T-308/94

Commission of the European Communities, represented initially by Richard Lyal, of its Legal Service, and Géraud de Bergues, a national officiai on secondment to the Commission, subsequently by Richard Lyal and Guy Charrier, a national official on secondment to the Commission, acting as Agents, with an address for service at the office of Carlos Gómez de la Cruz, of its Legal Service, Wagner Centre, Kirchberg,

defendant,

* Language of the case: French.

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JUDGMENT OF 14. 5. 1998 — CASE T-308/94

APPLICATION for annulment of Commission Decision 94/601/EC of 13 July 1994 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the E C Treaty (IV/C/33.833 — Cartonboard, OJ 1994 L 243, p. 1),

Facts

1 This case concerns Commission Decision 94/601/EC of 13 July 1994 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EC Treaty (IV/C/33.833 — Cartonboard, OJ 1994 L 243, p. 1), as corrected prior to its publication by a Commission

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decision of 26 July 1994 (C(94)2135 final) (hereinafter 'the Decision'). The Decision imposed fines on 19 producers supplying cartonboard in the Community on the ground that they had infringed Article 85(1) of the Treaty.

2 By letter of 22 November 1990, the British Printing Industries Federation ('BPIF'), a trade organisation representing the majority of printed carton producers in the United Kingdom, lodged an informal complaint with the Commission. It claimed that the producers of cartonboard supplying the United Kingdom had introduced a series of simultaneous and uniform price increases and it requested the Commis­ sion to investigate whether there had been an infringement of the Community competition rules. In order to ensure that its initiative received publicity, the BPIF issued a press release. The content of that press release was reported in the specia­ lised trade press in December 1990.

7 The Commission therefore decided to initiate a proceeding under Article 85 of the Treaty. By letter of 21 December 1992 it served a statement of objections on each of the undertakings concerned. All the addressees submitted written replies. Nine undertakings requested an oral hearing. A hearing was held on 7, 8 and 9 June 1993.

8 At the end of that procedure the Commission adopted the Decision, which includes the following provisions:

'Article 1

Buchmann G m b H , Cascades SA, Enso-Gutzeit Oy, Europa Carton AG, Finn- board — the Finnish Board Mills Association, Fiskeby Board AB, Gruber & Weber G m b H & C o KG, Kartonfabriek "de Eendracht N V " (trading as BPB de Eendracht NV), N V Koninklijke K N P BT N V (formerly Koninklijke Neder- landse Papierfabrieken NV), Laakmann Karton G m b H & C o KG, Mo Och Domsjö AB (MoDo), Mayr-Melnhof Gesellschaft mbH, Papeteries de Lancey SA, Rena Kartonfabrik A/S, Sarrio SpA, SCA Holding Ltd (formerly Reed Paper & Board (UK) Ltd), Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB, Enso Española SA (formerly

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— met regularly in a series of secret and institutionalised meetings to discuss and agree a common industry plan to restrict competition,

— agreed regular price increases for each grade of the product in each national currency,

— planned and implemented simultaneous and uniform price increases through- out the Community,

— reached an understanding on maintaining the market shares of the major pro- ducers at constant levels, subject to modification from time to time,

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(ii) Cascades SA, a fine of E C U 16 200 000;

(…)'

According to the Decision, the infringement took place within a body known as the 'Product Group Paperboard' (hereinafter 'the PG Paperboard'), which com- prised several groups or committees.

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10 In mid-1986 a group entitled the 'Presidents Working Group' (hereinafter 'the ΡWG') was established within that body. This group brought together senior rep­ resentatives of the main suppliers of cartonboard in the Community (some eight suppliers).

15 According to the Decision, the Commission also took the view that the activities of the PG Paperboard were supported by an information exchange organised by Fides, a secretarial company, whose registered office is in Zurich, Switzerland. The Decision states that most of the members of the PG Paperboard sent periodic reports on orders, production, sales and capacity utilisation to Fides. Under the Fides system, those reports were collated and the aggregated data were sent to the participants.

16 The applicant, Cascades SA ('Cascades'), was formed in September 1985. Cascades Paperboard International Inc., a company incorporated under Canadian law, holds the majority of its shares.

17 The Canadian group entered the European cartonboard market in May 1985 by taking over Cartonnerie Maurice Franck (which became Cascades La Rochette SA, 'Cascades La Rochette'). In May 1986 Cascades acquired the Blendecques mill (which became Cascades Blendecques SA, 'Cascades Blendecques').

18 The Decision states that the Belgian company Van Duffel N V ('Duffel') and the Swedish company Djupafors AB ('Djupafors'), acquired by the applicant in March 1989, participated, prior to their acquisition, in the cartel referred to in Article 1 of the Decision. Since 1989, those two undertakings have been renamed and have operated as separate subsidiaries in the Cascades group (point 147 of the Decision). However, as regards the period both before and after their acquisition by Cas- cades, the Commission took the view that the Decision should be addressed to the Cascades group, represented by the applicant.

22 Sixteen of the eighteen other undertakings held to be responsible for the infringe­ ment have also brought actions to contest the Decision (Cases T-295/94, T-301/94, T-304/94, T-309/94, T-310/94, T-311/94, T-317/94, T-319/94, T-327/94, T-334/94, T-337/94, T-338/94, T-347/94, T-348/94, T-352/94 and T-354/94).

23 The applicant in Case T-301/94, Laakmann Karton G m b H , withdrew its action by letter lodged at the Registry of this Court on 10 June 1996 and the case was removed from the Register by order of 18 July 1996 (Case T-301/94 Laakmann Karton GmbH v Commission, not published in the ECR).

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24 Four Finnish undertakings, members of the trade association Finnboard, and as such held jointly and severally liable for payment of the fine imposed on Finn- board, have also brought actions against the Decision (Joined Cases T-339/94, T-340/94, T-341/94 and T-342/94).

25 Lastly, an action was also brought by an association, CEPI-Cartonboard, which was not an addressee of the Decision. However, it withdrew its action by letter lodged at the Registry of the Court on 8 January 1997 and the case was removed from the Register of the Court by order of 6 March 1997 (Case T-312/94 CEPI- Cartonboard ν Commission, not published in the ECR).

30 The parties in the cases referred to in paragraph 26 above presented oral argument and gave replies to the Court's questions at the hearing which took place from 25 June to 8 July 1997.

Forms of order sought

31 The applicant claims that the Court should:

— annul the Decision in so far as it concerns it;

— in the alternative, annul or reduce the fine imposed on it by Article 3 of the Decision;

— order the Commission to pay the costs.

The plea grounded upon infringement of the rights of the defence

Arguments of the parties

33 The applicant states that the Decision contains an objection which did not appear in the summary of the statement of objections, namely that there was discussion and agreement on a common industry plan to restrict competition (Article 1, fifth indent, of the Decision). The summary of the statement of objections is, however, an essential element of the file which is intended to inform the addressees of the facts on which it is based. The objection in question is not mentioned in the body of the statement of objections either.

34 The applicant states that the Commission is incorrect in arguing that, since the objection that there was an 'industry plan' covers the various acts called into ques­ tion, is not a wholly separate objection: an 'industry plan' refers to the totality of economic and social measures adopted and formalised in writing, generally by a State, in order to restructure an industry. However, the P G Paperboard never brought together all the producers on the Community market, nor was the export market ever the subject-matter of the P G Paperboard's meetings. Finally, the mere fact that this objection was formally separate from the other objections in Article 1 of the Decision shows that it is a separate objection.

35 Referring to the case-law of the Court of Justice concerning the purpose of the statement of objections (Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche ν Commission [1979] E C R 461, paragraph 11, and Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85 Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others ν Commission [1979] ECR 1-1307, paragraphs 42 and 52), the applicant states that

Findings of the Court

39 Observance of the right to be heard is, in all proceedings in which sanctions, in particular fines or penalty payments, may be imposed, a fundamental principle of

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Community law which must be respected even if the proceedings in question are administrative proceedings (Hoffmann-La Roche ν Commission, cited above, para­ graph 9).

40 Applying that principle, Article 19(1) of Regulation N o 17 and Article 4 of Com­ mission Regulation N o 99/63 of 25 July 1963 on the hearings provided for in Article 19 (1) and (2) of Council Regulation N o 17 (OJ English Special Edition, 1963-1964, p. 47) oblige the Commission to adopt in its final decision only those objections in respect of which the undertakings concerned have been afforded the opportunity of making known their views.

44 That interpretation of the operative part of the Decision is consistent with the statement of reasons, which make it clear that the Commission is referring to the 'plan' in order to describe one element of an 'agreement' within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.

45 Thus, according to point 126, second paragraph, of the Decision:

'[...] an agreement can be said to exist when the parties have reached a consensus even in broad terms as to the lines of their mutual action or abstention from action in the market. While it involves joint decision-making and commitment to a com­ mon scheme, it does not have to be made formally or in writing [...]'.

46 Furthermore, the Decision explains (point 131, first and second paragraphs):

'The Commission considers that from the end of 1987, with the concretization of the progressive collusion of the producers in the so-called "price before tonnage" scheme, the infringement has presented all the characteristics of a full "agreement" in the sense of Article 85.

The working out of the plan via the twice-yearly price initiatives is not to be treated as involving a series of separate agreements or concerted practices but as part of one and the same continuing agreement.'

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51 In particular, under the point headed 'The nature of the infringement in the present case', the Commission states (p. 83):

'The main features of the "price before tonnage" scheme were:

— the control of production so as to ensure market conditions favourable to price increases;

— the periodic implementation of agreed price initiatives involving simultaneous and uniform price increases by all producers in each national market;

53 This plea must therefore be rejected.

The plea of infringement of the obligation of confidentiality

Arguments of the parties

54 The applicant submits that under Article 214 of the Treaty and Article 20(2) of Regulation N o 17 the Commission's officials are not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. However, the reports which appeared in the trade press from 13 July 1994 onwards indicated that the Decision was imminent. The information revealed in those reports, which contained detailed comments not only on the existence of the procedure and stage which it had reached, but also on the content of the Decision, must have emanated from the Commission, in breach of the rules governing confidentiality.

55 The failure to comply with the obligation of confidentiality calls into question the very validity of the Commission's economic assessments. It is not therefore a case of a mere 'external irregularity' but of a defect justifying annulment of the Decision.

56 The Commission disputes that it was the source of the information disclosed to the press and states that other authorities were aware of the content of the draft decisions before they were adopted by the College of Commissioners.

Arguments of the parties

59 The applicant submits that the decision of 26 July 1994 (see paragraph 1 above) was adopted in irregular circumstances and in breach of the principle of collegiality.

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60 In its reply it states that that decision does not state that the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions ('the Advisory Committee') had been consulted before it was adopted. However, pursuant to Article 190 of the Treaty and Articles 10 and 15 of Regulation N o 17, the opinion of the Advisory Committee is required before the adoption of a decision which, like that of 26 July 1994, imposes a fine (Case T-19/91 Vichy ν Commission [1992] E C R II-415).

61 The Decision should therefore be annulled on the ground that it fails to comply with procedural rules (Joined Cases T-79/89, T-84/89, T-85/89, T-86/89, T-89/89, T-91/89, T-92/89, T-94/89, T-96/89, T-98/99, T-102/89 and T-104/89 BASF and Others ν Commission [1992] E C R 11-315, and Case C-137/92 Ρ Commission ν BASF and Others [1994] E C R 1-2555).

65 The applicant's argument that, contrary to the provisions of Article 10(3) of Regu­ lation N o 17, the Advisory Committee was not consulted before the adoption of that decision was introduced for the first time in its reply. It cannot be regarded as an extension of the argument in its application, grounded on infringement of the principle of collegiality. It is, in reality, an independent plea alleging that a proce­ dural defect vitiated the lawfulness of the procedure for the adoption of the Decision.

66 Under Article 48(2), first paragraph, of the Rules of Procedure, no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure.

67 Since the plea alleging lack of consultation of the Advisory Committee is not based on matters of fact or of law which have come to light in the course of the pro­ cedure, it must be declared inadmissible.

68 As to the plea of infringement of the principle of collegiality, the Court finds that the applicant has not pleaded any evidence or specific fact such as to displace the presumption of validity which applies to Community acts (see, in particular, Dun- lop Slazenger ν Commission, cited above, paragraph 24). It is not therefore neces­ sary to investigate whether the alleged infringement existed (see, by analogy, Case T-34/92 Fiatagri and New Holland Ford ν Commission [1994] E C R II-905, para­ graph 27).

69 Consequently, the plea must be rejected as unfounded.

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73 The fact that the Commission's defence reproduced the wording of the press release confirms that the Decision was founded on considerations which had not been set out in it.

74 The Commission disputes that the Decision was definitively adopted on 26 July 1994. The decision of 26 July 1994 was adopted only in order to correct small errors in the previous decision. In those circumstances, any discrepancies between the press release and the Decision do not affect the Decision's validity (Hihi ν Commission, cited above, paragraph 136).

75 Furthermore, there is no substantive discrepancy between the documents in ques­ tion. The Commission quotes parts of the two documents which, according to it, show that conduct prior to mid-1986 was not called into question by the press release or the Decision.

Findings of the Court

'According to Stora (second statement, p. 2) the Cartonboard producers had "attempted to bring order to the ... market since 1975. Members of the PG Paper- board or its predecessor (prior to 1981) have met to discuss pricing and market shares during that period"'.

80 Moreover, the first paragraph of point 161 of the Decision, explains:

'Although it is apparent from Stora's statements that collusive arrangements had been in existence since at least 1975, and that the P G Paperboard was in all likeli- hood set up as a vehicle for unlawful cooperation, the Commission will in the present case limit its assessment under Article 85 and the application of any fines to the period from June 1986 onward.'

81 The applicant does not dispute that the grounds of the Decision adequately justify in law the finding that the infringement referred to in Article 1 began in mid-1986.

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84 Article 85 of the Treaty applies only where the undertakings concerned have real autonomy in determining their conduct on the market (see, to that effect, the case- law relating to the application of Article 85 of the Treaty to undertakings in the same group (Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebüro [1989] ECR 803, Case 30/87 Bodson [1988] ECR 2479, and Case T-102/92 Viho Europe ν Commission [1995] E C R II-17)). Article 85 does not therefore apply to agreements or concerted practices between two undertakings where an undertaking is forced by another undertaking to participate and has no real possibility of freeing itself from the influence and control of that other undertaking. That contention is implicitly supported by the judgment in Joined Cases 32/78, 36/78 to 82/78 BMW Belgium and Others ν Commission [1979] E C R 2435. The applicant's contention has been upheld by the Cour d'Appel de Paris in a judgment of 9 November 1989, in which national competition rules were applied.

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85 Article 85 of the Treaty should not therefore apply to an undertaking which has acted under compulsion, where that conduct is the only course of action which can remove threats of danger to the undertaking; the threats are direct; and the danger is imminent and cannot be warded off by any other lawful means. Those require- ments are in essence the same as those for the plea of self-defence.

86 In the second part of the plea, the applicant asserts that it was compelled to par- ticipate in meetings of the bodies of the PG Paperboard by other members of that association.

90 In support of its claims, the applicant refers to statements by Mr Lemaire and Mr Bannermann, two persons who had experienced the above events as representatives of the applicant, and asks the Court to hear their oral testimony.

91 It states that the assertions in those statements are corroborated by other evidence.

92 First, according to Stora's statement (Appendix 39 to the statement of objections), the applicant's attempts to increase its market shares and the reactions of the other producers gave rise to a considerable, unstoppable fall in prices. That statement confirms the existence of a 'price war' caused by the applicant's entry on to the European market, as described by Mr Bannermann.

93 Second, the applicant's participation in the P W G meetings was an 'anachronism', because it was a new entrant on the European market, and the most important French producer (Papeteries Béghin-Corbehem, currently belonging to the Stora Group) was already participating in those meetings. The applicant's participation is, in fact, explained by the other participants' desire to monitor it and to prevent it from acting independently.

94 Third, its conduct prior to joining the PWG indirectly confirms that it never delib- erately participated in the collusion. It never played an active role in the PWG and the PG Paperboard, the PWG decisions, in particular on price increases, were

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98 As regards the second condition, namely that the undertaking could legitimately have believed that the only means of safeguarding its existence was to fall into line, the applicant considers that it fulfils that condition, even though it could have resorted to the Commission or to a national court in order to request an order that the compulsion cease.

99 In the alternative, it submits that it could not have adequately and effectively warded off that compulsion by lodging a complaint with the Commission or bringing proceedings before the national court.

100 As regards the first part of the plea, the Commission submits that the answer to the question whether an undertaking which has acted under compulsion may escape the application of Article 85 must be based on the Community case-law relating to the defence of necessity (see, for example, Joined Cases 303/81 and 312/81 Klöckner-Werke ν Commission [1981] E C R 1507, and Case 188/82 Thyssen ν Commission [1983] E C R 3721) and of self-defence (Case 16/61 Acciaierie Fer­ riere et Fonderie di Modena ν High Authority [1962] E C R 289, 303 and, to the same effect, Case T-9/89 Hüls ν Commission [1992] E C R II-499, paragraphs 365 and 366, and Case T-10/89 Hoechst ν Commission [1992] E C R II-629, paragraphs 358 and 359). The case-law relating to the application of Article 85 of the Treaty to undertakings in the same group, on which the applicant relies, is therefore irrel­ evant.

101 An undertaking can escape the application of Article 85 on the ground that it was compelled to act, only if its conduct was essential to ward off threats of danger to it, the threats were direct, the danger imminent, and there was no other lawful means of averting it.

105 The applicant cannot claim that its allegedly purely passive role in the P W G is evi­ dence that it was compelled to participate in the meetings: it has not adduced any evidence to show that it never proposed a price increase. In any event, it took an active part in the implementation of the price initiatives on the French market.

106 As regards the alleged evidence of compulsion, the Commission observes that even if it were proved that the applicant's pricing policy was independent of the agree­ ment reached in the P G Paperboard, that does not mean that the applicant did not fully participate in the cartel (Case T-141/89 Tréfileurope ν Commission [1995] E C R II-791, paragraph 60).

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107 As regards the third part of the plea, the Commission submits that even if compul­ sion may have been exercised by the other producers, the applicant had various lawful means by which it could have escaped that compulsion: the lodging of a complaint with the Commission under Article 3 of Regulation N o 17 or the bring­ ing of an action before a national court. In those circumstances, the applicant can­ not escape the application of Article 85 of the Treaty by arguing that it acted only under compulsion (see Hoechst ν Commission, cited above, paragraph 358 and Tréfileurope ν Commission, cited above, paragraphs 58, 71 and 178).

Findings of the Court

'[..] the other producers informed us that if Cascades continued the aggressive policy which it had been pursuing until then, its attitude would provoke a serious war on the European market. They stated that Cascades could never win that war and would be excluded from the market. They suggested that it would be better for Cascades to cooperate with them.'

112 Mr Bannermann states that, until the applicant joined the PG Paperboard in mid-1986, the applicant's competitors colluded in conducting a price war directed exclusively against it. H e states in particular (point 10 of the statement) that at the end of a meeting in February or March 1986 between the representatives of Cas- cades and the managers of three of its main competitors (KNP, Finnboard and Feldmühle or Mayr-Melnhof), the President of Finnboard stated, in regard to the applicant's commercial policy: 'If you continue like that, we will bury you.' H e states: 'Even if the two other persons present did not speak, it was clear to us that they formed a block and that the statement by Mr Köhler (of Finnboard) reflected the three participants' common position.'

1 1 3Mr Bannermann states in regard to the alleged practice of undercutting the appli- cant's prices (point 12 of the statement):

'My impression at that time was that a real "price war" was being conducted against Cascades and that the other producers took turns in order to share the financial sacrifices which that "war" involved.'

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That is why Cascades La Rochette was excluded from meetings of the P G Paper- board between 1986 and 1987 [...].

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That exclusion was accompanied by an attempt by the existing producers to exclude it from the market.'

1 1 8It is therefore clear from that document that the other producers sought to keep the applicant away from the bodies of the PG Paperboard, not to force it to par- ticipate in those bodies so as to monitor, or indeed control, its conduct on the market. However, the applicant's actual exclusion from meetings of the PG Paper- board in 1986 and 1987 is not confirmed by the statements of Mr Lemaire and Mr Bannermann.

119 Consequently, the detailed explanation of the applicant's reasons for participating in the bodies of PG Paperboard, furnished for the first time in the proceedings before the Court, are not consistent with those furnished in the administrative procedure before the Commission, which, in the circumstances of this case, can only weaken the probative value of the statements produced by the applicant.

123 In those circumstances, its assertion that it played a passive role in the P G Paper- board and operated an independent pricing policy are irrelevant. O n the contrary, having regard to its regular participation in the meetings of the P W G and of the J M C (see tables 2 and 4 annexed to the Decision), whose anti-competitive object it does not dispute, there are no grounds for finding that it was only a reluctant par­ ticipant in the infringement and acted under compulsion.

124 Stora's statement (Appendix 39 to the statement of objections), to which the appli­ cant refers, confirms that the alleged 'price war' was triggered off by the applicant after its arrival on the European market.

125 Stora states (point 2 of the appendix):

'Cascades entered the European market in 1985 with the acquisition of La Roch­ ette Mills and attempted to gain market share in Europe. The consequent reaction of the other producers resulted in significant drops in prices during this period. Attempts to stop the fall in prices were unsuccessful; prices fell again in 1987 (by 10%).'

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130 According to point 145, first and second paragraphs, of the Decision, responsibil­ ity for such conduct had to be attributed:

— to the transferred company, where, but for the acquisition, the Decision would have been addressed to it and the transferred company enjoys functional and economic continuity;

— to the vendor company, where, but for the acquisition, the Decision would have been addressed to the parent company of the vendor group.

1 3 1The third paragraph of point 145, which states that '... if the transferred subsidiary continued as a member of the cartel, it will depend upon the individual circum­ stances whether proceedings in respect of such participation should be addressed to that subsidiary in its own name or to the new parent group', is referring solely to conduct after the acquisition.

136 Article 1 of the Decision should therefore be annulled in part inasmuch as the par- ticipation by Duffel and Djupafors in the infringement is attributed to the appli- cant for the period preceding its acquisition of them.

137 The Commission submits that it correctly applied the principles which it laid down in the Decision, because it applied the principle in point 143 of the Decision, under which the Decision was addressed to the parent company of a group where, inter alia, more than one company in the group participated in the infringement. As point 145 refers expressly to the principles set out in points 143 and 144, it can- not be interpreted in a manner contrary to those principles.

138 The Decision contained a proper statement of reasons regarding the attribution to the applicant of its two subsidiaries' conduct prior to their acquisition. The last sentence of point 147 of the Decision refers expressly to point 143, which concerns situations in which more than one company in a group participated in the infringe- ment.

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Findings of the Court

1 4 0 It is settled law that the statement of the reasons on which a decision having an adverse effect on an individual is based must enable effective review of its legal validity to be carried out and must provide the person concerned with information sufficient to allow him to ascertain whether or not the decision is well founded. The adequacy of such a statement of reasons must be assessed according to the circumstances of the case, and in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons relied on and the interest which addressees may have in receiving explanations. In order to fulfil those purposes, an adequate statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the Community authority which adopted the measure in question. Where, as in the present case, a decision taken in application of Article 85 or Article 86 of the Treaty relates to several addressees and poses a problem of attribution of liability for the infringement, it must include an adequate statement of reasons with respect to each of the addressees, in particular those of them who, according to the decision, must bear the liability for that infringement (see, in particular, AWS Benelux v Commission, cited above, paragraph 26).

1 4 1 In the present case, points 140 to 146 of the Decision contain a sufficiently clear statement of the general criteria on which the Commission relied in order to deter­ mine the undertakings to which the Decision was addressed.

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144 Where companies had been acquired, the Commission determined the addressees of the Decision on the basis of the principles set out in point 145 of the Decision:

'The application of the principles set out above has the consequence that in cases where, but for the acquisition, proceedings would normally have been addressed to the subsidiary in its own right, responsibility for its conduct prior to the transfer passes with it. [...]

O n the other hand, where a parent company or group which itself is properly con­ sidered a party to the infringement transfers a subsidiary to another undertaking, responsibility for the period up to the date of divestment does not pass to the acquirer but will remain with the first group.

In either case, if the transferred subsidiary continued as a member of the cartel, it will depend upon the individual circumstances whether proceedings in respect of such participation should be addressed to that subsidiary in its own name or to the new parent group.'

149 That interpretation is supported by point 147 of the Decision, which deals with the applicant's own situation. It is stated that 'it is appropriate to address this Decision to the Cascades Group represented by Cascades SA in respect of the par- ticipation in the infringement of all of Cascades cartonboard operations (see recital 143)'.

150 That interpretation is consistent with the wording of the statement of objections.

151 In that document the Commission explained (p. 91 and 92) that the proceedings were addressed in principle to the entity named in the membership lists of the P G Paperboard, but that they were nevertheless addressed to the group (represented by the parent company) in particular where more than one company in a group had participated in the infringement.

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152 As to the situation where companies had been transferred, the statement of objec­ tions states as follows (p. 92):

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156 Since point 145 of the Decision must be interpreted in the light of the general scheme of the Decision and in the light of the statement of objections, which is worded sufficiently clearly (see, to the same effect, Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73, 55/73, 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others ν Commission [1975] E C R 1663, paragraph 230), the Court finds, first, that the Commission, in addressing the Decision to the applicant in respect of the conduct of Djupafors and Duffel throughout the period of their participation in the infringement found, did not misapply the principles which it had set for itself in the Decision nor infringe the obligation to state reasons as laid down by Article 190 of the Treaty. Furthermore, in view of the terms of the applicant's reply to the statement of objections, the Commission was not required to give a more detailed explanation in the Decision of the reasons for which the applicant had to be con­ sidered responsible for the unlawful conduct of Djupafors and Duffel prior to their acquisition.

157 Finally, as regards the correctness of the attribution to the applicant of the unlaw­ ful conduct of Djupafors and Duffel prior to their acquisition, it suffices to point out that there is no dispute that at the time when those two companies were acquired they were participating in an infringement in which the applicant was also participating by virtue of the involvement of Cascades La Rochette and Cascades Blendecques.

158 In those circumstances, the Commission was entitled to attribute to the applicant the conduct of Djupafors and of Duffel in respect of the period before and the period after their acquisition by the applicant. It was for the applicant, as parent company, to adopt in regard to its subsidiaries any measure necessary to prevent the continuation of the infringement of which it was aware.

160 The applicant submits that, having regard to the lack of seriousness of the infringe­ ment, the general level of fines is excessive.

161 First, it refers to the considerations taken into account by the Commission in point 168 of the Decision in order to determine the general level of the fine and to the Commission's previous practice in its decisions. The object and nature of the infringement found in this case is similar to the infringements which were the sub­ ject of Commission Decisions 86/398/EEC of 23 April 1986 relating to a proceed­ ing under Article 85 of the E E C Treaty (IV/31.149 — Polypropylene) (OJ 1986 L 230, p. 1, 'the Polypropylene decision') and 89/190/EEC of 21 December 1988 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the E E C Treaty (IV/31.865 — PVC) (OJ 1989 L 74, p. 1, 'the PVC decision'). In general, the respective fines adopted in those two cases were approximately 4%, and under 1%, of the value of the mar­ ket, whereas in the present case the total amount of the fines is 5.3% of the value of the market. Although the Commission is entitled to raise the general level of the fines, its previous practice nevertheless provides an indication of the normal level of fines.

162 Second, in order to assess the gravity of the infringement and thus to set the gen­ eral level of the fines, the Commission must take the actual effects of the infringe­ ment on the market into consideration (Joined Cases 100/80, 101/80, 102/80 and 103/80 Musique Diffusion Française and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 1825,

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167 Where it has been proved that collusion has had an anti-competitive object, It is not required to take the actual effects of the infringement into consideration in order to assess its gravity and to fix the amount of the fines (Case T-12/89 Solvay ν Commission [1992] E C R II-907, paragraph 310, Case T-13/89 ICI ν Commission [1992] E C R II-1021, paragraph 386, and Case T-142/89 Boel ν Commission [1995] E C R 11-867, paragraph 122).

168 Furthermore, as stated in point 115 of the Decision, the net price increases closely tracked the announced price increases, albeit with some time lag. That was even expressly acknowledged, as regards 1988 and 1989, by the author of the LE Report on which the applicant relies. The Commission is entitled to take account of such effects of a cartel with an anti-competitive object (see, for example, Case T-6/89 Enichem Anie ν Commission [1991] E C R II-1623, paragraphs 276 to 284, and Case T-11/89 Shell ν Commission [1992] E C R II-757, paragraphs 359 to 364). Moreover, it has never alleged that announced price increases always went up by the full amount of the proposed increase and at the same time for all customers (point 115 of the Decision).

169 The reasons why the collusion in question must have had an appreciable effect on market conditions were duly set out in points 135 to 138 of the Decision. There is no reason to doubt the cartel members' assessment that the cartel had been suc­ cessful (point 137).

170 As regards collusion on market shares, the Commission points out that the appli­ cant acquired its market share only through the acquisition of existing production units and that the market share obtained corresponds to that of the units acquired. In those circumstances, the applicant cannot allege that the acquisition of that share of the market proves that the collusion on market shares had no actual effect.

173 In order to review the Commission's appraisal of the effects of the infringement, the Court considers that it suffices to consider the appraisal of the effects of the collusion on prices. First, it is apparent from the Decision that the finding con- cerning the large measure of success in achieving objectives is essentially based on the effects of collusion on prices. While those effects are considered in points 100 to 102, 115, and 135 to 137 of the Decision, the question whether the collusion on market shares and collusion on downtime affected the market was, by contrast, not specifically examined in it.

174 Second, consideration of the effects of the collusion on prices also makes it pos- sible, in any event, to assess whether the objective of the collusion on downtime was achieved, as the aim of that collusion was to prevent the concerted price initia- tives from being undermined by an excess of supply.

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175 Third, as regards collusion on market shares, the Commission does not submit that the objective of the undertakings which participated in the meetings of the P W G was an absolute freezing of their market shares. According to the second para­ graph of point 60 of the Decision, the agreement on market shares was not static 'but was subject to periodic adjustment and re-negotiation'. In view of that point, the fact that the Commission took the view that the cartel was largely successful in achieving its objectives without specifically examining in the Decision the success of that collusion on market shares is not therefore open to objection.

that during the period covered by the Decision there was 'a close linear relation- ship' between changes in announced prices and those in transaction prices expressed in national currencies or converted to ecus. It concludes from this that: 'the net price increases achieved closely tracked the price announcements albeit with some time lag. The author of the report himself acknowledged during the oral hearing that this was the case for 1988 and 1989' (point 115, second paragraph, of the Decision).

179 When appraising this second type of effect the Commission could properly take the view that the existence of a linear relationship between changes in announced prices and changes in transaction prices was proof of an effect by the price initia- tives on transaction prices in accordance with the objective pursued by the produc- ers. There is, in fact, no dispute that on the relevant market the practice of holding individual negotiations with customers means that, in general, transaction prices are not identical to announced prices. It cannot therefore be expected that increases in transaction prices will be identical to announced price increases.

180 As regards the very existence of a relationship between announced price increases and transaction price increases, the Commission was right in referring to the LE report, which consists of an analysis of changes in the price of cartonboard during the period to which the Decision relates, based on information supplied by several producers.

181 However, that report only partially confirms, in temporal terms, the existence of a 'close linear relationship'. Examination of the period 1987 to 1991 reveals three distinct sub-periods. At the oral hearing before the Commission the author of the LE report summarised his conclusion as follows: 'There is no close relationship, even with a lag, between announced price increase and market prices in the early part of the period, in 1987 through 1988. There is such a relationship in 1988/1989, and then the relationship breaks down and behaves rather oddly over the period 1990/1991' (transcript of the oral hearing, p. 28). H e also observed that those

183 At the hearing the Commission stated that it had also taken into account a third type of effect of the price collusion, namely the fact that the level of transaction prices was higher than that which would have been achieved in the absence of any collusion. Pointing out that the dates and order of the price increase announce­ ments had been planned by the PWG, the Commission takes the view in the Decision that 'it is inconceivable in such circumstances that the concerted price announcements had no effect upon actual price levels' (point 136, third paragraph, of the Decision). However, the LE report (section 3) drew up a model which enabled a forecast to be made of the price level resulting from objective market conditions. According to that report, the level of prices determined by objective economic factors in the period 1975 to 1991 would have evolved, with minor variations, in an identical manner to the level of transaction prices applied, includ­ ing those during the period covered by the Decision.

184 Despite those conclusions, the analysis in the report does not justify a finding that the concerted price initiatives did not enable the producers to achieve a level of transaction prices above that which would have resulted from the free play of competition. As the Commission pointed out at the hearing, it is possible that the factors taken into account in that analysis were influenced by the existence of collusion. So, the Commission rightly argued that the collusive conduct might, for example, have limited the incentive for undertakings to reduce their costs. H o w ­ ever, the Commission has not argued that there is a direct error in the analysis in the LE report nor submitted its own economic analysis of the hypothetical

— The general level of the fines

188 Under Article 15(2) of Regulation N o 17, the Commission may by decision impose on undertakings fines ranging from E C U 1 000 to 1 000 000, or a sum in

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excess thereof but not exceeding 10% of the turnover in the preceding business year of each of the undertakings participating in the infringement where, either intentionally or negligently, they infringe Article 85(1) of the Treaty. In fixing the amount of the fine, regard is to be had to both the gravity and the duration of the infringement. As is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice, the gravity of infringements falls to be determined by reference to numerous factors including, in particular, the specific circumstances and context of the case, and the deterrent character of the fines; moreover, no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria which must be applied has been drawn up (order in Case C-137/95 Ρ SPO and Others ν Commission [1996] E C R 1-1611, paragraph 54).

189 In the present case, the Commission determined the general level of fines by taking into account the duration of the infringement (point 167 of the Decision) and the following considerations (point 168):

— the cartel was operated in the form of a system of regular institutionalised meetings which set out to regulate in explicit detail the market for cartonboard in the Community,

— elaborate steps were taken to conceal the true nature and extent of the collusion (absence of any official minutes or documentation for the P W G and JMC; dis- couraging the taking of notes; stage-managing the timing and order in which price increases were announced so as to be able to claim they were "following", etc.),

— the cartel was largely successful in achieving its objectives.'

190 Furthermore, according to the Commission's reply to a written question from the Court, fines of a basic level of 9 or 7.5% of the turnover on the Community cartonboard market in 1990 of each undertaking addressed by the Decision were imposed on the undertakings regarded as the 'ringleaders' of the cartel and on the other undertakings respectively.

191 It should be pointed out, first, that when assessing the general level of fines the Commission is entitled to take account of the fact that clear infringements of the Community competition rules are still relatively frequent and that, accordingly, it may raise the level of fines in order to strengthen their deterrent effect. Conse- quently, the fact that in the past the Commission applied fines of a certain level to certain types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising that level, within the limits set out in Regulation N o 17, if that is necessary in order to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy (see, inter alia, Musique Diffusion Française and Others ν Commission, cited above, paragraphs 105 to 108, and ICI ν Commission, cited above, paragraph 385).

194 O n the basis of those factors, the criteria set out in point 168 of the Decision jus­ tify the general level of fines set by the Commission. Admittedly, the Court has already held that the effects of the collusion on prices, which the Commission took into account when determining the general level of fines, are proved only in part. However, in the light of the foregoing considerations, that conclusion cannot materially affect the assessment of the gravity of the infringement found. The fact that the undertakings actually announced the agreed price increases and that the prices so announced served as a basis for fixing individual transaction prices suf­ fices in itself for a finding that the collusion on prices had both as its object and effect a serious restriction of competition. Accordingly, in the exercise of its unlim­ ited jurisdiction, the Court considers that the findings relating to the effects of the infringement do not justify any reduction in the general level of fines set by the Commission.

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195 In view of the foregoing, the pleas alleging that the infringement had only limited effects and that the general level of the fines is excessive must be rejected.

The plea that the statement of reasons for the increase in the general level of the fines is inadequate

196 The applicant contends that the Decision involves an increase of approximately 25% in the general level of the fines, when compared with previous similar deci­ sions, that is to say, the Polypropylene and PVC Decisions, and that although it is true that the Commission is entitled to increase the general level of the fines, the Decision must then set out the reasons justifying such an increase.

199 The applicant states that according to point 170 of the Decision, the undertakings considered to be the 'ringleaders' had to bear a special responsibility, as 'they clearly constituted the main decision-makers and were the prime movers of the cartel'.

200 First, that statement of reasons is insufficient to justify the fine imposed. The 'prime movers of the cartel' were the undertakings which took the initiative for it, laid down its policy, and ensured that the other producers complied with it. Mere participation in the P W G meetings does not suffice for the attribution to it of such a role. Weig was not regarded as one of the 'ringleaders', even though it partici­ pated in PWG meetings from 1988 onwards. In its reply to the statement of objec­ tions the applicant contested its classification amongst the 'ringleaders'. However, despite the arguments and evidence submitted, the Decision did not explain the Commission's grounds for that allegation.

201 The Commission's argument that there is only a slight difference between the fines (expressed as a percentage of turnover) imposed on the applicant and on Weig should be rejected. Moreover, the applicant is unable to reply to that argument, because the Decision does not give any precise information of the percentage of turnover taken in order to fix each undertaking's fine.

202 The applicant asserts, second, that in any event there are no grounds for attributing to it the role of 'ringleader'. It had always adopted a passive role in regard to the

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— The statement of reasons regarding the fixing of the individual fines

207 At the hearing the applicant adopted, in particular, the arguments submitted on one of the subjects dealt with in the course of common oral argument, namely those dealing with the statement of reasons in regard to the determination of indi­ vidual fines. In its written pleadings to the Court it submitted that the Decision contained an insufficiënt statement of reasons for the classification of the applicant as a 'ringleader' of the cartel. It has, however, stated that it was impossible to reply to some of the Commission's arguments, because the Decision does not contain any information regarding the percentages of turnover adopted in order to set the amount of the individual fines. The applicant's arguments submitted at the hearing before the Court are therefore merely an extension of the arguments already con- tained in its pleadings and not a new plea in law within the meaning of Article 48(2) of the Rules of Procedure.

208 It is settled law that the purpose of the obligation to give reasons for an individual decision is to enable the Community judicature to review the legality of the decision and to provide the party concerned with an adequate indication as to whether the decision is well founded or whether it may be vitiated by some defect enabling its validity to be challenged; the scope of that obligation depends on the nature of the act in question and on the context in which it was adopted (see, inter alia, Case T-49/95 Van Megen Sports ν Commission [1996] E C R II-1799, para­ graph 51).

211 In the Decision, the criteria taken into account in order to determine the general level of fines and the amount of individual fines are set out in points 168 and 169 respectively. Moreover, as regards the individual fines, the Commission explains in point 170 that the undertakings which participated in the meetings of the P W G were, in principle, regarded as 'ringleaders' of the cartel, whereas the other under­ takings were regarded as Ordinary members'. Lastly, in points 171 and 172, it states that the amounts of fines imposed on Rena and Stora must be considerably reduced in order to take account of their active cooperation with the Commission, and that eight other undertakings were also to benefit from a reduction, to a lesser extent, owing to the fact that in their replies to the statement of objections they did not contest the essential factual allegations on which the Commission based its objections.

212 In its written pleas to the Court and in its reply to a written question put by the Court, the Commission explained that the fines were calculated on the basis of the turnover on the Community cartonboard market in 1990 of each undertaking addressed by the Decision. Fines of a basic level of 9 or 7.5% of that individual turnover were then imposed, respectively, on the undertakings considered to be the cartel 'ringleaders' and on the other undertakings. Finally, the Commission took into account any cooperation by undertakings during the procedure before it. Two undertakings received a reduction of two-thirds of the amount of their fines on that basis, while other undertakings received a reduction of one-third.

216 The Court points out in that context that, according to point 170, first paragraph, of the Decision, 'the "ringleaders", namely the major producers of cartonboard which took part in the P W G (Cascades, Finnboard, [Mayr-Melnhof], MoDo, Sarrio and Stora), must bear a special responsibility. They clearly constituted the main decision-makers and were the prime movers of the cartel.

217 Furthermore, the Decision amply describes the central role of the P W G in the car­ tel (in particular, points 36 to 38 and 130 to 132 of the Decision.

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218 The Decision therefore clearly contains an adequate statement of the reasons for the Commission's view that the applicant was a 'ringleader'. Moreover, the Com­ mission states that it had taken into account the fact that Weig did not appear to have played as important a role in the cartel as the other producers (point 170, third paragraph, of the Decision), which adequately states the reason why the applicant and Weig were not treated identically when their fines were fixed.

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221 Despite those findings, the reasons explaining the setting of the amount of fines stated in points 167 to 172 of the Decision are at least as detailed as those provided in the Commission's previous decisions on similar infringements. Although a plea alleging insufficient reasons concerns a matter of public interest, there had been no criticism by the Community judicature, at the moment when the decision was adopted, as regards the Commission's practice concerning the statement of reasons for fines imposed. It was only in the judgment of 6 April 1995 in Case T-148/89 Tréfilunion ν Commission [1995] E C R II-1063, paragraph 142, and in two other judgments given on the same day (T-147/89 Société Métallurgique de Normandie ν Commission [1995] E C R 11-1057, summary publication, and T-151/89 Société des Treillis et Panneaux Soudés ν Commission [1995] E C R II-1191, summary publica­ tion), that this Court stressed for the first time that it is desirable for undertakings to be able to ascertain in detail the method used for calculating the fine imposed without having to bring court proceedings against the Commission's decision in order to do so.

222 It follows that, when it finds in a decision that there has been an infringement of the competition rules and imposes fines on the undertakings participating in it, the Commission must, if it systematically took into account certain basic factors in order to fix the amount of fines, set out those factors in the body of the decision in order to enable the addressees of the decision to verify that the level of the fine is correct and to assess whether there has been any discrimination.

226 Consequently, the Court must find that the applicant was correctly classified as a 'ringleader' for the purpose of calculating the fine, and there is no need to rule on the correctness of the Commission's assertion that the applicant informed Papeter- ies de Lancey of the PWG's decisions (see point 38, fifth paragraph, of the Decision).

227 The applicant has not proved that its role in the PWG was less significant than those of the other undertakings considered to be the 'ringleaders' of the cartel (see also points 122 and 123 above).

228 N o r has the applicant adduced any evidence to show that it always played a pas- sive role in the PWG. In those circumstances, the Commission, when determining the amount of the fine, was entitled to treat it differently from Weig, because Weig had sent to the Commission a statement of 22 March 1993 (sent to the applicant, for comment, with the Commission's letter of 1 June 1993) by Mr Roos (Feld- mühle's representative at the PWG meetings) which confirmed that Weig had played a less important role in the PWG than that of the other participants in its meetings.

229 In adopting a basic rate of 9% of the applicant's turnover on the Community cartonboard market in 1990 the Commission did not therefore treat the applicant

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JUDGMENT OF 14. 5. 1998 — CASE T-308/94

234 The Commission expressly accepts that some customers obtained favourable terms or rebates on announced prices (see, in particular, the last paragraph of point 101 of the Decision). The statements of some customers, to which the applicant refers and which state that the applicant always endeavoured to offer the most competi- tive pricing terms, do not therefore prove that its conduct differed from that agreed with the other undertakings.

235 Furthermore, the applicant has expressly admitted in its pleadings that during the period to which the Decision relates it increased its market share only by virtue of its acquisition of production units. There is therefore no basis for the view that its transaction prices were appreciably lower than those of the other producers par- ticipating in the collusion on prices.

236 Having regard to the foregoing, the plea that the applicant was wrongly classified as a 'ringleader' of the cartel must also be rejected.

The plea alleging the existence of mitigating circumstances

Arguments of the parties

241 If a fine is reduced on account of a failure to contest the Commission's factual allegations, that may lead to incorrect decisions because, simply in order to obtain a substantial reduction in any fine, the undertakings would be induced to refrain from contesting those allegations, even though they had evidence showing them to be incorrect. Examination of the facts would thereby shift from the procedure before the Commission to the proceedings before the Community judicature, which would clearly be inconsistent with the division of tasks laid down in the Treaty.

242 There is a risk that the Commission's approach would lead to discrimination, given the difficulties associated with determining which undertakings have not contested the Commission's allegations of fact. The applicant states that it is not clear why the Commission treated Sarrio as an undertaking which had not con­ tested the factual allegations and that the transcript of the hearing before the Com­ mission clearly demonstrates the inherent difficulties in applying such a test.

243 There are no such difficulties where the test applied is that of an undertaking's contribution to the investigation of the case through the submission of substantive, tangible evidence. The applicant demonstrated such cooperation during the inves­ tigation, as it supplied the Commission with all the documents in its possession and furnished it with important information, such as information on the number of the P W G meetings in which it had participated. The Commission should there­ fore have taken account of its cooperation when it fixed the amount of its fine.

248 As regards the third mitigating circumstance, it states that the applicant has no legal interest in claiming that the Commission, when calculating the fines, was not entitled to take into account the cooperative attitude of undertakings which had not contested the Commission's factual allegations.

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249 The Commission must take an undertaking's cooperation into account where it materially facilitated the establishment of the infringement (ICI ν Commission, cited above, paragraph 393). Just like the supply of evidence, a failure to contest the facts facilitates the establishment of the infringement by the Commission.

250 N o n e of the serious consequences to which the applicant refers are result of the fact that the Commission took into consideration the choice by some undertakings not to contest the facts. As the Decision shows, the Commission did not rely solely on the admissions of the undertakings to which its investigation related. Nothing in the transcript of the hearing before the Commission confirms the applicant's concern that there is a risk of discrimination.

251 In any event, the applicant did not actively cooperate during the pre-litigation pro­ cedure. Referring to the grounds of the Decision (points 40 to 102), the Commis­ sion also disputes that the documents furnished by the applicant were particularly useful.

254 As to the third consideration, the applicant's alleged cooperation with the Com­ mission, the Court points out that in its reply to the statement of objections the applicant did not admit that any of the factual allegations raised against it were correct.

255 The Commission correctly considered that the applicant, by replying in that way, did not conduct itself in a manner which justified a reduction in the fine on grounds of cooperation during the administrative procedure. A reduction on that ground is justified only if the conduct enabled the Commission to establish an infringement more easily and, where relevant, to bring it to an end (see ICI ν Commission, cited above, paragraph 393).

256 An undertaking which expressly states that it is not contesting the factual allega­ tions on which the Commission bases its objections may be regarded as having furthered the Commission's task of finding infringements of the Community com­ petition rules and bringing them to an end. In its decisions finding infringements of those rules, the Commission is entitled to take the view that such conduct con­ stitutes an acknowledgement of the factual allegations and thus proves that those allegations are correct. Such conduct may therefore justify a reduction in the fine.

257 The situation is different where the essential allegations made by the Commission in its statement of objections are contested by an undertaking in its reply to that statement, or where the undertaking does not reply or merely states that it is not expressing any view on the Commission's factual allegations. By adopting such an attitude during the administrative procedure the undertaking does not further the Commission's task of finding infringements of the Community competition rules and bringing them to an end.

261 The applicant cannot validly claim that the reductions in the fines of Stora and Rena prove that cooperation in the form of replies to requests for information must be taken into consideration.

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262 Stora supplied the Commission with statements containing a highly detailed description of the nature and object of the infringement, the operation of the vari- ous bodies of the PG Paperboard, and the participation of the various producers in the infringement. Through those statements, Stora supplied information well in excess of that which the Commission may require under Article 11 of Regulation N o 17.

263 As regards Rena, the applicant has not disputed the statement in point 171, second paragraph, of the Decision that it had 'provided important documentary evidence to the Commission on a voluntary basis'.

264 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the Commission was not required to reduce, for cooperation during the administrative procedure, the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant.

268 Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party's pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful in its submissions, it must be ordered to pay the costs, as sought by the Commission.

O n those grounds,

T H E C O U R T O F FIRST INSTANCE (Third Chamber, Extended Composition)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the application;

2. Orders the applicant to pay the costs, including those relating to the appli­ cation for interim relief.

JUDGMENT OF 14. 5. 1998 — CASE T-308/94

Summary

Facts II-932

Procedure II-939

Forms of order sought II - 941

The application for annulment of the Decision II - 942

The plea of infringement of the principle of collegiality II - 949

Arguments of the parties II - 949

Findings of the Court II - 950

The plea alleging discrepancies between the Decision and the Commission's press release

of 13 July 1994 II-952

Arguments of the parties II - 952

Findings of the Court 11-969 II-1004

CASCADES ν COMMISSION

The application for annulment or reduction in the amount of the fine II - 975

The pleas alleging that the infringement had limited effects and that the general level of

the fines is excessive II - 975

Arguments of the parties II - 975

Findings of the Court II-988

— The statement of reasons regarding the fixing of the individual fines II - 989

— The classification of the applicant as a 'ringleader' II - 994

The plea alleging the existence of mitigating circumstances II - 996

Arguments of the parties II - 996

Findings of the Court II-999