leisure present an unlawful obstacle to the pursuit opportunities is a corollary of freedom of of such occupations, as in the decision in movement to take up economic activities, Commission ν Italy on access to social hous and is thus within the scope of application of ing. 6 3 Although that decision is couched in the Treaty. As a result, discrimination in this economic terms, the case can been linked to regard on grounds of nationality is, in the Cowan, as they are both concerned with the case of those availing of the free movement social environment in which economic free of workers or of freedom of establishment, doms have to be exercised. 6 4 or of ancillary rights of residence after exer cising such rights, contrary to Article 6 of the Treaty.
63 — Case 63/86 [1988] ECR 29, paragraphs 16 and 17 of the judgment. 64 — The two decisions were taken 'dans une même perspective de protection de l'environnement sociologique des libertés 65 — See, for example, Joined Cases 389/87 and 390/87 Ecbter- garanties', in the words of J. Mortens de Wilmars, 'L'Arrêt nach and Moritz ν Minister for Education and Saience Cowan' (1990) Cahiers de Droit Européen 388, p. 401. [1989] ECR 723, paragraph 20 of the judgment.
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45. As regards the French rules governing sel in the exercise of economic activities. It is the nationality of crews, I accept the argu- also a restriction on the vessels which can ments of the Commission in respect of the exploit French fishing quotas which is not inadequacy of a ministerial circular as a related to the objectives of the quota legally effective remedy for the breach of regime. 69 Community law identified by the Court in its judgment in Commission v France. 66 This emerges from the judgment of the Court in that case, 67 and is confirmed by the consis- tent case-law cited by the Commission. 68 Costs
46. As regards the Commission's argument 47. Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Pro- that the French crewing rules are contrary to cedure, the unsuccessful party is to be Article 52 of the Treaty, the existence of rules ordered to pay the costs. Since I have con- (even if not enforced in practice) restricting cluded that the Commission is correct in the category of persons who may be respect of all of its allegations that the defen- employed on a vessel registered in France is dant is in breach of its obligations under an obstacle to the establishment of natural or Community law, I recommend that the legal persons with a view to using such a ves- French Republic be ordered to pay the costs.
Conclusion
In accordance with the reasoning set out above, I conclude that:
(1) by maintaining in force laws restricting registration and the right to fly the French flag to ships o w n e d (in the majority) by persons with French nation- ality, or o w n e d b y legal persons with certain specified links with France, and
66 — Case 167/73, cited i n f o o t n o t e 2 above. 69 — See Agegate, cited in f o o t n o t e 43 above. 67 — See paragraphs 41 and 42 of the judgment. 6S — See the cases cited i n f o o t n o t e 51 above.
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restricting crewing, in a specified proportion, to French nationals, the French Republic is in breach of Articles 6, 48, 52, 58 and 221 of the Treaty, of Com mission Regulation (EEC) N o 1251/70 and of Council Directive 75/34/EEC;
(2) by its failure to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court in Commission ν France, the French Republic is in breach of Arti cle 171(1) of the Treaty; 7 0
(3) the French Republic should be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings.
70 — Case 167/73, cited in footnote 2 above.
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