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Súdny dvor Európskej únie·4.3.1997

C-189/95

ECLI:EU:C:1997:101

Súd
Súdny dvor Európskej únie
IČS
61995CC0189

FRANZÉN

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL ELMER delivered on 4 March 1997 * Table of Contents

The national legislation and its background I - 59u

Systembolaget's activity in practice I - 5919 Facts I - 5925 Questions referred to the Court I . 5926

Observations submitted to the Court I - 5928

General observations on Article 30 of the Treaty I - 5930

General observations on Article 37 of the Treaty I - 5935

Is the Swedish statutory system applicable to the retail of alcoholic beverages caught by the prohibitions laid down in Articles 30 and 37 of the Treaty? I - 5937 Can the system be justified under Article 36 of the Treaty? I - 5948

The question of the transitional period and the consequences of the system's incompatibility with Articles 30 and 37 of the Treaty I - 5952 Conclusion I . 5952

1. I n the p r e s e n t reference for a p r e l i m i n a r y viously held b y t w o State u n d e r t a k i n g s . ruling the C o u r t is requested t o rule o n t h e V & S Vin & Sprit A B (hereinafter ' V & S ' ) compatibility w i t h Articles 30 a n d 37 of t h e enjoyed t h e exclusive right t o m a n u f a c t u r e E C Treaty of the Swedish legislation g o v e r n - and export spirits a n d t o i m p o r t beer, w i n e ing t h e retail sale of alcoholic beverages. and spirits. Systembolaget A B enjoyed the exclusive right to sell b y retail a n d b y w h o l e - sale t o restaurants. The national legislation and its background

2. T h e exclusive right t o p r o d u c e a n d sell alcoholic beverages in Sweden w a s p r e - 3. F o l l o w i n g the e n t r y i n t o force of t h e E E A A g r e e m e n t , c o n c l u d e d b e t w e e n , inter alia, Sweden and the C o m m u n i t y , o n 1 J a n u a r y * Original language: Danish. 1994, a Finnish c o u r t referred a q u e s t i o n t o

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O P I N I O N OF MR ELMER — CASE C-189/95

the EFTA Court for an advisory opinion on 2. Article 16 EEA must be interpreted as the compatibility with Articles 11, 13 and 16 meaning that, as from 1 January 1994, every of the EEA Agreement (which correspond in State monopoly of a commercial character substance to Articles 30, 36 and 37 of the not covered by Protocol 8 EEA must be Treaty) of a statutory system which con- adjusted so as to eliminate the exclusive right ferred on a monopolistic State undertaking to import the goods the subject of the the exclusive right to import alcoholic bever- monopoly into a Contracting Party from ages from other Member States of the EEA other Contracting Parties.' or, in the case of trade between the EEA States, required authorization from the monopolistic State undertaking to import such products and place them on the market. In Case E-l/94 Restamark1 the EFTA Court held, in particular:

4. In the negotiations concerning Sweden's ' 1 . Article 11 EEA must be interpreted as accession to the European Union, correspon- precluding a national measure which confers dence on the Swedish alcohol monopolies on a statutory State monopoly the exclusive was exchanged between the Commission and right to import alcoholic beverages falling the Swedish Government before that judg- within the product coverage of the EEA ment was delivered. 2 It was apparent from Agreement and originating in the Contract- that exchange of correspondence that the ing Parties, or the application to intra-EEA Commission — subject to future judgments trade of national provisions which require of the Court of Justice and its own role as the authorization of. the statutory State guardian of the Treaty — did not consider it monopoly for the importation and putting appropriate to take measures of its own ini- into free circulation of such products, even if tiative against the retail monopoly, provided such an authorization is granted automati- that the production, wholesale and import cally. Neither can such measures be justified monopolies were dismantled and any dis- under Article 13 EEA merely because they crimination against products from other form part of an alcohol policy aimed at mini- Member States was precluded. 3 mizing the injurious effects to health of con- sumption of alcoholic beverages, since this objective can be achieved by measures which 2 — See the letter of 20 December 1993 sent by Commissioner H. are less restrictive of the free movement of van den Broek to the Minister for European Affairs, U. Din- goods. kelspiel. 3 — It is apparent from the minutes of an exchange of views between Sweden and the Commission on 21 December 1993 that the Commission attached particular importance to the publication of rules on the purchase and sale of alcoholic products, to the objectivity and transparency of those rules 1 — See Report of the EFTA Court, 1 January 1994-30 June 1995, and to the provision of consumer information on new prod- p. 17. ucts so that those products might attract consumers.

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FRANZÉN

The Act of Accession contains no specific 6. That reform of the Swedish legislation on provisions on trade in alcoholic beverages. alcohol was effected by the Alkohollag of 16 Finland and Sweden made a unilateral decla- December 1994 5 (Law on Alcohol, hereinaf- ration, * according to which the Conference ter 'the Law'), which entered into force on 1 at ministerial level was informed of the January 1995. The statement of reasons in abovementioned exchange of letters with the the draft law 6 states, inter alia, the follow- Commission. ing:

'Excessive consumption of alcohol creates considerable social, medical and socio- 5. With effect from Sweden's accession to economic problems. This is why Sweden has the European Union on 1 January 1995, for a long time had a restrictive policy on V&S's exclusive rights to produce and export alcohol. spirits and to import beer, wine and spirits were abolished, as was Systembolaget's exclusive right to sell alcohol beverages by wholesale to restaurants.

At the same time, far-reaching changes tak- ing place in the outside world are having an impact on the alcohol policy pursued up to now. According to the committee respon- sible for alcohol policy, having regard to the process of integration going on in Europe Those rights were replaced by a system and the foreseeable intensification of social under which traders may import and sell by and cultural exchanges, strong action in the wholesale spirits, wine and beer, provided matter of alcohol will be necessary in future that they have a licence to do so, and resell in order to limit consumption, reduce alco- those products to Systembolaget or to hold- holism and combat the injurious effects of ers of serving licences. alcohol.

Current Swedish policy on alcohol is based However, Systembolaget's exclusive right to on a balance between high taxation, restric- retail alcoholic beverages was maintained.

5 — SFS 1994: 1738. 6 — See Regeringens proposition 1994/95: 89, Förslag til alkohol- 4 — OJ 1994 C 241, p. 398. lag, p. 48.

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OPINION OF MR ELMER — CASE C-189/95

tions, information and opinion-forming and it draws up rules on the marketing of alco- efforts in relation to treatment. The condi- holic beverages and guidelines for retail sales tions for using pricing as a means of alcohol of these beverages. In the sectors in which policy will change. The weighting between monopolies in alcohol must be abolished, the various means will therefore have to that is to say, the manufacturing, import and change and information, opinion-forming wholesale sectors, the principle takes on a and other preventive measures will acquire new meaning. Previously, State action was increased importance in efforts to bring intended to preclude private interests from about new drinking habits in our country. the alcohol trade. From now on, the guiding principle will be the control of market forces through a system of licences, supervision and sanctions which will be administered by a new alcohol authority.'

The fundamental aim of Swedish alcohol policy throughout the twentieth century has been to limit the effect of market forces, namely competition and private profits. The 7. The Law refers to 'alkoholdrycker' (here- reason for this was the conviction that com- inafter 'alcoholic beverages'), defined in petition and private profits encourage active Article 3 of Chapter 1 of the Law as bever- marketing and active selling, which lead to ages having an alcoholic strength of more increased consumption. The greater the than 2.25% by volume. The beverages number of undertakings having an interest in referred to are classified as 'sprit', 'vin', increased alcohol sales, the better alcoholic 'starköl' and 'öl'. 'Sprit' (hereinafter 'spirits') beverages will fare in the competition for is defined in Chapter 1, Article 2, as any liq- consumers' money. In the case of a sector uid of more than 2.25% alcohol by volume, which society does not wish to see expand, with the exception of 'vin', 'starköl' and 'öl'. market mechanisms such as competition and 'Vin' (hereinafter 'wine') means a fermented profit are not particularly suitable as means beverage based on grapes or other fruit with of control. an alcoholic strength of not more than 22% by volume, see Chapter 1, Article 5. Accord- ing to Chapter 1, Article 6 of the Law, 'starköl' (literally 'strong beer') is a fer- mented beverage made from malt having an alcoholic strength of more than 3.5% by vol- ume. Where the alcoholic strength by vol- In the Government's view, the principle of ume is higher than 2.25% but below 3.5% limiting private profits in the alcohol trade the product comes within the category 'öl' remains valid and must guide the State when (literally 'beer', hereinafter 'light beer').

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Imports Manufacturing and wholesale licences

Artide 2 of Chapter 4, on imports, is worded as follows:

8. Under Chapter 2, Articles 1 and 2, of the Law, only traders in possession of a special licence (manufacturing licence) are autho- rized to produce alcoholic beverages. 'Spirits, wine and beer may only be imported into Sweden by a trader holding a produc- tion or wholesale licence for such products

9. Under Article 1 of Chapter 4 of the Law, Questioned on this provision at the hearing, special authorization (a wholesale licence) is the Swedish Government confirmed that required to engage in wholesale trade in spir- Article 2 of Chapter 4 means that a producer its, wine and beer. However, a manufacturing or intermediary who is established and exer- licence automatically entitles the holder to cises a lawful activity in another Member engage in wholesale trade in the correspond- State can only sell his products on the Swed- ing products. ish market via an intermediary holding a Swedish wholesale licence or if the producer himself has obtained a wholesale licence from the Swedish authorities and paid the associated charges, of which more below.

Under Article 5 of Chapter 4, a person hold- Neither Systembolaget nor holders of serv- ing a manufacturing or wholesale licence ing licences are authorized to import alco- may (only) sell his goods to Systembolaget, holic beverages but under the Law requires to other persons holding manufacturing or that they purchase only from traders who wholesale licences covering the same prod- hold a Swedish production or wholesale ucts or to the holders of serving licences licence. relating to such products.

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O P I N I O N OF MR ELMER — CASE C-189/95

Charges payable for licences 9 200) and the surcharge is SKR 50 (approxi­ mately E C U 5.8) per 1 000 litres, so that the overall charge comes to SKR 0.056 per litre where the whole band is utilized.

10. Article 4 of Chapter 7 deals with licences. The applicant must pay a charge when submitting his application and the holder of a manufacturing or wholesale Retail trade licence must also pay an annual monitoring charge intended to finance the permanent monitoring of compliance with the condi­ tions of the grant of the Učence and the application of the Law. The authority responsible for administering licences and for control is the Alkoholinspektion (Alco­ 11. Chapter 5 of the Law covers the retail hol Inspectorate). The procedures are laid sale of spirits, wine and beer. down in the 'Alkoholförordningen' (Alcohol Regulation). 7 Article 10 of the Alcohol Regulation provides that the charge payable on submitting an application is to be SKR 25 000 (approximately E C U 3 000).

Article 1 of Chapter 5 is worded as follows:

The permanent monitoring charge (see Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the Alcohol Regu­ lation) consists of a basic charge and a vari­ able surcharge. The charge corresponds to production bands and the overall charge per 'A company limited by shares (a retail com­ litre decreases as volume increases. For pany), owned by the State, 8 shall be formed example, the basic charge (with no surcharge specifically for the purpose of retailing spir­ payable) for wine in the 0-50 000 litres band its, wine and beer. is SKR 10 000 (approximately E C U 1 165), so that the overall charge where the band is fully utilized comes to SKR 0.2 per litre. In the 1 001 000-5 000 000 litres band, the basic charge is SKR 79 000 (approximately E C U

The retail company shall not import, export 7 — Sec SFS 1994: 2046, i s most recently amended by SFS 1995: or manufacture the alcoholic beverages 1215. Following the 1995 amendment, Article 18 provides referred to in the preceding paragraph. that the charge is to be calculated provisionally at the begin­ ning of each calendar year on the basis of the estimated vol­ ume of sales. At the end of the year the licensee must declare actual sales. According to the available information, however, it is not clear whether a refund is made where sales are lower than forecast- 8 — This is the company known as Systembolaget.

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If it has a wholesale licence, the retail com- Article 5 of Chapter 5 provides that spirits, pany may sell to the holders of serving wine and beer which are not stocked are to licences. 9 be supplied upon demand by the retail com- pany, unless it does not consider it possible to supply them.

The provisions relating to the activity and operation of the retail company and its spe- Under Article 6 of Chapter 5, food stores, cific control by the State shall be adopted in Systembolaget and producers in possession an agreement between the company and the of a manufacturing licence are authorized to State.' retail light beer.

12. The agreement referred to in Chapter 5, Article 2 of Chapter 5 provides as follows: Article 1, of the Law between the State and Systembolaget, I0 of which the State is sole shareholder, provides that Systembolaget is to conduct its activities in such a way as to prevent, as far as possible, the harmful pub- lic, social and medical consequences associ- ated with the consumption of alcohol. 'Spirits, wine and beer shall only be retailed by the retail company.

Paragraph 4 of the agreement is worded as follows:

The retail company shall determine the loca- tion of points of sale in accordance with the guidelines laid down in the agreement between the State and the company.' 'Products shall be selected by the company in such a way that national products are not 9 — Systembolaget has a wholesale licence and is therefore able favoured. Selection must be based only on an to sell to the holders of serving licences. It is apparent from page 3 of the report the Konkerrensvcrket (Competition evaluation of the quality of the product, the Authority) of 7 November 1996 submitted to the Commis- sion on the situation of alcoholic beverages in the Swedish market, that the market in sales of wine and spirits to restau- rants in 1995 represented 7% of the total market in wine and spirits and that Systembolaget was the dominant supplier for 10 — See Tillkännagivande av avtal meliem Systembolaget Aktie- that year in that market (too). bolig och Suten, SFS 1994: 2049.

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OPINION OF MR ELMER — CASE C-189/95

particular risks of injurious effects of the Law, to act reasonably, to provide a quality product, customer demand and other com- service to its customers and to ensure that mercial and ethical considerations. the State receives a reasonable return on its capital without making the products unnec- essarily expensive.

Upon application by a supplier whose prod- uct has not been accepted or has been dropped from the company's range, the company shall inform him in writing of the Serving licences reasons for its decision. The supplier shall be informed of the remedies available before the Alkoholsortimentsnämnd against the compa- ny's decisions.

13. Chapter 6 of the Law concerns serving The range referred to in this agreement is the licences. Article 5 of Chapter 6 provides: range in the company's ordinary price list.' 'Holders of serving licences may purchase the spirits, wine and beer necessary for their activities only from holders of wholesale licences relating to such products'.

The agreement also establishes that System- bolagets marketing is to be impartial and that, within the limits of the Law and the restrictions which it imposes on the advertis- ing of alcoholic products, the company is to Penalties take steps to ensure that its customers are acquainted with new products.

Lastly, the agreement provides that System- bolaget's trading margin is to be determined 14. Pursuant to Article 2 of Chapter 10 of according to the objective criteria applicable the Law, anyone who sells alcoholic bever- to both domestic products and imported ages, whether intentionally or negligently, products and that Systembolaget is to pursue without authorization is liable to a fine or to its retail activities in accordance with the a sentence of up to two years' imprisonment.

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Marketing wine and spirits market came to approxi- mately 7% (corresponding to some 10 mil- lion litres). In 1995 Systembolaget was the dominant supplier of wine and spirits to serving outlets. 12

15. The marketing of spirits, wine, beer and light beer is governed by the Lag (1978: 763) med vissa bestämmelser om marknadsföring av alkoholdrycker (Law enacting certain measures governing the marketing of alco- holic beverages). n This law provides that advertising and other marketing measures are 17. Systembolaget offers its selection of not to be pressing or insistent and are not to products to consumers in 384 shops, which encourage the consumption of alcoholic bev- represents one shop per 23 039 inhabitants or erages. The Law generally prohibits the one shop per 1 172 km 2 . In the shops the advertising of alcoholic products on televi- customer is served personally at the counter sion or radio or in newspapers or other peri- and only a few products are on display. The odicals. shops are all open from Monday to Friday from 9.30 a. m. until 6.00 p. m. The majority of shops are also open until 7.00 p. m. on Thursdays. All the shops are closed on Sat- urdays and also on Sundays and public holi- days. Apart from Systembolaget's shops Systembolaget's activity in practice there are approximately 550 delivery points, for example food stores, where products can be ordered from Systembolaget's catalogue and delivered later. The products can also be ordered along 56 bus routes and on 45 rural post rounds.

16. In 1995 Systembolaget and holders of serving licences sold a total of approximately 336 million litres of wine, beer and spirits, representing 38 litres per inhabitant. System- bolaget's share was approximately 248 mil- lion litres (30 million litres of spirits, 110 million litres of wine and 108 million litres 18. All Systembolaget's purchases for resale of beer). Sales by holders of serving licences are centralized. A particular shop cannot were principally of beer (approximately 78 therefore purchase its stock independently. It million litres in all), while their share of the

12 — The majority of these figures are taken from pages 3 and 4 11 — As amended by the Lag om ändring af lagen (1978: 763) of the report referred to m footnote 9. The others have been med vissa bestämmelser om marknadsföring av alkoholdry- inferred from the figures provided in the report. See also cker (Law amending the law enacting certain measures gov- the letter of 19 August 1996 from A. L. Galatius, Primeur erning the marketing of alcoholic beverages) of 20 Decem- Vin AB, in which it is stated that the serving outlets' share ber 1994, SFS 1994: 1740. of the wine market was 6%.

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O P I N I O N O F MR ELMER — CASE C-189/95

follows in particular from paragraph 8.2 of 21. There are therefore 74 holders of manu­ the 'Sammanställning av bestämmelser vid facturing or wholesale licences who do not försäljning till Systembolaget' (hereinafter supply Systembolaget. Either they sell to the 'conditions of sale and supply') that: holders of beverage outlet licences in compe­ 'Any producer, supplier or agent thereof tition with Systembolaget, which is the who attempts to influence sales by contact dominant supplier to restaurants and similar with Systembolaget's staff shall be prose­ establishments, or they have a licence with­ cuted. Wholesalers, manufacturers and their out selling anything, for example because agents shall not normally have any contact they have applied for a Učence in order to be with shops other than when delivering goods able to submit offers to Systembolaget but or making purchases in such shops in their have not succeeded in selling their products private capacity. Fact-finding visits to shops, to Systembolaget. 1 5 for example with guests from abroad, shall be notified beforehand to Systembolaget's commercial department.'

19. Systembolaget purchases products from traders who hold a manufacturing or whole­ 22. 130 of Systembolaget's suppliers (87%) sale licence. 1 3 O n 7 October 1996 a total of together delivered less than 1 % in volume of 223 licences for the manufacture and/or Systembolaget's products. Having regard to wholesale of spirits, wine and/or beer had the criteria of sales figures for a product been issued. , 4 which determine whether it remains in Sys­ tembolaget's basic assortment or in its trial assortment (see my observations below on the various assortments), it must be pre­ sumed that these suppliers' products are mainly in the temporary assortment and are only sold for a short period through System­ bolaget's sales network or that they are in the 'available to order' assortment, which is 20. However, in September 1996 Systembo­ not stocked by Systembolaget. It is not clear laget had a total of only 149 suppliers. from the evidence before the Court to what extent these 130 suppliers are able to sell the same products to holders of beverage outlet 13 — It is apparent from a Government decision of 5 October licences; moreover, in this market they 1995 that foreigners operating from their own countries are not required to have a permanent establishment in Sweden in order to obtain wholesale and import licences. However, it is apparent from a survey carried out by the Alkoholins­ pektion on 7 October 1996 that all holders of wholesale licences were undertakings established in Sweden. The 15 — It may be the case that licensed manufacturers export their Commission stated at the hearing that it was investigating, products. It is apparent from the papers before the Court inter alia, whether representation was required. that there are actually some products of Swedish manufac­ 14 — See the Alkoholinspektion's list of undertakings with ture, e. g. Absolut Rod 50% vodka, which are not included wholesale and manufacturing licences. in Systembolaget's various assortments.

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compete with Systembolaget to sell the wine and a 66.6% share of the market in products which they succeed in selling to spirits. I8 Systembolaget. ,6

In the same period the overall retail-market share of the 10 largest suppliers of wine and spirits was 71.8% for wine and 96% for spir- 23. Out of the 223 licence-holders and the its. 19 149 suppliers to Systembolaget, therefore, only 19 suppliers remain. These 19 suppliers represent 8.5% of the 223 licence-holders and 13% of the 149 suppliers to Systembo- laget. However, it is these 19 suppliers who supply more than 99% in volume of the products sold to Systembolaget. 17 Having In the period January-September 1996 the regard to the sales figure criteria described retail-market share of Swedish-manufactured below, it must be presumed that it is mainly spirits and beer was 51.3% for spirits and or exclusively the products of these 19 sup- 83.1% for beer. 20 pliers which are in Systembolaget's basic assortment and which are therefore perma- nently on offer.

24. Systembolaget's total range consists of a basic assortment, a trial assortment, a provi- sional assortment and a 'by order' assort- ment.

Among these 19 suppliers who make 99% of the deliveries to the monopoly which supplies the entire retail market in Sweden, the main supplier is the State-owned company V&S, which, as I have already said, previously had a statutory monopoly for the The basic assortment consists mainly of import and export of spirits, wine and beer products in the low and medium price cat- and the manufacture of spirits. In September egories. 21 Only some 35 shops carry the full 1996, V&Shad a 35% share of the market in basic assortment, but it is available to order

16 — Apparently, Systembolaget does not undertake to purchase 18 — See Annex 1(c) to the report referred to in footnote 9 on a specific product from the wholesaler who is the official the situation of alcoholic beverages on the Swedish market, distributor of that product. However, I am unaware from which it is also apparent that the share of the retail whether Systembolaget imposes obligations of exclusivity beer market held by the three largest Swedish breweries is on wholesalers, prohibiting them from competing with Sys- 72%. tembolaget by supplying a product that they sell to System- 19 — See Annex 1(c) to the report referred to in footnote 9. bolaget to holders of serving licences. 20 — See tables 2A and 2D in the report referred to in footnote 9. 17 — See page 3 of the report referred to in footnote 9. 21 — See paragraph 2.2.1 of the conditions of sale and delivery.

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OPINION OF MR ELMER — CASE C-189/95

in all shops. The trial assortment is made up Court give no indication of whether signifi- of some of the products which are not cant use is made of this possibility in prac- immediately purchased as part of the basic tice. assortment. As explained in paragraphs 30 and 31 below, where a prospective supplier's offer is refused by Systembolaget he may request that the product be tested according to a special procedure, following which it may be included in the trial assortment and then, provided certain conditions as to quan- tity are met, in the basic assortment. 25. The basic assortment, the trial assort- ment and the provisional assortment appear in an overall price list published approxi- mately seven times a year. It is aimed at con- sumers, who are able to obtain copies in the shops, and it is also sent to the 9 000 restau- rants and other outlets in possession of a serving licence, which are also able to pur- According to paragraph 2.2.1 of the condi- chase their alcoholic beverages from System- tions of sale and supply, the provisional bolaget. Consumers can take out an annual assortment consists of '... brands of limited subscription to the price list, at a cost of availability, often only for a month or two, SKR 100 (approximately E C U 11.65). Each for example vintage wines, seasonal drinks or shop also has a list of the products which it types of goods of which customers demand a stocks. varied supply.'

The 'by order' assortment consists of prod- 26. Systembolaget draws up an annual pur- ucts which Systembolaget does not stock but chase plan, which is revised every quarter. which are stocked by licensed wholesalers. Purchases take the form of an invitation to Products in this assortment appear in a spe- licensed manufacturers and wholesalers to cial price list. Products which are ordered are tender for delivery of products of a specific subsequently delivered to the Systembolaget type and possibly from a particular produc- shop where the order was taken. Finally, tion region, 21 for example: Beaujolais, red, there is an import service: at the customer's fleurie; Italy, red, vino nobile; Rioja, red, request, Systembolaget will import a particu- reserva. Traders without a manufacturing or lar product which is not in any of its assort- wholesale licence are unable to tender. ments. The minimum quantity which can be ordered is one case, or ten cases of beer. The purchaser pays the handling and transport 22 — See paragraph 2.3.2 of the conditions of sale and delivery charges and the duty. The papers before the and Systembolaget's 1997 product plan.

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27. The tenders received are first dealt with 30. Where a product is not placed in the by Systembolaget's buyers, who examine basic assortment, the licensee who offered it whether the price is favourable and assess may, within two months from the decision previous experience with the production rejecting it, register the product with a view region and type of products concerned. Fol- to a trial sale. 24 The product is then tested lowing this initial examination approxi- with other products registered in the same mately half the products offered are rejected. category and the same price range by a panel of 13 consumers chosen from a list of approximately 400 consumers selected beforehand by Jordbrukets provkök, a com- pany owned by the agricultural unions.

28. The remaining half then undergo a 'blind' test by members of Systembolaget's staff. The products receiving the highest points in each category are then placed in the basic assortment or in the provisional assort- ment.

As an example of how such a tasting pro- cedure may go we can take the tasting of a 29. If a product is to remain in the basic Riesling Kaefferkopf (vintage and producer assortment, its sales in each 52-week period not indicated) on 24 September 1996 by nine must reach a minimum amount expressed in women and four men who, according to the both market share and volume, failing which record, often buy/drink dry white wine cost- it is taken out of the assortment (dropped ing around SKR 100. The tasting provoked from the list). 23 For wine, the thresholds the following comments: 'light and clear in currently applicable are a minimum volume colour, delicate bouquet, very good'; 'fresh of 27 000 litres, corresponding to 36 000 and light, fruity taste, floral bouquet'; 'excel- bottles, and a market share of 0.5% (red lent!!'; 'pleasant, fruity bouquet, average wine) or 1% (white wine) in one of the fol- taste, will add nothing'; 'too anonymous'. lowing price categories: (1) under SKR 60 Following the tasting this wine, which con- (under E C U 7.1), (2) SKR 60-79 (ECU noisseurs rank among Alsace's finest, ** 7.1-9.3), (3) SKR 80-119 (ECU 9.4-14.1) and obtained a score of 8-5. (4) SKR 120 and over (ECU 14.2 and over).

24 — See paragraph 2.5.1 of the conditions of sale and delivery. 25 — Kaefferkopf from Ammerschwihr, Alsace, France, was clas- 23 — See paragraph 2.3.4 of the conditions of sale and delivery sified as a Grand Cru in 1983, see Raymond Dumay, Guide and Annex 2: c Sortimcntsutvärdcring — Regelverk, which du Vin, p. 98. Wines from here are not only well known but is set out in Annex 4(b) to the report referred to in footnote also very highly thought of, see Hugh Johnson, Wine '97, 9; sec p. 5 et seq. of that report. p. 60.

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31. Where the product obtains a majority of increasing sales of a product are taken into positive votes it is placed in the 'trial' assort­ account, so that the product may, depending ment appearing in Systembolageťs overall on circumstances, be included in the basic price list. The price list does not state that it assortment even where sales are lower than is a 'trial' product. However, only a limited the minimum thresholds, or the sales period number of special 'trial' shops stock the may be extended. 26 'trial' product. Where sales of the product over 26 weeks reach a certain threshold, a minimum volume of 13 500 litres for wine, corresponding to 18 000 bottles, and a mar­ ket share in the price category in question of 0.5% for red wine or 1% for white wine, the product is transferred to the basic assortment 33. Paragraph 2.3.4 of the conditions of sale and thereby made subject to the conditions and delivery provides, in particular, as fol­ relating to sales figures described in para­ lows: graph 29. The criteria applicable during the trial period are therefore actually the same as those applicable to the basic assortment, since the sales period is reduced by half, to six months, with a corresponding reduction in the volume criteria, the only difference 'A product which has been dropped from being that 'trial' products are only stocked in the basic assortment or the "trial" assort­ a limited number of shops. It the trial sales ment cannot be reconsidered until two years fail to reach the minimum thresholds men­ have elapsed.' tioned above the product is dropped from the list and the remaining stocks are returned to the licensee at his expense. 2 7

34. N e w products are presented in Vare Nytt, which appears monthly. A subscription to the price list also covers that publication, in which each new product is depicted, together with a brief description of its taste, 32. It is apparent from the report of the suggested accompaniments and a brief Konkurrensverket, 2 S p. 8, that a product is description of the region of production and not automatically dropped from the list the producer. where the thresholds are not reached; in practice, circumstances are taken into account, to a certain extent. For example,

26 — According to paragraph 2.5.2 of the conditions of sale and 35. The October 1995 price list included ' delivery, there are two groups of 'trial' shops, each consist­ ing of 30 shops spread throughout the country. Each group 2 454 products, including 1 584 wines (660 represents approximately 2 0 % of total sales. red wines, 748 white wines, 52 rosé wines 27 — Sec p. 6 of the report of the Konkurrensverket referred to in footnote 9. and 124 sparking wines, including 50 cham­ 28 — See footnote 9. pagnes).

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These 2 454 products were made up as fol- It is impossible to ascertain from the avail- lows: 1 288 products in the basic assortment, able evidence whether the offers submitted 930 in the temporary [provisional?] assort- by the public companyV&Swere rejected to ment and 236 in the trial assortment. the same extent as those submitted by other holders of wholesale licences.

36. Systembolaget received 12 576 offers during the first eight months of 1996. 29 37. The four principal wine-supplying coun- Examination of 5 159 of these offers had not tries during the first eight months of 1996 yet been completed when the Konkurrens- were Spain (30.8%), Italy (12.9%), Germany verket delivered its report on the situation (10.7%) and France (9.6%). 30 on the Swedish market in alcohol on 7 November 1996. It is to be presumed that of the 7 417 offers whose examination had been completed, 3 608 (approximately 49% of the offers whose examination had been com- Facts pleted) were rejected in the preliminary examination, since it is stated that only 3 809 of these offers (approximately 5 1 % of the offers whose examination had been com- pleted) reached the tasting stage. Of the 3 809 offers tested, 2 700 (70% of the offers 38. At the beginning of April 1994 Harry tested and 36% of the offers whose examina- Franzén, who at the time owned a food store tion had been completed) were rejected. The in Röstånga, purchased a quantity of wine in remaining 908 offers (12% of the offers Denmark which he imported into Sweden. whose examination had been completed) After selling most of this wine in his shop on which were accepted by Systembolaget and 7 April 1994, he again sold wine in his shop the products to which they related were pur- on 1 January 1995, which was the day of chased as part of the basic assortment, the Sweden's accession to the European Union. 'trial' assortment or the temporary [provi- He had purchased some of that wine from sional?] assortment. Systembolaget and some came from the wine which he had previously imported from Denmark.

In all, 6 509 offers, or 88% of the 7 417 offers whose examination had been completed by the reference date, were therefore rejected by 39. The Public Prosecutor prosecuted Harry Systembolaget. Franzén for unlawfully selling and keeping alcoholic beverages. Mr Franzén was charged

29 — Sec p. 5 of the report of trie Konkurrensverket referred to in footnote 9. 30 — Sec Table 2B of the report referred to in footnote 9.

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with, inter alia, selling 20 bottles of wine and 2. Is a statutory monopoly such as that of 5 litres of wine in cartons and with keeping Systembolaget contrary to Article 37 of the 12 other bottles of wine and 1 litre of wine Treaty of Rome and, if so, must the in a carton, contrary to Chapter 3, Article 1, monopoly be abolished or is an adjustment and Chapter 10, Articles 2 and 5, of the possible? Swedish Law on Alcohol.

3. If a monopoly such as that of Systembo- laget is to be regarded as being contrary to 40. Harry Franzen denied having committed Article 37, is any period of adjustment avail- an offence and claimed, in particular, that the able or should it have been abolished or an charge, in so far as it related to the sales on 1 adjustment made by 1 January 1995?' January 1995, was based on rules of law which were contrary to Article 30 of the Treaty, which prohibits quantitative restric- tions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect, and Article 37, which pro- vides that Member States are to adjust any State monopolies of a commercial character 42. The national court stated as follows in so as to ensure that no discrimination the order for reference: regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of Member States.

'Examination of the proceedings brought by the public prosecutor raises the question whether a person can be sentenced for hav- Questions referred to the Court ing acted in breach of a rule of law which is contrary to Community law. The Law on Alcohol is structured in such as way as to enact a basic prohibition of selling alcoholic beverages. As far as retail is concerned, a derogation from that prohibition gives Sys- 41. By order of 14 June 1995 the Landskrona tembolaget the exclusive right to engage in Tingsrätt (District Court, Landskrona) such trade. It can indeed be argued that even stayed the proceedings and asked the Court if Systembolaget's monopoly position were to answer the following questions: to be regarded as being contrary to Commu- nity law, this still does not mean that ordi- nary persons have a right to sell alcoholic beverages anywhere they wish, since a basic prohibition of sale still subsists. However, it was not the legislature's intention to enact a ' 1 . Is a statutory monopoly such as that of total prohibition on retailing alcoholic bever- Systembolaget compatible with Article 30 of ages but the aim of the Law is to give Sys- the Treaty of Rome? tembolaget an exclusive right in this regard.

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The Court considers that, in order to be able system in its entirety and not merely as it to give judgment in the case, it must be relates to the various points of sale. determined whether Systembolaget's monopoly is contrary to Community law.'

44. By the questions which it has referred to the Court, the national court seeks in effect to ascertain whether Articles 30 and 37 of It follows that there is a close link between the Treaty are to be interpreted as precluding the statutory prohibition on the sale of alco- a statutory arrangement for the retail of alco- holic beverages and the monopoly conferred holic beverages such as the one described. on Systembolaget, so that the national court Answering these questions will entail in this considered that in order to be able to give case examining if there is a transitional judgment in the main proceedings it was period for the Kingdom of Sweden such as necessary to determine the question whether that referred to in Article 37 of the Treaty Systembolaget's monopoly is contrary to and whether the arrangement may be justi- Community law. fied under Article 36 on grounds of the pro- tection of health and life of humans.

43. The national court also described the characteristics of the monopoly which result 45. The wording of the questions appears to from the Law and the agreement between indicate that the national court is also asking the State and Systembolaget. That descrip- the Court to consider whether the national tion is, moreover, consistent with the scheme in question must be abolished, or account given above. It follows from those whether it might be adjusted. In that regard, characteristics that the purpose of Systembo- I would observe that in the context of the laget is to limit sales of alcoholic beverages. cooperation procedure established by Article There is a centralized system in which a 177 of the Treaty, the Court only has juris- single undertaking owns and exploits all diction to rule on the interpretation of Com- points of sale and also takes decisions relat- munity law and, as regards the specific case, ing to purchases and marketing. The effect of to provide the national court with the infor- this statutory link between Systembolaget mation which may enable it to determine and the points of sale is to create an indivis- whether the national scheme is contrary to ible whole. In order to answer the questions Community law and, accordingly, must not referred, it is therefore necessary, in the be applied. The Court has consistently held opinion of the national court, to consider the that both Article 30 and Article 37 of the

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OPINION OF MR ELMER — CASE C-189/95

Treaty have direct effect, 31 so that it is for the minimum thresholds in market share and the national court to ensure that it does not quantity, the opaque and subjective selection apply any national provision which is procedure and the requirement for a whole- incompatible with those articles. sale licence, which also applies to exporters from other Member States who seek access to the Swedish market, have the cumulative effect that it is difficult for products from other Member States to penetrate the Swed- ish market. 46. I consider that all the questions referred by the national court should be dealt with together. In what follows I shall first summa- rize the observations submitted to the Court. I shall then examine, more generally, the substance of Articles 30 and 37 of the Treaty, before addressing the question whether the national statutory system for the retail of alcoholic beverages described above is com- The Law is also contrary to Article 37 of the patible with those provisions and if not Treaty. Article 37 is designed to ensure that whether it can be justified under Article 36 the prohibition in Article 30 is not circum- of the Treaty. Finally, I shall devote some vented by national monopolies of a commer- argument to the question whether there is a cial character. transitional period and to the effect of incompatibility with Articles 30 and 37 of the Treaty.

Observations submitted to the Court Lastly, Mr Franzén maintains that the restriction on the free movement of goods which results from Systembolaget's statutory monopoly cannot be regarded as justified under Article 36 of the Treaty. In Mr Fran- zén's view it is legitimate to seek to limit 47. Mr. Harry Franzen maintains that the alcohol consumption but Systembolaget is Law is contrary to Article 30 in several not the appropriate instrument for doing respects. First, it constitutes an obstacle to this. Rather, the monopoly increases the con- access of imported products to the Swedish sumption of illegal home-distilled alcohol, market. Systembolaget is the sole sales chan- which represents a greater risk to health. nel to consumers. The limitation of the num- Official alcohol consumption in Sweden, ber of shops, the majority of which only which amounts to 5.3 litres of alcohol per stock a small proportion of the total range, inhabitant (1993), is much lower than the corresponding figure for Denmark, for example, where it stands at 10 litres per 31 — See, for example Case 74/76 Iannelli v Aleroni [1977] ECR inhabitant. However, it is necessary to add 557 and Case 45/75 REWE v Hauptzollamt Landau [1976] secret consumption, which covers both ECR 181.

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FRANZÉN

private imports and illegal home-distilled protection of public health, as provided for alcoholic beverages and amounts to approxi- in Article 36 of the Treaty. mately 40% of recorded consumption. Moreover, the monopoly is contrary to the principle of proportionality, since less restrictive measures, namely a system of approval of private traders, would allow sales to be kept low. Nor, in so far as it applies to Article 37, is Article 36 of the Treaty able to 49. The French Government considers that a justify a derogation from Article 37 of the retail monopoly which does not hinder Treaty. access to the market by imported products and which does not make their access more difficult than for domestic products does not fall within the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty. To determine whether that is the pos- ition it is necessary, in the French Govern- ment's view, to take into account criteria such as the number of points of sale, their opening hours, the choice of products offered by the monopoly, the way in which 48. The Swedish Government, supported by these products are distributed throughout the Finnish Government and the Norwegian the shops and the way in which the Government, which has intervened pursuant monopoly markets competing products. A to Article 20 of the Rules of Procedure as a retail monopoly which does not discriminate Member State of the EEA, claims that against products from other Member States Articles 30 and 37 of the Treaty do not pro- or hinder the access of such products to the hibit a system such as the Swedish system, market is compatible with Article 37 of the provided that all discrimination, in law or in Treaty. fact, between imported products and national products is precluded. That con- dition is met. The national retail monopoly is an essential ingredient of Swedish policy on alcohol, which aims to limit sales and, accordingly, consumption of alcoholic bever- ages. 50. The Commission maintains the point of view which it expressed during the negotia- tions on access with the Swedish Govern- ment, but at the hearing it explained that it had sent the Swedish Government a formal letter in which it expressed doubts as to the compatibility with Article 30 of an alleged condition of representation, of the charge payable on submitting an application, of the condition that holders of serving licences In the opinion of the Swedish, Finnish and must have an import licence and, finally, of Norwegian Governments, a system such as the prohibition on sending alcoholic bever- the Swedish system must in any event be ages to Sweden from another Member State regarded as justified on grounds of the as gifts.

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General observations on Article 30 of the over the free movement of goods. 33 As was Treaty made clear in the 'Cassis de Dijon' judgment, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale v Bundesmo- nopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649, this case-law is based on the prin- ciple of mutual recognition. Products which have been lawfully produced in one Member State must be able to be marketed in other 51. Article 30 of the Treaty prohibits quan- Member States without having to satisfy the titative restrictions on imports and any requirements in force in those Member measure having equivalent effect between States. Member States.

54. In Keck and Mithouard 34 the Court held 52. The Court has consistently held that any that the application to products from other measures which are capable of hindering, Member States of national provisions directly or indirectly, actually or potentially restricting or prohibiting certain selling intra-Community trade are to be regarded as arrangements is not such as to hinder, measures having an effect equivalent to directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, quantitative restrictions. 32 trade between Member States, so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and those from other Member States. 53. The Court has consistently held that this condition is met by obstacles to free move- ment of goods which, in the absence of har- monization of legislation, are the conse- quence of applying to goods coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed rules that lay 55. O n the basis of that case-law, the Court down requirements to be met by such goods has accepted, in particular, that the following (such as those relating to designation, form, national provisions are provisions relating to size, weight, composition, presentation, certain selling arrangements which are not labelling, packaging), even if those rules covered by Article 30 of the Treaty, provided apply without distinction to all products that they do not have the effect of discrimi- unless their application can be justified by a public-interest objective taking precedence 33 — See Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mith- ouard [1993] ECR 1-6097, paragraph 15, and Case C-315/92 Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb v Clinique [1994] 32 — See Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR ECR 1-317, paragraph 13. 837 md Case C-3I3/94 Graffiane v Ditta Fransa [1996] 34 — See Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, cited in footnote ECR 1-6039, paragraph 15. 33, paragraphs 16 and 17.

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FRANZÉN

nating against products from other Member would not be consistent with the wording of States: provisions governing the opening Article 30, which refers to measures having times of shops; 3 5 a measure prohibiting equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions pharmacists from advertising outside the on imports. Such an interpretation would pharmacy products commonly sold in phar- undermine the provision which up to now macies; 36 the exclusion of the distribution has been one of the cornerstones of Euro- sector from televised advertising; 37 a prohi- pean integration. bition on the marketing of processed milk for infants outside pharmacies; 38 and a pro- hibition on the sale of tobacco by traders other than specially authorized retailers. 39

56. In the light of the Keck and Mithouard judgment and subsequent decisions, it might be asked whether, in the light of the observa- 57. In my view, Keck and Mithouard did not tions submitted in the present case, Article have a particularly wide scope; it merely 30 has been reduced to a provision which established that the purpose of Article 30 is prohibits discrimination. to prohibit obstacles to the free movement of goods throughout the common market and thereby to ensure that the products of one Member State have access to the market in other Member States. O n the other hand, Article 30 is not designed to prohibit Mem- ber States from adopting general trade regu- lations applicable to traders in the Member To my mind, however, the case-law of the State concerned where such regulations do Court cannot be interpreted in this way. not bar or impede access to the market by Such an interpretation of Article 30 would in products of other Member States, which may practice reduce that provision to a mere rep- be the case where the Member State dis- etition of the general prohibition of discrimi- criminates between the products of other nation in Article 6 of the Treaty, which Member States and domestic products. In line with the foregoing, the Court expressly affirmed in Keck and Mithouard and in sub- 35 — See Joined Cases C-418/93, C-419/93 C-420/93, C-421/93, sequent decisions that the application to C-460/93, C-461/93, C-462/93, C-464/93, C-9/94, C-10/94, products from other Member States of C - l l / 9 4 , C-14/94, C-15/94, C-23/94, C-24/94 and C-332/94 Semeraro Casa Uno v Sindaco del Comune di national provisions restricting or prohibiting, Erbusco [1996] ECR 1-2975 and Joined Cases C-401/92 and C-402/92 Tankstation 't Heukske and Boermans [19941 within the Member States of importation, ECR 1-2199. certain selling arrangements is not such as to 36 — See Case C-292/92 Hiinermund [1993] ECR 1-6787. 37 — See Case C-412/93 Lederc-SipUc v FFI Publicai and M6 hinder trade between Member States, since Publicite [1995] ECR 1-179. their application to products from other 38 — See Case C-391/92 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR Member States is not to be regarded as pre- 1-1621, the 'Babymilk' case. 39 — See Case C-387/93 Banchero [1995] ECR 1-4663. venting access by those products to the

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O P I N I O N OF MR ELMER — CASE C-189/95

Member State of importation or as impeding places where the products concerned might such access more than it impedes access by be distributed by regulating the marketing of domestic products. 40 those products, without thereby preventing access to the market of products from other Member States or specifically placing them at a disadvantage.

58. Consequently, according to the Court's case-law, what matters is whether the meas- ure in question is apt to hinder trade 60. Similarly, in paragraph 44 of its judg- between Member States. The words 'certain ment in Banchero 43 the Court held that Ital- selling arrangements' 41 used in paragraph 16 ian legislation which reserved the retail of of Keck and Mithouard support this view by manufactured tobacco products to distribu- suggesting that certain other provisions relat- tors with special authorization, but without ing to selling arrangements might be caught thereby barring access to the national market by Article 30 even if they do not entail dis- by products from other Member States or not crimination against products from other impeding their access to the market more Member States. than it impeded access for domestic products to the distribution network, was not caught by Article 30 of the Treaty.

59. That interpretation of Article 30, to the effect that it is intended to ensure the access The Court held that the legislation in issue to the market of products from other Mem- did not have such a restrictive effect on trade; ber States, is also consistent with the most it relied, among the evidence, on the fact that recent decisions of the Court. In Case retailers, some 76 000 in number, could C-391/92 Commission v Greece (the freely choose how to stock their outlets Babymilk case), 42 which concerned Greek according to the state of the market and that legislation allowing processed milk for the legislation concerned did not therefore infants to be sold only in pharmacies, the constitute a de jure or de facto centralization Court held, in paragraph 20, that the Greek of purchases. legislation was confined to limiting the

40 — This reason for allowing provisions concerning certain sell- ing arrangements to escape the application of Article 30 of the Treaty has, in my view, been expressed most clearly in Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments v Minister van Finan- cien [1995] ECR 1-1141, paragraph 38. See also paragraph It is hard to understand the judgment as 17 of the Keck and Mithouard judgment, cited above. 41 — The wording of the French version of the Keck and Mith- meaning anything else than that the Court ouard judgment would in fact suggest that certain other provisions relating to selling arrangements might be con- trary to Article 30 of the Treaty, even if they do not dis- criminate against products from other Member States. 42 — See Case C-391/92, cited in footnote 38. 43 — See Case C-387/93, cited in footnote 39.

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FRANZÉN

assumed that such a de jure or de facto cen­ importation and imposed an economic bur­ tralization would bring the legislation within den on importers which was likely to restrict the scope of Article 30. Criticism of the Ban- the volume of imports. The determining fac­ chero judgment by academic writers ** seems tor was therefore not a comparison with the to forget that the conclusion of the judgment situation of comparable national products results solely from that assessment of the but the fact that the legislation was likely to probative value of the evidence before the restrict imports. Court as to the practical effects of the legisla­ tion and that it must therefore be presumed that the Court found in its judgment that a de jure or de facto centralization of trade is likely to hinder trade between Member States and in which case is covered by the prohibition laid down in Article 30 of the Treaty. 4 5 62. In recent decisions the Court has applied a uniform interpretation of the various pro­ visions of the Treaty on the free movement of goods, freedom of movement for persons and the free movement of services and capi­ tal, see, inter alia, Case C-55/94 Gebhard. 47 Whether the proposed interpretation of Article 30 is right may therefore also be ascertained by examining the most recent 61. That interpretation is confirmed by a decisions of the Court on freedom of move­ comparison between the decisions in the ment for persons and the free movement of Babymilk and Banchero cases and the judg­ services. ment of the Court in Case C-323/93 Cre­ spelle. 4 6 In that judgment the Court held that rules of a Member State which required private economic operators importing into its territory quantities of bovine semen from another Member State to store it, subject to a charge, in an authorized centre which enjoyed an exclusive concession with regard 63. In Bosman 4 8 the Court had to rule on to the storage of the semen and insemination the applicability of Article 48 of the Treaty, constituted a barrier to imports within the on freedom of movement for workers, to the meaning of Article 30, since that requirement football federations' transfer system, under applied at the stage immediately following which transfers between clubs were subject to payment of a transfer fee by the new club. The Court held in paragraph 103 that, although the transfer rules in issue applied 44 — See E L., Juris-Classeur, Europe, 1996, p. 15, and C. J. Berr, Journal du droit international, 2 1996, p. 495. also to transfers between clubs within the 45 — See, in this regard, my Opinion in that case, in which I con­ sidered — although the Court disagreed — that it had been sufficiently established that there was in fact, if not in law, such a centralization of trade and that the legislation there­ fore came within Article 30 of the Treaty. 47 — Case C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine dežii Avvo­ 46 — Case C-323/93 Centre d'Insémination de la Crespelle v cati e Procuratori di Milano [1994] ECR 1-4165, para­ Cooperative d'Élevage et d'Insémination Artificielle du graph 37. Departement de la Mayenne [1994] ECR 1-5077, para­ 48 — Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football graph 29. Association v Bosman [1995] ECR 1-4921.

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OPINION OF MR ELMER — CASE C-189/95

same Member State, they still directly since it directly affected access to the market affected players' access to the employment in services in the other Member States. market in other Member States and were thus capable of impeding freedom of move- ment for workers. The transfer rules could not thus be deemed comparable to the rules on selling arrangements which, according to the Keck and Mithouard judgment, fell out- side the ambit of Article 30 of the Treaty.

65. An interpretation of Article 30 of the Treaty to the effect that the prohibition it lays down covers measures which are capable of barring or impeding access to the market by goods manufactured in another Member State is also necessary to prevent lacunae in the protection of the free move- ment of goods where there is no domestic production of the goods in question. In such cases there cannot by definition be discrimi- 64. The Alpine Investments case 4 9 con- nation against products coming from other cerned the applicability of Article 59 of the Member States in comparison with domestic Treaty, on the freedom to provide services, to products and a Member State might there- a prohibition of the practice of making unso- fore be encouraged to impose charges on licited telephone calls, known as 'cold call- such products, since it can do so without ing', for the purpose of selling various finan- having to impose comparable charges on cial services. The prohibition in question domestic products. There would be nothing applied not only to the 'cold calling' of cus- to preclude such obstacles to trade if Article tomers in the Member State concerned but 30 were understood as only containing a also to the 'cold calling' of customers in prohibition of discrimination against prod- other Member States in connection with ucts of other Member States in comparison such services. It was not, therefore, the ser- with domestic products. In that regard, refer- vice itself that was prohibited but a certain ence can be made to Case C-47/88 Commis- arrangement for selling the service. The sion v Denmark. 50 The Court there held that Court expressly refused to apply the crite- it was not permissible for the Member States rion of discrimination established in the to impose on products which, in the absence Keck and Mithouard judgment. In para- of comparable domestic production, escaped graphs 35 and 38 the Court stated that, the application of the prohibitions contained whilst the prohibition in issue was general in Article 95 charges of such an amount that and non-discriminatory and neither its the free movement of goods within the object nor its effect was to put the national Common Market would be impeded as far as market at an advantage over providers of ser- those goods were concerned and that such a vices from other Member States, it could question must be appraised by reference to none the less constitute a restriction on the Article 30 of the Treaty. 51 The Court stated freedom to provide cross-border services,

50 — Case C-47/88 Commission v Denmark [1990] ECR 1-4509. 49 — See Case C-384/93, cited in footnote 40. 51 — See paragraphs 12 and 13.

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FRANZÉN

in the Babymilk case 52 that whether Article Paragraph (3) of Article 37 provides that the 30 was applicable could not depend on the timetable for the measures referred to in existence of national production. paragraph 1 is to be harmonized with the abolition of quantitative restrictions on the same products provided for in Articles 30 to 34.

General observations on Article 37 of the Treaty

67. Article 37 does not require the outright abolition of national monopolies having a commercial character. 54 According to Article 37(1), however, they must be adjusted in 66. Article 37(1) of the Treaty is worded as such a way as to ensure that no discrimi- follows: nation regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of Member States. Such an adjustment may mean that it is necessary to abolish certain monopoly rights. 55

'Member States shall progressively adjust any State monopolies of a commercial char- acter so as to ensure that when the transi- tional period has ended no discrimination 68. Article 37(1) is designed to preclude any regarding the conditions under which goods discrimination between nationals of Member are procured and marketed exists between States regarding the conditions under which nationals of Member States. 53 goods are procured and marketed. It does not therefore prohibit, as, for example, Article 95 of the Treaty does, the imposition on products from other Member States of charges in excess of those imposed on domestic products, but refers generally to The provisions of this Article shall apply to the nationals of the Member States. It fol- any body through which a Member State, in lows, to my mind, that Article 37 of the law or in fact, either directly or indirectly Treaty refers to the traders who supply the supervises, determines or appreciably influ- market in products. That provision therefore ences imports or exports between Member differs from Article 30 of the Treaty, first by States. These provisions shall likewise apply being limited to discrimination and secondly to monopolies delegated by the State to by not protecting the free movement of others.'

54 — See paragraph 27 of Case C-387/93 Banchero, cited in foot- note 39. 52 — See paragraph 17 of Case C-391/92 Commission v Greece, 55 — See Case 59/75 Pubblico Ministero v Manghera [1976] ECR cited in footnote 38. 91, where an import monopoly was held incompatible with 53 — The transitional period expired on 31 December 1969. Article 37 of the Treaty.

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O P I N I O N O F MR ELMER — CASE C-189/95

goods as such but by protecting the traders a commercial character must be adjusted so of the other Member States who participate as to eliminate the exclusive right to import in the free movement of goods. 56 from other Member States'. That finding is quite general and must be interpreted as meaning that the Court accepted that national import monopolies in themselves constitute discrimination between nationals of the Member States 59 and that it is there- fore unnecessary to ascertain on a case-by- case basis whether such import monopolies 69. That was confirmed in Case C-347/88 actually lead to discrimination between Commission v Greece,57 where the Court nationals of the Member States. held that to maintain in force the State's rights with regard to the importation and marketing of petroleum products gave rise to discrimination within the meaning of Article 37(1) against exporters established in other Member States. Presumably, the determining factor in that case was that the State's monopoly was of such a kind as to prevent certain traders, in particular those with whom the Greek State's monopoly did not have commercial relations, from exporting to 71. The wording of the Treaty provides no the Greek market. There was therefore dis- support for the assumption that Article 37 of crimination between nationals of the Mem- the Treaty derogates from the fundamental ber States, as mentioned in Article 37(1). rule on the free movement of goods laid down in Article 30 of the Treaty. O n the other hand, Article 37(3) shows that Article 37(1) is designed to supplement the rules laid down in Articles 30 to 34. Article 37(3) pro- vides that the timetable for the measures referred to in paragraph 1 is to be harmo- 70. I could also refer to the Manghera judg- nized with the abolition of quantitative ment. 5S In that judgment the Court, after restrictions 'on the same products' provided stating that the exclusive right to import for in Articles 30 to 34. Moreover, the Court manufactured tobacco products enjoyed by has also held 6 0 that it follows from the the monopoly of the Italian State consti- wording of Article 37 and also from its posi- tuted, in respect of Community exporters, tion in the general scheme of the Treaty that discrimination prohibited by Article 37(1) of the article is designed to ensure compliance the Treaty, held that that provision must be interpreted 'as meaning that as from 31 December 1969 every national monopoly of 59 — I also refer in that regard to the Court's reasoning in para- graph 34 of Case C-202/88 France v Commission [1991] ECR 1-1223 (hereinafter the 'telecommunications terminals judgment'), where it is stated that the existence of exclusive importing and marketing rights deprives traders of the 56 — Unlike Article 37, Article 30 is designed to protect the free opportunity of having their products purchased by con- movement of goods, not the operators participating therein. sumers. 57 — Case C-347/88 Commission v Greece [1990] ECR 1-4747, 60 — See paragraph 9 of the Manghera judgment, cited in foot- paragraph 44. note 55, paragraph 42 of the Commission v Greece judg- 58 — See paragraphs 12 and 13 of the judgment, cited in foot- ment, cited in footnote 57, and paragraph 27 of the Ban- note 55. chero judgment, cited in footnote 39.

I - 5936

FRANZÉN

with the fundamental rule of the free move- 73. Consequently, national monopolies of a ment of goods throughout the common mar- commercial character are prohibited follow- ket, in particular by the abolition of quanti- ing the expiry of the transitional period in so tative restrictions and measures having far as they are capable of barring or imped- equivalent effect in trade between Member ing, in law or in fact, access to the market by States, and thereby to maintain normal con- products from other Member States (Article ditions of competition between Member 30) or constituting discrimination between States where a given product is subject, in nationals of Member States as regards the one or other of those States, to a national conditions under which goods are procured monopoly of a commercial character. 61 or marketed (Article 37).

Is the Swedish statutory system applicable to the retail of alcoholic beverages caught by the prohibitions laid down in Articles 30 72. Furthermore, in its decisions the Court and 37 of the Treaty? has sometimes applied Articles 30 and 37 concurrendy to a national monopoly of a commercial character and sometimes applied only Article 30 to exclusive rights conferred on a national monopolistic undertaking. Thus in Case C-347/88 Commission v Greece, cited above, the Court held that the exclusive right to import and market finished petroleum products was contrary to both 74. As stated above, the national court has Article 30 and Article 37(1). In the telecom- described the characteristics of the munications terminals judgment 62 the Court monopoly which result from the Law and held that exclusive rights to import and mar- the agreement between the State and System- ket terminal equipment constituted a meas- bolaget and which, moreover, are consistent ure having equivalent effect to a quantitative with what I have said on the matter. It fol- restriction on imports within the meaning of lows that the purpose of Systembolaget is to Article 30 of the Treaty. O n the other hand, limit sales of alcoholic products. There is a the Court did not consider it necessary to centralized system in which one undertaking examine the matter under Article 37, which owns and manages all points of sale and itself may be regarded as confirmation of the fact takes purchasing and marketing decisions. that Article 37 supplements Article 30. The existence of this statutory link between Systembolaget and the various points of sale means, in the national court's opinion, that there is an indivisible whole. In order to 61 — In Case 91/78 Hansen v HaupttoUamt Flensburg [1979] ECR 935, paragraph 13, the Court expressed this in the fol- answer the questions which it has referred to lowing words: Article 37 is intended to render the sales the Court, it is necessary, in the national policy of a State monopoly subject to the requirements of the free movement of goods and of the equal opportunities court's view, to evaluate the system in its which must be accorded to products imported from other Member Sutes. entirety and not merely as it relates to a par- 62 — See footnote 59. ticular point of sale.

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75. In what follows I shall examine the vari- the Konkurrensverket report set out in para- ous characteristics of the Swedish statutory graph 16 above confirm that sales of alco- system in order to determine to what extent holic beverages are relatively low in Sweden, it falls under Articles 30 and 37 of the Treaty. since total sales during the period considered I shall then ascertain whether the system is (including sales by holders of serving necessary on grounds of the protection of licences) came to only approximately 1.75 the life and health of humans and whether litres of beer and approximately 1.13 litres of the system meets the requirement of propor- wine and spirits per inhabitant per month. 63 tionality: in that regard, reference will be made to Article 36 of the Treaty.

78. In my opinion, it may therefore be pre- 76. As I have already mentioned, the sumed that sales of alcoholic beverages in national court points out that the purpose of Sweden would be significantly higher if it the Swedish system governing the retail of were not for the limited accessibility and alcoholic beverages is to limit sales and supply of such products brought about by thereby limit consumption of alcoholic the statutory system centred on Systembo- products. That point is confirmed by the laget. observations submitted by the Swedish Gov- ernment during the procedure and by the statement of the reasons on which the Law is based, to which I referred in paragraph 6 above.

79. Although the Swedish statutory system governing the sale of alcoholic beverages does not completely prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages or directly introduce quantitative restrictions on imports of those 77. All the information available in the products and cannot therefore be described present case indicates that that objective has as a quantitative restriction in the strict actually been achieved in practice. The statis- sense, the objective sought and the effect tical information to which Mr Franzen produced by the system amount to the same referred in his observations shows that thing in practice, that is to say, it signifi- recorded alcohol consumption in Sweden is cantly limits sales of a particular group of significantly lower than that in other Mem- products. There is, therefore, a strong pre- ber States of the Community, namely 5.3 sumption that the Swedish statutory system litres of alcohol per inhabitant in 1993 com- hinders intra-Community trade and, accord- pared with, for example, 10 litres per inhab- itant in Denmark, which, like Sweden, is unable to produce grape-based wine and tra- ditionally consumes less wine than other 63 — It is not possible to give the exact figures for wine and spir- its. Sales of spirits probably account for approximately 20 Member States. Similarly, the figures from to 25% of total sales of wine and spirits.

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ingly, constitutes a measure having an effect guishes products coming from other Mem- equivalent to a quantitative restriction within ber States in relation to domestic products. the meaning of Article 30 of the Treaty.

82. The judgments in the Babymilk case and 80. If the methods which the Swedish statu- in BancberoM are entirely consistent with tory system uses to achieve its purpose are that reasoning. In the latter judgment the examined, it is significant that the Law con- Court held that a system which reserved the fers on Systembolaget, which is entirely retail of manufactured tobacco to specially- State-owned, the exclusive right to retail authorized distributors without affecting the alcoholic beverages in Sweden, which, as marketing of products from other Member stated in paragraph 17, it does through the States differently than domestic products was 384 specialist shops and other outlets. This not covered by Article 30 of the Treaty. The limitation of the number, inter alia, of shops explanation for that finding, however, lies in makes it harder to obtain alcoholic bever- the fact that the Court considered that the ages. system in issue, in the case before it did not have such a restrictive effect on trade. The Court found that the evidence showed that each operator of a tobacco outlet, of which there were 76 000, was free to make arrange- ments relating to purchases according to the market situation, so that the system in ques- tion did not involve, either in law or in fact, a centralization of purchases. In arriving at 81. In paragraph 52 et seq. above I consid- that finding the Court implicitly considered ered the Court's most recent decisions on that such a centralization, in law or in fact, Article 30 of the Treaty. As I pointed out in of purchases for supplying the retail market paragraph 57, in Keck and Mithouard and in would have meant that the system would subsequent decisions the Court clarified the have been caught by Article 30 of the Treaty. purpose of Article 30, which is to prevent obstacles to the free movement of goods within the common market and thereby to ensure that products from one Member State have access to the markets of the other Member States. O n the other hand, Article 30 is not intended to prohibit Member States from undertaking a general regulation of trade in relation to the traders of the Mem- 83. A system which reserves the sale of cer- ber State concerned where such regulation tain specific products to operators having neither prevents nor hinders access to the market of products coming from other Member States, which may be the case where, for example, the Member State distin- 64 — See Case C-391/92, referred to in footnote 38, and Case C-387/93, referred to in footnote 39.

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special authorization does not therefore of 85. There is, however, no need for the Court itself come within Article 30 of the Treaty, to adopt a definitive position on the question provided, however, that the system neither whether the existence of only a limited num- prevents nor hinders access to the market of ber of points of sale in itself brings the products from other Member States. Swedish statutory system within the scope of Whether such a system is likely to prevent or Article 30. As the national court states, the hinder access to the market depends, as the system to be assessed by the Court consti- French Government observes, on, inter alia, tutes a whole, and for that reason I shall now the number of points of sale, the opening turn to a second element, which is doubtless hours and the range of products. essential for the determination to be made by

the Court. Unlike in the Banchero and Babymilk cases, the Swedish statutory sys- tem makes provision for alcoholic products to be sold to consumers not through a large number of independent operators with spe- cial authorization — in Banchero there were some 76 000 operators able to obtain sup- plies freely — but through an outright State monopoly which centralizes the purchasing of all the products intended to be sold on the 84. If the Swedish statutory system appli- retail market.

In economic theory the term cable to retail sales of alcoholic beverages is 'monopoly' refers to a situation in which examined in the light of those criteria, the there is only one provider or purchaser on question arises, in particular, whether the the market. 65 In the Banchero and Babymilk limitation of the number of points of sale cases there was not a retail monopoly within constitutes such an obstacle to the consump- the proper meaning of the term. tion of alcoholic beverages that the limitation constitutes in itself a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports within the meaning of Article 30. The limitation imposed on the availability (and therefore on sales and consumption) of alcoholic beverages, which is taken to be the object and effect of the Swedish system, is obtained, in particular, by the existence of only a few very limited number of points of sale, namely one shop per 23 039 inhabitants and per 1 172 km 2 . By way of comparison, 86. The Swedish system does not therefore the city of Luxembourg, with a population solely concern the sale of alcoholic beverages of approximately 82 000 inhabitants, would to consumers. The system, which has at its have only three or perhaps four shops where heart a monopolistic State undertaking, also beer, wine and spirits could be obtained if a entails above all a centralization of all pur- similar system were in force in Luxembourg. chases of such beverages for sale on the In my view, a number of factors argue in Swedish retail market.

An undertaking favour of regarding this severe limitation of the number of shops (which must be even more noticeable in rural areas) as a measure 65 — Sec Scherer & Ross, Industrial Markel Structure and Econ- having an effect equivalent to a quantitative omic Performance, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1990, p. 17, according to which a purchasing monopoly is, restriction caught by Article 30 of the Treaty. apparently, called in English a 'monopsony'.

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having a monopoly of sales on a particular the telecommunications terminals case, in market, for example the retail market for which the Court held as follows: alcoholic beverages, 66 will necessarily also have a monopoly in purchases on that mar- ket. A purchasing monopoly has the conse- quence that a particular offeror has only a single possible contracting partner. Either a product will have access to the monopoly holder's sales network or it will be com- 'In that regard it should be noted first that pletely excluded from the market in ques- the existence of exclusive importing and mar- tion. The monopoly holder therefore decides keting rights deprives traders of the opportu- what products will be sold and therefore nity of having their products purchased by what products will have access to the market. consumers.

87. A proper retail monopoly is therefore It should be pointed out, secondly, that the considerably different, in my view, from a terminals sector is characterized by the system in which a number of independent diversity and technical nature of the prod- retailers are granted the right to sell one or ucts concerned and by the ensuring con- more categories of products which they straints. In those circumstances, there is no obtain independently. This distinction is par- certainty that the holder of the monopoly ticularly clear on a market such as the retail can offer the entire range of models available market in alcoholic beverages, where the on the market, inform customers about the range of different products of different state and operation of all the terminals and brands on offer is extremely wide. It is guarantee their quality. impossible in practice for the monopoly holder to offer more than a fraction of the overall supply.

Accordingly, exclusive importation and mar- keting rights in the telecommunications ter- minal sector are capable of restricting intra- 88. In that regard, reference may be made to Community trade.' paragraphs 34, 35 and 36 of the judgment in

66 — The Court has held, in connection with Article 85 of the Treaty concerning agreements which restrict competition, that the retail trade and the restaurant sector are separate markets: sec Case C-234/89 Delimita v Horniger Bräu [1991] ECR 1-935, paragraphs 16 and 17. Although case- law on the competition rules is not decisive for the purpose 89. The fact that even at that time the Court of interpreting Article 30 of the Treaty, it is none the less important to bear that definition of the market in mind saw a substantial difference between such when assessing the characteristics of Systembolaget. exclusive rights conferred on monopolies

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and systems which restrict access to retail monopoly does not extend to the actual trade to specially authorized operators is import stage. illustrated by the judgment given virtually contemporaneously in Case C-23/89 Quiet- 67 lynn, in which the Court held that a pro­ hibition restraining undertakings other than approved undertakings from selling porno­ graphic material was not caught by Article 30 of the Treaty. 92. It is apparent from the information pro­ vided during the proceedings that 9 3 % of non tax-free sales of wine and spirits on the Swedish market are made through System­ bolaget. The remaining 7% are sold by res­ taurants and other such outlets, to whom, moreover, Systembolaget is the dominant supplier. Therefore, as well as being the sole 90. The Court therefore considers that a purchaser on the retail market, Systembo­ State monopoly affects the free movement of laget is also in fact the only intermediary goods differently and much more restric- between producer and consumer on the tively than a statutory system of administra­ entire Swedish market. tive authorization. 6 8

93. The commercial reality is therefore, in 91. In the telecommunications terminals my view, that a product from another Mem­ judgment the exclusive right related to both ber State will only be imported into Sweden imports and marketing. It is therefore rea­ where it is certain that it can be marketed by sonable to ask what importance is to be Systembolaget. What point would there be in attached to the fact that Systembolaget's holders of wholesale licences importing a product if they were unable to sell it? As far as products' access to the market is con­ cerned, the fact that imports are not them­ 67 — Case C-23/89 Quietlynn and Richards v Southend Borough Council [1990] ECR 1-3059. selves in the hands of a State monopoly is 68 — It may seem surprising, therefore, that during the procedure therefore irrelevant. the Commission considered that there was no difference, for the purposes of the free movement of goods, between a retail sales monopoly stricto sensu and a system of adminis­ trative authorization. That view is all the more surprising because quite recently, in a decision of 20 November 1996, N o . ľV/M.784 —Kesco/Tuko, the Commission decided that a merger between two Finnish retail chains, which would have had the effect of creating a dominant undertak­ ing with a market share of at least 55%, was incompatible with the common market. According to paragraph 11 of the decision, the transaction also affected intra-Community trade in so far as suppliers from other Member States would in fact have to seek access to Kesco's distribution channels The fact that on paper the Swedish alcohol to ensure that their products could be adequately marketed monopoly does not extend to the right to in Finland. It may be, however, that the Commission's atti­ tude is explained by_ the correspondence referred to above import strikes me as a purely formal artifice, between the Commission and Ule Swedish Government in connection with the Kingdom of Sweden's accession to the which does not alter the real position, which European Union. is that it is Systembolaget which decides

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which products from other Member States own wholesale and retail channels. 69 It may are to be imported into Sweden. The central- also be observed that in Case C-347/88 izing of purchasing and retailing therefore Commission v Greece, cited above, the Court has the effect that in the case of import held that a State monopoly on imports could monopolies there is only one single channel not be distinguished from a State monopoly linking the producer to consumers and it is on the refining of crude oil. The fact that therefore a monopolistic State undertaking measures which are applied after the import which decides which products from other stage may constitute an obstacle to imports Member States are to be imported into the within the meaning of Article 30 follows Swedish market and which importers are to from paragraph 61 of the Crespelle judg- carry out those imports and profit from ment, cited above. them.

95. It is also necessary to bear in mind the relationship between Articles 30 and 90 of the Treaty. Article 90(1) of the Treaty pro- vides that, in the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which they grant special It is significant, in that regard, that V&S, or exclusive rights, Member States are nei- whose capital is owned by the State, contin- ther to enact nor to maintain in force any ues to be the dominant supplier of spirits measure contrary to the rules contained in and wine on the retail market in Sweden: see the Treaty. Article 30 is one of those rules. paragraph 23 above. Article 90(3) provides that the Commission is to ensure the application of the provisions of Article 90(1) and, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States.

94. In my view, a State monopoly on retail The delimitation of Article 30 is therefore trade, such as the Swedish monopoly, there- relevant to the scope of the Commission's fore directly affects access of goods to the market in exactly the same way as a State monopoly on imports. In that regard, refer- ence may also be made to the fact that in a 69 — See Commission Recommendations of 22 December 1969 to the French Republic concerning the adjustment of the number of recommendations made on 22 national monopoly of a commercial character in Thomas clinker {Journal Oficiei 1970 L 31, p. 7), to the Italian December 1969 pursuant to Article 37(6) the Republic concerning the adjustment of the national Commission considered it necessary that the monopoly of a commercial character in cigarette papers (Journal Officiel 1970 L 31, p. 9), to the Italian Republic Member States should adjust a number of concerning the adjustment of the national monopoly of a commercial character in flints (Journal Officiel 1970 L 31, State monopolies of a commercial character p. 12), to the Italian Republic concerning the adjustment of the national monopoly of a commercial character in salt so as to ensure State neutrality in relation to (Journal Officiel 1970 L 31, p. 14) and to the Federal retailers and ensure that suppliers from other Republic of Germany concerning the adjustment of the national monopoly of a commercial character in alcohol Member States would be able to set up their (Journal Officiel 1970 L 31, p. 20).

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competence under Article 90(3). 7° Should not sufficient to look at how the undertaking the Swedish statutory system governing the in question looks on paper but that it is retail of alcoholic beverages be held to fall essential to ascertain whether in practice the outside the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty, body in question has an appreciable effect on the Court would thereby remove from the intra-Community imports or exports. It Commission a competence which, in the must therefore be presumed that a State telecommunications terminals judgment, it monopoly governing the retail trade which had previously recognized it as having, with in practice decides which products from all the attendant consequences for the pre- other Member States are to be imported into vailing institutional balance and the internal Sweden and which in practice has the same market. effects as an import monopoly is also cov- ered by the prohibition in Article 37(1) of the Treaty, since it prevents a large number of traders from other Member States from marketing their products on the Swedish market.

European undertakings and consumers would undoubtedly have had to pay a much higher price for modern telecommunications equipment such as mobile telephones and fax machines if the Commission had not adopted — and the Court, with reference to 97. A statutory system governing the retail Article 30, essentially upheld — Commission of alcoholic beverages, such as the Swedish Directive 88/301/EEC of 16 May 1988 on system, can therefore in itself hinder intra- competition in the markets in telecommuni- Community trade and in practice has the cations terminals equipment. 71 same effect as a State import monopoly, which, in my view, means that the system is caught by both Article 30 and Article 37.

96. It follows from the judgments in Mang- hera and in Case C-347/88 Commission v 98. Turning now to the way in which the Greece 72 that State import monopolies have system operates in practice, it is also clear in general a discriminatory effect within the that traders from other Member States have meaning of Article 37(1). As I have already great difficulty in penetrating the Swedish stated, I consider that a system such as the market with an alcoholic product. Swedish system actually has the same effects as an import monopoly. The second subpara- graph of Article 37(1) makes it clear that it is

— In order to be able to submit an offer at 70 — See paragraph 21 of the grounds of the telecommunications terminais judgment, cited in footnote 59. all, the person concerned must have a 71 _ OJ 1988 L 131, p, 73. wholesale licence; on this point, see 72 — Sec Case 57/95 Mancherà, cited in footnote 55, and Case C-347/88 Commission v Greece, cited in footnote 57. below, where the effects of this require-

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ment, which constitute an obstacle to spices, 73 to meet with the taster's trade, will be set out in greater detail. approval? It will depend on the actual taster, whose taste is not necessarily the same as that of all other consumers. Fol- lowing the blind tasting, 70% of the offers not eliminated in the initial discre- tionary examination, which itself culmi- — Then, to be able to submit an actual offer, nated in the exclusion of approximately he must be invited by Systembolaget to half of the offers submitted, are rejected. submit an offer relating to a particular product, for example, 'Beaujolais, red, Fleurie'. N o information is available on what induces Systembolaget to invite undertakings holding wholesale licences to submit an offer for a particular prod- uct at a particular time and it is therefore — Eventually, 12% of the offers submitted not known to what extent Systembolag- (whose examination had been completed e t s suppliers and other licensees are able by the reference date) can be put on sale: to ask Systembolaget to invite them to see paragraph 36. However, there is no submit an offer relating to a particular guarantee that the tenderer will be product. allowed to sell his product other than to the limited extent implied by its inclusion in the provisional assortment.

— When the offer has been submitted, Sys- tembolagets staff evaluate the quality/ price ratio and assess previous experience with the production region and the type of product in question: see paragraph 27 — To be included in the basic assortment — above. This stage seems to me to involve which, moreover, only contains cheap a largely discretionary choice which leads products and those in the intermediate to the exclusion of approximately half of price range — a product must satisfy cer- the products offered. tain minimum requirements in terms of sales, failing which it will be dropped from the list: see paragraph 29 above. From a commercial and administrative point of view, it is not surprising that Systembolaget, as a monopoly covering the entire territory, should require mini- — Systembolaget's staff then conduct a mum annual sales of 36 000 bottles and a blind test. Taste is by no means objec- certain market share in the relevant sector tively measurable. When, for example, if a product is to remain in the basic does a Châteauneuf du Pape taste suffi- ciently of raspberry, liquorice, exotic spices and roast nuts, or a Brunello di Montalcino taste sufficiently of red and 73 — The gustatory characteristics mentioned are reproduced in Parker's Wine Buyer's Guide, Simon & Schuster, Fourth black fruit, juniper, oak and roast Edition, 1995, p. 516 et seq. and p. 678.

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assortment. That in itself shows, how- even more difficult to meet the quantita- ever, that a monopoly such as the Swed- tive requirements than products on the ish monopoly is apt to hinder access to basic list mean, however, that the 'trial' the market by products from other Mem- product has no real prospect of obtaining ber States, since such a limitation would access to and remaining on the market. not occur on a free market, where, by definition, products would be able to have much easier access to the market. For a particular producer, the system therefore means a serious restriction, since only products with a certain market share are able to have access to the basic assortment and therefore remain on the market. Moreover, the criteria for exclu- sion are not completely objective: see 99. I would again point out here that 19 sup- paragraph 32. pliers together supply 99% of Systembolag- e t s wines and spirits and probably supply the entire basic assortment, that it is V&S, which is wholly owned by the State, which dominates the wine and spirits market and that Swedish-manufactured spirits and beer have 51.3% of the retail market in spirits and — When a product is dropped from the list 83.1% of the retail market in beer. because of insufficient sales it is subject to a quarantine period of two years, and even when that period has expired account is taken of previous experience with the product when products intended to be sold by Systembolaget are subse- quendy selected; see paragraphs 33 and 27.

100. As I mentioned earlier, a particular problem arises from the aspect of both Article 30 and Article 37, namely that trad- ers' access to the Swedish market is even fur- ther hindered by the system resulting from — The possibility of having rejected prod- Articles 1 and 2 of Chapter 4 of the Law, ucts sold on a trial basis (on this point, which make imports subject to possession of see paragraphs 30 and 31 above) does not, a wholesale or manufacturing licence issued in my view, provide unsuccessful suppli- by the Alkoholinspektion. As I observed ear- ers with a real chance of obtaining access lier, such authorization is necessary not only to the market. First, the product must to be able to sell to Systembolaget but also, pass a tasting test. Secondly, even if it generally, to be able to submit an offer to passes that test, the quantities which must Systembolaget, which does not itself have the be sold and the fact that the 'trial' range right to import. In my view, this licensing is only available in a limited number of system is indistinguishable from a commer- shops so that the 'trial' product finds it cial monopoly, since, as I have already said,

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the system determines the categories of per- the Swedish conditions relating to establish- sons from whom the monopoly is able to ment, in particular the State-owned V&S, will purchase and, accordingly, those who are be able to sell directly to Systembolaget and eventually able to gamble on Systembolaget's to holders of serving licences. choice of the products destined to be sold on the retail market in Sweden. 7* As the Swed- ish Government acknowledged at the hear- ing, the system means in effect that traders from other Member States are not entitled to sell alcoholic beverages on the Swedish mar- ket save via an intermediary having a Swed- ish wholesale licence or unless the producer himself has a wholesale licence issued by the 102. In my view, this part of the State retail Swedish authorities and pays the charges monopoly system discriminates against trad- associated with obtaining that licence. ers from other Member States and is thus contrary to Article 37 of the Treaty. The dis- crimination is reinforced by the fact that the monitoring charge is on a sliding scale and therefore much higher per litre where turn- over by volume is low. Such a system is par- ticularly favourable to a supplier such as the State-owned V&S, which has a 35% share of the wine market and a 66.6% share of the spirit market, in relation to wholesale-licence holders who are only able to sell small quan- tities, or even no quantity at all, to System- 101. However, scarcely any undertakings bolaget. established in other Member States will wish to take the trouble to apply for a wholesale licence and to pay application and monitor- ing charges simply in order to have the pos- sibility — should Systembolaget happen to seek an offer relating to a product they can supply — to offer their products to System- bolaget with no guarantee of any kind that they will sell even a single bottle. In practice, an undertaking will therefore normally be 103. Such a system, under which the condi- obliged to approach a Swedish wholesaler. 75 tions relating to establishment of an under- In contrast, Swedish producers who satisfy taking are extended to cover traders estab- lished in other Member States, is in my view liable in itself to hinder the free movement of goods, since it makes imports more expen- 74 — Article 37 only concerns activities intrinsically connected sive and more difficult by requiring those with the exercise of the specific function of the monopoly. It has no relevance to provisions which are generally aimed traders either to employ the services of an at the production and marketing of goods, whether or not they come within the monopoly in question: sec Case intermediary or themselves obtain a whole- 199/78 Peureux v Directeur des Services fiscaux de la saler's licence and in so doing pay the associ- Haute-Saône [1979] ECR 975, paragraph 28, and the Boli- chero judgment, cited in footnote 39, paragraph 29. ated fees. In my view, such a system is there- 75 — This comes close to being a requirement to have a represen- fore also contrary to Article 30 of the Treaty. tative, which is in itself contrary to Article 30 of the Treaty: see Case 247/81 Commission v Germany [1984] ECR 1111. Reference can be made here to the fact that

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in Case 94/79 Vriend [1980] ECR 327 the defined in abundant case-law, should also be Court held that a system which exclusively applied in relation to Article 37. reserved the import of vegetable reproduc- tion material such as chrysanthemum plants to persons affiliated to publically approved bodies was contrary to Article 30 of the Treaty.

107. Accordingly, I consider that Article 37 is to be interpreted as meaning that restric- tions ensuing from the existence and specific Can the system be justified under Article 36 functioning of commercial monopolies but of the Treaty? which are justified on, for example, grounds of the protection of health and life of humans may be compatible with Commu- nity law, subject to the conditions laid down in Article 36, such as the condition that they are not to constitute a means of arbitrary 104. According to the derogations provided discrimination. The Court does in fact for in Article 36 of the Treaty, Article 30 is appear to have implicitly accepted that not to preclude restrictions on imports justi- Article 36 may derogate from Article 37. fied, inter alia, on grounds of the protection Thus, in Case C-347/88 Commission v of health and life of humans. Such restric- Greece, cited above, the Court considered tions are not, however, to constitute a means whether an exclusive right to import and of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised market petroleum products was justified on restriction on trade between Member States. grounds of public security, one of the grounds referred to in Article 36, with- out distinguishing between Article 30 and Article 37.

105. By its wording, Article 36 refers only to Articles 30 to 34 and the question there- fore arises whether those derogations also apply to Article 37 of the Treaty.

108. As regards the substance of Article 36,1 would observe first that the Court has con- sistently held that this provision relates only 106. Earlier, relying on the case-law of the to non-economic considerations. 7b Even Court, I applied the interpretation according though the purpose of Systembolaget and, in to which there is a close link between the particular, of the restriction of the number of scope of Article 30 and that of Article 37 and points of sale is purported to be connected those articles can be applicable to the same with alcohol policy, there is scarcely no factual situations. It is therefore very difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between Article 30 and Article 37. In my view, there- 76 — Sec Case 238/82 Duphar v Netherlands State [1984] ECR fore, Article 36, whose content has been 523, paragraph 23.

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doubt that the system entails a considerable these alternative measures must be chosen. 79 economic advantage for the Swedish State in If the measure is not in itself appropriate to that all profits from the retail of alcoholic achieve that objective or where it is in itself beverages in Sweden go to the Swedish Trea- disproportionate, it will no longer be com- sury and these profits are maximized patible with Community law. 80 through the reduction of selling costs due to the limitation of the number of shops. How- ever, under the consistent case-law of the Court, no account is to be taken of any loss of resources which the Swedish State would incur if it were required to abolish or adjust the monopoly on the retail of alcoholic bev- 111. The Swedish Government maintained erages in order to render it compatible with during the procedure that alcohol was injuri- the rules of the Treaty. ous to health and that the aim of the Swedish statutory system was to limit sales and thereby limit the consumption of alcohol. The Government referred in that regard to a European Alcohol Action Plan adopted in 1993 by the Regional Committee for Europe 109. O n the other hand, the Court has con- of the World Health Organization, which set sistently held that the health and life of as an objective for all European States humans rank foremost among the values or belonging to the W H O a 25% reduction in interests protected by Article 36 of the alcohol consumption by the year 2 000 com- Treaty and it is for the Member States to pared with consumption in 1980. decide, within the limits imposed by the Treaty, what degree of protection they intend to ensure. 77 The Member States have a cer- tain discretion in that regard.

112. It is primarily for the Swedish legisla- ture to determine whether the protection of public health in Sweden justifies measures aimed at restricting the consumption of alco- 110. The limits imposed on the competence holic beverages, and the W H O recommenda- of the Member States ensue, in particular, tions constitute weighty documentary evi- from the principle of proportionality, dence. There is no doubt that alcohol abuse according to which the action must be neces- can have seriously injurious effects from a sary to provide effective protection for the social and medical point of view, and mea- life and health of persons. 7S If they may be sures to prevent abuse might therefore be protected as effectively by measures which covered by Article 36. 81 are less restrictive of intra-Community trade,

79 — See paragraph 17 of Case C-320/93 Ortscheit, cited in foot- 77 — See Case C-320/93 Ortscheit v Eurim-Pharm Arzeimittel note 77, and paragraph 17 of Case 104/75 De Peijper, also [1994] ECR 1-52«, paragraph 16, and Cise 104/75 De cited in footnote 77. Peijper [1976] ECR 613, paragraph 15. 80 — Sec Case C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli 78 — See Toincd Cases C-l/90 and C-176/90 Aragonesa de Pub- Avvocati e Procurati di Milano [1995] ECR 1-4165, para- licidad Exterior and Publwía v Departamento de Sanidad y graph 37. Seguridad Social de U Generalität de Cataluña [1991] ECR 81 — See the Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior and Publivía 1-4151, paragraph 16. judgment, cited in footnote 78.

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113. O n the other hand, I think that alcohol whole, gready hinders access to the market consumption can hardly be likened to alco- by products from other Member States and hol abuse. New studies indicate that a certain also leads to discrimination against nationals daily consumption of wine has beneficial of other Member States. Taken as a whole, effects on health. A recent Danish study the Swedish statutory system therefore con- published in, inter alia, the British Medical stitutes, in my view, an appreciable restric- Journal82 reached the following conclusion: tion of the free movement of goods and this 'Light to moderate consumption of wine (up is a factor which must be taken into account to three to five glasses a day) is associated when considering whether the system is nec- with a significant reduction, virtually pro- essary or whether less restrictive measures portionate to intake, of the risk of dying would be capable of protecting public health. from all causes, unlike consumption of beer and spirits. This reduction relates to both a reduction in the risk of death from cardio- vascular and cerebrovascular disease and also to a reduction of the risk of death from all causes.' According to the study, if the rela- tive risk of death of persons who never drink wine is set at 1.00, the risk for persons drink- ing three to five glasses a day is 0.51. O n the 115. As I have said, the main problem of a other hand, the corresponding risk of death State retail monopoly such as the Swedish for those drinking three to five 2-cl glasses of monopoly is that it involves a centralization spirits a day is 1.34. As regards beer, no con- of purchases and that it is therefore the State sistent difference was found in relation to the monopoly which actually decides which relative risk of 1 for those who never drink products from other Member States will be beer; the study does not therefore support imported and have access to the market. It is the assumption that normal consumption of therefore the monopoly as such that restricts beer is injurious to health. trade.

114. As is apparent from my earlier argu- 116. O n the other hand, it is not the ments, I consider that the Swedish system of monopoly as such which has a restrictive selling alcoholic beverages, considered as a effect on sales and thereby on consumption of alcohol. That effect is due to the limitation of the number of points of sale. If, in the 82 — N . M. Grenbaek, A. Deis, T. I. A. Sørensen, P. U. Becker, interest of the protection of public health, it P. Schnohr and G. Boje Jensen, Forskel i dødelighed ved moderat forbrug af øl, vin og spintiti. Ugeskrift for Laeger is desired to limit sales of alcoholic bever- 158/16, 15 Aprfl 1996, p. 2258. The study, which was also ages, it is not necessary to set up a central- published in the British Medical Journal 1995, 310: 1165, is based on the drinking habits of 6 051 men and 7 234 ized State monopoly in order to do this, women aged between 30 and 79, who were studied between since such a limitation could be achieved by 1976 and 1988. The study shows, inter alia, that deaths from cardiovascular disease in Denmark fell by 3 0 % during less drastic means, such as a system with a the last 15 years, which may be attributed to the fact that in the period 1975-1992 wine consumption increased from number of independent outlets all obtaining 17.3% to 30.2% of total consumption, which remained their supplies independently, which would constant

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not therefore entail any particular obstacles even in small daily quantities, apparently to the free movement of goods. have adverse effects on health. However, as I have argued, the Swedish system governing the sale of alcoholic beverages must be con- sidered as a whole, so that in the present case there is no need to give a definitive ruling on that question, which the Swedish legislature 117. Such independent sales outlets could be will be able to study more closely should the required, just like Systembolaget, to observe legislation be eventually amended. certain opening hours and not to sell to per- sons under a certain age. The State could also regulate retail marketing. 83 Furthermore, the public authorities would be able to monitor compliance with the licence conditions by the shop owner or manager. It is precisely this model that is used in Sweden for super- vising beverage-serving establishments: 119. It is clear, to my mind, that it is not apparently, it is possible to exercise effective necessary, on the grounds of public health in control over approximately 9 000 indepen- Sweden, to require traders established in dent beverage-serving establishments, a num- another Member State and lawfully carrying ber much higher than the present number of on their activity there who wish to sell on retail shops. the Swedish market either to employ the ser- vices of a Swedish intermediary or them- selves hold a Swedish wholesale licence and be subjected to control by the Swedish Alco- hol Inspectorate and pay the associated charges. From the point of view of health 118. A further question is whether the policy, it cannot matter whether the storage present very low number of sales outlets is premises of such traders outside Sweden necessary or whether it is possible to achieve comply with the Swedish requirements or the desired reduction in abusive consump- whether the conduct of the traders in ques- tion of alcohol by means of an increased tion satisfies the requirements of the Alko- effort to provide information and social mea- holinspektion. sures, which raaji in practice be better suited to reducing alcohol abuse without limiting normal consumption. Less restrictive rules on wine, normal consumption of which appears, as I have explained, to have benefi- cial effects on health, and on beer, normal consumption of which does not appear to be injurious to health, would also be apt to 120. On the other hand, ensuring that the change the drinking habits of the population products are taxed in Sweden and are not so that it would consume less spirits, which, sold in a way contrary to Swedish rules on alcohol, for example to minors, does matter. However, it is perfectly possible to meet these conditions without requiring traders in 83 — See the judgment in Hünermtmá, cited in footnote 36, and other Member States to have a Swedish the judgment in Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior and Pub- íivíay cited in footnote 78. wholesale licence if they are to sell their

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products on the Swedish market. It is suffi- makes no provision for any derogation or cient to impose certain conditions on traders period of adjustment for the Swedish system who stock, transport and retail alcoholic governing the sale of alcoholic beverages. beverages in Sweden. The abovementioned declaration relating to the exchange of letters between Sweden and the Commission is a purely unilateral decla- ration which cannot derogate from the 121. In conclusion, I consider that, taken as Treaty. a whole, the Swedish statutory system gov- erning the retail of alcoholic beverages can- not be justified under Article 36 of the Treaty on the grounds of the protection of health and life of humans. 84

123. As I stated above, Articles 30 and 37 of The question of the transitional period and the Treaty have direct effect. Since 1 January the consequences of the system's incompat- 1995, the date of Sweden's accession to the ibility with Articles 30 and 37 of the Treaty European Union, those provisions can there- fore be relied on by individuals before the Swedish courts, which must refrain from 122. As I explained in paragraph 4, the Act applying any national measure which is of Accession of the Kingdom of Sweden incompatible with them.

Conclusion

124. F o r the foregoing reasons, I p r o p o s e t h a t t h e C o u r t should answer the q u e s - tions referred t o it b y the L a n d s k r o n a Tingsrätt as follows:

(1) Articles 30 a n d 37 of the E C Treaty are t o be interpreted as p r e c l u d i n g an overall national s t a t u t o r y system g o v e r n i n g the retail of alcoholic beverages w h i c h has the following characteristics: — the system is designed t o Umit sales a n d t h e r e b y limit c o n s u m p t i o n of such p r o d u c t s and it m u s t be p r e s u m e d t o have that effect in practice; and

84 — Purely for the sake of completeness, I would add that the retail monopoly might possibly be maintained for national products, see Joined Cases 80/85 and 159/85 Nederlandse Bakkerij Stichting v Edah [1986] ECR 3359, paragraph 18, which establishes that Article 30 of the Treaty does not pre- vent products from other Member States b a n g favoured in comparison with domestic products.

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— the law confers on a wholly State-owned company the exclusive right to retail alcoholic beverages, which are sold in a limited number of shops and other outlets; and

— while the retail monopoly in question comes into operation at the stage immediately following the import stage, it is the sole legally authorized purchaser of alcoholic beverages destined for the retail market in the Mem- ber State concerned and therefore in practice determines which products will be imported into that market from other Member States; and

— producers and other traders who are established in another Member State and lawfully carry out their activity there are only able to sell such bever- ages on the market of the Member State concerned through an intermedi- ary in possession of a wholesale licence or only if they themselves have obtained a wholesale licence from the authorities of the Member State con- cerned and pay the associated charges.

(2) Such a system, taken in its entirety, cannot be justified on the grounds of pro- tection of health and life of humans, as provided for in Article 36 of the Treaty, since that protection can be ensured by measures less restrictive of the free movement of goods.

(3) The provisions of Articles 30 and 37 of the EC Treaty have been applicable in Sweden since 1 January 1995 and have direct effect, so that they may be relied on by individuals before the national courts, which must not apply any provi- sion which is incompatible with them.

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