C-245/95
ECLI:EU:C:1997:400
- Súd
- Súdny dvor Európskej únie
- IČS
- 61995CC0245
- Zdroj
- eur-lex.europa.eu ↗
COMMISSION v N T N A N D KOYO SEIKO
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL LÉGER delivered on 16 September 1997
1. By this appeal the Commission is asking must therefore be assessed in the same way, the Court of Justice to review the judgment in a review 4and in the original investiga- of the Court of First Instance of 2 May 1995 tion. 5 More specifically, the question is in Joined Cases T-163/94 and T-165/94 NTN whether, in both those cases, the existence of Corporation and Koyo Seiko v Council, 1 injury must be established in accordance which annulled Article 1 of Council Regu- with the criteria laid down by Article 4(1) of lation (EEC) N o 2849/92 (also referred to Regulation N o 2423/88 ('the basic regu- hereinafter as 'the regulation at issue'). 2 lation').
2. The contested judgment was the first given by the Court of First Instance in an anti-dumping case since it was given jurisdic- 4. In the alternative, the Court is asked tion to hear such cases 3 and it is the first whether the fact that an investigation was time that the Court of Justice has been carried out after the period prescribed by requested to give judgment in that connec- Article 7(9)(a) of the basic regulation neces- tion pursuant to Article 168a of the EC sarily means that the regulation at issue must Treaty. be annulled.
3. In essence, the Court of Justice is asked to clarify whether the concept of 'injury' or 'threat of injury' to an established Commu- 5. I shall first summarize the legal, factual nity industry by the release into free circula- and procedural background to the dispute tion of a dumped product is the same, and (I), before considering the admissibility of the appeal (II). I shall then examine the appellant's first plea and set out the reasons * Original language: French. 1 — [1995] ECR 11-1381 (hereinafter 'the contested judgment'). 2 — Regulation N o 2849/92 of 28 September 1992 modifying the definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ball-bearings 4 — Procedure provided for by Articles 14 and 15 of Council with a greatest external diameter exceeding 30 mm originat- Regulation (EEC) N o 2423/88 of 11 July 1988 on protection ing in Japan imposed by Regulation (EEC) N o 1739/85 (OJ against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not 1992 L 286, p. 2); and the corrigendum thereto (OJ 1993 members of the European Economic Community (OJ 1988 L 72, p. 36). L 209, p. 1), as amended by Council Regulation (EC) N o 3 — Council Decision 94/149/ECSC/EC of 7 March 1994 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped amending Decision 93/350/Euratom, ECSC, EEC amending imports from countries not members of the European Com- Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom establishing a Court munity (OJ 1996 L 56, p. 1), which has since entered into of First Instance of the European Communities (OJ 1994 force. L 66, p. 29). 5 — Article 7 of Regulation N o 2423/88.
I - 403
OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-245/95 P
for which I consider it unnecessary to exam- to the international agreements to which the ine the second plea, before suggesting that Community is a party, in particular the Gen- the appeal should be dismissed (III). I shall eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade concluded by considering the question of ('GATT') and the Agreement on Implemen- costs (IV). tation of Article VI of GATT 7 ('the Anti- Dumping Code').
I — Legal, factual and procedural back- ground to the case
8. Article 113(1) of the Treaty provides that *[t]he common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in Legal background regard to ... measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies'.
6. Before considering the relevant provisions of the Community anti-dumping regula- tions, it seems worthwhile calling to mind their legal basis and their general structure. 9. However, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the Treaty places limits on the Com- munity institutions' discretion in framing the common commercial policy and, in particu- lar, in implementing instruments to protect trade, by providing that c[b]y establishing a Basis of the Community's common commer- customs union between themselves Member cial policy States aim to contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the
7. Regulation N o 2423/88 was adopted on 7 — Council Decision 80/271/EC of 10 December 1979 concern- ing the conclusion of the Multilateral Agreements resulting the basis 6of Article 113 of the Treaty — from the 1973 to 1979 trade negotiations (OJ 1980 L 71, pp. 1 and 90) is in point in this case. That decision has been which was incorporated into Title VII on the replaced by Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December common commercial policy — and pursuant 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994) (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 1). A new Agreement on the implementation of Article VI of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has also been con- 6 — Second recital in the preamble to that regulation. cluded (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 103).
I-404
COMMISSION v N T N A N D KOYO SEIKO
lowering of customs barriers'. It follows Community provisions in question were from that provision that recourse to trade observed; 13 that objectively correct facts protection measures must not unjustifiably were taken into account; 14 that no manifest impede international trade. error was made in appraising those facts; 15 that there had been no failure to take an essential matter into consideration; 16 and, finally, that the Community institutions had not included in their reasoning any consider- ations amounting to an abuse of power or an infringement of essential procedural require- 10. Likewise, the Court of Justice has con- ments. 17 sistently held that even though in the context of the common commercial policy and more particularly in regard to trade protection measures, the Community legislature has, on account of the complexity of the economic situations which must be examined by the 12. Lastly, Community anti-dumping legis- institutions, 8 a wide discretion 9 in regard, in lation must also comply with the obligations particular, to the assessment of the dumping assumed by the Community in the context margin 10 and injury or the threat of injury 11 of GATT and the Anti-Dumping Code. and the determination of the period to be Because it was contractually bound by those taken into consideration for the purpose of agreements, the Community could not adopt determining injury in the course of an anti- anti-dumping rules and take measures in that dumping proceeding, 12 there are limits to area conflicting with those agreements with- that discretion. out incurring liability under international law.
11. Accordingly, the judgments given before jurisdiction was assigned to the Court of 13. As the Court of First Instance has First Instance show that, in the course of its pointed out, 18 the Court of Justice con- review of the exercise of that discretion, the cluded from this, in particular in Nakajima v Court of Justice was at pains to ascertain that Council, 19 that the Community legislation the procedural guarantees afforded by the must be interpreted in the light of Article VI of GATT and the Anti-dumping Code.
8 — See, in particular, Case C-69/89 Nakajima v Council [1991] ECR 1-2069, paragraphs 86 and 87. 13 — Ibid., paragraph 8. 9 — See, in particular, Case C-121/86 Epicheiriseon Metalleft- 14 — See, in particular, Case 191/82 Fediol v Commission [1983] ikon Viomichanikon kai Natáliákon and Others v Council ECR 2913, paragraph 26. [1989] ECR 3919, paragraph 8. 15 — See, in particular, Case 240/84 Toyo and Others v Council, 10 — See, in particular, Case 240/84 Toyo and Others v Council cited above, paragraphs 21 to 24. [1987] ECR 1809, paragraphs 13 and 14. 16 — See, in particular, Case 187/85 Fediol v Commission [1988] 11 — See, in particular, Joined Cases C-320/86 and C-188/87 ECR 4155, paragraph 6. Stanko France v Commission and Council [1990] ECR 1-3013. 17 — See, in particular, Case 264/82 Timex v Council and Com- 12 — See, in particular, Epicheiriseon Metalleftikon Viomichani- misaon [1985] ECR 849, paragraphs 30 and 31. kon kai Naftiliakon and Others v Council, cited above, 18 — Paragraph 65 of the contested judgment. paragraph 20. 19 — Paragraphs 30, 31 and 32.
I-405
OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-245/95 P
14. Under Article VI of GATT, dumping is 18. Article 3 refers to the criteria to be taken to be condemned if it causes or threatens to into account when determining what consti- cause injury to an industry in the importing tutes 'injury'. I shall deal with this point country. later.
15. The Anti-Dumping Code contains use- 19. 'Industry', the conduct of a proceeding ful particulars on the implementation of anti- and its conclusion are also dealt with by the dumping measures. Anti-Dumping Code.
The relevant Community r e g u l a t i o n s
16. Article 2(1) provides that '[fjor the pur- pose of this Code a product is to be consid- ered as being dumped, i. e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to (a) Regulation N o 2423/88, the basic regu- another is less than the comparable price, in lation the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country'.
20. The basic regulation aims 20 to incorpo- rate at Community level the new policies determined within GATT and to take 17. Article 2(2) states that 'the term "like account of the experience gained by the product" ("produit similaire") shall be inter- Community institutions in applying the pre- preted to mean a product which is identical, vious Community anti-dumping rules. 21 i. e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although 20 — Second and third recitals. not alike in all respects, has characteristics 21 — Namely, Council Regulation (EEC) N o 2176/84 of 23 July closely resembling those of the product 1984 on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Economic under consideration'. Community (OJ 1984 L 201, p. 1).
I - 406
COMMISSION v NTN AND KOYO SEIKO
21. The objectives of the basic regulation contain sufficient evidence of the existence of are, first, to present certain concepts in a dumping and the injury resulting therefrom. clear and detailed fashion 22 and, second, to set out certain aspects of the procedure lead- ing to the imposition of anti-dumping duties. 23
25. According to Article 6(4), consultations may take place within an Advisory Commit- tee consisting of representatives of each Member State and a representative of the Commission. The consultations may cover 22. Article 2(1) lays down the principle that the existence of dumping, injury and the an anti-dumping duty may be applied to any causal link between dumping and injury, dumped product 'whose release for free cir- together with the measures to be taken. culation in the Community causes injury'.
26. Article 7 deals with the investigation car- ried out by the Commission, that is to say, 23. Article 4(1) lists the various relevant fac- its formal aspects and subject-matter. An tors for determining the existence of injury investigation should normally be completed or a threat of injury to an established Com- within one year of the initiation of the pro- munity industry or a material retardation in ceeding. Under Article 8 information sub- the establishment of such an industry. mitted by the parties to the Commission during the investigation may be treated as confidential.
24. Article 5 provides that any natural or 27. At the end of a preliminary examina- legal person, or any association, acting on tion, provisional duties may be imposed by behalf of a Community industry which con- the Commission, for a maximum period of siders itself injured or threatened by dumped four months (Article 11). imports may lodge a written complaint with the Commission or a Member State. In the latter case, the complaint is to be forwarded to the Commission. The complaint must
22 — Fourth to ninth recitals. 28. The investigation may be terminated 23 — Tenth recital et seq. where protective measures are unnecessary
I-407
OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-245/95 P
(Article 9), undertakings are accepted (b) Regulation N o 2849/82, the regulation at (Article 10) or definitive anti-dumping duties issue are imposed (Article 12).
31. The purpose of the regulation at issue, which entered into force on 2 October 1992, is to review, pursuant to Articles 14 and 15 of the basic regulation, the definitive anti- 29. Under Article 14(1), a review of anti- dumping duties imposed by Council Regu- dumping duties is to be held at the request of lation (EEC) N o 1739/85 24 on the relevant an interested party where there is 'evidence type of ball-bearings originating in Japan. of changed circumstances sufficient to justify Regulation N o 1739/85 had imposed defini- the need for such review, provided that at tive anti-dumping duties varying from 1.2% least one year has elapsed since the conclu- to 21.7% on imports of ball-bearings with a sion of the investigation'. Article 14(2) pro- greatest external diameter of more than 30 vides that, 'where, after consultation, it mm. The products manufactured by N T N becomes apparent that review is warranted, and Koyo Seiko had been subjected to a the investigation shall be reopened in accord- definitive anti-dumping duty of 3.2% and ance with Article 7, where the circumstances 5.5% respectively. so require'.
32. Having found that the Community industry was in a weak position despite the duties imposed by Regulation N o 1739/85, 25 the Council concluded that upon the expiry 30. Article 15(1) provides that the anti- of the existing anti-dumping measures there dumping duties and undertakings are to was a danger of recurrence of the injury suf- lapse after five years from the date on which fered by that industry, 26 and adopted new they entered into force. However, Article measures. 15(3) provides that: 'Where an interested party shows that the expiry of the measure would lead again to injury or threat of injury, the Commission shall, after consulta- 24 — Regulation No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposine a defini- tive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ball-bearings tion, publish in the Official Journal of the and tapered roller bearers originating in Japan (OJ 1985 L 167, p. 3). European Communities a notice of its inten- 25 — Points 26 to 32 of the preamble to the regulation at issue. tion to carry out a review of the measure'. 26 — Ibid., point 39.
I-408
COMMISSION v NTN AND KOYO SEIKO
33. Article 1 of the regulation at issue pro- Factual and procedural background vides in particular as follows:
34. O n 27 December 1988 the Federation of 'The definitive duties imposed by Article 1 European Bearing Manufacturers' Associa- of Regulation (EEC) N o 1739/85 on the tions ('FEBMA') requested a review, on the products defined below are hereby modified basis of Article 14(1) of the basic regulation, in accordance with the following provisions: of the anti-dumping measures taken against imports of ball-bearings originating in Japan, on the ground that there had been a change of circumstances since the imposition of definitive duties by Regulation N o 1739/85.
1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of ball-bearings with a greatest external diameter exceeding 30 mm falling within C N Code 848210 90 and originating in Japan; 35. Taking the view that this request con- tained sufficient evidence to justify the initia- tion of a review, the Commission ordered an investigation on 30 May 1989. Since defini- tive duties lapse after a period of five years, the Commission published a notice on 30 May 1990 27 stating that, in accordance with 2. the anti-dumping duty, expressed as a per- Article 15(4) of the basic regulation, the centage of the net, free at Community fron- existing measures would remain in force tier price of the product before duty shall be pending the outcome of the review. 13.7% (Taric additional code 8677) except when manufactured by the following compa- nies for which the rate of anti-dumping duty is set out below:
36. O n 28 September 1992, after an investi- gation lasting 41 months — May 1989 to September 1992 — the Council adopted the regulation at issue, which increased the anti- dumping duty applicable to N T N to 11.6%.
27 — Notice 90/C 132/06 concerning the continuation of anti- dumping measures in force on imports of ball-bearings with a greatest external diameter exceeding 30 mm, originating in — N T N Corporation, Osaka 11.6%.' Japan (OJ 1990 C 132, p. 5).
I - 409
OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-245/95 P
37. N T N and Koyo Seiko then brought flexible anti-dumping duty contrary to the actions before the Court of First Instance, on basic regulation. 28 20 December 1992 and 30 January 1993 respectively, for annulment of Article 1 of the regulation at issue.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance
38. FEBMA was granted leave to intervene in support of the Council in Case T-163/94 NTN v Council. The Commission and FEBMA were granted leave to intervene in support of the Council in Case T-165/94 Koyo Seiko v Council. 41. Dealing with the various pleas under two heads, the Court of First Instance gave a detailed judgment which annulled Article 1 of the regulation at issue in so far as it imposed an anti-dumping duty on the appli- cants. Endorsing the applicants' arguments, it held that the Council had not established 39. N T N and Koyo Seiko claimed that the injury within the meaning of Article 4(1) of Court of First Instance should annul Article the basic regulation and had not complied 1 of Regulation N o 2849/92 in so far as it with the time-limit prescribed by Article imposed an anti-dumping duty on them, and 7(9)(a) of that regulation. should order the Council to pay the costs. The Council, supported by FEBMA and the Commission, contended that the Court should dismiss the applications and order the applicants to pay the costs.
The appeal
40. In support of their actions, N T N and Koyo Seiko relied on various pleas in law: the Council's failure to establish the exist- ence of injury to the Community industry; its failure correctly to determine the possible 42. The Commission claims that the Court effects of the expiry of the existing measures; of Justice should set aside the contested and also abuse of powers. They are therefore judgment, refer the case back to the Court of claiming that, if the review investigation had First Instance and order N T N and Koyo been carried out within a reasonable period, Seiko to pay the costs. the Community institutions could not have established the existence of any injury. Finally, the regulation at issue had imposed a 28 — Paragraphs 26 and 27 of the contested judgment.
I-410
COMMISSION v NTN AND KOYO SEIKO
43. N T N and Koyo Seiko ('the respon- 46. Furthermore, the fourth paragraph of dents') claim that the Court of Justice should Article 37 of the EC Statute of the Court of uphold the contested judgment, dismiss the Justice provides that: 'submissions made in appeal and order the Commission to pay the an application to intervene shall be limited to costs. In the alternative, in the event that the supporting the submissions of one of the contested judgment is set aside, Koyo Seiko parties'. asks the Court to annul the contested regu- lation so far as it is concerned.
47. O n the basis of that provision the Court held, by order of 14 February 1996, that 'since [NSK] did not bring an action for annulment, its rights as intervener must be confined to supporting the forms of order sought by the respondents'. 30 44. NSK Ltd and its European subsidiary companies (hereinafter 'NSK'), which have been given leave to intervene in the appeal in support of the respondents, claim that the Court should grant the forms of order sought by N T N and Koyo Seiko and rule 48. The Council has not lodged any written that the annulment of Article 1 of the regu- observations. Nevertheless, it has intimated lation at issue also applies to NSK. that it supports all the submissions and pleas of the Commission.
49. O n 10 October 1995, FEBMA lodged its application to intervene with the Registry of the Court of Justice. Since it was a party to 45. As regards that claim, since NSK did not the proceedings before the Court of First bring an action within the period prescribed Instance, it could intervene only under by the third paragraph of Article 173 of the Article 115(1) of the Rules of Procedure of Treaty for annulment of the individual the Court of Justice, which provides as fol- decision addressed to them, which was part lows: 'Any party to the proceedings before of the regulation at issue, that decision the Court of First Instance may lodge a remains valid and binding as far as they are response within two months after service on concerned. 29 The effects of that decision him of notice of the appeal. The time-limit have become final and cannot therefore be for lodging a response shall not be extended.' challenged in this appeal. Notice was served on 24 July 1995. The
29 — See, for instance, Case C-188/92 TWD Textilwerke 30 — Case C-245/95 P Commission v NTN Corporation, Inter- Deggendorf[1994]ECR I-833, paragraph 13. vention II, [1996] ECR I-559, paragraph 9.
I-411
OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-245/95 P
period allowed to FEBMA for submitting its 53. Furthermore, Article 1 of Annex II to response, as extended by time on account of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Jus distance under Article 81(2) of those rules, tice — which provides that '[i]n order to expired on 2 October 1995. take account of distance, procedural time- limits for all parties save those habitually resident in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg shall be extended as follows: — for the King dom of Belgium: two days ...' — cannot be relied on by parties, such as the Commis sion, which have already appointed an agent with an address for service in Luxembourg.
50. The Court therefore held, by order of 14 February 1996, that FEBMA was time- barred from intervening in the appeal. 3 1
54. Koyo Seiko concludes that, by bringing this appeal two months and two days after the judgment was notified, the Commission is time-barred. II — Admissibility of the appeal
55. To my mind, the Court has settled this question in its judgment in Commission v BASF and Others, 3 3 a case which raised the same issue, by holding that 'in lodging its 51. In its response 3 2 Koyo Seiko claims that appeal the Commission was entitled to two the Commission's appeal is inadmissible. additional days, as provided for by the Decision on extensions of time-limits on account of distance [Article 1 of Annex II to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Jus tice] for persons having their habitual resi dence in Belgium'. 3 4
52. It claims that the Commission did not bring its appeal 'within two months of the notification of the decision appealed against', as required by Article 49 of the Statute of the 56. In this case, the judgment was notified to Court of Justice. the Commission on 10 May 1995. By lodg ing its appeal on 12 July 1995, namely two
31 — Case C-245/95 P Commission v NTN Corporation, Inter vention I, [1996] ECR I-553. 33 — Case C-137/92 P Commisńon v BASF [1994] ECR I-2555. 32 — Paragraphs 3 to 6. 34 — Commission v BASF, paragraph 42.
I-412
COMMISSION v NTN AND KOYO SEIKO
months and two days later, it complied with First limb: the concept of 'injury' in the con- the rules. text of a review
57. The objection of inadmissibility raised 59. The Commission 35 claims that, by by Koyo Seiko must therefore be rejected. applying the criteria set out in Article 4 of the basic regulation in order to assess the existence of injury in the context of a review — a procedure provided for in Articles 14 and 15 of that regulation — the Court of First Instance 36 committed an error of law.
III — Examination of the appellant's pleas
The first plea: misinterpretation of the con- 60. The Court of First Instance found as fol- cept of 'injury' in Articles 14 and 15 of the lows: 'Consequently, although the basic basic regulation regulation includes provisions regarding the factors which must be established before a review may be initiated, it does not include specific provisions regarding the injury, the existence of which must be established in a regulation modifying the existing duties'. 37 It concluded that, 'in the absence of specific provisions regarding the determination of injury, in the context of a review initiated under Articles 14 and 15 of the basic regu- 58. By its first plea, which has two limbs, lation, a regulation modifying existing anti- the Commission claims that the Court of dumping duties after such a procedure must First Instance misinterpreted the concept of establish the existence of injury within the 'injury' in Articles 14 and 15 of the basic meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic regu- regulation. First, it is necessary to establish lation'. 38 whether the Court of First Instance correctly interpreted the concept of 'injury' in the context of a review. Second, it should be examined whether, in that context, injury 35 — Paragraphs 12 to 31 of the appeal. 36 — Paragraphs 30 to 116 of the contested judgment. caused by a contraction in demand on the 37 — Ibid., paragraph 58. market must be taken into account. 38 — Ibid., paragraph 59.
I-413
OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-245/95 P
61. The Commission claims that Article 4 of 64. The respondents contend that the Court the basic regulation applies only in the con- of First Instance applied the appropriate test text of the original investigation. — namely the existence of injury or of a threat of injury within the meaning of Article 4 of the basic regulation.
62. It claims that a teleological interpretation 65. They claim that the concept of 'recur- of that regulation would produce a result rence of injury' is irrelevant inasmuch as it diametrically opposed to that reached by the was 'invented' for the purposes of the action: Court of First Instance. It states that the the Community legislation makes no refer- effectiveness of the provisions of the basic ence to it. That concept is therefore not the regulation providing for the organization of product of an interpretation of that legisla- separate procedures for the original investi- tion but of 'rewriting' it. 42 Besides, the ques- gation and for a review would be frustrated tion of recurrence of the injury was indeed if no legal implication was inferred from the dealt with by the Court of First Instance in existence of distinct procedures. the course of interpreting the concept of 'threat of injury'.
63. It submits that: '[t]he test to be applied 66. Lastly, they contend that the Court of in a review is therefore not whether there is First Instance rejected the first plea on still injury, but whether there would be account of the numerous factual errors com- injury if the duty were to be abolished and mitted by the Council. Since the question of whether the existing measure is effective in those findings cannot be reopened by the preventing the dumping or removing the Court of Justice, on the ground that it is not injury'. 39 It further submits that it follows a question of law, the plea must be rejected. from Articles 13 and 14 of the basic regu- lation that the object of a review investiga- tion must be 'to establish whether the mea- sures are still necessary and appropriate to remove the injury caused by the dumping'. 40 It concludes that 'it is necessary to assess 67. Taking the last argument first, I would what the situation would be in the absence note that the grounds put forward by the of measures and in particular whether a situ- Court, of First Instance based on the view ation would recur in which the dumping that the Council adopted measures on the causes injury'. 41 basis of incorrect or misleading findings may not be reviewed by the Court of Justice.
39 — Paragraph 23 of the appeal. 40 — Ibid., paragraph 24. 42 — Paragraph 15 of the response of NTN and Koyo Seiko Co 41 — Ibid., paragraph 25; my emphasis. Ltd.
I-414
COMMISSION v NTN AND KOYO SEIKO
That appraisal falls within the exclusive com- and clearly. As has been seen 44 that is, more- petence of the Court of First Instance. over, one of the objectives of that legislation.
68. Article 168a of the Treaty provides that an appeal is limited to points of law. That restriction is called to mind in the first para- graph of Article 51 of the Statute of the 71. As regards the procedural rules, the leg- Court of Justice, which specifies the grounds islature states, in the fourth, eighth and tenth on which an appeal may be based, namely recitals respectively 45 that it is desirable (a) ‘lack of competence of the Court of First 'that the rules for determining normal value Instance, a breach of procedure before it s h o u l d be presented clearly and in sufficient which adversely affects the interests of the detail …’; (b) ‘to lay down, in adequate detail appellant … [and] the infringement of Com- the manner in which the amount of any sub- munity law by the Court of First Instance’. sidy is to be determined’; and (c) ‘to lay The Court has concluded from this that ‘the down the procedures for anyone acting on appeal may rely only on grounds relating to behalf of a Community industry which con- the infringement of rules of law by the siders itself injured or threatened by dumped Court of First Instance, to the exclusion of or subsidized imports to lodge a complaint any appraisal of the facts …’. 43 …’.
69. I have three main reasons for consider- ing, contrary to the view taken by the Com- mission, that the Court of First Instance cor- rectly interpreted the concept of ‘injury’ in Articles 14 and 15 of the basic regulation. 72. As regards the definition of specific con- cepts, the seventh, ninth and fourteenth recitals, respectively, 46 provide as follows: ‘the term “dumping margin” should be clearly defined …’; ‘it seems appropriate to set out certain factors which may be relevant for the determination of injury’ and ‘to avoid 70. First, it appears from the general scheme confusion, the use of the terms “investiga- of that regulation that, when the legislature tion” and “proceeding” in this regulation intends to adopt a rule or define a rule or should be clarified’. draw a distinction, it must do so expressly
44 — Point 21, supra. 43 — See, for instance, Case C-283/90 P Vidrányi v Commission 45 — My emphasis. [1991] ECR I-4339, paragraph 12. 46 — Ibid.
I-415
OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-245/95 P
73. The Community legislature also clearly imports may lodge a written complaint'. In indicates when it intends that a distinction contrast, in the case of a review, the second should be made between rules of procedure subparagraph of Article 14(1) grants locus or between concepts. Thus, the very wording standi to the Member States, the Commis- of the 14th recital establishes 'a distinction' sion or an interested party. between the concepts of 'investigation' and 'proceeding', since it states that it is also an aim of the basic regulation to avoid 'confu- sion' arising between those terms. Then again, the 27th recital provides, in the proce- dural sphere, that specific periods must elapse before a review may be conducted. 77. Likewise, the heading and the wording of Article 14 of the basic regulation, which lays down the procedural rules to be fol- lowed, expressly indicate that the procedure to which that provision relates applies only to a review.
74. This rinding is borne out by the body of the basic regulation itself.
78. Neither the regulation at issue nor the basic regulation define the concept of 'recur- rence' of the injury as one specifically appli- cable in the context of a review investigation.
75. Thus, where specific procedural rules are applicable to the original proceeding or to a review, articles in the basic regulation set them out clearly and precisely. 79. Moreover, as far as the provisions gov- erning investigations are concerned, it is a fact not only that the actual terms 'original investigation' and 'review investigation' do not appear in the preamble to the basic regu- lation and appear only very exceptionally in the body of its provisions, 47 but also that the 76. This is so in the case of the rule relating legislature does not give any indication that to locus standi. In the case of the original it intends to lay down separate, specific rules proceeding, Article 5(1) of the basic regu- in regard to those different situations. lation provides that: '[a]ny natural or legal person, or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of a Commu- 47 — Only Article 16 refers to the concept of 'original investiga- nity industry which considers itself injured tion' whereas 'review investigation' is never used. On the other hand, the term 'investigation' appears in Articles 7, or threatened by dumped or subsidized 10, 12, 13 and 14.
I-416
COMMISSION v NTN AND KOYO SEIKO
80. Thus, the heading to Article 7 of the 84. Article 14 of the regulation, which lays basic regulation is 'Initiation and subsequent down the procedural rules to be followed in investigation', without otherwise specifying the event of a review, does not refer to the nature of the investigation in question, 'injury' or 'threat of injury', let alone to and the very wording of that provision uses 'recurrence of injury'. It merely indicates only the term 'investigation' without ever that a review is to take place if a Member indicating whether the original investigation State, the Commission or an interested party or a review investigation is meant. 'submits evidence of changed circumstances sufficient to justify the need for such review'. 51
81. Likewise, Article 14(2) of the basic regu- lation, which is wholly concerned with the 85. The Commission argues from the fact review procedure, refers, for the rules gov- that Article 14 does not refer to the existence erning the investigation, to Article 7, which of injury that the existence of injury within applies to the original proceeding. As a result the meaning of Article 4 of the basic regu- of that express reference, the Community lation does not have to be proved in the con- legislature makes it clear that the same rules text of a review as provided for in Articles 14 are to be followed in regard to the 'original' and 15 of that regulation. It adds that, and 'review' investigations. by taking the opposite view, the Court of First Instance adopted an inappropriate approach. 52 The Commission submits that to require the Community institutions, in a review, to prove the existence of injury, without taking into account the anti- dumping measures applied, would be tanta- mount to abolishing the anti-dumping meas- 82. N o t only is the concept of 'recurrence of ure as from its entry into force, since the aim injury' never explained, it is not even used in of such measures is precisely to prevent the basic regulation. injury. 53
86. In my view it is wholly logical that 83. Only the term 'injury' 48 is used in the Article 14 should make no reference to the preamble to that regulation and only the concept of injury. Contrary to what the terms 'injury' 49 and 'threat of injury' 50 are Commission appears to be implicitly argu- specified in its provisions. ing, the review procedure not only allows
48 — See the 9th, 11th and 19th recitals. 51 — Article 14(1), second subparagraph; my emphasis. 49 — Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15. 52 — Paragraph 29 of the appeal. 50 — Articles 4, 10, 12 and 15. 53 — Ibid.
I-417
OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-245/95 P
the Community institutions to adopt new 89. Second, the GATT agreements and the anti-dumping measures but also, as Article Anti-Dumping Code, in the light of which 14(3) of the basic regulation indicates, to the basic regulation must be interpreted, 58 repeal or annul the anti-dumping measures confirm the interpretation reached by the originally adopted. That is the reason why Court of First Instance. the second subparagraph of Article 14(1), unlike Article 5, 54 entitles a request for a review to be more widely made, that is to say by any interested party who submits evi- dence of changed circumstances.
90. Although Article 5 of the Anti-Dumping Code is headed 'Initiation and subsequent investigation', the rules governing the origi- nal and the subsequent investigations are identical.
87. That change in circumstances may be a resumption of sound commercial practices — which might justify the repeal or annul- ment of the anti-dumping measures initially adopted 55 — but also the continuation, or even the aggravation, of dumping in a given 91. Article 5(1), (2) and (3) of the Anti- sector and of the resultant injury — which Dumping Code provide as follows: would result in the imposition of new anti- dumping measures. 56
' 1 . An investigation to determine the exist- ence, degree and effect of any alleged dump- ing shall normally be initiated upon a written 88. Accordingly, as regards the second of request by or on behalf of the industry those hypotheses, Article 15(3) of the basic affected. The request shall include sufficient regulation provides that: '[w]here an inter- evidence of the existence of: ested party shows that the expiry of a meas- ure would lead again to injury or threat of injury, the Commission shall ... carry out a review of the measure'. 57
(a) dumping; 54 — See point 76, infra. 55 — Article 14(3) of the basic regulation. 56 — Ibid., Article 15(3). 57 — My emphasis. 58 — See points 12 and 13, infra.
I-418
COMMISSION v NTN AND KOYO SEIKO
(b) injury within the meaning of Article VI the earliest date on which in accordance of the General Agreement as interpreted with the provisions of this Code provi- by this Code; and sional measures may be applied, except in the cases provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 10 in which the authorities accept the request of the exporters.
(c) a causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged injury.
3. An application shall be rejected and an investigation shall be terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satis- fied that there is not sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify pro- If in special circumstances the authorities ceeding with the case. There should be concerned decide to initiate an investigation immediate termination in cases where the without having received such a request, they margin of dumping or the volume of shall proceed only if they have sufficient evi- dumped imports, actual or potential, or the dence on all points under (a) to (c) above. injury is negligible.' 59
92. By the same token, examination of Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Code con- 2. Upon initiation of an investigation and cerning injury shows that injury or threat of thereafter, the evidence of both dumping and injury must be determined in accordance injury caused thereby should be considered with the same criteria, irrespective of the simultaneously. In any event the evidence of purpose of the investigation — namely the both dumping and injury shall be considered 'initiation of a proceeding' or a 'subsequent simultaneously: investigation'.
(a) in the decision whether or not to initiate an investigation, and 93. Third, in Rima Eletrometalurgia v Council this Court held that 'the existence of sufficient evidence of dumping and the injury resulting therefrom is always a pre- requisite for the opening of an investigation,
(b) thereafter, during the course of the inves- tigation, starting on a date not later than 59 — My emphasis.
I-419
O P I N I O N OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-245/95 P
whether at the initiation of an anti-dumping 2176/84, 64 which concerns the criteria to be proceeding or in the course of a review of a taken into account in appraising the exist- regulation imposing anti-dumping duties'. 60 ence of injury in the original investigation, and held, in a paragraph of general scope, that: 'As regards the reduction in market share for imported electric motors, relied on by Neotype, it should be pointed out that, in accordance with Article 4(2) of Regulation 94. I do not consider that the Court N o 2176/84, the examination of injury must intended to confine the effects of the judg- take account of a whole series of factors and ment in Rima Eletrometalurgia v Council no single factor can in itself be decisive'. 65 and, in particular, the scope of paragraph 16 As a result, the Court held that the concept thereof, to the particular facts of that case, of injury must be assessed in accordance but that it wished its interpretation to be of with the same criteria in the original investi- general scope. gation and in an investigation initiated fol- lowing a request for a review.
95. In my view, paragraph 16 of that judg- ment must be appraised in the light of the judgments in Neotype Techmasbexport v Commission and Council 61 and Sermes v Directeur des Services des Douanes de Stras- 97. I would point out that Article 4(2) of bourg. 62 An examination of those judgments Regulation N o 2423/88 reproduces verbatim suffices to show that the specific circum- the wording of Article 4(2) of Regulation N o stances of the Rima Electrometalurgica case 2176/84. in no way influenced the scope which the Court intended to give to the approach which it adopted.
96. In the Neotype Techmasbexport case, 98. In the Sermes case, following a review which was concerned with adoption of a under Article 14 of Regulation N o 2176/84, definitive duty following a review, 63 the the Council adopted a regulation imposing a Court applied Article 4(2) of Regulation N o definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW but 60 — Case C-216/91 Rima Eletrometalurgia v Council [1993] ECR I-6303, paragraph 16. 61 — Joined Cases C-305/86 and C-160/87 Neotype Techmashex- port v Commission and Council [1990] ECR 1-2945. 64 — That regulation, which was in force at the material time, has 62 — Case C-323/88 Sermes v Directeur des Services des Douanes been repealed and replaced by Regulation N o 2423/88 (see de Strasbourg [1990] ECR I-3027. point 20, infra). 63 — See Neotype Techmasbexport v Commission and Council, 65 — Neotype Techmashexport v Commission and Council, para- paragraphs 6 to 9. graph 50.
I-420
COMMISSION v NTN AND KOYO SEIKO
not more than 75 kW, originating in various Second limb: the possibility of taking into countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet consideration, in the context of a review, the Union. The Serines company, from which existence of a period of recession in order to anti-dumping duties had been claimed under establish the threat of injury that regulation in respect of the import of electric motors, maintained that the Commu- nity institutions had not established that Community producers had suffered injury within the meaning of Article 4(2)(b) of Regulation N o 2176/84 66 as a result of the imports in issue. Giving judgment in the context of a review, the Court of Justice held that 'in accordance with Article 4(2) of the 100. The Commission 6 8 claims that the basic regulation, an examination of the injury Court of First Instance committed an error suffered by the Community must involve a of law in holding that, in a review, the Coun- series of factors no one of which can give cil could not rely on the existence of a period decisive guidance'. 67 of recession in the Community ball-bearing industry in order to establish the threat of injury. 69
101. In view of my reasoning so far and the conclusions which I have reached, 70 I submit that, as the Court of First Instance correctly observed, 71 that factor could not be validly taken into account by the Council without 99. It follows from the above observations infringing the last sentence of Article 4(1) of that, in the context of a review, when assess- the basic regulation, which provides as fol- ing whether the expiry of an anti-dumping lows: 'Injuries caused by other factors, such measure previously adopted would again as volume and prices of imports which are lead to injury or a threat of injury, the crite- not dumped or subsidized, or contraction in ria laid down by Article 4 of the basic regu- demand, which, individually or in combina- lation must be applied. Consequently, the tion, also adversely affect the Community first limb of the first plea, alleging an error of industry must not be attributed to the law by the Court of First Instance in apply- dumped or subsidized imports.' 72 ing the concept of 'injury' cannot be accepted. 68 — Paragraph 30 of the appeal. 69 — Paragraph 97 of the contested judgment. 70 — First limb of the first plea. 66 — Serines, paragraph 26. 71 — Paragraph 98 of the contested judgment. 67 — Ibid., paragraph 27. 72 — My emphasis.
I - 421
OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-245/95 P
102. I must therefore conclude that the fact that the first plea of the appeal must be Court of First Instance was right in law to rejected in itself affords confirmation that take the view that, in a review, the existence Article 1 of Regulation No 2849/92 should be of injury must be determined on the basis of annulled in so far as it imposes an anti- the factors exhaustively listed in Article 4(2) dumping duty on the respondents. and (3) of the basic regulation.
106. At the end of its consideration of the 103. In the light of the above considerations, first plea and after stating that '[i]n the light I submit that the first plea of the appeal must of those factors and bearing in mind, further- be rejected as the Court of First Instance did more, the misleading or inaccurate state- not commit any error of law. ments ... it is possible that in the absence of those errors of fact and law the Council would not have found that there was a threat of injury', 74 the Court of First Instance reaches the conclusion that: '[c]onsequently, The second plea: failure to comply with the the forms of order sought by the applicants time-limit for the investigation prescribed by should be granted and the contested regu- Article 7(9)(a) of the basic regulation lation annulled in so far as it affects them'. 75
104. In its second plea the Commission 107. While the Court of First Instance, after seems 73 to be asking the Court, in the alter- considering the second plea, states that '[t]he native, to set aside the contested judgment Council has therefore failed to demonstrate but only if Article 1 of Regulation N o to the satisfaction of the Court that the 2849/92 was also annulled on the ground of review proceeding was concluded in this case the infringement of Article 7(9)(a) of the within a reasonable period. Consequently the basic regulation considered by itself. plea of infringement of Article 7(9)(a) of the basic regulation is likewise well founded', 76 it does not conclude from this that the infringement of Article 7(9)(a) of the basic regulation also warrants the annulment of Article 1 of the regulation at issue, but that 'in the light of all those considerations Article 105. In my view, it follows from the very 1 of the contested regulation must be grounds of the contested judgment that the
74 — Paragraph 115 of the contested judgment. 73 — The Commission's observations in support of the second plea are not very clear (see, in particular, paragraphs 5, 7, 8 75 — Ibid., my emphasis. and 32 of those observations). 76 — Paragraph 124, my emphasis.
I-422
COMMISSION v N T N A N D KOYO SEIKO
annulled, in so far as it concerns the appli- 111. Advocate General Darmon 7 9 and cants. It is not necessary for the Court to rule Advocate General Tesauro 80 argued that fail- on the other pleas relied on by the applicants, ure to comply with Article 7(9)(a) of the nor to order the measures of inquiry sought basic regulation should not result automati- by Koyo Seiko in Case T-165/94.' 77 cally in the regulation's being annulled. However, since the Court did not consider that the duration of the investigations in question had to be regarded as 'unreason- able', it did not have to consider that ques- tion.
108. Consequently, I am of the opinion that the Court of First Instance did not draw any express conclusion from the infringement of Article 7 of the basic regulation as regards the validity or invalidity of the regulation at 112. I share the view of Advocate General issue. Consequently, it is unnecessary to con- Darmon and Advocate General Tesauro sider the second plea. essentially for two reasons.
113. First, the one-year period prescribed by the Community and international legislators 109. I shall, however, consider the second for the duration of the investigation is not a plea for the sake of completeness. firm time-limit.
114. Thus, the second sentence of Article 110. It should be borne in mind that the 7(9)(a) of the basic regulation merely pro- Court of Justice has never ruled on the vides that: 'conclusion [of the investigation] consequences of a failure to comply with should normally take place within one year the time-limit prescribed by Article 7(9)(a) of the initiation of the proceeding'. 81 The of the basic regulation, even though the use of the adverb 'normally' reduces the Court was invited to do so in Continentale imperative nature of the verb 'should' and Produkten Gesellschaft v Council 78 and emphasizes the non-binding nature of the Epicheiriseon Metalleftikon and Others v time-limit. Council.
79 — Point 10 of his Opinion in Continentale Produkten Gesell- 77 — Paragraph 125, my emphasis. schaft. 78 — Case 246/87 Continentale Produkten Gesellschaft v Council 80 — Point 9 of his Opinion in Epicheiriseon M e talle f tikon. [1989] ECR 1151. 81 — My emphasis.
I-423
OPINION OF MR LÉGER — CASE C-245/95 P
115. Likewise, Article 5(5) of the Anti- adopted by the competent institutions — Dumping Code provides that: 'investigations after having correctly followed the pro- shall, except in special circumstances, be con- cedure in other respects — is the proper pen- cluded within one year after their initia- alty to be imposed for failure to comply with tion'. 82 The international legislator has not the time-limit for the investigation and noth- explained what is to be understood by 'spe- ing more. cial circumstances'. In that way, it leaves a degree of discretion to the competent authorities as regards the period for carrying out an investigation.
119. Moreover, the interpretation which I suggest also reflects the principle adopted by 116. Second, nowhere in the basic regulation a number of Member States, according to or in the Anti-Dumping Code is there any which there can be no presumption that a reference to a penalty in the event of a failure penalty is to be imposed. In my view, that to comply with that time-limit. principle constitutes in the present case the necessary corollary to the general principle of legal certainty recognized by Community law.
117. The Court of Justice has inferred from the first point that the imprecise wording used does not allow the time-limit in Article 7 of the basic regulation to be construed as mandatory, but as a mere guideline. 83 120. Lastly, since the Court has held that this time-limit is merely a guideline, a failure to comply with it cannot be equated to an 'infringement of an essential procedural requirement' within the meaning of the sec- 118. Since the Court has held that the lack ond paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty. of precision of the wording of Article 7 of the basic regulation does not allow the time- limit laid down in it to be construed as man- datory, I consider that, a fortiori, in the absence of any reference to a penalty, the Court cannot construe the provisions as meaning that annulment of the final decision 121. In the light of the whole of the forego- ing, I am of the opinion that annulment of 82 — Ibid. the regulation at issue cannot constitute the 83 — Consistent case-law of the Court of Justice (see, in particu- proper penalty for a mere infringement of lar, the judgments cited by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 119 of the contested judgment). Article 7 of the basic regulation.
I - 424
COMMISSION v NTN AND KOYO SEIKO
Costs of Justice the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs in proceedings between the Community institutions and individuals. Consequently, the Commission, 122. Under the first subparagraph of Article as appellant, should be ordered to pay the 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court costs of the appeal.
Conclusion
123. H a v i n g regard t o the foregoing observations, I p r o p o s e that the C o u r t should:
(1) dismiss t h e appeal;
(2) o r d e r t h e appellant t o p a y t h e costs of t h e appeal.
I-425