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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·16.9.1997

C-120/95

ECLI:EU:C:1997:399

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Súdny dvor Európskej únie
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61995CC0120

OPINION OF MR TESAURO — CASES C-120/95 AND C-158/96

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL TESAURO delivered on 16 September 1997 *

1. The implementation of the single market, Assurances Sociales and the Cour de Cas- that area without internal borders within sation. The issue to be decided by the former which the free movement of goods, persons, is whether the sickness fund acted lawfully services and capital is ensured, ought by now in refusing to reimburse the cost of a pair of to have been completed and to constitute spectacles purchased in another Member one of the cornerstones and hallmarks of the State by an insured person who had not Community. However, the questions applied for and obtained the prescribed referred to the Court by two Luxembourg authorisation in advance. The case before the judicial bodies, the Conseil Arbitral des latter, meanwhile, involves the refusal of a Assurances Sociales (Social Insurance Arbi- request for authorisation sought by an tration Council) (Case C-120/95) and the insured person on behalf of his daughter, Cour de Cassation (Court of Cassation) who is a minor, for the purpose of claiming (Case C-158/96), cast some doubt on the cost of orthodontic treatment to be car- whether this is so, by highlighting the fact ried out in another Member State. that to this day citizens of the Community, unless they forgo reimbursement of the costs incurred, are obliged, as a rule, to obtain medical services in the State in which they are insured.

2. The questions referred by the two bodies Reimbursement of medical expenses incurred require the Court to rule essentially on the in another Member State — whether to pur- compatibility with Community law of chase medicinal products or to obtain medi- national rules, of Luxembourg in this case, cal treatment — is conditional on prior which make the reimbursement of medical authorisation, the granting of which by the expenses incurred outside the national terri- competent social security institution is more- tory subject to the condition that the medical over subject to particularly restrictive condi- treatment or the purchase of the medical tions. This state of affairs cannot but dis- products and/or accessories in question were courage the free movement of patients, or of duly authorised by the competent social the less affluent among them at least, which security institution. Those rules are attacked of itself is a disadvantage for the patients on two different grounds: that they limit the concerned of course. It is this very state of free movement of medical products and affairs which lies at the root of the disputes accessories, namely a pair of spectacles, and pending before the Conseil Arbitral des thus contravene Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty (Case C-120/95); and that they may fetter the freedom to provide medical ser- * Original language: Italian. vices, namely orthodontic treatment, by

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reason of the restrictions they impose on the Relevant legislation recipients of such services, and are thus con- trary to Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty (Case C-158/96).

4. Article 20(1) of the Luxembourg Social Insurance Code ('the Code'), which was enacted on 27 July 1992 and entered into force on 1 January 1994, provides that, with the exception of emergency care received in The issue, therefore, is whether the require- the event of accident or illness abroad, ment of prior authorisation, as a condition insured persons may receive medical treat- for reimbursement, is such as to constitute a ment abroad or have recourse to a treatment barrier to the free movement of goods (Case centre or a centre providing ancillary facili- C-120/95) or the freedom to provide services ties abroad only after obtaining the prior (Case C-158/96) and, if so, whether it may authorisation of the competent social secu- none the less be regarded as a barrier which rity institution. The terms and conditions for is justified in view of the special require- granting authorisation are laid down by ments inherent in a national health service. Articles 25 to 27 of the statutes of the Union des Caisses de Maladie ('the U C M statutes'), in the version which entered into force on 1 January 1995. In particular, the statutes pro- vide that authorisation may not be given for services which are not eligible for reimburse- ment under the national rules (Article 25), that the cost of duly authorised treatment is to be reimbursed in accordance with the tar- 3. Although these two cases have been iffs applicable to persons insured in the State referred by two different bodies and, at least in which the treatment takes place (Article at first sight, turn on the interpretation of 26), and that authorisation will be granted different provisions, I none the less consider only after a medical assessment and on pro- it appropriate to deal with them together, duction of a written request from a doctor since the contested national measure is the established in Luxembourg indicating the same in both instances and the arguments doctor or hospital centre recommended to adduced by the parties and by the govern- the insured person and the criteria and facts ments which have submitted observations which make it impossible for the treatment are essentially the same. My decision is also in question to be carried out in Luxembourg influenced by the fact that the Community (Article 27). rules in the field of social security may have a significant bearing on the assessment of the restrictive effects on trade, whether in goods or in services, complained of by the plaintiffs in the main proceedings, and this impact would not in principle be any different according to whether it is Article 30 or It should also be noted, since those national Articles 59 and 60 which come into play. rules were not yet in force at the time mate-

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rial to Case C-120/95, that the relevant pro- The relevant parts of that article provide: visions of the former code were — so far as is relevant here — essentially identical. In particular, the question of treatment abroad and prior authorisation thereof was governed by Article 60(3), which is essentially the same as Article 20(1) of the Code currently ' 1 . An employed or self-employed person in force. Furthermore, the rules governing who satisfies the conditions of the legislation reimbursement of the cost of spectacles were of the competent State for entitlement to at the material time contained in Article 78 benefits, taking account where appropriate of of the U C M statutes, which referred to the the provisions of Article 18, and: relevant collective agreement. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that then, as now, reimbursement was on a flat-rate basis with a ceiling of LFR 1 600 for frames. 1

(a) ...

(b) ...

(c) who is authorised by the competent institution to go to the territory of another Member State to receive there the treatment appropriate to his con- dition, 5. As regards the relevant Community legis- lation, apart from the provisions on the movement of goods and provision of ser- vices, Article 22 of Council Regulation (EEC) N o 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to shall be entitled: employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community 2 (hereinafter 'the Regulation') is of particular significance, as we shall see below.

(i) to benefits in kind provided on behalf 1 — See Article 119 of the current UCM statutes. of the competent institution by the 2 — See the version consolidated by Council Regulation (EC) No 118/97 of 2 December 1996 (OJ 1997 L 28, p. 1). institution of the place of stay or resi-

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dence in accordance -with the provisions 3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall of the legislation which it administers, apply by analogy to members of the family as though he were insured with it; the of an employed or self-employed person. length of the period during which ben- efits are provided shall be governed, however, by the legislation of the com- petent State; ..." 3

This article therefore, like the Luxembourg legislation challenged in this case, makes (ii) to cash benefits provided by the compe- reimbursement of medical expenses incurred tent institution in accordance with the in another Member State subject to the con- provisions of the legislation which it dition that the insured person (who received administers. However, by agreement the benefits in question) obtained prior between the competent institution and authorisation from the competent social the institution of the place of stay or security institution. Only if that is the case residence, such benefits may be provided will the competent institution bear the costs by the latter institution on behalf of the incurred. 4 former, in accordance with the provi- sions of the legislation of the competent State.

Facts and questions submitted for a prelimi- nary ruling

2. ... — Case C-120/95

6. The dispute in Case C-120/95 is between Mr Decker, a Luxembourg national, and the The authorisation required under paragraph 1(c) may not be refused where the treatment in question is among the benefits provided 3 — Article 22a, inserted by Regulation (EC) N o 3095/95 (OJ 1995 L 335, p. 1), provides as follows: 'Notwithstanding for by the legislation of the Member State on Article 2 of the Regulation, Article 22(1)(a) and (c) shall also whose territory the person concerned apply to persons who are nationals of a Member State and are insured under the legislation of a Member State and t o resided and where he cannot be given such the members of their families residing with them.' Following that amendment, therefore, it is no longer necessary to be a treatment within the time normally neces- worker or a member of a worker's family in order to rely o n sary for obtaining the treatment in question Article 22; it is enough to be insured, irrespective of the basis on which one is insured. in the Member State of residence taking 4 — Article 36(1) of the Regulation provides that 'benefits in kind account of his current state of health and the provided in accordance with the provisions of this chapter by the institution of one Member State on behalf of the insti- probable course of the disease. tution of another Member State shall be fully refunded'.

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Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés must be authorised in advance by the above (hereinafter 'the Fund') and arises from the social security institution, compatible with latter's refusal to reimburse the cost of a pair Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty, in so of spectacles purchased from an optician in far as it penalises in general the importation Arlon (Belgium) on production of a pre- by private individuals of medicinal products scription from an ophthalmologist in or, as in this case, spectacles from other Luxembourg. Arguing that this refusal, Member States?' based on the ground that he had failed to seek prior authorisation as required under the relevant legislation, was contrary to the Community rules on the free movement of goods, Mr Decker complained to the Fund and subsequently appealed to the Conseil" — Case C-158/96 Arbitral des Assurances Sociales. 5

8. The plaintiff in Case C-158/96 is another Luxembourg national, a Mr Kohll, who, unlike Mr Decker, did request prior authori- 7. For the purpose of resolving the dispute sation from the Union des Caisses de Mala- before it, the latter body decided to refer the die (hereinafter 'the UCM'), with which he is following question to the Court for a pre- insured, to enable his daughter Aline, who is liminary ruling: a minor, to receive orthodontic treatment in Trier (Germany). His request was rejected, however, by decision of 7 February 1994, on the grounds, first, that the treatment sought was not urgent and, secondly, that suitable treatment of that kind could be obtained in Luxembourg. 'Is Article 60 of the Luxembourg Code des Assurances Sociales, under which a social security institution of Member State A refuses to reimburse to an insured person, w h o is a national of Member State A, the cost of spectacles with corrective lenses, pre- The Conseil Arbitral des Assurances scribed by a doctor established in Member Sociales, before which Mr Kohll challenged State A but purchased from an optician the refusal, since confirmed by the U C M established in Member State B, on the Management Board, dismissed his appeal by ground that all medical treatment abroad decision of 6 October 1994. Mr Kohll appealed against that decision to the Conseil Supérieur des Assurances Sociales which, by 5 — The Conseil Arbitral des Assurances Sociales dismissed the decision of 17 July 1995, upheld the con- appeal by order of 24 August 1993. It likewise dismissed tested decision on the ground that Article 20 M r Decker's appeal against that order by decision of 20 October 1993. It was after the setting aside of that decision of the Code and Articles 25 and 27 of the by the Cour de Cassation that the case was remitted to the Conseil Arbitral des Assurances Sociales. U C M statutes, on which the refusal was

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based, were fully in accordance with Article The issues raised and outline of this Opinion 22 of the Regulation.

9. Finding that the appellate body had con- 10. As they are worded, the questions sidered only whether the Luxembourg rules referred by the Conseil Arbitral des Assur- were consistent with the Regulation, and had ances Sociales and the Cour de Cassation not taken any account of the provisions on turn solely on the interpretation of the freedom to provide services, the Cour de Treaty provisions relating to the free move- Cassation, before which Mr Kohll challenged ment of goods and services: the Court has the decision of the appellate body, decided been asked to determine whether the that it was necessary to refer the following requirement of prior authorisation for reim- questions to this Court for a preliminary rul- bursement of medical expenses incurred in a ing: Member State other than the State of resi- dence is contrary to Articles 30 and 59 of the Treaty.

'(1) Are Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty establishing the EEC to be interpreted as precluding rules under which reim- In the course of the procedure, however, bursement of the cost of benefits is sub- there was some discussion, in depth, of the ject to authorisation by the insured per- applicability to the case of the Community son's social security institution if the rules on social security, and specifically benefits are provided in a Member State Article 22(1)(c)(i) of the Regulation. In par- other than the State in which that per- ticular, it was argued that it is this provision son resides? which regulates the issue of prior authori- sation and reimbursement and that, since the disputed rules are fully in accordance with it, the possibility of conflict with Articles 30 and 59 does not arise. This is closely linked to another argument put forward during the course of the procedure, according to which the fact that the disputed measure falls (2) Is the answer to Question 1 any differ- within the sphere of social security means ent if the aim of the rules is to maintain that, even if the Regulation were inapplicable a balanced medical and hospital service to the case at hand, the measure still could accessible to everyone in a given not be examined from the point of view of region?' the Community rules providing for the free

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movement of goods and services. This, the 12. Secondly, once it has been established argument basically runs, is because the social that neither the social security nature of the security sector is even today, at least where it national measure nor the existence of a is not governed by specific Community rules, Community provision having essentially the a matter within the purview of the Member same content has the effect of precluding the States. application of Articles 30 and 59, it will then be necessary to determine whether the meas- ure is compatible with the Community pro- visions in question. In other words, it will be necessary to ascertain whether the require- ment of prior authorisation for reimburse- ment of medical expenses incurred in a Member State other than the State of resi- 11. In those circumstances, I believe the first dence amounts, at least in principle, to a bar- task is to ascertain whether the national rules rier to trade in goods and/or services. in question fall within the scope of Articles 30 and 59. To do so, it will be necessary to determine, in the light inter alia of the Court's case-law in this area, to what extent and subject to what limits the fact that the measure in question is in the field of social security precludes any inquiry as to its com- patibility with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. Needless to say, the conclusion arrived at will apply equally to Article 22 of the Regu- lation, assuming of course that the disputed national rules are consistent with it. In other words, if the barrier to the movement of goods and the provision of services is the requirement to seek prior authorisation — in the absence of which the competent institu- tion will refuse to reimburse expenses It will likewise be necessary to determine incurred by an insured person in another whether Article 22 of the Regulation applies Member State — it is quite clear that the bar- to the case and, if so, 'whether this fact of rier is created in like manner by both the itself takes the matter outside the scope of national rules and the Regulation. Articles 30 and 59. O n this point, I cannot refrain from observing right away that a pro- vision of secondary legislation, which is what Article 22 of the Regulation is, cannot in any event be regarded as capable of excluding an examination into whether or not Treaty pro- visions, such as Articles 30 and 59, have been infringed. I therefore take the view that even if, after examination, the Luxembourg rules 13. Lastly, we shall have to consider whether are found to come within the scope of the any restrictive effects caused by the national Regulation and to be consistent with it, it measure, and, by the same token, by Article does not follow that Articles 30 and 59 are 22 of the Regulation, may nevertheless be inapplicable to this case. justified. To that end, it will first be neces-

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sary to establish whether the disputed rule is I — The applicability of Articles 30 and 59 discriminatory or indistinctly applicable, since the justifications which come into play in the two cases are different: express dero- gations (under Articles 36 and 56) in the former, and overriding requirements or, if one prefers, reasons relating to the general interest, in the latter. It is only in the latter 15. Although the points in dispute in the case that account may be taken of special two cases are many, perhaps too many, there requirements, including economic require- is fortunately no dispute about some funda- ments where appropriate, inherent in the mental matters which are essential to a cor- existence, operation and maintenance of a rect definition of the issues involved. It is national health service which is accessible to common ground that medical products con- everyone. stitute goods within the meaning of Article 30 of the Treaty, from which it follows that any unjustified limitation on the importation of this category of products, including importation by an individual for personal use, is contrary to that article. 6 Likewise, it is not disputed that medical activities consti- tute services, as is expressly provided for by Article 60, 7 nor, as was made clear by the Let me add that the analysis of the justifica- Court, that 'the freedom to provide services tions relied upon and its outcome will inevi- includes the freedom, for the recipients of tably imply a view on the validity or other- services, to go to another Member State in wise of Article 22 of the Regulation. If the order to receive a service there ... and that disputed rules are found to be incompatible tourists, persons receiving medical treatment with Articles 30 and 59, this may result ipso and persons travelling for the purpose of facto in the relevant Community provision education or business are to be regarded as being declared invalid — to the extent that recipients of services'. 8 both measures (national and Community) lay down the same rules, follow the same logic and pursue the same aim.

That being the case, it is equally indisput- able, in my view, that rules which make reimbursement of medical expenses condi- tional on the medical products and/or 14. Finally, let me point out that this reason- ing process could undoubtedly proceed more rapidly and less laboriously if some of the 6 — See Case 215/87 Schumacher [1989] ECR 617 and Case C-62/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-2575. steps mentioned above were omitted. I feel, 7 — See also Case C-159/90 Grogon [1991] ECR I-4685, in however, that, at least in an Opinion, it is not which it was held that 'medical termination of pregnancy, performed in accordance with the law of the State in which it permissible to dispense with the analytical is earned out, constitutes a service within the meaning of Article 60 of the Treaty' (paragraph 21). rigour which a case of this importance 8 — Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] demands. ECR 377, paragraph 16.

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services upon -which they were incurred hav- — The fact that the contested measure con- ing been 'purchased' within the national ter- cerns social security ritory are quite capable, at least in theory, of having an adverse effect on trade in goods and services. Suffice it for now to point out that such rules — for the very reason that they deny insured persons reimbursement of medical expenses incurred abroad, unless prior authorisation has been obtained — may discourage those concerned from pur- chasing such products or from seeking treat- ment in a Member State other than the one 17. Let me begin by remarking that the fact in which they reside, which may, in certain that the national rules in question concern cases, act as a restriction on imports of the social security by no means has the effect of relevant products or on the freedom to pro- removing them, at least not automatically, vide the services in question. from the scope of the Community rules on the movement of goods and provision of ser- vices. And I would add straight away that the Court's consistent view that 'Commu- nity law does not detract from the powers of the Member States to organise their social security systems' 9 by no means implies that the social security sector constitutes an island beyond the reach of Community law and that, as a consequence, all national rules relating to social security fall outside its scope. 10

16. The applicability of the Treaty rules on the free movement of goods and freedom to provide services has, however, been called into question, as indicated above, on the grounds that the national measure in ques- 18. It is of course true that as Community tion concerns social security and is alleged to law stands at present 'it is for the legislature be in accordance with a precise and specific of each Member State to lay down the condi- provision of the Regulation. It has been tions creating the right or the obligation to argued that those two considerations, which, become affiliated to a social security as we shall see, are interrelated, have the effect of taking the contested measure out- side the scope of Articles 30 and 59. The fol- 9 — Case 238/82 Duphar [1984] ECR 523, paragraph 16. See lowing arguments seek to refute that conten- also, more recently, Case C-70/95 Sodemare [1997] ECR I-3395, paragraph 27. tion, which was supported by the majority 10 — For a comprehensive review of the case-law in this area, and of the Member States which submitted its implications, see the Opinion of Advocate General Fen- nelly, delivered on 6 February 1997 in Case C-70/95 Sode- observations in the two cases. mare [1997] ECR I-3398, paragraphs 23 to 30.

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scheme', 1 1with the result that those subject to social security benefits'. 13 However, the to such legislation, if it makes affiliation Court has also made clear that the freedom compulsory, have no choice as to which thus left to the Member States must not give scheme to join. It is also true, as the Court rise to 'discrimination between nationals of held in Poucet and Pistre, that the activity of the host state and nationals of the other sickness funds, and of the organisations Member States'. 14 involved in the management of the State social security system, 'is not an economic activity and, therefore, the organisations to which it is entrusted are not undertakings within the meaning of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty'. 12

In other words, while it is true that the organisation of the social security system remains a matter for the Member States and that the relationship between the social secu- rity institutions and their members is gov- erned by national law, this does not mean that Member States may contravene with However, the scope of that case-law is much impunity a fundamental principle established narrower and more confined than is claimed by the Treaty to secure the free movement of by the Member States in arguing that Com- persons, namely the prohibition of discrimi- munity law does not apply to social security. nation on grounds of nationality. 15 It is therefore necessary to place those deci- sions in their proper context and to assess their implications correctly.

20. Secondly, the point must be made that while the Court did indeed conclude that social security institutions are not subject to the rules on competition, this applies only in 19. First of all, it is quite clear that, in the so far as the activity of those institutions is absence of harmonisation at Community based 'on the principle of ... solidarity', in level, it is for the Member States to lay down the sense that the benefits provided are the conditions governing affiliation to the 'statutory benefits bearing no relation to the social security system and, at least in prin- ciple, 'the conditions governing entitlement 13 — Joined Cases C-4/95 and C-5/95 Staber and Piosa Pereira [1997] ECR I-511, paragraph 36. 14 — See Coonan and Paraschi (cited in footnote 11), paragraphs 11 — It is not by chance that this statement is a constant feature 12 and 15 respectively. of the case-law on the interpretation of Regulation N o 15 — Suffice it to recall that one of the cardinal principles of 1408/71. See, inter alia. Case 110/79 Coonan [1980] ECR Regulation N o 1408/71, although its purpose is limited 1445, paragraph 12, and Case C-349/87 Paraschi [1991] merely to coordinating national legislation in this area, is in ECR I-4501, paragraph 15. fact equality of treatment, laid down in Article 3(1), 12 — Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91 [1993] ECR I-637, between a Member State's own nationals and those of other paragraph 19. Member States resident in the State.

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amount of the contributions'. 16 In other therefore only such institutions as operate words, it is clear that the determining factor social security schemes of this nature that are in the outcome — although the Court also exempted from the application of the Com- referred, in the same judgment, to the exclus- munity rules on competition. ively social function performed by those institutions, whose activity is entirely non- profit-making — was precisely the fact that the system in question was based on the principle of solidarity. 17 This was confirmed in a later judgment in which the Court held that where those (or similar) institutions operate instead a supplementary insurance scheme, based on the funding principle and with the level of benefits directly linked to the level of contributions (the solidarity principle thus not applying), they are to be regarded as undertakings within the meaning of the Treaty rules on competition. 18

21. It is true also that in its judgment in Garcia, the Court stated that Articles 57(2) and 66 of the Treaty, which were the legal basis for the adoption of the coordinating directives intended to facilitate the taking-up and pursuit of self-employed activities, could not 'regulate the field of social security, which is covered by different provisions of Community law'. 19 But this statement, I believe, cannot be interpreted as meaning that the Treaty rules on the right of estab- lishment and provision of services are inap- In essence, therefore, compulsory affiliation plicable, by definition, to national rules on to a particular scheme, although it has the social security, 20 and it should be read in the effect of eliminating all potential competition light of the particular features of that case. by other entities or at any rate reducing their activity to a purely residual sector, is a neces- sary condition for the operation of a social 19 — Case C-238/94 [1996] ECR I-1673, paragraph 13. security scheme based on the solidarity prin- 20 — Since the statement was taken, albeit couched in more abso- ciple, which depends on everybody's contri- lute terms, from my Opinion in that case (delivered on 29 February 1996, [1996] ECR I-1675, point 9), I must point bution in order that each may benefit. It is out that it was certainly not my intention to arrive at such an result. Rather, as may be seen from the Opinion, I was seeking to make the point that in the present state of Com- munity law, none of the provisions of the Treaty, including those directly concerning the social security sector or social affairs in general, can serve as a basis for 'the adoption of 16 — Poucet and Piltre (cited in footnote 12), paragraph 18. measures aimed at dismantling the national social security 17 — A point confirmed, albeit a contrario, in Case C-41/90 systems' (sec footnote 6), where the term 'dismantling' Höfner and Eher [1991] ECR I-1979, where the Court means precisely the destruction of the different systems stated that, in the context of competition law, the concept which exist at present in the Member States. There is no of an undertaking 'encompasses every entity engaged in an doubt, on the other hand, that if those systems were one economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity day to be harmonised, the proper legal basis for undertak- and the way in which it is financed' (paragraph-21). ing the liberalisation (inter alia) of the activity of the insti- tutions which administer them would indeed be Articles 18 — Case C-244/94 FFSA [1995] ECR I-4013, paragraphs 17 to 57(2) and 66 of the Treaty. 22.

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In view of the fact that that case concerned a however, Member States are bound to com- challenge to the requirement of compulsory ply with Community law even when exercis- affiliation to a statutory social security ing the powers reserved to them in the field scheme in reliance on the liberalisation intro- of social security. duced by a directive coordinating national rules on direct insurance other than life assurance, it need only be pointed out that the exclusion from liberalisation of the activities of bodies operating statutory social security schemes, which is, moreover, an express provision of that directive, was a There is no basis for any other conclusion. necessary corollary to the exemption, already The fact remains, therefore, that no discrimi- established, of such activities from the com- nation based on nationality is permitted o n petition rules. Otherwise the obligation to the territory of a Member State, 22 and that, join such schemes would inevitably have with the exception of the case where national been removed, whereas the Court empha- rules are closely bound up with the opera- sised that the obligation was necessary 'in tion and survival of the relevant social secu- order to ensure that the principle of solidar- rity scheme, social security is not exempt ity is applied and that their financial equilib- from the application of Community law. I n rium is maintained', pointing out that, if the particular, for the purposes of the present obligation was removed, 'the schemes in case, we may note that unjustified restric- question would thus be unable to survive'. 21 tions on the free movement of persons (establishment and services) and of goods are not permitted merely because the benefit conferred on individuals by the relevant Community rules conflicts with a national measure which in some way relates to social security.

23. The Court's case-law on the matter con- 22. In the light of the foregoing, it is abun- firms this. For example, the Court has dantly clear that the statement that Commu- acknowledged that, as Community law nity law does not detract from the powers of stands at present, a Member State may con- Member States to organise their social secu- sider that the social welfare system it has put rity systems means, quite simply, that Com- in place, 'whose implementation is in prin- munity law does not regulate this area ciple entrusted to the public authorities, [and directly, nor does it impinge on it, if its which] is based on the principle of solidar- application would have the effect of jeopar- ity', 23 necessarily requires, in order to dising the survival of social security schemes achieve its objectives, that the admission of of the kind described above. Otherwise,

22 — See point 19 and footnote 14, above. 21 — García (cited in footnote 19), paragraph 14. 23 — Sodemare (cited in footnote 9), paragraph 29.

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private operators to the system be subject to of Article 52, but on a more general note, the the condition that they are non-profit- Court has stated that Member States are making; the Court accordingly came to the under an obligation to observe its provisions conclusion that national rules laying down 'even though, in the absence of Community such a requirement are not contrary to legislation on social security for self- Article 52 of the Treaty. 24 Clearly, the out- employed persons, they retained legislative come was determined by the importance jurisdiction in this field'. 26 attributed, rightly or wrongly, to the fact that the system in question was based on the principle of solidarity.

24. The Court has also had occasion to state, in relation to the rules on the free movement of goods, that even measures adopted in the field of social security and which do not relate directly to importation, 'depending on The Court has taken an entirely different the manner of their application and the use approach, however, in cases where the made of them, ... may affect the possibilities national measures, albeit falling within the of marketing the preparations and, to that sphere of social security, were not of such a extent, ... may indirectly influence the possi- kind, on the face of it, as to be capable of bilities of importation', 27 thus, potentially, having an adverse effect on the survival of falling foul of Article 30. This would be the social security schemes based on the prin- case, for instance, of national rules which ciple of solidarity. For example, in upholding had the effect of making only domestic prod- as compatible with Article 52 a Belgian ucts eligible for reimbursement. measure which denied laboratories operated by legal persons, whose members were also legal persons, reimbursement of the cost of clinical biology services performed by them, the Court not only pointed out that the leg- islation in question applied without distinc- tion to Belgian nationals and those of other Member States, but also stated that there was no evidence that it had been adopted for Lastly, in Sodemare, where a possible breach 'discriminatory purposes' or that it produced of the rules on the freedom to provide 'discriminatory effects'. 25 Still on the subject

26 — Case 143/87 Stanton [1988] ECR 3877, paragraph 10. See 24 — Idem, paragraphs 32 and 34. The Court none the less felt it also the judgments of the same date in Joined Cases 154/87 necessary, in that judgment, to state that the system in ques- and 155/87 Wolf [1988] ECR 3897, paragraph 10. tion cannot however 'place profit-making companies from 27 — Duphar (cited in footnote 9), paragraph 18. See also Case other Member States in a less favourable factual or legal C-249/88 Commission v Belgium [1991] ECR I-1275, para- situation than profit-making companies from the Member graphs 38 and 42, where the Court held that national rules State in which they are established' (paragraph 33). which gave preference, as regards eligibility for reimburse- 25 — Case 221/85 Commission v Belgium [1987] ECR 719, para- ment, only to domestic pharmaceutical products, were con- graph 11. trary to Article 30.

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services was also in issue, the Court took their compatibility with Articles 30 and 59 of pains to explain that in the case in question the Treaty. there was no provision of services within the meaning of the Treaty. It accordingly ruled that 'Article 59 of the Treaty does not cover the situation of a company which, having established itself in a Member State in order to run old people's homes there, provides — Article 22 of the Regulation services to residents who, for that purpose, reside in those homes permanently or for an indefinite period.' 28 That statement demon- strates, however, lest there be any remaining doubt, that social security does not per se fall outside the scope of the Community rules. 26. It now falls to be considered whether the above conclusion may be called into ques- tion by reason of the existence of a provision of Community law, namely Article 22 of the Regulation, governing the very matter which concerns us. Let me say straight away that the answer to that question can only be in the negative, although the possibility of the said provision itself being invalid cannot be excluded.

But let us take things in order. We need first 25. In short, the fact that, in the present state to ascertain whether the provision in ques- of Community law, Member States' powers tion governs the matter in hand, then t o in the field of social security, as in other verify whether the contested national meas- areas, 29 remain intact, by no means leaves ure is consistent with it and, finally, if that is them free to enact in that field rules which indeed the case, to examine whether that fact are contrary to Community law. It follows alone may be regarded as precluding any fur- that the social security nature of the disputed ther inquiry into the question whether the rules does not, of itself, by any means have fundamental freedoms guaranteed to indi- the effect of precluding any review of viduals by the Treaty, which undoubtedly include the free movement of goods and ser- vices, have been observed. 28 — Sodemare (cited in footnote 9), paragraphs 36 to 40. 29 — A similar approach is to be seen, for example, in the area of direct taxation. The Court, in its case-law in that field, has consistently held that 'although, as Community law stands at present, direct taxation does not as such fall within the purview of the Community, the powers retained by the Member States must nevertheless be exercised consistently with Community law' (Case C-279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225, paragraph 21; see also, more recendy, Case C-250/95 Futura Participations [1997] ECR I-2471, para- 27. Let me begin by observing that Article graph 19). 22(1)(c) of the Regulation, by making it

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possible for individuals — albeit subject to 28. That being so, it would appear, at least authorisation by the competent institution on the face of it, that cases such as this do — to receive the medical services they indeed come within the scope of Article 22 require in another Member State, 'constitutes of the Regulation and are accordingly gov- one of the measures intended to permit a erned by it. That conclusion, which is not in worker who is a national of one of the Mem- dispute in respect of cases where the benefits ber States of the Community, without regard sought by the insured person consist, for to the national institution to which he is example, in specialist consultations or treat- ment (as in the Kohll case), is however dis- affiliated or the place of his residence, to puted in respect of cases where the benefits receive benefits in kind provided in any sought consist instead of the purchase of other Member State', 30 and to do so, of medical products and accessories (as in the course, without having to forgo reimburse- Decker case). ment of the expenses incurred. Clearly, Mr Kohll and Mr Decker are seeking to be allowed to avail themselves of this possibil- ity.

Specifically, the Commission argues that the term 'benefits' in Article 22 covers only medical services in the strict sense and does not extend to medical products and accesso- ries, such as medicines and spectacles. By contrast, the Member States which have I need hardly add, in this regard, that these intervened (in the Decker case) maintain that individuals, although they are Luxembourg the term covers all benefits necessary for the nationals and have not exercised their right treatment of a particular ailment and hence to freedom of movement, are persons t o all products necessary for that purpose as w h o m the Regulation applies. As we know, well. They further argue that the applicabil- the Regulation applies not only to migrant ity of Article 22 to medical products and workers and members of their families, but accessories is confirmed by Article 19 of Regulation (EEC) N o 574/72, 32 which also to (sedentary) workers and to members expressly provides that frontier workers — of their families moving within the Commu- who are entitled to medical treatment in nity for reasons other than work. 31 both their State of residence and their State of employment — may purchase such items as medicines and spectacles only in the 30 — Case 117/77 Pierik I [1978] ECR 825, paragraph 14. 31 — See Case 182/78 Pierik II [1979] ECR 1977, paragraph 4, and Case 75/63 Hoekstra [1964] ECR 177, in particular at p. 186. Moreover, by virtue of the insertion of Article 22a in the Regulation, it is no longer even necessary, for the pur- 32 — Regulation (EEC) N o 574/72 of the Council of 21 March poses of the application of Article 22 at least, to he a 1972 laying down the procedure for implementing Regu- worker or a member of a worker's family; it is now enough lation (EEC) N o 1408/71 (see the amended and updated to be insured (see footnote 3, above). version published in OJ 1997 L 28, p. 102).

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Member State in which those 'products' That said, I readily concede that where the were prescribed. 33 benefit sought consists, as it does in the Decker case, in the purchase of a pair of spectacles, or in the purchase of medical products in general, it can hardly be argued that the treatment in question could not be provided in sufficient time to prevent any deterioration in the insured person's state of health, in which case Article 22 provides that authorisation may not be refused.

But this 29. There is no doubt that 'sickness and fact is not conclusive, as it means simply that maternity' benefits, within the meaning of authorisation will virtually never be granted Chapter I in Title III of the Regulation, of for the purchase of medical products and which Article 22 forms part, include 'benefits accessories, 35 save in the case of products under legislation concerning invalidity which (for example, a particular kind of prosthesis are in the nature of medical or surgical ben- or appliance) which cannot be found in the efits'. 34 Furthermore, I am not convinced by Member State in question. the Commission's argument that Article 19 of Regulation N o 574/72 has no application

to the present case. While it is true that the provision in question applies only to frontier workers, whom it requires to purchase medi- cal products and accessories (and to have laboratory analyses carried out) in the Mem- ber State where the prescription was made, this is simply because those workers are the only ones to have access, without prior authorisation, to the 'benefits' in question in two different Member States. It would be illogical, however, to infer that what frontier workers are not allowed to do, to prevent them from purchasing the relevant products in whichever of the two Member States has more favourable reimbursement terms, other workers in any of the other 14 Member States are permitted to do. 30. In the final analysis, it is my view that Article 22 is intended to apply not only to medical services, in the narrow sense, as the Commission maintains, but to all benefits 33 — Article 19 of Regulation N o 574/72 provides: 'In the case of frontier workers or members of their fami- involved in a particular type of treatment or lies, medicinal products, bandages, spectacles and small appliances may be issued, and laboratory analyses and tests health-care, and thus also to medical prod- carried out, only in the territory of the Member State in ucts and, for our purposes, to the purchase which they were prescribed, in accordance with the provi- sions of the legislation of that Member Sute, except where of a pair of spectacles.

I therefore conclude the legislation administered by the competent institution or an agreement concluded between the Member Sutes con- cerned or the competent authorities of those Member Sutes is more favourable.' 34 — Case 69/79 Jordens-Vosters [1980] ECR 75, paragraph 9. 35 — Of course, prior authorisation granted for medical treat- The particular case involved the refusal by the competent ment in another Member Sute cannot but also cover social security institution, that of the Netherlands, to reim- expenses incurred in that S u t e on the purchase of medical burse to a Belgian national expenses which she had incurred products and accessories; this fact is, I believe, indisputable in Belgium on pharmaceutical products and medicines. and, indeed, has not been disputed.

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that the cases under consideration do indeed of the Regulation. It is quite clear that those fall within the scope of Article 22(1)(c) of the rules, at least in terms of their wording, do Regulation. not go beyond the limits laid down by the latter provision. 36

31. I now turn to the question whether the contested measure is in conformity with 32. That finding, however, as already indi- Article 22 of the Regulation. It is not in dis- cated, does not mean, contrary to the con- pute that both measures (Community and tention of a number of governments during national) make the reimbursement of medical the proceedings, that there is no possibility expenses incurred in another Member State of the contested rules conflicting with subject to prior authorisation. Both measures Articles 30 and 59 and that, consequently, also require, in order for such authorisation there is no need to examine whether the to be granted, that the benefits sought by the former are compatible with the latter. Fur- insured person are among those eligible for thermore, the arguments put forward in sup- reimbursement under the legislation of the port of this view are, even on the face of it, Member State in question. I would also recall devoid of substance. that Member States are bound to grant authorisation, under Article 22(2), only where the treatment sought cannot be pro- vided within such time as to ensure its effec- tiveness, thereby leaving all other eventuali- ties to the Member States' discretion. For their part, the national rules in force in Luxembourg, specifically Article 25 of the U C M Statute, provide that authorisation is to be granted only if the treatment sought is not available in Luxembourg or if the stan- In particular, we need not be detained by the dard of the health-care provided is inad- argument that if the contested rules were equate for the particular ailment from which found to be incompatible with Articles 30 the insured person is suffering.

36 — It would be otherwise only if the interpretation given by the Court to the phrase 'treatment appropriate to his con- dition', in Article 22(1)(c), were still valid today. The Court had held that the phrase in question meant that 'benefitsin kind for which the worker is authorised to go to another Member State cover all treatment calculated to be effective for the sickness or disease from which the person con- cerned suffers' (Pierik I, cited in footnote 30, paragraph 15, and Pierik II, cited in footnote 31, paragraph 10; emphasis added). Unfortunately, that interpretation must now be regarded as having been superseded, because Article 22(2) was amended, in fact as a consequence of the Pierik judge- ments, and made more restrictive so that, in particular, it Accordingly, there can be no doubt that the now sets out expressly and without ambiguity the one case in which authorisation may not be refused. contested rules are consistent with Article 22

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and 59 of the Treaty, the fact that this would between the ... systems of individual Member mean that Article 22 of the Regulation was States, and hence in the rights of persons unlawful (as well) would have the effect of working in the Member States, are unaf- giving those Treaty provisions precedence fected by Article 51 of the Treaty'. 40 It over Article 51, the legal basis of the Regu- would therefore be perverse, in the absence lation, thereby setting up a hierarchy of of common rules on the matter, to hold that norms for which there is no basis in the a national measure is exempt from any Treaty itself. Suffice it to say that the fact review of its compatibility with the Treaty that a particular national rule is compatible provisions merely because it is one of those with an article of the Treaty can under no covered by the Community's coordinating circumstances constitute sufficient reason for legislation adopted on the basis of Article 51. the rule in question to be immune from the application of other (relevant) Treaty provi- sions. 37 Similarly, it is difficult even to con- ceive that a regulation might violate Treaty provisions with impunity merely because (and as long as) it complied with the Treaty provision which constitutes its legal basis, in this case Article 51. 38

This appears also to be the view taken by the Court in its decisions in point. I refer, in par- ticular, to a judgment in which the Court interpreted the provisions of the Regulation relied upon in the case in question as mean- 33. Furthermore, the Regulation 'does not ing that entitlement to family benefits pro- set up a common scheme of social security but allows different national schemes to exist vided in respect of children resident in and its sole objective is to coordinate those another Member State may not also be con- national schemes', 39 whence it follows that ferred on self-employed persons affiliated to the 'substantive and procedural differences a voluntary social insurance scheme where, as in that case, the competent national insti- tution for the payment of such benefits is German. 41 That conclusion, however, did 37 — On this point see, for example, Case C-21/88 Du Pont de Nemours [1990] ECR I-889, paragraphs 20 and 21, in which not prevent the Court from inquiring into the Court ruled that the possible classification of a national whether the national rules under which the measure as aid within the meaning of Article 92 did not exempt it from the prohibition in Article 30. self-employed are eligible for the allowances 38 — I would also recall that the Court has made it clear that the discretionary power vested in the Community legislature in question only if they are affiliated to a by Article 51 must be exercised by means which are objec- statutory social security scheme were com- tively justified (Case 19/76 Triches [1976] ECR 1243, para- graph 18). This statement can only be interpreted as mean- ing that measures adopted pursuant to Article 51 may not unjustifiably restrict the scope of the rights conferred by the Treaty on the citizens of the Community. 39 — Case 807/79 Gravina [1980] ECR 2205, paragraph 7; Case 40 — Case 41/84 Pinna [1986] ECR 1, paragraph 20. 21/87 Borowitz [1988] ECR 3715, paragraph 23; and Case 41 — Stöber and Piosa Pereira (cited in footnote 13), paragraphs C-227/89 Rönfeldt [1991] ECR I-323, paragraph 12. 32 to 34.

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patible with Article 52. 42 Thus, having therefore in conflict. 45 Clearly, this is an pointed out that the rules in question treat outcome which confirms, at the risk of stat- 'nationals who have not exercised their right ing the obvious, that there is no basis for the to free movement and migrant workers dif- argument that the Court is precluded from ferently, to the detriment of the latter, since inquiring into whether national rules are it is primarily the latter's children who do compatible with Treaty provisions having not reside in the territory of the Member direct effect, solely because such rules are in State granting the benefits in question', the conformity with the relevant regulation or, at Court found that such treatment was not least, are not outlawed by it. objectively justified and held that the rules in question 'must be regarded as discriminatory and hence as incompatible with Article 52 of the Treaty'. 43

II — The restrictive effects of the contested measure

35. Having established the relevance to the case of the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty, I now propose to examine 34. In short, the Court held in that case, on whether the contested national rules may act the one hand, that the relevant provisions of as a barrier to the movement of goods and the Regulation did not entitle the plaintiffs to the provision of services. I need hardly add the benefits sought and upheld the lawful- that the outcome of this examination will be ness of such exclusion 44 and, on the other, equally valid in relation to Article 22 of the that the plaintiffs were entitled to those ben- Regulation, now that we have shown that the efits by virtue of Article 52 of the Treaty, with which the relevant national rules were

45 — In that respect, it is puzzling that the Court did not find it necessary to question the validity of the provision of the Regulation which permitted workers not affiliated to the 42 — This approach confirms, moreover, that the Court's state- statutory social security scheme to be excluded from eligi- ment quoted above to the effect that observance of a bility for family allowances — particularly if it is borne in directly effective provision, such as Article 52 of the Treaty, mind that, in support of its conclusion that the national is binding on Member States 'even though, in the absence of rules were incompatible with Article 52, the Court pointed Community legislation on social security for self-employed out that such exclusion had the effect of placing at a disad- persons, they retained legislative jurisdiction in this field' vantage nationals who had exercised their right to free (Stanton and Wolf, cited in footnote 26, paragraph 10 in movement. But if that is the case, it must follow that the each case), has not lost any of its significance merely provision of the Regulation which permits such exclusion is because of the fact that the Regulation has since been invalid. I need hardly recall that the Court has consistently extended to cover self-employed workers. held that 'the aim of Articles 48 to 51 would not be attained 43 — Stöber and Piosa Pereira (cited in footnote 13), paragraphs if, as a consequence of the exercise of their right to freedom 38 and 39. of movement, workers were to lose the advantages in the field of social security guaranteed to them by the law of a 44 — In this connection, the Court noted in that judgment that single Member State' (see, inter alia. Case 284/84 Spruyt 'there is nothing to prevent Member States from restricting [1986] ECR 685, paragraph 19, and Joined Cases C-45/92 entidemcnt to family benefits to persons belonging t o a and C-46/92 Lepore and Scamuffa [1993] E C R I-6497, solidarity system constituted by an old-age insurance paragraph 21). Clearly, the same must apply to self- scheme. The Member States are at liberty to determine the employed persons who exercise their right to freedom of conditions for entitlement to social security benefits, since movement, since the Regulation is now also applicable to Regulation N o 1408/71 merely plays a coordinating role' them. (paragraph 36).

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national rules in question are in conformity States maintain. That line of reasoning, with it. In other words, any restrictive effects which is, to say the least, based on a simplis- on the movement of goods and/or the provi- tic view of the issue, must be rejected as sion of services will be capable of being regards both the movement of goods and the traced back to both the national rules and provision of services. the Community Regulation.

— The movement of goods

36. The disputed rules, it will be recalled, makes the reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by an insured person in a Member State other than his or her State of residence — whether on the purchase of medical products and accessories or on medical and hospital services — subject to the condition that the insured person in 37. I have already recalled that, according to question has obtained prior authorisation the Court's case-law in this area, any rules from the competent social security institu- which unjustifiably restrict an individual's tion. It therefore needs to be determined ability to import medicinal products for per- whether, as claimed by the plaintiffs in both sonal use is contrary to Article 30. 46 I need the main proceedings, the requirement of hardly add that this must also apply to a pair prior authorisation is in conflict, at least in of spectacles and, in general, to all medical or principle, with Article 30 and/or Article 59 surgical accessories. of the Treaty.

On that point, all the Member States which submitted observations in the two cases were That said, it is true that the rules under dis- at one in dismissing the possibility of any cussion by no means amount to a ban on barrier to intra-Community trade. In their importing the products in question, nor do view, the rules in question have neither the they even directly affect the possibility of object nor the effect of restricting trade flows purchasing them outside the national terri- but in fact do no more than set out the terms tory. Insured persons remain free to pur- and conditions for reimbursement of medical chase such products wherever they please, expenses. The rules are therefore concerned including in a Member State other than their only with the relationship between the insured person and the social security insti- tution to which he is affiliated, the Member 46 — See paragraph 15, above, in particular footnote 6.

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State of residence. 47 But from that it does clear disincentive to purchase the products not follow, at least not of itself, that the rules concerned in a Member State other than the in question do not create any barrier to the State of residence: and this results, or at any importation of such products. rate may result, in a limitation on imports of such products.

Moreover, the authorisation in question, in view of the particularly restrictive conditions to which its grant is subject, is very unlikely to be accorded in a case where the benefit 38. In the first place, it is quite clear that the sought by the insured person is simply the rules in question, by requiring prior authori- purchase of a pair of spectacles and/or, in sation only for purchases made outside the general, any products prescribed in the national territory, involve unequal treatment Member State in which he or she is resi- based on the place of purchase of the prod- dent. 49 In those circumstances, clearly, the ucts concerned. 48 Even assuming, for the rules in question regulate the reimbursement sake of argument, that such differentiated process in such a way that only products treatment is in itself of no relevance for the purchased in the national territory are eli- purposes of the application of the Commu- gible. 50 In view of the point made above nity rules on goods, it is nevertheless the case regarding the deterrent effect of reimburse- that the rules in question, by denying ment not being available, it is therefore indis- insured persons not having obtained prior putable that such rules inhibit, albeit indi- authorisation reimbursement of medical expenses incurred outside the national terri- tory, have the effect of deterring those con- 49 — In circumstances such as these, it is obvious that the com- cerned from buying medicinal products, or petent social security institution will refuse to grant prior authorisation, since it must be assumed, first, that a pair of even a pair of spectacles, in another Member spectacles (even of a particular kind), or a medicinal prod-

State. In other words, such rules constitute a uct, prescribed respectively by an ophthalmologist and a doctor established i na given Member State, are available in the territory of that S t a t eand, secondly, that the sute of health of the insured person is not going to deteriorate if he does not purchase those products outside the national ter- ritory (on this point, see also paragraph 29, above). If any- 47 — Suffice it to note that Mr Decker had no difficulty whatso- thing, the insured person's stateof health could deteriorate ever in purchasing the pair of spectacles giving rise to the if he decided, instead of buying the products he needs as dispute in a Member State other than his State of residence. soon as possible, to seek prior authorisation and to await The problems began, however, when he applied to the com- the result (virtually certain to be negative) of a series of petent social security institution for reimbursement of the medical and administrative formalities. cost, which was duly refused. 50 — A very clear corollary of the decision in Duphar, inter- 48 — In this regard, it should however be emphasised that the preted a contrario, is that if national rules were to regulate authorisation in question, although it is required only for the reimbursement process in such a way that only domes- the purchase of products 'abroad', cannot be equated with tic products were eligible, they would be contrary to other prior authorisations 'struck down' by the Court (see, Article 30 (judgment cited in footnote 9, paragraphs 18 to

for example. Case 124/81 Commission v United Kingdom 22). The fact that in the case which concerns us it is only [1983] ECR 203, paragraph 18). This is essentially because products purchased in the national territory which are eli- in the case which concerns us importation as such is not gible for reimbursement should not, to my mind, produce a subject to authorisation. different outcome.

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rectly, imports of medical products and recipient of services, 52 which is a factor of accessories by private individuals for their some importance. Given then that the patient personal use. is covered by the provisions on freedom to provide services when travelling to another State in order to avail himself or herself of medical treatment appropriate to his or her state of health, what are we to make of the rules in question?

39. To my mind, this is sufficient to 'warrant the conclusion that the national rules in question meet the criteria for a measure hav- ing equivalent effect to a quantitative restric- tion inasmuch as they are capable, in accord- ance with the well-known Dassonville formula, 'of directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, hindering intra-Community trade'. 51 It follows that, without prejudice to any possible justification which may be available, they must be regarded as contrary Let me say straight away that those rules to Article 30 of the Treaty. This conclusion must also be regarded as being in conflict also holds, it goes without saying, in relation with Articles 59 and 60, for reasons broadly to Article 22 of the Regulation. similar to those adduced in considering their compatibility with Article 30. Before exam- ining more closely the restrictions they place on freedom to provide services, however, I believe it worthwhile to clear up some of the misunderstandings which have emerged dur- — The provision of services ing the course of the proceedings.

52 — See Luin and Carbone (cited in footnote 8), paragraph 16. In that connection, moreover, I cannot overcome the suspi- cion that the rules on the provision of services may also be of relevance to cases involving the purchase of products (as in the Decker case). In view of the special nature of the products in question and also the fact that the Court has 40. The same rules are in dispute and the acknowledged that the presence of qualified personnel is required both for the sale of spectacles and contact lenses barrier is of the same type. However, the rel- and for that of medicinal products (see Case C-369/88 evant provisions of Community law, Articles Delattre [1991] ECR I-1487 and Case C-60/89 Montea and Samanni [1991] ECR I-1547, both concerning pharmacists, 59 and 60 of the Treaty in this case, are dif- and Case C-271/92 LPO [1993] ECR I-2899, which con- cerned opticians), it could very well be argued that the rules ferent, as is the position of the central figure, applicable in such cases also come within the scope of Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty. In short, I do not believe who, as always in such cases, is still the the possibility can be ruled out, at least not categorically, patient. In this case, the patient derives that the rules on the provision of services may apply to the circumstances of Mr Decker travelling to another Member standing in Community law not indirectly, State to purchase a pair of spectacles: b y virtue of the fact that the journey is undertaken not for the purpose of sim- via the products he imports, but rather as a ply purchasing a product but to take advantage of the pro- fessional skills of an optician established in another Mem- ber State. That said, the points made in the text in relation to the Kohl] case would clearly also be valid in relation t o the Decker case if it were found that the rules on the provi- sion of services were applicable to that case as well. 51 — Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5.

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41. It has been argued that the rules in ques- irrelevant. 53 N o r does the mere fact that the tion merely lay down the terms and condi- State is involved in financing the benefit in tions for reimbursement of medical expenses question mean that there is no provision of and that, accordingly, they are concerned services: the fact remains that the medical only with the relationship between the treatment is supplied for consideration 54 and insured person and the social security insti- that the insured person bears a significant tution to which he or she is affiliated, with portion of the cost through his health insur- the result that a dispute over reimbursement ance contributions. 55 of the expenses in question is purely an internal matter. The relevant service in such circumstances, according to this argument, is the benefit provided by the social security institution to the insured person, and not a provision of services within the meaning of Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty. In any event, it should be acknowledged that an activity financed by the State using public funds does not involve any provision of ser- vices within the meaning of those articles.

42. That said, it is clear that the rules in question do not prohibit insured persons (who are recipients of services in this case) from using a provider of services established in another Member State and, in general, do not, at least not directly, make their access to medical care in other Member States subject to conditions. Moreover, since the require- ment of prior authorisation applies to all

53 — The case-law on services provides many examples of national measures which, although they were not concerned with the provision of a service themselves, were found to be contrary to Article 59 as they were liable to have an adverse effect on the provision of the service in question. For That argument, in my opinion, betrays some instance, the Court has held that national rules which made the grant of a housing benefit subject to the requirement confusion about the nature of the issue that the relevant loan was obtained from a credit institution under consideration. What needs to be deter- established in the Member State in question were incompat- ible with Article 59, for the very reason that such a require- mined is whether national rules which make ment was liable to dissuade borrowers from approaching banks established in other Member States in order to obtain reimbursement of medical expenses incurred loans intended to finance the construction, acquisition or in a Member State other than the State of improvement of housing (Case C-484/93 Svensson [1995] ECR I-3955). Needless to say, in that case just as in the residence conditional upon prior authorisa- present case, the rules under scrutiny did not directly con- cern the provision of the services in question. tion have the effect of discouraging and 54 — The Court has in fact made clear that it is not necessary hence restricting the freedom to provide ser- that the service should be paid for directly by those receiv- vices in the sector in question. The fact that ing it (see Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders [1988] ECR 2085, paragraph 16), hence the nature of the issue does not the rules in question are in the field of social change even if the competent social security institution pays for the service directly. security and are expressly concerned with 55 — Medical practice is thus not comparable to public instruc- the terms and conditions of reimbursement tion in this respect (see Case C-263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365, paragraphs 4 to 6, and Case C-109/92 Wirth [1993] of medical expenses is, in this regard, wholly ECR I-6447).

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persons resident in the Member State in of the service in question who are not estab- question wishing to travel to another Mem- lished in the State concerned. 56 Save for the ber State in order to obtain the health-care limited number of instances in which autho- they require, it is equally clear that those risation is granted, they can supply only ben- rules do not discriminate on grounds of efits which are not eligible for reimburse- nationality among the recipients of the ser- ment. vices in question.

None the less, the fact of the matter is that the authorisation referred to is required only In the final analysis, the disputed national where it is sought to use a provider of ser- measure and, by the same token, Article 22 vices established in another Member State, of the Regulation, entail restrictions based, and this constitutes, albeit indirectly, a differ- albeit indirectly, on where the provider of ence in the treatment of insured persons services is established. 57 Both provisions based on the country of origin of the service. reduce very substantially the freedom of Furthermore, reimbursement is denied only health-care consumers (recipients of services) to insured persons who obtain a medical ser- to use (also) providers of services established vice in another Member State but without in other Member States and thereby hinder having secured the requisite authorisation; the latter's cross-border trade.

Clearly, such this constitutes a difference in the treatment restrictions are manifestly contrary, at least of insured persons according to whether in principle, to Article 59 of the Treaty. 58 they choose to avail themselves of services supplied by providers established in the national territory or in another Member State. 56 — It may be recalled that Article 59 requires 'the abolition of any restriction (. . .), when it is liable to prohibit or other- wise impede the activities of a provider of services estab- lished in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services' (Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221, paragraph 12).

I need hardly add that the nature of the issue does not change even if the rules in question do not apply to all providers of services established in the territory but only to those approved for social security reimbursement purposes. It is settled case-law that the fact that national rules do not give preference to all domestic providers of a service is immaterial for the purposes of the application of 43. In short, it is abundantly clear that the Article 59 (see, for example, Case C-353/89 Commission v Netherlands [1991] ECR I-4069, paragraph 25). rules in question, because they make reim- 57 — In that regard, the General Programme for the abolition of bursement of medical expenses incurred in restrictions on freedom to provide services (OJ 1974 Special Edition, Second Series, DC, p. 3) included among the restric- another Member State subject to prior tions to be abolished those which impinge indirectly on authorisation and because they deny reim- providers of services, for example via their effect on the recipient of the service. bursement of such expenses to insured per- 58 — This conclusion, that Article 22 of the Regulation is also, on sons who have not obtained such authori- the face of it, contrary to the Treaty rules on services, is one which commands widespread support among academic sation, are a highly deterrent factor and thus writers. See, inter alia, Bosscher, La seguridad social de los trabajadores migrantes en Ut perspectiva del establecimiento entail a restriction on the freedom to provide del mercado interior, in Los sistemas de seguridad social y el mercado único europeo, Madrid, 1993, p. 23 et seq., in par-

services. Furthermore, it cannot be denied ticular p. 31 et seq.; and Comelissen, The Principle of Ter- that a situation of that kind is bound inevi- ritoriality and the Community Regulations on Social Secu- rity, in Common Market Law Review, 1996, p. 439 et seq., tably to have an adverse effect on providers in particular pp. 463 to 466.

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III — The reasons advanced to justify t h e Articles 30 and 59 of the Treaty. 59 The out- contested measure come would be different only if the two measures (national and Community), while laying down essentially the same rules, had different aims and/or followed different schemes.

44. Given that it is the same measure which 45. That said, in order to determine what creates barriers of the same kind to both the type of justification is permissible it first free movement of goods and the freedom to needs to be decided whether the contested provide services, it is hardly surprising that measure is to be categorised as formally dis- the reasons advanced to justify it are essen- criminatory or as indistinctly applicable. In tially the same in the case of both freedoms. the former case it can be justified, and hence To be precise, the Luxembourg Government upheld as compatible with Community law, and most of the governments which have only if it comes within the scope of Article submitted observations in the two cases con- 36 (goods) and Article 56, referred to by tend that the restrictions entailed by the con- Article 66 (services), in other words, if it tested rules are necessary on public health comes within one of the derogations grounds and, in particular, to ensure the maintenance of a balanced medical and hos- pital service accessible to everyone. 59 — For the sake of completeness, I would point out that the European Commission on Human Rights has given an opinion on the relevant Luxembourg rules and on Article 22 of the Regulation, in a case in which the plaintiff — a Luxembourg national who had been refused by the health insurance fund reimbursement of medical expenses incurred in another Member Sute (Belgium) and for which she had not obtained prior authorisation — alleged a violation of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on account of the excessive length of the procedure and the fact that the dismissal of her appeal on the ground of inadmissibility by the Cour de Cassation, a court Dound by the obligation to make a refer- ence for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the Treaty, had deprived her of the possibility of a ruling by the Court of Justice on the interpretation of Article 59 of the Treaty, with which, she contended, the national rules were manifestly in conflict.

The Commission on Human Rights — having noted that the health insurance fund and the Luxembourg courts had dismissed her action on the ground that the plaintiff could not reasonably claim, under Article As already indicated, appraisal of those justi- 60(3) of the Code des Assurances Sociales, Article 51 of the Treaty and Article 22 of the Regulation, reimbursement of fications necessarily entails taking a view o n medical expenses incurred in another Member State without having sought and obtained the prescribed authorisation in the validity of Article 22 of the Regulation. advance — stated that the legislation applicable to the case Once we have established that this provision, did not confer on the plaintiff an entitlement to be reim- bursed for health-care received in Belgium.

Essentially, the by imposing the requirement of prior autho- Commission on Human Rights, having interpreted Article 22 of the Regulation as not conferring entitlement to reim- risation, produces the same restrictive effects bursement, drew the conclusion that the plaintiff did not as the national measure in issue, we must hold a right under Article 6(1) of the Convention and accordingly held the action to be inadmissible (Decision of perforce ascertain whether or not, like the 16 April 1996, Marie-Anne München v Luxembourg, N o . 28895/95).

national measure, it is compatible with

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expressly provided for by the Treaty, with applicable without distinction may be the further consequence that no consider­ incompatible with Community law if they ation may be given to economic aims pur­ are restrictive and not justified by overriding 61 sued by means of the restrictive measure requirements or reasons relating to the gen­ 63 but only, in the present instance, to the pro­ eral interest; and, secondly, as we shall see tection of public health. below, that in this latter case consideration may abo be given to economic aims pursued by means of the restrictive measure, such as the safeguarding of the financial stability of the health-care system.

In the latter case, on the other hand, there is a broader range of requirements pertaining to the general interest capable of justifying the measure. The Court has held that in order to be compatible with Community law 'national measures hable to hinder or make 46. However, the parties and the govern less attractive the exercise of fundamental ments which submitted observations have, in freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must ful justifying the contested measure, referred fil four conditions: they must be applied in a without distinction both to the protection of non-discriminatory manner; they must be public health, and thus to one of the deroga justified by imperative requirements in the tions provided by Articles 36 and 56, and to general interest; they must be suitable for the safeguarding of the financial stability of securing the attainment of the objective the health-care system, which is a reason which they pursue; and they must not go relating to the general interest.

The Commis beyond what is necessary in order to attain sion, for its part, submits that the measure is it'. 6 2 This means, first, that even measures discriminatory as regards goods, since prior authorisation is not required to purchase the relevant products in the national territory, but indistinctly applicable as regards services, 60 — In relation to goods, sec Case 113/80 Commission v Ireland [1981] ECR 1625, paragraphs 8 and 11, and, more recently, since the authorisation requirement, Joined Cases C-321/94 and C-324/94 Pistre [1997] ECR I-2343, paragraph 52.

In relation to services, it was only in its judgment in Bond van Adverteerders (cited in footnote 54) that the Court for the first time clearly stated that 'national rules which are (. . .) discriminatory are compatible with Community law only if they can be brought within 63 — This approach, which when first adopted, in the Cassis de the scope of an express derogation' (paragraph 32); on the Dųon judgment, was confined to the free movement of same point, see also the more recent case of Svensson (cited goods, was subsequently extended to the other fundamental in footnote 53), paragraph 15. freedoms enshrined in the Treaty.

As far as services are con cerned, that approach was expressly adopted, in particular, 61 — As regards goods, see Duphar (cited in footnote 9), para in Case C-288/89 Gouda [1991] ECR I-4007, paragraphs 11 graph 23, and Case 7/61 Commission v Italy [1961] ECR to 15, Commission v Netherlands (cited in footnote 56), 317, at p. 329. As to services, see, inter alia. Bond van paragraphs 15 to 19, and Säger (cited in footnote 56), para Adverteerders (cited in footnote 54), paragraph 34, and, graph 15. Given, however, that since its verv first decisions more recently, Case C-17/92 Feditine [1993] ECR I-2239, on the subject the Court has upheld as justified in the gen paragraphs 16 and 21. eral interest measures restricting freedom to provide ser 62 — Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165, paragraph 37, vices (see, for example, Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] in which, significandy, the Court referred without distinc ECR 1299), it is clear that the Gouda, Commission v Neth tion to all the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the erlands and Säger judgments, far from constituting a new Treaty, thus highlighting the unitary nature, for the pur departure, merely clarified the existing approach and pro poses which concern us nere, of the relevant rules. vided it with a fuller theoretical analysis.

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although it applies only where medical ser- 47. So far as concerns the rules on goods, let vices are sought abroad, applies in the same me begin by pointing out that this is the first manner to nationals and non-nationals alike. time that the Court has been called upon to It would seem, therefore, that under the determine whether a measure which imposes rules laid down for goods even measures an additional burden (prior authorisation) which, while not prescribing any particular only on those intending to purchase the formalities for the purposes of importation products in question outside the national ter- as such, are likely to discourage imports, are ritory is discriminatory for the purposes and discriminatory, whereas under the rules gov- within the meaning of Article 30 of the erning services only measures which involve Treaty. Given that authorisation is required different treatment based on nationality are solely for the purpose of conferring a benefit discriminatory. 64 (total or partial reimbursement of the cost of a particular product) and not for the purpose of importation, 65 it must be recognised, however, that the measure in question does not lay down different rules for imported products, but rather entails a difference in the treatment of persons (the insured), all resident in the same Member State, according to whether they have chosen to purchase a particular product in their State of residence or in some other Member State. Let me add that the fact that the difference in the treat- ment of insured persons depends, albeit indi- rectly, on the place where the optician or I cannot subscribe to this analysis. The meas- pharmacist who supplies the products is ure in question does not directly hinder established, is of no significance for the pur- trade either in goods or in services. It may, poses of the rules on goods, even if it may be however, have the effect of limiting such considered to constitute formal discrimi- trade by reason of the obvious disadvantage nation based on the place of establishment. 66 (no reimbursement) in purchasing products or medical services abroad, without authori- sation. What needs to be determined, there- fore, is whether restrictions on the free movement of goods and on the freedom to provide services based, albeit indirectly, on where the seller of the goods or provider of the service is established, fall to be classified as discriminatory or as indistinctly appli- cable. Any restriction on imports stems from the deterrent effect, on insured persons' deci- sions, of the fact that the cost of products

64 — This view his in fact been superseded by developments in the case-law. The Court also regards as discriminatory, and hence as justifiable only in accordance with one of the derogations set out in Article 56, national rules which treat 65 — There still is complete freedom as regards actual importa- services differently according to their origin (see, inter alia, tion. See paragraph 37, above, and, in particular, footnote Bond van Adverteerders, cited in footnote 54, paragraphs 48. 26 and 29, Case C-211/91 Commission v Belgium [1992] 66 — This would be a relevant factor, however, if it were decided ECR I-6757, paragraphs 9 to 11, and Fedicine, cited in foot- that the rules on the provision of services were also appli- note 61, paragraph 14). cable to the Decker case. See footnote 52, above.

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purchased in another Member State is not service providers established in another reimbursed. It is my view, therefore, that the Member State to carry on the activity in measure in question, even though it favours question. 71 the purchase of products sold in the national territory, is not formally discriminatory. Leaving aside all other considerations, it requires no specific formality to be complied with at the time of and for the purpose of importation, nor does it favour domestic The measure under consideration, it is worth products over imported products. noting, does not entail any discrimination based on nationality nor does it prescribe, at least not directly, separate rules for service providers established in another Member State. The difference in treatment concerns, at least formally, all those insured under the social security scheme in question. Bearing in mind, however, that different treatment depends on the choice of doctor or of hospi- tal, it is quite clear that the difference in the way insured persons are treated depends on the place where the provider of the service is established. Is this sufficient to warrant a finding that the measure in question, in so far as it results in different rules applying in 48. Turning to the scope of the contested respect of the provision of services originat- national measure in relation to the provisions ing in another Member State, is in any event on services, I would first recall that the to be categorised as discriminatory? Court has consistently held that measures are formally discriminatory only where they prescribe different rules for non-nationals 67 and/or for the provision of services 'originat- ing' in other Member States. 68 It regards as indistinctly applicable, on the other hand, measures capable of applying to all those 49. A negative answer to this question could who carry on a particular activity in the ter- be deduced from the fact, referred to above, ritory of a particular Member State, even if that, under the Court's case-law on services, such measures expressly impose a require- rules requiring a person to be established in ment of residence 69 or establishment 70 the Member State in question in order t o which effectively makes it impossible for carry on a given activity are justifiable o n

67 — See Case C-20/92 Hubbard [1993] ECR I-3777, paragraphs 71 — See, most recently. Case C-222/95 Parodi [1997] ECR 14 and 15, and Case C-45/93 Commission v Spain [1994] I-3899, in which the Court again emphasised that the ECR I-911, paragraphs 9 and 10. requirement of establishment 'has the result of depriving Article 59 of the Treaty of all effectiveness, a provision 68 — See footnote 64, above. whose very purpose is to abolish restrictions on the free- 69 — See, for example, Van Binsbergen (cited in footnote 63), dom to provide services of persons who are not established paragraph 14, and Case 39/75 Coenen [1975] ECR 1547, in the State in which the service is to be provided'. The paragraphs 7/8 and 9/10. Court added, however, that 'if such a requirement is to be 70 — See, in particular, Case 205/84 Commission v Germany accepted, it must be shown that it constitutes a condition [1986] ECR 3755, paragraphs 52 to 57, and Case C-101/94 which is indispensable for attaining the objective pursued' Commission v Italy [1996] ECR I-2691, paragraph 31. (paragraph 31).

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grounds relating to the general interest, by for the grant of a housing benefit that the reason of the fact, however unsatisfactory loan should be obtained from a lending insti- this result may seem, that the requirement is tution established in the national territory imposed on all those who carry on a particu- was discriminatory on the ground of the lar activity in the territory of a particular place of establishment, and thus justifiable Member State and is thus, formally at least, only on the basis of the derogations not in any way discriminatory. From the expressly provided for in the Treaty. 73 N o r same perspective, a measure which does not did it help to clarify matters that the Court prescribe, at least not formally and directly, then considered it necessary, in the same different rules for providers of services estab- judgment, to rebut the proposition that the lished in another Member State, should like- measure in question was necessary in order wise be regarded as non-discriminatory. to preserve the cohesion of the tax system: 74 in so doing, the Court was also verifying whether that measure could be justified on the basis of requirements likely to be taken into account only in the case of measures applicable without distinction.

O n this very point, however, the case-law o n measures of the kind at issue in this case, in other words measures by 'which the confer- ring of a benefit is made conditional upon a provider of services established in the national territory being used, is not free from uncertainties and contradictions. For example, in Bachmann the Court held that the contested measure, which made the 50. I do not believe that the compatibility of deductibility of certain contributions subject a national measure with Community' law to the condition that they were paid in the may be assessed without distinction and/or Member State itself, was justifiable in the cumulatively with regard to derogations interests of the cohesion of the national tax expressly provided for in the Treaty and to system, thereby classifying the measure as grounds relating to the general interest, 75 indistinctly applicable. 72 In the later case of particularly as the justifications in question Svensson, on the other hand, the Court ruled apply in different situations which are in part that a measure which specified as a condition governed by different rules. While acknowl-

73 — Svensson (cited in footnote 53), paragraph 15. More pre- 72 — Case C-204/90 Bachmann [1992] ECR I-249. To this end, it cisely, the Court stated that 'the rule in question entails dis- is worth pointing out, the Court confined itself to noting crimination based on the place of establishment' and that that 'the requirement of an establishment is compatible accordingly it 'can only be justified on the general interest with Article 59 of the Treaty where it constitutes a con- grounds referred to in Article 56(1) of the Treaty, to which dition which is indispensable to the achievement of the Article 66 refers, and which do not include economic aims'. public-interest objective pursued' (paragraph 32). It would appear from that statement that since the general interest 74 — Idem, paragraphs 16 to 18. can justify even a prohibition, imposed by means of a 75 — On this point, it should be emphasised that Svensson is not requirement of establishment, on exercising particular the only case, nor the first, in which the Court took into activities in the territory of the State concerned, there is all consideration, for the purpose of determining whether a the more reason to regard as justified rules which entail national measure restricting freedom to provide services some disadvantages, or at any rate do not confer certain was compatible with Article 59, both the requirements set advantages, for those who choose to avail themselves of out in Article 56 and those relating to the general interest providers of services not established in the State in ques- (see, for example, Commission v Italy, cited in footnote 70, tion. paragraphs 31 and 32).

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edging that it may not be an easy matter to upon to justify it, namely the protection of establish whether or not a particular measure public health and the maintenance of a bal- is discriminatory — either because the dis- anced medical and hospital system accessible criminatory effect (in fact) is all too obvious, to everyone in a given region. The latter or because the particular features of a given requirement, it may be recalled, is expressly sector induce a degree of caution — it is mentioned in the second question submitted essential none the less to place the measure by the national court in Case C-158/96 in the proper category. (Kohll), while the Member States which sub- mitted observations have referred instead to preserving the system's financial stability. The two aims are in fact interrelated in that the latter, more immediate, objective consti- tutes, according to those Member States, the means by which the former is to be achieved.

In short, it is my view that, for the purposes of this case and in order to dispel the afore- mentioned ambiguities in the case-law, the Court should either follow Svensson and rule that discriminatory measures include those which indirectly give rise to unequal treat- ment as Between providers of services estab- lished in a given Member State and those not so established or, alternatively, confirm the approach which appears to have been adopted in Bachmann, namely that measures which do not formally lay down different rules for providers of services not established in the Member State are still deemed to be indistinctly applicable. I would merely add that the latter approach would appear at present to be more in keeping with the case- One further aspect, I believe, needs to be law in this area considered as a whole. This made clear. The points raised and the result does not of course alter the fact that a reap- arrived at in examining whether the con- praisal would be timely. tested measure is justifiable on public health grounds would be equally valid, given that it is a requirement expressly provided for in Articles 36 and 56 of the Treaty, if the con- tested measure were assumed to be discrimi- natory. 76 But the same cannot be said for the requirement of maintaining a balanced medi- cal and hospital system accessible to every- one in a given region. Even granting that this 51. Assuming that the national measure aim comes within the concept of public under consideration is to be regarded as indistinctly applicable, with respect to the Community rules on both goods and ser- 76 — See, in particular, Joined Cases C-1/90 and C-176/90 Ara- vices, I now turn to the requirements relied gonesa de Publicidad [1991] ECR I-4151, paragraph 13.

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health, in the broad sense of the term, 77 already cited those directives in judgments the fact remains that it is based entirely on where it stated that the prescription of a the financial stability of the system and thus medicinal product by a doctor in another on an economic aim, which, as such, can Member State and the purchase of such a under no circumstances justify a discrimina- product in that State provide guarantees tory measure. 78 equivalent to those afforded where prescrip- tion is by a doctor in the importing State or the product is sold through a pharmacy in the Member State into which it is imported by a private individual. 80 That case-law, which of necessity also applies to the pur- chase of all medical and surgical accessories, including a pair of spectacles, presupposes that guarantees equivalent to those provided 52. That said, let me add straight away that by doctors, pharmacists and opticians estab- the proposition, also put forward by the lished in the national territory must be Luxembourg Government, that the contested assumed to be provided by doctors, pharma- rules are necessary to ensure the quality of cists and opticians established in other Mem- medical products and services —- which, ber States as well. where travel abroad is involved, can only be checked when authorisation is requested — is devoid of any foundation. The conditions for taking up (and pursuing) the activities with which we are concerned here, like the rules governing the release of medicinal products on to the market, have been the subject of Community coordinating and har- monising directives. 79 Indeed, the Court has

77 — But the Court has so far given a narrow interpretation to the concept of 'public health' and has allowed it to be used to justify only measures aimed at preventing risks to the health of humans and animals. 78 — See the judgments cited in footnote 61. I would merely note that in Duphar the Court made clear that because Article 36 relates to measures of a non-economic nature, it cannot In those circumstances, I do not believe it is therefore justify a national measure intended 'to reduce the reasonable to argue that the health of insured operating costs of a sickness insurance scheme' (judgment cited in footnote 9, paragraph 23). persons is not adequately protected when 79 — I refer, in particular, to Council Directive 93/16/EEC of 5 they obtain health-care in another Member April 1993 to facilitate the free movement of doctors and the mutual recognition of their diplomas, certificates and State. 81 It follows, of course, that the meas- other evidence of formal qualifications (OJ 1993 L 165, p. 1), and, among the specific directives, to Council Direc- ure in question cannot be regarded as neces- tives 78/686/EEC and 78/687/EEC of 25 July 1978 con- sary for the protection of health. cerning the mutual recognition of diplomas and the coordi- nation of national provisions on dentists (OJ 1978 L 233, p. 1 and p. 10). I would also refer to Council Directives 85/432/EEC and 85/433/EEC of 16 September 1985 on the coordination of national provisions and the mutual recogni- tion of diplomas in relation to certain activities in the phar- 80 — Sec Schumacher (cited in footnote 6), paragraph 20, and maceutical sector (OJ 1985 L 253, p. 34 and p. 37). Finally, Commission v Germany (cited in footnote 6), paragraph 18. I would recall that the free movement of pharmaceutical 81 — Since the Luxembourg Government itself stated that products is ensured at Community level, with due account insured persons are free to obtain health-care in another taken of the protection of public health, by Council Direc- Member State, the question has to be asked why the afore- tive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 (OJ, English Special said public health concerns no longer arise when reimburse- Edition 1965-1966, p. 20). ment is not sought.

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53. So far as preserving the system's finan­ system, which is indeed the essential aim of cial stability is concerned, let me begin by the measure in question, is not an end in stating that this is, in my view, a requirement itself but a means which contributes (at least) worthy of protection by Community law. to providing insured persons with services of While it is true that the Court has on occa­ a certain standard in terms of both quantity sion categorically dismissed economic aims and quality. If the financial balance of the put forward to justify indistinctly applicable system were upset, the level of health protec­ measures (as well), 8 2 it is also apparent, on a tion could deteriorate with obvious and closer reading of the relevant judgments, that inevitable adverse repercussions, particularly economic aims are indeed justifiable, where for insured persons belonging to the weakest far from being an end in themselves, they are strata of society. Moreover, the Court has crucial to the operation of the system in already recognised, for example in the matter question 8 3 or affect interests of vital impor­ of equal treatment of men and women in the tance to the State. 8 4 social security sector, 8 5 and also in interpret­ ing the relevant provisions of the Staff Regu­ lations of Officials, 8 6 that the financial sta­ bility of social security systems constitutes a legitimate objective and, accordingly, one worthy of protection.

From that point of view, I believe it is beyond dispute that the preservation of the 54. I now turn to consider whether the con­ financial stability of the social security tested measure is necessary for and suited to preserving the financial stability, and thereby the continued operation, of a medical and hospital service accessible to everyone. All 82 — See Gouda (cited in footnote 63), paragraph 11. See also, more recently, Case C-398/95, Syndesmos ton en Elladi the governments which submitted observa­ Touristikon kai Taxidiotikon Grafiton [1997] ECR I-3091, paragraph 23, in which the Court stated that 'maintaining tions have argued, on this issue, that prior industrial peace as a means of bringing a collective labour authorisation is essential in order to avoid dispute to an end and thereby preventing any adverse effects on an economic sector, and consequently on the the social security institutions having to economy of the State, must be regarded as an economic aim which cannot constitute a reason relating to the genera! reimburse the cost of the benefits in question interest that justifies a restriction of a fundamental freedom in accordance with the legislation of the guaranteed by the Treaty'. 83 — I recall, for example, that in Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] Member State in which each individual ECR I-1039, the Court stated that a ground which is 'not insured person chooses to avail himself or without relevance, although it cannot in itself be regarded as an objective justification, is that lotteries may make a sig­ herself of medical care and/or to purchase nificant contribution to the financing of benevolent or pub­ lic interest activities such as social works, charitable works, medical products. They add that the Member sport or culture' (paragraph 60, emphasis added). I would State chosen will normally be the one in further refer to Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, p aragraphs 106 and 107, in which the Court upheld as egiūmate the aim of maintaining a financial and competi­ tive balance between football clubs as its purpose was to preserve a degree of equality and uncertainty as to results. 84 — This is one possible interpretation of the Court's acceptance 85 — See Case C-137/94 Richardson [1995] ECR I-3407, para­ of the cohesion of the tax system, which is undoubtedly an graphs 18 to 29. economic aim, as a ground related to the general interest 86 — See, most recendy, Case T-41/90 Barassi v Commission {Bachmann, cited in footnote 72, paragraphs 21 to 28). [1992] ECR II-159, paragraphs 32 to 35.

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which the benefit in question is considered 55. In view of this, the contested measure most advanced and is, accordingly, the most must be regarded as necessary and propor- expensive. tionate to the attainment of the aim pursued. The requirement of prior authorisation is the only means which enables the social security institutions to assume the burden of expenses incurred by insured persons in another Member State, on the terms laid down in that Member State, only where it is adjudged necessary because of the state of health of the persons insured and thus to contain excessive expenditure which could upset the financial balance of the system.

N o w it must of course be acknowledged that an obligation to reimburse, in accordance with the legislation of the different Member States, the cost of benefits which insured per- sons have chosen to avail themselves of out- side the national territory, could indeed upset the financial stability and adversely affect the continued operation of a balanced medical and hospital system accessible to everyone. In that regard, suffice it to note that, at present, the costs of health-care and The Commission, however, arguing that the rules governing the financing of health Article 22 of the Regulation imposes an obli- insurance systems differ appreciably from gation not to refuse authorisation in a par- one Member State to another. 87 Unrestricted ticular case but is silent as to other situations freedom of movement for patients could •which might arise, maintains that each case therefore lead to imbalances which would be has to be looked at individually to determine highly detrimental to those Member States in whether the grant of authorisation for a par- which the cost of benefits is significantly ticular benefit, and the attendant financial lower than the cost which their social secu- burden, would entail upsetting the financial rity institutions would have to reimburse to balance. 88 As attractive as this approach may insured persons who chose to avail them- appear, it is lacking in rigour. It is clearly the selves of such benefits in other Member case, and rightly so, that Member States States. could (and indeed can) be more generous than is required of them by Article 22 of the Regulation; I wonder, however, on the basis of what criteria national rules which autho- 87 — For an overview of current differences, see Le Grand, 'La rise insured persons to travel to other Mem- asistencia sanitaria y la construcción del mercado único: perspectiva y problemática', in Los sistemas de seguridad social y el mercado único europeo, op. cit, p. 321 et seq. See also, in relation to the more general issue of the funding of social protection, Euzeby, 'Le financement de la protection sociale dans les pays de la CEE: problèmes et perspectives', 88 — This point, it should be noted, would apply only to ser- in Quel avenir pour l'Europe sociale: 1992 et après?. Brus- vices. Having maintained that the contested measure was sels 1990, p. 133 et seq., and, by the same author, 'Finance- discriminatory in relation to the rules on goods, the Com- ment de la protection sociale, efficacité économique et jus- mission was consistent and submitted that the measure in tice sociale', in Revue du Marché commun et de l'Union question was not justifiable on the ground of protection of européenne, 1997, p. 253 et seq. public health set out in Article 36 of the Treaty.

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ber States to avail themselves of medical care, ing the stability of the systems in operation at least in the cases in which Article 22 of the in the various Member States. Regulation so requires, can be regarded as compatible with that provision, which the Commission itself deems valid, but contrary to the Treaty rules on services. 89

57. But if this is true it follows, first, that the restrictions imposed by the relevant provi- sions of Article 22, precisely because they are aimed at ensuring that insured persons may avail themselves of medical benefits in another Member State on the terms laid down by the legislation of that State, are objectively justified and hence compatible 56. Rather, it is quite true that Article 22 of with Articles 30 and 59 of the Treaty and, the Regulation in no way requires, or secondly, that the preservation of financial implies, that in cases in 'which authorisation stability, the aim pursued by the national is not granted on the ground that the condi- measure, is relevant only if and to the extent tions it lays down are not satisfied, insured that it is assumed that reimbursement by the persons must bear the full cost of the ben- competent social security institution of ben- efits concerned or are not entitled to any efits which insured persons choose to obtain form of reimbursement. The purpose of the in another Member State must be based on provision in question is to ensure that the the rules and criteria applied by the Member right of the insured to certain benefits may, State in which the benefits are provided. by derogation from the principle that a per- son is subject to a single body of legislation, which is the basis for the coordination brought about by the Regulation, also be exercised in another Member State (at least) in cases where a transfer is necessary because of the state of health of the person con- cerned. In other words, the provision in question is intended to guarantee to insured That being so, it must therefore be consid- persons the right to receive appropriate care ered whether the risk of upsetting the finan- in another Member State without suffering cial balance, and hence the need for prior financially as a result and without endanger- authorisation, still subsists if the competent social security institution is obliged to make full reimbursement in accordance not with the legislation of the Member State in which 89 — While I do not share the author's view (see paragraph 31 and footnote 36, above), I find more convincing the view the insured person received the care in ques- put forward by da Mavridis in 'Le citoyen européen peut-il se faire soigner dans l'Eut de son choix?' in Droit social, tion, but with the legislation and the tariffs 1996, p. 1086 et seq., according to which it is Article 22 in force in the Member State in which the itself, as interpreted Dy the Court in Pierik I and Pierik II (cited in footnotes 30 and 31 respectively), which requires recipient of the medical care is insured. In authorisation to be granted for all care liable to ensure other words, the question is whether reim- effective treatment of the disease from which the person concerned is suffering. bursing Mr Decker, as he claims, on the same

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O P I N I O N O F MR TESAURO — CASES C-120/95 A N D C-158/96

terms as those to which he would have been Nor, in consequence, would the maintenance entitled had he bought the spectacles from an of a medical service accessible to everyone in optician established in Luxembourg, or reim- a given region be placed in jeopardy. While it bursing Mr Kohll on the basis of the Luxem- is true that those living in border regions bourg tariff, would really have the effect of may cross the border more frequently, inter undermining the financial balance of the sys- alia for medical treatment, the fact remains tem. that the traffic is not all one-way, at least in principle, and, especially, that the benefits we have been considering do not affect the financial balance to a greater extent than if they had been obtained in the Member State of residence of the persons concerned.

58. Viewed in those terms, it is clear that dif- ferences in financing methods and in health- care costs between the various systems are immaterial for as long as the competent social security institution does not have t o reimburse benefits received by insured per- sons in another Member State in accordance with the legislation applicable in that State. It is self-evident that reimbursement to Mr Decker of the sum of LFR 1 600, t o which he would have been entitled had he purchased the spectacles from an optician established in Luxembourg, would have n o effect on the financial balance of the system, 59. I believe, however, that the position in any more than would be the case in the event relation to hospital infrastructure is quite dif- of reimbursement of orthodontic treatment ferent and requires a different answer. Unlike provided in Germany to a person insured b y the benefits provided by individual practitio- the Luxembourg health insurance fund in ners, the reality in the case of hospitals is, accordance with the 'Luxembourg' cost of first, that their location and number is deter- such treatment. 90 mined by forward-planning and, secondly, that the cost of one person's stay in a hospi- tal cannot be separated from that of the hos- 90 — The only effect I can conceive of is that one optician estab- pital as a whole. Clearly, if a large number of lished in Luxembourg will have sold one less pair of spec- insured persons chose to avail themselves of tacles and the only orthodontist established i n the same State will have lost one patient. It is therefore the individual hospital facilities located in another Member practitioners who are adversely affected and not the system itself. State, their domestic hospitals would be

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under-utilised but would have the same staff which must be provided to insured persons and equipment overheads as if they were in hospitals and, in general, to all benefits being used to full capacity. 91 which the insured person wishes to have paid or reimbursed in full by the competent social security institution. O n the other hand, the measure is not justifiable in rela- tion to the purchase of products or medical services provided by private practitioners, consisting of consultations and visits to spe- cialists, in respect of which a flat-rate reim- In other words, reimbursement, by the com- petent social security institution, of medical bursement is requested at the tariff in force benefits received by insured persons in hos- in the Member State in which the person pitals of other Member States, even on the concerned is insured. basis of a flat-rate equivalent to the 'Luxem- bourg' cost of the benefits in question, would none the less result in an additional financial burden for the system concerned. In the hospital sector, therefore, it remains essential, in order not to disrupt the financial balance of the system and to ensure the maintenance of a service which is accessible, both financially and logistically, to everyone, including therefore those who do not intend to travel but wish to receive the health-care they require in the place nearest to them, to seek and obtain prior authorisation. 92 Action by the Community legislature aimed at harmonising the area in question so as to allow genuine and effective freedom of movement for patients, which would be a significant factor in the creation of a single integrated market, would be welcome. Con- scious of the fact that this is an ambitious 60. In short, it is my view that the contested goal which is difficult to achieve at present, I measure is justified in relation to all benefits believe that the Community legislature should at least act, and do so promptly, to broaden the range of circumstances in which 91 — Of course, this does not mean I wish to associate myself authorisation may not be refused. There is with the view advanced by some Member States that, if freedom to choose one's doctor and hospital were given, no doubt that it would be advantageous in there would be an uncontrolled and uncontrollable flow of many respects for authorisation to be patients from one Member Sute to another. The fact remains that travelling to a Sute other than the Sute of granted in all cases in which the insured per- residence entails significant inconvenience, often including language difficulties, and additional costs, if only for those son could receive more effective treatment in persons accompanying the patient. another Member State or where, as was 92 — On this point, however, the question arises whether, and to what extent, the situation is otherwise, in relation to the explained in the course of the hearing in the aim of maintaining a hospital system accessible to everyone, Kohll case, there is just one specialist in the in those Member Sutes where the competent social security institution provides reimbursement, albeit on a partial and Member State of residence capable of pro- fiat-rate basis, of the cost of benefits which insured persons choose to obtain in private clinics. viding the service required.

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OPINION OF MR TESAURO - CASES C-120/95 AND C-158/96

Conclusion

61. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I suggest that the Court answer the questions referred to it by the Luxembourg Conseil Arbitral des Assurances Sociales and the Cour de Cassation respectively, as follows:

(a) in Case C-120/95

Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty are to be interpreted as precluding national rules under which a social security institution refuses to reimburse to an insured person, on the ground that prior authorisation is required for any health-care abroad, the cost of a pair of spectacles, prescribed by a doctor established in the Member State in which the insured person resides but purchased from an optician established in another Member State, in accordance with the legislation applicable in the former State;

(b) in Case C-158/96

Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty are to be interpreted as precluding national rules under which reimbursement of the cost of benefits is subject to authorisation by the insured person's social security institution if the benefits are provided in a Member State other than the State in which that person resides, on condition that and in so far as such benefits are provided outside the hospital infrastructure and the cost is reimbursed in accordance with the rules not of the State in which they are provided but of the State of insurance; on the other hand, Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty are to be interpreted as not precluding such rules where their purpose is the preserva- tion of the financial balance along with the maintenance of a hospital service acces- sible to everyone in a given region, where the benefits in question must be provided in hospitals and, in general, in respect of all benefits the cost of which is to be reim- bursed in accordance with the rules of the Member State in which they are pro- vided, rather than the Member State in which the insured person resides.

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